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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1567)	1
Expression of thanks to preceding Presidents	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488): Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/10199 and Corr.1)	1

NOTE

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FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 26 May 1971, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Nsanzé TERENCE (Burundi).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1567)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/10199 and Corr.1).

Expression of thanks to preceding Presidents

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): First of all, I have the greatest pleasure in expressing my gratitude to my immediate predecessors, the Ambassador of Argentina, who presided over the Council for the month of March, and the Ambassador of Belgium, who presided for the month of April. Although they were not faced with events which made it necessary for them to convene a meeting of the Security Council, in their capacity as Presidents of the Council they nevertheless endeavoured to maintain contacts and consultations to everyone's satisfaction. It is therefore on behalf of all members of the Security Council that I express my gratitude to them for having successfully discharged their functions.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/10199 and Corr.1)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the usual practice of the Council when dealing with the question now before it, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, pursuant to their request to be allowed to participate in the discussion of the question

without the right to vote, to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Z. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. U. H. Bayülken (Turkey) and Mr. D. Bitsios (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Security Council will now take up the question of Cyprus on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General of 20 May 1971 [S/10199 and Corr.1]. Members of the Council have before them also the draft resolution which has been prepared during informal consultations [S/10209].

4. A certain number of representatives have expressed the wish to speak before the vote on the draft resolution. Before calling on them, however, I should like to welcome and express my congratulations to Ambassador George Bush of the United States, who is participating in the meetings of this United Nations organ for the first time. It was a great pleasure for me, in order to enable him to be present on this occasion, to make arrangements to advance the date of this meeting, which had originally been set for 28 May. I am sure that we can count on having him share with us here, with his characteristic dynamism, the responsibilities and duties of the Security Council, as well as its rights and powers, bringing with him a new air due in part to his youth, which I feel corresponds perfectly to the qualities of the African leadership.

5. The first speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

6. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, it is my pleasant duty, if I may be permitted to do so, to offer you our sincere congratulations on the occasion of your assuming the presidency of this august body for a second time. Your experience and diplomatic skill, combined with your many other qualities, make it specially appropriate for you to preside over the debate on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), particularly since you know the problem of Cyprus so well.

7. Before I enter upon the subject before us I wish on this occasion to extend to the Government and people of Turkey the sincere condolences of my delegation and my Government on the tragic loss of life and property that has occurred in that country as a result of recent earthquakes. Having ourselves been victims of similar catastrophes in the past, we in Cyprus can understand the tragic situation that

has arisen and feel every sympathy and compassion for the unfortunate victims in Turkey.

8. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the Council for giving me this opportunity to participate in this debate and to put forward our views on the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

9. We meet again for the renewal of the mandate, and on this occasion I wish first to state the consent of Cyprus for such renewal, considering that under the resolution it is Cyprus that must signify its consent, and I wish to express my Government's appreciation of the positive work UNFICYP has been carrying out in contributing to the maintenance of peace and its efforts to normalize the daily life of the people of Cyprus. In that connexion I should like to convey to the Commander of the Force, Major-General D. Prem Chand, and to the officers and men under his command, the expression of our appreciation.

10. I should like now to reiterate once more our deep gratitude to the Secretary-General for his genuine concern about the question of Cyprus over the years and his dedicated efforts to contribute to a just and peaceful solution of the problem and, furthermore, our admiration of his wise leadership of the United Nations and his outstanding services in the cause of peace and progress in the world. As time goes by we admire him more and more. We wish to see him as Secretary-General for as long as he thinks he can possibly serve this Organization.

11. We also express appreciation to Mr. Osorio-Tafall for his very patient and constructive work on the island, which has been useful on many occasions, as also to the collaborators and assistants of the Secretary-General, Mr. Ralph Bunche, Mr. Rolz-Bennett, who served until recently, and Mr. Guyer.

12. I take this opportunity to say a few words about Mr. Rolz-Bennett and express our deep sorrow at his absence today. He has for many years been a very familiar, helpful and respected figure as one of the Secretary-General's closest collaborators on the question of Cyprus—and, of course, on other subjects also—and his deep knowledge of the question of Cyprus, coupled with his many qualities and his dedication to duty, will be greatly missed.

13. In meeting to renew the mandate the Security Council must consider the Secretary-General's report covering the United Nations peace-keeping operations in Cyprus over the past six months [*S/10199 and Corr.1*]. The report shows that within that period the situation with regard to any recurrence of fighting has been generally calm. Indeed in this respect it has actually been calmer than any of the preceding periods. Thus there have been only four shooting incidents, of which three are attributed to Turkish Cypriot armed elements and one to Government security forces—all without casualties or any consequences. Furthermore, the report notes that "emphasis continues to be given with encouraging results to the prevention of incidents, as well as to the maintenance of the *status quo* in sensitive areas" [*ibid.*, para. 32].

14. As appears from the report, the co-operation that had emerged between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on economic matters continued and increased. Thus in the economic field contacts have been maintained, especially in the private sector and in a number of semi-autonomous and non-governmental institutions. In the Government Productivity Centre there has been growing Turkish Cypriot participation and the same can be said of the Dekelia Trade Training Centre organized under an agreement between the Governments of Cyprus and Britain. Similarly, there is greater interest and increasing participation of Turkish Cypriots in agricultural projects undertaken by the Government with the assistance of FAO and the World Food Programme. In public services further progress towards normalization was noted in respect of electricity for Turkish Cypriot villages, new water schemes and telephone and postal services.

15. However, in that respect the necessity for an integrated economic policy is all too apparent. Such a policy would greatly benefit all concerned but more importantly the Turkish Cypriots. It is therefore regrettable that the Turkish Cypriot leadership still prevents progress in that direction. To us that seems an anachronistic approach. At a time when great nations that have had deep national differences are striving to integrate their economies it seems particularly odd and inexplicable that in Cyprus a small Turkish community is still following the opposite course. As the report points out,

"It . . . will be difficult to utilize fully and rationally the human and other resources of the island if the present trend towards separate economic development is maintained, especially when the preparation of the new Five-Year Plan for 1972 to 1976 is in its final stages. It has been suggested in this connexion that one way to foster some form of intercommunal economic co-operation would be the establishment of closer links between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot co-operative movements and regular exchanges of views between Greek and Turkish Cypriots within economic planning institutions. [*Ibid.*, para. 41.]

16. The Cyprus Government for its part, as is stated in the report,

"has reiterated its willingness to help raise the [*Turkish Cypriots*] living standards and to allocate funds for investments in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, provided it has [*the necessary*] over-all supervision and financial control over such projects" [*ibid.*, para. 40].

It is further observed that:

"The military situation has continued to be relatively calm . . . but UNFICYP's efforts to bring about a relaxation in the areas of direct confrontation have failed, as in the past, to produce any positive results." [*Ibid.*, para. 26.]

17. In this respect it may be recalled that proposals made by UNFICYP regarding deconfrontation were agreed to by my Government but regrettably the Turkish Cypriot

leadership did not accept them;¹ similarly, they rejected a number of suggestions subsequently made to them by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General which, as the report says, if agreed to, could, at minimum risk to them, help to generate an atmosphere of increased mutual confidence and contribute significantly to the improvement in the living conditions of their community.

18. In his present observations the Secretary-General refers to the problem of de-escalation and deconfrontation as one "of crucial importance for a return to normal conditions" [*ibid.*, para. 84]. It may be recalled that the report of the Secretariat survey team of 1969 that went over the whole situation of Cyprus in relation to UNFICYP emphasized the importance of this problem of military confrontation: unless solved or attenuated by the moving of the forces farther apart, it would cause the presence of the United Nations Force to continue to be necessary. I say this to emphasize the need for this deconfrontation which really seems absolutely necessary in respect of the positions held over three and a half years of calm. In his present observations the Secretary-General refers to the problem of de-escalation again and remarks:

"Although this has for a long time now been the subject of persistent efforts by UNFICYP, ... no substantial progress has been made during the period under review. An important factor in this impasse is the contention of the Turkish Cypriot leadership that a return to normal conditions in this field cannot take place without impairing its position with regard to the basic issues of the Cyprus problem which are under discussion in the intercommunal talks". [*Ibid.*]

19. This seems a strange explanation. Mere deconfrontation or lessening of the degree of proximity of the two armed posts does not in the least alter the *status quo* and could not affect the positions of the parties in the talks. On the contrary by the resulting relaxation in the tension it creates a better climate. As a matter of fact, the normal thing is that you have normalization first to help promote a solution. You cannot wait for the solution in order to bring normalization. Indeed, the main resolution adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964 [186 (1964)] sees two duties: the duties for normalization, and a different thing for the solution of the problem. Of course, it is understood that you first normalize, conciliate and proceed to bring a better climate before you can hope for the solution. So if we prevent the normalization it is as if we were preventing the solution.

20. From the report we see that the training activity of the Turkish Cypriot armed elements has continued to increase while that of the Government armed forces has as before remained at the same level.

21. Referring to what is called "periods of considerable military display and acute sensitivity" [S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 26] the report notes that:

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1969*, document S/9521, para. 77.

"Throughout most of the period, uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters ... continued to appear in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol, marching to and from their training area" and in a number of instances "appearing in full uniform and parading with weapons." [*Ibid.* para. 29.]

Strong protests, therefore, from UNFICYP had become necessary to restore the *status quo*.

22. The report refers also to the Government's concern at the "apparent increase in Turkish Cypriot fighter presence and activity throughout the island" and "at the intensive overt training programmes now being carried out in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas." Particularly perturbing was the "stepping up of the distribution of locally manufactured arms and ammunition, since full freedom of movement" was ensured to all the Turkish Cypriots "by the Government early in 1968." [*Ibid.*, para. 27.]

23. Thus accentuated military preparations and intense distribution of arms throughout the island appear to have been so far the Turkish Cypriot response to the Government's gesture of normalization by unilaterally lifting all restrictions and all check points and searches at the risk of internal security.

24. We have also definite information that the Turkish Cypriots have been supplied with very heavy weapons, apart from the light weapons that they have manufactured themselves continually, the source of which could be understood to be that of the Turkish contingent in Cyprus. I will not go into detail on this subject at present but it is a matter of concern as it indicates a trend on this point.

25. On the Government effort at normalization so vitally needed for promoting a peaceful solution, the report remarks with regret that there has been no improvement on the long-standing problem of freedom of movement. On this freedom of movement there have been repeated urgings by the Secretary-General in his previous reports, and in the present report there is a call for reciprocal action by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to the Government's normalization measures in lifting all restrictions, even at the risk of internal security, which remain unheeded. As a result, this abnormal situation continues in which all Turkish Cypriots, without exception, enjoy full freedom of movement in all parts and on all roads of the island. In contrast the Greek Cypriots, namely, 80 per cent of the population, are forcibly prevented not only from entering the Turkish enclaves but also from using over a hundred public roads and even main communication roads.

26. In addition, Greek Cypriot farmers are still being denied access to their fields which lie in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, while Turkish Cypriot farmers are allowed by the Government to cultivate their lands even within prohibited military areas.

27. This unbalanced situation is due to the fact that in its policy of retaining peaceful conditions on the island—in co-operation with the United Nations Force—the Government has consistently refrained from any forcible measures for the purpose of ensuring the necessary freedom of

movement on all roads for all the inhabitants of Cyprus-- notwithstanding its unquestionable power to do so.

28. In the observations of the report of December 1970, the Secretary-General notes:

"It is with regret that I have once again to voice my disappointment that, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of my representatives in Cyprus, no significant advance has been made towards a return to normal conditions, especially to freedom of movement along all roads for unarmed citizens." [S/10005, para. 116.]

29. At the last meeting of the Security Council on this question a number of members spoke of the need for normalization and referred to three aspects: deconfrontation, freedom of movement for all Cypriots, and return of displaced persons to their villages. I have already dealt with the first two. Regarding the third, displaced persons, there has been a significant development through my Government's putting forward a concrete formula for the repair and reconstruction of damaged Turkish houses and other buildings in twenty-one villages.

30. This serves to demonstrate once again the good faith of the Government towards normalization and its sincere wish to facilitate the return of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons to their villages.

31. As is stated in the current report of the Secretary-General, this formula which was put forward in the form of a letter dated 13 February 1971 from Mr. Clerides to Mr. Denktash, provides for the repair or reconstruction of Turkish Cypriot houses in thirteen villages by 31 August 1971, and the same would apply as a second stage for eight more villages by the end of 1971, provided that the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of the first thirteen villages in fact do return.

32. It will no doubt be appreciated that this stipulation regarding the two stages is indeed necessary since repaired buildings, if left unoccupied, deteriorate both from natural causes and from furtive removal of building materials, and thus require additional financial expenditure to make them habitable. This is what in reality did happen in several cases during the past four years when Turkish houses were repaired by the Government at considerable expense and the Turkish leaders did not allow the inhabitants of those houses to return, as in the villages of Skylloura, Ayios Vasilios, Lapithos and others. The Turkish villagers who returned did so only in very small numbers.

33. In approaching this question in a positive and realistic manner the Government proposal provides an opportunity to the Turkish Cypriots to respond in the spirit in which this proposal was made, and it should be recalled that the urgency of this matter was stressed by the Turkish Cypriot leaders.

34. However, three months have already elapsed without a positive response; yet it is to be hoped that such a response may soon be forthcoming. As the Secretary-General put it in his previous report:

"With some goodwill it should be possible to approach the whole problem, which affects thousands of Turkish Cypriots, from a humanitarian rather than from a political point of view." [Ibid., para. 84.]

35. Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which is the basic resolution, provides for a two-pronged effort of the United Nations on the problem of Cyprus, namely, first, that of peace-keeping and normalization through the establishment of the United Nations Force in the island and, second, that of peace-making through the appointment of a Mediator.

36. The former task, which was entrusted to the United Nations Force, is being performed in a most useful and valuable way. The latter, that of mediation, was performed by the Mediator who produced a report² which was a constructive, middle-course plan for the solution of the problem; it was endorsed by the Secretary-General, and it has generally been regarded as a positive basis for a solution.

37. We are at present following another procedure on the same basis, the procedure of local talks which come as a sequel to and within the framework of the Secretary-General's good offices; it falls within the United Nations peace-keeping effort under the aforementioned resolution. The talks have in many ways been useful and constructive and have helped to improve the situation significantly. The exchange of views is a channel of communication towards mutual understanding for a common purpose--that of achieving a peaceful, just and democratic solution to the problem. The continuance of the talks has received general support. The interlocutors, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, in a number of public statements, have made it clear that although they still disagree on fundamental issues they will continue the talks as the best, and perhaps the only way to find a peaceful and agreed solution.

38. These talks initiated in 1968 on the agreed basis of an independent unitary State and with a view to overcoming unworkable provisions in the Constitution have, however, run into difficulties and have been practically stalled for nearly thirty months on the question of local government. The difficulties arose in respect of the degree and extent of the division involved in the Turkish Cypriot proposals. In this connexion it should be recalled that local government is an entirely new element as it did not exist in the Constitution in respect of which the talks are being conducted. Upon universally accepted norms, "local Government", both in its meaning and its application, is intended to refer to specific geographical areas. It is never based on ethnic criteria, nor could it be conceived as extending from the bottom to the top of the administrative structure, for it would then cease to be local and would in reality create a State within a State.

39. The obvious result of such unworkable provisions would be the collapse of the State itself, bringing about a confused situation fraught with the gravest dangers and threats to international peace and, what is still worse, with

² Ibid., *Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1965*, document S/6253.

the disaster of partition looming on the horizon. As I have already said on another occasion, partition is the saddest lot and the worst calamity that can befall any country and its people. This has been amply demonstrated in repeated cases over the years. A glance around the world today shows that war is waged continually and human suffering never ends in those countries that have had the unfortunate fate of being partitioned.

40. All the people of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish alike, should be deeply concerned with saving their country and themselves from a misfortune of such magnitude.

41. In the current talks on the Constitution of Cyprus, my Government has made all possible concessions in an effort to reach accommodation by repeated and increasingly accommodating proposals. There is, however, a certain limit beyond which separatism cannot be pushed without imperilling the independence of the State and its very existence. And it is on this very issue that the talks have hinged, as is well-known to all who follow closely the developments in Cyprus. The need for a more positive approach to the problem has become all too obvious, particularly since the very constructive and accommodating package-proposals made by the Government on 30 November 1970. It is therefore to be hoped that the Turkish Cypriot side will, in a positive spirit of co-operation, join in an effort to overcome the difficulties that have arisen on this issue so that in that spirit the talks may proceed on a fruitful course towards the achievement of a peaceful and lasting solution on the agreed basis of an independent unitary State within the principles of the Charter. In doing so, we would be following the course called for by the Secretary-General in his observations in paragraph 83 of the report for a peaceful solution based on the independence and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus.

42. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call upon the representative of Turkey.

43. Mr. BAYÜLKEN (Turkey): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to join the previous speakers in extending our congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. All our good wishes are with you.

44. I should also like to express my thanks to Ambassador Rossides for his very kind words with regard to the earthquake disaster that struck Turkey a few days ago. I appreciate his expression of kind sentiments.

45. Mr. President, I thank you and the members of this Council for allowing me to present the views of my Government on the item before the Council today. The Council is convened to consider the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. Once again the Secretary-General's comprehensive report provides the customary terms of reference for our deliberations this morning.

46. As usual, the report includes almost all the practical aspects of the issue: the operation of UNFICYP, activities towards preventing a recurrence of fighting and contributing to the restoration and maintenance of law and order,

activities towards a return to normal conditions, inter-communal talks; and finally, in the concluding part, we have the observations. The Secretary-General begins the pertinent part of the report with the observation that:

"It is with concern that I am compelled to report to the Security Council that in the period under review there has been little perceptible improvement in the situation in Cyprus and no indication of progress towards a negotiated solution of the underlying problems of the island."
[S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 78.]

47. Indeed, it is this aspect of the problem that requires full attention. On several occasions my Government expressed its concurrent views with this assessment by the Secretary-General that there has been very little improvement indeed in the situation in Cyprus and no substantial progress towards a peaceful and agreed solution.

48. If in the last three years the intercommunal talks have not made substantial progress, if they have not penetrated the heart of the problem, it is because mistrust between the two communities has prevailed—mistrust has even been fostered. This aspect of the problem has constantly been emphasized in the reports of the Secretary-General, including the present one. Consequently, efforts with respect to normalization, as well as efforts to return to constitutional order, have suffered from this lack of trust. Let us take normalization first.

49. First, the report indicates no notable progress in the economic field which concerns the livelihood of the Turkish community. It is almost exclusively the Greek Cypriots that benefit from international programmes of aid and technical assistance, as well as all the revenues of the Republic, although the Turkish community pays some duties and taxes. It was only after insistent urgings that some of the programmes were partially extended to the Turkish Cypriots.

50. Secondly, even public services such as water supply, telephone, electricity and postal services are not effectively available to the Turks. There have been six months of planning and talks regarding the supply of electricity to the Turkish villages, but if ever these talks are concluded and the plans implemented, still less than 20 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot villages will be covered. I take this information from the report.

51. Thirdly, the Turkish Cypriots have been eliminated from the social insurance plan. Continued requests have not produced any feasible results from 1964 onward.

52. Fourthly, the 20,000 displaced Turkish Cypriots, in the eighth year of their displacement, are kept away from their homes. Discussions which produced elaborate plans on the part of the Greek Cypriot community have not, unfortunately, been directed solely to humanitarian ends. On the contrary, these plans have sought to bring the displaced persons unconstitutionally under the political and juridical authority of the Greek Cypriot administration. They constitute one fifth of the population of the Turkish community, namely, 20,000 people.

53. Finally, movement in the island has not become completely free. True, given the political motivation of the Greek Cypriot leadership I have already described, one cannot be surprised that freedom of movement has not been established.

54. On this issue I should like to clarify two points. As stated by Mr. Küçük, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, in a letter dated 17 May 1971 [see S/10200], Greek Cypriot civilians who have a legitimate business can enter the Turkish controlled areas. Furthermore, it is not correct to say that the Turks enjoy full freedom of movement in all parts and on all roads of the island, for the Turkish Cypriots are denied access to some areas which are unconstitutionally declared sensitive or restricted areas by the Greek Cypriot administration. In fact, these restricted areas are much larger in extent than the areas under the control of the Turkish Cypriots.

55. On the question of normalization, it is the Turkish community that is subject to all the deprivation, and what could be more natural than its desire to achieve normalcy? I believe that the Greek Cypriot leadership stretches its credibility when it seeks to impute inhibitions to the Turkish Cypriots on this issue. So much for normalization.

56. It is not only mistrust but diversion in the objectives of the communities in the talks that has prevented real and final progress.

57. Members of the Council will recall that the basic issue in the island rests on the adjustment of the sovereign entity of the two communities in the governing of the island in such a manner that neither community is constitutionally soluble. Indeed, as also very pertinently underlined in the report of the Secretary-General, the re-declaration of an ultimate political objective other than the continuation of the independence has gravely endangered not only the process of confidence building, but also all the efforts for a peaceful solution of the problem.

58. In March, statements demanding *enosis*—the annexation of the island—emanated with a new momentum from leading Greek Cypriots. This stream of statements reached its peak on 14 March 1971, when the most responsible of them all, Archbishop Makarios, emphatically declared:

“Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of its history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece.”

59. In addition, this pro-*enosis* campaign was supplemented with a series of acts of harassment against the Turkish Cypriot community. I have sent many communications in this respect to the Secretary-General.

60. This morning I have presented yet another communication to the Secretary-General concerning a very recent example of such acts. Regrettably, I shall have to relate it.

61. On the night of 23 May 1971, only two days ago, Mr. Ismet Kotak, a Member of Parliament, a member of the

Executive Council for Labour, Co-operatives and Rehabilitation of the Turkish Community, and three Turkish representatives accompanying him, were manhandled and assaulted by armed Greek Cypriot policemen near Famagusta. On a road in this locality, their car was stopped and these prominent Turkish Cypriot leaders were manhandled and assaulted on the spot by armed Greek Cypriot policemen without any cause or provocation. Then they were illegally arrested and taken to the Greek Cypriot Police Headquarters in Famagusta where they were interrogated and later released.

62. That is the treatment that the prominent members of the Turkish Community are receiving when returning from a very innocent visit to some areas in Cyprus. In fact the area from which they were coming back was just a mixed village in Cyprus, Nergisi. It was not even a visit to an entirely Turkish Cypriot village.

63. Incidents of this grave nature are bound to have negative effects on the process of confidence-building, and, moreover, they result in a further aggravation of the tension in the island which, if not checked, may develop an explosive character.

64. In Mr. Küçük's letter of 17 May, the Council was also informed about some actions concerning the implementation of this ultimate political objective such as affiliating Greek Cypriot federations, trade unions, telecommunication services, banking institutions, student and youth organizations with similar organizations in Greece; Greek Cypriot National Guards taking an oath of allegiance to the Kingdom of Greece and playing the Greek national anthem at all official ceremonies as if it was the national anthem of the Republic of Cyprus, and so on.

65. The attention of the Council was drawn to the scope of the action in pursuance of this ultimate political objective. This policy was reiterated in unequivocal terms when at a meeting it was disclosed that on 9 March 1971 Archbishop Makarios had said he would never cease to work for *enosis* and that he would never sign an agreement which excluded *enosis*.

66. Such statements by the most authoritative Greek Cypriot quarters are not an expression of “the natural ethnic sentiments of the large majority of the [Greek] Cypriot people for union with Greece”, as Mr. Rossides claimed in his letter of 6 May 1971 [S/10187]. Rather, as the Secretary-General indicates in his report, they constitute an irrefutable revelation of an ultimate political objective and the disclosure of the official policy of the Greek Cypriot Community.

67. This openly expressed policy of *enosis*, and the consequent *enosis*-minded approach to problems, are the main reasons—I repeat, the main reasons—why the inter-communal talks have been unproductive until now. This irreconcilable Greek Cypriot state of mentality pursues an ultimate political objective rather than the continuation of the independence of Cyprus as a final and permanent solution. Continuation of independence was the basic accord which made the initiation of intercommunal talks possible. Any attitude contrary to this basic accord, thus

denying the Turkish Community's vested constitutional and legitimate rights and interests is bound to stall the intercommunal talks, and for very obvious reasons.

68. The Turkish Cypriot Community has followed a constructive and patient line in the talks, but its demands for the reiteration and restoration of its legitimate and constitutional rights and interests, as well as its demands for effective guarantees against a future attempt to change the international status of the island, have constantly been labelled as "divisionist" or "intransigent" by the Greek Cypriot Community in order to conceal an ultimate political objective: namely, the abrogation of the independence and the recolonization of the Turkish Community. It is an historical fact that partition for the Turkish Community has always been a self-defensive measure against recolonization vis-à-vis demands and activities for *enosis*. Take *enosis* away and respect the Turkish Community's partnership and rights, and you will not hear of partition.

69. Cyprus became an independent State as an outcome of international agreements reached among Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece, as well as between the two communities. This independence rests on two communal pillars and on equal footing with the Greek Cypriot Community. The Turkish Cypriot Community has inalienable and undeniable rights and interests in the independence, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the island.

70. Once this fact was realized, I believe, Cyprus would not only be an island where the two communities happily and peacefully lived within the framework of an agreed constitution, but would also constitute a strong link rather than a subject of dispute between Turkey and Greece, which have close historical, ethnic and contractual ties with this island and its peoples.

71. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot Community has already stated its determination to continue to the end the search for all possibilities of reaching a peaceful solution, and I am sure that the members of the Security Council have noted with satisfaction the recent assurances given in his letter to the Secretary-General by Mr. Fazıl Küçük, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, that the Turkish Community would continue to work for permanent independence based on a compromised peaceful solution, irrespective of whether the Greek side chooses to misrepresent the policy of defending the Turkish Community's vested rights and interests as "divisive" or as an attempt to create a "State within a State" in order to justify the uncompromising Greek Cypriot attitude and aims.

72. My Government has also repeatedly expressed its wish to see an early and peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. I take pleasure in stating once again that the Turkish Government has always been ready to work constructively for a just and equitable solution to this problem, effectively safeguarding the independence of Cyprus as well as the respective rights and interests of the two communities within the framework of the balance established, recognized and respected at the inception of the State.

73. Before concluding, allow me to express once again my Government's appreciation to our distinguished Secretary-General, U Thant, and his assistants both here and in Cyprus—Mr. Osorio-Tafall, his Special Representative, Major-General D. Prem Chand, the Commander of the Force, Mr. Ralph Bunche, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Guyer, his political assistant—as well as to all members of UNFICYP for their dedication and constructive work. Our appreciation also goes to contributing countries and the members of the Security Council which make it possible for UNFICYP to continue its important task.

74. May I also be permitted to express our appreciation to Mr. Rolz-Bennett for all his past efforts in this matter and to wish him all the best for the future?

75. I think that my statement takes care of almost all the points that were raised this morning in the statement of Ambassador Rossides, but let me just offer one or two clarifications. I do not intend to say anything that may make this debate either an acrimonious one or a very long one. I should merely like to offer one or two clarifications which I believe are needed.

76. First of all, with regard to normalization I stated the basic and important point. Ambassador Rossides referred to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and rightly said that a return to normal conditions was prescribed in the resolution. That is true, but of course it should be borne in mind that the reference to a return to normal conditions is preceded in the 4 March resolution by another statement of fact and obligation that relates to "the maintenance and restoration of law and order". When law and order is restored, when the constitutional rights are respected, there is no difficulty in restoring normal conditions in Cyprus.

77. Another point was that the Greek Cypriot leadership had information that some heavy armaments were supplied to the Turkish Cypriot community. I am really puzzled as to the source of this information because less than a week ago my Government approached UNFICYP about the new and additional importation of Cobra anti-tank guns to Cyprus and asked for an inquiry about it. The Turkish community expressed its concern about this increase in armaments. To say that the Turkish community is receiving heavy equipment from the Turkish contingent on the island is, I believe, either entire misconception or misinformation, because I am sure that Ambassador Rossides knows perfectly well what sort of equipment is permitted to the contingents of Greece and Turkey on the island. There is a specific list, and this list is known by UNFICYP, by the United Nations and also by Mr. Rossides and by the Greek Cypriot leadership. Therefore, to speak of heavy equipment is to use a very strange term. I do not want to draw myself into a useless and acrimonious debate in this connexion, but I should like just to point to the fact that since the treaties were entered into the attitude and the behaviour of the Turkish contingent has been impeccable, and its record is spotless when one recalls the very tragic events of 1963, 1964, and so forth, and the attitude of this contingent. So I think that that is a very wrong and unjust imputation, and I reject it.

78. Concerning the refugees, I think my main statement took care of the main reasons. But I should nevertheless like to quote from the report of the Secretary-General, to show that the programme, prepared by the Greek Cypriot community, is not so much to help the Turkish refugees who would be prepared to go to their homes. In paragraph 52 the report states:

"In its programme, the Government reiterates that returning Turkish Cypriots will come under Government administrative control and policing as well as being subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. It also reserves the right to restrict temporarily the return to mixed villages of certain individuals whose presence in its view might cause difficulties to peaceful village coexistence. The Government has further renewed its offer of some provisional resettlement aid, but feels that it cannot consider compensation and damage claims of Turkish Cypriots without at the same time considering Greek Cypriot claims."

We have information that some time ago 500 Greek Cypriots were already compensated for damages sustained in the events.

79. These are conditions which mean that the Turkish Cypriot community would surrender its defence of the rights and interests it acquired under the treaties, and should forget all its struggles to maintain its rights. If it is so, then I believe there would have been no use meeting here today just for the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP.

80. I think Ambassador Rossides touched upon the Turkish Cypriot freedom-fighters. In the report in regard to the military preparedness of the two sides, there are some remarks, and he made some allusions to them. What I can say is that it is a perfectly well-known fact that these fighters comprise an organization that is designed solely for defence, in nature and in purpose, an organization that has no offensive-destructive weapons such as tanks, cannons or armored carriers.

81. As regards the intercommunal talks and the allusions to creating a State within a State, and so forth, I shall not repeat what we have been saying all along during the meetings of the Security Council. I believe that my main statement made it quite clear why these talks are stalled and what is the main reason for the lack of progress. But as I said—and I repeat—we should like to express the hope that in spite of everything the representatives of the two communities, whose outstanding qualifications are well known, will work hard in order to reach a basic agreement on the framework of the constitution which will take care of the interests and legitimate rights of both communities and will pave the way later on for an over-all agreement on the question of Cyprus.

82. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on the representative of Greece.

83. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, my delegation is very happy to see you presiding over the deliberations of the Council, especially at

this meeting devoted to further consideration of the question of Cyprus. I should like to congratulate you and extend to you our best wishes. May I also express to Ambassador Bayülken the deep sympathy of my delegation for the victims of the recent earthquakes in his country? We share the emotions which our colleagues of the Turkish delegation feel at hearing this sad news.

84. The Secretary-General's report dated 20 May 1971 [*S/10199 and Corr.1*] informs us about developments in Cyprus during the last six months, and I thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council for allowing me to make a few observations on behalf of my Government. I should like to start by saying that we agree to the recommendation of U Thant concerning the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, because it is due to his desire to contribute to the maintenance of calm on the island of Cyprus and will thus provide valuable assistance to those in Nicosia who are negotiating for the solution of the problem. This desire of the Secretary-General's is fully consonant with the policy guiding the Government of Greece.

85. The records of the Security Council testify to the consistency of our attitude. They further reveal that we insisted at an early date on the fact that time was of the essence because, as I stated here as early as 11 December 1969 [*1521st meeting*], lack of movement in the Nicosia conversations threatened to lead to a hardening of opposing positions and to make success more difficult.

86. The Secretary-General, in his observations, in large part attributes the slow pace of these conversations to a lack of confidence on both sides in Cyprus. The Security Council was aware of this important factor when it requested both parties of the population to work for a return to normalcy and instructed UNFICYP to contribute to this goal. The obvious hope of the Council was that a return to a normal situation would lead to an easing of tension, which, in turn, would engender a climate of confidence likely to foster the political settlement of the problem. Each of the parties can examine its conscience and see to what extent it has heeded the appeal of the Council. The moment is not propitious for drawing up a balance sheet now.

87. I will limit myself to reminding the Council of measures gradually taken by the Government of Cyprus to ensure a return to normalcy. Those measures culminated on 7 March 1968 in the removal of all restrictions to the movement of persons and goods.

88. I would also note the more recent but equally constructive role of the Government in the field of economic co-operation, investment, the labour force, the normalization of public services, and its proposals in favour of displaced persons, which are mentioned in paragraphs 38 to 55 of the Secretary-General's report.

89. Furthermore, the contribution of the Cyprus Government to the development of the Nicosia conversations has been positive. It is not up to me to deal with the details, and I would merely recall the contents of paragraph 61 of the report.

90. These are concrete facts, which are infinitely more weighty than words. Words fly away, and only acts reveal intentions and enable an observer to obtain an objective view of the situation and the way in which it develops.

91. We also agree with the statement of the Secretary-General that intercommunal talks "are unquestionably not only the best but in the present circumstances probably the only way to an agreed settlement." [*S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 81.*]

92. On 3 April 1971 the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Palamas, speaking in the name of the Greek Government, stated:

"Greece is interested in a peaceful and equitable solution. On our part we avoid public statements and replies. We do everything that is in our power to facilitate progress and the success of intercommunal talks. We believe that these talks will continue not only because they constitute a reasonable procedure accepted by all parties concerned, but also because we do not see who would assume the heavy responsibility of interrupting them."

93. All previous statements from the Greek Government were conceived in the same spirit. They testify to our wish to see both parties in Cyprus conciliate their differences, establish a State machinery capable of functioning adequately, and thus to find a way to live together in an independent, sovereign and unified State, as advocated in the report of the Secretary-General.

94. That is the wish I express at the end of my statement because, as far as we are concerned, we believe, with the philosopher Heraclitus, that "opposites work together and that it is from diversity that the most beautiful harmonies result."

95. The constant interest shown by our eminent Secretary-General in the question of Cyprus has earned him our fullest gratitude. We shall never cease to support his efforts. We should also like to thank his assistants, Mr. Ralph Bunche and Mr. Roberto Guyer. This leads me to think of and express our best wishes to Mr. José Rolz-Bennett, who spared no efforts over many long years to contribute to the pacification of Cyprus and ensure the well-being of its inhabitants. To his successor, Mr. Guyer, we wish full success in his new task. We are convinced that he will put his great talents and experience to the service of peace.

96. On the spot, in Cyprus, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and the Commander of the Force, General Prem Chand, continue their constructive efforts with infinite patience and unlimited goodwill. We are most grateful to them.

97. THE PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): As no other representative wishes to speak before the vote, I should like to make a statement. First of all I regard the members of the Security Council as an organic entity. From that point of view the traditional quorum in other assemblies cannot apply in this organ, whose scope is unique. That is why I was led to delay for a few moments the opening of this meeting so as to allow all members to be

present. Some major unforeseen difficulties arose to which I had to attend, causing me to be a little late in arriving. I would express my admiration to those members who arrived most punctually and would ask them, as well as the Secretary-General, to accept my apologies.

98. The silver anniversary ceremonies a few months ago, marking the end of the adolescence and the beginning of the maturity of the United Nations; the dawn of a new decade, my unshakeable faith in this Organization in general and my deep veneration for the Security Council in particular, and my ardent passion for interracial brotherhood on the scale of our human race are the reasons for which I must discharge a prior duty, that of inaugurating this meeting with an introductory statement which, it seems to me, in my capacity as President, is not only appropriate but imperative.

99. I would feel grave remorse if I resisted the imperatives of my conscience which resolutely call upon me to insist again on the fundamental aspects of the Security Council's mission. After the commemorative session as before it, I had the honour and pressing obligation to stress the colossal but exalting task of the Security Council which is to work for the benefit of mankind.

100. The United Nations has just emerged from its years of adolescence. Happily, it has survived the crisis inherent in adolescent behaviour. Would it be wise to claim that the deluge has passed and rest on our laurels? I agree with the statement of Victor Hugo that "adolescence is the most delicate of all transitions, but also the beginning of womanhood and the end of girlhood." A quarter of a century has granted the world community a respite to alter and correct its course. It has been helped by extenuating circumstances.

101. In its youth, our Organization faced acute crises and open conflicts; it was shaken by international tensions and wracked by local or regional conflicts.

102. What will be its fate now that it embarks upon its phase of crystallization and full maturity? Must it constantly founder, or is it resolved to reassert its mission? Is it enough to engage in endless recriminations against the Security Council to cure it of its ills? Is it enough for the doctor to diagnose the illness without curing the patient, or without prescribing an antidote?

103. The viability and the effectiveness of the Security Council in the field of peace will be fully assured only if the causes that previously weakened it are eradicated.

104. When I had the privilege of presiding over the first meeting last year, seventeen months ago, my irresistible propensity for appealing as powerfully as possible for the strengthening of the effectiveness of this body led me, in a statement similar to this one, firmly to ask the Council to recover its rights and powers and make full use of them.

105. Let me quote from a speech that I made then:

"At its age our Organization is faced by many temptations—the temptation to sink in routine activities to

make insufficient efforts, to persist in its refusal to recover . . . the sublime ideal of universal peace which the Council has the weighty task of guarding throughout our planet makes it imperative for all the members to . . . adopt a more dynamic attitude which would enable the Council to face its tremendous responsibilities.

“ . . .

“The objectives of the United Nations make it incumbent upon all members of the Security Council, mainly the great Powers which have primary responsibility, to take a stand against the *de facto* measures taken by Governments that have revolted against the United Nations . . .” [1527th meeting, paras. 12 and 16.]

106. Richelieu was right when, in his *Maximes d'Etat* he wrote that in political matters everyone conceives of public affairs according to his own mind.

107. On the basis of that maxim, a retrospective glance upon the achievements of the past twenty-five years reveals a tremendous gap between dream and reality. But the same glance shows tangible results achieved by the United Nations in general and especially its main body, the Security Council.

108. Therefore a sense of justice prevents us from downgrading the merits of the United Nations or, *a fortiori*, from condemning it as a whole. On the contrary, it was able to dominate the various events that threatened its very existence.

109. As a happy witness of the success achieved mainly in the past decade, during which this international Organization has been led by a man as devoted as U Thant, to whom I wish to pay a highly deserved tribute for his intellectual talents and the superiority of the human qualities he has devoted to the quest for peace while confronting opposing ideologies and navigating in the midst of contradictory events, this Council was not always able to overcome all the tribulations in its path and reach the ultimate ideals which the objectives and noble and imperative principles of the Charter entrust to him.

110. It is the giants who, in the last analysis bear the full brunt of the destiny of mankind and the primacy of peace. My apologia for the preponderant part of the great Powers in the safeguarding of peace is not made in order to catalogue them, nor to view them as titans who would overshadow all the other States. It is a conclusion realistically dictated by the undeniable hegemony of the five giants: the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom. They exercise their supremacy by dint of the nuclear weapons at their disposal as also their overwhelming might in all political, economic and military fields.

111. There is no doubt that they are best able to ensure the salvation of mankind if they are determined to make of this Council a powerful instrument for peace. To reach that indispensable objective the four giants of the Security Council, together with another giant, the People's Republic

of China, whose triumphal entry into this Organization should be speeded up, must revive the significance of the rights and powers attributed to and reserved for the permanent members by the Charter. The considerable prerogatives they enjoy entitle them to protect this great body against the insolent contempt some Governments show for the Security Council.

112. Invested with unlimited powers, when in harmony they could act as dependable and supreme guarantors of peace and the authority of the United Nations.

113. Security and peace are not within the exclusive purview or sole competence of the five Powers because according to Article 2 of the Charter it is the collective efforts of all Member States that are responsible for the fate of the world. The role of each State, no matter what its resources, is important as that of a member of one single human family.

114. The stationary nature of politics makes it mandatory to find a genius capable of adapting it to the universe as it evolves. “To reach truth,” Descartes said, “we must once in our lifetime abandon all preconceived opinions and reconstruct from the beginning all the systems of our knowledge.” Without being an unconditional advocate of it, one must admit that this Cartesian thesis comprises a good deal of truth and is applicable to the political machinery that guides the conduct of international affairs.

115. The gap, characteristic of our time, between political activity and the level of other human progress, is extremely striking. While science and technology are striving to overtake each other in speed and compete for primacy, politics seems to be lagging behind. The rules for directing international affairs are still modelled on ancient patterns. The tremendous speed of human progress in all other fields makes it ever more obvious that political activity mostly remains wedded to forms and traditions which sometimes go back twenty-five centuries. Some examples will illustrate that political reality.

116. Thus, in the face of the magnificent triumphs of science and technology we see a disconcerting contrast between the luminous progress of creative thought from Pythagoras to Galileo, from Lavoisier to Einstein, and the slow motion of political thought.

117. In many respects the speeches mentioned by Thucydides in the fifth century before our era fully apply to our own international problems although the intellectual, sociological and technical environment is completely different. It is surprising to note that policies applied in the international area are still hamstrung by methods followed by men whose memory has been blurred by history: Pericles, Disraeli, Caesar, Napoleon and Mazarin, all giants in their day but meaning nothing in our own, all authors of political maxims which were a stroke of genius then but are quite insignificant now.

118. The procedures and principles used in the treaties of Westphalia and Vienna are still fashionable. The same wars are born around the same borders under the same grandiose but wasteful historical processes. In this era of the atomic

bomb our frozen international law continues to lead to armed conflicts which are the normal activity of States, whilst the criterion of sovereignty is construed as the right to unleash hostilities. In acute contrast to the constantly increasing speed of transport communications and, unfortunately, missiles, the problems of sovereignty and borders remain subject to notions that were current in the days of slow caravan, and plodding cavalcades.

119. In international forums, political behaviour remains a prey of collective impulses. Dependable technology and rational organization are applied everywhere except in the political field, which remains open to sentimental improvisation or to violence. And the regrettable consequence is that the life of international organizations is characterized by harmful periodic fluctuations which are sometimes akin to the way in which nature spontaneously restores the balance in animal societies, including human society.

120. How is it possible in the nuclear era for antagonists still to be incapable of imagining any solution other than war to their traditional competition? Just as in the Middle Ages every Government considers itself justified in stating that its armaments are there to preserve peace. And each one considers that its weapons are defensive and those of the other side offensive, and that its war would be a "just war".

121. One can therefore not beg the question whether our civilization, in the final analysis, is not condemned to die of this frightening sophistry, which is sincere in addition. In any case, we must remember that all civilizations prior to ours died by war.

122. Thus, Bergson seems to have been right when he stated that "the future of mankind remains unknown because it depends upon mankind." This strange paradox, this sophism justifies the sarcastic remark of Jean Jaurès who said:

"It seems, the Heads of State themselves proclaim it that all the peoples want peace and that human progress points in that direction. But this peace, which everybody wants, can only be guaranteed by universal arming to the teeth! Let all peoples be covered with heavy armour and bristle with bayonets at a cost of billions. Let all budgets be taken over by military expenditures. This is a condition for peace! Human reason has gone so far that it cannot maintain a peace which everybody desires without arming everyone with the gun and the sword."

123. One is often tempted to judge the actions of great Powers without mercy, without patiently examining the reasons which inspire their national and international policy, without understanding the ultimate reasons for their position. I must admit that supremacy, if it is used on behalf of peace, overbearing as it may superficially seem, is reassuring if it is possible to understand its scope. If the five gigantic Powers (the four in this Council and China which is about to join them) in a framework of peace and security, adopt attitudes almost leading to the *de facto* abdication of their omnipotence, it is because they find it difficult to conciliate their obligations on the national level towards their citizens and the fundamental obligation towards the

objectives of the United Nations. Thus, interpenetration of interests and interrelation of causes threaten to transform this virtual abdication into a final capitulation of the five great Powers.

124. In the final analysis, if we wish to avoid that, it would seem beneficial to envisage the creation of an apolitical brain-trust which would not come above the Security Council and substitute itself for any body of the United Nations but, rather, serve as a kind of intellectual general staff which would strive to remedy the immobility of present international customs which are still dominated by old-fashioned systems in complete contrast with the development of today's world. This new "think tank" in the United Nations would be a crucible for international relations; it would lead our Organization to move at the same pace as all other human activities, it would free it from the shackles of obsolete traditions. It would avoid any duplication with the Secretariat. This brain-trust would be composed of outstanding specialists in international politics, devoid of any partisan allegiance or ideological bias and would be free from any external or internal influence, devoted to the ideals of the Charter and recruited from various institutions, particularly the universities, among international civil servants and on the five continents.

125. This initiative, if approved by the United Nations, would be a powerful step towards the ultimate ideal in the direction of the destinies of our world where the problems of peace among nations and harmony among races confront each other, where the needs and interests are pitted against one another, as are the ambitions of States and of human collectivities.

126. While expressing my thanks for the patience with which the members of the Council listened to me, I am compelled to propose a solution, since the time remaining is most brief. I have many speakers listed to speak after the vote. Therefore, I should like, in order to limit our work for this afternoon, to invite the members of the Council to pass on to the vote so that at the next meeting statements may be made relating to the draft resolution which will have been voted upon at that time.

127. I hear no objections to this proposal, and I shall therefore put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/10209.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.³

128. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Pursuant to unofficial consultations during the meeting, a second meeting has been scheduled for 4 p.m.

³ See resolution 293 (1971).

129. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I have asked to speak on a point of clarification. Am I correct in understanding, Sir, that you have decided to defer all statements to the afternoon meeting?

130. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): That is precisely the proposal which I intended to make: perhaps, in order to preserve a certain degree of uniformity, we might start our statements this afternoon from beginning to end, if this proposal is acceptable to the members of the Council.

131. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): With all due respect to the Chair, it seems to me that since we still have some time left, and since there is a long list of speakers, we might perhaps start by hearing two or three speakers before the meeting is adjourned.

132. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We have a while left, if a speaker were to take the floor it might save a few minutes' time.

133. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): My statement is reasonably short. Before I give it, let me join the previous speakers in expressing our condolences to the Government of Turkey. Our President today made a statement in which he said that he had instructed our Ambassador, Ambassador Handley, in Turkey to receive recommendations from the Government for any appropriate aid, and I join the others who very eloquently expressed the concern of this Council about that disaster.

134. Since this is my first opportunity to represent the United States in the Security Council, I should like to recall—and violate—an excellent precedent set by my predecessor, Ambassador Yost. At the Council's 1565th meeting, Ambassador Yost set an example of restraint in the practice of mutual congratulation which has been a feature of the Council's work for some years, I am told. I am entirely in favour of this sort of reciprocal self-denial, but I could not let this opportunity pass without expressing my pleasure at serving with such a distinguished membership on the Council. Both as representatives of your Governments and as individuals, I know each of you is in a position to make a unique contribution to the work of the Council in the all-important field of international peace and security.

135. Having thus made an inroad on one of Ambassador Yost's reforms, I will adhere to two other practices that he initiated. Although I have the highest regard for His Excellency the President of the Council I will refrain from congratulating him on assuming the Presidency this month. He has too many real accomplishments to his credit to be praised for an alphabetical accident of succession to the Presidency. I do want to thank him for his very generous opening remarks and his words of welcome to me, the newest of your members. Second, I should like the Secretariat to note that the United States waives the right to consecutive interpretation for all interventions unless a specific statement to the contrary is made before the United States representative begins his remarks.

136. We have before us a somewhat cheerless document—the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations

operations in Cyprus. Although the United Nations Force—and all United Nations personnel connected with the Cyprus operation—have performed their duties with great ability, we are at least as far from a solution now as we were six months ago. The Secretary-General speaks of “an aggravation of tension”, in his report rather than the relaxation which is necessary for progress. He notes that should the intercommunal talks break down—which remains a dismal but real possibility—“a new and major crisis would more than likely erupt”.

137. In these circumstances, we of course supported the extension of the mandate. The Secretary-General's report makes it plain that without the United Nations presence a serious threat to international peace and security could easily develop on the island. The United Nations Force has played an invaluable role during the past six months, helping to defuse potentially inflammatory situations. Yet it is not only in times of crisis that the United Nations presence is essential. The Secretary-General's report shows the supportive and catalytic role that UNFICYP plays in preventing friction and promoting progress in everyday situations, in economic development as well as the preservation of order.

138. Since becoming the United States representative to the United Nations, I have frequently been asked by Americans to catalogue the Organization's achievements. There are many of these, but Cyprus is one of the outstanding areas where the United Nations is performing the role that most of us believe it was primarily created for—the preservation of peace in a situation where an outside agency is absolutely indispensable. I think we can all be proud of the Cyprus operation as a peace-keeping operation in the true sense of this word.

139. At the same time, my Government wishes to caution that UNFICYP can assist in creating a climate in which agreement may be reached, but can do no more than that. It is up to the parties directly and intimately involved to demonstrate the good faith, the spirit of compromise and, above all, the necessary statesmanship to resolve the underlying political difficulties. The world community is not prepared indefinitely to bear the burdens created by failure to come to grips with the need for mutual concessions.

140. The mechanisms for resolving the Cyprus conflict exist, in the intercommunal talks. As we have stated in the past, the United States firmly supports these talks and believes they provide the best procedure for reaching an agreement which will safeguard the legitimate rights of all elements in Cyprus within a unified and independent State. In the interim we welcome the Secretary-General's comments on deconfrontation, de-escalation and refugee resettlement. Efforts by both sides to reach agreement on these outstanding problems would reduce tensions and the possibilities of violent incidents, thus enabling the local negotiations to concentrate on the basic issues that are before them. I join the Secretary-General in calling upon the leaders of all parties to give impetus to these negotiations by exerting their best and most statesmanlike efforts to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation so that there may be an equitable, lasting and peaceful solution.

My Government believes that the discussion in this Council should convey this conviction clearly to the parties concerned. I also join the Secretary-General in urging all parties concerned to refrain from any activities, or statements, especially statements referring to *enosis* or partition, which would aggravate the already delicate situation. Only a step such as this can bring the abatement of tensions, the atmosphere of mutual confidence and statesmanship, which certainly must take place in order to be a prelude to progress.

141. Finally, let me say a few words about the problems of meeting UNFICYP's costs. We have all noted the Secretary-General's report on the increasingly perilous state of financing. To support peace-keeping as a principle—and who of us here, certainly, does not; I think we all do—is fine, but unless we are prepared to support it in practical terms our words mean very little. My Government has pledged up to 40 per cent of the costs to the Organization for UNFICYP. Much of that sum has already been paid to the Organization, but we have been unable to turn over all of it because sufficient pledges and payments to cover the other 60 per cent have been lacking. In effect, we hold in escrow a large sum of money, pending receipt by the United Nations of matching funds. Many nations pledged sums for UNFICYP in the past, but have not done so within recent years. Other nations, some of them with a direct interest in the maintenance of peace in the Mediterranean area, have never pledged anything at all. The United States is fully prepared to play its part, but we believe that the clear interest of other States in preserving the peace on this island should be reflected in their financial support of the United Nations operation. We earnestly entreat all nations to recognize that we have a joint responsibility and obligation to assure UNFICYP's success and to take the steps necessary to that end by making contributions now.

142. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Since brief thanks addressed to the last speaker will not run counter to his convictions, I wish to extend my thanks to him.

143. Mr. JAMIESON (United Kingdom): First, Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on assuming the Presidency of our Council. It is customary also to congratulate the outgoing President; this is the first meeting we have had this month and we did not meet at all in April, nor for that matter in March. However, my experience in Committees of the Security Council allows me to say how fortunate we have been in the delegations in the chair in the last three months.

144. It would have been nice to think that the absence of meetings of the Security Council in the last three months represented an absence of controversy and conflict in the world. Unfortunately it does not do this, though perhaps it signifies a realization that there is little point in calling for a meeting of the Security Council unless we have some idea where we are going, unless there is a reasonable prospect that agreement on a certain course of action is possible, as for example has been the case today.

145. From this point of view, namely, that we are able to agree on a positive course of action in regard to Cyprus, my

delegation was happy to vote in favour of the resolution that has been unanimously adopted. But it was with mixed feelings that we did so, because we have to regret that the positive course is no more than a repeat performance of what we have been doing for the last seven years. If we are not careful we shall be rivalling one of those long-running Broadway productions; but if so it will be a tragedy, not a spectacular.

146. As the Secretary-General reminds us in his report, which once more provides a clear if necessarily pessimistic picture of the situation in the island, this is the nineteenth time that he has recommended a renewal of UNFICYP's mandate. My delegation shares the Secretary-General's concern that the blue berets of the Force should not come to be regarded as a permanent part of the landscape in Cyprus. My Prime Minister made much the same point in the House of Commons on 2 March when he said in connexion with peace-keeping:

"We have endeavoured to support the United Nations in this, but for too long a United Nations force has been needed in Cyprus. We wish to see a settlement there and an end to the need for a peace-keeping operation. A more determined effort is now required to resolve the differences which took the Force there seven years ago, for one reason, namely, that there are other possibilities of peace-keeping forces being required in other parts of the world. I do not believe that we shall be able to persuade other countries constantly to support the United Nations in peace-keeping endeavours if they find that a peace-keeping force is not a means to resolve a situation and to give time for diplomacy to work, but is merely a permanent commitment which seems to be unending."

147. The fact of the matter is that the United Nations has done a magnificent job in keeping the peace in Cyprus. Unfortunately, however, less success has been achieved in making the peace. Here again I would like to quote from something my Prime Minister has said, this time during his speech in the commemorative session of the General Assembly last October. He said:

"I want to emphasize that the task of the peace-keepers should, of course, be a temporary one. Too often we take them for granted, as I have said, and little is done to deal with the problems that took them there. They are there to hold the ring while the peace-making machinery of our Organization is brought into action to tackle the problem at its roots."⁴

148. It is in this context that my delegation has noted the Secretary-General's suggestion that there should before long be a comprehensive review of the problem and that members of the Security Council should give thought to constructive alternatives to the present arrangement. Quite clearly to continue indefinitely with the present situation is an admission of failure. It is therefore not only inevitable but right that the Secretary-General should have to think in these terms. My Government, of course, shares the Secretary-General's belief that the intercommunal talks continue

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1881st meeting, para. 97.*

to provide the best hope of making progress towards a solution of the basic problems of the island. It is of vital importance that these talks should go on and we urge both sides to continue to take part in them with the maximum flexibility and goodwill. This is the first priority and clearly the primary contribution to a constitutional settlement must come from the parties themselves. But we must all, whether members of the Security Council or representatives of the States particularly concerned, bend all our efforts to, and use all our ingenuity in, seeing whether there is anything more that can be done to promote quicker progress, to reduce the physical dangers represented by the degree of armed confrontation on the island, and to contribute to the creation of conditions in which UNFICYP is no longer necessary and to the re-creation of an atmosphere in which all the people of the island can live in peace and prosperity.

149. At this point I would like to express my delegation's thanks once more to the Secretary-General for his report. I should also like to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, to Mr. Rolz-Bennett, formerly the Under-Secretary responsible for this question, to whom all our sympathies go out for his premature retirement because of ill-health, and to his successor, Mr. Roberto Guyer, who has just visited the island for the first time. We are confident that Mr. Guyer's wide experience of diplomacy will help us at last towards a solution to this problem which has concerned us for so long. I should also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's admiration for the work which General Prem Chand and the men under his command are performing in Cyprus on behalf of us all.

150. My delegation was prepared to accept the Secretary-General's recommendation that UNFICYP's mandate should be extended for a further six months, on the understanding, now confirmed, that it had the general support of members of the Council and of the parties to the dispute. We noted the Secretary-General's view that any sizable reduction of the Force would be inadvisable at this stage. We agree with this assessment, but we hope that the

Secretary-General will, in consultation with the Force Commander, continue to keep the possibility of further reductions under close review.

151. My Government is willing to keep its troop contingent in Cyprus for the period of the renewed mandate. We are prepared to make a financial contribution in support of the Force up to a total figure of £875,000 sterling, that is \$2.1 million at the current rate of exchange, for the period of the renewed mandate. This figure will include both the extra costs of the British contingent, and, as before, a cash element which will not exceed the previous level of £625,000 sterling.

152. Finally, I would like to draw attention to what the Secretary-General says in his report about the deficit on the UNFICYP account, and to the remarks which the representative of the United States has just made on the same subject. My delegation has often expressed its concern about the deficit and about the way in which the operation is financed. But recently the number of contributions has even been declining. In these circumstances we support the plea which has been made by the representative of the United States. We hope that those countries which have contributed in the past will at least continue to do so, and that other countries will consider whether they also ought not to give their financial support to this peace-keeping operation.

153. I cannot close without associating my delegation with those others that have expressed sympathy to the delegation of Turkey on their recent new tragic earthquake. I would ask Ambassador Bayülken to accept on behalf of my delegation and transmit to his Government and people our sincere condolences.

154. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I propose with the consent of the Council to adjourn the meeting. We shall meet again at 4 p.m., as was agreed in private consultations.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.