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TWENTY-FIFTH YEAR

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 20 July 1970, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Guillermo SEVILLA SACASA (Nicaragua).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1546)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

Letter dated 15 July 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9867).

Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): As we are all aware, today, 20 July, the Republic of Colombia, so worthily represented among us by Ambassador Joaquín Vallejo Arbeláez, is joyfully celebrating the anniversary of its independence.
2. For this reason, in the confidence that I am interpreting the thought and feeling of all members of the Council, I greet Ambassador Vallejo Arbeláez and extend to him our best wishes for the constant well-being and ever-increasing prosperity of his noble country, which we all hold in such high esteem.
3. In the name of the Council, I request Ambassador Vallejo Arbeláez and the distinguished members of his mission to transmit to His Excellency Mr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo the Council's cordial greetings, together with the good wishes we have here expressed for the Colombian nation.

4. Also, I wish to inform members of the Council that the Secretary-General has invited us to a ceremony to commemorate the first anniversary of the flight of Apollo 11 to the moon, which gave rise to the wonderful adventure that made it possible for man to set foot for the first time on the earth's natural satellite.

5. The celebration will take place at 5 p.m. If we have not completed the list of speakers by that time, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to suspend the meeting for half an hour. If, however, the list of speakers has been completed by that time, we shall adjourn.

6. I call on the representative of Zambia on a point of order.

7. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): On a point of order, Mr. President, I thank you for the information you have just conveyed in connexion with the reception which has been scheduled for 5 p.m. to mark the first anniversary of the landing of man on the moon. However, I wish to place the reservations of my delegation on record in regard to this function at 5 p.m. We should not be willing, as a delegation, to abandon this important meeting for the sake of attending a reception, for we consider the matter currently under discussion to be of more vital concern to us.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to inform our colleague from Zambia that it is my intention that the meeting be only suspended for about half an hour and not adjourned, the purpose being that we might accept this kind invitation to attend a very important ceremony. We should be absent for only half an hour to be with our Secretary-General, and then we should return and hear the remaining speakers on the list.

9. The Chair hopes that the Ambassador of Zambia will be good enough to accept this explanation and would be pleased if the representative of Zambia were to give a generous interpretation to what I have just stated.

10. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): If it is the view of the members that we should adjourn at 5 p.m. to attend this important function, I will not obstruct the Council in that regard. I only wish to say that my reservations, which are very strong, on this matter have been placed on record. I will go along with your decision, and I do not wish in any way to misinterpret what you have said, Mr. President.

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I intend to suspend this meeting, at about fifteen minutes before five o'clock, and we shall resume at 6 p.m. I understand the reasons advanced by the representative of Zambia, but I am very happy that we are now all in agreement.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

Letter dated 15 July 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9867)

12. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decision adopted by the Council at our last meeting, and with the consent of the Council, I intend to invite the representatives of Mauritius, Somalia and India to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

13. Since the last meeting of the Council I have also received requests from the representatives of Ghana and Pakistan to participate without the right to vote in the debate. As I hear no objections I propose to invite these representatives to participate in the debate.

14. In view of the fact that the number of seats available at the Council table is limited and in accordance with the practice followed in the past in similar cases, I invite the representatives of Mauritius, Somalia, India, Ghana and Pakistan to take the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber, with the understanding that they will be invited to sit at the table when the time comes for them to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. K. Ramphul, (Mauritius), Mr. A. A. Farah (Somalia), Mr. S. Sen (India), Mr. R. M. Akwei (Ghana) and Mr. A. Shahi (Pakistan) took the places reserved for them.

15. Mr. WARNER (United Kingdom): Mr. President, it is a great honour and good fortune for all of us to have you as our President during this month of July when discussions of such great importance will be taking place in the Security Council. We wish you every success in your difficult task and you will, of course, have the full support of my delegation. I will personally

ponder deeply the wise words which you addressed to us at the opening of our meeting on Friday.

16. May I also thank the representative of Nepal for the helpful and efficient manner in which he guided our affairs and those of some of our important subordinate Committees during the month of June.

17. A few hours ago the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary of my country, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, made a statement to the British Parliament on the subject which we are discussing here. The nature of that statement is already known to the Governments of a number of those delegations which signed the letter requesting this meeting of the Council [S/9867], and many of the members of the Council will already have read it. Nevertheless, I feel sure that the Council would wish me to inform them officially of what has been said.

18. This is the text of the statement:

"Her Majesty's Government have an overriding duty to take account of present and future strategic needs of the United Kingdom and, in that context, a particular concern for the free passage of ships in all circumstances on the vital sea routes round South Africa. It was to that end that the Simonstown Agreement was negotiated.

"It is our intention to give effect to the purposes of that Agreement and we believe that as a consequence we should be ready to consider within that context applications for the export to South Africa of certain limited categories of arms, so long as they are for maritime defence directly related to the security of the sea routes.

"The Government have made abundantly clear their fundamental disagreement with the racial policies of the South African Government. In no circumstances would there be sales to South Africa of arms for the enforcement of the policy of *apartheid* or internal repression.

"It is on this basis that the Government have naturally been concerned to consult with Commonwealth Governments and to discuss these matters with them. A number of these Governments have not yet replied and a number request further information and discussion. At the same time the South African Government are also seeking clarification of the interpretation of the Simonstown Agreement; this will need consideration with the South African Government.

"The Government propose to complete these consultations and discussions before decisions are finally taken."¹

19. That is what was said by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. The Council will see that no final decision has yet

¹ House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates (Weekly Hansard)*, No. 834 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), col. 49.

been taken and that consultations with interested Governments will continue. Meanwhile, I hope members of the Council will see that the statement does indicate that some of the fears expressed in the Council during our discussion on Friday went far beyond anything that my Government has had in mind.

20. First, there has been no question of raising the embargo as a whole: it will be generally maintained and all that has been under study is the question of considering any application which may in future be received for the purchase of limited categories of arms for use in defence of the sea lanes.

21. Secondly, in 1963, when the embargo was established, Sir Patrick Dean noted, on behalf of the former Conservative Government, that the United Kingdom would be willing to sell to South Africa any arms reasonably required for "external defence". Today we are not speaking of external defence as a whole but only of that smaller category of arms to be used in defence of the sea routes. This is because of the importance of the security of those sea routes to the United Kingdom itself.

22. Thirdly, whatever may eventually be decided—and I stress again that no decision will be finally made until consultations are completed—my Government is determined that no arms will be sold for the enforcement of *apartheid* or internal repression. Considerable doubts have already been expressed during this debate on whether such a distinction can be made, but I must emphasize that my Government believes sincerely that it is a valid distinction and, if necessary, I will try to answer later any particular arguments on this subject which are made here.

23. The statement which I read to the Council describes the full limits of what my Government has under discussion with other friendly Governments at this moment. On Friday we heard about a document prepared by certain members of the Conservative Party when it was in opposition. The representative of Zambia expressed the fear that this might be put into force as the policy of the Government of the United Kingdom. He should now know that this is not so. The document in question was the product of a working party set up by a group which has only affiliated status with the Conservative Party. The policy of my Government is not contained in such unofficial documents. It will be found in the speech made by Her Majesty the Queen on the advice of her Government on the Opening of Parliament and in statements made by ministers in their new official capacities. Policy is decided by the Government alone on the basis of all the information and views available to it and in the light of what it considers to be the interests of Britain as a whole. In this case the decision will be carefully considered and will in any case not be taken until the consultations are complete.

24. In our debate on Friday there were a number of advance criticisms of my Government's supposed intentions. There have also been criticisms of the motives and considerations thought to underlie them.

I would naturally like to comment on these remarks at some stage, but it might be best if I were now first to give other speakers a chance to reflect on and comment on the announcement which has been made today.

25. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Ghana.

26. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): Mr. President, may I thank you and distinguished members of the Security Council for according me the opportunity of participating in the debate on the item before the Council.

27. My delegation is one of the signatories of the letter contained in document S/9867, dated 15 July, which requested an urgent meeting of the Council as a result of which the current debate is proceeding. The Council deserves our appreciation for acting promptly on the request of the forty African and other delegations that signed the letter.

28. Mr. President, you represent a great and respected country and a geographical region that is bound by the closest ties to the African continent not only in sentiment and culture but also in the conviction that all men are brothers, that no race is superior to another, that where such outmoded and primitive notions exist we have a common responsibility to attack and eliminate them from the face of the earth. It is with such feelings of hope and solidarity with you that we appear before the Council today, confident that under your Presidency this Council will rise to its responsibility and do its duty in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

29. The question has been asked: what is the necessity of calling an urgent meeting of the Security Council at this time on the question of *apartheid* with particular reference to the arms embargo? Our answer is simple. As the distinguished Secretary-General stated last year:

"... there has emerged a wide consensus that the policies of *apartheid* are abhorrent and that they are inconsistent with the obligations of a Member State under the Charter; that the situation resulting from these policies constitutes a grave danger to international peace and security; that a solution must be sought by securing the abandonment of the policies of *apartheid* . . ."²

30. One of the solutions proposed to this end by this very Council in 1963 and 1964 was that all States cease the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, ammunition of all types, military vehicles and equipment, and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition. It is also significant that this is the only tangible action taken so far by this organ of the United Nations in this field. Since this decision of the Council was taken by way of resolutions adopted in 1963 and 1964, the Council has not again discussed

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 150.

the issue. Meanwhile, the arms embargo has continued to be breached and violated on a scale not worthy of further toleration by this Council, if it is to preserve the credibility, prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. The time is therefore ripe and long overdue for this Council to brave itself to its responsibilities and take effective action to stop this erosion of its authority. This alone is sufficient justification for an urgent meeting of the Security Council in order to review the implementation of its own decision on the arms embargo regarding South Africa.

31. But there were additional reasons why this course of action became imperative. In recent weeks there have been official intimations and pronouncements both from the new British House of Commons and particularly from the new Conservative Government of the United Kingdom and the British press which could leave nobody in doubt, except cynics and apologists of *apartheid*, about the intentions of the British Government to resume the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military equipment to South Africa. Within days of the coming into office of the new Conservative Government, the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Muller, was received by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. It is known that the two discussed the possible resumption of the sale of arms by Britain to South Africa. Sir Alec has argued the necessity of the sale of arms to South Africa on the basis, not only of British but of Western security—the security of the so-called free world. He has equated those interests with the use of the Simonstown base and the so-called relevance of that base to an East of Suez policy, a policy to which the new Conservative Government has apparently committed itself, with the tacit support of the United States, although it is common knowledge that the British economy is too sick to support such a policy.

32. Apart from these official pronouncements and intimations, we know that the new British Government has made, and continues to make, soundings and to prepare the ground for its cynical intention, soundings which have elicited, according to the world press, thanks to those Governments, the concern and warnings of the United States Government, the Canadian Government and some Commonwealth African Governments. The question therefore was not whether this Council was being called to debate an illusion or supposition or a non-existent policy of the British Government. It was whether this Council should act at the eleventh hour, before it was too late, to prevent a violation of its decision by the British or any other Governments, before this occurred, to neutralize an evil, racist policy in the making before it was made. Some said that an urgent meeting of the Security Council was premature because no recent act of the British Government or any other Government had yet taken place. Such persons are merely cynical and hypocritical apologists of *apartheid*, racism and imperialism.

33. The duty of the United Nations and of this Council is not only to deal with crises but also to head off crises before they break out, to remove threats before

the peace and security of the world are actually endangered. The call for this urgent meeting of the Security Council is therefore correct, proper and timely. Of course, now the cat is out of the bag and the statement just made by the British representative must remove all doubts about the British Government's intentions. I shall speak on the statement which has been made by the representative of the United Kingdom later this afternoon, with your permission, Mr. President.

34. The principle and purpose of the arms embargo against South Africa must be appreciated before the importance of the debate can be understood. The arms embargo is one of many in the armoury of the international community designed to achieve the objective of eliminating *apartheid* by removing its props and supports in South Africa. Its purpose is to weaken the hold of the Government of South Africa over its oppressed peoples, to reduce its power and capacity to further oppress the unhappy victims of *apartheid* within the boundaries of South Africa so that these victims, with what further assistance that the international community can give them, can of their own resources, determination and organization, rid themselves of this evil policy which all civilized men and nations have condemned. Therefore, any nation that breaks the arms embargo, that aids the military build-up of South Africa, for whatever reason, is clearly opposed to the objective stated above and is an enemy of the people of Africa, generally, and in particular of the victims of *apartheid* in South Africa.

35. The first question that should be answered, therefore, is: what has been the development of the military forces and equipment of the Republic of South Africa since the arms embargo was instituted by the Security Council in 1963 to 1964? The second question is: who have aided South Africa's military potential in this period?

36. For the first question I cannot do better than refer members of the Council to General Assembly document A/AC.115/L.279 and Corr.1, dated 25 June 1970, entitled "Note on military forces and equipment of the Republic of South Africa". I will not bore the Council with all the revealing and alarming statistics of that document, but a few deserve mention. The South African defence budget estimates in 1960-1961, 1963-1964, were R44 million and R157 million respectively, while those for 1969-1970 are R272 million. While half of the expenditure in 1960-1961 was for salaries, wages and allowances, this item accounted for less than a quarter of the expenditure in 1969-1970. More than half of the expenditure in 1969-1970 was for the acquisition of arms.

37. The military equipment of South Africa has been increased, strengthened and modernized to a state of sophistication, thanks to its Western friends, so that it has one of the best arsenals of aircraft, ships, armour, anti-aircraft guns, rockets and guided missiles, radio and navigational equipment, vehicles and tanks that any modern defence force can boast of. In addition to these a radar network was erected in the Transvaal by the Marconi Company of Britain and transferred

to the Defence Department in November 1965 to give an early warning system in case of an aerial attack on South Africa's northern frontiers.

38. There is the large naval base at Simonstown near Cape Town. A second base is being built at Salisbury Island, Durban, and a third is to be built at Saldamber Bay on the west coast. A submarine base is being built at Simonstown.

39. The South African air force has about 500 aircraft consisting of Sabres, Mirages, Vampires, Canberras, Avrons, Shackletons, Buccaneers, Lockheed Hercules, Nord Transalls, Viscounts, Skymasters, Cessnas, Harvards, Impalas, Macchis, Alouettes, Wasps, Sikorskys.

40. Much of the above equipment has come from abroad, particularly Western Europe, and much of it is progressively being produced now in South Africa itself, with the aid of foreign technical assistance and know-how, finance, licences and patents. Who are the suppliers of this equipment, licences, patents and finance which have made this tremendous military build-up in South Africa possible?

41. The report I have referred to above indicates that until about 1961 the chief arms supplier to South Africa was the United Kingdom. By August 1963, when the first Security Council resolution was adopted, France and the United States had joined the group of suppliers. These countries had also begun to supply patents and licences at this time to enable South Africa to produce its own arms locally.

42. Since the Security Council resolutions of 1963 [181 (1963) and 182 (1963)], Belgium supplied military arms in 1963 and 1964, allegedly on sales agreements entered into before the Security Council resolution. Canada, while accepting the Security Council resolution, has been supplying what it calls maintenance spares and military equipment, "judged to be without relevance to the endorsement of the policy of *apartheid*". For similar reasons, France has continued not only to supply but actually to increase such supplies of military equipment, especially Mirages, Mystères, Alouettes, submarines and missiles. Indeed, this country, France, which claims the friendship of Africa and espouses the humanitarian principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, has become the chief military supplier of the most racist and anti-African State in the world. Italy has rejected the charges of supplying military equipment to South Africa, explaining that aircraft supplied was outside the purview of the Security Council resolutions. Japan has not denied supplying certain questionable goods to South Africa but has rejected their being defined as arms. Switzerland, that little neutral European country, which earns so much money from hosting United Nations offices, permitted the delivery of anti-aircraft guns and explosives to South Africa on the grounds that they were exclusively for air defence.

43. The United Kingdom, under the Labour Government, claimed to be observing the Security Council

resolutions, but in fact only partially did so, since it supplied sixteen Buccaneer aircraft and spares in 1964, and various other types of equipment, ammunition and weapons later, on the spurious grounds, used by Canada and France, that arms supplied were only those that could be used for external defence and not for internal repression.

44. The United States has tried, sincerely, to observe the Security Council resolutions but only on the condition of its own interpretation "in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security". Indeed, the United States has not hesitated to supply South Africa with military spare parts of all kinds, amounting to some \$35.5 million in the period 1962 to 1968, and \$3.1 million in 1969.

45. In addition to the above military supplies, many foreign countries have made available to South Africa, by means of licences, patents and other legal devices and stratagems, the capacity to produce its own arms and ammunition locally. The United Kingdom, the United States, France, Belgium and Italy are some of the countries which have permitted this cynical subterfuge, which ultimately can only undermine the spirit and letter of the Security Council resolution on the arms embargo.

46. West Germany is another prominent culprit in the supply of arms and ammunition to South Africa. Freight and troop carriers have been and continue to be supplied by a French-West German combine; South African pilots train in West Germany while naval cadets receive training in French ports. Press reports have appeared of South African agreements with Brazilian companies for the import of guns and ammunition in violation of the arms embargo. Rossi and Tarus of Brazil and Tarla of Argentina are reported to have agreed to supply vehicles, pistols, rifles and ammunition. If these reports are true, the suspicion can only be aroused in African minds that European manufacturers of military hardware are establishing branches or subsidiaries in Latin America to subvert and circumvent the arms embargo and involve Africa and Latin America in a political confrontation. All Latin America must weigh seriously the implications of such developments for their relations with African countries.

47. The local South African armaments industry has been given a tremendous boost by the establishment of an aircraft industry producing 300 military jet trainers, while a shipbuilding industry to produce warships is also being planned. The South African Government claims to have at the moment military equipment worth nearly \$3,000 million and may export some arms.

48. What conclusions can we draw from the foregoing analysis?

49. First, the arms embargo is not being implemented, or where it is being implemented so many loop-holes exist in the current resolutions that they must be strengthened and made as watertight as possible to prevent further breaches.

50. Second, the consequence of these breaches of the arms embargo has been a tremendous military build-up in South Africa.

51. Third, the distinction between defensive weapons and weapons for internal repression is not only silly but dangerous, and is only designed to justify breaches of the arms embargo.

52. Fourth, it is not only the supply of arms equipment and communication systems that must be prevented, but the transfer of licences, patents, technical know-how and finance, if the objective of the arms embargo is to be achieved.

53. Fifth, while socialist countries of Eastern Europe on the whole have generally complied scrupulously with the arms embargo resolutions, Western countries, on the other hand, have generally subverted and violated the embargo whenever it suited their purpose.

54. Sixth, the concept of the so-called strategic importance of South Africa in the general security of the free world seems to be the only preoccupation of the Western nations and the main reason by which they justify their collusion with South Africa.

55. Seventh, unless the military power of the South African Government is weakened rather than strengthened, the prospects for the elimination of *apartheid* are gloomy indeed.

56. Eighth, to strengthen the arms embargo vigorous efforts must be made to prevent more States from violating the Security Council resolutions. To this end some kind of implementation and review machinery must be set up by the Security Council.

57. To state these conclusions is to identify the areas where urgent Security Council action is called for now. Any resolution adopted by the Security Council which does not deal adequately with the points mentioned above and which particularly does not address itself to how South Africa's defiance of the Council's authority can be punished or stopped will not meet the requirements of the problem.

58. Let me state emphatically, in pondering the foregoing conclusions, that Africa is not fighting communism in South Africa, as the South African Government claims to be doing. Africa is fighting for its human rights, its dignity, its freedom. The communists of South Africa exist in the demented minds of demented whites in South Africa who are in need of drastic psychiatric treatment. They exist also in the mischievous calculations of men like Sir Alec Douglas-Home, with antiquated foreign policy attitudes based on false and whimsical notions like east of Suez policy, Russian presence in Egypt and communist conspiracy in Africa. Indeed, one might well ask whether Western Europe is actually not in collusion with South Africa when the latter resorts to repressive legislation such as the Terrorism Act, ostensibly to destroy communists but in reality to snuff out the liberation movement in South Africa.

59. In this connexion, the United States cannot escape the anger and anguish of Africa, for it claims to be the leader of the West—and indeed it is the leader of the free world and espouses a humane civilization. Its attitude towards the *apartheid* problem cannot be dissociated from its attitude to its own black American problem. Indeed, in the view of educated Africans the African problem is only the black American problem writ large on an international canvas. The two problems are indissolubly linked in the minds of educated Africans. In the same way that there is no rational explanation for the continued discrimination and poverty of black Americans in the United States, there is no rational explanation for the present involvement of the United States in South Africa. A country with a gross national product of over \$850 billion per annum does not need the pittance of a \$3 million military trade with South Africa. A country with an over-kill capacity three times over, covering our entire planet, does not need the puny military potential of South Africa in defending the interests of the free world. What, then, is the interest of the United States in selling military spare parts to South Africa? If it needs neither South African money nor South African military alliance, we are entitled to ask: is present United States policy on *apartheid* only an extension of the long and sinister arm of the southern strategy to our oppressed continent?

60. How can Africa take seriously the declared commitment to African freedom of an administration which makes a distinction within its own borders between *de jure* and *de facto* segregation? We are not unmindful of the great effort which the United States has made in complying with the main objectives of the arms embargo, but, having gone so far, we are amazed that it should find it necessary to sell puny military spare parts to that country. For the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolutions demand that not only should arms and equipment not be exported but also that spare parts for them should not be sold to South Africa. We expect the United States, as the leader of the free world and the possessor of enormous military power, to tell its Western European allies not to pursue blind military policies at the expense of Africans and at the expense of their own interests. For the inevitable logic of Western policies in Africa today is ultimately to range the West on the side of Africa's white racist minority in the wrong war against the wrong side and to drive the Africans into the arms of the so-called communists they say they do not wish to see in Africa.

61. The Western nations are diametrically opposed to the aspirations of Africans in South Africa since to them the existence and power of the South African Government is essential while to us its destruction is imperative because of what it stands for basically: *apartheid*. Indeed, this strategic concept is contrary to present-day military logic, and South Africa will never be allowed by Africans to be a stable and reliable military ally in any future confrontation between the free world and the so-called communist world. In fact one may well question whether, in the present military development of missiles, ABMs and MIRVs, this strategic concept is not outdated.

62. This urgent meeting of the Council has been called because of the increasing violation of the arms embargo in general and because of an impending decision on the matter, now officially admitted, of the new British Government in particular. Four main reasons have been adduced from British sources to justify the British Government's intention to resume the sale of arms to South Africa as follows: first, that the arms it supplies are not likely to be used for internal suppression but for external defence; secondly, that it is good financial business; thirdly, that it is a legal obligation arising from the Simonstown Agreement of 1955;³ fourthly, that their strategic interests require them to strengthen South Africa's military build-up.

63. Concerning the first reason, it needs only to be stated to be exposed as the fallacy it is. We totally reject this kind of distinction, since by no stretch of the imagination can anyone consider South Africa as being in danger of attack from within or without Africa. On the contrary, the present military strength of South Africa already poses a serious threat to the weak neighbouring African States. There is also evidence that the South African security forces have used against the opponents of *apartheid* some of the equipment provided by its suppliers and are engaged in operations other than police operations against freedom fighters in their legitimate struggle for liberation. This distinction is therefore not valid and must not be used as an excuse by countries like France, and the United Kingdom for that matter, which have consistently violated the arms embargo in defiance of the Security Council resolution.

64. It is common knowledge that Rhodesia's successful and blatant defiance of Britain was largely due to the support and assurances of military assistance from South Africa. The arms which are sold to South Africa, and the help which that country obtains in manufacturing them locally, have helped it not only to suppress the non-whites in South Africa and Namibia but also to support Portuguese colonialism and Rhodesian rebellion. South African planes are staging surveillance flights over Rhodesia and Mozambique today against patriots and liberation fighters. Therefore, who is threatening whom, and by what weapons is this threat being carried out? Every secondary schoolboy in Africa knows the true answer to this question, but apparently not the sophisticated officials of Western Europe.

65. The second reason—that of financial and economic benefit—is a most cynical and rather uncharacteristic argument for the British. They might as well say: "Why do we not promote production and sale of narcotics, which is also good financial business?" There are many constructive avenues by which British industry can generate both good financial benefit and human development all over the world. Why do they not invest in the instruments of peace

rather than the weapons of war? In any case, British trade has not suffered significantly from the arms embargo, according to statistics.

66. The third reason—that of strategic and security interest to Britain and the free world—is the most unconvincing. In the nuclear world of missiles, ABMs and MIRVs, the Cape route sea lanes are just as vulnerable as is Britain itself. No place is safe unless it is behind the nuclear shield. Here I can do no better than quote the words of Lord Chalfont:

"The only threat to our sea routes in the south Atlantic is the threat of war and the next war is not going to be a war of naval engagements in the south Atlantic. The nuclear weapon has changed all that and those who talk, as the Foreign Secretary talked last week, of showing the flag in the traditional way of a great naval power, are indulging in the worst excesses of pre-nuclear fantasy."

67. Much play is being made by Sir Alec Douglas-Home about the Russian presence in Egypt. What has the Russian presence in Egypt got to do with South African security? If the Russians are indeed in Egypt, are they there to help defend or attack a country? And if the Russian presence in Egypt causes Britain concern, the logical course of action would be to remove the causes that have sent them there rather than jeopardize the anti-*apartheid* movement in South Africa.

68. The last reason has an appearance of plausibility about it, but it is only an appearance. For the Simonstown Agreement, as Lord Chalfont said in the House of Lords recently, does not make it obligatory for the United Kingdom to sell arms to South Africa. Throughout the life of the former British Government, it claimed to have fulfilled the major essential obligations of the agreement without the need to sell further arms. Nor was this lost on the South African Government, which took no initiative during all this period to abrogate the Simonstown Agreement. Indeed, this argument does not make sense of the economic argument either, for during the period when the arms embargo was applied to South Africa, in the words of Lord Chalfont, "British trade with South Africa had shown no sign of diminishing".

69. In any case, if there was an obligation under the Simonstown Agreement to sell arms, as was asked by my friend and brother the Indian representative the other day, has the British Government not got an equally binding obligation to fulfil the Charter of the United Nations, an international treaty that supersedes all other such treaties?

70. None of the above reasons therefore makes any sense to a rational being. I submit that the real reason is not what the British Government has said but rather what it has not but which cannot escape any serious student of African affairs. The real reason for all these British efforts to resume the arms supply is to buttress and reinforce Western European supremacy and

³ Agreement relating to the transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base: see *Exchanges of Letters on Defence Matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, June 1955* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955, Cmd. 9520).

racism in southern Africa, from the Cape to the Zambesi, from Angola to Mozambique. The arms are only a significant facet of a grand design, unfolding, step by step, till African freedom is slowly blotted out in what they hope will be a gradual realization of a fait accompli in that part of Africa. But they should reckon with the African spirit before they take their fateful decisions. The other facet of this vicious grand design can be found in the statement of Sir Alec Douglas-Home that the new British Government will seek an honourable settlement of the Rhodesian question on the basis of the five principles.⁴ An honourable settlement on the five principles? The principles which have been rejected by the Organization of African Unity, by Smith himself and by many men of goodwill because of the capitulation implied therein to the racism of Ian Smith? We accept the six principles,⁴ the principles espoused by the former British Government and which in the deplorable circumstances in which they were fashioned represented at least a fair and just basis for a settlement.

71. In view of the above reasons the Government of Ghana would regard the resumption of the sale of arms by the British Government as a racist alignment with South Africa and an unfortunate disregard for the susceptibilities of so many African States in Africa whose goodwill and friendship towards Britain have sustained the British presence in Africa over many years. Whatever short-term advantage the British Government might hope to derive from the resumption of sale of arms to South Africa or from any such conciliatory posture in its dealings with the present racist régimes in southern Africa could not be compared with the long-term benefits which the British people might gain in their relations with so many other African States.

72. The Government of Ghana also wishes to express its anxious hope that the British Government will not only maintain but also seek ways and means of strengthening the present sanctions against Rhodesia and avoid a settlement not based on the six principles. Any settlement of the Rhodesian question which compromises the six principles laid down by the Labour Government as the basis for a just and honourable solution to the problem will be regarded by the Government of Ghana as a complete sell-out of the four million black people of Rhodesia to the forces of reaction and racism, which may very well seriously undermine Ghana's abiding desire to foster the closest possible relations between the British Government and the Government of Ghana and between the people of Great Britain and the peoples of Africa.

73. The Government of Ghana has chosen to make its position clear on these two issues at this stage in view of the persistent rumours of an impending change in the attitude of the British Government towards the problem of Southern Rhodesia—a peaceful and an acceptable solution of which is of central importance to the peace and well-being of Africa.

⁴ See *Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement—1966* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmd. 3159).

74. What the South Africans want today is not solely arms and what the British want to supply South Africa is not solely arms. It is something more important. Company, recognition, respect in international society, by bringing them into Europe through the figment of a free-world security system. South Africa, the negator of free-world principles, joining in the defence of freedom. Are we living in a mad world? It is the same objective that Ian Smith sought. British policy then was "isolate Rhodesia; close the consulates". Of course they and their friends isolated Rhodesia by closing the consulates in Salisbury, a meaningless symbolic exercise, while they allowed their consulates in neighbouring States to reopen contact with the same criminals to be isolated, while they retained the South African and Portuguese backdoors through which they fed Rhodesia with investments, with contraband goods. We agree with the policy of isolation today. So does the United Nations apply it against South Africa. That is why resolutions have been adopted on the embargo of arms sales, on an economic boycott of South Africa, on the breaking of diplomatic relations with it. We challenge the British Government to act on these resolutions if they refute the charge of the sinister grand design I have just described.

75. In the long run, this discussion of the arms embargo is really a discussion of *apartheid*. The evils of this vicious system have been pointed out many times in the United Nations. To certain delegations, this constant recital of the catalogue of crimes that the South African regime is perpetrating against human dignity has become terribly boring. They argue that since these routine exercises achieve no practical results, there is no reason to continue them. Some of these delegations indeed find these debates not boring but embarrassing since they are in a way forced to re-examine their unpardonable collusion with a régime that has shown gross defiance of all enlightened opinion. These delegations have been responsible for their own agony, for they have chosen to put material gains over principles of international morality which they have openly pledged to support.

76. Some would have us believe that international morality no longer exists. As long as States find that it is in their economic or political interests to ally with South Africa, they find nothing wrong with encouraging that régime to defy the world body and international opinion with impunity. In their thinking, politics and morality simply do not converge and it is useless to talk of morality in an international political organization of sovereign States. We, however, believe that it was the desire to create some form of international morality and world order that led to the founding of the United Nations itself and justifies its continued existence. As the Prime Minister of Ghana, Mr. K. A. Busia, eloquently put it in his address to the General Assembly last year,

"The existence of the United Nations General Assembly is based on the assumption, explicit or implied, that all men are capable of being persuaded by rational argument, and also that there is a moral

language of principles of right and wrong which all men share, whatever their race, colour or tongue.”⁵

The Organization of African Unity Charter and the Organization of African Unity Manifesto on Southern Africa, commonly referred to as the Lusaka Manifesto,⁶ equally speak a moral language, for we Africans believe that reason and morality alone can resolve the chronic problems of colonialism and racism in South Africa.

77. At its founding, the United Nations adopted a Charter by which it declared its determination “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women”. Subsequently, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,⁷ the United Nations proclaimed that all human beings were born free and equal in dignity and rights, and that everyone was entitled to all the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social, property, birth or other status. These noble ideas similarly find eloquent expressions in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples⁸ and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.⁹

78. The celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations must lead to a moral re-evaluation of the *apartheid* policies of the South African régime in the light of these declared objectives of our Organization. Measured against this Organization’s purposes “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace . . . and to achieve international co-operation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights”, the continued denial to the majority African population of their right to self-determination and independence comes into true perspective. Speaking as the representative of an African country and as a Commonwealth country I would address a solemn warning to the British Government not to underestimate the consequences that might well follow any short-sighted decision of that Government. The situation in South Africa will never make for human understanding, co-operation and world peace. It is a serious threat to race relations and to international security.

79. The task of the Security Council is clear: to condemn all those States which are violating the arms embargo, particularly the permanent members of the Council involved, for they have a particular responsibility in solving the problem of *apartheid*, to seek ways and means of ending the brazen defiance of South Africa, to warn intending violators of the arms embargo

to desist from doing so, to strengthen the arms embargo resolutions and make them mandatory, and to establish some implementation and review machinery which will make the embargo really effective. This is the least this Council can do in this twenty-fifth year of the founding of the Organization to strengthen its authority and rehabilitate the image of the United Nations.

80. Mr. President, I had wanted to make some preliminary comments on the statement which was made earlier this afternoon by the representative of the United Kingdom, but I am deeply conscious that perhaps in doing so I might be upsetting your own programme for the afternoon. If you will allow me, perhaps I could stop here and take the floor on another occasion in order not to upset your programme for the afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 5.5 p.m. and resumed at 6.10 p.m.

81. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Just a few moments ago we were in the offices of the Secretary-General, participating in an impressive ceremony to commemorate the first anniversary of the flight of Apollo 11 to the moon. We shook the hands of the three valiant astronauts, Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins. It was our honour to speak with them; it was a pleasure for us to hear what they had to say. We saw with our own eyes a piece of rock which they took from the moon during their immortal feat. We were also very proud to see our flag—the flag of the United Nations—that was placed on the moon proclaiming international peace and security. We are very grateful indeed to the Secretary-General for his invitation.

82. I now call on the representative of Ghana to continue his statement.

83. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): I thank you, Mr. President, for calling on me but there have been some consultations between delegations that wish to speak at this afternoon’s meeting and my own delegation, and I have agreed to pass since I did not wish to stand in the way of a brother delegation’s exercising its privilege. I shall continue if you wish me to do so, but I should not like to stand in the way of my colleagues.

84. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I take note of the statement just made by the representative of Ghana, and I now call on the representative of Sierra Leone, although the representative of Ghana may speak again when he wishes to.

85. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, my delegation takes this opportunity of extending its warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council. Your close association with the United Nations for a quarter of a century—its life span, in fact—has endowed you with considerable knowledge and insight into its functioning. We assure you of our unstinted support and co-operation and we are confident that under your

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1786th meeting, para. 15.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

⁷ General Assembly resolution 217 A (III).

⁸ General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

⁹ General Assembly resolution 2106 A (XX).

Presidency the very important questions on the agenda will be handled with skill and understanding and that ways and means will be found to arrive at a just and reasonable solution.

86. My delegation also wishes to express its profound gratitude to His Excellency Major-General Khatri and the Nepalese delegation for the indefatigable manner in which, as President of the Council for the month of June, he grappled with the tasks before this body and directed its work to satisfactory conclusions.

87. I wish also to thank the representative of Ghana for allowing me to speak first at this meeting.

88. The Council has been convened to resume consideration of the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa with a view to examining the situation arising from violations of the arms embargo called for in Security Council resolutions 181 (1963) of August 1963, 182 (1963) of December 1963 and 191 (1964) of June 1964. The Chairman of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*,¹⁰ His Excellency Ambassador Farah of Somalia, has drawn the attention of the Council, in document S/9858 of 2 July 1970, to the massive and unwarranted arms build-up in South Africa and the repressive policies of the Government of that country against its black population, as well as its illegal occupation of Namibia and its assistance to the racist minority régime of Salisbury.

89. My delegation notes that previous speakers on this issue before the Council have dealt in great detail with the question of *apartheid* in its historical context. We therefore refrain from going over in any detail the growth and development of this atrocious and utterly disastrous policy. It is a system which contravenes world public opinion, the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.¹¹

90. Under *apartheid* no freedom of the right to work or freedom of movement exists for the African in the so-called "prescribed areas". Wage rates for the same work and responsibility are based on the colour of the skin. Strike action by black Africans is illegal; freedom of movement is restricted. Black Africans are prevented from residing in cities or doing business in towns. Bantustans are artificially created. Segregation is total and exists in all aspects of the Government's policy where it has been elevated to the level of an official State philosophy. The economy and both political and social relations are based on the concept of racial antagonism.

91. In addition, the individual is denied the right of ownership of productive land; he is denied the advantages of a superior education. But worse than all these,

he is denied even the rights of citizenship in his own country. The State moves him at will without his having recourse to the right of undisturbed occupation.

92. This Council has recognized for a decade that the situation in South Africa was one which opened itself to international friction and that, if continued, it might endanger international peace and security. Since that recognition, the situation has steadily worsened. Resolution 181 (1963) stated that the Council was convinced that the situation in South Africa was "seriously disturbing international peace and security". It called upon "all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles" to that country. By using such terminology and by invoking measures for restoring international peace and security envisaged under Article 41 of the Charter and by framing its decision in the language of Article 41, the decision of the Council could reasonably be construed as having been taken within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter.

93. What has been the response of the Vorster régime to the injunctions of the Council? It has shown its disregard for this world organ in an extraordinary manner. By June 1964 this body had on three separate occasions expressed its conviction that the policies of the racist minority Government of South Africa were a grave disturbance to international peace. But although such conviction has been given expression, the Council has not thought fit to declare the situation as constituting a "threat to the peace" or a "breach of the peace" or an "act of aggression"—the exact formulation of Article 39. What therefore we have witnessed in this connexion is an acknowledgement of a threat to peace but an avoidance on the part of the Council of the logical implications of its own resolutions.

94. When States with the power of veto take an indefensible stance on a matter of such world-wide implications, we are left to infer that they do so for reasons determined by motives of self-interest. Members with the veto have from time to time condemned South Africa for its racial policies. The right to give effect to their condemnation was left to them as part of their responsibility. But in refusing to exercise that right they have failed in their duty as well.

95. A large number of States have faithfully implemented the arms embargo against South Africa, but, at the same time, the South African Government continues to receive aircraft, submarines and other equipment for military use from several others. It is regrettable to note that some of the permanent members of the Security Council, with its foremost duty of the maintenance of international peace and security, are chief among those guilty of this breach.

96. In his statement to the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador and representative of the Republic of Somalia, states the position succinctly, in these words:

¹⁰ Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

¹¹ General Assembly resolution 1904 (XVIII).

"Briefly, let us recount what has happened since the adoption of the arms embargo resolution. The Soviet Union is the only State that has discharged its responsibility fully. France has honoured the arms embargo more in the breach than in the observance and by its actions has encouraged several other Western European States to break the embargo. Almost every report on the arms situation issued by this Committee since its inception has contained evidence of the supply of French arms and military equipment to South Africa in defiance of the Security Council resolution.

"In all fairness to the United Kingdom and the United States we must state that considerable efforts have been made by those two States to honour their commitment, although at times we have had reason to point out discrepancies in their performance. These discrepancies arise from the extremely loose interpretation which they place on certain arms and military equipment as falling within the category of arms for external defence, and on arms contracts entered into before the arms embargo was instituted. It cannot be denied that arms and military equipment supplied ostensibly for purposes of external defence have been used extensively for internal security.

"Yet despite these lapses, we must concede that the public commitment of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to honour the arms embargo has had a restraining influence on the supply of arms to South Africa."¹²

97. As pointed out in this quotation, France, more than any other State, has been noted for its constant violations of the Council arms embargo. At a time when maintenance of international peace and security has been hanging in the balance, at a time when most Governments have been making efforts to observe and respect the ban, France has been providing South Africa with AMX-90 and AMX-60 tanks and Panhard armoured cars, as well as assisting with experiments to produce a South African SAM missile based on France's Cactus system, and in carrying out research on the production of nuclear weapons. France has undertaken the construction of Pretoria's first submarines—the Daphne class—and an unspecified number of new submarine chasers. France supplies South Africa with Mirage fighter-bombers and Mirage pursuit planes. France trains South Africa's pilots and provides them with air-to-ground "anti-guerrilla" rockets. France has strengthened South Africa's helicopter force with a number of highly manoeuvrable Alouettes and Super-Frelons.

98. Because South Africa is adequately supplied with arms by its major trading partners, the Government of that country is enabled, in spite of the injunctions of this Council, to further its crime against humanity within its territories and also to export it into the neighbouring lands. We have noted the active co-operation of the armed forces of South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia in thwarting the legitimate aspiration of

the liberation movements in southern Africa. It is estimated that about 5,000 South African troops are at present stationed in the neighbouring buffer war zones to help contain the escalation of the conflict. This has hindered almost every resolution passed by this Council, the General Assembly and the Committee of Twenty-four¹³ in pressing for the speedy decolonization of these areas.

99. Disquieting reports in British newspapers over the past few weeks about the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom to raise the arms embargo against South Africa have given grounds for serious concern to many people all over the world. It has been said that arms will be supplied by Britain to South Africa for external maritime defence needs.

100. The former distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, whose dedication to the struggle against racial prejudice is notable, has warned last week in the House of Lords in Britain against the advisability of this grave and, in our view, misguided intention.

101. Members of the British governing party, to a number almost equal to their majority, have expressed their dissatisfaction at this step, as have also the massed ranks of the opposition who, against pressure, obeyed the United Nations resolution for almost six years. In all the gloom surrounding Britain's deep commercial involvement with the racist and fascist State of South Africa, which we have tried to understand, this was the sole flickering light. Extinguish it and there will be moral darkness.

102. The leaders of the Church in Britain, both Protestant and Catholic, the universities, liberal opinion in all the political parties, Conservatives, Labour and Liberal, have expressed their abhorrence of this contemplated step, which will strengthen the doctrine and policy of *apartheid* and racial prejudice.

103. To mix metaphors, is this proposed action not similar to a single soldier of the line who had put a wrong foot forward first and then complained that the whole regiment was out of step?

104. It is not for us to question a great Power which has decided that it must act in its own national interest. But it is extremely arguable if this is so—when many of those with whose interests Britain's overlapped are not in favour of this step, or are strongly opposed to it. The majority of Britain's allies are not of the same thinking. The majority of the Commonwealth is strongly against it. The overwhelming majority of the African group, as outlined last week by the representative of Mauritius, Ambassador Radha Krishna Ramphul, our current Chairman, are alarmed that the first important step of the new British Government in Africa will involve arming a Government whose main domestic policy lies in the brutal subjugation of the

¹² Document A/AC.115/L.277.

¹³ Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

majority of its non-white citizens, and whose foreign policy is aimed at intimidating or bribing neighbouring black African independent States.

105. Our Prime Minister, the Honourable Dr. Siaka Stevens, was one of the first to congratulate the new British Government on its democratic ascendancy to power. It cannot therefore be said to be interfering or impolitic if our Government now expresses its strongest disapproval and disfavour at this step which is contemplated in open and dangerous disregard of African and world opinion. The British case seems to rest on its maritime defence needs. Some of the more outspoken have also mentioned the strong commercial interests involved and the great loss in trading profits ensuing from the enforcement of the embargo. It is true that recently the trade deficit of the United Kingdom with South Africa has almost doubled, although British exports to South Africa have gone up by 10 per cent. The sale of arms, however, cannot provide an honourable answer in closing the trade deficit.

106. As far as the maritime defence needs are concerned, has it not been pointed out that strategically Simonstown is useful but not essential? When these agreements were first made, defence strategy was different and racism was not so clear-cut an instrument of the domestic policy of South Africa. It is ironical that now, within the city of Simonstown itself, its Mayor has been complaining of the effects of *apartheid*.

107. Does anyone imagine for a moment that if Britain abandoned Simonstown, South Africa would hand it over to Britain's enemies? I would not like to argue on maritime matters with an experienced naval officer such as the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, but there is a difference between patrolling an area and acts of war. We have not heard of any evidence of interference with the shipping of Britain and its allies which called for that extensive patrolling and surveillance which the South African navy cannot carry out even when further armed. We have respect for the South African armed and paramilitary forces, many of the members of which have twice come forward to fight in world wars for democracy. It is not perhaps their fault if now their exploits are confined to ignoble acts like shooting unarmed and defenceless Africans in Sharpeville, or hunting down black freedom fighters whose sole aim is to gain that type of freedom enshrined in Afrikaner folklore and demonstrated in the Boer War at the end of the last century.

108. With all its tradition of valour in North and East Africa, and over the skies of Europe and Asia, it is idle to think that British arms sold to South Africa will allow the armed forces of that country to last more than a few weeks or even a few days against a super-Power where war is concerned. Survival depends more on the goodwill and disarmament proposals of the super-Powers, buttressed by the good sense and alliances of the other great Powers and the co-operation of the other Members of the United Nations, the so-called third world.

109. The arms which are to be sold to South Africa for maritime defence needs on the Cape route will be used in exactly the same way as arms supplied to Portugal under NATO are being used: for the suppression of men fighting for their inalienable human rights of freedom and dignity.

110. Naval vessels will certainly be used for aggressive acts by ship-to-shore bombardment against every coastal African State from Morocco through the west, central and eastern portions of Africa up to the Red Sea, with refuelling facilities from Portuguese-held Territories stretching from Madeira and the Azores to Mozambique.

111. The Buccaneer aircraft, supposedly to be used for anti-submarine purposes for Western defence, have already been used against African freedom fighters in Namibia and Rhodesia, and have bombed, with shatteringly explosive devices, territories bordering on Zambia and Botswana.

112. The Nimrod aircraft, similarly supposed to be primarily anti-submarine, can be used as a major component and guide plane in land operations in conjunction with Buccaneers and other aircraft.

113. All of the projected arms supplies can thus be used to attack independent African States and to destroy freedom fighters in the captive Portuguese-held States of Mozambique and Angola, and in the illegal Republic of Rhodesia.

114. It has been said that there is a competitive multi-million-dollar element present in Britain's intended sale of Nimrods to South Africa as against a similar anti-submarine aircraft, the Breguet, being bought from France, and that it was in Britain's economic interest to step in quickly. It seems very strange indeed that the two European Powers mainly responsible for decolonization in Africa in the past decade, and which repeatedly express sentiments of friendship to African nations, should now compete in selling weapons to an avowed enemy determined to destroy us and subjugate our peoples.

115. Again, it has been said by the industrialists of these Powers and other industrial nations involved in arms traffic to South Africa that if they did not engage in this traffic, others would, and they would correspondingly lose. It is thus against their economic interests not to sell arms to South Africa. This has always seemed to me to be an exceedingly odd argument. It is like saying to doctors or pharmacists that it is against their family interest for them not to engage in drug trafficking; it is like saying to virtuous, upright women that they were not looking after their interests or those of their family properly because they did not resort to the profitable practices of the *demi-mondaine*. Upright nations, like upright people, gain virtue and moral strength when they refuse to debase themselves for mercenary purposes.

116. In spite of the previous actions of France and Italy and others in this matter, we would strongly urge them to desist from this detestable traffic. Mistakes that have been made by great Powers becoming involved in local ideological conflicts in other parts of the world must not be repeated in Africa with the same lofty and mistaken motives of communist containment.

117. We welcome the action of the British Government that has just been announced by the representative of the United Kingdom in deferring decision on this matter, and we would urge it to consider the strong feelings of African States on this question. It would be a sign of strength rather than weakness for it to stop while there was yet time. It would be helping to prevent a bloody holocaust which would inevitably result if it persisted in these actions. Activities of this present nature can only be described as short-sighted, at their most euphemistic, and bring little credit and overwhelming disapproval on those who engage in them.

118. We call for mandatory sanctions against the selling and exportation of arms to South Africa as long as that country continues its vicious policies of *apartheid* and fascism and its attacks on the freedom fighters of neighbouring countries and its threatening posture against independent African States.

119. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): Forty Member States of the United Nations have requested the meeting of the Security Council on an urgent basis to resume its consideration of the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* with a view to examining, in particular, the situation arising from violations of the arms embargo called for in the Security Council resolutions of 7 August 1963 [181 (1963)], 4 December 1963 [182 (1963)] and 18 June 1964 [191 (1964)]. As is explained in the letter from those Member States, the necessity for such a request has arisen from the refusal by a number of countries to implement the arms embargo.

120. Not only the race-supremacy policies of the Government of South Africa are in question here but also the attitude and sincerity of many other Governments which despite the arms embargo continue to furnish South Africa with arms, ammunition of all types, military vehicles and equipment and materials for the maintenance and manufacture of arms and ammunition which are being used in furtherance of the policies of *apartheid* and for threat of aggression against other States in Africa.

121. It is a matter of public knowledge that, thanks to generous aid and assistance from the West, South Africa has during the decade of the sixties become a vast military empire which is based on the concept of race supremacy and is, moreover, in a close political league with the colonial régime of Portugal and the illegal racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. The one and only enemy of this colonial-racist triangle in the heart of Africa is Africa itself.

122. According to public statements of responsible officials of South Africa, the whole military build-up, particularly the air force, is oriented towards a guerrilla type of warfare. The South African radar network developed with the assistance of a British company faces north and provides an early warning system in the event of an attack from South Africa's northern neighbours. The tendency to condone and encourage repressive régimes on grounds of security is not a new phenomenon in world politics. We already know how costly it can become in terms of human life and civilization. My delegation considers that the bogey raised in some quarters of an extra-continental communist encroachment in Africa jeopardizing the security of other continents cannot be taken too seriously.

123. Since South Africa began arming itself frantically in 1960, its arms budget has increased sevenfold from \$60 million to \$380 million in 1970. The armed forces are composed entirely of whites. They possess such sophisticated military equipment as supersonic jet strike-bombers, submarines, rockets, missiles and heavy armour. It is estimated that the assets of the South African armed forces would amount to more than R2 billion, an equivalent of nearly \$3 billion.

124. Here it is interesting to note that the period in which this unprecedented arms build-up took place with Western aid coincides with the period of general *détente* in Europe, a period which witnessed a gradual lessening of cold war postures. It took place despite the Security Council arms embargo. What is of more significance is that this is also a period of African renaissance and intense nationalism, a period in which an entire continent has come of age.

125. It is evident that this situation represents a solid phalanx of reaction aimed at perpetuating colonialism and racism in Africa. Those who practice racism and colonialism and those whose profit-oriented policies amount virtually to giving moral and material support to the colonial racist régimes are both guilty of suppressing the legitimate and natural aspirations of the peoples of Africa. The forty Member States which have requested the meeting of the Security Council have clearly stated in their letter that continuation of this most unfortunate state of affairs would "seriously prejudice relations between African States and those States who are contravening the embargo" [S/9867].

126. Previous speakers who took the floor last Friday and this afternoon, particularly the Chairman of the African Group, the Ambassador of India and the Chairman of the Special Committee on *apartheid*, sounded the same warning, all without exception. This is a warning which has come out of desperation and frustration—it has come straight from their hearts. In it is represented the voice of all Africa and Asia, and indeed of all peoples who have suffered. They have sounded a warning out of anguish, which should not be dismissed lightly.

127. It is in this context that the matter under consideration should be viewed and considered by the Security Council, whose primary function it is to maintain peace and security and orderly relations between States.

128. It may be recalled that the Security Council first considered the question of race conflict in South Africa arising from the policies of *apartheid* in March and April 1960, following the Sharpeville massacre. The resolution adopted on that occasion [134 (1960)] suffered, as usual, from the maximum generality of conclusions necessitated by political considerations; but the merit of the resolution lay in the fact that by its very first operative paragraph the Security Council recognized "that the situation in . . . South Africa is one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security".

129. The Security Council further considered the matter in the course of several meetings in 1963 and 1964. The resolution of 7 August 1963 [181 (1963)] put an embargo on "the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa".

130. The resolution of 4 December of the same year [182 (1963)], which was adopted unanimously, went one step further by extending the embargo to cover also "the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa".

131. Those provisions were further reaffirmed in the resolution of 18 June 1964 [191 (1964)]. Since then the Security Council has not met to consider the question of race conflict in Africa.

132. What has happened in the meantime? Several countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean have won independent nationhood. General East-West relations have become more and more relaxed and cordial; but on the other hand, the over-all situation in Africa has worsened. In a continent where this century's first international movement for peace based on racial harmony and social and political justice was started by one of history's great peace apostles, Mahatma Gandhi, the situation today is drifting in the direction of a colour war. And those countries—permanent members of the Security Council and the real founders of the United Nations—which are in a position to check it are doing nothing positive about it. Some of them are even taking financial and commercial advantage of it.

133. At no time in the past several years have the policies of *apartheid* been so merciless and the machinery to enforce them so strong as they are today. South Africa today is a veritable armed camp ready to strike at enemies at home and abroad alike. Portugal has increased the tempo of its colonial wars on all fronts and, encouraged by the vacillation in the policy of the administering Power, a group of racist settlers have seized power in Southern Rhodesia and since then have been defying the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury triangle, founded upon mutual interests of colonialism and racism, has become more real than apparent.

134. A development of far greater importance to the United Nations that occurred during this period is the one concerning Namibia. The mandate of South Africa

over Namibia has been terminated. However, South Africa has not only refused to vacate its occupation of Namibia but has also introduced the policies of disintegration and *apartheid* into the international Territory. This is a new situation in which the United Nations finds itself in a position of direct confrontation vis-à-vis South Africa. To furnish arms and ammunition to such a régime on whatever grounds would be an act of international irresponsibility and an attitude of callous disregard of decent world opinion.

135. In the face of all these developments, it was unfortunate indeed that the Security Council could not meet to consider the question relating to South Africa. The Western Powers have never been enthusiastic about calling a meeting of the Security Council with regard to South Africa. But the blame for the inactivity of the Security Council in the face of South African developments must be shared by all African-Asian States, particularly African States, which have, by their silence, created an appearance of passive acquiescence in the policies of *apartheid*, in its aggression on Namibia and in its threat of aggression against other States in Africa.

136. As early as 1 April 1960, the Security Council recognized that the situation in South Africa was one which led to international friction and which, if continued, would endanger international peace and security. Subsequent resolutions adopted by the Security Council lacked the degree of candour found in that resolution [134 (1960)]. Ten years later, we find that the situation has not only continued, but it has also deteriorated to an extent not foreseen in April 1960. If the present situation does not represent a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, then we might very well ask: what does?

137. In these circumstances, the least the Security Council should do is to act positively on the request of the forty Member States by strengthening the arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa.

138. The existing arms embargo has been weakened and made totally ineffective owing to the profit-motivated policies of some highly industrial, trading and military Powers which have subjected Security Council resolutions to their own restrictive interpretations and drawn a distinction between arms that can be used for imposition of *apartheid* and arms that are required for external defence.

139. The Special Committee on *Apartheid*, which is practically the only United Nations body to watch over the situation in South Africa, has done an excellent job—despite the unfortunate total lack of support and co-operation from the Western Powers and all permanent members of the Security Council—of furnishing over the years detailed and much-needed information about the extent of the violations of the arms embargo called for in Security Council resolutions. The recent special report of that Committee on military forces and equipment of South Africa¹⁴ and the Committee's communications to the Security Council¹⁵ prove beyond doubt that the arms embargo has indeed failed.

¹⁴ Document A/AC.115/L.279 and Corr.1

¹⁵ See document S/9858 of 2 July 1970.

140. South Africa has continued to receive aircraft, submarines and other sophisticated military weapons from several Governments. Those Governments have also continued to permit the export to South Africa of spare parts for military equipment and vehicles and to provide for the training of South African military personnel. South Africa continues to receive financial and technical assistance and licences for the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all kinds, and military equipment and vehicles.

141. The Special Committee has rightly rejected the distinction made by some Governments between arms for internal use and those for external use. Apart from the fact that statements made by highly-placed South African officials themselves belie that distinction—officials who admit openly that their armed forces are geared to “anti-terrorist” activities—the distinction does not hold water in the context of South Africa’s illegal occupation of the international Territory of Namibia. In Namibia, South Africa’s external enemy is the United Nations and its Member States, jointly and separately.

142. The delegation of Nepal associates itself with the forty Member States and the Special Committee on *Apartheid* in urging the Security Council to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa, as a minimum step. In addition to reaffirming the existing embargo, the Security Council, we feel, should call upon all States: (a) not to subject Security Council resolutions to reservations and restrictive interpretations; (b) to cease supplying spare parts for military equipment for use by the South African armed forces; (c) to cancel licences granted to South Africa for the manufacture of arms; (d) to prohibit investment in South Africa for the purpose of armament production and (e) to sever all military and para-military co-operation and relations with South Africa. *Apartheid* must be vigorously condemned and the legitimacy of the people’s struggle recognized by the Security Council. Finally, the Security Council should create its own machinery to watch over the situation in South Africa, particularly the status of the arms embargo, in co-operation with the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

143. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Pakistan and invite him to take his seat at the Council table to make his statement.

144. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Mr. President, the present debate under your distinguished Presidency may well be one of the most important ever held in the Security Council. The intensification and extension by the Government of South Africa of its inhuman policy of *apartheid* is by far the gravest potential threat to peace in Africa. The repercussions of that policy are likely to spread so far and wide that the continent which only ten years ago so narrowly escaped becoming a theatre of great Power conflict may yet be drawn into its ramifications. As for the Security Council, how it acts on the problem of tightening the arms embargo

against the Government of South Africa and securing compliance on the part of all the main trading partners of South Africa will be crucial to its credibility as the primary organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

145. For many years there has been interminable debate as to how the United Nations can be strengthened as an instrument of peace. For many years much talk and great efforts have been devoted to improving its procedures and the organization of its business. But the fact that the heart of the problem lies not in those areas but in the political will of its members, and above all in the willingness of the permanent members to implement its decisions fully and without reservations, is demonstrated in all its clarity by the results of the arms embargo against South Africa adopted by the Security Council seven years ago.

146. In the view of the Pakistan delegation, the manner in which the Security Council acts on the present question will to a large extent determine whether the United Nations will emerge, after twenty-five years of its life, as a stronger or a weaker organization. It is the outcome of this debate more than anything we may say or do at its twenty-fifth anniversary session that will be crucial to our efforts to strengthen it.

147. Pakistan’s intimate involvement with the question of race conflict in South Africa dates from the very inception of the United Nations. Before our independence, as part of undivided British India, we, along with our neighbour India, were the first to plead before the Organization that the question of the treatment of non-whites in South Africa could not be regarded as essentially a matter of domestic jurisdiction and since 1952 we have always joined in African-Asian initiatives to articulate the question more intensively in terms of *apartheid*. In recent years, my delegation has participated, whether as a member or as a non-member, in almost all debates of the Security Council on the situation in South Africa. We are therefore grateful to you, Mr. President, and to the other members of the Security Council for permitting us to participate in this debate without vote.

148. The question now engaging the Council’s attention has been most ably elucidated by the representative of Somalia and also by the Ambassadors of Mauritius and Zambia. Considering its history and its present setting, there is hardly any exaggeration in the statement that a weakening of the arms embargo on South Africa would undermine whatever confidence still exists in the United Nations as an instrument for controlling international tension.

149. In addition to that obvious implication, there is a further issue of great consequence involved in this question and that is the issue of the responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council. No one can dispute the statement that the permanent members have the responsibility not only to uphold and resolutely implement the decisions of the Security Council but also to guard against the erosion of those decisions.

150. In the present case there are three resolutions of the Security Council—namely, resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964)—which are unequivocal. In the last one, that is, resolution 191 (1964), the Security Council reaffirmed its call to all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles and also equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in that country. As long as a resolution of this type is supported by a member of the Security Council, the question of whether the resolution is adopted under the provisions of Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter loses material importance as far as that member is concerned. For members of the Council the difference between the recommendatory character of resolutions under Chapter VI and the binding force of those under Chapter VII is material only when the implementation of a resolution rests upon a member of the Security Council, whether permanent or non-permanent, that has not supported it. This, I must stress, is not new legal doctrine. It is only a reasonable interpretation of the positions taken by members of the Security Council when they cast their votes. The permanent members have been vested with special rights. Responsibility flows from privilege. Obligations are the obverse of rights. Since a permanent member has a legal right to prevent a resolution from being adopted, regardless of the extent to which its interests may or may not be specially affected, it follows that when that member has voted for a resolution it has assumed an obligation to carry it out.

151. In focusing attention on this crucially important aspect of the question, I am not overlooking the fact that, when the three resolutions relating to the arms embargo were adopted, some of the permanent members entered reservations regarding the supply of military equipment to South Africa. Those reservations implied that the embargo could not apply to the provision of arms for external defence or nullify arrangements for collective self-defence, specifically for the protection of the sea routes in accordance with existing agreements between South Africa and one permanent member. Apart from the question of relevancy of such reservations in the light of developing weapon systems, strategic doctrines and political realities, the question arises: can those reservations be permitted to allow for the supply of other kinds of arms even if such supply defeats the very objective of the resolutions?

152. Sir Patrick Dean, then representative of the United Kingdom, gave an undertaking at the 1056th and 1078th meetings of the Security Council that the United Kingdom

“... would comply with it”—that is, the arms embargo—“in the sense that no arms would be exported to South Africa from the United Kingdom which would enable the policy of *apartheid* to be enforced” [1078th meeting, para. 16].

153. What do those words mean? Can a distinction be drawn between arms and ammunition which enable and those which do not enable a policy of a government

to be enforced? The policies of a Government are backed by its entire strength, and its strength is indivisible. I do not mean to say that there is never any difference between offensive and defensive weapons. I recognize situations of conflict where such difference is an important factor. But, in a situation like the one prevailing in southern Africa, can anyone dispute that any increase in South Africa's capability in respect of external defence will, inevitably and automatically, mean an augmentation of the resources available to it for persevering in its policy of *apartheid*? What kind of arms and equipment exists which, when supplied to the Pretoria régime, will not strengthen its intimidatory posture both towards its own population and towards the neighbouring African States? The representatives of African States have cited evidence in the Security Council of the use of aircraft against African resistance and military assistance extended by South Africa to racist and colonial régimes in southern Africa to enforce *apartheid* and colonial rule.

154. In view of these compelling considerations, the commitments made by the permanent members of the Security Council when the Council decided upon an arms embargo against South Africa must in fairness be regarded as unqualified. To regard the commitment as partial, to admit loop-holes into the embargo, to make it subject to changing doctrines of strategic defence, is to thwart its objective and, indeed, to undermine its whole basis. Let us not forget the vast increase which has recently been effected in the arsenal of the Pretoria régime despite the arms embargo. Let us not ignore the wide disparity that exists between its armed strength on the one side and that of the neighbouring African States on the other. Since the natural result of the policy of *apartheid* is a likely confrontation between the two, is it any wonder that the Organization of African Unity has warned, in a recent resolution, that the supply of any type of arms to the Pretoria régime would be a hostile act against the African States? Since the African States seek nothing but the eradication of *apartheid* and the liquidation of racist rule and colonialism in southern Africa, can there be any doubt that such an act will defeat the very ends which the United Nations has been persistently trying to achieve?

155. I must confess that, when my delegation first received reports about a relaxation of the arms embargo being contemplated by the United Kingdom, our reaction was one of deep regret. Such a reversal of the policy to comply substantially with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council cannot be viewed in the context of national interest alone. Its impact on the rest of mankind cannot be disregarded. Unquestionably a relaxation would be contrary to the drives and urges of Asia and Africa. Even though current indications in the Middle East and South-East Asia fill us with forebodings, we still like to assume that, in regard at least to the question of race conflict in southern Africa, the Western Powers concerned will not let their policies run counter to the overwhelming demand of the peoples and nations of the two continents. It is saddening, to say the least, that this assumption should be challenged by any act or intention of theirs.

156. Our anxiety at the prospect of a further weakening of the arms embargo against South Africa has not been relieved by reports received today that the United Kingdom intends to give effect to the purposes of the 1955 Simonstown Naval Base Agreement with South Africa by exporting certain limited categories of arms directly related to the security of sea routes. So goes the statement of intention by the British Foreign Secretary. At the same time we appreciate that the United Kingdom Government has been solicitous of the views of Commonwealth countries and expressed itself as open to their influence before taking a final decision.

157. The fact has been brought out in this debate by African representatives that the arms embargo has even now been far from total and that it has been allowed to operate in such a fashion as to cause no setback to South Africa's ambition of developing into a hemispheric Power. The militarization of South Africa has proceeded apace. Considering the fact that the arms embargo is the only measure hitherto adopted by the Security Council to bring about a reversal of the policy of *apartheid*, no reassurance can be gained until the Council takes a twofold decision: first, to enjoin all Powers against any relaxation of the arms embargo; and, second, to tighten it in such a way as would make it effective and meaningful. It is not only the supply of arms and military equipment which needs to be blocked. The racists in South Africa command resources far in excess of those available to the African States. In view of South Africa's industrial potential, no arms embargo will be effective if it does not also embrace the sale of spare parts, licences, blueprints and patents for military equipment, the military training in Western countries of South African personnel, the emigration to South Africa of skilled technicians for the armaments industry and the provision of capital for such industry.

158. Unless all these loop-holes in the arms embargo are plugged the Security Council will have to remain a witness to a steady worsening of the situation in

southern Africa and the progressive approach of the dread possibility of racial conflict.

159. My delegation would urge the Council to take commensurate steps to avert such deterioration. That it is entirely in the power of the Security Council to act decisively if it has the necessary political will stems from the fact that in the situation under consideration Council action cannot be frustrated by South Africa if member States which supply it with arms refrain from doing so.

160. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In view of the late hour, and as the representatives of the Soviet Union, Colombia, France and Poland, who are listed to speak in that order, have agreed to postpone their statements, I propose now to adjourn the meeting if there are no objections.

161. The representative of Colombia, however, has asked to speak now to make a very brief statement on a matter not connected with the item on our agenda. I therefore call on him.

162. Mr. VALLEJO ARBELÁEZ (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I merely wish to thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words concerning Colombia's national holiday being celebrated today. I should also like to take this opportunity to say how very pleased I am to see you as President of the Security Council. I shall have the opportunity tomorrow to state my country's position on the item under discussion.

163. I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Ambassador of Nepal on the very fine services he rendered as President of the Council last month.

164. The PRESIDENT: After the customary consultations, it is my understanding that representatives agree that the Council should meet again tomorrow, 21 July, at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.

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