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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND SECOND MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 25 November 1971, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. E. KUI/AGA (Poland).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1602)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
 - (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
 - (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

- (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
- (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2)*

1. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): I should like first of all to thank you, Mr. President, and all my colleagues for coming here at such relatively short notice so that I may inform the Council at the earliest possible moment of the most recent developments with regard to Rhodesia. As you know, it has always been the policy of my Government to give the United Nations the fullest possible account of the discharge of our responsibilities towards that Territory. We have done this both on occasions when we were seeking action by the Council in support of our own endeavours and on occasions when no action was called for but when

we wished the United Nations to be aware of significant developments.

2. There has never been any doubt in this forum that the settlement of the Rhodesian problem is primarily a matter for the British Government. Indeed, every resolution adopted on the subject has explicitly reaffirmed it. Nevertheless, it has also always been recognized that the question was one of legitimate and continuing concern to the rest of the world community. For that reason, if for no other, it seems to my Government right and fitting that we should inform the Security Council at virtually the same moment as my Foreign Secretary is informing the House of Commons of the very latest developments, of the present situation and of future prospects as we see them.

3. I am afraid it will take some time. The events of the past few days can hardly be understood without reference to the past, and they will have consequences of considerable importance for the future. The proposals for the future of Rhodesia¹ that I am going to describe are inevitably complex and detailed where they apply to matters of a constitutional nature. However, I am sure that the Council will wish for a full account, with nothing of importance omitted. It is obviously essential that, whatever judgement individual members of the Council may ultimately make, they should each be in possession of all the relevant information.

4. I have only one other preliminary point, but it is important. It is that the fact that agreement has been reached on certain proposals does not in itself represent any change in the present situation. This is the first step only. Finality will not be reached until the people of Rhodesia as a whole have had a full and free opportunity to demonstrate whether the proposals are acceptable to them. During the time that this test of acceptability will take, there will be ample opportunity for reflection, analysis and judgement by all those who interest themselves seriously in this problem. Meanwhile, as far as the United Nations is concerned and indeed as far as British legislation is concerned, including the sanctions legislation which has recently been renewed, the position is unchanged. Indeed the proposals themselves end with the statement that nothing in them "shall be regarded as implying any change in the current attitude of either side to the present status of Rhodesia or of the 1969 Constitution".

5. When we last debated the question of Rhodesia a year ago, in 1970, I remember that I described how the present

* Subsequently issued as *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement Nos. 2 and Corrigendum and 2A.*

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10405.

British Government, as soon as it came into office, had made clear its intention, which had formed part of its commitment to the British electorate during the preceding elections, "to make a further effort to see whether a settlement of the Rhodesian problem on the basis of the five principles is possible" [1556th meeting, para. 132]. In a moment I shall outline the result of that effort. But if it is to be understood at all, it must be seen in context. I must therefore claim your indulgence, Mr. President, and that of the Council if I rehearse very briefly the course of events leading up to the present situation. The present situation is only fully understandable against that background.

6. From 1894 until 1923 Southern Rhodesia was administered by the British South Africa Company, a company established by Royal Charter. In 1898 both executive and legislative councils were established and by 1907 there was a majority of elected members, representing the white settlers, on the legislative council. In 1920 that council passed a resolution requesting the establishment of responsible government "forthwith". The issue was put to the white electorate as one of two choices: responsible self-government, or entry into the Union of South Africa as the fifth province. At a referendum in 1922, 8,744 votes were cast for self-government, and 5,989 for the alternative. Accordingly, after the 1922 referendum Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed to His Majesty's Dominion as a colony on 12 September 1923; under the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Letters Patent of 1923, issued on 1 October 1923, the colony was granted full internal self-government, subject to a formal reservation to the British Government of legislation affecting the interests of the African population. In general, the British Government conducted international relations on behalf of Southern Rhodesia; but Commonwealth relations, trade relations and relations with colonial Territories in Africa were mainly conducted by the Southern Rhodesian Government directly. That state of affairs lasted until 1953 when for a further ten years Southern Rhodesia formed part, together with Northern Rhodesia—now Zambia—and Nyasaland—now Malawi—of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. When the Federation was dissolved on 31 December 1963 the Southern Rhodesian Government resumed the powers similar to those which had been transferred to the Federal Government in 1953.

7. It will be clear from this brief account, as indeed it was clearly brought out in the early debates on Rhodesia in the United Nations in 1962, that Rhodesia was not an ordinary colonial situation in what one might call the classic sense. Britain has never in fact administered Rhodesia directly by physical presence. Thus the leverage that the British Government might have exerted—the direct exercise of power by a physical presence—was not available to us, and has not been for almost half a century. At all times since 1923 it has been necessary on internal questions for the British Government to work by agreement with those who control power in Rhodesia.

8. Of course, what I have just said is both familiar and obvious enough. Were it not so, the British Government would evidently never have encountered the illegal Declaration of Independence in 1965. Were it not so, the rejection by Mr. Ian Smith of the proposals worked out with the

British Prime Minister on *HMS Tiger* in 1966, and again those discussed in October 1968 aboard *HMS Fearless*, would hardly have been possible. Were it not so, the 1969 Constitution could hardly have come into effect. However, as we all know, those events did take place, and—disagreeable as it may be to have to admit the fact—the British Government did not have the power to prevent them or to impose its will.

9. Perhaps at this point I ought to pause a moment to deal yet once more with the argument that has so often been raised here before—namely, the thesis that the British Government had only to use a little force and all would have been settled satisfactorily. This is a familiar issue here and has been argued out fully. Many members of the Council will have heard our side of the case ably set out by my predecessor. This is that the application of force was neither feasible nor desirable. It was not feasible because the historical fact that Rhodesia had been virtually self-governing and possessed its own forces for nearly half a century would have required an invasion in the middle of a continent: it was not desirable because the results of violent action are incalculable. The launching of what would have been war was never justifiable.

10. At this point, too, we have to consider objectively what the effect has been of mandatory United Nations sanctions, for which the British Government originally asked in order to assist it in bringing the rebellion to an end. We for our part have played our full role in applying those sanctions and we are grateful for the support we have had from the United Nations. It has been the British delegation which has played the primary part in bringing suspected cases of evasion to the notice of the sanctions Committee. It has been the British delegation, too, which has constantly urged that Committee to draw up constructive and helpful guidelines for other Governments in the implementation of their own sanctions legislation, particularly in respect of the factors they could usefully consider when dealing with cargoes going to or coming from Mozambique and South Africa which could perhaps be destined for or originate from Rhodesia. These sanctions have not been without their effect, as was recognized when the sanctions Committee produced its last report. They have severely hampered the expansion of the Rhodesian economy, and, as Mr. Smith has himself admitted, they have compelled Rhodesia to buy at a premium and sell at a discount. I feel sure that this has played its part in making the Rhodesian authorities more willing to negotiate on a satisfactory basis.

11. But, as was also recognized by the sanctions Committee, they have not bitten so deep as to compel Mr. Smith to capitulate and to accept an imposed settlement. Here too, therefore, just as the British Government had no power to impose its will, and disagreeable as this too may be to have to admit, even with the support of United Nations sanctions the way was not open to impose a settlement.

12. This, then, has been the position. For six years we have been faced with an internal situation in Rhodesia of which we disapproved but which we were powerless to influence directly. Although international disapproval has been manifested strongly, its main effect has been not to

the present rulers of Rhodesia but on the Rhodesian Africans. Was there any escape from a deteriorating situation? And what might be an acceptable alternative? But, before we come to that question, let us look a little closer at what would be likely to happen if no acceptable way out could be found.

13. There is no doubt how the development of the situation should be measured: it is in practical terms. Of course, it can be pointed out that there is a theoretical deterioration in that any and every step away from legality, as represented by the illegal Declaration of Independence and by the 1969 Constitution, was a deterioration. But there is more to it than that. Racial discrimination has been increasing steadily, and on the basis of the present Constitution parity is a very remote prospect and majority rule is totally excluded. The 1961 Constitution, though not designed as an independence constitution, at least provided for African political advance and contained a Declaration of Rights to safeguard the legitimate interests of all the people of Rhodesia. The 1969 Constitution explicitly denies any possible advance beyond parity to majority rule, and has a non-justifiable declaration of rights, denying the courts the right to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any law on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights. Expenditure on education of Africans has been limited to 2 per cent of the Rhodesian budget. Those and many more instances of growing racial discrimination against Rhodesian Africans may be found in any survey of recent developments.

14. Whatever the reasons for this—and it is common ground that fear and ignorant prejudice are at the roots of racial discrimination—there is no doubt that the lot of the Rhodesian Africans is bad and is steadily getting worse. As things stand in Rhodesia they have little chance to get the education to improve themselves, the political freedom to express themselves, or the economic opportunities to raise their standard of living. No one can really offer the African any alternative, unless it is to sacrifice his life in a recourse to violent protest.

15. In these circumstances, the atmosphere of Rhodesia is coming increasingly to resemble that of South Africa. Forced economically and psychologically to become dependent on its powerful southern neighbour, the white population of Rhodesia seems to have become increasingly influenced by the same fears and prejudices which have shaped the attitudes to the black African population that are prevalent in South Africa. Thus we are faced with the steady, perhaps accelerating, downhill run towards the installation of *apartheid* in Rhodesia; to a further deterioration of the position of the Rhodesian Africans in education, in employment, in land-holding, in social life and in any kind of influence. The process has not yet gone beyond recall but it is only too likely that it will continue unchecked if something is not done to find another way out.

16. Faced with this prospect, it is small wonder that many people have felt that every effort ought to be made to try to reverse this descent downhill. There have been pleas from the most diverse quarters that further efforts should be made to reach an agreement—to halt this decline which

can only harm the Rhodesian Africans, which can only turn Rhodesia into a dependency of South Africa. Whatever doubts we may have had about the good faith of the other side, however gradual progress may be, the effort is worth making. For this is the question that we face: can we stop this process, this steady erosion? Can we pull Rhodesia back from the edge of the abyss? Can we find a foothold, a platform at which we can halt this slide and from there move on to racial equality, indeed to a multiracial society? Can we give the Rhodesian Africans a chance to get the jobs, to get the education, to get the wealth, to move on to run their country?

17. That, therefore, is how my Government sees its obligation to try to find a solution. That is how we interpret the call that was most recently affirmed by this Council in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 288 (1970), which calls upon

“the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility, to take urgent and effective measures to bring to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and enable the people to exercise their right to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960”.

18. In seeking to find this opening, my Government, as it has often made clear, has set itself, in the form of guidelines, five principles to which it has consistently held. These are that in any settlement (a) the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule would have to be maintained and guaranteed; (b) there would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution; (c) there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; (d) there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination; and (e) the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. These five principles have been reiterated by successive British Governments at every stage, and they still apply today. It is of course the fifth and last which governs the four preceding principles. The process of hammering out an agreement has been slow and difficult, but we now consider that we have agreed proposals which accord with the first four principles which we believe we can now put before the people of Rhodesia, and ask them whether they want to accept them or not. It is for them to judge—they will have to live under the system, they will have to work it, they will obtain its benefits. My Government believes it provides a way forward.

19. We should like to have been able to offer them something more of our own making. Enough is known of the history of British decolonization to show that we are here dealing with an exceptional and not a typical case. We have to take account not only of developments in 1923, but of the situation as it has evolved since 1965 and is evolving now. We have to recognize also that this is probably the last chance. We consider, however, that the agreed proposals that I am about to describe do give

Rhodesians the opportunity to move forward again. It is they who must give the answer.

20. I now come to the proposals for a settlement that were agreed between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Smith in Salisbury on 24 November and have since been accepted on this basis by the British Cabinet. I intend to make available to all members of this Council the full text of these proposals. Meanwhile, I shall do my best to give an extensive description of them together with some explanation—since some of them are very complicated—and an indication in each case of the manner in which they correspond with the five principles to which I have already made reference.

21. First of all there is the test of acceptability. Since the proposals in their entirety are conditional upon the British Government being satisfied that they are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the first point to which we address ourselves is the test of acceptability. Indeed this is the first point dealt with in the agreed proposals. It has been agreed that the British Government will appoint a commission to ascertain directly from all sections of the population of Rhodesia their views on the acceptability of the proposals and to report thereon to the British Government. The chairman will be a much esteemed and senior member of our highest appellate court, the House of Lords. This is Lord Pearce, a former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. In addition there will be two deputy chairmen and a number of commissioners. They will visit the main centres of population, councils in the rural areas and traditional meeting places in the tribal trust lands.

22. In the period before and during the test of acceptability, normal political activities will be permitted to the satisfaction of this commission provided they are conducted in a peaceful and democratic manner. Radio and television time will be made available to political parties represented in the House of Assembly.

23. The commission will carry out its inquiries in public or in private as it deems appropriate. There will be immunity for witnesses heard by the commission in respect of their evidence and freedom for persons resident in Rhodesia, whatever their political views or affiliations, to enable them to appear before the commission. All Rhodesian Government employees will be permitted to express their views to the commission. Persons in detention or under restriction will be similarly permitted. Arrangements will be made in London and elsewhere as necessary for Rhodesians resident abroad to submit their views to the commission.

24. The test of acceptability, as I have described it, represents the means of fulfilment of the essential fifth principle. It will be a full, free, and fair ascertainment and it will be under the direct control of the British Government, not of the Rhodesians. It will be carried out by persons whose experience and whose independence of the Rhodesian authorities can be relied upon. The methods used will be exhaustive and will not be confined to routine and traditional assemblies, such as the indabas of tribal chiefs. Under the method agreed it will not just be, as it would in the case of a referendum, a question of seeking views but rather of explaining the proposals before seeking views.

Every effort will be made by the commission to ensure that all Rhodesian Africans understand the proposed terms and every Rhodesian who wishes to do so will be given every opportunity to express his views to the commission. Thus all urban centres will be visited, and rural meeting-places will, where necessary, be visited twice; the first time to explain the proposals and to answer questions, the second to assess the views expressed. The meetings held in the tribal trust lands will be arranged to allow the tribal Africans to express their views themselves; consultation will not be confined to Chiefs. Anyone who wishes will be able to give his evidence *in camera*. The test will include Rhodesians who live outside the Territory.

25. We come now to the central part of the proposals, namely the constitutional arrangements, which are vital in terms of the first principle, unimpeded progress to majority rule. In these proposals we have made a real change of direction—a substantial change in direction away from the present state of affairs as embodied in the 1969 Constitution.

26. The first stipulation of the proposals regarding the House of Assembly reads as follows:

“The existing provisions governing the increase of African representation in the House will be repealed . . .”

They will be replaced by the detailed arrangements that I shall now try to summarize, though these will of course be set out in full in the published text of the proposals. I am afraid they are rather complex, and I must ask you to follow me in an exercise in arithmetic.

27. First of all, the House of Assembly. The base line is the composition of the House of Assembly as it is now and as it would be at the moment of the coming into force of the proposals—in other words, after the test of acceptability and legislation by the Rhodesian and British Parliaments. This base line is a total of 66 members, made up of 50 Europeans, elected by voters on a European roll; 8 Africans, elected by voters on the African lower roll; and 8 Africans, indirectly elected by electoral colleges of chiefs, headmen and elected councillors.

28. Under the new proposals, the Africans will proceed to parity of representation in the House of Assembly by means of additional seats created on the basis of progressive increases in the number of Africans registered on a new African roll to be known as the African higher roll, which will have the same qualifications as the European roll. When the number of African higher roll voters equals 6 per cent of the total European roll voters, the Africans will receive two additional seats; the first two seats thus created will be African higher roll seats—i.e. directly elected—and the next two will be indirectly elected under the existing system and so on alternatively until 34 seats have been created—that is to say, 18 African higher roll seats and 16 indirectly elected seats. At this point parity will have been reached and the House of Assembly will be made up as follows: 50 Europeans members, 8 Africans elected by African lower roll voters, 24 Africans indirectly elected (i.e. the present 8 plus 16 new ones) and 18 directly elected by African higher roll voters.

29. Perhaps at this point I should digress to explain the nature of the indirectly elected African seats. These members are elected by electoral colleges, consisting of chiefs, headmen and elected councillors of African district councils within the rural area. There are now some 150 councils and new ones are being established. The role and influence of both the chiefs and the district commissioners in them are being gradually reduced. Thus the councillors of whom there are 760, many of whom are elected, already outnumber the chiefs and headmen, of whom there are 706, who sit by virtue of their office. There were close-fought contests in a number of the electoral colleges in the 1970 elections. The indirectly elected representatives will ensure that the rural Africans, few of whom yet qualify for the electoral rolls, will have a growing voice in Parliament as well as the urban Africans. It is, I think, worth noting that even under the present arrangements the eight indirectly elected African members have invariably voted with their directly elected African colleagues on all important issues.

30. At the point that parity has been reached with 50 Europeans and 50 African Rhodesians, a referendum will be held among all the African voters, in which the Europeans will not take part, to decide the future of the indirectly elected African seats, of which there will be 24 at this point. The referendum will be to decide between three choices: whether these 24 seats should remain indirectly elected; or whether they should be re-allocated as to one quarter to the African lower roll, making a total of 14 for that roll, and as to three quarters to the higher African roll, making a total of 36 for that roll; or whether they should all be re-allocated to the higher African roll, making a total of 42 on that roll.

31. The next step in the progress from parity to majority rule will take place at the next general election after parity when 10 common roll seats will be created. They will be filled by election from a roll consisting of the voters on both the African higher roll and the European roll. Before this takes place an independent commission will have decided whether the creation of such seats is acceptable to the Rhodesian people and, if not, what alternative arrangements would command support. But any decision not to create these common roll seats would be regarded as a constitutional amendment and therefore covered by the guarantees subject to African control which I shall describe later.

32. Therefore, as soon as the African Rhodesians registered on the African higher roll outnumber the white voters on the European roll it will be possible for them to secure the majority of these common roll seats giving them a majority in the Assembly. The size of the House of Assembly will remain constant after the creation of the common roll seats. My Government is satisfied that these constitutional proposals provide for unimpeded progress to majority rule in accordance with the first principle. We have eliminated the existing provision that there can never be majority rule and by getting rid of the income tax regulator we have eliminated a device which could be used to block Africans getting on to the franchise, and provided a straightforward way by which Africans can advance to parity and beyond.

33. At this point perhaps I should say something about the electoral arrangements. As regards the African higher roll the number of voters registered on this and the European rolls will be reviewed at six-monthly intervals by the Registrar-General so that the necessary arrangements can be made for the addition at the next general election of any additional seats corresponding to the increase in the registered voters. This will mean that the delimitation commission, whose job it is to draw up revised constituency boundaries, will be sitting almost permanently. Under the electoral law it will be required to ensure that each constituency contains as nearly as possible equal numbers of voters. The effect of this is that the country will be divided into a growing number—18 by the time parity is reached—of single member African higher roll constituencies, in addition to the European and African lower roll constituencies.

34. For the European and African lower roll existing arrangements will be retained—i.e. 50 single member European constituencies and 8 African constituencies. As regards the common roll there will be a single national constituency for all these seats.

35. In addition to the House of Representatives there will continue to be a Senate. This will remain constituted as at present. Its powers, which are limited, will not be affected by the proposals except that as a consequence of the new Declaration of Rights enforceable by the courts the Senate Legal Committee will become unnecessary and will be abolished.

36. We now come to the Declaration of Rights, which is a very important element in the proposals. There will be a new Declaration of Rights affording protection to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and conferring a right of access to the High Court for the purpose of obtaining redress for any person who alleges that its provisions have been contravened in relation to him. In particular, on discrimination the Declaration will re-enact the safeguard relating to discrimination contained in section 67 (4) of the 1961 Constitution.

37. The other main constitutional provisions which I should like to bring to your notice are those relating to amendment of the Constitution. The specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution will include among other things both the new provisions to give effect to the proposals as regards increased African representation and the new Declaration of Rights, including the provisions for its enforcement by the High Court. Furthermore, certain key provisions of the Electoral Act regarding voting qualifications will be subject to the same requirements regarding amendment as the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution.

38. Throughout the period up to parity the blocking mechanism for the specially entrenched clauses of the Constitution will be two-thirds of the Assembly and the Senate, voting separately, plus majorities of the European and African Members of the Lower House, again voting separately.

39. As I have gone along I have tried to explain these proposals in terms of the five principles. But I would be the

first to admit that we are dealing with complicated matters and I think therefore that at this point it might be useful to summarize how the first four principles have been met.

40. As regards the first principle the provision in the present Constitution preventing any increase in African seats beyond the parity will be repealed. Further, the provision for increased African representation linked to the number of voters on the African higher roll, and the addition of common roll seats after parity has been reached, will ensure unimpeded progress to majority rule. This is something which has never before been agreed by the Rhodesian régime and represents the major breakthrough that we have sought.

41. With regard to the second principle, that there will also have to be "guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution", it will be seen that in all cases in the progress to majority rule it will be necessary to obtain the approval of a majority of the African representatives in the House of Assembly for any amendment in the specially entrenched clauses in the Constitution. No amendments to specially entrenched provisions will be introduced until after the creation of the first two, directly-elected, African higher roll seats or until three years have elapsed, whichever is the sooner. In other words, there will always up to parity be a blocking mechanism in the hand of the directly-elected Africans. After parity a two-thirds majority of the House of Assembly will need the support of at least 17 Africans.

42. As regards the third principle, that there would have to be "immediate improvement in the political status of the African population", the creation of the new African higher roll will bring it the prospect in the near future of increased African representation in the House of Assembly. It will be seen from the text of the proposals that there will be an extension in the franchise qualifications for the African lower roll. This will enfranchise a large additional number of Africans. Further benefits will follow in connexion with the development aid to which I shall refer in a moment.

43. As regards the fourth principle, that there would have to be "progress towards ending racial discrimination", measures include a new and strengthened declaration of rights which will be enforceable in the Courts.

44. This brings us to the next point in the agreed proposals. There will be a review of existing legislation.

45. The Rhodesian authorities have intimated their firm intention within the spirit of the proposals to make progress towards ending racial discrimination. An independent commission will be set up to examine the problem of racial discrimination. It will be required to consider existing legislation and to make recommendations to the Rhodesian Government on ways of making progress towards ending racial discrimination. There will be included in the functions of the commission a special duty to scrutinize the provisions of the Land Tenure Act and to consider the possible creation of an independent and permanent land board to preside over the long-term resolution of the problems involved. The terms of reference of the commission have been agreed with the British Government and the composition, which will be of three members one of whom

is to be an African, will also have to be agreed with the British Government. It will be established as soon as possible after the test of acceptability has been completed. Its findings will be published and the Rhodesian authorities have given assurance that they will, except where there are considerations which any Government would regard as overriding, commend to their Parliament such changes in existing legislation as are required to give effect to its recommendations.

46. There are certain other provisions in the agreed proposals which have a direct bearing on this important question of the status and rights of the Africans. As you will realize when you see the text of these proposals, I am taking them slightly out of order but I think it is convenient to do so because of their connexion. The Rhodesian authorities have agreed on the release shortly of a significant number of detainees and restrictees. As part of a return to normality, they will review all cases of those detainees and restrictees not already released. The further special review will be carried out by the existing tribunal, of which the Chairman is a judge of the Rhodesian High Court, as soon as possible after the test of acceptability has been completed. The recommendations of the tribunal will be binding on the detaining or restricting authority. For the purposes of this special review an observer appointed by the British Government in agreement with the Rhodesian Government will be entitled to be present. The Rhodesian Government will also allow the return of Rhodesian exiles and prepare for the ending of the state of emergency. As vacancies occur in the Rhodesian Public Service they will be filled according to the criteria of merit and suitability, regardless of race.

47. Finally, the proposals contain important provisions about land and development.

48. In the African area there are at present approximately 5 million acres of unoccupied land which is available for settlement by Africans: 3.5 million acres in the tribal trust lands and 1.5 million in the purchase area. Provision exists under which significant additional land can be made available and the Rhodesian Government intends to make it available as the need arises. Both Governments agree that they will immediately devote a proportion of an increased aid programme to the improvement of areas currently occupied or intended for occupation by Africans.

49. With the exception of certain forest and national park areas the development of which may involve the removal of a limited number of occupants without established rights, the only two cases in which the Rhodesian Government is considering the eviction of Africans from land in the European area are Epworth and Chishawasha Missions. The Rhodesian Government has given assurance that it will not take steps to evict African tenants or other occupants from these two areas or from other areas in which they are living until such time as the commission to review racial discrimination, to which I have already referred, has reported and its recommendations have been fully considered.

50. There will be a development programme to increase significantly educational and job opportunities for Africans in order to enable them to play a growing part in the

country's future development. The British Government will provide up to £5 million per year for a period of 10 years in capital aid and technical assistance to be applied to purposes and projects to be agreed with the Rhodesian Government, to be matched appropriately by sums provided by the Rhodesian Government for this development programme. This will be in addition to the annual expenditure currently planned by the Rhodesian Government for African education and housing and for development projects in the tribal trust lands and African purchase areas. Part of this development programme will be devoted to the establishment of new irrigation schemes, intensive cultivation projects and the improvement of communications and industrial projects in the tribal trust lands and African purchase areas. As regards education, the moneys will be used to improve and expand facilities for Africans in agriculture, technical and vocational training, teacher-training and training in administration and for other educational purposes in the field of primary, secondary and higher education. The parallel development of the two elements in this programme will thus help to ensure that new job opportunities for Africans will become available as the economy expands and additional educational facilities are provided for them.

51. The Council has listened very patiently to these extremely complicated proposals, and members may well now be asking themselves: what exactly do they add up to? Where do we go from here?

52. The answer, as I tried to make clear at the beginning of my long account, is that we do not go anywhere until we know the views of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. As Sir Alec Douglas-Home said recently in Parliament, the only reason we are in this business at all is that we want to help the Africans towards a better future than they are otherwise likely to have. The central issue of the agreed proposals is their advancement—their advancement in education, their social advancement, their economic advancement and their political advancement. Their participation in every respect is essential to the success of the proposals. It therefore follows that their acceptance of the proposals is a *sine qua non* of the whole exercise which cannot begin until this is ascertained.

53. It is the view of my Government that the agreed proposals present an acceptable alternative to the *status quo*, a healthy reversal of the present increasingly unhealthy trend, and an honourable solution fully in accordance with the five principles to the human and political problems involved. If this were not our view we should not be recommending these proposals. But we do not pretend to have the last word. We leave that to the Rhodesian people themselves.

54. We are therefore for the present and perhaps for the next few months confronted only with a hypothesis. If the evidence—which will be fully, freely and fairly collected—is to the effect that the Rhodesian people as a whole do not accept these proposals, then they will have been made in vain. If it is found that they do accept them, then we shall be able to press ahead with the appropriate legislation and with making them work. It is only at that stage and when the British Government is fully satisfied that the Rhodesian

Government has enacted the necessary legislation and taken the necessary steps to give effect to the proposals that the final section of the proposals, which envisages the conferring of legal independence upon Rhodesia and the lifting of sanctions, will come into effect.

55. Until that stage is reached, the situation will remain exactly as it is now. No legislation will be required or will be undertaken by my Government and all existing measures will remain in force.

56. There comes a moment in every question when we need to stand back and look at the problem as a whole. Every one of us will be conscious of his own responsibilities and of the wider context of principle and of reality in which he seeks to carry them out. Those who have responsibility with regard to Africa stand, as a British Prime Minister pointed out nearly 10 years ago, in the path of a wind of change. For many years that wind has blown strongly and steadily. If it has not yet succeeded in bringing every ship home to the right port, that is not to say that it could have done so better had it blown at hurricane force. Our belief, as is well known, has always been in evolution, not revolution: we have always understood the impatience that this has sometimes generated, though we might at times have asked for a more generous understanding of our motives.

57. At this moment our task might be said to be to ensure that the wind of change, which is in danger of shifting to the wrong quarter, can once more blow steadily in the right direction. This question is far too serious for us to indulge in wishful thinking. It is far too complex for strong words, though strong words would indeed be appropriate to the present plight and likely sequel for the African majority in Southern Rhodesia if the *status quo* continues. The dark cloud of growing racial discrimination is creeping northwards and seems bound to turn Rhodesia into a satellite of the *apartheid* system unless it is halted and reversed.

58. In contrast to this, any lightening of the clouds might seem like a new dawn. In some ways it could be and it should be. The development plans that are an essential part of the agreed proposals will immediately release unprecedently large funds to improve the lot of Rhodesian Africans in the most immediately beneficial way: that is to say, in their living conditions and in the education and further job opportunities that will enable them as individuals and families to raise their standard of living and achievement. But more important, if the Rhodesian Africans seize the opportunities which this economic and educational advancement will provide, the prospect will be open to them of achieving political freedom and responsibility for deciding their own fate, for playing a full and eventually decisive part in a multiracial society.

59. This is the opportunity which is being offered. It is for the people of Rhodesia as a whole to say whether it is acceptable to them. We do not know what they will say. We shall not change our policy with regard to the present Rhodesian régime until that opinion has been ascertained. With regard to that ascertainment we shall have nothing to hide and we shall give a full and complete account of its results. When these are known, and not before, we shall

know whether we can go forward. This is the way in which we are carrying out our special responsibility for Rhodesia, in a way that all may see.

60. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, the representative of a State which is a permanent member of the Security Council and the administering Power bearing a special responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, concerned the important question of the implementation of Security Council decisions on Southern Rhodesia. It will, of course, be studied by the delegation of the Soviet Union and we reserve the right to speak on it in more detail at a later stage of the discussion of the item on Southern Rhodesia on the agenda of the Security Council.

61. However, we would like to dwell at this point on some aspects of that statement and of the agreement which was worked out in Salisbury and which, it seems, is going to be called the "Home-Smith agreement".

62. Firstly, attention must be drawn to the fact, widely known and obvious to us all, that the talks were held with an illegal régime which has been condemned by the United Nations as a usurpatory and racist régime. The Home-Smith talks were held in defiance of a direct appeal by the General Assembly to have nothing to do with that illegal régime and not to hold talks with it about the future of the Zimbabwe people. Anyone who wishes to check this may read it in General Assembly resolution 2652 (XXV).

63. The General Assembly called on the Government of the United Kingdom to hold consultations with the political parties of the Zimbabwe people, which are engaged in a just and lawful struggle for the freedom and independence of Southern Rhodesia, for its liberation from racist tyranny, and for the establishment in Southern Rhodesia of a system of popular rule and democratic government in accordance with the will of the majority of the population. Yet the representative of the United Kingdom, when informing the Security Council of that agreement today, told the Council officially that the Government of the United Kingdom did not know the Zimbabwe people's opinion regarding that agreement. Such is the position of the United Kingdom Government and such is its attitude towards United Nations decisions regarding Rhodesia, which condemn the illegal racist régime and forbid any further dealings with it. But the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary opened talks not with the representatives of the Zimbabwe people but with the racist and Fascist régime in Southern Rhodesia, which has established its tyrannical domination over the many millions of Zimbabwe people and has deprived that people of elementary human rights, freedom and national independence.

64. The representative of the United Kingdom informed the Security Council here today of a declaration of rights worked out by Lord Home and the leader of the Southern Rhodesian racists, Smith. Gentlemen, members of the Council, what kind of declaration of rights could they be talking about? The Zimbabwe people demand complete freedom and national independence, unlimited by declarations of any kind—that is what the Zimbabwe people

demand. But instead of that, Lord Home and the racist, Ian Smith, present the Zimbabwe people with a declaration of rights.

65. The contents of the Home-Smith agreement are not yet fully known. We objected yesterday to a meeting being specially convened today to listen to the representative of the United Kingdom here. We insisted that the United Kingdom delegation distribute the text of that agreement so that members of the Security Council should have the opportunity to study it and express their opinions. But the representative of the United Kingdom insisted, with the support of some of his friends, that a meeting of the Security Council must be held today in a ridiculous and hasty manner, ignoring the national feelings of the American people and their important holiday, Thanksgiving Day. Thus the members of the Security Council do not know the contents of the Home-Smith agreement. None of us have read that agreement. But the essential meaning is obvious from the information we have heard today and from the reports in the American press. It is a deal between an English lord and a Southern Rhodesian racist, the objective of which is to maintain for an indefinite period the racist order existing in Southern Rhodesia, and to cover up that order with an external window-dressing of unlawful "legality".

66. We are told that the United Kingdom delegation—and Lord Home was accompanied by a numerous suite—supposedly managed to obtain some confessions relating to the tempering of the racist discriminatory laws and progress towards the establishment of majority rule. All that, however, is a fiction. This racist-imperialism deal (that is the only way it can be described) in fact puts off for an indeterminate period the time longed for by the Zimbabwe people, when that people will be able to achieve freedom and national independence and become master of its own land, master of its own soil, taken from it by the foreign colonialists or, as the United Kingdom representative said today, occupied soil. That deal sanctions the rule of a racist minority over the indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia—the Zimbabwe people.

67. The American press tells us that after the final meeting the leader of the Southern Rhodesian racists, Smith, told journalists: "I am a very happy man." He, the racist tyrant, is happy, but the Zimbabwe people are not happy about this deal between an English lord and the ringleader of the racist clique in Southern Rhodesia. Smith had reason to be glad, but the feelings of the Zimbabwe nation were well expressed by one of the African nationalist leaders in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Chinamano. He said that the indigenous population of Rhodesia had no reason to be glad about the agreement between Home and Smith. Since the Africans did not take part in those talks, said Chinamano, there was every reason to presume that the agreement was concluded against the interests of the Zimbabwe people. Douglas-Home came to an agreement with Smith on the best way for both sides to present their bargain to world public opinion, the United Nations and the Security Council. And we see this today at the Council meeting. But the essence of the question was decided beforehand. The United Kingdom will try to impose on the Zimbabwe people the agreement it has concluded with the racists. At

the same time it will try to sugar that pill and that was the mission the United Kingdom representative was carrying out today.

68. According to reports in the press, the United Kingdom promises to finance a long-term programme of education for the Africans in order to prepare them for more rapid political progress. The representative of the United Kingdom said that here today also. But what does this mean? Each of us sees in this the reappearance of a long condemned colonialist theory that the Africans are supposedly not ready for independence or to manage the affairs of their own States.

69. The fallaciousness of this imperialist theory was shown up long ago and was proved by the example of the attainment of independence by many African countries. Their representatives in the United Nations and on the Security Council have no worse an education, level of preparedness, understanding of international problems or ability to defend the interests of their countries and peoples than the United Kingdom diplomats. Among the Zimbabwe people, too, there are politicians who are able, capable and sufficiently prepared to be able to resolve the affairs of their country independently, without the advice of an English lord and a Southern Rhodesian racist. However, they are in the prisons and torture chambers of the racist Southern Rhodesian régime.

70. It should be stressed in particular that this deal was made in secret from the Zimbabwe people; this was confirmed today by the United Kingdom representative, who admitted that he did not know the Zimbabwe people's opinion of that bargain. This too is a flagrant violation of a decision of this current twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, which reaffirms that any settlement relating to the future of Southern Rhodesia must be worked out with the fullest participation of all nationalist leaders representing the majority of the people of Zimbabwe. Such an agreement must be endorsed freely by that people. Representatives of the Zimbabwe people, as I have already mentioned, are languishing in prisons and concentration camps. The leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Joshua Nkomo, and the leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Ndabaningi Sithole, have been in prison for many years now, without trial or investigation. But it is with them, the fighters for the freedom and independence of the Zimbabwe people, that conditions should be worked out for the settlement of the question of Southern Rhodesia and the granting of total and unrestricted freedom and independence to the Zimbabwe people.

71. However, some explanation has filtered into the press as to what the representatives and leaders of the Zimbabwe people think of this shameful deal by the United Kingdom Government. It was stated in particular that the leader of ZANU, Mr. Sithole, resolutely condemned, in a memorandum addressed to Douglas-Home the attempt by the United Kingdom Conservatives to reach agreement with the racist minority which rules Southern Rhodesia. In that memorandum, according to the press, Sithole stressed that his party would agree to nothing except the immediate granting of independence to the indigenous population of

Rhodesia—the Zimbabwe people. He also emphasized that the so-called United Kingdom principle of "steady progress towards majority rule" had no political meaning, since, if power remained in the hands of the foreign racist minority, its racist ringleaders would sabotage and undermine any progress towards majority rule.

72. The discussions between the United Kingdom Government and the racist Smith clique, conducted behind the backs of the indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia and its representatives, can be regarded at the international political level and in the context of the discussion of this question in the United Nations only as a colonialist racist collusion, the essence of which is United Kingdom assistance to help the racist régime maintain and strengthen the racist order in Southern Rhodesia.

73. The United Kingdom talks with the Southern Rhodesian régime, its supplying of arms to the South African racists, its co-operation with the Portuguese colonialists, its withdrawal from the Committee on Decolonization,² and, finally, the use of the veto by its representative in the Security Council to prevent the adoption of even a comparatively weak resolution against the Smith racist régime, proposed by the African delegations—all these are links in the same colonial policy of the United Kingdom Tories, who are providing help and patronage for the racist colonialist régimes in southern Africa, which have been frequently, decisively and unconditionally condemned by the United Nations.

74. The Security Council cannot ignore the remarkable fact that the visit of the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary to the Southern Rhodesian racists coincided with the adoption by the United States Congress of an act revoking the embargo on purchases of chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia by United States monopolies. That question as we know was considered in the General Assembly. Is this a coincidence? No, it is not. It too is a link in the same chain of unified action by two great Powers, taken with the active support of the United Kingdom and United States imperialist monopolies in order to satisfy the interests of those monopolies. This action shows once more that international obligations, United Nations decisions, Security Council decisions and the freedom and independence of the Zimbabwe people are pushed into the background when it comes to the profits of the monopolies, their capital investments, the exploitation of cheap African labour and the strengthening of economic and strategic positions in southern Africa. It is quite obvious that attempts are being made to save the illegal racist régime of Southern Rhodesia, to support the Portuguese colonial system and the racist system of South Africa, in order to maintain and strengthen in southern Africa a bastion of imperialism, colonialism and racism, designed to prevent at any price the completion of the irreversible historical process of the national liberation revolution on the African continent and the implementation in southern Africa of the Declaration on decolonization adopted by the United Nations in 1960. Up to now that Declaration has been a mere scrap of paper for the

² Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

colonial territories of southern Africa; it has not been implemented, and everyone knows who is responsible.

75. Such policies and actions in connexion with Southern Rhodesia can only be described as connivance at and patronage of the despotism and racist terror created by the Smith régime and are arousing rightful anger throughout the world. Naturally they could not but arouse the serious concern of the African peoples and alarm among the overwhelming majority of delegations to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. This found concrete expression in the resolutions recently adopted on the initiative of the African delegations at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. One of those resolutions decisively condemns the United States for violating the United Nations decisions imposing sanctions against the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia and banning any kind of economic or trade relations with it. In violation of these United Nations decisions, the United States Congress, as has already been noted, adopted an act allowing chrome ore to be imported from Southern Rhodesia into the United States. The second resolution, which I have already mentioned, was adopted at the current session of the General Assembly, also on the initiative of the African delegations, in connexion with the visit to Southern Rhodesia of the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Douglas-Home, and his talks with the racist régime, which has been condemned by the United Nations and has established its illegal rule in that country. The United Kingdom Conservative Government not only ignored the demands of the indigenous population of Rhodesia; it ignored the demands of all progressive people in all Africa and throughout the world and it also ignored a decision of the United Nations.

76. It is well known too that in many of the decisions of the Organization of African Unity—as can be confirmed officially by the representative of that Organization, our mutual friend the distinguished Mr. Thiam, who is present here—the régime of Ian Smith has been described as an illegal racist and oppressive régime. It was emphasized in decisions of the Organization of African Unity that the United Kingdom Government has no right to conduct talks of any kind with the racist minority clique which seized power against the will of the majority of the population of the country. The demand “No independence for Rhodesia before the establishment of majority rule” is a universal demand not only of the Zimbabwe people but of the whole of Africa. This demand is confirmed also by the decisions of the United Nations. However, it has been completely ignored and is being ignored by the United Kingdom Government.

77. Even the American press today had to announce that the Africans are disturbed and concerned by the deal made between Home and Smith, and that they fear that as a result of that deal the interests of the Zimbabwe people have been betrayed and sold out. This is the same as the appraisal which, according to the American press, was made of that deal in a statement by the Soviet telegraph agency TASS. The agreement was described as a sell-out of the African majority. TASS said the accord would “go down in history as an undisguised and shameful collusion between

the imperialists and their racist henchmen in Africa”.³ That is the Soviet description of that shameful deal.

78. In the light of the attitude of the Africans towards the Home-Smith agreement, the Security Council has the right to know and must know the opinion of the Zimbabwe people and its representatives. The delegation of the Soviet Union insists therefore that the United Kingdom representative should not just limit himself to the information he presented to the Security Council today on the Home-Smith agreement but should reveal here today, at the Security Council meeting, the full contents of the memoranda which, according to the press, were received by Lord Home in Salisbury from the leader of ZAPU, Mr. J. Nkomo, and the leader of ZANU, Mr. N. Sithole. Until it is acquainted with those documents, the Security Council cannot take any decisions on the basis solely of the one-sided and clearly tendentious information given by the United Kingdom representative.

79. The Soviet delegation also proposes that the leaders of those two parties, Mr. Nkomo, and Mr. Sithole, should be invited to the meeting of the Security Council and that the Security Council should listen to their information on the real situation in Southern Rhodesia and their opinion of the Home-Smith agreement.

80. In conclusion, I should also like to remind the Security Council that, as we have already pointed out on many occasions, the fundamental and consistent position of the Soviet Union in supporting peoples fighting for their national liberation against imperialism, colonialism and racism was confirmed once again at the twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That position is an integral and indivisible part of the programme for the fight for peace and international co-operation, and for the freedom and independence of peoples, which was confirmed by that Congress. A rapid and complete implementation of United Nations decisions on the elimination of the remaining colonial régimes and a universal condemnation and boycott of racism and *apartheid* in all their forms and manifestations are the concrete and fundamental goals of that programme, which the Soviet Union will continue to pursue unswervingly.

81. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): We listened with close interest to the long statement made earlier by the representative of the United Kingdom. The delegation of Burundi will study this statement very carefully. In a word, we shall be happy to study it with a magnifying glass.

82. On the other hand, we shall make some comments here which will constitute the first of the statements we shall deem it necessary to make subsequently before this Council. We also regard the British statement as a prelude to the substantive debate which will take place as of today, depending on the consultations which you, Mr. President, will hold. We therefore see in this statement a kind of introduction to the discussions which will take place shortly on the problem of Rhodesia as such, in conformity with the agenda before the Council in document S/Agenda/1602. It is in this context that we wish to make

³ Quoted in English by the speaker.

some comments, without prejudging the merits of the document which has been submitted. It is above all in the light of that document that we take the floor at the present stage.

83. We consider that the independence of Rhodesia cannot and must not under any circumstances be mortgaged. We therefore feel some concern because Sir Colin Crowe himself has repeatedly stressed that the situation is only a *status quo*. We are therefore justified in asking now what progress has been achieved as a result of the agreements which have been signed.

84. First of all, it is fitting and legitimate to wonder whether the electoral system which has just been decided is not infinitely complex, particularly if one is to judge from the past situation whereby Rhodesians were not able to accede to independence because they did not have sufficient education. If that was the case and if they were not able to express their will on independence in a referendum, one wonders whether they will be able to express their views on what the representative of the United Kingdom called the "test of acceptability of the proposals". In other words, we wonder whether the Rhodesians, who were judged incapable of expressing their will on independence, will be able to do so on so complicated an electoral system. For if one cannot do the least then one cannot do the most, the least being the will to independence. We also note that the various phases through which the people of Rhodesia must pass constitute a long chain, which could have been avoided had agreement been reached on accession to independence quite apart from the present situation.

85. Consequently, the electoral system as now established is a source of genuine concern to my delegation. Our position in Burundi is to argue the case, wherever necessary and possible, for multiracial and multinational societies. You will understand, then, that the failure of those agreements to recognize the equality of rights of Rhodesian citizens is already a matter of grave concern to us. As we see it, Rhodesia has both black and white inhabitants who should accede to independence, irrespective of any racial consideration, religious label or any other separatist factor, so that independence will be the heritage of all citizens, whoever they may be, in the light of and on the basis of personal individual criteria and values.

86. But the situation, as described, rather seems to institutionalize the *fait accompli*, namely, that black inferiority exists and that white supremacy must be maintained, at least for a certain period, the duration of which was not mentioned. We persist in thinking that racial heterogeneity can afford a complementarity among citizens, whatever their racial differences. Homogeneous societies which tend to draw back upon themselves and become exclusivist cannot benefit either the whites themselves or, still less, the black Rhodesians. Thus, we are forced to conclude that these agreements leave the problem fundamentally and basically the same. We would like to know today, or at future meetings, why the leaders of the rebel régime seek to exercise a discretionary right with regard to the release of detainees and restrictees or the return of exiles? During Sir Alec Douglas-Home's stay in Salisbury for instance, some prisoners were authorized to be received

in audience by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, while others were not.

87. Secondly, as regards the new agreements, we have not been told why the release of political prisoners and the repatriation of political exiles is to be discretionary—because, if I correctly quote from the notes I jotted down, our colleague from the United Kingdom spoke of "the release . . . of a significant number of detainees and restrictees"³ [see para. 46 above].

88. As we see it, all political prisoners and exiles should benefit from these agreements if the agreements are supposed to be impartial. Of course, we are not here pleading the cause of prisoners who may have been punished for common law crimes; we are speaking of political restrictees and exiles who were the victims of the political situation created by the Ian Smith régime. Accordingly, we consider that all the leaders, all those who have sought to lead Rhodesia to independence should be set free and that all the political exiles should be unconditionally repatriated.

89. As regards political posts: if the intention is to reach an understanding in the near future then Rhodesians must be given posts on the basis of their merit and their personal value.

90. Some mention has also been made of a new educational system; but one cannot help wondering whether the funds to be disbursed by the United Kingdom for the education of the African masses may not perhaps be diverted and instead used to alleviate whatever minor ills—repeat, minor ills—may have been caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Are there any guarantees that these funds will in fact be used in accordance with the decisions and the agreements? Shall we be able to get assurances from the British Government? That is one of the questions we wished to put.

91. As regards the granting of independence to colonial peoples, my delegation would like to submit some thoughts to this august assembly. Frequently, the lack of training of colonial peoples has been mentioned and it has been said that this lack of training justifies the maintenance or continuation of the colonial system. Now, there is no country in the world that can provide all its people with academic training and education unless that people is independent. That is to say, independence is the essential pre-condition for universal education. To mention what some newspapers describe as "tiny" Burundi, as an example, let me tell you that today we have a compulsory educational system on a national scale and we are now turning out 50 university graduates a year. That was not the case in the past. So that if after years of colonization Rhodesia has not been able—during the almost 100 years it has been virtually self-governing—to train skilled personnel who can take over when the time comes, it will take more than two years or five years to produce people the Ian Smith régime will regard as fit to succeed it. We do not think that will be possible, and we would also extend this argument to the case of the Portuguese Territories.

92. We know that Portugal has had colonies in Africa for 500 years. Yet that same Portugal has been incapable of

training skilled personnel who could run the country were Portugal one day to withdraw.

93. And then, one might rather ask whether certain colonial régimes do not themselves need training, from other Powers or from the Africans themselves, if for 100 years or 500 years these régimes have been incapable of providing the colonial peoples with the necessary education. This holds true both for Portugal and for Rhodesia.

94. So you can see why we, for our part, continue to be concerned, despite the generosity of the British, who have decided to grant these funds so as to ensure a sort of accelerated education for the Rhodesians. Unless there is supervision of the way the funds are used, unless there are guarantees that the programme will be administered by honest men—and this is not prejudging the issue—we fear that the funds may be used for other purposes.

95. Nevertheless, we are grateful for the efforts which the British Government has endeavoured to make, even though the results—at least on the present level—are far from satisfactory. The intentions were good, but in practical terms a greater effort must be made so as to reach the ultimate aim, which is nothing other than unrestricted, unmortgaged independence for all the Rhodesian population, and above all without any shame. By this we mean that there must be a multiracial, multinational people complementing each other without any exclusion for the simple reason that we consider any racial system a degradation. The Africans have shown on many occasions—I would mention Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania and my own country where, after accession to independence, we have rather sought to co-operate, and we would wish this system to be continued in the case of Rhodesia and in the case of the Portuguese Territories—that what they wish is to co-operate with those who yesterday were their colonizers.

96. The situation which has just been created is hardly a rosy one. Nevertheless, if the British Government intends to solve the problem once and for all it should realize that once Rhodesia is independent its white settlers will not be destined for the slaughter-house. On the contrary, they will be called upon to participate in the material, educational and political development of the Rhodesian people as a whole. If no account is taken of this system, which is the only possible one and the only ideal one, then perhaps the black Rhodesians, once they have taken independence by force despite the white settlers and despite the United Kingdom, will not then adopt so conciliatory an attitude as the one we are advocating at present: this because human feelings which are universal and which no one can control, except by a wise policy which once and for all should commit itself to the cause of independence in as short a time as possible.

97. There is another question which I should like to raise before concluding and until I have another opportunity to make a statement in the light of the document submitted to us earlier. I should like formally to put the question: what will be the duration of the rebel régime in Rhodesia, since the *status quo* is maintained, and what will be the duration of the transitional system established under the agreements signed yesterday? These are some of the questions which

my delegation feels compelled to put and to which we would like to have replies, if possible today, but at any rate at our future meetings, because as we see it the debate on Rhodesia is now open and we must continue to the adoption of a resolution which will be submitted later by members of the Security Council.

98. I thank you, Mr. President, and I reserve the right to speak at a later time, as circumstances dictate.

99. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I have to inform members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of Saudi Arabia [S/10398] requesting that he should be allowed to participate in the debate without the right to vote on the item on the agenda. If there is no objection I shall invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to participate in the debate in the Council and I now call on him.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took a place at the Council.

100. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Thank you, Mr. President. I shall dispense with paying you a tribute because, after all, you are such a modest and capable man that I would be embarrassing you if I did so at this late hour, but you know of the affection and deep respect which I have had for you ever since I had the honour and privilege of knowing you. The hour is late and I shall not keep you long from sharing with our American hosts their traditional Thanksgiving turkey dinner, which anyway does not usually begin before two o'clock or even later.

101. I have asked for the floor at this early stage because I feel constrained to make a few comments on the burning question of Southern Rhodesia lest we get lost in the labyrinth of debate that no doubt will ensue within the following days, and the suggestions which I have to make in particular to the five permanent members of the Council, may lose their impetus. You have all welcomed the representative of the People's Republic of China—and rightly so. He is now seated among you and I sincerely hope that your congratulations will be matched by your collective endeavour, the five of you, to seek a just and practical solution to the question which has bedeviled the United Nations for so many years.

102. I listened to the first part of the statement delivered this morning by my illustrious friend, Sir Colin Crowe, the representative of the United Kingdom. I must say that the statement was laudable for its frankness and quite plausible on the basis of premises which, I am afraid, are invalid in the context of the United Nations Charter. Sir Colin Crowe gave me the impression that there seems to be an *entente cordiale* between Mr. Ian Smith and his party on the one hand and the United Kingdom Government on the other. A total of 250,000 whites and 4 million blacks—we do not have to go into detail—constitute the population of Southern Rhodesia. We are told that a political arrangement has been concluded. Has it been done with the consent of the 4 million blacks? Since the days of Magna Carta, the British have always brought to our attention how fine and just their democratic parliamentary system of government was, but this reminds me of Periclean democracy, a

democracy for the Athenians. Anyone who lived outside the walls of Athens was considered to be a barbarian. Are the blacks considered barbarians by Mr. Ian Smith's white régime? Are they considered human or subhuman by Mr. Ian Smith's régime? That is the question.

103. If they were not as developed economically as the whites, why is it then, in the United Kingdom, that the poor and the under-privileged have the same vote as the others in the parliamentary system of the United Kingdom? This is my other question.

104. I shall begin with my comments and, I hope, statements of fact. First, the whites of Southern Rhodesia are obsessed by a genuine fear that if a majority rule is established in that country, in no time the whites will lose their identity. Nobody can contest that: 250,000 whites, 4 million African blacks. The ratio between the blacks and the whites is great, and no one expects the whites, 25 years or even 50 years from now, to have their fears dissipated. Therefore, it is not a question of time; it is a question of how to deal with that issue.

105. My second comment is, I hope, also factual. The United Kingdom population happens to be preponderantly white, with a few exceptions, and they consider the whites of Rhodesia their kith and kin. So the British, understandably, are not expected to chastise Mr. Ian Smith and those constituting his régime because if they do, any British Government—whether Labour or Conservative—will fall overnight. We have to accept this fact. I am sure that Sir Colin Crowe thinks the same way, but I am saying it for him because it is rather embarrassing for him to say so. This is a statement of fact. Can anyone refute it as a statement of fact?

106. My third comment is that economics, rightly or wrongly—we are not going into the ethical or moral question—shape the policies of States, big and small, whether we like it or not. Aristotle should have said that man is an economic animal, rather than a political animal, because politics revolves around economics. When I mentioned this to my good friend the representative of the Soviet Union, he said: "This is Marxist." I said: "Come on, what do you mean, Marxist? This has been so since the days of Adam and Eve." As if Marx invented this truth. The mythological Cain and Abel were two brothers, one of whom wanted to have more than the other. Those who believe in the monotheistic religion think that Adam and Eve had two sons and one killed the other. He was greedy; he wanted to have the whole earth to himself. Therefore, do not expect the United Kingdom to be an exception. After all, economics and finance determine the policy of the United Kingdom to a large extent, and the United Kingdom is not different from others, except once in a while when it has tried to find a motivation for war. It fought the First World War against German militarism. It was the biggest naval Power and France was the biggest military Power and was therefore the ally of the United Kingdom, as was Russia also. They were fighting German militarism and tyranny, or something like that. In the Second World War, they were fighting German nazism and fascism—but in fact they were fighting to preserve their Empire. Economics is stronger than politics.

107. Freedom? Come on. People are not that free nowadays. I would make a comment on your word "freedom". I think you were "aggrieved against" by the Germans; I have no doubt about it, but I am talking now about the United Kingdom, not the Soviet Union, so do not inject your "freedom" in my statement. We all want freedom.

108. Another comment I wish to make—which, I believe, you will all consider factual—is that economic sanctions have not proved to be adequate, as Sir Colin Crowe candidly told us in his statement. But I would say something else: I would say that smuggling and shipping under neutral flags can be done unscrupulously and with impunity. When in my early years—and I am talking about half a century ago—I was involved in national liberation movements in the region of the Middle East, we used to smuggle arms and ammunition from under the nose of the French and the British, who were the mandatory Powers in that area. Sometimes we bought the arms from French sources. Let me refresh your historical memory, Sir, because you must have been very young. The steel cartels in the First World War sold to both sides, the German and the French. They found a way of doing it. Money, money, money—all trouble comes from too much money and too much wealth.

109. Whether or not the agreement concluded by Mr. Ian Smith and Sir Alex Douglas-Home will be ratified is beside the question. The *status quo*, or something similar to it, in Southern Rhodesia remains. The representatives of 250,000 whites will continue to rule and control 4 million blacks. This is the sad thing about the whole question. And the Mother of Parliaments, the United Kingdom, rationalizes its stand on the grounds of kith and kin and on the grounds of economics and of strategic considerations.

110. What is the solution to this impasse? More abortive Security Council resolutions? I have witnessed in this Council resolutions of condemnations, resolutions that threatened to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter—sanctions and this and that—with no result whatsoever. Economic and military sanctions, when we know that Southern Rhodesia continues to be one of the strongest white enclaves, militarily speaking, in Africa? Economic sanctions, when we know that their tobacco is smoked with euphoria in many parts of Western Europe? I do not know about the Russians; maybe you have your own tobacco.

111. Their nickel is being sold at cut-rate prices—and not because of the effect that sanctions have had. A ton of nickel two years ago sold for \$16,000 and a fraction which I do not have in mind. Now it barely fetches \$3,000 because there is a world recession—not because of the sanctions but because there is a world recession. The price of copper and nickel has gone down tremendously. So let us not mix the issues and say that they have felt the impact of the sanctions. They have not; the lower prices are caused by the bad days we are witnessing here in the host country, where things are not as they used to be three or four years ago. The Germans are now also beginning to feel the recession. I do not know about our Japanese friends. More power to them because they know how to manage their economy: \$1.50 per hour for skilled labour—and they are

happy—while here it is \$7.50 and they do not do things as they should. I have to take my car to the garage every now and then because the workers have no more pride in manufacturing cars. Next time I shall buy a Japanese car or a Swedish car.

112. So let us not be fooled by the statement of the United Kingdom that the sanctions are working. They are not working at all; the fact is that there is a world recession. In their heart of hearts the British know that sanctions do not work: they are ink on paper.

113. What shall we do then? More persuasion? I am sure that the United Kingdom tried to persuade Ian Smith to alter his policy, but within the framework of maintaining white supremacy. There is racial discrimination. Unfortunately, there is also discrimination which is non-racial—discrimination between classes, between brother and brother. Between brother and brother, I should like to call it prejudice and not discrimination. But we have to contend with racial discrimination.

114. Mr. Ian Smith and his successors will not be persuaded to pave the way for majority rule, whether now or 25 years hence. You cannot persuade a people that is panicking about losing its white identity. It is a real fear; it is a psychosis. They think there is something magical about their white colour. That is another fact to which I should like to draw the Council's attention.

115. I do not mean that the United Nations—and, more particularly, the Security Council—should not keep up its pressures. But I believe we should find other avenues, and those avenues are open to the so-called big Powers—the five permanent members of the Security Council.

116. Let us see what are the options or the alternatives that these Powers may or may not be able to use. My African friends always tell me: "Where there is a will, there is a way. Why do not the five major Powers act?" Well, let us see how they expect them to act. My friends from Africa and from Asia think that it is open to the big Powers to use external force—force from without; after all, it is their prerogative to maintain peace and security in the world. I think that is far-fetched. They will not resort to such drastic measures. I believe our African friends know it in their heart of hearts, and, although they ask them to do that, the five Powers will not do it, collectively and by agreement. And remember the veto; if anybody suggests such action, there is the veto.

117. Secondly, they say that the big Powers should help to create an African army, assisting it financially and also with anything it needs to wage war on Rhodesia. Such a solution—and it is not far-fetched—they will not adopt, and perhaps wisely so because the blacks are still no match for the whites in Rhodesia. Anyway, the five Powers will not agree among themselves to resort to such drastic measures, which, I am sure, they are afraid might create a precedent.

118. The third possible solution is to foment rebellion inside Southern Rhodesia. They can do it in the classical manner: in the name of freedom and liberation. Well, two of the permanent members, I am sure, would like to do that

and have been doing it—rightly so, in the name of freedom and liberation. Why should there not be rebellion? But I doubt that they will collectively adopt such a solution, because it will throw them into a state of confrontation. And we know what happened after Lumumba was killed.

119. The Western Powers said "Hands off black Africa". This is what they told the whites of Western Europe and since then the Soviet Union, wisely, refrained from a military confrontation with the Western Powers because, after all, they wanted peace. We can refute that statement? I was present here during the crisis in the Congo.

120. A fourth plan would be for the Asians and Africans and their friends to boycott the goods of the countries which trade with Southern Rhodesia. I doubt that such a boycott would be effective since the Afro-Asian countries are in a state of economic development and they need the Western Powers and the socialist States to extend aid and technological assistance to them.

121. Then we may ask, Sir, since you mentioned all those solutions as being only academic in so far as implementation is concerned, will you, the representatives of the five Great Powers, or your Governments, declare your helplessness to solve the problem? Then you are on a par with the non-permanent members of the Security Council. Moral support for the four million blacks of Southern Rhodesia? My dear friend and colleague, Sir Colin Crowe, it is not a question of tea and sympathy. You can have tea and sympathy with old ladies in hotels but not with liberated people, sympathy with their plight, the plight of four million. What, offer them tea and sympathy? No.

122. I can see the twilight of solutions. I have aired my views in the Fourth Committee on many occasions during the last seven or eight years. Nobody took my suggestions in earnest. The hour being late now, may I request you to consider this statement of mine as preliminary to a set of points which, with the President's permission and that of the members of the Council, I will read to you whenever it is feasible for the President, and the Council to give me some time to present them?

123. Now that I have finished this preliminary statement, I thank the President and the members of the Council for having been patient with me. I feel horror at the thought that 60 million turkeys have been slaughtered, but man being a predatory animal it sometimes makes me wonder whether he will ever reform. *Bon appétit* to all of you.

124. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia for his kind words addressed to me and to all members of the Council.

125. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from French*): It goes without saying that my delegation reserves the right to express its views on the contents of the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, the Administering Power for Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, it can be observed at once that the statement contains no specific reference to the right of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination, a principle on which the consideration of the problem of Southern

Rhodesia in the United Nations has always been based. Nor is there any mention of procedures to govern the exercise of that right. It is simply a question of a complex system of so-called parity representation—the parity, if there is any, being projected into a distant future. One problem which is at the heart of the tragedy of the Zimbabwe people is dealt with only marginally, and that is the problem of racial discrimination which is practised against the African majority, so as to maintain them under the colonial yoke in a status of chronic inferiority.

126. The statement of the United Kingdom simply refers to the appointment of a commission to study the problem, as though the question of equality of rights and duties were a secondary matter, and were not at the very heart of the entire problem. In fact, if the statement has any merit, it is that this time it admits that racial discrimination is practised, that the Africans are expelled from their lands and that they are deprived of their right to property, employment, education and economic opportunities. The eloquence of the statement in describing this racial discrimination is certainly striking. We are most grateful to the representative of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, we must recall that when representatives of justice-loving countries have reported these practices in the United Nations, the representatives of the United Kingdom invariably accused them of exaggerating. It has taken them all these years finally to recognize the facts.

127. I would not wish to dwell on other aspects of the problem. There will be full opportunity to do so. But one element seems to me at first sight to be lacking in all these proposed processes—the time element and, as a corollary, the alternative. How long do they think it will take this 50-50 parity to be achieved? For example, after how many years is it expected that the referendum will be held in regard to the 24 indirect seats? If the test of acceptability should prove negative, how does the United Kingdom intend to discharge its responsibility as Administering Power? Will it leave the Smith régime full freedom of action by saying that the proposals were rejected? These are key questions which, if unanswered, will render consideration of the statement very difficult and perhaps without any real significance.

128. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the United States has asked to exercise his right of reply and I call on him.

129. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): Members can be sure that, since this is an American holiday, I will be very brief. I would, as a preliminary, like to suggest to Ambassador Baroody that once all those turkeys have been slaughtered it would be a shame to waste them. Many of us do have our meal at lunch time and we should be grateful, on Thanksgiving, for all favours. I am grateful for his relative brevity. I appreciate his understanding of the American position.

130. I should like to reply very briefly—in two minutes—to the theory of connivance put forward by my colleague from the Soviet Union. We are not singing a duet. The action of the Congress that Ambassador Malik alluded to did not have the support of the Administration of the

United States Government. I will not deny that this action—not supported by the United States Government—reflected a certain concern amongst our people and amongst their representatives about the ineffectiveness of the sanctions. As we indicated in the Fourth Committee, there does not seem to be a dearth of buyers for Rhodesian chrome. The United States is not buying chrome from Rhodesia. Somebody else is. And I will not engage in a debate here on the capitalism that has been practised. We are now paying for chrome from other sources three times what we were paying when chrome was being sold in the market by the Rhodesians. But if the Ambassador and others had spent as much time seeing why the sanctions have not been fully effective—if they had spent as much time on that phase of the problem as they spend hammering away at the United States, which has not yet violated the sanctions—perhaps the problem would be further along the road to solution. I recognize that the distinction between the Administration's policy—the policy of the United States Government—and the action taken by the Congress is a distinction that it is hard for some Governments to make. I would simply remind my colleague that the United States is not in violation of those sanctions.

131. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): This final statement will be brief. Even were the Council to continue its debate—as the importance and gravity of the situation dictate—I do not wish to be the one who holds up the debate. A little earlier I dwelt on the inextricable process of the new system just set up. I might have included among the anomalies I enumerated and emphasized as sources of concern the negotiations and agreements that took place not only in the absence of the Africans but even to their exclusion, which is also a source of concern to my delegation. We consider that those agreements and negotiations should have taken into account those primarily concerned, who are the Africans, and that anything negotiated on the fate of Africans in their absence and to their exclusion cannot be expected to produce satisfactory results.

132. In conclusion, the Africans not only should have taken an effective part and have been consulted as fully fledged partners, but they should even have been considered on a preferential basis.

133. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): My delegation listened with interest to the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom and also to subsequent statements by members of this Council. In a matter of such importance my delegation will naturally require time to give the statement the consideration it deserves, and I reserve the right of my delegation to speak at length at the next meeting of the Council.

134. However, I am glad that the representative of the United Kingdom, when introducing his statement, said that the United Kingdom had always recognized that the question of Southern Rhodesia was one of legitimate and continuing concern to the rest of the world community. Indeed, when this Council was first seized with the question of Southern Rhodesia in 1965 it adopted a resolution [202 (1965)] which endorsed a request that had been made by the General Assembly and by the Special Committee on

decolonization urging the United Kingdom Government to obtain the release of all political prisoners, detainees and reestrictedees in Southern Rhodesia, the repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation in Southern Rhodesia and the removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights. Of course, since 1965 this Council has been seized with the question on many occasions, and on the last occasion, in 1970, it adopted a rather long resolution [277 (1970)] emphasizing that the United Kingdom had the primary responsibility of enabling the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

135. My Government firmly believes in the principle of self-determination and the procedures this Organization has worked out over the years to ensure that peoples can legitimately and properly express their right to self-determination. There can be no qualification on this. We must proceed on the basis that all citizens of Southern Rhodesia are entitled to equal rights and equal freedoms without distinction. My Government does not subscribe to the idea that there can be first-class and second-class citizens in a country. If the Africans have been generous enough over the years to accommodate a white immigrant community in their midst we must ensure that that small white community conducts itself so that its will is always in accord with the majority will of the Territory.

136. The representative of the United Kingdom—and I am now speaking quite briefly—spoke of a test of acceptability. Before the projected Royal Commission proceeds to ascertain public opinion, my delegation would like to know whether it is intended that there be an intensive campaign of public enlightenment, carried out well before the Royal Commission undertakes its task.

137. My delegation would like to know what would be the position of the two main African political parties in Southern Rhodesia, known as the Zimbabwe African People's Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union—both of which, as members may know, have been proscribed though together they constitute and represent the vast majority of Africans in that Territory. According to the statement, only those political parties represented in the present Assembly will be able to make use of radio and television in the political campaign that will precede or run parallel to the test of acceptability—thereby ensuring that the two main parties will not have an opportunity of addressing their people through the mass media.

138. In this connexion my delegation would like to associate itself with the very important proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union that a request be addressed to the United Kingdom Government to invite the leaders of these two political parties, Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, to come here so that we can have the benefit of their views.

139. My delegation would like to have some idea from the representative of the United Kingdom as to how long his Government believes it would take the African people,

assuming that the proposed constitutional reforms are accepted and implemented, to reach parity. Newspaper reports indicate that such progress will take at least 25 years. Others are less optimistic and say 30 to 35. But, acknowledging the kind of qualifications that have been demanded of Africans, educational qualifications, I must say that those are not really the supreme test. I can speak from personal experience. My own father was an illiterate Somali, but I can assure you he knew more about my country, how to govern his family and how to participate in the affairs of his country, than I, who have had the benefit of a university education, can ever hope to know. In this problem, the test of a man is not whether he has had secondary school or university education: the test is his citizenship. We are all endowed with certain inalienable rights, and one of those rights is that of full political participation in the life of one's country, and I submit that that must be the criterion on which any proposals aimed at bringing about a political solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia must be judged.

140. My delegation was also interested to see that a commission is to be established to determine in what way discrimination can be eliminated. For the past six years the white minority régime has been able to demonstrate how it feels on the question of white and black participation in the political life of the territory. The very first paragraph of the proposal for the constitution for Rhodesia which was adopted by the rebel régime in 1969 began:

“The Government of Rhodesia believe that the present Constitution is no longer acceptable to the people of Rhodesia because it contains a number of objectionable features, the principal one being that it provides for eventual African rule and, inevitably, the domination of one race by another and that it does not guarantee that government will be retained in responsible hands.”

141. The United Kingdom representative speaks of guarantees being built into the new Constitution. Who is going to guarantee those guarantees? The United Kingdom Government?

142. Another question on which my delegation would like to have some information in order to make a constructive contribution to this debate is whether the United Kingdom Government envisages at any period United Nations participation in the test of acceptability. This matter is of profound importance to the Council. Since the time when the United Kingdom brought the question to the Council, the Council has concerned itself intimately in trying to see in what way the welfare of the people of Southern Rhodesia could be protected and promoted. Does the United Kingdom Government envisage at least a team of observers from the United Nations, established by this Council, being present when the test of acceptability is being conducted?

143. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): In its statement, my delegation requested the United Kingdom representative to inform the Security Council of the contents of the memoranda which, according to press reports, were addressed by Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom. We should like to have a

reply from the United Kingdom representative—either now or, if this is not possible, perhaps at the next meeting.

144. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to remind you that in an earlier statement the representative of the Soviet Union proposed that the Security Council should invite Mr. Nkomo, the representative of ZAPU, and Mr. Sithole, the representative of ZANU, to address the Council concerning the item on the agenda. The representative of Somalia has just supported that proposal. I propose to hold the customary consultations on this subject and I shall keep members of the Council informed of the results.

145. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): If there are no comments on

that proposal, perhaps we can consider it adopted without special consultations?

146. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): I would suggest that this is something that would require a certain amount of consideration by the Council, since it has been produced in the way it has. It would certainly require, on my part, consultations with my Government.

147. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall therefore hold the customary consultations on this subject. As I hear no objection, I take it that the Council agrees.

The meeting rose at 2.05 p.m.

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