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1611th MEETING: 12 DECEMBER 1971

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Sunday, 12 December 1971, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. I. B. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1611)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 12 December 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10444).

Adoption of the agenda

1. The PRESIDENT: Today I received a letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States requesting the President of the Council to convene a meeting of the Security Council immediately. That request is contained in document S/10444, which has been circulated to the members of the Council.

2. The provisional agenda of this meeting is before the Council in document S/Agenda/1611. If I hear no objection, I shall consider the agenda adopted.

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 12 December 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10444)

3. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council will recall that at a previous meeting [1606th meeting] the Council decided to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to participate in the consideration of the item currently under discussion before the Council without the right to vote. In accordance with that decision, and with the consent of the Council, I shall invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Swaran Singh (India) and Mr. Z. A. Bhutto (Pakistan) took places at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT: The Council also decided at a previous meeting [1607th meeting] to extend invitations to the representatives of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia to take the places reserved for them in the Council chamber, on the understanding that they would be invited to take a place at the Council table when it was their turn to address the Council. Accordingly, I shall, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia to take the seats reserved for them in the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia) and Mr. J. M. Baroodi (Saudi Arabia) took places in the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The first name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of the United States.

6. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): First, I have an inquiry that I should like to make of the President. The resolution of the General Assembly [resolution 2793 (XXVI)] requests the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council of the replies which he has received on this matter. Has the Security Council been informed of any replies elicited following the resolution of the General Assembly?

7. The PRESIDENT: I shall ask the Under-Secretary-General to reply on behalf of the Secretary-General.

8. Mr. KUTAKOV (Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs) (*translation from Russian*): On behalf of the Secretary-General, I wish to inform the members of the Security Council that immediately after the adoption of resolution 2793 (XXVI) by the General Assembly on 7 December 1971, the Secretary-General communicated the text of the resolution to the Governments of India and Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan replied in a letter dated 9 September 1971, which is published in document S/10440. The Government of India replied in a letter dated 12 December 1971, which is published in document S/10445. The documents are being prepared and will be distributed at approximately 9 p.m.

9. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

10. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, I thought we had agreed that you would inform the members of the Security

Council that, in view of the urgency with which the Council meeting was convened and the need for the members of the Security Council to study the problem which the United States representative will put before us, today's meeting would be limited to hearing his statement and that, if the parties wished to speak, they would be given the opportunity to do so, after which the meeting would be adjourned. However, there has been no such statement from you. What does this mean?

11. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the United States was given the floor because he had submitted the letter calling for an immediate meeting of the Council. Therefore, he has the right to explain to the Council why he felt it necessary that the Council should hold a meeting immediately. It is my hope that we would then hear the parties concerned and, depending on the situation, we could decide on further action at that stage. It is hoped that the further action would be in accordance with the line which the representative of the Soviet Union has stated. I hope that this will satisfy the representative of the Soviet Union and that we can proceed.

12. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I should like to make it clear that I did not deny the right of the United States representative to speak; that is the right of every representative. I spoke only of the agreement which I understood had been reached.

13. The PRESIDENT: Before calling on the representative of the United States, I would assure the representative of the Soviet Union that the understanding which was reached will be followed, but the decision to follow it will be taken at a later stage. The understanding is that the representative of the United States will speak, after which we shall assess the situation and see what further statements will be made.

14. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The representative of the Soviet Union has just said that there was an understanding. The Chinese delegation has had no part in that understanding.

15. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): At the outset, on behalf of the United States Government, let me say that we know of no understanding, and I shall certainly proceed on the basis of the ground rules just outlined by the President. We have a draft resolution we wish to present. We feel there is much business for the Council to do. We were not a party to any understanding and if any other representative here was I would certainly yield to him so that we may know about it. But on behalf of the United States Government I can officially say that we were not approached on any such understanding.

16. I have asked for the Security Council to reconvene because it is essential that this body promptly and effectively deals with the threat to international peace and security which is continuing in the subcontinent. In asking for this immediate meeting of the Council the United States Government today made the following statement:

"On 7 December the General Assembly by a vote of 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions, called on India and

Pakistan to institute an immediate cease-fire and to withdraw troops from each other's territory. Pakistan has accepted the resolution. India has refused. In view of India's defiance of world opinion, expressed by such an overwhelming majority, the United States is now returning the issue to the Security Council. With East Pakistan virtually occupied by Indian troops, a continuation of the war would take on increasingly the character of armed attack on the very existence of a Member State of the United Nations. All permanent members of the Security Council have an obligation to end this threat to world peace on the most urgent basis. The United States will co-operate fully in this effort."

17. This is a war that need never have taken place. The opportunity for progress towards a peaceful accommodation was, in our view, available. It was refused by the Indian Government, just as India has spurned the world Organization by not replying to the resolution of the General Assembly.

18. Let me first focus on events in March of this year. It was on 25 March that the central Government of Pakistan decided to use force in East Pakistan. The United States has never supported or condoned that action, which was followed by a tragic series of subsequent events. We regretted that action, and we took measures promptly to stop certain military and economic aid that was going to Pakistan.

19. As I said before, the United States has never supported this action in any way. We have always recognized that the events of 25 March had a very important impact on India, and we have always recognized that the influx of refugees into India broadened the danger of communal strife. We fully appreciated both the social and the economic strain the influx of refugees imposed on India. The fact that the use of force in East Pakistan in March can be characterized as a tragic mistake does not, however, justify the actions of India in intervening militarily and placing in jeopardy the territorial integrity and political independence of its neighbour Pakistan.

20. I want to describe to the members of this Council in some detail how we viewed the situation a few weeks before Prime Minister Gandhi came to Washington on 4 November, and what we did to try to resolve matters peacefully. We were prepared at that time to take at face value the Indian statement that India preferred a peaceful resolution of the matter to war. We asked ourselves how we could be helpful if in fact India's intentions were peaceful. In the context of that visit the Indian Government was informed of four things. First, the small trickle of military spare parts which had remained in the pipeline to Pakistan was terminated. It could no longer be said that this insignificant flow could in any way be considered a continuing irritant in the relations between the United States and India. We have thereby maintained a climate of confidence in United States-Pakistan relations. That climate of confidence in turn helped bring about Pakistan's co-operation with the United Nations relief efforts and with United States proposals which could have moved matters to the conference table rather than to the battlefield. Secondly, the United States had pledged additional financial

and economic assistance for the care of the refugees, making it clear that in addition to the \$90 million already contributed to India in this regard the President had asked for an additional \$250 million for relief in the area. Thirdly, we felt that, important as financial resources were, some practical step was needed to defuse the situation. We knew that the Indian Government had, some two weeks earlier, already rejected a prior United States proposal for mutual withdrawal of forces. Therefore, after full consultations with President Yahya Khan, we were in a position to tell the Indian Government in the context of the visit that the Pakistan Government was willing to make a unilateral step of withdrawal first, provided it could be assured that some subsequent reciprocal step would be taken by India. I would stress that it was a unilateral step of withdrawal about which we were given assurances. India's response was a public call for the Pakistan Government to pull its forces out of its own territory in East Pakistan. Fourthly, we were particularly concerned that some practical step also be taken toward political accommodation. We accepted the Indian view that a step for military disengagement in and of itself was not enough.

21. Therefore, during the visit the Indian Government was informed that after discussions with the United States the Pakistan Government was prepared to do the following: its representatives were willing to meet with an appropriate representative of the Awami League from Dacca; alternatively, the Pakistan Government was prepared to meet with an appropriate representative from Calcutta of the so-called Bangla Desh; it was also willing to consider meeting with representatives designated by Mujibur Rahman.

22. Given the extremely difficult nature of the problem we had some reason to feel, after the high level United States-Indian talks in November, that, while all the Indian conditions obviously had not been met, this series of proposals could begin to turn the cycle away from violence to a peaceful settlement, taking into account the aspirations of the people concerned. These proposals also proved to be an acid test of the intentions of the Government of India.

23. The Indian response to the first two proposals was rejection. As to the third proposal, while at first India seemed very interested, it again took a consistent position that the only step towards political accommodation that was feasible was the release of Mujibur Rahman and negotiations between him and Yahya Khan.

24. This is one step which President Yahya Khan did not feel able to make. We believe that it was much more important for a dialogue to begin without pre-conditions. Because India was unresponsive to these diplomatic efforts, I said the following in the General Assembly on 7 December:

"We have said before, and we repeat, that the beginning of the crisis goes back to the use of force by Pakistan in March of this year, but since the beginning of the crisis it should also be clear that India bears the major responsibility for broadening the crisis by spurning the efforts of the United Nations to become involved, even in a humanitarian way, in relation to the refugees, spurning the proposals such as the Secretary-General's offer of

good offices, which could have helped in defusing the crisis, spurning proposals that could have begun the process of dialogue leading towards a political accommodation."¹

I now reaffirm this judgement categorically on behalf of the United States Government.

25. Now, India has gone further. With the support of two Soviet vetoes here, it has previously prevented the Security Council from adopting resolutions calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces. Twice we acted in this Council. One hundred and four countries in the General Assembly—104 countries—supported precisely this course of action. But in defiance of this expression of world opinion, India again said no. They continued to prefer the use of force to peaceful means. India, which over the years has sought to reflect, inside and outside this chamber, the moral force of the world, the very precepts for which its great leaders Gandhi and Nehru stood, is now disregarding the Charter of the United Nations.

26. And now developments have reached a point in the area where Indian military actions have not only led to virtual occupation of East Pakistan, but to a war which is increasingly taking on the earmarks of an attack on the very life of a State Member of this Organization. The question now arises as to India's further intentions. For example, does India intend to use the present situation to destroy the Pakistan army in the West? Does India intend to use the counter-attacks in the West as a pretext to annex territory in West Pakistan? Is its aim to take parts of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, contrary to the Security Council resolutions of 1948, 1949 and 1950?

27. If this is not India's intention, then a prompt disavowal is required. The world has a right to know what the intentions of India are.

28. Pakistan's aims have become clear. It has indeed accepted the resolution the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 104 to 11. My Government has several times in the last week asked the Indian Government this question concerning its intentions and I regret to inform the Council that the replies have been unsatisfactory and not reassuring. This Council has a responsibility to demand, as a first step, immediate compliance by India with the resolutions on cease-fire and withdrawal. It should also insist that India give the members of the Council a clear and unequivocal assurance that it does not intend to annex Pakistan territory and change the *status quo* in Kashmir contrary to the United Nations resolutions. Otherwise, India will be injecting a new and more serious dimension to the risks and the hostilities in the subcontinent.

29. I am submitting the following draft resolution which I will read to the Security Council. As the members of the Council will see, it is in substance essentially the same as the resolution that was adopted in the General Assembly with the support of 104 Members. Pakistan has accepted the resolution and we urge India to end its defiance of this

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2002nd meeting, para. 96.

overwhelming world opinion, to support the resolution and help bring about an immediate end to what the United Nations overwhelmingly feels is a senseless war.

30. It was in this effort to try again, following the instructions of the General Assembly, to solve this conflict through peaceful means that we are submitting the draft resolution that I should like to read at this point:

[The speaker read out the text of a draft resolution subsequently circulated as document S/10446.]

31. It was almost a week ago that the General Assembly adopted a resolution by 104 votes to 11. Since then the Security Council has been inactive. There have been, I expect, some consultations between some parties, but there have been no intensified consultations; indeed, the Security Council has almost not been seized of the matter at all. Before a week has elapsed, it seems to us that the Security Council should now, here, urgently, address itself once again to this question of war and peace; address itself to the question of cease-fire and withdrawal; address itself in the light of a week of destruction and untold loss of life on both sides, address itself in a statesmanlike fashion, to this draft resolution, which was so overwhelmingly adopted by the rest of the General Assembly and which we feel merits the sincere and urgent consideration of everyone at this table.

32. The PRESIDENT: I call on the Foreign Minister of India.

33. Mr. Swaran SINGH (India): I agree with the representative of the United States of America that this is a war which need not have occurred. The representative of the United States of America seemed to have rushed to the conclusion that India has not yet replied to the Secretary-General's communication, and he has chosen to ignore the Secretary-General's intimation, given to the Security Council, that a reply from India has already been received.

34. This is the second time within a fortnight that the Security Council is meeting to deal with the tragic events in South Asia. The concern of the international community regarding this conflagration and its anxiety to stem it as early as possible are understandable. The deliberations in the Security Council between 4 and 6 December [1606th to 1608th meetings] and later in the General Assembly on 7 December [2003rd plenary meeting] under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution [resolution 377 (V)] indicated the common concern of all with the situation which is causing untold suffering to millions of people in my part of the world.

35. But we should frankly ask ourselves—and I would be failing in my duty if I did not ask the Council—if this common concern extends to all aspects of the situation, its causes and development to the present stage. The situation today is the culmination of the sufferings brought upon the people of Bangla Desh because of the unwillingness of the rulers of Pakistan to respond to the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the people who formerly were part of the State of Pakistan.

36. My Government has taken note of the resolution which the General Assembly adopted at the end of its discussion on the situation in Bangla Desh and on the Indian subcontinent [resolution 2793 (XXVII)]. While it constitutes a testimony to the unimpeachable concern of the United Nations for the cause of peace and the good intentions of most of the world community, it is also, in our minds, an acknowledgement of a fundamental and unfortunate limitation from which the United Nations suffers in dealing with such situations.

37. The United Nations had been faced for over nine months with a most challenging problem and the solution which it suggested was—if I may say so—unrealistic. My country finds it all the more regrettable because India is totally committed to the objectives and ideals of the Charter. If the international community had willed and acted in concert in time we would not have faced today the clouds of war which have now burst over the Indian subcontinent.

38. While the General Assembly made an appeal for cease-fire and withdrawal, there appears to have been no deliberation on whether such a cease-fire and withdrawal, by itself, would meet the immediate problems that today confront the people of India and Bangla Desh, problems which we have attempted to meet with restraint, caution and peaceful means; problems which are not of our creation and which we have had to face over the last nine months.

39. The compound tragedy originates in the denial, by coercive authority and brutality, of the legitimate and declared aspirations of the people of Bangla Desh. My country has been accused of having ulterior motives and subversive intentions against the neighbouring State of Pakistan. There have been consistent attempts at projecting the tragedy of Bangla Desh as a creation of India and a dispute between India and Pakistan. Those attempts have, to my mind, unfortunately succeeded in adding another dimension to the struggle of the people of Bangla Desh against the Government of West Pakistan. This new dimension is the confrontation today between the armed forces of India and Pakistan.

40. It is a matter of grief for us that a military confrontation has come about. We believe that it has occurred because of the failure of the international community to act upon the realities of the situation as it developed and to meet it with objectivity and promptness in a manner which would have prevented it from deteriorating into this present stage.

41. My delegation has endeavoured, since the eruption of the crisis in what was East Pakistan on 25 March 1971, to put the problem in perspective in world capitals as well as here at the United Nations. The effort was made by us at the highest possible level; and though the genesis of the problem was explained and the prognosis of its implications outlined repeatedly, we regret to say that the international community failed to understand the problem in terms of its fundamental causation and thus found itself unable to remedy it at its root.

42. Since we are meeting today at a moment of deep crisis on the sub-continent, with violence and war stalking the

land, the events which led to the present tragedy bear repetition. I feel compelled to recount these details as it is imperative to remove misunderstandings regarding the reasons for the present crisis, if the problem is to be solved decisively and in a constructive manner.

43. The immediate origin of the crisis occurred some time between December 1970 and March 1971. After 23 years of unrepresentative rule and 13 years of military dictatorship which were matched by continuous economic exploitation and political discrimination by the vested interests of Pakistan against the East, the first ever free general elections were organized in Pakistan by the Government of President Yahya Khan in December 1970.

44. We welcomed the elections in the hope that apart from restoring the long-suppressed rights of the people of Pakistan, they would also open a new chapter of improved relations with this important neighbour of ours.

45. Our hope found further confirmation in the electoral victory of political parties, both in the eastern and western wings of Pakistan, that really embodied the aspirations of the people of those regions.

46. This positive political development in Pakistan was, however, prevented from evolving to its logical, legal and political conclusion by the decision of the military régime of Pakistan to reject callously the clearly expressed demand of the East Bengali people for autonomy. This deep-seated urge found incontrovertible expression in the massive victory of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League, not only in elections to the Provincial Assembly, but in elections to the National Assembly of Pakistan in which the Awami League commanded an absolute majority by winning 167 seats out of 313 seats. The Awami League won 98 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly allotted to East Pakistan. It had 167 out of a total of 169 seats.

47. Instead of transferring power to the duly elected representatives of the people, President Yahya Khan repeatedly postponed the convening of the national and provincial legislatures until mid-March.

48. The final preface to the brutal suppression of the declared wishes of the people of East Bengal took the form of a pretended negotiation between President Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the early part of March 1971, while in fact the Government of West Pakistan was undertaking a massive augmentation of its armed forces in East Bengal to terrorize and suppress the people of that area.

49. The climax of the conspiracy against the people of Bangla Desh occurred on the infamous night of 25 March, when the West Pakistani army went into action against them. Events took a catastrophic course and an international problem with explosive potentialities was created overnight. Informed international opinion, as reflected in the media and at least some Governments, recognized this straight away. But the international community as a whole responded to the humanitarian aspects of the problem sooner than to its political and other implications.

50. The Secretary-General issued his appeal for relief to the refugees on 19 May 1971. His memorandum to the President of the Security Council was sent on 20 July 1971 [*S/10410*,² para. 3].

51. In the meanwhile, a massive exodus into India of the people of Bangla Desh commenced on the night of 25 March, and still continues. This is an exodus unprecedented in known history across an international frontier. The threat to our security, stability and economy by what has been called the massive civilian invasion of refugees into India cannot be determined in tangible terms.

52. I had explained to the General Assembly the implications of the brutal and continuing suppression of the people of East Bengal by the West Pakistani army, in terms of its grave socio-economic-political consequences to India in my statement on 27 September this year [*1940th meeting*]. I had underlined that the exodus of East Bengal refugees into India had created intolerable demographic pressures on the most densely populated neighbouring states and territories of India. I had pointed out that the entire administration of the Indian states in which these refugees came had to be geared to the relief of these refugees. The economic implications of the number of refugees, which now stands at 10 million, and the generated economic pressure on India can be discerned from the fact that our Finance Minister has made two additional provisions of nearly 330 crores of rupees, or approximately \$500 million, in our annual budget for the year 1971-72, which ends on 31 March 1972. A smaller State would have collapsed in the face of such an influx.

53. Social friction, the fear of epidemics and the possibilities of communal and other tensions had to be countered. The refugees became an incalculable hindrance to our economic development for the years to come. Their continuing exodus, without any hopes of their return, was a destructive obstacle to the very socio-political fabric of India.

54. Pakistan's repressive policies, compelling millions to flee in terror into our territory, posed a threat to the fundamental principles on which we have tried to build our society and to the hard earned stability that the Indian people had achieved by the labours of over a quarter of a century.

55. Our problems were accentuated by a deliberate and false propaganda offensive by the Government of Pakistan, first questioning the existence of the refugees and then ultimately describing them as a few miscreants and secessionists put up by India. When the facts became too manifest to be questioned, Pakistan then resorted to questioning their numbers as mentioned by India.

56. The people of Bangla Desh resorted to the only course open to them in the face of the violent and repressive denial of their aspirations, accompanied by unimaginable terror, brutalization and genocide. They became totally alienated from West Pakistan and took the decision to declare their independence on 10 April 1971.

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*.

57. The West Pakistani military régime continued in its unimaginative, callous and fatal course. Things went from bad to worse. Mr. Bhutto, who now leads the Pakistan delegation, himself acknowledged in July that the military could not solve Pakistan's problems. In spite of the counsels of reason by the international community, in spite of the appeals of the Secretary-General to seek a political reconciliation taking due account of the welfare and fundamental human rights of the people of East Bengal, in spite of the humanitarian response of the international community to the refugee problem, in spite of the restrained, non-interfering and humanitarian reaction of the Government of India, the Government of West Pakistan refused to come to terms with the people of Bangla Desh and their already elected representatives led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

58. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was, from the beginning, imprisoned in West Pakistan and subjected to a secret military trial carrying, we are told, the penalty of death. We do not even know whether he is still alive, but we do know that no one has been able to contact him.

59. The policy of repression and genocide continued unabated over the last nine months. In his statements and pronouncements, President Yahya Khan, since last May, refused deliberately to deal with the basic problem which he himself had created; on the contrary, he banned the Awami League, arbitrarily disqualified a large number of the elected representatives of the provincial and national assemblies of East Bengal, and continued to hold the people of Bangla Desh to ransom at gunpoint. To confuse the issue, Pakistan shifted the blame on to India. To confuse the issue further, Pakistan put out rumours that the popular Awami League policies and decisions were inspired by the Government of India. India was accused of encouraging secession. The widespread resistance movement which emerged in Bangla Desh in the face of Pakistani repression was described as a subversive force organized by India. An attempt was made to counter the mounting international pressure to recognize the aspirations of the people of Bangla Desh by declarations of so-called amnesty—which did not cover the elected representatives of the people—and by the imposition of a civilian government in East Bengal constituted by quislings and unrepresentative politicians who had even lost the elections in December 1970.

60. These policies of the Government of Pakistan had the inevitable consequence of alienating even further the people of Bangla Desh, strengthening their determination to break the colonial yoke of the West Pakistani régime and channelling the freedom movement in a manner which would inevitably lead to emergence of Bangla Desh as an independent nation. Pakistan's military action, the snuffing-out of all human rights and the reign of terror which continues, have shocked the conscience of mankind. The popular revolt against these actions has a hard core of fighters who are former members of the East Bengal regiment and the East Pakistan Rifles, who took the cause of their people to their hearts. They were joined by thousands of highly motivated young men determined to end the tyranny once and for all.

61. During the general debate in the Assembly in September, I had attempted to explain the developing situation

in its true perspective and I had appealed to the international community and to the United Nations to persuade the Government of Pakistan to see reason and to evolve a political settlement with the already-elected representatives of the people of East Bengal. I had stressed that in such an atmosphere of strife and ferment, the United Nations remains the only hope for States and peoples; I had pointed out that it is in such moments that we all can prove that the ideals of the Charter are not static norms to which we rededicate ourselves for form's sake every year. I had forewarned the international community of our apprehensions that if, in spite of our declared commitments to the Charter, we found ourselves unable to face realities in the face of crisis born of violations of the very principles of the Charter, violations which were deliberate and calculated as they are in the case of Bangla Desh, then the United Nations would indeed be failing in its fundamental purpose, that it would be questioning its very existence and its principles.

62. It was our earnest hope that the incalculably grave consequences of the crisis created by West Pakistan in the East would be comprehended by the nations of the world, and that their undoubted influence would be brought to bear on the Government of West Pakistan to restore the fundamental rights of the people of East Bengal to them. Our hopes that the counsels of reason would prevail were, however, not fulfilled. The consequence is the conflict that we face today.

63. It is essential that in seeking a solution to the current conflict, the Security Council take note of the events which led to this crisis. I shall come a little later to the immediate genesis of the problem over the last few days.

64. I would, however, be failing in my duty to the Council if I did not draw its attention to the consistent pattern of antagonism and hostility which has characterized Pakistan's policies towards India since the emergence of India into independence. The origins of the present conflict are to be found in the psychosis of hatred and war, continuously whipped up by the rulers of Pakistan, of which India has been repeatedly the victim.

65. We have repeatedly been accused of desiring the break-up of Pakistan, of nurturing not merely political but social, communal and cultural antagonism against the people of Pakistan, of having been parties to alleged subversions against this neighbouring State of ours. I could resort to an interpretative and even rhetorical rebuttal of these allegations, but we all will agree that facts unmistakably reveal intentions even better than do arguments.

66. The leaders and the people of India accepted the desire of the Muslim majority areas of India to constitute themselves into a separate State, the State of Pakistan, nearly 25 years ago. But India, for its part, refused to accept the two-nation theory on which the demand for Pakistan was thought to be based. The result was that, at the time of the partition, India continued to have nearly 40 million Muslim citizens, whose number today is nearly 70 million. These are honoured and equal citizens of the secular, democratic Republic of India. The partition of the subcontinent was accepted by us as an irrevocable political

fact essential for the future welfare of the peoples inhabiting it. If there was any desire to prevent the creation of Pakistan or to question its separate existence, the people of India had sufficient political means to prevent the creation of Pakistan. Students of history will acknowledge the veracity of this assertion. Hardly had the ink dried on the agreements arranging for the partition of the country when we were faced with brazen aggression by our new neighbour, in Kashmir in 1947—a few months after the emergence of India and Pakistan as independent countries—an aggression motivated by a wish for territorial aggrandizement.

67. While we tried to stem the aggression, we brought it to the notice of the United Nations. Though the fact of aggression was proved and the identity of the aggressor incontrovertibly established, the United Nations, due to reasons which are incomprehensible, has not yet been able to arrange for the evacuation of the occupied parts by the West Pakistani troops. Though an uneasy peace prevailed in the area, India continued its attempts at reconciliation and a building up of relations with Pakistan on positive and constructive lines. In spite of the military conflict imposed upon us soon after partition, we unilaterally honoured our economic and financial obligations towards the new State of Pakistan, in glaring contrast to Pakistan's refusal to honour its commitments in this regard, regarding assets, evacuee property and border arrangements. We continued our efforts at increasing economic and cultural relations. Even at great sacrifice we were willing to share our resources with our neighbour; an outstanding example of this was our agreement to share our river water resources with Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty of 19 September 1960. The provisions of the Treaty constituted a drain on our own resources. While our policy of reconciliation continued, the response from Pakistan remained negative, even abrasive.

68. The Government of Pakistan undertook a deliberate policy of pushing out its minority communities into India. Substantial sections of minority population were either massacred or driven into India from West Pakistan in the wake of partition. An unending trek of refugees from East Bengal into India started in 1947 where the minority communities were more populous. Pakistan made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to convert its aggression in Kashmir into an instrument of harassment of India in the chancelleries of the world and in the United Nations. When those attempts failed it reverted to the naked use of arms against India in 1965, first, by undertaking armed intrusions into the Rann of Kutch, and indulging in an all-out unprovoked aggression against India in Kashmir. India again came to the United Nations in the hope of finding redress. The events of the conflict of August and September 1965 in Kashmir, and the spirit of reconciliation which the Government and people of India showed at Tashkent following the conflict, are well known to the international community.

69. If India at any time had harboured design of territorial aggrandizement in what is now Bangla Desh, those designs would surely have been manifested in the conflicts of 1947-1948 and 1965.

70. Our expectation was that the agreement at Tashkent³ would open a new chapter of friendship and co-operation between India and Pakistan. Our hope was that the spirit of Tashkent would overcome the bitterness of the past. It was this hope that led the Government of India to send a high level delegation consisting of three Cabinet Ministers and five Principal Secretaries of the Government of India to Rawalpindi early in 1966 to work out the details of implementing the agreement of Tashkent. This delegation faced an intransigent and unco-operative Government of Pakistan. India still remained understanding and felt that some unilateral action on India's part would persuade that Government to take the hand of friendship extended by India. India unilaterally withdrew the trade embargo against Pakistan after the 1965 conflict. We returned all the goods and properties. We proposed the signing of a mutual no-war declaration. Pakistan's response to each of those gestures was, unfortunately, negative. The attitude of recrimination and hostility continued. Not only in bilateral relations, but every internal crisis in Pakistan born out of the unwisdom of the successive Governments of Pakistan continued to be laid at the door of India, holding India responsible by some curious logic.

71. The picture will not be complete if I do not recount how the successive régimes of Pakistan, dominated by the western wing, treated the people of East Bengal. To put it in the words of the acting President and Prime Minister of Bangla Desh:

"It is well known that the people of Bangla Desh were subjected to a long period of ruthless colonial domination, systematic exploitation and gross political and cultural discrimination by the successive régimes."

72. This pattern of discrimination and exploitation was evident in the beginning years themselves. Since 1948 the wish of the people of East Bengal to have their own language—Bengali—as one of the official and working languages of Pakistan has been consistently rejected. The demand for an equal share in the wealth of the country, in holding responsibility for the administration of the nation, was rejected. When this intolerance of the West Pakistani ruling circle resulted in the emergence of regional movements for meeting the legitimate economic and political aspirations of the people of East Bengal, the movements were suppressed with police techniques and coercive authority. When political parties, representing the wish of the people of East Bengal, formed governments on the basis of local elections, they were dismissed on flimsy political and legal pretexts and subjected to martial law and military rule.

73. The history of political developments in East Bengal and the relations between the two wings of Pakistan from 1952 to 1971 is a sad and intolerable chapter characterized by intolerance, repression and the ruthless denial of the fundamental rights and liberties of the majority of the population of Pakistan, the 75 million people of East Bengal. The political inequity of this is compounded further when one realizes, as I said, that the people of East

³ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966*, document S/7221.

Bengal constitute nearly 60 per cent of the total population of Pakistan. They earn most of the foreign exchange for Pakistan, on which economic development depends. It was the agricultural and industrial resources of East Bengal that sustained Pakistan's economy, and yet the fruits of the resources of East Bengal were not available to them. They served only one purpose: the perpetuation in power of an unrepresentative business-cum-military ruling circle and the ensuring of their continued prosperity at the cost of the sufferings of the millions in Bangla Desh.

74. Not only were their political aspirations denied, their will thwarted, their liberty suppressed, even the integrity and *bona fides* of their intentions were questioned by the unimaginative rulers of West Pakistan; their patriotism to their country was questioned. The legitimate expression of their grievances was characterized as conspiracies hatched by India. Their political movements were ignored and each of their protests was perversely described as an Indian machination.

75. This policy of political discrimination and repression became unbearable not only in East Bengal but also in West Pakistan. The result was the political upheaval in Pakistan, led by the present representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Mr. Bhutto, which resulted in the former President Ayub Khan's handing over power to President Yahya Khan, who assumed the direction of the affairs of his country with a welcome promise of returning power to the people of the country.

76. India watched the developments in Pakistan during the elections of 1970 with expectations and, I would add, also hope. When President Yahya Khan announced the decision to hold free elections and agreed to the Awami League of East Bengal's fighting elections on its declared and well-known manifesto for provincial autonomy within a federal structure of Pakistan, we had every hope that a new era of democracy and freedom was due to emerge in Pakistan and also that relations between India and Pakistan would take a turn for the better, on more constructive lines. The elections were held in December 1970 and what followed is aptly described in a communication from the acting President and Prime Minister of Bangla Desh to the Prime Minister of India dated 15 October 1971. This has been published and distributed widely:

"Over the last several years our people had waged a peaceful and non-violent struggle for the attainment of our basic rights. Even after the successive postponements of the convening of the National Assembly by the military régime of Pakistan, we did not resort to violence but continued our non-violent struggle. The military rulers of Pakistan took advantage of this to gain time to employ the rules of so-called negotiations till the night of 24 March while they were augmenting their military strength. Their plans became visible to the whole world on the black night of 25 March when they let loose their army under a premeditated plan on the innocent and defenceless men, women and children of our country. They made a special target of the intellectuals, the *élite* of the youth and the leaders of the workers, peasants and students. This left us with no alternative but to resort to arms."

77. I should like to add that these aspects were noted in one of the public statements made by no less a person than the distinguished leader of the Pakistani delegation.

78. That is the historical background on which the tragedy on the Indian subcontinent has been enacted since March last; I recounted some details of this in the earlier part of my statement. But the tragedy had to reach greater depths in terms of human sufferings, in terms of death and violence. By the middle of October the continuing influx of refugees from East Bengal had swelled their number in India to nearly 9.5 million. Apart from being a testimony to the continuing repression and brutality of the West Pakistan army, it also became the cause for a spontaneous and strong resistance movement within Bangla Desh itself.

79. We were informed by the acting President and Prime Minister of Bangla Desh that nearly half the territory of East Bengal was under their effective military and civil control at that time. That was borne out by the pronouncements of President Yahya Khan during the month of October, when he repeated his assertions of July and August that any success of the Mukti Bahini, the freedom-fighters of East Bengal, would be considered by him as an act of aggression which would justify his having "total and open war against India". His pronouncements to the press from that stage on became progressively more bellicose and assumed a threatening posture against India.

80. On 12 October, in an address to the country, he blamed India for encouraging what he described as the "secessionist" movement in East Bengal. Within a few days a massive build-up of the Pakistani army, including armour and artillery, against India's western frontiers, including the areas adjacent to the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, was organized by the West Pakistan military régime. It is relevant to mention that the inquiries of the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan regarding these troop movements were met with a blatant falsehood. He was informed that the troop movements were purely for training purposes.

81. India understandably responded to his impending threat to its territorial integrity and security and moved its troops forward in the western sector more than a week later. I should here emphasize that we did this while keeping the United Nations Military Observers in Kashmir fully informed.

82. The political propaganda was accompanied by continuing military provocations by Pakistan against us over the last nine months. From 25 March to 15 November 1971 there were over 60 major border intrusions committed by Pakistani forces on the Indo-East Bengal border. India had to lodge 66 protests against 890 cease-fire violations in the Kashmir sector of our frontier with Pakistan during the same period. This sabre-rattling was accompanied by war hysteria. Important cities of West Pakistan held rallies and sent out processions with "Crush India" and "Conquer India" slogans. Photographs of this have appeared extensively in the international press. Apart from a threatening deployment of its land forces against India, Pakistani air intrusions into Indian territory both in the east and west were stepped up.

83. While these military provocations continued, Pakistan made suggestions regarding troop withdrawals—and this was mentioned by the representative of the United States of America—posting of United Nations observers and so forth, a series of deliberate gimmicks to hide its real intentions. The hypocrisy reached new heights in a so-called message of goodwill and friendship addressed by President Yahya Khan on 20 November to the Prime Minister of India. The Prime Minister of India reciprocated the message and made the suggestion that the tragedy in the subcontinent could be avoided by means of a political settlement between the Government of West Pakistan and the already elected leaders of East Bengal. While these messages were being exchanged Pakistan was planning further aggression.

84. On 21 November the West Pakistani army mounted a massive attack against Indian border posts in the Indo-East Bengal border in the Boyra area. After coming into conflict with the units of the freedom-fighters of East Bengal, the West Pakistani troops continued their thrust towards the Indian border. It was a full-scale attack with armour and artillery, and when Indian resistance was firm Pakistan brought its air force into action. Similar incidents took place on the Assam-East Bengal and Tripura-East Bengal borders between 15 and 22 November this year. The Pakistani attacks were successfully resisted by the local commanders of the Indian army and Pakistan also suffered losses of its planes while attacking Indian troops over our territory. Two of the Pakistani pilots who were piloting these planes were captured on Indian territory after they had baled out. These incidents were followed by the declaration of emergency by President Yahya Khan on 23 November, and on the same day in a press interview to the magazine *Newsweek* he stated that he expected to be "off on a war within 10 days". I would add that he kept the date.

85. Gravely concerned at the fast-deteriorating situation and hoping to retrieve it, the Prime Minister of India made a statement in the Indian Parliament on 24 November, in which she said:

"Even though Pakistan has declared an emergency, we shall refrain from a similar step unless further aggressive action by Pakistan compels us to do so in the interest of national security. In the meantime the country should remain unruffled. The rulers of Pakistan must realize that the path of peace, of peaceful negotiations and conciliation is more rewarding than that of war and the suppression of liberty and democracy."

86. She also described the military actions between 21 and 22 November as "purely local action", thereby clearly indicating India's intention of doing all that is possible to de-escalate the situation.

87. The Government of Pakistan, as was shown later, was, however, bent on escalating the situation further. The shelling of villages and armed intrusions on the Indian side of the border continued, and to hide the reality of the situation, as well as their aggressive intentions, President Yahya Khan addressed several communications to the Secretary-General during the last week of November, accusing the Indian army of acts which are entirely

fictitious and baseless. The truth of the matter was different and I shall come to it presently.

88. During this period the Mukti Bahini's successes inside East Bengal continued. Being frustrated in East Bengal, the West Pakistani army stepped up its military activities against India. We had received two communications, one on 15 October and another on 23 November, from the acting President and Prime Minister of Bangla Desh, requesting the Prime Minister of India to acknowledge the increasing control of the Bangla Desh Government over East Bengal territory and to give it formal recognition. India, however, did not wish to exacerbate the deteriorating military situation by any precipitate political action. We still hoped at that late stage that the Government of Pakistan would accept the reality of the situation in East Bengal and negotiate a settlement with the already elected representatives of the people of East Bengal. This hope of ours was reflected in the tour of the five West European countries and the United States, undertaken by the Prime Minister of India, to persuade the world leaders to exert their undoubted influence on President Yahya Khan to come to a rational and practical political settlement of the problem. We are aware of the strenuous efforts made by many of the world leaders and would like to acknowledge the valuable efforts that they made in the cause of peace.

89. Taking note of the deteriorating situation, the Prime Minister of India and I myself addressed communications to various world leaders in the third week of November, requesting them to do whatever they could to persuade the Government of Pakistan to avoid further violence in East Bengal and an aggressive war against us. These efforts were of no avail, as the events on 3 December revealed when Pakistan carried out a premeditated and massive aggression against India.

90. Pakistan has accused us of starting the present conflict, but the following facts should undoubtedly clarify the situation.

91. Friday, 3 December, was allotted for unofficial work and Private Members' Bills in the Parliament of India. Three senior members out of five of the Political Affairs Committee of the Indian Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, were in different parts of the country. The Prime Minister was in Calcutta addressing a massive public meeting. The Defence Minister, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, was in Patna, in eastern India; the Finance Minister, Mr. Chavan, was in Bombay in western India. Only I was in the capital to deal with parliamentary work connected with a private resolution moved by a Member of Parliament about relief to the East Bengal refugees. I had just finished addressing the Upper House of the Parliament, the Rajya Sabha, on this bill and was attending a function organized in connexion with the silver jubilee of the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, which was being presided over by the President of India, when, a little before 6 p.m., the first air-raid warnings were sounded over Delhi. We heard over the All India radio at 6.15 p.m. that the Pakistani Air Force had carried out an extensive and unprovoked air strike against our cities and major air bases in northern India, namely, Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipur, Uterali, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra from 5.47 p.m. We later learned that this

was an air strike carried out by the Pakistani air force in the hope of destroying our air force as a prelude to launching a full-scale ground attack against us. It was only one hour after the air strikes were initiated that Radio Pakistan announced at 6.30 p.m. on 3 December that India had started a ground attack against Pakistan in the western sector. The air attacks were followed by a massive artillery barrage from Pakistan on the Indian border posts and defence positions in Sulaimanki, Khem Karan, Poonch and other sectors of the Western front by the Pakistani Army.

92. The Prime Minister was informed of the Pakistani air attacks as she finished addressing the meeting in Calcutta, about 900 miles away from Delhi. We were still anxious not to get involved in an open war. We limited our instructions to our armed forces to keeping defensive positions. The Prime Minister addressed the nation a little after midnight between 3 and 4 December, and she described the situation as follows:

"Today the war in Bangla Desh has become a war on India. This has imposed upon me, my Government and the people of India a great responsibility. We have no other option but to put our country on a war footing. Our brave officers and Jawans are at their posts mobilized for the defence of the country."

93. Even in face of this unprovoked aggression India did not respond with a declaration of war. The President only declared a state of emergency for the whole of India, and we awaited further events. But the Pakistani air strikes continued through the night and their armed forces attacked us in strength right across India's western frontiers. Whatever little doubts we had about Pakistan's intentions were clarified on the morning of 4 December when President Yahya Khan stated that "a state of war exists between India and Pakistan". It is in this context that India was compelled to take the necessary steps to defend its territorial integrity and security.

94. The representative of the United States has posed certain questions, asking me what our intentions are. I should like to put across to him my thought that it was President Yahya Khan who declared war against India. Has the United States inquired from him as to what his intentions were when he declared war?

95. It was after Pakistan's massive attacks on us and its extensive military provocations against India, both in the east and in the west, that India decided to move into Bangla Desh in support of the freedom-fighters of Bangla Desh, and also to repel Pakistani aggression in the west by all means and methods available. It is a well-known principle, recognized by the international community, that an aggressor cannot compel the aggressed to fight at a place of the aggressor's choice. Once we were attacked in a massive way we had to take all defensive action to safeguard our position and to defend the integrity and sovereignty of our country.

96. The acting President and Prime Minister of Bangla Desh addressed a communication to the Prime Minister of India on 4 December, informing her that in view of the direct aggression committed by Pakistan against India on

3 December, the freedom-fighters of Bangla Desh were ready to fight the aggressive forces of Pakistan in Bangla Desh, in any sector or on any front.

97. He repeated his earlier request that India recognize the existence of the free Government of Bangla Desh, which was in control of the majority of the area of East Bengal. As Pakistan's blatant aggression on 3 December killed the hope of a political settlement leading to the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the people of Bangla Desh, the normal hesitation on our part to do anything which would come in the way of a political solution or which might be construed as intervention lost significance. The people of Bangla Desh, battling for their very existence, and the people of India, fighting to defeat aggression, found themselves partisans in the same cause, and therefore the Government of India accorded recognition to the People's Republic of Bangla Desh on 6 December. We delayed recognition of the Government of Bangla Desh to avoid any precipitation of the crisis, but the emergence of Bangla Desh was based on the declared and manifest will of the people of East Bengal. The Government of Bangla Desh is constituted by the freely elected representatives of the people of East Bengal, who contested the elections of December 1970. It was they who took the decision to declare the independence of their country on 10 April in the face of Pakistani repression. Still, we stayed our hand and did not accord any recognition but waited until 6 December.

98. An important consideration in our according recognition to Bangla Desh was that the brutalities and repression of the Pakistan Army against the civilian population there were increasing in proportion to the successes of the Mukti Bahini. The Government of Bangla Desh conveyed to us the urgent need to restore normalcy and order in their territory. They requested us to come to the assistance of their freedom forces to re-establish order. Recognition was therefore necessary to provide a proper basis for our presence in Bangla Desh.

99. Secondly, we wanted to make it absolutely clear that the entry of our armed forces into Bangla Desh was not motivated by any intention of territorial aggrandizement. That should satisfy the representative of the United States of America. We recognized Bangla Desh to provide a proper juridical and political basis for the presence of our army in support of the Mukti Bahini and the Bangla Desh Government in that country—apart from the fact that our action was in exercise of the defence of our country.

100. We have a clear and formal understanding with the Government of Bangla Desh that the armed forces of India shall remain in Bangla Desh only as long as the people and Government of Bangla Desh require and welcome their presence. The alternative to those arrangements would have been chaos and repression in East Bengal and a misinterpretation of our intentions by interested parties. To sum up, therefore, recognition of Bangla Desh, apart from being an acknowledgement of an inevitable political reality, is also an imperative requirement for the restoration of peace and stability in the area and for our own defence and security.

101. That is the perspective in which the Security Council should deliberate on the situation and devise means to

restore normalcy to the region. The military conflict raging in the subcontinent, apart from being unfortunate, is unimaginable in terms of its violence and destruction. We do not doubt the motives and concern which prompted the General Assembly to adopt the resolution of 7 December asking for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal [*resolution 2793 (XXVI)*].

102. It is my submission that the appeal should be directed to the Government of Pakistan. It is not India which declared war or started war; it is not India which is responsible for creating the original conditions that led to the present unfortunate conflict; it is not India which deliberately and systematically refused to meet the aspirations of the 75 million people inhabiting the country which was once part of Pakistan; it is not India which perpetuated the repression, genocide and brutality which provided the springboard for the freedom movement of Bangla Desh, which led to the decision of the people of that region to create for themselves a free and independent nation; it was not India which forsook the long period of nine months during which a reasonable political settlement could have been evolved with the leaders and people of Bangla Desh; it was not India which refused to listen to the counsels of reason and the impulses of wisdom generated by the international community for dealing with this situation.

103. It is not India which has tried to convert the issue of East Bengal into an India-Pakistan dispute for narrow purposes of power and exploitation. It is not India which has subjected the undisputed leader of the people of East Bengal, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to the unthinkable suffering of imprisonment and secret trial, which might even lead to a death sentence. It is not India which has set a record in political persecution, the genocide of a people and the suppression of human rights that inevitably led to the present conflagration.

104. If India has been guilty of anything, it has been of its restraint, its willingness to keep all the options for peace and reason open for a period of nine long months, while 75 million people in the neighbouring region underwent untold suffering and while nearly 10 million political victims facing their own tensions and problems came to our territory.

105. The Government of Pakistan did not merely fail to utilize those intervening months to redress the situation but deliberately took decision after decision which could have only one ending, which is the present tragedy. The continued repression by the West Pakistani army in East Bengal over these intervening months; the deliberate flouting of the popular will in appointing civilian governments constituted by quislings and stooges; the repeated refusal to accept the true nature of the freedom movement of the people of East Bengal and the consistent and repeated attempts to inveigle India into a military conflict so that attention would be diverted from the evil and destructive policies of West Pakistan in East Bengal—all lead to only one conclusion: that President Yahya Khan and his Government did not look upon the nine months of restraint by India and patience by the people of East Bengal as a period of option to settle the matter peacefully.

106. As the Government of Pakistan's policies have shown, it utilized this time to foreclose each option offered

to them by the international community, deliberately and finally. The present conflict between Pakistan and India, and Pakistan and Bangla Desh, is the inevitable consequence of a Government which believes that the feeble power of the sword can overcome the will of a people, the forces of democracy and the impulse of liberty.

107. It is in this context that I should like to deal with the views expressed by some representatives, particularly the representative of Pakistan, about India's so-called unwillingness to co-operate with efforts made by the United Nations to normalize the situation.

108. The efforts made by the United Nations fall into two broad categories: the first dealing with the humanitarian and relief aspects of the problem created by the massive influx of refugees from East Bengal into India, and unsettled conditions created by the military repression by the West Pakistani Army inside East Bengal.

109. India was prompt in bringing this problem to the notice of the United Nations and all its relevant forums, and pointed out at the very outset that a final remedy to the humanitarian aspect of the problem cannot be found without a rational political settlement of it, according to the wishes of the people of East Bengal. While mentioning this, India assured full co-operation to the United Nations in whatever interim measures the United Nations wished to take to bring succour and relief to the unfortunate millions of East Bengal.

110. Indeed, India has shouldered the major burden of taking care of the refugees, though the response of the international community has been generous, but from the very nature of the circumstances inadequate, if we take into consideration the colossal size of the problem. India agreed to the location of the United Nations focal-point office in Delhi and rendered full co-operation and all facilities to the representatives of this office in organizing relief operations for the refugees. India has also responded to the legitimate wish of the international community to assess the situation objectively by allowing free access to observers from all over the world to come and study this situation on the spot.

111. India has given all its resources and manpower, to the maximum extent possible, to alleviate the sufferings of the people of the neighbouring region and India remains committed in this regard until all the refugees return to their homeland for rehabilitation and resettlement. Although India is doing all this, as a trust on behalf of the international community, it is the responsibility of the international community to look after these millions of refugees.

112. We have appreciated the efforts made by the Secretary-General in this regard, but we remain convinced that the international community was mistaken in the hope that giving relief assistance to the refugees would be sufficient to overcome the declared wishes of the people of East Bengal. The real problem was the prevention of the re-imposition of the tyrannical rule of West Pakistan over them. The validity of our assessment has unfortunately but tragically been confirmed by events.

113. I should now like to come to the second category of views expressed in regard to the political aspects of the problem. The Secretary-General, in his *aide-mémoire* of 19 July addressed to the Government of India, and in his memorandum addressed to the President of the Security Council, on 20 July, had acknowledged that one of the important reasons for the continuing stalemate in East Bengal was the breakdown of civilian administration in East Bengal and the lack of progress in achieving a political reconciliation. He had again rightly pointed out, in the introduction to his report on the Work of the Organization to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly,⁴ that a disaster of such vast proportions can be solved and remedied only with due respect to the humanitarian and political principles.

114. At the beginning of the current session of the General Assembly, the outgoing President, Ambassador Hambro, as well as several representatives, including the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and Sweden, had drawn attention to the root cause of the problem. It was the denial of the wishes of the people of East Bengal which led to the evolving crisis. In spite of this correct appreciation of the problem, the international community and the United Nations found themselves unable to exert effective influence on the Government of Pakistan to bring about a political settlement of the problem according to the wishes of the people of East Bengal.

115. We in India, as well as people all over the world, noted with regret that this inability of the United Nations to deal with the root cause of the problem was compounded by the tactics adopted by Pakistan. Pakistan made proposals for locating United Nations observers on both sides of the India-Pakistan border, for the deployment of contact groups. None of these proposals, even by implication, dealt with the political situation in East Bengal resulting from the repression carried out by the Government of West Pakistan in that region. It was deliberately sought to convert an issue which was primarily between the people of East Bengal and the Government of Pakistan into an India-Pakistan issue which would not in any manner have achieved the imperative requirement for a solution to the problem: namely, the restoration of the freedom, liberty and fundamental human rights of the people of East Bengal to them, and the creation of a political system in East Bengal according to their wishes.

116. The voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland under conditions of dignity and honour, with guarantees of rehabilitation and resettlement in their homeland, and the discontinuation of the military repression of East Bengal by the Government of Pakistan are directly inter-linked. We had mentioned this apprehension of ours to the Secretary-General in our reply to his *aide-mémoire* of 19 July, on 2 August 1971. We have reiterated this point of view in our statements in the General Assembly, its Committees and the Security Council as well as in various other relevant forums.

117. Informal consultations in the Security Council in July and August indicated that the international com-

munity could not act in the matter, owing to some limitations born of its commitments to the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction. In face of a direct and consistent violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter by Pakistan, the Security Council and the United Nations should have found themselves in a position to intervene in the matter and persuade Pakistan to return to the path of reason. This did not happen. While developments proceeded on their inexorable course towards the present tragedy, the United Nations continued to be inhibited by considerations of domestic jurisdiction. When Pakistan initiated its massive military build-up against us in October and wished to stem the tide of freedom in East Bengal by a direct armed confrontation with India, the Secretary-General made a last, much appreciated, but unfortunately fruitless attempt to prevent the situation from deteriorating any further. He offered his good offices to both India and Pakistan in a communication addressed to President Yahya Khan and the Prime Minister of India on 20 October [see S/10410, para. 5]. But even this offer of good offices was not aimed at the root cause of the problem. The Secretary-General offered his good offices to mediate between India and Pakistan to de-escalate the military situation. But the fact of the matter was that the military situation was created by Pakistan in direct response to the increasing success of the freedom movement in East Bengal.

118. Pakistan accepted the Secretary-General's offer in the hope that the dignity of his office could be utilized, not only to prevent India from taking effective defensive action, but also to bolster the strength of the West Pakistani army against the freedom movement in East Bengal.

119. President Yahya Khan is on record as stating that he would consider the success of the Mukti Bahini a sufficient justification to launch a war on India. Since he himself had linked the military situation inside East Bengal—which was primarily a matter between the West Pakistani army and the people of East Bengal—with the military situation on India's western border, India could not but take note of the situation and react accordingly.

120. India was aware of Pakistan's motives in accepting the Secretary-General's offer and, therefore, while replying to the Secretary-General's communication of 20 October, the Prime Minister of India stated in a letter of 16 November [*ibid.*, para. 7] that the offer of good offices by the Secretary-General could be a constructive step provided it was directed towards bringing about a political settlement between the Government of Pakistan and the people of East Bengal, according to the declared aspirations of the latter.

121. India assured its full co-operation to the Secretary-General if he undertook such an initiative to deal with the basic problem. India also assured the Secretary-General, and through him the United Nations, that it had no aggressive intentions against Pakistan and that it would not start a military conflict.

122. The President of Pakistan made a last and desperate attempt to involve the prestige of the United Nations in perpetuating his policy of repression in East Bengal when

⁴ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

he made a suggestion in his communication of 23 November to the Secretary-General that he would be willing to locate United Nations observers on the East Bengal side of the India-East Bengal border to verify the facts of so-called Indian aggression. This was, to our mind, a deliberate attempt at tarnishing the image of the United Nations by making it a party to the repression of the people. Pakistan's repeated assertions of co-operation with the United Nations in dealing with the problem have no meaning whatsoever in the context of President Yahya Khan's intransigence till today in coming to terms with the already elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh and their undisputed leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

123. It would indeed be unfortunate if Pakistan's calculated policy to get the United Nations involved as a party to its oppression in Bangla Desh were passed off as adherence to certain stipulations of the Charter.

124. There is one other consideration of fundamental importance which I would like to raise. International law recognizes that where a mother State has irrevocably lost the allegiance of such a large section of its people as represented by Bangla Desh and cannot bring them under its sway, conditions are suitable for that section to come into being as a separate state. It is India's assessment that this is precisely what has happened in Bangla Desh.

125. The overwhelming majority of the elected representatives of Bangla Desh have declared themselves in favour of separation from the mother State of Pakistan and have set up a new state of Bangla Desh. India has recognized this new State. The armed forces of the new State have long been engaged in a struggle against the forces of West Pakistan in Bangla Desh. In these circumstances, is it realistic to call upon India to cease fire without at the same time giving even a hearing to the representatives of Bangla Desh, whose armed forces—numbering about 150,000—are engaged against the forces of West Pakistan?

126. India earnestly hopes that, in the light of the facts set out above, the United Nations will consider once again the realities of the situation, so that the basic causes of the conflict are removed and peace is restored. Given an assurance of a desire to examine these basic causes with objectivity, India will not be found wanting in offering its utmost co-operation.

127. The struggle that the people of India and the people of Bangla Desh are engaged in today is a struggle for their territorial integrity and security; for their fundamental liberties; for the preservation of the ideals of democracy, secularism and non-alignment; for the strengthening of the forces of peace; for upholding the very principles of the Charter which Pakistan is guilty of violating. This is a struggle not merely for survival in dignity and freedom of nearly one-sixth of mankind, but for survival of the international community within the framework of international covenants and agreements which the peoples of the world have so laboriously built up after two holocausts during this century.

128. In this context I should like to assure the Council that India has no territorial ambitions in Bangla Desh or in

West Pakistan. India would be willing to discuss any cease-fire or withdrawal which would ensure the freedom and aspirations of the people of Bangla Desh, and which would ensure the vacation of aggression by Pakistani troops from Indian territory.

129. During the conflict India stands committed in dealing with the enemy forces according to the Geneva Conventions. India's Chief of Staff assured his Pakistani counterparts of this commitment of the Government and the people of India on 7 December. He went one step further in assuring the West Pakistani troops in East Bengal of their safe evacuation to West Pakistan if they would surrender and discontinue their repression of the civilian population of Bangla Desh.

130. We are meeting today to deal with a crisis unprecedented in the annals of the United Nations. India's record of co-operation with the United Nations over the last 25 years and its unqualified commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter are well known and there for all to see. While repeating the Government of India's assurance that it will co-operate with the United Nations in any realistic effort that it may make to deal with the root cause of the problem, I should like to add that India will not be deflected from the vital task of ensuring its own territorial integrity and security by any attempts undertaken from any quarter.

131. I would also be remiss in defining the realities of the situation if I did not reiterate that any solution to the present conflict will have to take into account the views of the Government and people of Bangla Desh. Initiatives by the United Nations or from other quarters which ignore the existence of a nation of 75 million people with a Government of their own choice, who are the main party affected by this crisis, cannot succeed.

132. I cannot but affirm our determination in this regard, because India is fighting today for the preservation of the basic principles on which its people and its Government have sought to build a future. When our very survival is in question we cannot but commit our total mental, moral and material resources for its sake.

133. It is our earnest hope that the international community will appreciate the realities of the situation, as the future stability and peace of South-East Asia perhaps depend on the resolution of this conflict on a rational and realistic basis, ensuring peace, prosperity and justice. I should like to assure the Council that India will do its utmost to meet this objective.

134. The Council is the instrument of the United Nations to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council is bound by the noble principles and purposes of the Charter. These principles and purposes have to be applied to each concrete situation. The Security Council has failed in many cases in the past to ensure international peace and security, because it has failed to take note of the realities of each concrete situation. If the Security Council wants to ensure peace and security in the present crisis—and I presume it does want to do this—it would be failing in its duty if it did not take note

of the glaring fact that is there for everyone to see, namely, the successful struggle of the 75 million people of Bangla Desh to assert their birthright of freedom and independence. Any proposal or resolution of the Security Council that does not take note of the existence of the Government of Bangla Desh, established by the democratic will of the people, and of the fact that it is in effective control of its territory, would be a hollow and empty resolution devoid of any effect.

135. I would therefore submit most earnestly and with due respect that the participation of the representatives of Bangla Desh, and their being given a hearing to state their case, is imperative for the success of any proposal for a cease-fire, not only in Bangla Desh, but also in the West. The situation in the West has been created by Pakistan in order to cover up its failure in the East. The Security Council must recognize this link between the situation in the East and the West, and the fact that no cease-fire can be effective on the ground unless it has the consent of the Government of Bangla Desh. Without this there can be no durable peace, there can be no just peace or security in the Indian subcontinent. I am glad that this question was raised in the earlier discussions and it is my earnest hope and appeal that it will not be shelved again.

136. Before I conclude, I should like to read out the communication addressed by my Prime Minister to the Secretary-General, as it sums up our basic approach to this problem:

[The speaker read out the text of document S/10445.]

137. The representative of the United States of America has raised certain points. Some of these are covered in what I have already stated, but I would like to examine and consider very carefully all his points. With these observations at this stage, I should like to reserve my right of further comment upon certain specific points that have been raised by the representative of the United States of America.

138. The PRESIDENT: The next name inscribed on the list of speakers is that of the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan. However, he has informed me that he would request that the Council grant a recess of 15 minutes before he speaks, as he has received important messages from his Government which he would like to study much more closely before addressing the Council. Therefore, if there is no objection, it would be my intention to suspend the meeting for 15 minutes and, after resuming it, to call immediately upon the representative of Pakistan.

139. As there is no objection, the meeting will be suspended for 15 minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 9.30 p.m. and resumed at 10 p.m.

140. The PRESIDENT: I call on the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

141. Mr. BHUTTO (Pakistan): The Pakistan delegation has come to the Security Council at a time and moment of

crucial and dire importance not only to Pakistan but to the world community and the United Nations.

142. I am aware of the urgency of the situation, and I would not like unnecessarily to waste either your time, Mr. President, or that of this august body, which is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Time is running out. I too could go into the genesis of the Indo-Pakistan dispute. I could start from the time of the Emperor Ashoka and go down the lanes of history to the conquest of the Indian subcontinent by Mohammed Bin Qasim and the thousand years we have had of most unfortunate and tragic conflict in our subcontinent between its two predominant, profound cultures. We have sought to resolve them in the spirit of contemporary times.

143. At the present moment I cannot make an elaborate comment on all the issues that have been raised by the Foreign Minister of India, Sardar Swaran Singh, whom I know very well, and with whom I have worked in the past on these very disputes. In 1962 we had six months of negotiations for the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes. Sardar Swaran Singh was, I think, then Minister of Railways and I was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. We had six months of painstaking and sincere discussions for bringing about a settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes based on equity and justice. We made an effort; we endeavoured and we tried hard. As far as we are concerned, I can assure you that it was a sincere effort, and I assume it was an equally sincere effort on the part of India. But unfortunately we always seemed to reach an impasse. And so I shall not now go back to the past. The past is known to India; the past is known to Pakistan. We are part of the same subcontinent. The past is in part known to the members of the Security Council because it is their problem also. It is their responsibility to know of these grave issues, so from that point of view we expect them to know of the basic causes of the differences that divide India and Pakistan.

144. I am not going to indulge in glib rhetoric or draw any semantic blanks, because the situation is far too serious. The fat is in the fire, and the time has come for us to act either individually as separate States defending their sovereign integrity and national unity, or collectively for restraint as members of the United Nations acting in and through the Security Council, which is charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security in the world. Either we act individually or we act collectively. Those are the two basic options open to us.

145. Secondly, I do not attempt—and I never will—to speak in a spirit of recrimination or to put the blame on one party or the other. My effort will be to invoke the basic objective principles and point to the basic objective realities involved in the situation, rather than to inject a subjective character into the dispute that today is burning the subcontinent and has led to fratricidal warfare.

146. I am not going to assume a sanctimonious attitude. From the outset I am quite prepared to accept that we have made mistakes. Man is not infallible. Mistakes have been made everywhere—not only in the subcontinent. Mistakes have been made by the Roman Empire, by the British Empire, by every State of the world. But States are not to

be penalized for their mistakes. I admit that certain mistakes have been made by us, as they have been made by others. We are prepared to rectify those mistakes in a civilized spirit, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation in conformity with the highest principles of international law and international norms. I am not going to absolve myself of the tremendous and tragic blunders that have been made.

147. We all make blunders—all of us in Africa, Asia, Europe, the East and the West. It is not that we have been oblivious of or blind to these factors. Everywhere there have been blind spots and tragic developments. But the effort must be always to try to repair the damage. We are quite prepared to try to repair the damage.

148. So I do not say that we did not make mistakes; I do not say that mistakes have not been made in the subcontinent in the past. It is not a new phenomenon; it goes back to ancient times. It is rooted in history, and I am not going back into the historical factors involved in the situation. I am trying to confine myself to the relevant propositions involved in the present crisis.

149. And what are the issues involved in the present crisis? There are certain basic and important issues involved in the present crisis that has brought about a catastrophic situation in our subcontinent. In my opinion the primary and fundamental issue is that the world community, the United Nations and people at large, will not accept the fact that the unity of a State brought into being through the efforts of its own people, by their own struggle, expressing their own personality, is to be subjected to dismemberment by the use of force. That is the important basic issue.

150. Pakistan was not created by force. Please remember that the establishment of Pakistan was a great historic phenomenon. Pakistan came into being in the face of the opposition of the Indian Congress and of the British, who were the masters not only of the subcontinent but of an empire on which the sun did not set. Since such powerful forces were opposed to it, the creation of Pakistan could not have occurred without the pressure of historic forces and the force of a people's will. Pakistan crystallized as a sovereign, independent State in 1947, but the germs and seeds of Pakistan were laid much earlier. They were laid from the time when Mohammed Bin Qasim set his foot in the subcontinent. The theme and the message of Islam came into the subcontinent: the message of equality, of fraternity, of brotherhood. The seeds of Pakistan were laid much earlier than the creation of Pakistan.

151. If Pakistan might seem to be destroyed physically today by a predatory neighbour, by a military Juggernaut, it will still last, because Pakistan is an ideal. Pakistan is not a mere physical reality; Pakistan is an ideal. It will last even if its total physical embodiment is dismembered. We are prepared to face that physical destruction. We are prepared for the decimation of 120 million people. We will then begin anew and build a new Pakistan. But we will never accept subjugation by brute physical force. This is the reality. This is the situation: the ideal, the dream, the concept, the vision of Pakistan can never be destroyed by a

military Juggernaut. It can never be destroyed by force and by the preponderance of military power.

152. This is what I would like my Indian friends to recognize—and I refer to them as friends even though we are fighting. They recognized it in 1947 when they conceded the inevitability of the establishment of Pakistan. Their great leaders are still respected in Pakistan. They had stood for an ideal. They stood for a united India. But they recognized that that could not be maintained in the face of historical factors and the diversity of cultures. Finally, in 1947, the Indian Congress accepted the creation of Pakistan as an independent sovereign State, after years and years and years of opposition.

153. There was a great Prime Minister, the first Prime Minister of India, the father of the present Prime Minister of India, who said: "We were too old, we were too tired to oppose Pakistan, and Pakistan had to come into being. But we hope that one day we will get together again". I too hope so—not that Pakistan will emerge as subservient to India—but in the sense that we will get together again as equal friends, in a common fraternity, living in a common subcontinent and sharing the common effort of seeing that poverty, ignorance and misery are wiped out. The two countries that are the poorest in the world are Pakistan and India. Our resources might be tremendous, but the fact is that we two are the poorest in the world. Yet, in the last 24 years, we have gone to war three times. Three times there has been conflict in the subcontinent. I remember the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union once telling me that even rich nations try to avoid war; poorer nations should make a greater attempt to avoid war.

154. We are too poor. There is too much misery. There is too much squalor. You should know, Mr. President, as the representative of an African country, that our basic problem is to fight poverty, to bring about social justice, to bring about equality, to bring about a sense of fraternity, to progress, to try and keep pace with the progress of other countries, of other continents. It is unfortunate that today we should be pitted against each other and that one of us should dream semi-barbarically to annihilate the other. There can be no liquidation. It is not possible today. Even the great Powers cannot do it. Even they have found that hegemony and domination do not last. Does India think that today it is going to become a great Power in Asia? It is simply not possible because then India will be pitted against 120 million people, valiant people with a great past, fighting for their independence, fighting for their dignity, fighting for their self-respect.

155. So I offer a hand of friendship to India. I would have offered a hand of greater friendship to India if we were not at war. India knew that we were prepared to offer that hand of friendship to India as soon as a civilian Government returned to Pakistan. Perhaps they pre-empted that development, unfortunately for the subcontinent. But I shall come to that later.

156. So the issue, the basic issue involved today is that a State, a sovereign State, brought into being by the will of its own people, freely, without coercion, without interference, cannot be dismembered by force. It would be a

tragic precedent for the world at large, a terrible precedent. Today I speak not only for Pakistan but for a principle; I speak for a basic principle which affects Asia, Africa and Latin America. That is why the third world overwhelmingly supported the cause of Pakistan in the historic resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December [*resolution 2793 (XXVI)*].

157. If I had spoken only for Pakistan, I would have been isolated, because India is a bigger country than Pakistan. Power politics would have come into play. Pakistan's cause succeeded on 7 December because it was based, not on the interests of Pakistan conceived selfishly and subjectively, but on a world principle—universally accepted, universally recognized—that a sovereign State, brought into being by its own blood and toil and sweat, cannot be dismembered by a predatory neighbour wanting to tear it apart limb by limb. Today it is Pakistan; tomorrow it will be other parts of the world. Please realize that position. Please remember, we are not fighting the war for Pakistan alone; we are fighting the war for a cause, for a just cause: the cause that involves a State which came into being by its people's volition and whose establishment was recognized by India.

158. The British were the departing Power in 1947. What interests did they have? If the subcontinent wanted to be fragmented into six States, the British would not have cared. They would have said: all right, let there be six States; if there are to be four States, let there be four States. They were leaving the subcontinent. Why did the British create the two States of India and Pakistan? The British left the subcontinent with two States because the people of the subcontinent at that time, 400 million, wanted two States, and not three, or four or five States. One of the two States was India, that was called Bahrat, and the other was Pakistan. And it was the people of East Bengal who played a valiant role, a predominant role, in the creation of Pakistan. If the Bengalis, the East Bengalis—over whom my friend Sardar Swaran Singh waxes eloquent and sheds crocodile tears now—had wanted a separate State, the British would have granted a separate State and there would have been a separate State of Bengal—not only of Pakistan-Bengal, but of Indian-Bengal as well, and of Assam. There would have been a third State—and a fourth State as well.

159. So there is a basic issue involved. Stripped of all the frenzy and eloquence of Sardar Swaran Singh, it is that States which have been created through a struggle and in the teeth of massive and formidable opposition cannot be dismembered by physical force by a neighbouring State which is more powerful in military might. So please remember what we are fighting for. We are not fighting just for Pakistan. We are fighting for a cause that affects all of us, every one of us: either States are to remain independent, sovereign, free, or else they will be dismembered at will whenever a great Power or a semi-great Power, or a seemingly semi-great Power, wants it.

160. Today it is in the subcontinent, tomorrow it will be in other parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America; it can be anywhere. So it is a basic issue which is involved in the present situation.

161. And I ask you, Sir, as President of the Security Council: Is this not a challenge to the United Nations, to

the United Nations Charter? I am out of touch with the United Nations Charter, because for the last five and a half years I have been struggling internally for the restoration of democracy and social justice in my country. After five and a half years I am coming to the Security Council, after a very big struggle for democratic and social justice in my land. Is the present situation not a challenge to the United Nations itself? This is another basic issue involved. Is the United Nations going to permit this kind of mutation by physical force?

162. Today it is Pakistan, tomorrow it will be Bhutan—indeed Bhutan is already in the bag; Sikkim is already in the bag; Nepal is not yet in the bag, but it is going to be in the bag very soon if Pakistan is dismembered. Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, Ceylon, Afghanistan and Iran: the Pandora's box has not opened for Pakistan alone. It has opened for many countries, and in a very decisive way. So it is a challenge to all Members, who have to see whether this kind of mutation can be permitted in the world through physical force, blackmail and intimidation.

163. The Indian Foreign Minister has given a long list of events to try to show that we are the aggressors. Now, I appeal to your common sense and logic. India is five or six times larger than Pakistan. We are about 120 million, they are about 500 million; our foreign exchange earnings and resources are much more limited. One of the reasons why we wanted to create Pakistan was so that we could get into our own little corner and live in peace with a bigger neighbour. But the bigger neighbour did not accept that position. And so we have been accused of aggression. Can Denmark be accused of aggression against Germany? Can Mexico be accused of aggression against the United States of America? Can Holland be accused of aggression against France?

164. So, basically, I am dealing with the wider issue involved. The first principle is that a sovereign, independent State brought into being by popular free will cannot be dismembered by force. The second principle involved is that there is a responsibility for the United Nations, embodied in the Charter, undertaken because of the consequences of the Second World War, and, through all failures and successes, maintained for the last 25 years.

165. In this connexion I shall have to tell the Council that the United Nations has failed Pakistan in the past as well, because we are smaller than India. We came here in 1947 and 1948. We came here pleading for the exercise of the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir, which both India and Pakistan had accepted. And the then Prime Minister of India, the father of the present Prime Minister of India, had himself said that Kashmir was a disputed territory and that the future of Kashmir would be determined by the free will of the people of Kashmir. That was in 1948, but until today the Kashmir dispute has not been resolved and a part of a territory that would have formed a legitimate part of Pakistan has been denied to Pakistan.

166. Then we came here in 1965—the Foreign Minister of India referred to that. At that time I was representing my country and I remember that we were told in the resolution

which was adopted that the underlying cause of the conflict would be resolved. If we had really gone into the causes of the conflict, of which the Foreign Minister of India spoke so much this evening, if we had really gone into the basic causes of the conflict in 1965, today we would not be facing a greater tragedy. At that time the President of the Security Council was Mr. Arthur Goldberg, permanent representative of the United States of America. He told me that that resolution was a bible—I wish I had asked him whether it was the Old Testament or the New Testament—and we believed in that bible, because people believe in a sacred document. He said “We will see to it that it is implemented”. That was in 1965. It has not been implemented. So a further deterioration has taken place and today we find ourselves facing an even greater catastrophe. And if the world does not seize the problem, if the world does not have the courage and the moral fibre to say that these issues must be resolved and that the full force of the international community, its might and power must be brought to bear on them, then Indo-Pakistani problems will become ever more complicated. And who will suffer? The poor people of India and Pakistan will suffer—and I am not a friend of only the poor people of Pakistan; I am a friend of the poor people of India also. We have more poverty than any other people in the world.

167. We want to put an end to armed conflict. We want to lay down arms. We want a period of security and goodwill in the subcontinent, because we have had so much conflict and so much turmoil. And the *élite* has not suffered; the *élite* never suffers. The people who suffer are the poor: the refugees of whom the Indian Foreign Minister spoke, the people who merely eke out a subsistence living. We want to give our people food, shelter, clothing and education. We cannot do those things if we have daggers drawn, fighting all the time, chauvinistically quarrelling in the same geographical area, in the same place.

168. And when I say this I am not speaking from a position of weakness—because Pakistan can never be weak, and the Indians know that. We have a thousand years of history.

169. If this conflict had not taken place and if the Indian Government had given us a chance to transform the military régime in Pakistan into a civilian régime, it would have seen how far we would have gone to bring about basic changes in our outlook. I speak on these matters as an elected representative of the people of Pakistan. Sardar Swaran Singh spoke about Mr. Mujibur Rahman's being an elected representative. I was as much an elected representative of the people of West Pakistan as Mr. Mujibur Rahman was an elected representative from East Pakistan. I have as much *locus standi* in West Pakistan as Mr. Mujibur Rahman has in East Pakistan. I also speak not as a puppet. I speak as the authentic voice of the people of Pakistan. I spearheaded a struggle against a mighty dictator, and my roots are with the people and I want to serve the people of my country. The people of my country cannot be served if we are going to be locked in this suicidal, fratricidal warfare in this fashion.

170. I am not speaking from a position of weakness. I said these things even during the election campaign. I said that

we must begin a new chapter, because our basic objective was to bring about social and economic justice. What the subcontinent faces is not a political crisis or an economic crisis. The subcontinent faces a social crisis, a crisis of the social structure, born of the struggle against an unmain-
tainable and disgusting *status quo*, which has lasted for years. Therefore, we should bend all our energies for the end of an iniquitous *status quo*. Europe has progressed; other countries have progressed. We also are civilized peoples. We have 5,000 years of civilization behind us. We, too, have the means, the resources and the ability to progress, and we too can progress and bring about a better life for our people, provided we lay down arms, not on the basis of capitulation, not on the basis of the violation of international principles, not on the basis of lacerating States, of trying to dismember countries.

171. We should coexist, as the Soviet Union and the United States, two great Powers, can coexist. Now today if China and the United States can open a new dialogue, why cannot this happen in the subcontinent? We wanted it to happen. But we were not given a chance. The Indian Government forestalled those possibilities by striking a month before a civilian government, after 13 years, was going to come into power in Pakistan. They should have given us an opportunity, and we wanted that opportunity. But they struck two months before. A civilian democratic government was to be installed as a result of the struggle of both East and West Pakistan. The struggle in one region was not unconnected with that in the other. It was a common struggle, it was one united struggle. But we were not given that chance.

172. We have been failed in the past by history, unfortunately, but in contemporary terms we have been betrayed by the United Nations. We have been let down by the Security Council's inability to secure the implementation of its resolutions, on Kashmir in 1947, in 1965. And today we are again before this great world body. We have not come here to beg for peace. Please do not misunderstand. We are a nation of 120 million people. So what if a city falls? If Dacca or Jessore fall, about which people talk so much? A battle lost is not a country lost. Governments can go, monarchies can go, dictatorships can go, but nations last. States are rooted in the people. I wish the Indian Government would realize this. It should not be intoxicated by these reports of the fall of Jessore, the fall of one city or another. What is the fall of a city? The country is still there. The country was there before 1947 in idea, in spirit, and it crystallized into a sovereign nation State, and it will continue to be there even if today or tomorrow Dacca falls. Do not be misled by press reports. Because we are a smaller country we do not have the resources to pump in that kind of propaganda. Dacca is not going to fall so easily. I see the effort here is to filibuster until Dacca falls. And even if Dacca falls, so what? The valiant soldiers of Pakistan, the valiant people of East Pakistan, the soldiers of East Pakistan—they will stand indomitably to defend Dacca to the end. In some sections of the Western press Dacca has been described as Dunkirk. Do not be uncharitable. There is no comparison between Dunkirk and Dacca. Dunkirk was 20 miles away from Calais. We have a distance of 2,600 miles, surrounded by the Indian army. Dunkirk was not surrounded from three sides. East Pakistan is surrounded

from three sides. If the people of East Pakistan were not with Pakistan, East Pakistan would have fallen within minutes. Seven to one is the Indian superiority over the forces of East Pakistan. They are completely blockaded. No ammunition can get through, which I can understand they do not want to allow through. But even medicines and food cannot be airlifted. The blockade cannot be broken. We are terribly blockaded.

173. And here we have East Pakistan representatives still sitting with us. It is an oversimplification to say that the people of East Pakistan are against Pakistan. If the people of East Pakistan were against us, we would have capitulated and fallen long ago. Why is the Indian Chief of Staff, General Manekshaw, every day issuing appeals for surrender? It is because nobody is surrendering. They are going to fight and we are going to fight. We are not going to surrender like that. And do not think that by filibustering, that if the Security Council debate is postponed by a day or two we are going to be down and out and that we are going to be on our knees. Like Alice, we have come to the Wonderland to tell you that our country and our sub-continent is turning into a wasteland.

174. We were told that the General Assembly, the Security Council, are responsible for peace in the world. But we do not want peace without justice. We want peace with justice and our only demand is that our country should be spared from invasion, that foreign interference should stop, that an internal struggle should not be interpreted as giving rise to an external obligation. This is a basic requirement. Today we ask for it, tomorrow others will ask for it. So I am not pleading only for Pakistan. I am pleading really for the rule of international law and morality.

175. A basic, unalterable, principle of international law is non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter speaks of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It states:

"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter . . .".

Now this is a Charter obligation. But the Indian Foreign Minister spoke for an hour and fifteen minutes and all he spoke about was the internal affairs of Pakistan. His whole speech was devoted to the internal affairs of Pakistan. I did not have a bad conscience so I did not ask one of my friends here—and we still have a few friends left—to raise a point of order to say that he was raising a matter within the internal jurisdiction of Pakistan. I welcomed it. I am glad that the Indian Foreign Minister saw fit to talk about the internal matters of my country. For one thing, I will have an opportunity now to reply to it, if I can, but if I do not cover all the points I hope that members will forgive me because he only spoke just now. However, I shall try to cover some of his major points and, if I am unable to cover all his points, I shall try to seek a right of reply, not to filibuster, but to try subsequently to clear the points that he raised. I shall make that effort.

176. But what I am trying to say is that I am glad he raised those questions, even though it constituted an interference in Pakistan's essentially domestic matters. It was as if I were to talk about the DMK movement in Madras, about the Nagas' or the Meos' struggle for independence, about the plight of poor Bhutan and Sikkim, or about the many other matters that plague India. What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The consequences will come to the surface soon. It is up to India. If India thinks that Pakistan is going to be dismembered, the process is not going to stop there. The germ is going to spread, and it is going to spread very fast.

177. However, I will not choose to talk about the internal problems of India. Interference in the internal affairs of another country not only offends the principles of the Charter, but also violates the Bandung principles. Mr. President, you are from a State in Africa. There are other member States here from Asia and from Latin America. We all come from the same fraternity, we are all brothers-in-arms. We have all been exploited, we have all been subjugated, we are all the victims of ruthless exploitation. Are not the Bandung principles sacrosanct to you? Are they sacrosanct to me only, today, because my country is exposed to the mighty Juggernaut of a great military power that outnumbers my country in East Pakistan by a force of seven to one and that has blockaded us by sea?

178. No, this concerns all of us. The Bandung principles are being violated, the Pancha Shila. I was not the author of the Pancha Shila; I was only a student then. Who was the author? Who was the man who articulated the Pancha Shila? At the Bandung Conference, the Pancha Shila were articulated by, among other people, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. He talked about the "five principles of peaceful coexistence". The father of the Prime Minister of India said that non-interference was a sacrosanct principle and one of the five principles, the Pancha Shila.

179. India today has wrecked the Pancha Shila principles. India has abused and violated the Charter and the basic principles of international law and morality. India today has violated the Bandung principles of which it was a co-author.

180. These, therefore, are the basic principles involved in the matter, and they are very important principles. And furthermore, we never expected the countries of the third world to indulge in blackmail and big-Power chauvinism. We thought the great Powers were the culprits of big-Power chauvinism and of blackmail, of seeking hegemony. If the world can rise against the greatest Power in the world and against hegemony, and if the greatest Power in the world wants to reduce its sphere of responsibility, wants no longer to be the praetor, the policeman of the world, then India cannot do that either. If the United States of America finds itself today incapable of extending its influence over a world-wide range to become the policeman of the world, how can India become the policeman of the subcontinent of Asia? India does not have the capability. India is built on a hollow foundation, nurtured by fraud and deceit. India must abandon these illusions. If the United States of America, the greatest Power in the world, after 20 years of experience following the Second World War, finds that it

does not have the resources to dispense foreign aid and to continue the Viet-Nam war, that it must honourably leave Asia, India must also realize that it cannot hold on to Pakistan, to a part of the subcontinent. India must give up its pretence of trying to become the policeman of the subcontinent, of telling us what we should do in Pakistan: which leader we should recognize, which leader we should arrest, which leader we should release, which party we should negotiate with, what was the interpretation of the manifesto of a certain party.

181. This is a precedent for all of you to consider before the morning comes. It is all very well to talk sweetly and softly and in clipped tones. But let us talk about the realities. The Foreign Minister said: "Consider the realities". I say I welcome that: Consider the realities. I welcome that more than he would. The realities are that dictation, domination, hegemony, exploitation are being practised against my country through physical force and physical might. The largest Muslim State in the world, brought into being by its own volition, is being destroyed and decimated by a military machine and against the will of the people of the country. If we were not a united people, if we did not have a united resolve, we would not have lasted for 24 years. Egypt and Syria united briefly. They were Arabs. They were of the same race, they had the same religion. How long did the Egyptian-Syrian unity last? Three years, or two years. It broke up. Why are East Pakistan and West Pakistan together? Because we have a common denominator. We have a common interest, and that common interest is opposition to Indian domination, Indian hegemony, Indian exploitation. That is our common interest. So we are brothers-in-arms. We will always remain together. What has happened? The Indian Foreign Minister talks about all the mistakes made by Pakistan. Well, India never has made any mistakes. I congratulate India for never having made any mistakes in 24 years. We are the only ones who make mistakes. We are the only sinners in the world. Nobody else makes mistakes. We are the great sinners. But the same great sinners have remained together for 24 years, and today also it took India nine months in order to prepare to intervene to destroy us.

182. The Foreign Minister of India talks about the patience shown by India in waiting for nine months. It was not patience. India found it necessary; now that they have not succeeded they must physically intervene to destroy Pakistan. If all those brutalities, those terrible atrocities that have taken place in Pakistan were really as bad as the Foreign Minister said, and if there was such a great movement in East Pakistan, then it would not have been necessary for India to intervene militarily to bring about a military, physical victory by force of arms. But they have not achieved it yet, in spite of their best efforts.

183. So there is a basic contradiction involved in that. And please remember, the issue is not an issue of self-determination. As an Asian—and I am as much an Asian as I am a Pakistani—I have always had an Asian outlook. For we cannot think in terms of our own country alone. One country in Africa cannot think in terms of that one country alone; it must think in African terms. We in Asia must think in Asian terms. As President de Gaulle said, "a European Europe". I therefore say we must have an Asian

Asia. The question here is not a matter of self-determination. As Asians and as members of the third world, we must never renounce self-determination. Self-determination, after President Woodrow Wilson preached it and articulated it, brought about the independence of many countries. We subscribe to self-determination. There can be no compromise on self-determination—but it must be genuine self-determination. What is self-determination? That a country must be allowed to determine its future, that a people must be allowed to determine its future. We are not against self-determination. My distinguished friends are against self-determination, because if they had allowed self-determination to be practised today, there would have been the right of self-determination in Kashmir and the people of Kashmir, after 24 years, would have decided whether they were going to be a part of India or a part of Pakistan. But they are never allowed that right to self-determination.

184. In Kashmir, where Pandit Nehru himself said "Yes, there must be self-determination, because it is disputed territory", India has always blocked, stopped, prevented any action towards the self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Self-determination is not only a principle that was articulated by President Woodrow Wilson. The great founder of the Soviet State, Lenin, one of the greatest men of all times, articulated the principle of self-determination. So self-determination was accepted by India and Pakistan. But today, when 24 years have passed, self-determination has not taken place in Kashmir. Today India talks about the self-determination of a country which determined its future in 1947 and became a part of Pakistan. How is self-determination involved in Bengal, in East Pakistan? East Pakistan is a part of Pakistan, an inextricable part of Pakistan, united with Pakistan for 24 years. It chose to be a part of Pakistan and was in the vanguard of the movement for Pakistan. Let me tell you quite clearly that there could have been no Pakistan without the struggle of the people of East Pakistan for the creation of Pakistan.

185. The Foreign Minister of India has talked about the mother State. I also am a student of international law; I have not come across any acknowledged theory of the mother State. I have studied under Kelsen and Oppenheim and other people, but I have not come across this theory. It might be somewhere in some archives, found somewhere or other, this theory of the mother State. But let us accept the fact that there is such a theory of the mother State, that if a part of the mother State wants to release itself from the mother, it must find its own conditions for freedom. I accept that position, although I do not find authentic or reliable evidence for the mother State concept or theory that has been propounded by the Indian Foreign Minister. But if there is such a concept, who is the mother and who is the child? The mother is East Pakistan and the child is West Pakistan, because it is in East Pakistan that the majority of our people live. Fifty-six per cent of our people live in East Pakistan and the rest live in West Pakistan. The mother naturally must be the 56 per cent and not the 44 per cent. As I told you and as the British know, because they were in the subcontinent, there could have been no Pakistan without the contribution of the people of East Pakistan to the creation of Pakistan. They were a part of us

in the 1965 war; how heroically they stood by us. I remember in 1967 when I went there how devoted and concerned they were for the welfare and integrity of Pakistan.

186. After the general elections about which Swaran Singh has spoken, I went there, in January. I went there and I went to many parts of East Pakistan and I asked them "What do you want, because the people's will is supreme? What do you want? Do you want one Pakistan or two Pakistans?" Believe me, Mr. President. I am not lying to you; I would never lie to the President of the Security Council. They all said "We want one Pakistan. We believe in one Pakistan". This one Pakistan would have remained one Pakistan if the Indians had not stepped in with their powerful military action.

187. Finally, in deciding this issue, the Security Council is sometimes prevented from taking necessary action because of power politics, because the great Powers have great interests, and their great interests are determined by their own calculations. But these factors do not prevail in the General Assembly. The General Assembly is the voice of the world. The General Assembly symbolizes the march of humanity towards greater and greater progress. The General Assembly is where you, Sir, and I and others can speak for truth and justice, unimpaired by the calculations of power politics. The General Assembly is where the poorer nations speak. The General Assembly is where the farmers and the peasants and the proletariat of the international community, so to speak, and not merely the *élite*, have a voice. Now what has the General Assembly decided? On 7 December the General Assembly, by an overwhelming and massive vote of 104 in favour decided in favour of the unity and integrity of Pakistan. The whole world said, taking everything into account, taking the truth into account, that Pakistan is one and that Pakistan must remain one. We have no diplomatic relations with some of the countries that voted for us. We have no contact, but on a principle they voted that Pakistan is one; it came into being as one, it came into being after great sacrifices and it must remain one. Of the great Powers, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America also supported this basic truth. So this is an overwhelming verdict. I do not have to speak; the Indian Foreign Minister does not have to speak; I only ask you to recognize this truth, to heed the voice of the world. Do not stifle it, do not bury it, do not ignore it, because it is going to have far-reaching ramifications. Please take cognizance of it, please realize its value and its importance. Please do not become isolated from the voice of the world. It is very important that you do not do that, because the whole world has spoken for the unity and integrity of Pakistan. How can you ignore it here in this chamber? Can you ride roughshod over the voice of the world community? Can you arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously deny what the world wants? The world wants one Pakistan, the world wants the unity of Pakistan, the world does not want the dismemberment of Pakistan by violence or by force. All I have come here for is to tell you that this is the voice of the world, this is what the world wants, this is its verdict. Implement it, recognize it, accept it, otherwise there is going to be trouble and not only for Pakistan. Pakistan is in enough trouble; we are facing serious problems, but I am not only speaking of Pakistan, I

am speaking for all of the third world and for all those who believe in justice, equality and equity among nations.

188. Having made these general remarks, I should like to get down a little more to specific matters. We have been told by the Indian Foreign Minister tonight and before that it was implied in the position that India has taken on an internal dispute of Pakistan, that the people of East Pakistan want to be free and to sever relations with West Pakistan, and that this was the result of the last elections. In the last elections, which were held in December 1970, the Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman received an overwhelming mandate in East Pakistan. We recognize that. In West Pakistan I and my party received an overwhelming mandate. But what was the demand of the Awami League? The Awami League said in their election campaign that they wanted autonomy. They did not want secession. We in West Pakistan also were fighting for autonomy, for all the provinces, because we are a federal State, best suited to be a federal State. So they wanted autonomy and we wanted autonomy; they wanted democracy and we wanted democracy; they wanted to end military rule and we wanted to end military rule. We had these common factors between us. But what happened was that, suddenly, after the elections this demand for autonomy was converted into a demand for secession. There were many forces in the background. You know, Sir, that the line between maximum autonomy and secession can be a thin one, a very thin one. Through international manipulation and other factors, a struggle for autonomy was converted into a struggle for secession.

189. But who is to interpret whether it is autonomy or secession? The issue being internal, it is for the people to determine what is the point of that autonomy, whether it is genuine autonomy or *ultra vires* autonomy. It is not for a third country to interpret. It is not for an outside party to decide whether the people want secession or autonomy.

190. We were quite prepared to negotiate and to determine the quantum of autonomy within the concept of one Pakistan, but we were not prepared to accept that an outside neighbouring country should judge whether the demand was for autonomy or for secession. If the people of East Pakistan had wanted secession they would have said so and India would not have had to intervene. I accept that blunders have been made, terrible blunders. But, in spite of those terrible blunders, India would not have had physically to intervene with a whole 8 or 12 divisions in East Pakistan in order to get by force what it interpreted to be the aspiration of the people of East Pakistan as a consequence of the elections of 1970.

191. This is the basic problem again. Now if we are going to determine autonomy and secession on that basis, then may I ask my distinguished friend, Mr. Swaran Singh, the following: When the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, came to the United Nations in September 1960 and was asked: "When are you going to settle the Kashmir dispute, with regard to which you have agreed that there must be a plebiscite?", he replied: "I know that I have agreed to that; but if there is a plebiscite in Kashmir, which is a disputed territory"—it is not merely a disputed territory but would have been inevitably part of Pakistan—"it will be

like opening a Pandora's box." So, I ask, have you not opened a Pandora's box, indeed a treasure house? Please look beyond today, please do not be so myopic. We have to live in the same subcontinent; we do not want the subcontinent to be in flames. You will find fragmentation following in the wake of this situation. Today you may rejoice over what is happening to us. But if you think that today you are going to dismember Pakistan and the germs of dismemberment are not going to spread to your country, you are sadly mistaken. And where is this Pandora's box going to be closed? Is it going to be closed in Yugoslavia? Why not Yugoslavia? Why not Czechoslovakia? Why not Wales and Scotland? I shall not mention Northern Ireland because there is the Queen's peace there. There has been no trouble in Northern Ireland, so I shall not mention Northern Ireland but only Wales and Scotland. And Brittany, the Basque country, Morocco, Algeria, all the countries in Africa? Can it not happen in any single country in Africa and in Asia? If there is Bangla Desh in Pakistan, there must be Bangla Desh everywhere. Why should Bangla Desh emerge only in Pakistan by force? The fragmentation that it symbolizes can occur in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it cannot leave untouched the great Powers themselves—in Uzbekistan and in other parts of the world.

192. There will not be a Bangla Desh only in Pakistan. There will be a Bangla Desh everywhere. We shall see to it that it is not only in Pakistan. Then there will be Bangla Desh everywhere.

193. Bangla Desh exists on the lips of the Government of India. Bangla Desh exists in their mind; Bangla Desh does not exist in reality. And when I say that, I do not say that I do not have love for my Bengali brothers. I say: *Joi Bangla* as much as I say *Jia Sind*. They are parts of the same federation. These slogans cannot be turned against us. So, physician heal thy own wounds; do not heal the wounds of Pakistan. Pakistan has always had the rough end of the stick. Pakistan has been the sinner for a long time; Pakistan's territories have been taken in Kashmir, in East Punjab, in West Bengal, in Assam. Pakistan has been lacerated enough, much more than Mexico was lacerated in this hemisphere.

194. But the ills and the curses that you would impose on Pakistan by military force will not end by creating a so-called State of Bangla Desh in my country only. Then there should be Bangla Desh everywhere in the world. Why not? Let us open up the floodgates, because if sovereign States are going to be mutated in this fashion, let the deluge come. Why should it affect only my country?

195. We are prepared to die. We are not afraid to die. Our people are brave. We and India have shared 5,000 years of history together. They know us. Do not go by these Western press correspondents who tell you that we are running. We are not running; we shall not run. The liquidation of Pakistan will never be permitted. Believe me, Mexico might occupy the United States, Canada might occupy the United States, Denmark might occupy Germany, Finland might occupy the Soviet Union—but Pakistan will not be occupied by India in any circumstances. Remember that. We will not be occupied. We shall

fight, and we shall fight for 1,000 years as we have fought for 1,000 years in the past. Our history is not a new history. We have a 1,000-year history of confrontation. We can continue.

196. The Indian Government and the Indian people have a choice: the choice is very clear. It is: Do you want to live with us as friends in the same subcontinent, believing and respecting the principles of international law and morality, or do you want to be our implacable enemies? The choice is yours. We are prepared to extend the hand of friendship. We want to open a new chapter in our relations. Why can we not open a new chapter in our relations? Why should we always be the exception, if the Germans and the French can forget their problems and get into the Common Market after so many wars and if the Turks and the Greeks do not go berserk and mad over Cyprus and start a conflict?

197. There are so many international disputes, but there is always the restraining hand of civilization, of morality. If the Soviet Union and the United States after 15 years of confrontation can reach a *détente* and if China and the United States can open a dialogue, why cannot India and Pakistan also open a dialogue? And we are prepared for that dialogue; we wanted that dialogue. We wanted a new page, a new dimension. We wanted to move according to the mood and the requirements of modern times, and we were anxious for it. I think the Indian Government is very good at research because they have quoted many facts and figures. I made many important statements saying that we are prepared to open a new page in our history, but they have prevented it. If India had not today tried to occupy parts of Pakistan, I could have spoken more on the subject. But if I speak today on the subject, they might think that I am speaking from a position of weakness.

198. If only they had given us an opportunity. The Prime Minister of India said that she could not talk to a military régime. But the military régime said that after 13 years it was dissolving itself within a month. After the Prime Minister of India had spent nine months waiting, could she not agree on one more month for the civilian Government to come to power and open a dialogue, a communication between our two countries? Of course, the Indian Government did not wait for nine months out of tolerance and good behaviour. It utilized those nine months for infiltration into Pakistan. They wanted nine months to train people—the so-called guerrillas. The Foreign Minister of India has made a virtue of India's waiting for nine months. Well, he needed at least this time. We saw that. As a political leader of my country I said: "By the end of the year, there will be a new situation in Pakistan." We were anticipating their plans. After all, intelligence matters. We saw what their plan was. We could see it. They wanted to train guerrillas; they wanted to create an international climate. The Indian Prime Minister wanted to go all over the world to create an international climate of goodwill and then to swing. So she needed nine months to swing. It was not out of good behaviour, waiting for the world to act.

199. We said, give us another month. Much has been made of the refugees, the refugees that went from East Pakistan into the Bangla Desh of India. And in the Bangla Desh of

India there are supposed to be nine or ten million refugees. We have not contended that these figures are wrong; we have not disputed the figures. As far as we are concerned, we have said that we are ashamed of the fact that our citizens have left our country. No country likes to have refugees; no country likes to have people leaving it. But if our people have left our country, we want them back, because if they have lived in that place for thousands of years, and have lived there for 24 years after Pakistan was created, then why can they not also in the future live in our country? This is no problem. If we said, "No, there are no refugees", that would be false. We took a position on principle. We said that whatever the number of refugees, we are prepared to take them back—whether there are six million, three million, two million or eight million genuine Pakistanis who, out of fear and propaganda, have left Pakistan, we are prepared to take them back because if they have lived with us before they can live with us again. The Indian Prime Minister said that they could not go back while there was a military régime in Pakistan. We said, wait for a month, all we ask of you is to convert nine months into ten months; give us four more weeks. And I was prepared—and I said this in Karachi on the 12th—to go and visit those refugee camps as a political leader. I said that we were not closing any option, we were not imposing any conditions for a political settlement; but give us time, let us finish with the present phase and let us enter the new phase and usher in peace.

200. The Foreign Minister of India must know that I said on 18 October in Lahore that I did not anticipate a war. He has quoted various slogans like "Crush India". I said that I did not anticipate a war. Why did I say that? Because we want peace in order to serve our people, to concentrate on their misery, on their problems. We do not want to be locked in international conflicts. We want time to achieve progress for our people. We have a socialist and Islamic programme for our people for bread, butter and progress. We wanted time to implement that. We wanted time for a civilian government to be established in Pakistan after 13 years, based on a massive mandate from the people, so that we could progress, move ahead, and serve our people. Instead, after nine months, they could not wait for one more month. They struck. And they struck heavily, reversing those forces of democracy about which the Foreign Minister of India waxes so eloquent. If the Foreign Minister is so interested in democracy, he should have waited for some time and democracy would have come. Democracy generates its own laws. It has a parliament. There is freedom of the press, and the demands of the public are more important than the demands of foreign Powers. One thing might have led to another. We would first have tackled the principles involved, the causes of dissatisfaction, which, I can tell you frankly, were not confined to East Pakistan; there was dissatisfaction also in West Pakistan over questions of autonomy and democracy. So we were prepared to tackle all these problems. And we were prepared to tackle not only the problems of West Pakistan, but also the problems of East Pakistan on autonomy, on democracy, on secularism—all these matters. But we were not given a chance. It was used as a pretext. The idea was to see that Pakistan would not flourish and resolve its problems; the idea was to take advantage of the internal difficulties of Pakistan—not to come to its rescue,

but to take advantage of its internal difficulties. Otherwise, we would have been given this opportunity.

201. India's interest in the crisis did not arise suddenly after the tragic and fateful night of 25 March. Before 25 March India had manipulated a hijacking incident at Lahore which it used as a pretext to sever communications between East and West Pakistan through the air, through the Indian Corridor. That was on 30 January, after I had returned from East Pakistan, having completed my preliminary negotiations with Mujibur Rahman. If the Indian Government was such a friend of his it would not have created a new situation at that time. But the Indian Government was not happy about the negotiations that we were having with Sheikh Mujibur, because the moment that I had completed the preliminary negotiations with him and had come back to West Pakistan, the first thing that was manipulated was the hijacking incident which was arranged by Indian spies from occupied Kashmir in order to disrupt communications so that Mujibur Rahman and I could not come in contact.

202. Now the Indian Government talks about a political settlement, a political agreement with the leaders of East Pakistan. But when the accredited leaders of East and West Pakistan met, the Indian Government disrupted their communications because it did not want an agreement on the basis of one Pakistan, which we were trying to achieve. So the first thing it did was to break the means of contact between the leaders of East and West Pakistan. We could not go by sea in those difficult circumstances in order to hold political dialogue and negotiations.

203. After that, on the pretext of holding elections in the Bangla Desh of India, they sent 150,000 troops to conduct the polls. The idea was to put an army into position against East Pakistan and against Pakistan as a whole.

204. India has talked about how Pakistan, a smaller country, one fifth of the size of India and less in manpower and resources—and bear in mind India's armed forces, its army, navy, air force, its indigenous manufacturing capacity—has always been the aggressor against India. We come to this question of aggression, as to how much we have committed aggression against India in the last 24 years, since 1947 when the two States of India and Pakistan came into being.

205. In 1948 there was a conflict in Kashmir. You all know the history of Kashmir, which was a disputed territory. It was a princely State. It had to determine its own future, according to the standpoint of both India and Pakistan, by its free will. If India had permitted a plebiscite in Kashmir there would have been no trouble there today; the Kashmir problem would not still be on the agenda of the United Nations. But it was India which prevented the plebiscite from being held in Kashmir. And yet it accuses Pakistan of the trouble there. If there is trouble in Kashmir, it is of India's making because India is the country that admitted that there should be a plebiscite, a referendum, in Kashmir and then prevented that plebiscite. No less a person than the Prime Minister of India himself—and you can see this in the records of the Security Council—made the commitments on the question of the plebiscite. And yet today the Indian Foreign Minister has the temerity to say

that we were responsible for the conflict in 1947-1948 in Kashmir.

206. The Indian Foreign Minister referred to the Rann of Kutch conflict. In the Rann of Kutch conflict, it was the Indian forces which were the occupiers. Mr. Parthasarathi, who is now here on the delegation, was the High Commissioner. He was a good friend of mine—I was Foreign Minister at the time—and he came to me. I said, we are prepared to solve this problem peacefully; and we did solve it peacefully. I remember that he came to me very agitated. I said, there must be some trouble; we will solve it peacefully. And if we had not wanted to solve it peacefully it would not have been solved in that manner. We left it in the able and experienced hands of the British who arranged arbitration between the two of us. The British know the subcontinent better than the rest of us. They arbitrated on the question. The trouble is, too many people from the outside have arbitrated in the disputes of the subcontinent; right from Clive to the Tashkent Declaration, outside intervention has decided the fate of the subcontinent. Why cannot India and Pakistan decide the fate of the subcontinent for a change? Either we have left it to outsiders—the French, the British, the Russians and others—to decide our fate or we have gone to war. I tell the Government of India, let us not leave it to outsiders, and let us not allow war to be the arbiter. Let us open a new page, provided hostilities are ended and we return to normal conditions. But the Rann of Kutch dispute was left to the British and they arbitrated, and we accepted their award. In my opinion, it was not a fair award because we were denied our territorial rights still, we accepted what was short of our rights. Very well, we accepted in the interests of peace, security and good relations between our two countries.

207. We were not, then, responsible for the 1947 holocaust, and we were not responsible for the trouble in the summer of 1965 in the Rann of Kutch. After that came the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. Again, we went to Tashkent, and we settled it. We had arbitration. I think that arbitration also was not in the interests of Pakistan. That is an objective assessment. Nevertheless signatures were attached by both the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. Although the agreement more or less accepted the Indian position, yet again in the interests of peace, there was a settlement at Tashkent. The fact that that settlement did not get implemented—well, they can say we are responsible; we say they are responsible. But the crux of the matter is that we agreed to a settlement which was not in our interests, which was more in their interests—so much so that their Prime Minister died of jubilation at Tashkent. It was favourable to them, and their press and everyone else was in agreement that it was.

208. So again we, as the smaller State, witnessed the power and might of the bigger State, causing an erosion of our rights. But where are we to stop? How much are our rights to be eroded? Already the Indian Prime Minister is saying that the people of West Pakistan and Baluchistan must have their rights—already making a distinction between them. We know what is in your minds. We know why you are stalling, how you are taking something and consolidating it. And you want to take more and more and more. And you have never really reconciled yourselves to

what you call the vivisection of Bharatt Mata. That is the truth of the matter. It has been established now in your action, in your predatory aggression in East Pakistan. You never really reconciled yourselves to the creation of Pakistan. Today, more than ever before, you have eloquently, barbarically and ruthlessly demonstrated to the world that you are not reconciled to the vivisection of what you call Bharatt Mata. But, Sardar Swaran Singh, neither Bharatt nor Mata will be left—because these are the methods which leave behind neither a country nor principles.

209. Now I come to a problem which I do not like to deal with, but it is essential that I do so, because it is a connected, relevant and cardinal aspect of the problem. If it were avoidable, I would avoid it. But since it is pivotal to the problem I must refer to it because my people know that this is the position, and the world must know it is.

210. India and Pakistan, as we call the two major communities, have existed in the subcontinent for thousands of years. We have had conflicts, we have had wars. We have known how to deal with each other. We have dealt with each other and we have established some kind of equilibrium between ourselves. But today we are not pitted against India as such. Today we are pitted against India and a great Power. India is a big country. I have already said it is. But today it is standing on the shoulders of a big Power to look bigger. If it did not stand on those big shoulders and look bigger, it would not have been arrogant enough to defy the will of the General Assembly and the whole world expressed in a resolution calling for a cease-fire, the end of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces. Today we are pitted not against India but against a great Power—and a neighbouring great Power—to which we have done no harm. We have done it no wrong. We have made every effort to have the best of relations with that great Power. We have the greatest respect for it. It is a neighbouring Power, very close to Pakistan.

211. In 1960, as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, I was the first Minister to go to the Soviet Union to conclude an oil agreement in order to foster good relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. We annoyed our allies; we annoyed and had some basic misunderstandings with a country that is a greater Power, militarily speaking. We were involved with that country in two treaties—the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)—and in bilateral agreements. But we wanted to improve our relations with a neighbouring country—and at that time it promised that if we got out of those pacts or became passive in those which were directed against it, that would bring about a new turn in relationships. Perhaps we were not as shrewd in power politics as are others, but believing we should do so we made great efforts to improve our relations with the Soviet Union.

212. We have never wronged the Soviet Union. We have had the greatest respect and admiration for the Soviet people and for the great founder of the Soviet State, Lenin, one of the greatest men of contemporary times, of all time. And our people are still full of admiration. We cannot understand why the Soviet Union is being a party to our

dismemberment. What wrong have we committed against the Soviet Union? If the Soviet Union was not a party to this exercise we would not be facing the present situation.

213. I do not want to go into details. I do not want to quote facts and figures. I do not want to tell the Council on what date a destroyer was torpedoed, how it was torpedoed or what has been done. I am not a person who goes into detail; I stress principles. My principles make me ask the Soviet Union what wrong the 120 million people of Pakistan have done that the Soviet Union should adopt such a partisan attitude, and support a predatory aggressor and take such an extreme position—not in a just cause but to see my country dismembered. That is a legitimate question I ask in good faith, and still as a friend: Why does the Soviet Union want to defy world opinion on the question of the unity of Pakistan? Have we done the Soviet Union some basic wrong?

214. What makes it more puzzling is that on 2 April 1971 President Podgorny in a message wished the Pakistani people well being and prosperity and said he had rejoiced over their success in the democratic solution of the complicated problems facing the country. Mr. Kosygin told the special envoy of President Yahya Khan, Mr. Arshad Hussein, that relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan were based on principled positions of strengthening co-operation for mutual benefit. He said the Soviet Union was willing to continue developing those relations and efforts for the cause of strengthening peace and international security. Again, Mr. Kosygin told our Ambassador in Moscow repeatedly that the Soviet Union did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan and that it was for Pakistan to decide what political system to adopt. He went on to emphasize that the political system within Pakistan was for Pakistan alone to decide, not for India or the Soviet Union. He said, "Please, Mr. Ambassador, tell the President that every aspect of our co-operation is based upon peace and not upon war. It is our constant policy that all disputes between India and Pakistan should be settled by negotiations and not by armed conflict. We are friends of Pakistan, and we want all questions between Pakistan and India to be settled peacefully. They are not rich enough to have conflicts; even richer States try to avoid conflicts. We can sincerely say that Pakistan and India should resolve their differences without resorting to a conflict. We should like to see them as friends. We have no other consideration. We do not want to interfere in your internal affairs."

215. Now, those are the messages from the President and Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. And in 1965, when there was a conflict between Pakistan and India, the Soviet Union had very good relations with India and with Pakistan—though those with India were better, yet it did not take such a significant and conspicuous position in India's favour as it has today. Today the Soviet Union has openly and brazenly come out in support of India. The problem is that we are facing not India alone—we have faced India for thousands of years—but the Soviet Union. Otherwise the blockade of the Bay of Bengal would not have taken place. How could it have taken place, when the great fleets of the great Powers are on patrol there during peacetime? What is the object of that? They do not patrol in peacetime so that they can have a good cruise, because

then Portugal and Denmark and others could do the same. It is to ensure that during conflicts and troubles they can still keep the sea-lanes open. How have the sea-lanes been closed to us in East Pakistan? India could not have done it, especially with the Seventh Fleet and other forces operating in those seas.

216. It is because of the massive support that the Soviet Union has given to India. If the Soviet Union detaches itself from the Indo-Pakistan conflict, we are prepared to be pitted against India. India has become intoxicated with precisely the military gains which are a result of the Soviet support that it has received.

217. In this connexion, we must remember that the Indo-Soviet treaty of 9 August was concluded during this crisis. Now, please consider that India has always pursued a policy of non-alignment. India pursued a policy of non-alignment from 1947 until 1962 when it unnecessarily came into conflict with China. Just as they attacked us today, they attacked China in 1962. But from 1947 to 1962 India was non-aligned. And the architect of that policy was Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. And his name has gone down in history as the architect of such a positive policy. But even from 1962, India, on the whole, remained non-aligned, albeit with its own methods of duplicity and double-dealing.

218. Then, why did India abandon its principles of non-alignment, openly, legally, juristically, on 9 August 1971, and align itself with a great Power, the Soviet Union? As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, General-Secretary Brezhnev's Asian security proposal to isolate China had been made two years earlier. Like the European security proposal, it had its own connotation. But the Asian security proposal of General-Secretary Brezhnev had been made two years earlier. Why did not India then endorse the Asian security proposal? Or why did not India conclude a bilateral agreement in the spirit of the Brezhnev proposals in 1967 and 1968? Why was it on 9 August 1971 that the Indian Government abandoned its policy of non-alignment, violated its established principles, and concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union which was called the Indo-Soviet treaty. What is the *quid pro quo*? What is the reciprocity? As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is obvious: a great Power wants an Asian security pact for certain reasons, matching the power of another great country. But what was the benefit, what was the advantage to India? Why did a country that was wedded, fundamentally, irrevocably, to the classic policy of non-alignment, abandon it and go and conclude a pact with the Soviet Union on 9 August? Could you tell me what that *quid pro quo* was? That *quid pro quo* was the dismemberment of Pakistan. Nothing else. "We will join it, we will abandon non-alignment, we will eat our own philosophy; but this is an implacable enemy and you must be on our side to destroy it"—that was the *quid pro quo*.

219. The real trouble started not with what happened in Dacca on 24 March. The real, fundamental trouble started when this treaty was concluded, and we had to face a new India, supported by the power, the prestige, the spirit, the resources, the technology and the arms of the Soviet Union. If we had received half the amount of arms that the Soviet

Union has given to India, today we would be sitting in Delhi.

220. Now, there is an interesting article in that treaty. It is article 9:

"Each contracting party undertakes to abstain from giving any assistance to any third party that engages in an armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to attack or threat thereof, the high contracting party shall immediately enter into mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security of the country".

221. These are diplomatic words, couched in defensive jargon, for offensive purposes. We should know this, because for 12 years we were members of two defence treaties, and we still are. So we are familiar with the language of these treaties. This is not a defensive treaty; this is a treaty which has an offensive purpose. Today, also, the consultation is going on. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union has gone to Delhi. Some officials of India, such as Mr. Dhar, have gone to the Soviet Union.

222. I would really like to know what crime or what wrong Pakistan has committed against the Soviet Union, that my country should be dismembered. Is it because the Soviet Union has bad relations with China? China's relations with the Soviet Union do not mean that my country should be dismembered by the Soviet Union. China's relations with the Soviet Union are their relations. We have always taken the position that we want good relations with China and we want good relations with the Soviet Union. We do not want to have good relations with China at the cost of the Soviet Union, nor do we want to have good relations with the Soviet Union at the cost of China. But as a result of our good relations with China, we are being not only penalized, but treated in a fashion where, limb by limb, we are being taken apart. This is unprecedented.

223. But even if we are being torn apart limb by limb, we will not abandon our good relations with China. China is a reliable friend of Pakistan; China is a reliable friend of Asia; China is a reliable friend of the third world. Earlier on, we had to suffer with a greater Power than the Soviet Union for the development of our relations with China. But, today, we are happy to see that there is some change in that situation. We would be happy to see some change in the situation between the Soviet Union and China also.

224. But why should we be the victims? Why should we get into this nutcracker? The trouble is that we belong to Asia. We cannot transplant ourselves from Asia into the North American continent or Europe. China's borders with Pakistan are very long, very rugged; the Himalayas unite and link China and Pakistan—the mountains, the rivers.

225. Why should we have bad relations with a country which wants to have good relations and is a great Power on our continent? What is the crime that we have committed by having good relations with a friendly country which has supported us and has stood by us? China's crime is that it

has stood by the third world. Its crime is that it has stood by principles. Its crime is that it will never abandon its friends. Now, if China was a chauvinist Power, if China was an expansionist Power, if China was an arrogant country, if China wanted to exterminate us, we would not have good relations with China. Of course, at one time our relations were not good. But China is not an expansionist Power. China has not shown any sign ever of interference in the affairs of another country. So why should we unnecessarily spoil our relations with China? But the choice offered us is: either spoil your relations with China or get dismembered. This is a very poignant choice, a very tragic choice.

226. But I say that even if a part of our territory or country is occupied, that is not so important as having good relations with China. For whatever is occupied can be regained—and we will regain it, because it is our territory, they are our people, they belong to us. Even this threat, the threat that you must be punished for having good relations with China—the world must see what happens to China's friends and what happens to the Soviet Union's friends—we consider only temporary. We are convinced that the friends of the Soviet Union are not going to be beneficiaries in the long run, when they are aggressors. The friends of China are not aggressors. The friends of China are defending their self-respect, their sovereignty and their integrity; and if they are going to suffer some consequences, well, a brave nation, an honourable and self-respecting nation, is prepared to accept that confrontation.

227. Take East Pakistan for five or ten years. We will have it back; we will fight to take it back; and we will get our country back. Your occupation is not going to make any difference. East Pakistan belongs to Pakistan and all the forces in the world can get together, but our country will remain unimpaired in the long run. You can have any illusions; you can stand on the back of any great Power; you can use all its resources. But believe me, Mr. Foreign Minister, finally—this is the lesson of history from the beginning of time—what belongs to a people will go to that people. "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's; render unto God that which is God's." East Pakistan is part of Pakistan; you know this. This is a lesson of history.

228. The fact is that we are being made a Poland in Asia. Although Poland voted against us, we are being made a Poland. In 1939, there was a pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, and Poland suffered. In 1971 there is a pact between India and the Soviet Union, and Pakistan is suffering as a result of that pact. But we will not suffer for ever. The truth must prevail. Even if the Security Council takes no action, even if we have to face more trouble, even if this blackmail is to culminate in further aggression, we are quite confident that, finally, victory will be ours because we stand by justice. And all we are doing is to preserve our national unity and our national integrity.

229. The United States of America has been accused of supporting Pakistan. The United States of America is not supporting Pakistan but a principle. Please keep the distinction in mind. The United States of America has come out as a great Power for a principle, and that principle is not that it is supporting Pakistan; the principle is that it is supporting the unity of a country. It supports the integrity

of a country. It cannot permit a country to be dismembered by force. It cannot permit a country to be treated like a despised neighbour. And we are thankful to the United States for the position it has taken, not only for Pakistan but for an important international principle. We are beholden to the United States for promoting, not our cause, but the cause of peace, justice and international morality. And the United States knows that its own prestige in the world will rise as a result. The United States has no cause to feel embarrassed. Indeed, if the United States had taken the opposite position, we would have understood it because, unfortunately, sometimes we have had strained relations. I am sorry we have had those strained relations. I am prepared to do everything in my power to repair those relations in Asia for the United States, and in my country where I do not speak as a puppet or as representative of any régime. I speak in my right as an authentic voice of the people of West Pakistan. The time will come. We cannot forget it.

230. We are thankful to all countries which are supporting the cause of justice—we are thankful to China, we are thankful to the United States for supporting the voice of the world.

231. And now I come to France. The relations between France and Pakistan have been very good. Right from the creation of Pakistan, slowly, we have stepped up our relations in commerce, in trade and in economics. We have also obtained a deeper understanding. We have great respect and regard for French civilization and culture. We admire the current of French thought in Asian political thinking. The relations between Pakistan and France have been so good that we are really pained by France's present attitude in claiming that they are working behind the scenes. When there is no scene left where will behind the scenes be?

232. France must take a positive, moral position for national unity and integrity. We are not enemies of France; we are good friends of France. As far as we are concerned, Mr. Permanent Representative, the die has been cast. You must cast your die. Sometimes there will be the east wind; sometimes there will be the west wind. Do not go by the east wind; do not go by the west wind. Go by principle. The principle is that Pakistan is a united, sovereign State, and an attempt is now being made to dismember Pakistan by physical force. We have the greatest admiration and respect for your great country. When your great former President went to Canada, all he said was "*Vive le Québec libre!*" and such a storm was created. It was not said in the context of secession, but the whole world was in an uproar over how President de Gaulle was interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. That was nothing compared to what the Indians are doing in my country. They are not shouting a slogan of "*Vive la Joi Bangla!*" They are going in there with their arms, with their might, with their tanks, to take over my country.

233. So I appeal to you in the name of justice, I appeal to you in the name of humanity, I appeal to you in the name of the people of Asia—now you have a good name in Asia; you are a respected nation—please do not take the short-term factors into account. You must know that these bad days will pass and the truth will prevail.

234. I appeal to you, in the name of the people of Pakistan. Franco-Pakistan relations have been so good, so cordial and so warm. Today when we are fighting for our lives with our backs to the wall, when we are facing a much worse Dunkirk—speaking of Dunkirk, that is nothing compared to what our forces are facing—we would expect that France, conscious of the rights, conscious of its contribution to civilization and to world peace, would play an effective and positive role.

235. As for Britain, we are members of the Commonwealth, we have remained members of the Commonwealth and I do not want to say too much. This crisis was, to some extent, aggravated by the attitude the British took, for wherever we go outside Asia, we are told that the British know the subcontinent very well so we must consult them. If the British knew the subcontinent so well they would not have left us in this state, because for twenty-four years we have had conflict after conflict due to the way in which the departing Power left us.

236. Now the question is this: Why did the departing Power leave us in that situation? Of course, the departing Power took cognizance of the reality of the situation created by the will of the people. The British would not have permitted the partition of the subcontinent into two States—India and Pakistan, one divided by a 1,000 miles—if that was not what the people of the subcontinent had wanted. But the British did not give any benefit of doubt to Pakistan. The First Governor-General of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was British; he was not the first Governor-General of Pakistan. Certain areas which the British originally said would be parts of Pakistan were denied to us at the last minute. So the fact is this: after denying our legitimate rights, the British said of whatever was left, "This, finally, is Pakistan". Now, since the British decided what was finally Pakistan, why must they now not play a role to at least preserve what they finally conceded as Pakistan?

237. As far as the third world is concerned, we are most grateful to it. We are part of the third world. When it has come to us, in our humble way we have always tried to make a contribution to the cause of the third world. Anywhere in the Arab countries, Morocco, Algeria, on the questions of independence, on Viet-Nam, Cambodia, wherever issues of the third world have arisen, Pakistan has been in the forefront in supporting principles. Pakistan is grateful to the third world which has spoken the truth. I salute the third world. If the third world had not spoken the truth on this present situation in the subcontinent, then the third world would have become the fourth world and the fourth world would have been the graveyard of the third world. By upholding truth and unity and justice with respect to Pakistan, you have really preserved the third world. We are not fighting only Pakistan's battle, as I stated. If Pakistan is to be subjugated by force in this fashion, then as far as the subcontinent is concerned, Ceylon can forget its independence, Burma can forget it, Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Iran and all these countries can forget it. The steamroller will continue and go on and on. Any larger country will dictate to its smaller neighbour that so and so should be the President, that so and so should be the Prime Minister, that this is its will, that there should be

autonomy here and secession there. And it will send its forces to enforce the *diktat*. All we ask of the third world is not to forget us, because we never forgot the third world. We are a part of it. We are the small ones. We are the ones that they try to bully. We are the ones that they have tried to dominate. We must all unite collectively to put an end to great power hegemony and to great power domination. And we will succeed. There will be reverses, like the reverses we are facing. There will be troubles. There will be problems. But finally the third world is bound to succeed, because the third world is really the most inspiring force in contemporary politics. That is why today even if this draft resolution [S/10446] is vetoed, even if there is a deadlock, even if another draft resolution is vetoed, even if there are more difficulties for my country and more problems, I am sure that finally we shall succeed because the third world is with us. And today we have come to the Security Council to ask for the implementation of the verdict of the third world. That is all we ask to be done.

238. Again, I should like to return, before I conclude, to Indo-Pakistan relations. I have some notes here of the main points made by the Indian Foreign Minister. He raised quite a few points and I cannot refer to all of them now. However, there are some of them that I should like to touch upon. I have already touched upon some. I am sure that later the President will be kind enough to grant me the right of reply.

239. The Foreign Minister of India said that West Pakistan exploited East Pakistan—the resources and the riches of East Pakistan—and that is basically the reason why we have come to the present situation. This is a very fundamental question. Exploitation is not a phenomenon of individuals or regions. Exploitation takes place as the result of a social system. It is the social system that exploits. And the same social system basically prevails in India and Pakistan. As much as they are making efforts in India to change their social system, we are also making efforts in our country to change our social system, because we believe that our present social systems are basically exploitative. The political party which I lead contends that there was exploitation, that East Pakistan had been exploited, as well as regions in the West, but by the social system. The struggle was really related to the social system. We are not denying that there were problems. But we do not say that this means our country should be destroyed and dismembered by another country.

240. If tomorrow there are certain parts of another country that are being exploited because of the social system or for some other reason, does that mean that that country should be destroyed or dismembered? Certainly not. Therefore, that is a wrong premise on which they have proceeded.

241. In addition, the question is why India has occupied East Pakistan. It is rich, alluvial, fertile, and it has jute; it is a very rich region of the subcontinent. But the disaster of East Pakistan and of the other part of Pakistan is that a rich region has remained poor. We do not want to have exploitation in any part of our country and we do not want exploitation in any part of the world. But we should be given the chance to decide how we remake our own

country, how we transform our own social system and how our nation is to evolve. It is not the right of another country to dictate to us how that should be done or what should be done or who should come here to represent a point of view.

242. Today the Indian Foreign Minister said that the problem could only be resolved if a representative of the so-called Bangla Desh government, which was created by India, was represented in the Security Council. But Bengal is Bengal and East Pakistan is part of Pakistan. Are you going to permit this kind of precedent, when provincial parties and those who are clients of large countries should have representation before the Security Council? I know the world started with the Greek city state. Are we going to end with the principalities of India all over again? Sometimes the Maharathas will come to the Security Council; sometimes the Sikhs will come to the Security Council; sometimes the Punjabis will come to the Security Council; and other provinces will come to the Security Council to present their case. We can also bring some people from India. We have not indulged in that kind of mischief. But give us some time; we can also give you some representatives from India who will come here and ask that they should be represented.

243. *Sokoya Bangla, Sardar Sahib, Aya Ami dar Sonar Bangla, Bharatar nai*, which in English means: listen, Sardar Swaran Singh, the golden Bengal belongs to Pakistan, not to India. Golden Bengal is part of Pakistan. You cannot take away golden Bengal like that from Pakistan. We will fight to the bitter end. We will fight to the last man.

244. The PRESIDENT: I have no further speakers on my list. I believe that it is the desire of members to try to digest the various statements that we have heard from the representative of the United States, who gave us the reasons of his delegation for calling this meeting, from the Foreign Minister of India and from the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan. I think it is right that we should pay heed to the call for urgency. Both the Foreign Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan have said that the United Nations has failed the subcontinent. They have both agreed on that point and I believe that the Security Council ought not to fail the subcontinent in this trying hour.

245. Both have appealed for peace based on justice, on the honourable settlement which the representative of the United States is asking us to achieve. In the circumstances, it is my belief that we would need some further consultations, two strata of consultations: first, with our respective Governments at home, so that we could have definite instructions to resolve the matter once and for all, and that within the next 24 hours; and second, horizontal consultations here in New York, so as to achieve a spirit of compromise and accommodation.

246. Unless I hear anything to the contrary, we shall consider the discussion of the item on our agenda suspended, so that we can have fruitful, two-level consultations and resume tomorrow.

247. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I certainly do not want to interrupt you, Mr. President, but I did want to

be recognized before the meeting was adjourned. We feel that we are meeting here with a certain sense of urgency. We knew nothing of what Ambassador Malik referred to, that there was some understanding that, after the presentation we were permitted to make and the presentations by the representatives of India and Pakistan, representing their Governments here, this would be the procedure to be followed. I had the feeling, from what Ambassador Malik said, that there was some understanding in the Council to this effect. I would like to reiterate that nobody consulted the United States Government about this situation. We think we are meeting here with a sense of some urgency. It was a week ago today that the General Assembly acted. Most of the representatives are familiar, in our opinion, with what the General Assembly did. It was not very different from what the Security Council had done several days before.

248. We have a draft resolution before the Council [S/10446]. It would not take very long to have a vote on it one way or the other. I would hate to have the Council once more adjourn, with only three presentations having been made, and once again give the world at large the feeling that we are unable to act, even if not in total harmony; that another week might go by, or even another day, without our taking some action, whether or not we get total agreement on it.

249. So our view, on behalf of the United States Government, is that we would object to an adjournment. Needless to say, however, if it were voted by the Council, we would certainly abide by the Council's decision. But I do not think there is anything so new about what the General Assembly did. Representatives have had a long time to consult their Governments about this. It was one week ago that the General Assembly acted.

250. Therefore, I would like to urge that the Council try, within the next few minutes, to dispose of our draft resolution one way or the other. If it is successful, fine; we might actually stop some killing, we might stop some bloodshed. If it is not successful, perhaps we could do as the President says. Certainly we are prepared to meet again, and meet soon, to try to find some other draft resolution. But we already have one here. It is based on the overwhelming voice of the General Assembly at large—104 to 11. I do not think it requires great study or consultation. Certainly most representatives in the Council had to receive instructions on it, in general, once before. It is true there are some changes, because we referred it to the General Assembly. But I would like to see us stay in session for a very short period of time and try to dispose of this draft resolution one way or the other.

251. The PRESIDENT: First, on the question of the understanding. Before the meeting was held as a result of the letter received calling for an immediate meeting of the Security Council, it was necessary, in accordance with custom, to hold informal consultations, first with the representative requesting the holding of the meeting, next with the permanent representatives on the Security Council, and afterwards with the non-permanent representatives on the Council. In the course of those informal consultations, there was an understanding that the pro-

cedure which the representative of the Soviet Union mentioned earlier might be adopted if the situation warranted it. It is a pity if the representative of the United States was not apprised that such an understanding had developed as the consultations continued. Unfortunately, he was not available to be so informed.

252. I call upon the representative of the United States on a point of order.

253. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): Perhaps I would retract what I said, if we are the only delegation that was not apprised of that understanding, though every other delegation was. I beg your pardon, if that is true. There was a consultation that I did not attend. Therefore, if every other representative knew about the understanding, I would withdraw my comments concerning it.

254. The PRESIDENT: I would have liked to put this directly to the decision of the Council, but I notice that the representative of the Soviet Union would like to say something. I now call on him.

255. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): What is involved is not a matter of an understanding, but a matter of substance. I have already drawn attention more than once to the fact that the United States representative is in a privileged position by comparison with every one of us. Today, judging by reports on the United States radio, he was at a meeting of the National Security Council; he saw President Nixon, he received some sort of instructions and now he is speaking here. None of us had, or has, such an opportunity. I tried to contact Moscow by telephone, but I was unsuccessful.

256. The question is a serious one. The representative of the United States asserts that nothing new has happened, but he himself recognizes that "it is true there are some changes". Of course there have been changes. Statements have been made by two high-ranking representatives of the parties concerned, the Foreign Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan said a whole host of things which must be answered and which make it necessary for the meeting to be continued. Are we ready to go on until morning? Let us continue until morning, for, in particular, the distinguished Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan spoke about everything under the sun. He frightened us all, but he did not touch on the main cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. And that must be discussed. Is this new?—It is new. Must each of us ponder what has been said here? He must do so, he is obliged to do so. Must each of us report to his own Government? He is obliged to do so. Must each of us receive instructions from his own Government? He is obliged to do so and must do so.

257. Yet again I stress that we, unfortunately, do not enjoy your privileges. You have only to telephone Washington to receive ready-made instructions. Do you absolutely have to have a vote? I warned you that I have no instructions on so serious a matter and on a meeting in which the Foreign Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan have taken part. I asked you not to insist on a vote. There is little time left

before morning, and I think that we shall be able to continue our discussion of this serious question. If you introduced your proposal merely in order to have a vote, then go ahead. There is an agreement for you. In two minutes you can vote. You need only two minutes for a vote. Is it for this that you introduced your proposal? Is this really a serious approach to the solution of such a serious problem? Everyone here, the whole world will know why you introduced your proposal: merely in order to receive yet another Soviet veto.

258. I cannot vote on a draft resolution without having consulted my government and without having received instructions from it.

259. The President and the Council have put a reasonable proposal to you, namely, that we should continue our consultations in the presence of the two high-ranking representatives of the two parties. The reasonable view always prevails. But why is this not to your liking? Do you need a vote? You shall have it.

260. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the United States of America has contested my own interpretation of the understanding, and therefore I have to put it to the Council, whether the Council wants us to break up for further consultations, both with our various Governments and with the representatives we have here. The suggestion has been made that there is nothing more we can do; we have been unable to act. That is not so. We have been able to act, we have been able to get the two Foreign Ministers of the parties concerned to come here, to meet with us at the same table, to talk and to be listened to with all attention and respect. I believe it may be necessary for us to profit from this rare opportunity. But I am in the hands of the Council. I have to put it to the Council.

261. I call on the representative of Somalia on a point or order.

262. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Mr. President, I believe it would be in the interests of our work if we allowed a little more discussion to take place on the particular point under discussion, and then perhaps later on you could put your proposal to the Council.

263. The PRESIDENT: I take note of that suggestion.

264. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has been in the Council chamber from 3.30 p.m. and has participated in the consultations. But we are now told that we have reached an agreement, as mentioned by Mr. Malik, in the process of the consultation. This understanding does not exist as far as we are concerned.

265. Secondly, the question of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent is nothing new; it is not a new question, especially for Mr. Malik. Also I think we can say that for every representative here, for every member of the Council or for their Governments, a grave and acute question such as that of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent is not a new one, not a strange one. The situation has seen no new changes, but it has become increasingly serious. If there is any

change, then it has become more serious and needs our urgent action without further delay. I believe this is the responsibility of every Government, every representative participating in the Security Council meeting. We should allow no further delay. So I should like to address an appeal to all my colleagues here in the Council, to try their best to co-operate and continue our urgent, serious discussions and try our best to reach a satisfactory solution to this question and unanimous agreement.

266. Mr. BUSH (United States): The representative of Somalia has negated my desire to speak at this particular time. His comments were parallel to what I was going to say.

267. Mr. KUI/AGA (Poland): It may perhaps be easy for certain delegations to make decisions on questions of this importance in a very short time. The discussion up to now has seemed to indicate that, but I should like to say that I learned about the meeting today from the radio. I was then informed about consultations which were to start at a certain hour. We arrived here, and it was after a demand for further delay that we heard the reading of a draft resolution which we received during the meeting itself, while we were listening to the speeches of the representative of the United States, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of India and the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan. In his speech he raised a number of questions which in my opinion require some comments. That is the situation: while we were listening to the speeches of parties very interested in that problem, we did not have time to consult or to look at the draft resolution, much less to study it. That is why I think, in the case of my delegation, I should like to study that, to consult with my Government and to have instructions from my Government before I come to a vote.

268. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation was somewhat surprised at the haste with which this Council meeting was convened—not as far as the principle of meetings of the Council is concerned; we have always been in favour of that and I myself have pointed this out to the General Assembly;⁵ we were convinced that in the light of the gravity of the situation the question would at some time or another come back to the Security Council—but I wonder precisely why we are meeting. Is it to vote? Is it once again to count hands on a draft resolution which is identical to the resolution that was already submitted to us and on which the result will be the same? Or have we met to try to find a solution, to try to devise the unanimous agreement which the circumstances require? Doubtless we can continue the discussion. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan addressed me personally. I am happy and I am quite ready to respond to him, and to continue this beginning of a dialogue. But there are decisions to be adopted. There has been a draft resolution submitted to us [*S/10446*]. We have primarily to profit from the presence here of representatives of the two countries concerned, in the persons of their Foreign Ministers, and thereby try to set up a bridgehead, perhaps to try to build something positive and not merely to count hands in another vote.

269. I think, Sir, that your proposal is extremely well taken. In the present circumstances, we should continue

⁵ *Ibid.*, Twenty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2003rd meeting.

consultations with the Foreign Ministers concerned, with the delegations present, and then take up our work as soon as possible; but I think it is wisdom itself that dictates that if we continue the discussion now and go on to a vote, we will arrive at another stalemate which will again render the Security Council still more ineffective and will again and further damage the prestige of the United Nations. Therefore I would heartily support the motion for postponement.

270. Mr. BUSH (United States): I would say that it is not the same old warmed-over hash, something is different since we met here before. We have had two presentations here, but the most significant thing—and I do not think any member of this Council has only now begun to think about it—is that the General Assembly a week ago today acted by a vote of 104 to 11, and we have had a week to consult our Governments about this. We have had a week to think about it, we have had a week to do something about it, and if this draft resolution indeed ends with the same vote as before or with something approximate to it, let us find another. It is not an effort, as Ambassador Malik said, to force a veto. If he could give me some assurance that he could get instructions tomorrow that would enable him to vote for it or to have a more forthcoming position, we would be enthusiastic about it. But the world is watching, and if the draft resolution cannot be unanimous, it seems to us that the Council should be able to express itself on it, at least to let the General Assembly know—the 104 nations that stood up and voted for something almost identical—that many members on this Council care, and that many members at least want to give it another try. That is the reason. It is not an effort to embarrass some country. If that is not unanimous, or if that does not get enough votes to succeed, let us meet again tomorrow and try another approach that some consultations would bring forward. But I think we have had a week at least to consider the ingredients of a resolution which we had already considered before, and my hope is that many delegations who felt they must abstain or vote against it, will be influenced by the weight of world opinion, the weight of what the General Assembly did by 104 to 11. That is all we are pressing for.

271. The PRESIDENT: I know that the representative of the USSR wishes to speak. I do not want to deny him his right but before I call on him I should like to say that there does appear to be a consensus of opinion that we should continue with the discussion and express our opinion on the draft resolution before us.

272. Unfortunately, as President I do not have a list of speakers inscribed for that purpose. I would be quite prepared to allow the discussion to continue, but we cannot continue *in vacuo*. There must be representatives wishing to speak not on procedure but on substance.

273. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Your explanations are extremely valuable and I thank you for them. The United States representative has referred to the General Assembly resolution. But we are speaking of a vote on his resolution, on the draft resolution which he introduced. He introduced it today during his statement. The most elementary rules of procedure demand that each of the participants in the discussion

on any draft resolution should have the right to ask for time to study that draft, to send it to his Government and to ask for instructions.

274. Why do you Mr. Bush, absolutely insist on putting pressure on the Council to vote immediately, this very minute? Why can you not take into account the requests of those members of the Security Council who, with full justification, have asked that the voting should be postponed somewhat, for a few hours in fact? It is already past midnight and we can convene a meeting tomorrow morning at which anyone who wishes to do so can express his opinion, for, as the representative of France rightly said, the distinguished Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan raised matters which affect almost everyone sitting around this table. He said all sorts of fantastic things, side-stepping the main cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. His statement calls for a reply and the situation demands a discussion of this matter, not a vote on your draft resolution simply because it is yours. The need might arise to introduce amendments to your draft resolution, and agreement must be reached on them with our Governments. You must understand the true nature of the situation. If your approach to the consideration of this matter is a serious one, then let us go about it seriously. If all you need is two minutes to see that your draft resolution is not accepted, then you have evil intentions and hidden motives. You do not desire to bring about a settlement of the problem, but to have your draft resolution rejected yet again and to shift the blame to those who cannot agree with it for the reasons I have indicated.

275. In addition, I must make a strong protest against American propaganda which claims that the Soviet Union spoke against a cease-fire. Until now this propaganda has only been spread on the radio, television and in the American press. Today, an official spokesman of the White House slandered the Soviet Union and its position. I ask you, Mr. Bush, to take note of my protest about the statement by the White House spokesman and to take the draft resolution [S/10428] which I introduced at the last meeting on the matter [1608th meeting] and show it to him. In it you will find the words "cease-fire and cessation of hostilities". But there is another point too, and that is something about which even Mr. Bhutto was silent. It mentions the cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. It mentions the need for a political settlement; the two questions are closely interrelated. And I assure you, Mr. Bush, that if you had adopted those proposals, the matter could have taken another turn. But you had to have a vote, you had to have a Soviet veto so that you could subsequently slander the Soviet Union even from the White House. That is where your serious approach to the solution of this problem leads. And today you are continuing the very same policy; you do not wish to allow the other members of the Security Council to study your proposals seriously or to consider how a way out of the situation could be found by taking advantage of the fact that two high-ranking representatives of the two parties are participating here in the work of the Security Council.

276. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I hate to prolong the meeting by getting into an arguing match with my colleague from the Soviet Union. But if he indeed suggests that this draft resolution is some plot, some

connivance, to embarrass the Soviet Union, then he must also suggest that the draft resolution adopted by 104 Members of the General Assembly [resolution 2793 (XXVI)] was some plot, some connivance, to embarrass the Soviet Union. The texts of these two resolutions are very similar.

277. I do not care about two minutes; I should be willing to sit here all night long and talk about it. But there is a war on and we are trying to do something about it. That is what the United States is trying to do. We are not in the least interested in seeing you veto it. We want to see you support it, and that is what the General Assembly wanted.

278. I refuse to be placed in the position, for the United States Government, of having somebody suggest that we are here simply to embarrass a country or to see something not happen. We are here because we sensed inaction and we wanted to see something happen. If this draft resolution does not work, then let us sit here and find one that will. But do not back my country into a corner and say that we are trying to force a Soviet veto. We want a Soviet vote in favour of the same resolution that 104 Members voted for.

279. The PRESIDENT: While some delegations are making up their minds whether or not to intervene I should like to say that we must pay heed to some of the statements made by the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan. In his eloquent statement he reminded us that at a certain stage all Pakistan wanted was one month so that conditions for civilian rule and proper understanding of the main parties in the subcontinent would mature. I do not believe that in the Security Council we are asking for one month; we are not asking even for a day. Let us not rush.

280. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): We have been fortunate this evening to have had an opportunity of listening to the Foreign Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan. We are fortunate this evening in that unlike previous meetings we have here two very senior representatives of their respective Governments, and it might be possible, with their presence in New York, to perhaps try to reach a formula which could very well bring peace, or at least pave the road to peace, in the subcontinent.

281. A great deal depends not so much upon the non-permanent members, because we are always superseded by the veto power of the permanent members. In this particular problem it is the permanent members that have a special responsibility not only to exercise leadership but also to see that the privileges they enjoy are properly and constructively put to use.

282. My delegation would hope that the Council will resume this debate tomorrow and that in the intervening period the permanent members—France and the United Kingdom, which have yet to give this Council the benefit of their advice and leadership—will take more initiative; and perhaps, with their good offices and with those of the three other permanent members, we might be able to make a breakthrough.

283. Perhaps, Mr. President, we might adjourn until later in the day when we might have much better prospects than

we have had up to now. I note from the reply of the representative of India that his Government does agree in principle to a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Indian forces from East Pakistan, although it is qualified, unfortunately. But at least there is a commitment to that principle, which is what we all desire. If we can reach a formula which would make that commitment and perhaps the position of the Pakistani Government clear concerning the problem which certainly exists in East Pakistan, we might be able to reach an agreement.

284. I would suggest, therefore, that we adjourn our meeting at this stage, and that the five big Powers should not just sit in silence or bicker, but rather show the world Organization some sense of leadership and direction.

285. The PRESIDENT: A definite proposal has been made for a brief postponement—I shall not call it an adjournment—of the debate. I should like to ask the representative of the United States whether he can agree to this.

286. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I must say that I find the logic of the representative of Somalia overwhelming and I was most impressed by the spirit in which he made his intervention. I also think that if indeed there is a chance that the representative of Poland, who is awaiting instructions, can get positive instructions from his Government to vote in favour of a draft resolution similar to the one before us, or something like it, and if the representative of the Soviet Union would, before the President calls the next meeting, find it possible to vote in favour of a draft resolution like this, or something on the lines of the Assembly's cease-fire and withdrawal resolution I believe that they will be approaching it in the spirit that we accept it here, a spirit of construction, of trying to get something done. I hope that when we reconvene very soon, those delegations will have received instructions which will permit them to act in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly.

287. We are overwhelmed by the logic of the position of the representative of Somalia, and I would withdraw our objection to the President's ruling.

288. The PRESIDENT: The proposal is that we should adjourn the discussion for a few hours in order to permit fruitful consultations to take place. If there is no objection, I shall consider it adopted.

289. Before I adjourn the meeting I wish to remind members of the Council of the meeting which is scheduled for 10.30 this morning—in 10 hours' time—on the question of Cyprus. It is my hope that the draft resolution which is the subject of consultation among members of the Council will be adopted at that meeting and that the Council will be able to conclude its discussion on the item in part of one meeting so that we can devote the other part of the morning meeting to a continuation of our discussion concerning the problem now facing us.

The meeting rose on Monday, 13 December, at 12.35 a.m.

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