

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

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MEETING: 5 DECEMBER 1971

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Sunday, 5 December 1971, at 2.30 p.m.

President: Mr. I. B. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1607)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. (a) Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10411);
(b) Report of the Secretary-General (S/10410 and Add.1);
(c) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir (S/10412).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

- (a) Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10411);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (S/10410 and Add.1);
- (c) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir (S/10412)

1. The PRESIDENT: At yesterday's meeting the Council decided to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to participate in the discussion of the item on its agenda without the right to vote. In accordance with that decision, and with the consent of the Council, I propose to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. Sen (India) and Mr. A. Shahi (Pakistan) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the required practice of the Council, I wish to make a very brief

statement. My attention has been drawn to an article in today's issue of *The New York Times* entitled "United States asks Security Council to press for a cease-fire". The publication appears to allege that exchanges of an unpleasant nature took place between the representative of the USSR, my dear friend and colleague Ambassador Yakov Malik, and myself during the procedural aspect of the Council's work at yesterday's emergency meeting of the Council. Ambassador Malik, a very able and experienced diplomat, has also been a friend of Sierra Leone. He is one of the representatives in this body whose views I respect greatly. For the information of all, I wish to state clearly that it was not my intention to be indifferent to my Soviet colleague. I may add further that my country has for years now had diplomatic relations with the USSR and we have been on the best of terms.

3. I would also add an apology for starting the meeting so late. It would appear that we should have asked for an adjournment of 24 hours instead of 12 hours in order to hold consultations.

4. At the Council's meeting yesterday I referred to a letter from the representative of Tunisia [S/10413], in which he supported the request made by nine delegations to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council. At the same time I indicated that in a second letter [S/10414] the representative of Tunisia had requested that he be authorized to participate without vote in the relevant discussion of the Security Council. Taking into account both communications from the representative of Tunisia, I would propose, with the consent of the Council, to extend such an invitation to him, in accordance with the practice that has been followed on previous occasions.

5. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I should like to ask for clarification of exactly what this procedure means. Was this the only request? Would this be the only additional person to participate in the deliberations of the Council? Are there any other pending requests still before the Council at this point? I ask this because we were strongly supportive of our Italian colleague's position yesterday. We remain supportive; we feel that the matter is so urgent that the Council members, given the participation by India and Pakistan, must address themselves to this first step of trying to get some resolution that can solve this problem and cause this bloodshed to cease. With all due respect for our very cherished colleague from Tunisia, I would like to know exactly what is pending in terms of additional participants.

6. Our own view reluctantly remains the way it was yesterday: in support of the Italian representative's position

that until we get a first-step resolution we must insist that participation be confined to the members that are at the table right now.

7. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I am grateful to the representative of the United States for having recalled the suggestion I made, on which we were fully agreed around this table.

8. However, if I remember correctly, you, Mr. President, made a statement at the end of our meeting yesterday that you would give the floor to the representative of Tunisia at the next meeting—which is today. I think we owe it to the representative of Tunisia to let him speak today. I think we made an appeal to him yesterday; he showed full understanding and met our desires.

9. But before mentioning any other request on any side—I think we should not embarrass anyone else—I feel that in the case of the representative of Tunisia we also have to take into account the fact that he supported the request to convene this meeting; so that is one more reason why I believe we owe it to him to let him speak, although I would think that the decision taken yesterday should be respected with regard to other requests. Therefore, I think it would be better not to get involved with or speak about other requests at this time; we might commence that later on in order not to embarrass anybody.

10. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I believe that to deprive delegations which are Members of the United Nations of the right to participate in the discussion of questions which are on the agenda would be unprecedented. Throughout the entire existence of the Security Council, the practice whereby every delegation of a State Member of the United Nations has had the right to participate in the discussion of any question being considered by the Security Council and to state the views of its Government has been strictly observed. That is why I personally feel that there were absolutely no grounds for depriving the delegation of Tunisia of that right yesterday, despite my great respect for the representative of Italy, and, *a fortiori*, there are no grounds for depriving it of that right today, as the representative of the United States is implying.

11. In my opinion, there is no need to link the granting of that right to the representative of Tunisia to the question of whether there are other delegations wishing to speak at Security Council meetings on the subject under consideration. Any representative and any State Member of the United Nations has the right at any time to address a request to the President of the Security Council and, after the President has informed the Security Council of it, the Security Council decides whether to invite the delegation in question and permit it to participate in meetings without the right to vote. I do not recall any cases where such requests have been refused, although I have had occasion to participate in many meetings of the Security Council. I think, therefore, that we are wasting time in discussing this question. In my opinion, the representative of Tunisia should be invited and, if there are requests from other delegations, those delegations, too, should be invited and we should neither question this nor discuss it in order not to waste them.

12. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): What I had requested was clarification. I received it from the representative of Italy. Certainly, I am in accord with what he said, and would be prepared to proceed accordingly.

13. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Article 31 of the Charter reads:

“Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.”

14. I submit that the matter before this Council is one which intimately affects all States Members of this Organization if we wish to uphold the principles of the United Nations, which are very much at stake.

15. For that reason my delegation would support the request of the representative of Tunisia to be allowed to give us the benefit of his views, and the request of any other delegation which might also have submitted a similar request.

16. Mr. KUI/AGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): I shall be very brief. For the legal reasons that have just been raised by our colleague from Somalia, and also for reasons of practice and custom in the Security Council, as the representative of the Soviet Union has just suggested, I am in favour of extending an invitation to the representative of Tunisia and any other representative who may wish to participate in our debate.

17. The PRESIDENT: I should like to make a short statement in reply to the representative of the United States. Only one application remains, and that comes from the representative of a Member State. I do not know whether members wish to use rule 37 and approve that application. Since there have been no further comments I take it that the Council approves that application, and I shall make reference to him.

18. If there are no objections I shall now invite the representative of Tunisia to take a place at the side of the Council chamber on the understanding that I shall call on him to take a seat at the Council table when it is his turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia) took the place reserved for him in the Council chamber.

19. The PRESIDENT: As I have already explained, I have received a letter from the representative of Saudi Arabia in which he asks to be allowed to participate without the right to vote in the discussion of the item under consideration.

20. If there are no objections I shall now invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the side of the Council chamber on the understanding that I shall call on him to take a seat at the Council table when it is his turn to address the Council.

21. Mr. VINCI (Italy): First of all I want to make it quite clear that my delegation does not in any way question the

right of any Member State not a member of the Council to take part in our debates if it feels its interests are affected. I did not know that the other request was made by Mr. Baroody. I am sure that—and this has been shown—no member objects to listening to the views the representative of Saudi Arabia would like to submit to us. As a matter of fact, we always follow his statements with great attention and interest. I for one have always benefited from his great knowledge and wisdom, which he shares so generously with us, and therefore I should like to emphasize that we are certainly happy to hear whatever he has to say to us.

22. May I make just one suggestion concerning the order of our business: if we could proceed with our normal work and try to act as we have urged since yesterday—at great speed, if possible, and at least at a better pace than yesterday—and if in the course of our work we take no action, or do take action, the floor could be given to the representatives who are not members of this Council who have asked to be allowed to speak to us.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the place reserved for him in the Council chamber.

23. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, I should like to express my gratitude to you for having clarified the position with regard to the fabrication published in today's edition of *The New York Times* concerning you and myself. But, in view of my experience over many years, I am not surprised by such attacks by *The New York Times*, and I therefore urge you not to pay any attention to it.

24. I think that comments like this in *The New York Times*, as in any other newspaper, will in no way affect our good and friendly relations.

25. The second question I should like to raise is that of inviting Bangla Desh. This question was discussed here yesterday, and you, Mr. President, decided that we should postpone consideration of it until the next meeting, that is, until today's meeting.

26. I would invite you, Mr. President, in accordance with your ruling, to take a decision on that question too, before we begin the substantive part of today's meeting of the Security Council.

27. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation is of the view that the question of the invitation of the so-called representative of Bangla Desh is a substantive and not a procedural question.

28. The representatives of the Soviet Union and India are singing a duet openly trumpeting for the dismemberment of Pakistan in a sinister attempt to impose upon the United Nations the so-called Bangla Desh which they have created. This act of subverting and dismembering a sovereign country runs completely counter to the United Nations Charter and is definitely not permissible.

29. In order to achieve the dismemberment of Pakistan and to realize their scheme of the so-called independence of

East Pakistan, at yesterday's meeting the Soviet representative advanced an argument based on population statistics. This reminds one of the fact that in order to split China and engineer the so-called independence of Taiwan, the representative of another super-Power put forward at a meeting of the present session a similar argument, to the effect that the Chinese province of Taiwan has a population of over 10 million. This is indeed a coincidence. This is a true duet.

30. The Soviet representative has proposed that the representatives of the so-called Bangla Desh take part in the meetings of the Council, that their opinions be heard and their document be distributed. This is glaring interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan as well as a trampling upon the United Nations Charter, to which any country that upholds justice cannot agree. We agree with the view expressed by the representative of Argentina that, if the United Nations were to do so, it would be creating an extremely dangerous precedent.

31. We should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union a question. In 1962 the Soviet Government engineered a counter-revolutionary rebellion in China's Sinkiang province, and carried out subversive and divisionist activities against China. Several tens of thousands of Chinese civilians who were forcibly taken away by it still remain in its hands. It has used some of them for anti-Chinese scheming activities. Is it going to use Mr. Malik's logic with regard to the Pakistan refugees, as a pretext for launching armed aggression against China? Is it also going to invite those people to the United Nations to justify its subversion and aggression? Wang Ming, a traitor to the Chinese people and a renegade to the Communist Party of China, has all along been reared by you as a treasure and as a tool for subversion against China. Is it also going to invite him to the United Nations?

32. At present outside your country there exist quite a few people who oppose the Soviet Government and are attempting to establish a so-called independence movement. According to your principles, are you also going to agree to invite them to the United Nations?

33. We hope to receive a reply from the Soviet representative.

34. The PRESIDENT: I now call upon the representative of India.

35. Mr. SEN (India): I am glad to see that practically all those who have spoken about the application of the representative of Bangla Desh to be heard by the Council have treated this problem as a substantive problem. Therefore, I should like to make a few comments, although, following yesterday's point of order by our friend and colleague from Italy, I am not sure whether, under rules 37 and 38 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, delegations such as mine, which have been invited here by courtesy, are really out of order in making comments on points of order.

36. However, to begin with I shall simply reply to the Chinese delegation's standard accusations with standard indifference. I shall simply say that we have no experience

of interfering in other people's affairs so long as they do not interfere in ours. Other countries have vast experience in such interference and can always warm up to the subject.

37. With respect to Bangla Desh, we are discussing a most serious matter, and I think everyone round the table is agreed that the major party in the problem we are discussing is Bangla Desh. The elected representatives of Bangla Desh represent 75 million people, which is the majority of the whole population of Pakistan.

38. Now let us turn to rule 39, which states:

"The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence."

39. Let us start by analysing the sentence backwards. We assume that the subject we are discussing is a matter within the Council's competence. The only question is: can the representative of Bangla Desh supply us with information or give us assistance in discussing this matter? If the Council decides that such a representative will not be in a position to supply information or give other assistance relevant to examining the question before us, then of course the Bangla Desh representative will have no grounds for being dissatisfied if the Council rejects his request. If, on the other hand, the Council is satisfied that he can supply us with information and give us assistance in examining matters within its competence, then I think that under rule 39 the Council can easily invite him. Speaking for myself, I have not the slightest doubt that he can, should and must supply us with information and extend to us other assistance which will help us in appreciating the problem before us, a problem of great dimension and of great gravity, and which will also help us to reach a satisfactory conclusion.

40. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Pakistan.

41. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Although on a strict interpretation, or any interpretation, of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council parties not members who are invited to speak at the Council table cannot participate in a discussion of the kind that has been raised by the representative of the Soviet Union, I am compelled to intervene, since the representative of India has been allowed to make statements because he considered the problem to be a substantive one.

42. Yesterday I advanced a number of arguments of the most fundamental nature against the proposal put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union. I maintain that rules of procedure must be interpreted in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and one of the foremost principles of the Charter is the territorial integrity of Member States. The proposal before us is to accord recognition to a group of persons who represent a secessionist element—a secessionist force organized, armed, nurtured and propped up by India in order to bring about

the dismemberment of Pakistan. That is the real issue before the Council.

43. The real issue is whether a so-called representative of Bangla Desh, which is not recognized by any State in the world and which is a creature of the Government of India created in order to bring about the dismemberment of Pakistan, is going to be invited to speak before this Council to tell us about the facts of the situation that we are considering. That is the real issue.

44. Let this Council act with the fullest sense of responsibility.

45. Now let me quote rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council:

"The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence."

Whom can the Security Council invite? It can invite "members of the Secretariat" or it can invite "other persons"—individuals—not those claiming to represent a Government which is not recognized and is not a Member of the United Nations. How does rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure apply? Yet this proposal has been pressed upon the Security Council since yesterday. If the Council accepts the proposal that has been put forward by the representatives of the Soviet Union, India and Poland, then it would be contravening not only the fundamental provisions of the Charter but also rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

46. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, during the statement of the Chinese representative I could, of course, with every justification have asked you to interrupt that statement, since he touched on questions which have no bearing whatsoever on the item under discussion. But, considering that he is new here and has much to learn, I did not do so.

47. His statement convinces us even more that the main purpose of his participation in the work of the Security Council has not been to co-operate in a business-like manner in this main organ of the United Nations, which is responsible for strengthening peace and international security, but to invent and reiterate monstrous slanders against the Soviet Union. That is a thankless task.

48. The international authority and prestige of the Soviet Union are such that no slanders can succeed in shaking them. We have won this authority with our own blood, with the lives of millions upon millions of Soviet citizens who fought for the freedom of the whole of mankind. Tomorrow we are celebrating in our country an important holiday, the thirtieth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people near Moscow on 6 December, and the Soviet delegation would like to recall that date in connexion with the question raised by the representative of China. That event had great influence not only on the fate of the Soviet people but also on the fate of all mankind.

49. Tomorrow will be the thirtieth anniversary of the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow and the beginning of the end for fascist Germany. The battle for Moscow did not bring about a radical turn in the course of the war; it only marked the beginning of such a turn. However, it sharply changed the character of the armed struggle throughout the rest of the war. The Moscow victory contributed to the further unification of the forces of the anti-fascist coalition, gave life to the resistance movement in the countries occupied by Germany, dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the German armed forces and strengthened the confidence of the enslaved peoples of Europe in the inevitability of liberation from the fascist yoke; it was also a source of encouragement and a help to those Chinese who were struggling against Japanese imperialism. The victory of the Soviet people near Moscow was in large measure a guarantee that the allied forces would be victorious in the Second World War, a victory which led to the establishment of the United Nations. It is symbolic that the decision to establish this universal international Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security was taken in the territory of the Soviet State, a State which made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the fascist aggressors, and which has as the guiding principles of its foreign policy the principles of the struggle for peace and international security and peaceful coexistence among States having different social and political systems and the principle of extending all possible assistance to national liberation movements.

50. In the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China declared:

"That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

51. That is what the Soviet people fought for and that is what 20 million Soviet people gave their lives for. And if that had not been the case, we would have been the slaves of German fascism and the Chinese would have been the slaves of Japanese militarism. Yes, that is a historical fact and it is shameful for the Chinese representative to slander the first socialist State of workers and peasants in the world—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

52. I believe that we can discuss the question of Soviet-Chinese relations with the Chinese representative elsewhere. It is not the subject of today's meeting. However, the statement of the Chinese representative had an obvious political purpose, that of diverting attention from the main cause, the real cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent and from the monstrous and bloody reprisals against the population of East Pakistan. That is the main cause of the conflict—violence, terror, depriving millions upon millions of people of their elementary rights—it is that which forced them to flee to a foreign country in order to save their lives. And the purpose of the statement of the Chinese representative today is to divert attention from that main and fundamental cause, to cover up the bloody

terror and the sufferings and death of millions upon millions of East Pakistanis. The Soviet delegation spoke of this in detail in the statement it made yesterday.

53. Who can best inform the Security Council of what actually happened in East Pakistan if not the representatives of those 10 million people who fled to a foreign country and of all the 75 million East Pakistanis? To deprive them of the right to speak here in accordance with universally recognized practice and the rule of procedure which has already been cited here—I shall not repeat it—amounts to taking the side of those who forced those millions of people to leave their land, their homes and their houses and to flee to another country.

54. Of course, it is the easiest thing to blame someone else. In the words of a Russian proverb, that, as we have already said, amounts to "shifting the blame from a sick head to a healthy one". Perhaps these methods will also be used here by those who want to divert the Security Council's attention from the main cause of the conflict and the deteriorating situation in the Indian subcontinent. But it will not convince anyone and will only unmask the true intentions of those who resort to such unconvincing and contrived excuses.

55. Mr. KULAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): In the brief remarks I am about to make, I should like to keep to the question which, Mr. President, in accordance with your ruling yesterday, we are to decide upon today, that is, the invitation to Bangla Desh, without going outside the scope of our agenda item. We took a stand yesterday and we take a stand again today in favour of an invitation to the representatives of Bangla Desh. We do so on the basis of the same premise, that it is impossible to solve the present conflict without taking into account the reasons for it. These reasons are known to us; we spoke about them yesterday in our statement and we shall not dwell on them.

56. That is why our delegation considers that not to hear the representatives of the Bangla Desh—the elected representatives of that people—would be a mistake which might affect the work of the Security Council in so grave a question as that of the solution of the conflict on the Indian subcontinent.

57. If this proposal were to be rejected, the Security Council would be depriving itself of the possibility of hearing the opinion of a party that is very vitally concerned in the solution of the conflict; it would be rejecting its right under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council to invite any "persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information . . .". In the present circumstances this seems to be particularly appropriate.

58. Those are the reasons why we support the proposal to invite the representatives of the Bangla Desh, a proposal which is based on the principle according to which all parties to a conflict must be heard as well as the practical considerations which are directly related to the discharge of the duties of the Council.

59. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): I believe that the suggestion made by the Soviet delegation is

not a procedural one but rather a matter of substance. It is an attempt to establish the international status of the so-called "Bangla Desh" before the conflict between India and Pakistan is discussed here in the United Nations. It is an attempt to make the United Nations Security Council an accomplice in this kind of activity and the Chinese delegation is firmly opposed to this.

60. Mr. Malik has painted his own face well, but the cosmetics are not related to facts. The reality should be judged by the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the world.

61. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Chinese representative has put on a magnificent show for those who delight in dissension between China and the Soviet Union. He deserves their praise.

62. But I should like to add one more thing and explain to all whom it may concern that the problem of the crisis in East Pakistan and the problem of almost 10 million East Pakistan refugees has already been discussed and is being discussed in United Nations bodies, and, if we were to hear the representative of Bangla Desh concerning the origin, cause and development of this terrible human tragedy and the sufferings of millions upon millions of people, we would be following the practice of those United Nations bodies which are already dealing with the matter.

63. The PRESIDENT: At this juncture, may I state that I had intended to refer to this problem myself in the following words:

"Members of the Council are aware that the representative of India, by a letter dated 4 December 1971, which was circulated in document S/10415, had forwarded a letter from Mr. Abu Sayeed Chowdhury of Bangla Desh, requesting to be allowed to make a statement before the Council. This has apparently now been followed by a motion from the representative of the Soviet Union that that application should be acted upon. However, there appears to be an objection to the proposal. In the circumstances, it is my intention to put the matter to the vote for a decision by the Council, unless I hear any further comments."

64. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, yesterday afternoon I already stated the point of view of my delegation on this question. But since you are now going to put to the vote the proposal submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union, it is very important for my delegation, for the purposes of casting its vote, to know whom we are inviting.

65. Mr. President, you have referred to document S/10415 and to the letter contained therein. The last paragraph of that letter reads:

"As the representative of the people and Government of Bangla Desh, I have already requested you to allow me to make a statement before the Council on behalf of the people and Government of Bangla Desh, as and when the Council is convened to discuss this crisis. . . ."

66. Now the point to be clarified is whether the motion of the representative of the Soviet Union is that we invite the representative of a foreign Government. I need this clarification to be able to vote, since it is very important; that is to say, I should like to know whether this is a Government and whether it is one that any State Member of the United Nations has recognized. This is very important because it is no longer a matter of a person—to which rule 39 of the rules of procedure refers—but rather the representative of a Government and, whatever the outcome of the voting might be, I personally would not wish it to be interpreted as either recognition or non-recognition of that Government.

67. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I did not today raise the point of order I had raised yesterday, since I assumed that when the Ambassador of India took the floor he agreed that this is a question of substance. I think that the main parties concerned, the Ambassadors of India and Pakistan, were perfectly entitled to speak on this question if they considered that it was a substantive question.

68. Now the Ambassador of Argentina has raised another point, which I think is very pertinent. For my part, I said yesterday that you, Mr. President, in my view, acted very correctly when you circulated the communication we are speaking of in accordance with the appendix at the end of the provisional rules of procedure. After rule 61 there is an appendix, which says the following:

"A list of all communications from private individuals and non-governmental bodies relating to matters of which the Security Council is seized shall be circulated to all representatives on the Security Council."

69. This is what you did, Mr. President, and we approved your action. Now we have another letter, a communication from the representative of India. I think we are confronted with a very complex situation. When you said yesterday, Mr. President, that we would defer this question to a later stage, it was my understanding that we would start consultations. I think it would be advisable to have consultations on this question, which raises so many aspects. The debate that has already taken place shows how difficult, and perhaps even insoluble, it is—at this stage at least.

70. Therefore I would suggest that, rather than going on with a procedural debate of this kind, which will delay our work further, we should follow the line of action that you have taken, Mr. President; that is, to start consultations. Then, when our minds are clear regarding what sort of question we are confronting and what sort of decision we have to take, we can proceed to act.

71. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I shall answer the question asked by the representative of Argentina by saying that the Soviet delegation proposed that we invite the representative of Bangla Desh as a competent person on the item under discussion by the Council. In connexion with this, a reference was made to rule 39 of the rules of procedure. In my opinion, the suggestion by the representative of Italy that consultations should be held is reasonable and deserves

attention. Since this proposal has been made, my delegation will not insist on a vote.

72. The PRESIDENT: It is now clear that the representatives of Italy and the USSR, the formal proposer, have asked for further consideration by way of consultation on the subject. Unless objection is raised to this suggestion I propose to adjourn the question to a later date for further consultations.

It was so decided.

73. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now consider the substantive item on the agenda. The first speaker on my list on the substantive question is the representative of China.

74. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has presented a draft resolution [S/10421], to the Security Council on the question for consideration by the members of this Council. Now I should like to make some explanation, briefly, with regard to this draft resolution. An argument has been raised to the effect that a request can first be made for a cease-fire by both India and Pakistan, and the cessation of all military actions, although the question of withdrawal of military forces can be deferred to a later date. That is an argument to which we definitely cannot agree, because the present objective situation is that the Indian Government has brazenly carried out subversion and aggression against Pakistan and flagrantly sent troops to invade Pakistan territory. In these circumstances, the key to the realization of peace and security on the subcontinent is that the Indian Government's subversion and aggression must be immediately stopped. Indian troops must withdraw from Pakistan territory immediately, unconditionally and completely.

75. The demand for only a cease-fire in place by the two sides, without a demand for withdrawal of Indian troops, is in effect tantamount to conniving at and encouraging aggression and to recognizing the Indian aggressor troops remaining in Pakistan territory as legal. To do so would be of no help whatsoever to the settlement of the arms conflict between India and Pakistan or the relaxation of tension in that area. On the contrary, it would only bring extremely grave and dangerous results. Just as the representative of Somalia said yesterday, have not the resolutions passed by the United Nations on the question of the Middle East, which failed to demand the immediate withdrawal of Israeli aggressor troops from Arab territory but only called for a cease-fire in place, resulted in legalizing the fruits of aggression and imposing them on the Arab countries and people and in creating in the Middle East the danger of aggression and war on a still larger scale?

76. The United Nations should in no way repeat time and again such a grave error of principle. Should it do so, the people throughout the world who uphold justice will have every reason to accuse the Security Council of being an accomplice in the scheme of India and her behind-the-scenes boss, Soviet social imperialism, to invade and occupy Pakistan territory and to dismember the State of Pakistan. We sincerely call upon the sponsor States to give serious consideration to such evil consequences. Therefore, we

propose that clauses 'strongly condemning Indian armed aggression against Pakistan and demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Indian armed personnel that have invaded Pakistan territory be added to the draft resolution under consideration.

77. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of Tunisia to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

78. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, and at last, I thank you, Mr. President and members of the Security Council, for having authorized me today to take part in the debate on the deterioration of the situation between India and Pakistan. Therefore, in accordance with custom, while paying tribute to the work of your predecessor, our colleague and friend Ambassador Kułaga of Poland, I wish to address to you on behalf of the Tunisian delegation our sincere congratulations in respect of the important duties which you have been discharging for some days now and to express our wishes for success in these very difficult hours when more than one conflict is threatening to engulf our planet and the Security Council should fully fulfil the role assigned to it under the Charter.

79. Indeed, the deterioration of the situation between India and Pakistan is not the only problem of concern to the United Nations and on which the Security Council is called upon to pass judgement, but it is by far the most urgent and the most dangerous for peace at present.

80. Yesterday we believed that the limitation of the debate to the members of the Security Council and to the representatives of Pakistan and India, as proposed by our friend Mr. Vinci of Italy, would facilitate the adoption of a quick decision on at least an immediate cease-fire. That did not happen, and the Council was unable to exercise its powers. Let us hope that it will be able to do so soon, by making an urgent appeal to the parties concerned for an end to the fighting while we continue examination of the question and proceed to a vote on the substantive resolutions in the course of the present meeting. This proposal might perhaps be taken up by a member of the Council, or by yourself, Mr. President.

81. "During the past few days a situation which was already fraught with danger, and born of a latent conflict, has, for a multitude of reasons, become a veritable war-like situation, with everything war involves in terms of destruction, victims and casualties—and more victims and casualties. New unhappiness and further tragedy are thus being added to the problems of millions of refugees—problems which were rife throughout the region and whose dimensions are staggering. The turn of events has become increasingly more alarming and nothing reassures us, neither what we read or hear daily, nor the official statements of the Governments of the countries concerned and their representatives, nor the report of the Secretary-General, nor even the deliberations of the Security Council, which does not seem bent on action.

82. President Bourguiba, the Tunisian Government and the Tunisian people, like everyone in our region of the world, are concerned, alarmed, overwhelmed. That is why,

on the instructions of President Bourguiba and the Tunisian Government, and moved by the scale of the conflict with its unforeseeable consequences, I come before the Council to plead the cause of peace. The acts of war must come to an end immediately. The Security Council should give an order—or should at least appeal—for an immediate ceasefire, so that peace, re-established on the basis of justice and clarity in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, will at last permit a solution of the outstanding problems and bring about a reconciliation. Tunisia pleads for peace and against war, for justice and against injustice, everywhere that peace is threatened and justice is flouted.

83. On 2 December the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tunisian Republic published a communiqué on the situation between India and Pakistan in which it is stated, in particular:

“The Head of State has expressed his opinion that the peace-loving nations, and in particular those of the Middle East, although largely preoccupied by their own specific problems, are in favour of a peaceful settlement of the problem of the situation in India and Pakistan, in respect for unity and the territorial integrity of Pakistan.”

The communiqué adds:

“The President has expressed the hope that Pakistan will take the necessary measures to create a climate of peace and concord in East Pakistan such as to hasten the return of refugees to their own homes. President Bourguiba considers that the despatch of United Nations observers to the region would constitute an appropriate measure to silence the weapons and permit the beginning of a constructive dialogue between the two parties.”

84. Since then the situation has continued to deteriorate. War is raging. The Security Council must act.

85. It is evident that the problem started to arise as soon as the refugees from East Pakistan crossed the border into India in large masses. Secretary-General U Thant, to whom I wish to pay tribute, made an appeal for aid to the refugees. The High Commissioner for Refugees, His Highness Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Mr. Kittani, the Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Organizational Affairs and subsequently Mr. Paul-Marc Henry, Assistant to the Secretary-General for Help to the Populations of East Pakistan, as well as their assistants, have all attempted to alleviate the sufferings of millions of human beings, victims of the special situation in the region. The work they have accomplished and continue to accomplish, in conditions which are frequently difficult and perilous, is worthy of every tribute.

86. At the end of the summer session of the Economic and Social Council in Geneva, after a debate of five hours without interruption or respite, I considered it to be my duty, in my capacity as President of the Economic and Social Council, to make a statement, which is contained in the report of the Council, and I should like to quote two sentences from that statement:

“Seldom has the international community been confronted with a refugee problem of such gigantic propor-

tions. Seldom have the possible consequences been so grave.”¹

We all know that the voluntary repatriation of refugees is the best solution—indeed the only solution. The sooner it happens, the better it will be. A climate of confidence is necessary for the flow of refugees to be stopped and for voluntary repatriation to be brought about. That will be possible only if all those concerned show a spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding, which is so vital.

87. In the Third Committee a few days ago we debated at length the problem of refugees. Two draft resolutions were adopted, but they have not yet been submitted for the approval of the General Assembly in plenary meeting, in spite of their urgency. Something does not seem to be working properly in our system, when urgent questions are neglected. We are on the moon; we are dreaming. We are moon-struck, while our planet is aflame. The United Nations has thus far avoided considering the political consequences of the immense problem of the Pakistani refugees in India, especially in terms of the threat to peace; and yet the Secretary-General has constantly drawn the attention of the Members of the United Nations to this aspect of the problem. Thus he has written in his report:

“In a disaster of such vast proportions, the international community has a clear obligation to help the Governments and peoples concerned in every possible way. But, as I have indicated, the basic problem can be solved only if a political solution based on reconciliation and the respect of humanitarian principles is achieved.”²

88. India and Pakistan are two sister countries with which my country maintains the best relations. Their proximity with each other necessitates close co-operation, and frequently involves them in regrettable confrontations, but all in all those confrontations are temporary. The international community must help them in overcoming their difficulties, and not profit from those difficulties. When peace between neighbours is involved, and especially when the peace of the world is involved, nothing must prevent the United Nations from carrying out its duty. Tunisia, for its part, will associate itself with all nations and peace-loving peoples in working unstintingly for the triumph of that noble ideal.

89. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

90. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Thank you, Mr. President and members of the Council, including my two good friends Ambassador Vinci and Ambassador Bush, for being gracious enough to allow me to address the Council on this critical question. I happen to be an Asian and it stands to reason that I should be concerned with war in Asia somewhat more than my Italian and United States colleagues—with all due regard to their deep interest in the mother of continents, from which I happen to hail and which is thousands of miles away from both Italy and the United States.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 3, p. xiii.*

² *Ibid., Supplement No. 1A para. 191.*

91. It may seem to some of you quite paradoxical that a communist Ambassador, Yakov Malik, should defend the right of monarchist Baroudy to participate in your deliberations. It shows you that things have changed in the world. Neither one of us is a bugbear to the other and I do hope that harmony will prevail amongst all colleagues in the future.

92. In regard to the wisdom which my friend Ambassador Vinci said I proffered generously to the Council, I must tell him that I am still a humble student who is still learning, not so much from books nowadays as from the peculiar workings of my colleagues' minds and their skill in parrying issues through the instrumentality of the rules of procedure.

93. My intervention today will involve some probing of the policies that are being adopted by certain Powers—with this proviso that if I am wrong in my assessment of the situation, I gladly stand to be corrected. But I have been in the United Nations long enough to have learned a few things and I hope that you will not consider me presumptuous enough to claim that I am infallible. I invite anyone to refute certain facts which I will present to you.

94. Having witnessed the proceedings of the Council last night and this afternoon—with draft resolutions and tentative texts wafting in the air of the Council like autumn leaves whilst a full-scale war is being waged between two sister States in the Asian subcontinent, perpetrating untold sufferings on the innocent on both sides—I felt constrained to address myself as objectively as humanly possible to this human tragedy.

95. Last night a United States draft resolution was vetoed by the representative of the Soviet Union because Ambassador Malik considered it one-sided and that it more or less exclusively served the interests of Pakistan. I had a chance when I came to the Council Chamber this afternoon to read the draft resolution submitted by the representative of China and, judging by what I have seen, I have no doubt but that Ambassador Malik will turn it down on the grounds that it is against India. If the Soviet draft resolution were pressed to the vote I am afraid that the veto would be applied to it because one or two of the major Powers may consider it unfair to Pakistan. Is that not the situation before us? It becomes quite understandable why the non-permanent Powers have seen fit to try to synthesize the text of a draft resolution which they hope would be acceptable not only to the warring parties but to the major Powers, which have chosen sides and which, unfortunately, are diametrically opposed to one another in regard to how this sad problem should be resolved.

96. I submit that no draft resolution would be entirely satisfactory to all parties concerned. The alternative would be a draft resolution with semantic expressions that could be interpreted differently by one party or the other and thereby would resolve nothing. Such draft resolutions might be considered as covering some areas of agreement between even the warring parties as well as the major Powers, agreement on a set of principles without grappling with the real issue at stake, namely, how to stop the fighting and pave the way to a fair and just peace between India and Pakistan.

97. I advisedly used the word "fair" to qualify the word "peace" because no absolute justice can prevail in war, nor for that matter in the aftermath of war, as I myself observed after the First World War and after the Second World War. Furthermore, you gentlemen here do not constitute a tribunal to pronounce yourselves with precision on what may be considered a just or unjust settlement. More than ever I am convinced that we have not made any significant progress in handling international conflicts since the days of the League of Nations, and simply because neither the Charter nor the Covenant of the League of Nations has transcended the national interests of individual States.

98. From what most of you have observed last night and today, who can challenge the fact that the Asian subcontinent is being made a chequerboard of power politics, when the big Powers are still avid, as they have been in the past, to play that game with a view to consolidating their respective spheres of influence? Both the United States and the Soviet Union, independently of each other, declared in Washington and Moscow that the situation was fraught with the great danger that it might involve the great Powers in the Indian-Pakistani conflict. I am paraphrasing. The Soviet Union went so far as to say—and I am also paraphrasing—that the stand it is taking on the question has to do with its own self-defence.

99. The representatives of the non-permanent members of the Council have come out in their draft resolutions with such preambular phraseology as: "*Convinced* that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security". This is from the draft resolution in document S/10419. Another quotation is: "*Gravely concerned* that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security" [S/10417].

100. The defunct United States draft resolution in document S/10416, rendered defunct by the veto of Ambassador Malik, also refers in the second preambular paragraph to the threat to international peace and security in the following words: "*Convinced* that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security".

101. Curiously enough neither the Soviet nor the Chinese draft resolutions refer to the India-Pakistan hostilities as constituting a threat to international peace and security. It is we small States—I do not know, the United States may consider it, they have a great interest in that continent and they may consider it—but we small States are frightened. I tried to find such references in the Soviet draft resolution, references to the threat to peace and international security, and I could not find them. Nor could I find them in the Chinese draft resolution. The Soviet draft resolution [S/10418] refers to the letter of nine members of the Security Council and calls for a political settlement in East Pakistan, and then you know the rest of it. The Chinese draft resolution has nothing at all to say, unless they have added something—have you added something? Yes, I saw that: "*Noting in particular* that India has launched large-scale attacks on Pakistan, thus gravely undermining the peace in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent" [S/10421]. That is only in

the subcontinent, not international peace and security involving the whole world in a third world war. If you consider international peace and security as something between two sides, this is bilateral peace and security. No, I noted that; I am glad you gave it to me.

102. Gentlemen, I am afraid you are making a lot of hullabaloo—is that an American term?—about resolutions. In the English language which I speak it is “much ado” about resolutions. It is not the resolutions that count but the will to have them observed or whether they will be implemented or enforced.

103. Three big Powers have involved themselves in the India-Pakistan conflict, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Let us see how obviously each of those big Powers stands, without going into many details. To put it simply, the Soviet Union apparently is siding with India, China with Pakistan, and the United States seems to have tipped the balance in its policy in favour of Pakistan. Why? Ask them, I am not going to ask them.

104. Another point is quite obvious. China is a wholly Asian country and has frontiers with India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union has boundaries with China and also with Pakistan. That is what I thought. I do not have the benefit of the map which my colleague, Ambassador Bush, had. Can you lend it to me? The trouble is that we cannot do away with the great Powers because we have sometimes to borrow their maps. I do not see the United States on the map; it is several thousand miles from China, and also from the Soviet Union, as well as from the Asian subcontinent which has become the chequerboard of those three Powers.

105. In fairness to those three big Powers, they are not primarily responsible for the unfortunate situation as it obtains between India and Pakistan, and I shall not go into the substance of the conflict. Suffice it to say that I have every reason to believe that those three big Powers will not make the same mistakes they have committed in Korea and Viet-Nam. In other words, I am inclined to believe that they will not send troops either to India or Pakistan, although this does not mean that they will not send “advisers” who on the whole are military men in civilian clothes or wolves in sheep’s clothing. This is a figure of speech: no offence, please.

106. Have we not learned, during 25 years, how to deal intelligently with a question which confronts us by benefiting from the mistakes of the recent past—for instance, in the 21 years since the Korean war? I was sitting in this very chamber during the discussion of the Korean question, and none other than our colleague Mr. Malik walked out of the chamber. And then what happened? There was no one to veto a resolution which constituted what they called then “the Little Assembly” of 46 States, of which the Soviet Union and two other Soviet delegations, as well as, I believe, two or three other socialist countries, were not members. I, for one, made a statement that it would be futile to discuss the question of Korea without the presence of the Soviet Union. Finally, the Little Assembly—as you, Mr. Stavropoulos, will remember—faded away, and there was a war which lasted for four years. The Chinese sent volunteers—they thought, of course, that Korea was in their area and that they should help another Asian country.

107. Who bisected Korea? The Russians and the Americans. They drew a line through it called the thirty-eighth parallel, which meant in fact a bisection of that unhappy land. They were ethnologically the same people and their land was bisected.

108. We are not talking about Korea, you may say, but it has a bearing, and this I will show in the thesis which I am going to lay before the members of the Council.

109. The Soviet Union supported North Korea with arms, and the United States was joined by 15 other Member States in a war against North Korea—four years of war, because each of the big Powers froze its policy. Those other 15 Powers, you know, were adjuncts. We were sounded out about joining, and I was one who said: “We will never join in a war waged by one brother against his own brother.”

110. Do you not draw any lesson from the Korean war? Was it not enough that the French, with their famous political sagacity, saw that Indo-China was untenable and left it?

111. Again, what did they do? The major Powers were divided. Some were on the side of South Viet-Nam, and the others were on the side of North Viet-Nam. And the war has not yet ended.

112. Now they do not have to divide a country; there are two countries on the subcontinent, and, instead of doing something radical, we witness here solidified policies as reflected in draft resolutions. Suppose there is what you would call a compromise draft resolution: a compromise in words, not more and not less. And the war will continue on the subcontinent.

113. Sir, I want to be frank, and I am sure you welcome frankness because I can see frankness on your face. What should be done? More draft resolutions? I submit that resolutions without the collective will to act will bring us to nought. I believe that the differences between the big Powers are strategic. China: nobody can contest that it has emerged during the last two decades as one of the big Powers of the world, no matter how modestly they talk about their being a developing Power; we are all developing. It has organization; it has population—700 or 800 million. It now has know-how; it woke up from the days of the Manchus; it has become a model State. The Chinese have their own ideology—that is their privilege—and they are a Power to contend with. They happen to be neighbours of the Soviet Union, another major Power that came out from an agrarian society during the time of the Tsars to be one of the mightiest Powers on earth—of course, we never forget the United States.

114. Now, of course, every country speaks for itself; I am not delving into the motives of States. But why should China not be apprehensive that if it does not consolidate itself in Asia, it might perhaps be subjected to some invasion or war? On the other hand, the Soviet Union, because of the friendship that exists between China and Pakistan, immediately signed a friendship pact—I do not know whether it contains any secret provisions, they tell us that it does not—with India, lest there be a line barring it

from the hot waters of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. These are strategic considerations, nothing new. It reminds me of the era before the First World War when Russia, France and England were allied against Germany. It is a question of juggling for positions—I would say, strategic positions.

115. Where does the United States come in? Well, the United States is a world Power and it wants to make sure, as it tells us, that that whole area does not fall into Communist hands; and its delegation is sitting here near the Communists and is faced by the Communists. After Khrushchev came on the scene the United States initiated with him what was called a "policy of coexistence". Therefore, why this interest in Viet-Nam, and now in the subcontinent? For what? Trade? The Communists are trading with the capitalists. The Soviet Union has received a big deputation of American capitalists to do business with them. Italy's Fiat, I think, has a big project, and they are not communists. They are labour-oriented. But they are a great State with tradition. And then China is receiving Mr. Nixon, the President of a capitalistic State. I think they are doing business with another capitalist State, none other than Japan—two years ago to the extent of \$600 million *per annum*, and they might attain one billion dollars next year. Therefore, why are you big Powers taking sides? You cannot afford to wage war on one another because of the lethal weapons that you have in your arsenals that will do away with Powers, big and small, and with peoples, and may probably bring an end to humanity.

116. Well, it might appear that I am oversimplifying the question. I am not oversimplifying the question. I challenge the big Powers amongst us to tell us what will be derived if this conflict trails on with so much suffering and tribulation.

117. The hour is late and I see that more draft resolutions are being distributed. I mentioned that they were like autumn leaves being wafted in the Council. I will say these draft resolutions will come to nought judging by my experience in this very Council which has passed so many resolutions that were not implemented. Then why have I taken the floor—just to challenge the big Powers and tell them that they should do something? No. It is to make a suggestion. Perhaps someone will take it. If you leave it, it may have to come from Members who are not here if this tragedy goes on without respite, as I am afraid it will.

118. I suggest that you, Sir, and the members of the Council take into account the fact that India and Pakistan are Asian countries, and that other Asian brothers should handle this question, not necessarily in the Council, although it can be done, but through the instrumentality of the United Nations. The United Nations would be the link if a resolution is adopted by this Council, to call on Asian Chiefs of State not to send an appeal, but to meet in a small country. In order not to exacerbate religious sensibilities, it should be neither Hindu nor Muslim. It should immediately call for a meeting of Asian Chiefs of State and try to pour oil on troubled waters: not to appeal, not to adjudicate, but to resort to Asian magnanimity to put an immediate end to the war with a solution that will be acceptable. It will be an Asian solution not a United Nations solution, but through

the instrumentality of the United Nations—because if you adopt such a resolution you will ask the Secretary-General to try to have the Asian States, or at least 20 of them, meet in a country like Ceylon, for example, which I believe is Buddhist, or any such country, where they will put their heads together and see to it that this sad conflict will come to an end. The big Powers would be barred from such a convocation, although if they wanted to, they could send observers. Otherwise, I predict, you will be adopting resolutions in this very Security Council, just as on Korea, on Kashmir, on Palestine and on many other regions—I am not speaking only of regions of Asia—you have adopted resolutions that were not implemented, that were not observed. It can be done through the instrumentality of the United Nations—more specifically the Secretary-General. You can empower him to invite the Asian Chiefs of State to meet in a neutral country as soon as possible, to put their heads together and improvise a solution that will satisfy the warring parties and also save the taxpayers of the big Powers from the purchase of billions of dollars' worth of arms to be sent to those parties that are warring on the checkerboard where big Power politics are being unfolded.

119. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to make a few comments directly relating to the item under consideration and, in connexion, to state its views on and its assessment of the draft resolutions which have been submitted.

120. During the examination of the item being considered by the Council, the Soviet delegation has gone into sufficient detail in showing and stressing the cause of the armed conflict which has broken out in the Indian subcontinent. It is quite obvious that the main cause is to be found in the well-known actions of the Government of Pakistan against the population of East Pakistan. This is quite evident both from the report of the Secretary-General [S/10410] and from the detailed facts which were adduced in the statement of the Indian delegation. Even the Pakistan representative himself, as has already been pointed out, acknowledged in his statement the existence, continuation and seriousness of the political crisis in East Pakistan, which, as is now clear to all, has become international in character and has given rise to international consequences. The consideration of this question in the Council has shown, however, that the representatives of certain countries are attempting to side-step the main issue, to shut their eyes to reality and to distract the Security Council and consequently the United Nations from the real causes of the conflict and of the events which are taking place in the Indian subcontinent. And yet it is quite obvious that the Council's attention should be focused on the situation which has developed in East Pakistan as a result of the actions of the Pakistan authorities and which is the real cause of the conflict. I cannot agree with my friend, the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia, that anyone else is responsible for what happened and what is happening in East Pakistan. Unfortunately, in the statements of some representatives, including the statement of the representative of one State which is a neighbour of India's, an attempt was made to distort the true picture of the situation, to pass over in silence the real cause of the conflict and to make it look as if India was "inciting" the struggle of the people of East

Pakistan against the Pakistan authorities. This version of the story is contrived and completely groundless; its purpose is, first, to justify the policy of violence and terror carried out in East Pakistan and, secondly, to shift the blame. Actually, as a result of the consideration of this question in the Security Council, it is becoming quite obvious that the heart of the matter is precisely the fact that the repressive actions of the Pakistan authorities against the inhabitants of East Pakistan have led to the death of many thousands of peaceful people and have caused nearly 10 million persons to flee to neighbouring India to save their lives.

121. Several speakers here have tried to convince us that it would be "unprecedented" for the Security Council to deal with this main and real cause of the conflict. Attempts have also been made to take cover behind the clause regarding so-called "non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States". And yet it does not take much work or effort to understand quite clearly that this very phenomenon—the flight of almost 10 million people from their own country to another country in order to save their lives—is in itself an unprecedented event, and, what is more, this unprecedented event has had serious international consequences; it has resulted in the deterioration of the situation in the Indian subcontinent which has now been recognized in an official document signed by the representatives of nine members of the Security Council and in reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

122. The course of the discussion in the Security Council has also shown and confirmed that the armed resistance of the people of East Pakistan to the punitive actions of the Pakistan armed forces has not been brought about by any Indian intrigues but is the natural reaction of people who are subjected to cruel measures, violence and terror. The course of the discussion and the second report submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General [*S/10412 and Add.1 and 2*] has confirmed in a factual and well-documented manner the incontestable fact that the military operations were undertaken and initiated by Pakistan and not by India. Those military operations were undertaken because the Government of Pakistan, unable to cope with the resistance of the 75 million inhabitants of East Pakistan, instead of eliminating the real causes of the conflict, took military action against India, including the bombing of Indian cities, attacks on Indian posts, shelling, and the violation of India's territorial integrity. The purpose of those actions was to divert attention from the real cause of the deterioration of the situation in the Indian subcontinent and to cover up the Pakistan Government's inability to cope with the serious internal political crisis in East Pakistan.

123. The development of that crisis has shown that the Pakistan authorities have in fact reached an impasse in their policies with regard to East Pakistan. Having found themselves in such a position, they are now trying to find a way out by attacking India. By initiating military operations, they are obviously counting on transforming the problem of East Pakistan from an internal one to an international one and solving it through the intervention of the major Powers and the United Nations. As can be seen from Mr. Baroody's statement, that is how he has understood this action by Pakistan. To judge from the nature of the

debate on this question in the Security Council, and in view of the well-known fact that the United States was particularly insistent that a meeting of the Council should be convened urgently and has submitted to the Security Council a draft resolution which is clearly pro-Pakistan, it is becoming quite obvious that Pakistan is placing its hopes in assistance from the United States.

124. On the other hand, it is also obvious that the United States is being led by Pakistan and is ignoring the real cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent, trying its utmost to support Pakistan's assertion that it is India which is responsible for the conflict in that region.

125. China is following the same course, to judge from the statements of the Chinese representative and the content of the draft resolution he has submitted.

126. The position and approach of the Government of the United States are being sharply criticized even by the American press. The leading article in one of today's newspapers says quite openly that the United States Administration is ignoring the fundamental threat to India which has been created by the Government of Pakistan as a result of the terrorist repressions in East Pakistan. In stating this opinion, the same newspaper concludes that the United States has openly taken a position of false impartiality, which has led to an intensification of the conflict between India and Pakistan.

127. Furthermore, the newspaper stresses that the fundamental threat to India resulting from the cruel repressions by the Pakistan authorities in East Pakistan is thereby being disregarded.

128. In their statements, representatives have spoken of a cease-fire between India and Pakistan. However, many of them do not link the question of a call for the cessation of hostilities with a call to the Government of Pakistan to eliminate the main cause of the conflict. Yet the course of the discussion in the Council has shown that the main, fundamental and essential point is precisely that the question of the hostilities and the conflict in the Indian subcontinent should be linked with a call to the Government of Pakistan immediately and unconditionally to recognize the will of the people of East Pakistan as expressed in the elections of December 1970, which have already been described here in detail yesterday and at today's meeting. Both these questions should be organically linked. What does this mean? It means that only the people of East Pakistan, through their elected representatives, can decide their future fate. No one should deny the rights of the representatives elected by this people.

129. Through their elected representatives the people of East Pakistan are also free to decide on the renewal of negotiations with the Pakistan Government. And yet, under the proposals which were submitted to the Security Council yesterday and, it has become apparent from the course of consultations today, as is now being suggested by the representatives of the Western and some other countries, as before, the question of the hostilities should not be linked to the question of the need for a political settlement of the situation in East Pakistan; this problem is also not dealt

with in the Chinese draft resolution. The first question is stressed, while the second main question—the main cause of the conflict—is completely ignored. And yet, it is precisely this question, which, as has repeatedly been noted and stressed, is the main and decisive cause of the outbreak of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent.

130. Attempts have been made to give events in East Pakistan a certain religious colouration. However, according to the information available, approximately 60 million of the 75 million people living in East Pakistan are Muslims and up to 2 million of the 10 million refugees are Muslims. The violence and terror carried out by the military authorities in East Pakistan have therefore had not a religious but a political basis, with all the attendant results.

131. An attempt has also been made in statements and draft resolutions to adopt the same attitude towards both India and Pakistan. What is more, one delegation has followed the course of putting all the blame on India alone. That can in no way be justified. Such an approach is devoid of any foundation and it is therefore quite impossible to agree with it. It is impossible to adopt the same attitude towards both India and Pakistan, since the latter, unable to cope with the internal crisis in East Pakistan, has undertaken a diversionary manoeuvre in attacking India, bombing a number of its cities and other inhabited areas, attacking Indian posts and shelling Indian territory. Pakistan troops invaded Indian territory. This is how Pakistan acted, since it was unable to achieve a peaceful settlement of the internal crisis in East Pakistan and crush the resistance of the population of East Pakistan.

132. This is the heart of the matter and the real cause of the conflict. And no one, including the Security Council, has any right to overlook it.

133. The position of the Soviet Union with regard to the serious deterioration of the situation in the Indian subcontinent is set out in the TASS statement of 5 December 1971, which was issued today as Security Council document S/10422. The members of the Security Council and Missions to the United Nations will be able to acquaint themselves with that document.

134. As to the draft resolutions, the delegation of the Soviet Union will insist on the adoption of the draft resolution it has submitted. That is the one which reflects the main, fundamental and real cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. The two other draft resolutions do not take account of the main cause of the conflict but side-step it and the USSR delegation cannot therefore consider them acceptable and will vote against them.

135. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Pakistan.

136. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): In making my present remarks, I am concerned only with clarifying certain issues which were regrettably confused or distorted in the statements of the representatives of the Soviet Union and India.

137. Yesterday the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik, read from document S/10412, which

contains a report by the Secretary-General on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. It must be pointed out that that report relates to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which is disputed territory. It must also be pointed out that this report could not have been filed except for the provisions of resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, adopted under the auspices of the Security Council.

138. The Soviet representative will recall that the India-Pakistan question has been on the agenda of the Security Council for the last 23 years and has engaged the Council's attention at more than 100 meetings. He will also recall that it was his delegation which vetoed three proposals in the Security Council which would have facilitated a settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Let me quote paragraph 2 of that same document in rebuttal of the charge he made against Pakistan concerning the alleged violation of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir:

“(c) The Indian military authorities had admitted that, since 20 October 1971, they had strengthened their forces in Jammu and Kashmir by a considerable number, thus exceeding the authorized level of troops in Jammu and Kashmir under the Karachi Agreement, and that they would continue to do so as considered necessary for the security of Indian territory.

“(d) The Chief Military Observer found that Pakistan had also introduced additional forces on its side of the cease-fire line . . .” but “without . . . exceeding the permissible level.”

It may be noted that the dates when India violated the Karachi agreement,³ 20 October, and when Pakistan moved additional forces, but within the permissible limit, 29 November, are 40 days apart. It was only after 40 days of violation of the Karachi agreement that Pakistan moved to restore the balance, and even then it took care to remain within the magnitude of forces permitted under that agreement.

139. As regards the particular so-called violations cited by the representative of the Soviet Union—about the alleged crossing of the cease-fire line—let me inform the Council that such violations are being committed by India almost every day; UNMOGIP has been sending these reports of violations and they can be made available by the Office of the Secretary-General. So to single out one small alleged incident of a border crossing as denoting Pakistan's intention of attacking India is, I regret to say, not evidence of a sense of proportion.

140. The representative of the Soviet Union ranged far and wide in his many interventions on the internal affairs of Pakistan, and he also spoke about certain aspects of Pakistan's external relations. In speaking of the problems of the refugees he stated that India was justified in massing its forces on Pakistan borders because, to quote Ambassador Malik, what self-respecting State which cares for its security

³ For the text of the agreement, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7, annex 26.*

is not going to displace part of its armed forces to the territory where there was this rush of 10 million refugees? If that was justified, we should like to ask was it also justified for India to have established bases for armed guerrillas, to have equipped, trained and unleashed them to carry out acts of sabotage and destruction in East Pakistan? Is that also justified because there are 10 million refugees in India? And was it also justified when finally Indian armed forces attacked Pakistan on 21 November on a large scale at many points of the border—which has been admitted by the representative of India?

141. We regret that the Soviet representative did not take into account these other aspects of the situation. But in one respect I welcome his statement. Since April of this year we have heard repeated charges from India of genocide—that Pakistan armed forces had killed hundreds of thousands of men, women and children in East Pakistan, that they have carried out all kinds of untold atrocities.

142. We are glad to note the sobriety and responsibility in the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union and in his Government's statements whenever they have spoken about the situation; they have referred to thousands killed in the disturbances—although they have talked of 10 million refugees.

143. I should like to inform the Council that I have no desire to enter into an exchange with the representative of India in regard to this tragic situation. Impartial observers such as the correspondents of the London *Guardian* and even some correspondents of *The New York Times* did report on the massacres carried out by the anti-State and secessionist elements in East Pakistan before 25 March. And if the representative of India has chosen to disregard the other side of the picture we can only say that his submissions here in the Security Council cannot be considered balanced or fair. I would be glad to draw his attention to the reports that have appeared in the world press, in the most responsible and respected organs of public opinion, in this regard.

144. The representative of the Soviet Union drew a very graphic picture when he said that 10 million refugees constitute a larger population than that of some 88 Member States of the United Nations. Undoubtedly, this is an enormous figure. Without entering into a controversy as to the actual number of refugees that have left, let me also point out that in the Third Committee debates on the question of humanitarian assistance to Pakistani refugees the representative of Uganda stated that his country had given asylum to 188,000 refugees from neighbouring African countries. And at the same time the representative of Uganda maintained that his Government had taken strict precautions to see that none of those refugees were armed and trained and sent to carry out depredations against the neighbours of Uganda.

145. In terms of percentage of the population of India, the refugees, as was pointed out by the representative of Greece in the Economic and Social Council debate at its fifty-first session, constitute 2 per cent of the population of India. But we agree that it is a very large number, which we are most anxious to take back under conditions of safety

and security which can be certified by the United Nations if the international community is genuinely interested in seeking a humanitarian solution to this problem and not exploiting it as a weapon to bring about the dismemberment of the territorial integrity of a Member State. I could say much about displacement of populations elsewhere, about mass transfers of human beings, about the denial of the right to return to their homes even after a generation, but I do not think that much purpose would be served by entering into such exchanges and therefore I say no more on this subject.

146. We have also heard a great deal about the need for a political settlement in Pakistan. Of course, we know that this is vital to the survival, not only of East Pakistan but also of West Pakistan, but we have been told about the human rights of citizens, about national liberation movements and about democracy. We know that many States Members of the United Nations are not homogeneous States. In fact, many of them claim to be pluralistic societies or multi-national States, but the question arises, when Pakistan is told that it should not suppress autonomy, that it should respect the aspirations of the people of East Pakistan—we ask to what extent the right to autonomy demands respect? Many representatives of States who tell us this know that in their own countries there is no autonomy; they are unitary States even though ostensibly they are federal in form. Even as federations, they are highly centralized States and leave only local powers for the constituent units of a federation.

147. We in Pakistan would have been able to settle this problem if the demand had not escalated to a break-up of Pakistan from a federation into a confederation. We would hope that those who are objective and who truly try to understand the problems of pluralistic societies where there is a diversity of peoples, where society is dichotomous, would try to be helpful and to understand and find a solution to this dilemma of reconciliation, of the need for preserving the territorial integrity and national unity of a State with the demand for autonomy which is undoubtedly genuine. But, instead, we have been pilloried by propaganda and by those who, for reasons of alliance, or of politics, wish to take sides and demand that Pakistan should concede the ultimatums that are put forward by elected representatives of the people, not for autonomy but for dismemberment.

148. We in Pakistan are formulating a political settlement, but regrettably it is not a political settlement that would be to the liking of India which seeks the dismemberment of Pakistan. About this there can be no doubt considering the statement of the Prime Minister of India and the statements of responsible leaders in the Indian Government which Ambassador Malik has totally chosen to disregard. He thinks that Pakistan is the guilty party and that it should be punished for its crimes by being made to submit to its disintegration by force. However, I should like to state that we have a will to survival and we will resist all attempts from any quarter to destroy our territorial integrity.

149. One of the reasons why India has chosen this time to launch an aggression against us is to disrupt the time-table laid down by President Yahya Khan to induct a represen-

tative government in Pakistan for which the date had been fixed between the 20th and 27th of this month. History is full of dangerous pitfalls emanating from the desire of big and powerful States which tried to impose a political settlement on relatively small and weak neighbours. Munich is a classical example. We know that India considers the existence of Pakistan a threat to its security, but now that the Soviet Union has articulated a new security doctrine for South-East Asia, perhaps all of us should seriously think of what it may portend.

150. The representative of the Soviet Union spoke about the Tashkent spirit but that spirit prevailed much before the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, of what is euphemistically called a treaty of friendship and co-operation. In content and effect it is nothing less than a military alliance. Events have conclusively proved it to be so. Actions speak louder than words and guns even louder. What are these actions? Immediately after this Treaty was signed a series of feverish military consultations started in Moscow and New Delhi under article IX of the Treaty, which pledges the parties to consultations with a view to taking what in diplomatic language has been described as effective measures to remove any threat to peace. We have sufficient experience of military pacts to know that similar clauses exist in those instruments and world opinion and the parties themselves construe such language to be sufficient to constitute a military pact. Supplies of sophisticated armaments such as MIG-23s, tanks and other military equipment were despatched post-haste to Calcutta and other Indian ports.

151. Having thus upset the balance of power in the subcontinent, the Indo-Soviet Treaty emboldened the Indians to opt for a military invasion of Pakistan under the pretext of self-defence. I said in the First Committee in October [1806th meeting] and in the plenary meeting last month [1996th meeting] that this Treaty must be judged by its results, whether it will act in restraint of war or will precipitate war. We now have the answer; we have it in India's aggression and the Soviet veto last night of the proposal for a cease-fire and withdrawal.

152. A double pretension surrounds the Indo-Soviet Treaty. One party makes it possible for the other to launch subversion and aggression against a third country and yet it invokes the Tashkent spirit. The other party closely binds itself to a military alliance and yet claims to be non-aligned. Who is so naïve as not to see through these pretensions? If any further evidence were necessary, it has been provided by the Soviet statement circulated by the TASS news agency this morning [S/10422]. The statement in effect says that Pakistan was following a dangerous course in defending itself and resisting a military occupation and implied that Pakistan action even posed a threat to the Soviet Union's security interests. I submit, how can we believe any more in the existence of the Tashkent spirit?

153. The representative of the Soviet Union, in his statement a few moments ago, referred to what he called an attack by Pakistan on 3 December. He did not refer at all to the large-scale attacks on East Pakistan from all sides, which commenced on 21 November and, in the words of the Defence Minister of India, left Pakistan no other alternative but to break up or choose to go to war.

154. It needs to be stressed again and again that the Council is concerned not with an ordinary situation or dispute but with a situation of war. Can there be any possibility of a return of the refugees unless and until international peace is secured? Let me make it very clear beyond any shadow of doubt that no proposal for a settlement of the conflict will have any effect if it does not assure the cessation of Indian infiltration and indirect aggression to the same degree and with the same force as it calls for the cessation of hostilities.

155. In asking for such a decision by the Security Council we are not asking for any partisan support or sympathy from any member of the Council. And I should like to tell my good friend Mr. Jamil Baroodi to take good note of what I have to say. We are not asking for partisan support from members of the Security Council; we are invoking the law of the United Nations. We issue solemn declarations of principle—the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations—but when the time comes to apply those principles we tend to put them aside. Is it not fundamental to the maintenance of the norms of international relations that no State should foment civil strife on the territory of another; that no State should aid and abet subversion and sabotage in another? Does it not follow logically that it should be condemned for such acts? The word "condemns" is used in the Declaration on non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. If the Security Council does not wish to condemn, should it not at least ask India to desist from armed intervention in Pakistan's affairs?

156. It was because the draft resolution which was voted upon last night was deficient in this respect—and I must be frank—that we had serious misgivings about its effectiveness. It did not condemn aggression. It is not, I repeat, enough to ask the parties to cease hostilities. Hostilities are but the second stage of the process which began with Indian subversion, Indian armed interference and Indian infiltration into Pakistan. Unless interference and infiltration are stopped, peace will not be restored.

157. The United States draft resolution, as I said before, failed to condemn India for its aggression, as India should have been condemned. It did not explicitly call upon India to desist from its attempts to bring about the disintegration of Pakistan, as the Security Council should demand. None the less, we were willing to co-operate with the Security Council on the basis of that draft resolution, because it carried the support of as many as 11 members of the Council. That is Pakistan's attitude.

158. Let the Council members compare that attitude with India's. There is no question of a cease-fire, says India. The representative of India warned the Security Council yesterday that India would persist in the course of its aggression against Pakistan. Whether or not this meeting of the Council will be able to take a positive decision, that message from India should be ringing in the ears of members of the Council.

159. Turning now to certain remarks of the representative of India, I would draw attention to his statement that:

“... we went into Pakistan territory after 21 November. We did; I do not deny it.” [1606th meeting, para. 162.]

And yet the United States draft resolution did not take into account the evidence submitted by my delegation about the facts of Indian aggression and the admission by India. What further proof was needed?

160. The representative of India gave as the explanation for the invasion of Pakistan territory that the Pakistan Army had “started shelling our civilian villages”. “What was the remedy left to us?” he asked. And he said the remedy was to invade Pakistan.

161. You will recall, Mr. President, that Pakistan accepted a proposal that the armed forces of India and Pakistan should pull back from the frontiers to their peace-time stations. That proposal was rejected by India. Then Pakistan accepted a proposal that they should pull back to agreed safe distances from the frontier, if not to peace-time stations. That proposal was rejected by India. Did India not have this option, so that shelling from the Pakistan side, which he has charged, could have been prevented and stopped? India had the option of peace, but chose war.

162. Finally, I heard a representative say earlier in this meeting that the problem of Bangla Desh had been discussed in the United Nations. Let me state categorically that this so-called problem has not been discussed in the United Nations—or if any such discussion ever took place the delegation of Pakistan had no knowledge of it and could never have agreed to participate in it.

163. Let me recall that only two problems pertaining to Pakistan have so far been discussed in the United Nations. One is the humanitarian problem of the refugees, and that was discussed in the Economic and Social Council and in the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The other is the situation between India and Pakistan, which is being discussed by the Security Council at this very moment. Neither of those problems can be considered to be the problem of Bangla Desh.

164. In addition to the reasons that have been so eloquently adduced by the representative of Argentina against the proposal that was discussed earlier in this meeting, let me again remind the Security Council of the fact that in this seemingly innocuous proposal lurks a sinister design: to promote the disintegration of Pakistan. Yesterday I quoted from a paper of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, about how India should proceed to deal politically in the United Nations with the East Pakistan situation. I should like to quote that passage again:

“There is no doubt that the Security Council would meet to call upon both nations to end the fight. Whether the fight should be ended immediately or continued for a period of time is a matter for India to consider. At this stage it should be India’s endeavour to get Bangla Desh as

one of the recognized parties to the dispute. In fact, that is the appropriate way to win international recognition for Bangla Desh. It should be made clear that the cease-fire cannot be signed in the Bangla Desh sector unless the Bangla Desh commander is recognized as an independent sector commander for the purposes of cease-fire, and the Bangla Desh government is recognized as a party to the dispute as a whole.”

165. The representative of India dismissed this quotation as the utterings of theoreticians and academicians, but the pattern of action that is being unfolded before your very eyes in this debate confirms every word and letter of this statement. This is the pattern that is being followed, beginning with the sponsorship by the representative of India of a request for giving a particular individual a hearing—and if you examine the request of that individual for a hearing, you see that he claims to speak in the name of the people and Government of Bangla Desh.

166. We would like to ask our distinguished colleagues who are formulating draft resolutions: are you formulating those draft resolutions to camouflage designs to promote secessionist forces and their designs against Pakistan? Will your calls for cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of forces allow for loopholes to achieve the designs that have been so clearly stated in this analysis by the Indian Institute of Defence Studies?

167. I should like to advise the sponsors of all draft resolutions that my delegation will look carefully into such formulations so that ambiguities may not be taken advantage of in order to promote ends in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

168. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of India.

169. Mr. SEN (India): I do not know how these things are arranged but I was under the impression that there would be another speaker between the representative of Pakistan and myself. However, it makes no difference because I think I can easily reply to the various points he made yesterday—as indeed I promised I would do—and to some of the points he made today.

170. Let us first look at the military affairs to which he referred at the beginning of his statement yesterday. As I said, he represents a military régime and therefore he has all the military details handy. However, we are not without some army and it is not altogether impossible for us to get some information. I shall just give you the list of incidents on the Bengal front on 7 November:

(a) The Pakistani Army started firing towards the Indian villages of Rahimpur and Gourangala under Kalamchoura police station in Tripura. Ten artillery shells and 14 bombs landed inside Indian territory.

(b) The Pakistani Army opened LMG and MMG fire towards the Indian village of Gourangala in Tripura.

(c) The Pakistani Army opened fire towards the Indian village of Mandabag in Tripura. Several 3-inch mortar

bombs and a number of artillery shells landed inside Indian territory.

(d) The Pakistani Army subjected the Indian village of Kasba in Tripura to intermittent firing. Several shells landed inside Indian territory.

(e) The Pakistani Army opened fire towards the Indian village of Simna in Tripura. Several artillery shells landed inside Indian territory.

(f) Several artillery shells landed inside Indian territory when the Pakistani Army opened fire towards the Indian border outpost of Sidhai in Tripura.

(g) Several LMG, MMG and 2-inch mortar shells landed inside Indian territory when the Pakistani Army opened fire towards the Indian village of Amlighat near Sabroom police station.

(h) The Pakistani Army opened fire towards the Indian village of Malua under Belonia police station in Tripura. Several artillery shells landed inside Indian territory.

(i) The Pakistani Army opened fire towards the Indian village of Belonia in Tripura.

(j) Pakistani troops opened unprovoked fire towards the Indian village of Chandannagar under Kamalpur police station in Tripura. Several artillery shells landed inside Indian territory.

(k) The Pakistani Army opened fire from Dhalai area towards Indian territory in Tripura. Several artillery shells landed inside Indian territory.

(l) The Pakistani Army subjected the Indian village of Rangauti under Kailashahar police station in Tripura to heavy and intermittent firing.

(m) Several shells of 3-inch mortar fired by Pakistani Army landed inside Indian village of Puran Raj Bari in Tripura.

171. That is the record of one day. I am quite sure the Council would not like me to recite this litany of military aggression from Pakistan day after day. But if the Council is interested, I am fully prepared to do so. It does shock the credibility of anyone listening to the representative of Pakistan for him to say that villages were not fired upon, that we were not compelled to take action in retaliation, that the only option open to us was to kill civilians or to silence the guns, to refer to all the offers to withdraw to a peace-time station, to any agreed limit, to anything they suggested. But anyone who has read the proposals will be interested to find that all these offers were related to one fundamental point—that we must cease helping what they call the “guerrillas” and the President of Pakistan must be satisfied that we have been good boys. That was one of the conditions attached to most of these so-called proposals. And yet the question still remains unanswered: if the intention was not to provoke hostilities with India, why did the Pakistan Army move forward to these positions? That question still remains unanswered and I have repeatedly

made it clear to my colleagues and to the representative of Pakistan himself, when he was on speaking terms with me, that we will not tolerate intrusion, aggression in our territory by the Pakistan Army and if they continue to do it they must take the consequences. And that is a statement I wish to make again in this Council, that we shall have nothing to do with aggression from Pakistan any longer. We have suffered four times and we are not prepared to suffer any more.

172. But let us turn to the other aspects. He makes a long song and dance—forgive my vulgar, rather casual, expression which *The New York Times* does not like—that we are trading, arming and doing all kinds of things to subvert, pervert, invert, convert and revolutionize East Pakistan. Let me repeat what I read out in the General Assembly on 13 October 1971. I said—it is always a bit of a bore to quote from one's own speeches, but sometimes it saves time:

“Pakistan accuses India of creating tension on the border and of supporting the freedom fighters inside East Bengal. I would in this context read out what the Ambassador of Pakistan in Washington had to say on 15 August 1971”—not 15 April, not 15 May, but 15 August—“on a programme of the television network of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC). Incidentally, the Ambassador of Pakistan in Washington is the brother of the representative of Pakistan here”—he no longer is because he has been transferred—he said: “There were at least about 160,000 armed personnel who defected on account of Awami League propaganda. The army was asked on the 25th of March to go and deal with these 160,000 armed people.’ Who are those people? In the same interview the Pakistan Ambassador answered:

“There are not only East Bengal Rifles; there were East Pakistan Rifles; there was a border military force; there were armed police.’

“From where did they get their arms? The Ambassador said:

“These weapons came from looting of armouries and government stores and from the armouries of reserve police and so on, weapons that had been collected by force, by militant student bands who were going and knocking at the doors of the houses and asking people to deliver their guns and whatever sporting rifles—guns and rifles—they had. These were not collected from the East Pakistan Rifles. We wish we had taken the trouble to disarm them before.’” [1965th plenary meeting, para. 215.]

That is the beginning of the story. That is how they got their arms. That is how the guerrillas started fighting for their liberty.

173. In the same context, one of the difficulties of answering the representative of Pakistan is that he roams so wide and large over the same theme, that India is guilty for arming the guerrillas; India is guilty over the elections; India is guilty for the Mukti Bahini; India is guilty for the Awami League, for their programme. It is extraordinarily creditable for us that such allusions should be made, but let me point

out three things. Mr. Bhutto, who is no friend of India as I mentioned to you yesterday, has written a big book and not a word has been said about Indian influence on elections or subsequent actions, or the exploitation of refugees, on which the representative of Pakistan is always waxing eloquent. We give shelter to refugees. We give shelter to all refugees—east, north, south, west, who flee from terror and from oppression. We have no apologies to make for our humanitarian action. If they flee from terror we give them shelter. If other Governments do not like it, it is too bad. I do not have to go into the business of Tibetan refugees; it has been mentioned again and again, and if the representative of China has any fears that we shall launch aggression against China because of the Tibetan refugees, I can assure him that fear is completely unfounded and indeed his charges are both base and baseless.

174. So no press reports wrote about it. No Pakistani wrote about it. Pakistanis are gloating about the successful election. We are indeed very happy they had a successful election in Pakistan. We hoped that, for a change, our relations would improve. Our country was going to have an election and our Government was returned to power with an overwhelming majority. We were looking forward to an economic breakthrough, with friendly relations with Pakistan. Was that the sign for plotting the dismemberment of Pakistan? These charges are flung, day in and day out, without the slightest evidence and without the slightest proof and I must protest most vigorously at this kind of nonsense being tolerated.

175. Let us see another charge. Just before President Ayub Khan retired, he had brought up another charge called the Agartala conspiracy case. Now let us see what Mr. Bhutto—who, as I said, is no friend of India—had to say about the Agartala conspiracy case:

“If Ayub Khan had at this stage heeded my advice, a reasonable compromise could have been reached, recognizing the basic merits of the case. If Ayub Khan had done in 1966 what he sought to do at the round table conference in 1969, the problem of Pakistan would not have come to such a pass. Unfortunately, Ayub Khan chose what he called ‘the language of weapons’ and not the weapon of language. He arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Agartala conspiracy case”—which made headlines, I was the High Commissioner in Pakistan and no one would tell me what the case was about, however—“which followed was handled in a disastrously clumsy manner and boomeranged so seriously that we still are reeling from its consequences. Only Sheikh Mujibur Rahman benefited from this case. If all of the most important political issues are handled in this clumsy way, we must reap the consequences whether it is in the military field or in the political field. This has been the story again and again.”

176. Since we are on the subject of Mr. Bhutto, I might touch on a humorous subject. Mr. Bhutto had gone to see President Yahya Khan in his presidential palace in Dacca. After the meeting was over Mr. Bhutto ran into Mr. Mujibur Rahman in the presidential drawing-room, and this is what Mr. Bhutto had to say:

“At this point, thinking that the room might be bugged, we walked out to the verandah towards the back of the

house and sat in the portico behind the President’s salon.”

177. I do not have to comment on this. If the Presidential palaces are bugged in this way so that two leaders like Mr. Bhutto and Mr. Rahman do not feel safe to converse, on political matters no doubt, then I have no further comments.

178. Much has been said about atrocities. The Pakistan delegation, I suppose like many of us, read some of the popular journals, but popular journals are not the type of documents we should quote in the Security Council. Here is a journal called *Foreign Affairs*—an American quarterly review of October 1971, price \$2.50 a copy—and since I am in America where many of the qualities are to be judged by the price tag, I suppose it is a good journal. Here is a very good article; at least, I think it is good: “Pakistan Divided” by Sydney Schanberg:

“In short the fanatic fury of a holy war seems to have been the overriding reason why the Pakistani Government loosed the army on the Bengali population. This is not hard to understand when we recall that Pakistan is a State based on religion where democratic traditions are almost nonexistent and where the popular will has been often frustrated. When the army troops began their rampage that first night, they seemed to be enjoying themselves. As Punjabi patrols emerged from alleys after killing unarmed Bengalis, they came out with their hands unraised, shouting . . . ‘Victory for God’ and . . . ‘Long live Pakistan’.”

That was the spirit where the Muslims killed Muslims in the name of religion. Then, a little further on, Mr. Schanberg says:

“At this writing, foreign diplomats estimate that the army has killed at least 200,000 Bengalis. Despite claims that normalcy prevails in the province, the military has not been able as yet to restore law and order or establish even a semblance of governmental administration.”⁴

179. This particular conclusion has been reinforced again and again to such an extent that I think it is a waste of breath and time to go on repeating the same story.

180. Much has been said about autonomy and independence. I am slightly tired of saying the same thing in different forums of the United Nations. There was no demand for independence at the time the elections were held, or when the negotiations were undertaken. The demand for independence only started when the military crack-down took place, and if there is any doubt in this respect, let those representatives of countries who have well-stocked archives come along and say this is not so. I doubt that they will.

181. To go back to another aspect, Washington’s call with the others for a Security Council meeting yesterday represented the welcome, though tragically tardy, recognition of those dangers and of the essential role of the United

⁴ *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 126, 127 and 129.

Nations in restoring and maintaining peace. For months the United States resorted to ineffectual secret diplomacy that by-passed and served to paralyse the world Organization. The Nixon Administration adopted a public posture of mock even-handedness which had the effect of exacerbating the Indo-Pakistan conflict. It ignored the fundamental threat to India posed by Yahya Khan's harsh repression in East Pakistan.

182. The United States Government is still sidestepping the central issue and is responding with flagrant injustice in attempting to pin the major responsibility for the present conflict on India. If Security Council intervention is to have any chance of restoring peace between India and Pakistan, the United States and the United Nations must recognize and deal with the basic problem in East Pakistan.

183. If that particular statement had been made by an Indian spokesman, our aid would have been cut, we would have been put on the mat and given a lecture as if we were some kind of native children from a missionary school. But this was not made by a spokesman of the Indian Government. This was made by the respectable *New York Times*.

184. Yesterday the representative of the United States said: "In an effort to end the bloodshed, to save lives, to reduce the untold suffering, we are introducing a draft resolution which . . ." and so on and so forth [1606th meeting, para. 200].

185. Now this bloodshed, this concern for the saving of lives, this concern for the reduction of untold suffering, would it not have been better expressed a few months earlier? Would it have been too much to ask the United States Government to make a public declaration expressing concern at all the humiliations, all the tragedies, all the suffering and all the brutalities that people were enduring? However, this is how politics rubs; let it be.

186. That also brings us to the Chinese draft resolution. As I said, I hope that I shall continue to treat all Chinese utterances with a degree of indifference because they only read out statements which have been made in Peking for the last six months. There is nothing new in them. But it is extraordinary that a country which is supposed to represent all revolutionary forces should be taking this attitude. I can only explain it by assuming that they think time is on their side and that there will be plenty of opportunities to change the direction of the sails according to the wind.

187. Now I come to the draft resolutions before us. As I explained, it is not for India to agree or disagree to cease-fire resolutions; it is for the Bangla Desh Government because they are fighting for their liberty and for their lives. If they agree, we shall see what can be done. But we cannot be involved in a dishonest agreement to cease fire, knowing fully well that we shall not be able to keep it because, as I said repeatedly yesterday, we have no desire to oppress people who are already sufficiently oppressed, in spite of the great invocation of the religion of Allah by the rulers of Pakistan.

188. I have only one more point to make before I finish, and it relates to our request that Bangla Desh representatives should be heard. I do not quite understand the

concern of the representative of Pakistan. We do not want to extend international recognition by listening to a Bangla Desh representative in the Security Council. If we did want to give recognition, we, as the Government of India, could have done so a long time ago. We shall do it when we think the normal criteria for recognition have been established, when we think that they deserve it, not because of the wish, but because of their ability to govern the country. It has nothing to do with Security Council attendance. Security Council attendance is governed by rule 39 of the rules of procedure. If there is any doubt about it, I wonder how many people have considered the number of representatives of various countries and areas who have come before us and given their views. The only question about listening to Mr. Justice Chowdhury—who, incidentally, was the Pakistan representative on the Human Rights Commission until he was removed very recently—reminds me of another remark because the Pakistan Ambassador is always saying that the Indians are at the back of all these evils, but how many ambassadors have defected? How many soldiers have defected? How many Ministers have defected? I have received letters from people who are leaving the Service today and those letters would bring tears to the eyes of even very hard-hearted people. Are these the people who are to be influenced by Indian propaganda, Indian machinations? If that is the nature of the Pakistan Foreign Service, then I do not have to make any further comments. At any rate, many people have appeared before the Security Council; even today we have pending requests from some delegation—I think it is the Soviet delegation—for two representatives of the black population of Rhodesia to be heard. I wonder if the representative of Pakistan will object to such an appearance. I have also before me a complete record of all those who have appeared before the Security Council, and I find the names of people from the Palestine movement and of various other people who have appeared before the Security Council, including the Mayor of Jerusalem at one stage. So I do not think we need be frightened by this question of recognition through the Security Council. We are not going to recognize anyone through the Security Council. All those people who have appeared have not been recognized, and I am quite sure that Mr. Ian Smith will not recognize the existence of the black community or of their rights merely because their spokesmen come and speak here. I am quite sure that the President of Pakistan will not recognize Mr. Justice Chowdhury as the spokesman of Bangla Desh. If we are to proceed in this matter in an intelligent way, in a realistic way, we cannot do so without listening to the party most interested in it.

189. Lastly, I thank the Council for a very patient hearing. I have tried, in spite of sudden outbursts of anger, because I do feel angry when nonsensical charges are made in the Council and so much time is taken up. It is now a quarter past nine; we sat up until 1.30 this morning, and much time has been taken up by unnecessary polemics, propaganda, controversies—and Bengal is burning.

190. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I wish very briefly to exercise my right of reply.

191. First, I think that we must all be tolerant because of the tensions and pressures on both the representative of

Pakistan and the representative of India. But I must express surprise in hearing an Ambassador quoting an editorial which includes a direct attack on the President of the United States, a President who has tried for a long, long time, through massive aid, through private contacts with the Heads of Governments in that area, to keep the continent at peace. Thus it was most surprising to find this kind of use of an editorial unfavourable to our Government presented by a representative to the United Nations.

192. To accuse the United States of a degree of indifference possibly could be excused because of the untold tensions in the area, and I am inclined to lean over backwards in this regard, but I do not see that our record of massive aid for refugees on both sides of the border, direct appeals to the Chiefs of State of both areas—nothing in it for us—entitle any representative to level, in these critical times, this kind of allegation against our Government.

193. Several Powers have made private appeals to the Chiefs of State to avoid hostilities; the Soviet Union did; the United States Government did; I believe the United Kingdom did, and perhaps others. And now there is a total war, complete with many thousands of troops on the soil of another country. And we have a crisis; we have a full-scale war.

194. If a man has his arm almost severed in an accident, emergency action is taken; a tourniquet is put on immediately; the bleeding is stopped; one does not tell him, with his arm almost severed, to start doing exercises; one does not give him a long-term answer; one acts to stop the bleeding. And here there is a crisis in the subcontinent, a war, a massive invasion in the East. The latest figures were some 120,000 troops. There are smaller incursions in the West just as condemnable perhaps, but much smaller, and we must put on a tourniquet, and that tourniquet must be for a cease-fire and it must be for a withdrawal. Innocent third parties are being harmed. We have only to look at the report of the Secretary-General that was put before us today about one of the aircraft contributed to the United Nations by a Member State being strafed although it was clearly marked as a United Nations aircraft. Third party ships apparently were attacked today.

195. The United States Government tried to help with the refugee problem and I do not believe that any country in the United Nations, or any country in the world, has done more. Perhaps we do not view this as anything except our obligation, but we did try. We gave a large amount of assistance to both India and Pakistan, and we yield to no nation in our concern for human suffering. In true quiet diplomacy we urged restraint on Pakistan and we urged restraint on India. We encouraged prompt attention to the situation in East Pakistan by the Pakistan Government, and we fully supported the man whom I wish could have been in his place with us today—the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But now India has invaded East Pakistan with thousands; 120,000 odd troops have crossed that border. And this Council at this moment should not be sitting here handing down some moralistic judgement. We must simply say there is a lot of blood being lost, a lot of agony, a lot of misery, a lot of death; and this body must act now to stop the war. This has been a full-scale invasion

in East Pakistan and it must stop. If people say we are favouring one side over another, they are wrong. But if they say that we insist that these invading forces go back to their own borders, they are correct. And where there are Pakistan forces on India's soil, they must as well go back. Of course they must go back. This is a crisis. It must be treated as a crisis. This is not the time to solve once and for all, in one neat package, this whole complex question. It cannot be done at this sitting. What can be done is to put on that tourniquet, to stop shooting, to withdraw troops. There has been a massive invasion of East Pakistan, and there is too little time to solve the underlying problems. But there is enough time for this Council now to end this war.

196. Our Government will support resolutions that are offered that will effect a cease-fire and effect a withdrawal.

197. Let me end where I began. The attack by the Indian representative on the policy of the United States Government would under different conditions receive a much different reaction from me. Here I understand the tensions, and I simply hope that we can lay aside these kinds of allegations and get on about our business of trying to have this Security Council act to bring about a cease-fire, bring about a withdrawal, and then continue to address ourselves to the agony that exists in the subcontinent. So I am inclined to excuse what I consider to be a most unfortunate comment about the President of the United States.

198. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document S/10423 have conferred on me the privilege of introducing it to the Council for consideration. I say that they have conferred the privilege on me and that I feel honoured by it because any of the distinguished representatives who have signed it would have been better qualified to introduce this text, and would have done so with greater eloquence than I will be able to muster.

199. You will doubtless recall that at the meeting yesterday or—to be more accurate—at the very end of the meeting early this morning, the representative of Somalia asked us to meet early in the afternoon so that the morning hours could be devoted to intense consultation with other delegations. Since 10.30 this morning, all the delegations who sponsored this draft resolution have been working incessantly and consulting all the other delegations on the Security Council and those of India and Pakistan to endeavour to arrive at a formula which might enable the Council to move forward and break the deadlock of our efforts. But more than that, to find a formula that would make an immediate cessation of hostilities possible and the restoration of peace in the area.

200. All the representatives of the eight countries who sponsored the draft resolution have had one primary concern: to find a solution that would be satisfactory to the two parties to the conflict. And this was our main concern because we all have excellent bonds of friendship with both the Governments of India and Pakistan.

201. The draft resolution which we submit to the Security Council is intended to follow a parallel course. On the one

hand, we direct our efforts to that which seems obviously most urgent and immediate, that is, to call for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces of India and Pakistan to their respective frontiers. On the other hand, our effort is intended to create the conditions necessary for the refugees to return immediately to their homes, thus putting an end to the suffering which has afflicted them because of the events of the last month. Furthermore, the draft resolution recognizes the need to deal adequately, at a later stage and within the framework of the United Nations Charter, with the questions which led to the hostilities, because we are convinced that tonight we will not solve a complex problem, and because we are convinced that what is most urgent and important is to restore peace in the region; and finally, because we are convinced that calmly, later on, we will be able to examine all the other problems which led to the outbreak of hostilities.

202. At the meetings we have had since this morning, we have been able to arrive at a joint text between the two draft resolutions which had previously been before the Security Council and which, as a result of this merger, are therefore eliminated. Since we were among the co-sponsors of the draft resolutions contained in documents S/10417 and S/10419 we were very quickly able to overcome some of the differences which divided us, and which were not important. But unfortunately we have not been equally successful in the other consultations we have had. The points of view of the parties, which are known to all the members of the Council, are strongly held. Both parties adhere to them and it is difficult in a time of crisis to persuade them to yield so as to arrive at a compromise formula. But even so, the eight sponsors who are non-permanent members of this body felt it to be their responsibility to submit a draft resolution which, as we see it, offers a possibility of arriving at an immediate and positive result, such as the cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces, and the restoration of peace in the region.

203. We know that the draft resolution is not perfect—far from it. We know too that it may not address itself to other crucial aspects which should be taken into account. But having had almost 12 hours of consultations we reached the conclusion that those other aspects could not be solved at this time. If any other delegation which may be critical of our draft resolution were to have any constructive ideas, the eight sponsors would be the first to welcome them, because we are not prompted by a spirit of competition. We do, however, appeal to all the members of the Council to bear in mind that it is very easy to criticize but that an adequate and acceptable plan of action is something else again and not so easy to formulate.

204. We, the representatives of these eight countries, trust that this first step—and I emphasize that this is simply the first step—will be acceptable to all the members of the Council and that we shall be able to leave tonight when the meeting is adjourned with at least the satisfaction of having contributed—in that region and in this conflict involving two Powers with which most of the members of this Council maintain excellent relations—to finding an honourable way towards immediate peace and the possibility for lasting peace in the region.

205. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of India.

206. Mr. SEN (India): I simply wish to correct a few facts.

207. First, I am not suffering from any tension, anxiety, boredom, fatigue or sleeplessness. I hope I am quite alert and completely cool, otherwise I should not be here to represent the Government of India.

208. Second, it is quite true that the United States Government has been extremely generous with its money in looking after the refugees. I have made many public acknowledgements of it and, if necessary, I shall repeat once again for the records of the Security Council that the United States Government has been extremely generous with money in looking after the refugees. But the claim that they have contributed most in financial terms is simply not correct. India has contributed more. I do not claim any credit for it; I do not think it is entirely a matter of money. But I again say for the sake of fact that we have spent more.

209. Third, my regret was not because the money has not been forthcoming but that no official condemnation of what was going on in East Pakistan has been forthcoming. If it is true—and I do not yet have the facts, the United States delegation has much more information than I have—that 120,000 Indian soldiers are in East Pakistan, I have explained the background in which they are there. But I have not heard any regrets about 80,000 Pakistan soldiers who, in the words of Mr. Schanberg, were described as having gone on a rampage against the civilian population. That was also a time to apply the tourniquet.

210. Lastly, with great deference I would say that I said nothing about the President of the United States. I believe that I am too seasoned an official to reflect on any President—any Head of State—in the Security Council. I read a quotation which said: "The Nixon Administration". Now that is the style of the American language. They do not describe their Government as the Government of the United States but as the "Nixon Administration", "Taft Administration" or "Eisenhower Administration". So if any excuse is to be given, it is to be given by the American language, not by the Indian Ambassador.

211. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation has listened carefully to the statement of the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Shahi. We appreciate the situation in which he finds himself at present. He needs arguments but really nothing that he has said concerning the statement of the Soviet delegation can be acknowledged as serious and convincing arguments. We understand that he needs these arguments in order to side-step the main problem, the main and real cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. Yesterday he himself recognized this main and real cause in his statement when he said that a serious internal political crisis had developed in East Pakistan. He denied that Pakistan had attacked India. That, however, has been shown by documentary material. And today the Indian representative has once again provided documentary and official information. The representative of Pakistan sug-

gested that the Soviet Union was trying to punish Pakistan. But that cannot be taken seriously.

212. All the activities of the Soviet Government, all the actions it has taken in connexion with the deterioration of the situation in the Indian subcontinent have been directed exclusively towards preserving peace in that region. This, too, is mentioned in the TASS statement which Ambassador Shahi quoted [S/10422]. I shall quote a few excerpts from it.

“Guided by concern for the maintenance of peace, the Soviet Government repeatedly expressed to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan and to the Government of Pakistan its concern over the situation that had developed in the Indian subcontinent in connexion with the events in East Pakistan.”

It goes on to say:

“In approaching the Government of Pakistan with these considerations, the Soviet Government acted in accordance with the principle of humanitarianism, wishing the Pakistan people well in solving, in a democratic way, the complex problems facing the country.”

And finally, the third point in that statement:

“In the face of the military threat now hanging over the Indian subcontinent, to which not a single peace-loving country can remain indifferent, the Soviet Union calls for a speedy end to the bloodshed and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of its people.”

That is the humanitarian position of principle of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, a position which is supported by the Soviet people. And, therefore, there are absolutely no grounds whatsoever for blaming or reproaching the Soviet Union for punishing Pakistan in some way.

213. I shall not dwell on the comments of the Pakistan representative concerning the Soviet-Indian Treaty. I have already had occasion to answer similar remarks in detail in another United Nations body. I am prepared to discuss the substance and purpose of this Treaty in great detail with Ambassador Shahi. I am astonished by remarks suggesting that there were some sort of special secret consultations in Moscow concerning this Treaty. This does not accord with the facts. I shall merely refer to the joint Soviet-Indian statement which was published in connexion with the visit to India of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko, on 12 August 1971. This stated:

“All the provisions of the Soviet-Indian Treaty serve the purpose of strengthening peace in Asia and universal peace and ensuring international security. The Treaty is not directed against anybody at all but is intended to be a factor in the development of friendship and good-neighbourliness in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”

214. The PRESIDENT: I wish to recapitulate at this juncture the situation in respect of the draft resolutions which are before the Council.

215. The Council has before it at this moment three draft resolutions. In the order of their submission they are: draft resolution S/10418 submitted by the Soviet Union, draft resolution S/10421 submitted by China, and draft resolution S/10423 submitted by Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia. I understand that draft resolution S/10423 supersedes the two draft resolutions presented yesterday by the same States in documents S/10417 and S/10419. Those two draft resolutions are therefore no longer before the Council.

216. When the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolutions before it, I shall put them to the vote in accordance with rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure.

217. As there are no further speakers inscribed on my list to speak at this stage, I take it that the Council is prepared to vote on the draft resolutions before it. I shall now put to the vote draft resolution S/10418 submitted by the Soviet Union.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: China.

Abstaining: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 2 in favour, 1 against, with 12 abstentions.

The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

218. Mr. VAN USSEL (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation was not able to support the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. We consider, in fact, that by dissociating the political problem from that created by the open armed conflict between India and Pakistan, the Council would not be doing its duty in this tragic hour. We must urgently adopt a draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and inviting the two Governments concerned to withdraw their armed forces to their own side of the Indo-Pakistan frontier and, finally, appealing to the Government of Pakistan to create the necessary political conditions which would make possible the repatriation in conditions of security of the refugees who have had to leave their homes.

219. Given the gravity of the situation, my delegation is even prepared to agree to a mere cessation of hostilities.

220. My delegation could not vote in favour of any draft resolution which does not contain these three essential elements. Indeed, while at the beginning of the conflict the acts of violence and hostility were limited to the frontier zone between India and East Pakistan, today there is an open war between two sovereign countries, a war which, unfortunately, extends to both the eastern and the western

part of Pakistan, as is borne out in the successive reports of the Secretary-General.

221. In other words, it is no longer a matter of frontier incursions of refugees, of Indian or Pakistani battalions, but of the land and air forces of both countries.

222. My delegation also attaches great importance to the appeal for the withdrawal of all military units occupying part of another country. On several occasions my country has clearly opposed territorial occupation through the use or threat of force. At a time when the General Assembly is debating the question of the Middle East it is not without point to insist upon the withdrawal of armed forces.

223. Allow me once again to recall our grave responsibility. This Council must act, and act fast. With the support of world public opinion duty bids us take without delay measures that will put an end to hostilities between India and Pakistan, both by an urgent appeal for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of armed forces and by a no less urgent appeal for an equitable political solution in accordance with the interests and aspirations of the populations concerned that will make it possible to normalize living conditions in the area of conflict and thus make possible the return of the refugees to their homes.

224. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): I should like to explain the vote we have just cast. The Chinese delegation voted against the Soviet draft because it would constitute direct interference in the internal affairs of a Member State. The present armed aggression by the Indian Government against Pakistan is being carried out with the connivance, support and shielding of the Soviet Union. Countless facts have proved this. Over a long period the Soviet Government has energetically supported India's expansion and has provided the Indian expansionists with large quantities of arms and other war material. It has encouraged India in its sinister activities to subvert and dismember Pakistan, and has at the same time openly exerted all kinds of pressure on the Pakistan Government.

225. Last August the Soviet Union and India concluded a so-called treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation which is in fact a treaty of military alliance. With the encouragement of that treaty, the Indian Government has become even more embroiled in carrying out expansion and aggression. Not long ago the Indian Prime Minister visited Moscow and held talks with the Soviet leaders. It is by no means accidental that since then the Indian Government has flagrantly sent troops to invade Pakistan.

226. The Soviet representative's performance at yesterday's meeting has made it even clearer that the Soviet Government is the supporter, encourager and protector of the Indian aggression against Pakistan. Reversing right and wrong, confounding black and white, the Soviet representative claims that India, which carries out armed aggression, is the victim and blames Pakistan, which is subjected to aggression, for the current armed conflict.

227. The Indian representative has undisguisedly declared that the Indian Government regards the dismemberment of Pakistan and the disruption of its unity as state policy, and

has openly slandered the representative of Pakistan as representing only West Pakistan.

228. The Soviet representative has also done his utmost to defend the Indian aggressive acts subverting the Pakistan Government and disrupting the national unity of Pakistan. In the draft resolution he put forward yesterday the Soviet representative went to the length of attacking Pakistan for causing the deterioration of the situation and he asserted that only after the so-called political solution of the question of East Pakistan could the acts of hostility cease. In other words, so long as the Pakistan Government refuses to agree to the "independence" of East Pakistan, the Indian Government has the right to continue its subversion and aggression against Pakistan. This echoes the open clamour of the Indian leaders that the Indian troops and armed personnel must not be withdrawn from East Pakistan, and they demand that Pakistan troops withdraw from their own territory, East Pakistan, and that a so-called Bangla Desh be established.

229. That is a naked revelation of the role played by Soviet social imperialism in India's armed aggression against Pakistan. To put it bluntly, in supporting India in its provoking of an armed conflict with Pakistan, the purpose of the Soviet Government is to take advantage of India's inevitable dependence on the Soviet Union in the war and to control the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the Indian Ocean and expand its spheres of influence so as to compete with another super-Power for world hegemony.

230. This is exactly the same tactic it has used in the Middle East question. The Soviet social imperialists are carrying out aggression, control, subversion and expansion everywhere. Everyone will recall the Soviet military aggression and armed occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Everyone will equally recall that the Soviet Government plotted to subvert the legal Government of an African country this year, grossly interfering in the internal affairs of that country. There are too many similar instances to enumerate them.

231. The present acts of the Soviet Government in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent are precisely the extension and continuation of that policy. No matter how hard—

232. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

233. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I should like to draw attention to the fact that the Chinese representative is diverting the Security Council's attention both from the main problem under consideration and from the voting, by spreading his customary slanders against the Soviet Union. I would ask you, Mr. President, to draw his attention to the fact that this is unworthy of the work of the Security Council.

234. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of China to resume his statement, but I would ask him to adhere strictly to the rules of procedure of the Security Council.

235. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): No matter how hard the Soviet representative may try to

justify himself, he cannot write off the facts. All these facts which I have mentioned just now are closely related to the Soviet draft resolution. You cannot deny facts. The present Soviet Government is out-and-out social imperialism. No matter how much Mr. Malik dislikes it, the label is on and cannot be taken off. By betraying the fundamental interests of the Indian people and serving the ambitious designs of the Soviet Government to control the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean, the Indian Government will inevitably eat the bitter fruits of its own making. Soviet social imperialism which supports and connives at Indian aggression and expansion will come to no good end either.

236. Because of the above-mentioned reasons, the Chinese delegation voted against the Soviet draft resolution.

237. The PRESIDENT: I now put to the vote draft resolution S/10421 submitted by China.

238. I call on the representative of China.

239. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): I wish to state that the Chinese delegation is now carrying out consultations with other delegations with regard to this draft resolution. Therefore, we do not ask you, Mr. President, to put it to a vote now.

240. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on draft resolution S/10423 submitted by Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America.

Against: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The result of the vote was 11 in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions.

The draft resolution was not adopted, one of the negative votes being that of a permanent member of the Council.

241. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): Sadly, we have witnessed the rejection, which was completely predictable, of draft resolutions both yesterday and today. Leaving aside the first draft resolution voted on this evening, which obviously could not have won the approval of a sufficient number of members of the Council, we should like to indicate the reasons for our abstention on the draft resolution just voted upon. We did not wish to vote against because we did not wish to oppose a text which had the approval of a large number of members of the Council and which could provide the basis for the beginning of a solution, but we thought we could not pronounce ourselves in favour of it because it was obvious that it was destined to fail from the time that it met with major objections from a party concerned, and, rightly or wrongly, it might also seem to be one-sided.

242. We also abstained because we wished to indicate that we remain open to any attempt at a constructive resolution, which the Council has the duty to achieve. For, we share the feelings expressed by a large number of members of the Council—and even of delegations not members of the Council; I am thinking of the statement made by Ambassador Driss—that it is deplorable that the Council should prove to be incapable of taking a decision on a question which endangers peace and security. It is regrettable that the Council should remain silent in action whereas it is so prolific in words, just as it is deplorable that for six months it did not deem it appropriate to take action, when all the world knew that the fate and lives of millions of human beings were in jeopardy. I am grateful to my neighbour, Ambassador Vinci, for having recalled yesterday the efforts which he as President of the Security Council and which I before him had endeavoured to make in this regard at the request of the Secretary-General because it was necessary—as it is still necessary—to do everything possible to put an end to bloodshed, all bloodshed. The draft resolutions, as Ambassador Baroody said, have fallen like dead leaves, and for the time being we are in a deadlock. Yet they are proof of one thing—that it is not by demanding everything with a maximum resolution that we can obtain the agreement of the Council. Nevertheless they do show, for important steps have been taken, that there has been the beginning of an agreement; they have proved that there is a basis for agreement.

243. The Ambassador of Tunisia reminded us of this. There is, nevertheless, a common feeling here that we must end hostilities, all hostilities and at the same time—because we cannot forget one of the phases of the problem—we must encourage a political solution which will make possible the free and voluntary return of all refugees. Now this basis has been provided for us in the latest draft resolution. In this connexion we regret that the text of Belgium, Italy and Japan was not presented in its original form. We consider that it would have been better, but even now we consider that, in the light of the explanations given to us, in the light of the appeals which have been made, and bearing in mind what has been stated even by delegations which seem to be so far removed from one another, we can still reach an agreement on the essential bases, and—and we are not claiming any originality—we believe we could take as a basis for our discussions and consultations the draft resolution which has been introduced, with possible amendments. In this connexion we are prepared to make our own suggestions, and we believe that we should be able to arrive at a text that would be worthy of the responsibility of the Security Council.

244. However, an effort of persuasion doubtless still remains to be made with some delegations in attempting to save time, we sometimes lose it. What must be avoided is the ruling out of anything, or categorical instructions. I believe it is too late tonight, because some delegations are, I take it, bound by instructions which prevent them from showing the necessary understanding and flexibility; but that is no reason to prevent us from persevering.

245. Therefore, on the basis of the result, which is an unfortunate and deplorable one, I should like to make a twofold suggestion: first, that the Council should remain

seized of the agenda as it now stands and, secondly, that we should adjourn and, under the guidance of the President, continue our consultations, which must be concluded quickly because of the urgency of the matter, and that we should resume this debate as early as possible in order to reach agreement.

246. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): As I explained in my statement last night, my delegation believes that no voting in the Council on this issue can be effective unless the draft resolution commands such support that a clear message can go out from the Council. Vetoed resolutions get us nowhere. However, so long as any hope remains, however slight, of our achieving a unanimous resolution, or at least one which no delegation would find it necessary to vote against, I believe we should pursue it. It may be that we shall not succeed, but I do not think that hope is yet dead.

247. For that reason my delegation abstained in the vote on the eight-Power draft resolution contained in document S/10423, and for that reason, too, my delegation supports the proposal just made by the representative of France, that we should have further consultations.

248. Mr. KUIŁAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): When I spoke yesterday my delegation presented the position of Poland in regard to the origin of the events which we have been considering, as well as the consequent threat to peace. We expressed the opinion that the Council should have urgently taken decisions which would have made it possible to end the conflict and restore a normal situation in the region.

249. As we said yesterday, we are convinced that those purposes cannot be achieved without taking into account the roots of the evil, without drawing practical conclusions from the deterioration of the situation in East Pakistan. We believe that that situation is doubtless due to the fact that the Government of Pakistan decided to resort to military measures instead of political ones in order to meet the difficulties which are known to us all. It is obvious that such military measures could not lead to a normalization of the situation. On the contrary—and events have sufficiently proved it—the effect was seriously to aggravate the situation in Pakistan itself, to lead to military activities, and to the tragedy in East Bengal, in the form of attacks against India.

250. That is why the delegation of Poland early this morning voted against the draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation. We are convinced that at the present stage launching appeals and exhortations which overlook the sources and profound causes of the deterioration of the situation will not facilitate the solution of the conflict. Such action on our part might, on the contrary, create the impression that the Security Council, by remaining silent as to the true causes of the conflict, accepts and approves events in East Bengal, and particularly the military action launched in that region.

251. The adoption of such a resolution by the Security Council could not have prevented the later aggravation of the military situation, or the expansion of the conflict between India and Pakistan.

252. Those are the serious reasons which led to the negative vote of my delegation on the United States draft resolution.

253. Taking as a point of departure the position of principle I have explained, we regret that we were not able to vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10423, mainly because it objectively places India and Pakistan on a footing of equality, which we do not consider to be appropriate and which we cannot accept.

254. For the same reasons of principle we voted in favour of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. We did so in the conviction that that draft resolution which went to the root of the evil, in order radically to eradicate the effects, would if adopted have made it possible to create the conditions necessary to ensure a political settlement, which, as I said yesterday, is the course that will lead to an end to hostilities between Pakistan and India, the normalization of the situation in East Pakistan and the return of the refugees to their homes, which we have hoped for and continue to hope for.

255. Mr. VINCI (Italy): My delegation, like other delegations—and not only the sponsors of the eight-Power resolution—deeply regret that that resolution was not adopted. As the representative of Argentina, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, so eloquently stated, an effort had been made by eight non-permanent members to have a very balanced text, which we succeeded in putting together having had consultations between ourselves and with the main parties concerned. Now we have reached a deadlock. We have failed to meet our responsibilities so far. It is deplorable, as my neighbour the representative of France has so clearly emphasized, that we have not been able to take any action, while the war continues, people are dying, and misery is increasing. We shall not lay the blame either here or there. We will not place it on anyone for the moment.

256. Perhaps there could be one explanation for our failure: we have tried to tackle so many problems at the same time—problems of great magnitude which cannot be dealt with in the space of a few hours. It is not only that those problems are complex, but that they involve so many conflicting interests, not only of the main parties concerned but also of outside Powers.

257. We feel that we cannot adjourn without making a last, perhaps more modest, attempt to do something by taking up, for instance, the most urgent and main duty which is incumbent upon us, trying to rise to the occasion, trying to live up to our responsibility, in short, stop the fighting and stop the bloodshed.

258. In the Council many voices were raised in favour of such an action. Many eloquent voices were raised also from some Member States which are not members of this Council. Today we heard the Ambassadors of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, two distinguished and highly esteemed colleagues who urged us to take action. And they were certainly expressing the views and expectations not only of the general membership, but I would say of world-wide opinion.

259. Our impotence could be condemned by public opinion and, what is worse, might lead to the negative consequences we have suffered and which we are still suffering for another case. I think that the serious miscalculations which were made in June 1967 are in the minds of many members. Because of the failure to take action at once we are still suffering from the negative consequences of what happened in those first days of June. Furthermore—and to this I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council—if we fail to take another step not only will we be criticized and attacked, but I think, and I believe it is a good guess, that there will be a move to take this question, which is a serious problem, to the General Assembly and thus by-pass the Security Council, which is paralysed, and you might have a General Assembly adopting one of the draft resolutions which yesterday and today, in spite of the overwhelming majority, were not carried.

260. Ambassador Driss has by his eloquent, moving statement inspired me to draft a very short resolution which takes up a very modest and urgent task which, as I said before, is to try to stop the fighting and the bloodshed. I know perfectly well that this draft will appear unsatisfactory to many delegations. However, may I point out at once that the draft resolution which we, together with other delegations, have in mind, does not prejudice any of the many issues which were raised during our debate, nor any of the measures we shall and must take in the future. I shall read this draft which is co-sponsored by Belgium, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Italy. As I said, it is a very short draft:

"The Security Council,

"Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

"1. Calls upon the Governments concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed of the implementation of this resolution;

"3. Decides to continue to discuss the further measures to be taken in order to restore peace in the area."
[S/10425.]

261. We have given this draft resolution to the Secretariat. I believe it will be available very soon and circulated. As will be noted, the last paragraph keeps us seized of this problem. In our mind it means we will go on meeting every day until we can take up other measures. And here I should like to thank Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet for his very favourable and positive comments on the original draft of Belgium, Japan and Italy. I thank him also for having advocated a further effort in order to go on with consultations and see if the original three-Power draft resolution could be amended and improved, if possible.

262. If there are no other speakers in explanation of vote, I would propose that we recess for a few minutes in order

that the text we are submitting can be printed and circulated and submitted for the consideration of the Council.

263. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I should like to defer our right to speak at this moment if I could until we see if this draft resolution is going to be voted on this evening and speak after the vote, if that is agreeable to the Chair.

264. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): I should like to explain the vote that the Chinese delegation has just cast. The Chinese delegation voted for the eight-Power draft resolution but we must state that the draft does not face reality squarely and condemn the aggressors. That is, of course, unsatisfactory.

265. Secondly, this draft resolution refers to the earliest political settlement. The Chinese delegation is of the view that these words cannot be interpreted as meaning a violation of the United Nations Charter or interference in the internal affairs of any sovereign State.

266. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation believes that the comments made by the French representative concerning the continuation of consultations are reasonable and appropriate at this time and that it would be advisable for all delegations and the Security Council as a whole to agree with those comments and proposals.

267. As I understand its actions, the Chinese delegation has also withdrawn its draft for the same reasons, explaining that it intends to pursue consultations on its own draft. There is therefore no reason for not taking these circumstances into account and hastily resubmitting proposals which cannot be adopted. Why? The answer is very simple: because, as has already been repeatedly stated and explained in great detail, it is not possible to separate the two aspects of the problem, to divorce one from the other and overlook the need for a political settlement. Here we disagree in principle with previous speakers.

268. The Pakistan representative himself has recognized the existence of a serious political crisis in East Pakistan. And until that crisis is settled by peaceful political means, only Utopians can hope for tranquillity in the Indian subcontinent. And anyone who side-steps this problem obviously prefers to see instability, terror, violence and chaos continue, in accordance with the principle "the worse it is, the better it is". It would therefore be far better if the Security Council continued consultations on this important problem which it is now considering.

269. We would therefore ask the Italian delegation to reconsider its position, not to insist on its proposal and to agree to the Council continuing its consultations.

270. Since I have the floor, I should also like to reply briefly to the latest maliciously slanderous statement against the Soviet Union and its peace-loving policies by the Chinese representative. More and more we are drawing the conclusion that he has come to the United Nations and the Security Council not as a serious representative of a serious

State to discuss serious matters, but to amuse the imperialists, aggressors and militarists who delight in dissension between the Soviet Union and China. Well, if he has assumed this role of one who amuses the imperialists, let him continue his mischievous work. This role is fully in accord with the beliefs of the Chinese social traitors.

271. Why did he feel the need to make this statement and to give such an obvious display of pathological hatred towards the Soviet Union? In order to disguise the beliefs of the Chinese, to disguise the real reasons for China's vote against the Soviet draft resolution and to prevent the Security Council adopting practical measures after such detailed consideration and after establishing the existence of a serious political crisis in East Pakistan. China does not want to see a just and effective decision taken by the Council, and this is in accordance with its beliefs: the more agitation, disorder, violence and terror, the better. That is the whole Chinese belief and policy.

272. The statement was also necessary in order to disguise the now obvious fact that the Chinese delegation is defending injustice, violence, terror and those who caused the sufferings of the almost 10 million people who have been forced to leave their homes, their land, their houses and flee to another country. It was also necessary in order to prevent the Security Council making a humanitarian appeal to Pakistan to take measures to settle the political crisis, whose existence has been officially recognized by all of us.

273. To these ends the Chinese representative has not scrupled to use any means. He has ascribed to me words which I have not said: "West Pakistan". That term does not exist in my vocabulary. He has distorted my quotations. This is a new means of carrying on debates in the Security Council: to distort quotations and then dispute them. If the Chinese representative comes to the Security Council with new methods of this type, he will not get very far with them. He mentioned the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. That is shameful for China and the Chinese representatives. If the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, had not extended fraternal assistance to the Communist Party and people of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia would have been engulfed by imperialism and reaction. That is precisely what China was aiming at, in pursuit of its own beliefs: the worse it is for socialism, for the revolutionary forces throughout the world and for friendship among the socialist countries, the better it is. And if the socialist countries had not taken the necessary measures, socialist Czechoslovakia would not have survived.

274. That is what the Chinese beliefs have led to and are leading to. And today we hail both the Communist Party and the people of Czechoslovakia, who have in their recent elections proclaimed their genuine proletarian and popular will, having voted for the candidates put forward by the Party and having thereby condemned both the attempts of imperialism and reaction to lead Czechoslovakia away from the socialist path and the policies and beliefs of the Chinese social traitors. On that point, perhaps I might stop.

275. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): At this stage in our debate my delegation

considers it appropriate to speak in accordance with the principle which we formulated yesterday. We realize that when the small countries speak, even when they put their finger on the truth, they are not always listened to with the maximum of attention. Less than 24 hours ago I said that my delegation, for its part, was sceptical about unanimity among the members of the Council on any draft resolution whatever. Unfortunately, my forecast has been confirmed several times.

276. We presume that the role which has been played by the non-permanent members of the Council—the majority of which are small States—may well be played down before world public opinion, in the newspapers. It is not inconceivable that tomorrow the headlines in the papers will be concentrated on the few clashes that have taken place in this chamber, instead of placing the emphasis on the highly laudable role played by the non-permanent members. We believe that the Security Council, at all costs, must be the instrument of international peace and security. We therefore wish to continue our efforts in the face of the tragedy that is unfolding in the region concerned. In Africa we have not yet experienced modern warfare, nevertheless we would have thought that the majority among us who have first-hand knowledge of the pain and ravages of war would be in a position to help us out of the present impasse. Of course, the Security Council is located far from India and Pakistan, and so it succumbs to a sort of abstraction; in other words, it has an abstract idea of the material and human devastation which is taking place in those two countries.

277. That is why, in accordance with our unswerving attachment to the ideas that we expressed yesterday, we believe that in order to understand better the situation which exists there, it is necessary to indulge in what experimental psychology calls introspection. If we could transport ourselves to the countries concerned and witness what is taking place, seeing the fate of the refugees and observe the war that is now going on in India and Pakistan, if we could see the women and children waiting for shells to fall upon them, what would our reaction be? Must politics and diplomacy disregard human feeling and compassion? We want to withdraw to an ivory tower where we no longer think of the terrible suffering which is a daily occurrence in the countries that we are discussing? Representing a small country which is a fervent champion of peace, I think that the Security Council must now rise above the difficulties which it has encountered for these last two days, in order to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.

278. It is true that conversations have been taking place in recent months, but now it is really time to take concrete action to find a solution and to see to it that the Security Council is respected in its powers and its rights.

279. We have just been presented with a draft resolution. I think that, since several have proposed it, it might be well to hold consultations to see whether a more acceptable solution—one which is greatly desired—might be found.

280. I should like to conclude by repeating an urgent appeal that any delay should be avoided so that we can save what remains to be saved on both sides, and bearing in

mind the fundamental points raised—particularly by the non-permanent members, which have no direct interests involved but have endeavoured to find a solution—to help us out of the impasse, in which we have been stuck for two days.

281. I should like to conclude by saying that, in order better to understand the situation, we should try to personalize the problem and to place ourselves in the position of those who are directly affected. For example, let us try to imagine the panic of those who are directly affected, when they realize that they might be burned to death at any moment.

282. Those are the reasons that have led me to speak more on the human level and setting aside political and diplomatic considerations which at times divert us from the true path towards a proper solution.

283. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): It seems that my statement hit Mr. Malik's sore point. Therefore, he made a most unreasonable and slanderous reply. However, the foreign policy of the great revolutionary Government of China cannot be distorted by a small Mr. Malik. Mr. Malik mentioned the great October Revolution. He mentioned the Second World War. The Chinese Government and people have only respect with regard to the great October Revolution and with regard to the great Soviet people for their sacrifice and for the contributions they have made during the Second World War.

284. But the blood shed by the martyrs of the great October Revolution and the blood shed by the Soviet fighters during the Second World War cannot cleanse the crimes committed by the Soviet traitors. The brilliant contribution made by the Soviet people in history cannot add any colour to the faces of these traitors. On the contrary, if we compare the past foreign policy of the revolutionary Government of the Soviet Union with the social imperialist foreign policy of today, things become very clear.

285. Mr. Malik mentioned the Czechoslovak event. He deems it regrettable that China was not able to participate in this great and glorious act of social imperialism. He is only dreaming. The Chinese Government and people and the Chinese Communist Party have long denounced vigorously the Soviet act of aggression against the people of Czechoslovakia. What you did was not rendering assistance to a socialist country. In the darkness of the night, like gangsters, you dispatched your planes, air force and paratroopers to control its capital city. You brought by force the leaders of Czechoslovakia to Moscow and then forced them to sign your most humiliating conditions. This has fully revealed your social imperialist "hand of friendship". The Soviet representative may well look over his statement made today. You have extended your security boundary to the Indian subcontinent now. You are saying that the Indian subcontinent is directly related to your security interests. This kind of reasoning is exactly the same as the security boundary and the security interests of Israel. It is precisely because of the policy of social imperialism pursued by the Soviet Government that the Chinese delegation cannot but vote against your draft resolution and expose the true nature of your draft resolution.

286. You said with regard to the situation in the Middle East that in 1967, within the United Nations, you put forward the proposal for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops. Why then do you refuse to apply the same principle to the situation on the Indian subcontinent? That fully reveals that you harbour expansionist ambitions with regard to the Indian subcontinent. You are resorting to delaying tactics to enable India within a very short time to change the military situation in Pakistan.

287. Certain responsible persons in India have stated that they regard military activities in Pakistan as a short-term affair.

288. At the very beginning of the meeting you made a proposal for the participation of representatives of the so-called Bangla Desh, using this to obstruct the progress of our meeting. And then you introduced this sinister draft resolution. In all you tried every means to engage in collusion with the Indian expansionists in order to achieve the dismemberment of the State of Pakistan and to attain your ambition, the control of the Indian subcontinent. Otherwise you would not have vetoed a draft resolution containing provisions for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops.

289. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I understand from the statement made by Ambassador Malik that the delegation of the Soviet Union is not yet ready to vote on the last draft resolution, that we have just circulated [S/10425]. Perhaps other delegations are in the same position. Therefore, on behalf of the sponsors and of my own delegation, I would say that we shall not insist on a recess and that we are ready to go into consultations.

290. May I just add a few comments, even if I should repeat myself? The purpose of the sponsors of this very short draft resolution was to make a very last attempt at this very late hour to see if we could not at least take one modest first step after 24 hours of discussion, an effort to stop the fighting, the shooting and the bloodshed, at least part of it. That was our main purpose, and I think the sponsors of this draft resolution can feel that they have done their duty up to the very last minute and that they can have a clear conscience.

291. Another comment I should like to make is that, as I said in introducing this draft resolution, we certainly did not mean to stop our deliberations after this first step but on the contrary meant to keep this problem under close consideration and to go on and on meeting until we could take further measures, including what Ambassador Malik has called a political solution. To prove this point I think I need only refer to draft resolution S/10423, submitted by eight delegations, including my own, in which there is a preambular paragraph reading as follows:

"Convinced that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes,"

So we certainly had that point in mind, but we thought, and we still think, that an early decision—if we can still call

it "early" after 48 hours of discussion—was necessary in order to fulfil our responsibility.

292. In any case, I repeat that we are ready to go along with the consultations suggested by the Ambassador of France and supported by other delegations.

293. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): This Council has now been in extended session for two full days. We met because we were faced with a clear and present threat to the peace of the world. During our debate no member of the Council has even attempted to deny that this threat to international peace is an urgent fact with which we must deal.

294. A few minutes ago I recited our views on the hostilities which continue unabated. The duty of this Council is manifest. If it is to fulfil the responsibilities imposed on it by the Charter, it must act to stop the fighting and preserve the territorial integrity of Member States. Peace must be restored before we can expect progress towards the creation of a climate conducive to the settlement of the issues that lie behind the fighting.

295. It is clear that the dominant sentiment in this Council is that it must decisively address itself to first things first. By large majorities—11 members in one instance and then again 11 in another instance this evening—this Council has sought to achieve agreement that a cease-fire must be brought about in the Indian subcontinent and that the troops of the parties involved must be withdrawn to within their own borders.

296. This Council can do no less if it is not to abdicate its responsibilities in the eyes of the world. We cannot accept the view that we must bow to the will of those who oppose the course of action which such a large majority knows to be the right course. If the lowest common denominator resolution which can escape a Soviet veto makes no contribution to the urgent problem of peace in South Asia, then we cannot accept it.

297. The only responsible action which the Council can take is to call for both a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces. To act otherwise is to admit that the Council is impotent to act on the very issue of war and peace. My colleague from the Soviet Union has often made known his country's views that the Charter imposes on the Security Council the responsibility to act on security issues, on matters which involve a threat to the peace. Has the Council ever faced a more obvious test of its responsibilities?

298. Before we admit that this Council, the world's principal organ for the maintenance of peace and security, has failed in its duty, I want to join in the suggestion that has been made here by other representatives that we take

some time to reflect on the events of the past few days and that all of us consider carefully what more we might usefully do to rescue the Council from apparent impotence and failure. It may be that we shall find no basis for constructive action and that we shall have to consider what other possibilities are open to us. All of us would benefit from a brief period of time for reflection before we make this decision. My delegation believes that we should meet again as soon as possible tomorrow. I suggest, Mr. President, that we leave it to you, in consultation with members, to fix the time when we should meet again. Whatever we decide, however, one thing is clear: we cannot leave the matter where it is. As I have said, the world is watching, and all that we have done so far is to demonstrate that one member is able to frustrate the will of a very large majority. But I strongly hope that we shall yet find the collective wisdom to act constructively in the discharge of our responsibilities under the Charter. It is in that spirit that we strongly support the suggestions made by the representatives of France and of Italy.

299. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I have asked to speak in order to make a brief reply. Everyone who has listened to today's statement by the Chinese representative has been able to see clearly and with his own eyes the low level to which the social treachery of the Chinese has sunk.

300. With his malicious and pathological slander against the Soviet Union, the Chinese representative is playing the role of an imperialist jester in the main organ of the United Nations. He is amusing the imperialists with his malicious slander against the Soviet Union. Now there is nothing more for the imperialists to do in this area. They have a reliable spokesman.

301. The PRESIDENT: I have no further speakers inscribed on my list. I would therefore suggest to the Council that we adjourn this meeting. This would permit members of the Council to hold extensive consultations in order to find a solution for the grave and serious problems with which we are confronted.

302. It is my understanding that the draft resolution submitted by China, contained in document S/10421, is still before the Council. A six-Power draft resolution, contained in document S/10425, is also before the Council. In view of this situation, I would suggest that this item be included in the agenda of the meeting scheduled for tomorrow afternoon at 3.30 o'clock which is to take up the question of Southern Rhodesia and the admission of a new member.

303. As I hear no objection, we shall proceed accordingly.

The meeting rose at 11.15 p.m.

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