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1542nd MEETING: 19 MAY 1970

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FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 19 May 1970, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Jacques KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1542/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 12 May 1970 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9794)

3. The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 12 May 1970 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9795)

Adoption of the Agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 12 May 1970 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9794)

The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 12 May 1970 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9795)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decision taken previously by the Council [1537th meeting], I invite the representatives of Lebanon, Israel, Morocco and Saudi Arabia to participate in the debate without the right to vote. In accordance with the practice followed in the past I propose to invite the representatives of the parties directly concerned, that is the representatives of Lebanon and Israel, to take seats at the Council table. The other representatives will be invited to take the seats

reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber on the understanding that they will be invited to sit at the table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. E. Ghorra, representative of Lebanon, and Mr. Y. Tekoah, representative of Israel, took places at the Security Council table, and Mr. A. T. Benhima, representative of Morocco, and Mr. J. M. Baroodi, representative of Saudi Arabia, took the places reserved for them.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker on my list is the representative of Morocco, and I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to address the Council.

3. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): The Council will recall that at the end of the 1540th meeting, in a short statement, I drew its attention to the fact that the debate that had taken place during the previous meeting warranted some comments from my delegation because of certain statements that had left a misunderstanding, if not confusion, regarding the concept of a cease-fire and of territorial integrity. In the course of that same statement I said that I wished, on behalf of all the Arab delegations, to make a communication of the greatest importance to the Council. I shall begin this statement with the last of these comments, in view of the gravity and urgency of the communication, because in the meantime the development of the situation has confirmed the reasons that called for our first concern.

4. The Council will recall that for some months now the problem of the shipment of weapons by the Government of the United States to Israel has been at the very centre of the grave situation in the Middle East. A number of Heads of State, a number of friendly Governments and a number of delegations here have reiterated the gravity of such a step. President Nixon, at one point, took a decision to suspend the shipment of part of Israel's order as promised by the Government of the United States during the recent visit of the Israeli Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, to this country.

5. We wanted to place the greatest possible confidence in that decision by President Nixon. Indeed we did so. But the conditions surrounding that suspension kept alive the concern and disquiet that we felt, because the arguments put forward for suspending that decision were fragile and left to President Nixon complete discretion himself to determine, on the basis of considerations of domestic policy or of bilateral relations with

Israel, the possibility of choosing the moment—or of letting Israel choose it—for the delivery of the rest of the order in question.

6. In the contacts established by the Washington Government with a number of Governments concerned over this situation, we have become convinced that efforts were made to draw the attention of the United States Government to the situation. Unfortunately, a series of press releases, certain official declarations and a number of unofficial comments by persons, perhaps not in the United States Government but having a certain public position which adds to their personal reputations, have led to the belief that that decision might possibly be subject to reconsideration. We have been subjected recently, in accordance with the usual pattern, to an intensification of Israeli propaganda, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of the propaganda of the Israeli media of information in their annexe in New York and elsewhere, preparing world public opinion for the delivery of these weapons.

7. An attempt has been made to invoke the argument that there had been new elements in the Middle East situation. I shall return to that, but I want to take this opportunity, when the Security Council is considering another aspect of the use made by Israel of the weapons it possesses for the commission of aggression against one country or another in the Middle East, solemnly to draw the attention of the Council to the danger indicated by reports which unfortunately are constantly being confirmed. We would like the attention of the Government of the United States to be drawn to the serious and inevitable consequences that could not fail to take place certainly on the international level, but basically in the Arab world, because, in the light of an attitude of this kind, in the light of the deliberate strengthening of the military potential of Israel by a great Power, it is not possible for the Arab world—whose leaders, in accordance with political wisdom, continue to hold back and be moderate in the expression of their opinions, but who also, in accordance with another aspect of the wisdom of their policy, must take account of the demands and attitudes of their own public opinion—not to consider this decision as particularly grave and one such as seriously to prejudice the quality of the relations that the majority of Arab States still maintain with the United States Government.

8. We have to draw the attention of President Nixon to assess the ramifications in present circumstances of such a decision, for in the Middle East we can already actually read their consequences and effects.

9. In an English for which I will ask my Anglo-Saxon friends to forgive me, I shall read out some passages of an article appearing this morning in *The Washington Post*, a serious and important source, by Mr. Jack Anderson, who is usually well informed:

“President Nixon has taken pains to hush up the fact that the United States, in the strictest of secrecy, has made bombs available to the Israeli Air Force.

“The first hint that the United States might be giving secret aid to Israel leaked out of the President’s closed-door conference last week with the nation’s Governors. During his report on the Middle East, he confided guardedly that the United States was helping Israel in ways he couldn’t talk about.

“He didn’t mention the bomb shipments or otherwise indicate what secret help the United States might be furnishing. However, this column has learned from the most reliable sources that Israel urgently needed bombs and the United States agreed to supply some.”¹

10. There are means to get bombs to Israel and later to announce this fact to world public opinion in a Press conference; but we have reason to believe that that Press conference was called not to discuss the Middle East, but to discuss domestic affairs in the United States following the evolution of the Cambodia situation, and that by a very pertinent coincidence the circles that are ready to support the decisions of the American Government and of President Nixon regarding Cambodia are the same circles in the Congress and the American public opinion that are also supporting the aid to Israel.

11. This information from a valid newspaper accords well with the logical conclusion drawn from the communications made to the Governors that Mr. Nixon would like to have peace in Cambodia but on the other hand, leaves to American opinion the question of support for Israel.

12. In the last twenty years the Middle East has shown that very often decisions whose import seemed short-term have nevertheless had ramifications that changed the destiny of the region and have also altered the international context. I am sure everybody will recall that in 1954 when the Egyptian Government asked for weapons from the United States and from the United Kingdom, their refusal forced it to seek weapons elsewhere. That was a first modification within the framework of the Middle East. When the Egyptian Government asked for financial assistance from an international institution to build the Aswan Dam, the point of departure for a great economic and social development programme for the welfare of the region, the “no” of Foster Dulles created a series of events whose sequels we are still witnessing—and they are far from exhausted. I should hope that one day an historian will dwell upon the consequences that flow from that “no!” of Mr. Foster Dulles and consider what would have happened in the Middle East and in the Arab world if Mr. Foster Dulles had said “Yes” on the Aswan Dam instead of otherwise. We would ask President Nixon, who was in a very good position at that time, to round out his political experience and prepare himself for leadership, to weigh the consequences of the decisions adopted by his predecessors and to show that one of the first lessons that one learns in politics is to profit from such experience.

¹ Quoted in English by the speaker.

13. This covers the first point that I wanted to make and which basically consisted in the communication that I felt that I had to make to the Council on behalf of all the Arab countries which incidentally have taken the necessary steps in the last few days to keep the Government of the United States informed and also the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

14. Now, Sir, I go back to the debate held at our last meeting. I am happy that I heard the representative of the United States reaffirm, or perhaps state for the first time in so many words and without any circumlocutions, certain principles to which this Council is deeply attached and stress their validity. I am happy for that constructive and positive side of his statement, which endorsed the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by aggression which clearly recalled the attachment to the United States Government to resolution 242 (1967) of November 1967 and which, for the first time and quite correctly, mentioned the "*Palestinian fact*" which, whether we like it or not is one of the determining factors of the situation in the Middle East and the failure to mention which merely spells a desire not to find adequate solutions to the problem. I was very happy for once to hear the representative of the United States refuse to use the words "Palestinian refugees" and call things by their true name and talk about the "*Palestinian fact*". Because in the new dictionary of the Middle East there are no Palestinian refugees. There are Palestinian fighters.

15. I must express my concern over the fact that when the representative of the United States in a large picture referred to the global situation of the Middle East, he went back to the concept of cease-fire and territorial integrity but in an ambiguous way. I think that matters should be spelled out so that the weight of habit will not lead us by our silence to acquiesce in interpretations which are devised in certain capitals. What I mean is that the notion of "cease-fire" since it existed, has never meant during a truce or armistice that one of the belligerents, when agreeing to the cease-fire, by the same token agrees that he must fold his arms, renounce all military activities of any sort for the restoration of his military potential, for the continuation of the military training of his soldiers and the restocking of his arsenals. The notion of a cease-fire certainly does not mean that the aggressor can continue to act as he wishes while the occupied countries in turn have nothing to do but sit back and await his goodwill. That would lead us to ask Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic to sit back while Israel occupies their territory. I should like to recall, because this involves a basic concept, that when the Security Council ordered the cease-fire on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, Israel occupied a little more than 150 kilometres of Egyptian territory, the Golan Heights, and part of Jordanian territory—all after the cease-fire.

16. Therefore, even considering the present cease-fire lines, the position of Israel is still illegal—if I may so put it—because when the cease-fire order was given by the Security Council [*resolution 233 (1967)*] to the

belligerents Israel defied it until it had arrived at the Canal, until it had occupied the entire Golan Heights, and until it had reached the banks of the Jordan. Thus within that very context the reactions of the countries concerned are legitimate according to the Security Council resolution.

17. If Israel were ready today to go back to the lines on which it stood on 6 and 9 June 1967, then the situation would be completely different and we might speak of the cease-fire in other terms and within a different context. However, if we asked the Arab countries concerned to abstain from any action, we fear that three years after such a situation Egypt, Jordan or Syria might soon submit their case to the Committee of Twenty-Four² or the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, since they would have completely lost their independence and would merely be territories under foreign administration.

18. As for territorial integrity, we should like to know what kind of integrity we are speaking about here. There is, within the definition of a State, a fundamental element: namely, the territorial limits of that State. To the extent that Israel owes its very birth to the United Nations—that is, to that which we agreed at the time to be the International conscience—we would expect that that country's limits—should correspond to the frontiers set by the United Nations. In 1948 there was a truce in the Security Council [*resolution 46 (1948)*] which allowed Israel, in the space of a few days, to acquire 22 per cent more territory. We do not know what kind of a State it is that speaks as a State, which speaks of security and sovereignty, but which totally ignores the elementary and basic concepts of a State: namely, precise frontiers. That vague notion proves that Israel does not intend to put an end to international opportunism or to its successive occupations until the day it feels that Israel has become the whole Middle East.

19. I know that the United States Government, together with France and the United Kingdom in 1950, issued the famous Tripartite Declaration, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Middle East. But since then there have been so many encroachments upon the territorial integrity embodied in the Tripartite Agreement! The United States Government has never felt constrained to respect territorial integrity. The 1967 aggression was a violation of that solemn declaration which three of the great Powers of the period considered to be the territorial charter of the Middle East. If we examine the present-day map as it is, we may rightly remind those three great Powers of the moral obligation which they assumed before the Council when they said that they would guarantee the territorial integrity of the Middle East as it stood at that time. But it is this flexibility, this possibility of territorial extension according to international circumstances, that concerns us. We should like, once and for all, to abide by the strict definition of territorial integrity

² Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

as guaranteed by the Security Council and as three of the great Powers had seen fit to embody it in their Tripartite Declaration.

20. I know that in other parts of the world the will of the Government of the United States to ensure respect for territorial integrity has at times led the world to the very brink of the abyss and to the very brink of war. The commitments assumed by the United States after the war to ensure respect for the *status quo* in Europe led the international community a number of times to the very threshold of a possible international atomic war, because the United States affirmed that respect for what had been decided upon internationally forced it to assume its responsibilities as far as it was necessary so that there would be no alteration in what had been considered in Europe as territorial integrity, as defined in the Potsdam and other agreements that followed the end of the Second World War.

21. The United States Government justified its 1960 intervention in Viet-Nam as a moral obligation to redress what it called a violation of the *status quo* in the Far East, as defined in the 1954 Geneva Accords.³ The American Government at that time showed the meaning it could attach to a commitment on its part when it was a question of not modifying certain international commitments.

22. Perhaps in the course of the last few years those concepts have disappeared, but we refuse to be the victims of those modifications of vocabulary, and we call upon the Council, since the language of the Charter has not been subjected to those American modifications of terminology, to adhere to the language of the Charter itself.

23. In Korea, when General MacArthur wanted to go into the sanctuaries, I remember that Lord Attlee telephoned President Truman to draw his attention to the gravity of the right of pursuit. We are grateful both to the United Kingdom Government for the energy it showed at that time and to President Truman, whose decision in that matter changed the world's judgement of him and made him one of the best Presidents of the United States. At that time the United States considered as a temptation of the devil any urge to go beyond the River Yalu and to draw the world into a war with China. Does the certainty of impunity when the Arabs are involved—because they lack the power of Peking or because certain great Powers do not feel directly involved in that conflict—justify the modification of the most elementary concepts of international law today on the pretext that immediate interests lie in another direction and coincide with other international interests?

24. Before the Council continued its discussion, I wanted to draw its attention to these remarks and, in the friendliest, but also frankest way—and the two go together—I wanted to invite the United States delegation to consider the elements I have mentioned.

25. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Israel.

26. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel) I have only one observation to make on the remarks we have just heard from the representative of Morocco. I should simply like to draw the Council's attention to the interpretation of the cease-fire given at this meeting by the Moroccan representative on behalf of all Governments of Arab States.

27. The representative of Morocco has again submitted the thesis that the cease-fire in fact means to the Arab Governments the continuation of fire. That is, of course, not new: President Nasser of Egypt made this attitude even more explicit and unequivocal when, a year ago, he repudiated the cease-fire and openly proclaimed the so-called war of attrition against Israel.

28. That is the situation in which Israel finds itself today—a situation of continued war against it, a situation in which Israel is time and again compelled to defend itself against acts of aggression. Surely it is in this context that Israel's defensive action on 12 May directed against bases of aggression on Lebanese territory must be considered.

29. Unfortunately, we are not in a situation of peace and not even in a situation of a cease-fire recognized and respected by the Arab States, but in a situation of warfare waged against us.

30. What might be wrong, or questionable, in conditions of peace or effective cease-fire may surely be right in circumstances of war when the attacked finds it necessary to strike back at the attacker. The eyes of the world are undoubtedly on this Council to see whether it will take cognizance of this basic fact.

31. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I have no more speakers on my list. I understand that certain delegations are on the point of submitting a draft resolution and that they need to have further consultations. In any case, the Secretariat of the Council needs time to print and distribute the draft resolution in question.⁴

32. Consequently, if the Council agrees, I propose to suspend this meeting until 5.15 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 4.20 p.m. and resumed at 5.40 p.m.

33. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): During my intervention on 14 May [1540th meeting], I made it clear that my Government would not accept Israel's arrogant use of power against its Arab neighbours, not only because of the consistent position we have maintained on the matter since 1967 but also because of the dangerous precedent Israel's attacks on Lebanon create for all weak nations and indeed for mankind as a whole. We are still of the opinion that unless there is a strict observance of the cease-fire by all the parties directly con-

³ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

⁴ Subsequently circulated as document S/9807.

cerned, the situation in the Middle East will continue to deteriorate with unpardonable loss of life on both sides.

34. I believe that all of us are distressed by the Israeli military attacks against Lebanon and I equally believe that we should all like to see peace reign in the Middle East. To this end consultations have been held among members of the Security Council concerning a draft resolution the purpose of which is to arrest this deplorable trend of aggression on the part of Israel. I must emphasize that this draft resolution has been negotiated in a spirit of give-and-take and its does reflect to a very large extent the views which the members of the Security Council expressed in the course of these consultations. As the draft resolution is straightforward I shall merely read it out. It reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1537,

"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/9794) and of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/9795),

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and of Israel,

"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from violations of resolutions of the Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968 and 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969,

"Convinced that the Israeli military attack against Lebanon was premeditated and of a large scale and carefully planned in nature,

"Recalling its resolution 279 (1970) of 12 May 1970 demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory;

"1. Deplores the failure of Israel to abide by resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968 and 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969;

"2. Condemns Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter;

"3. Declares that such armed attacks can no longer be tolerated and repeats its solemn warning to Israel that if they were to be repeated the Security Council would, in accordance with resolution 262 (1968) and this resolution, consider taking adequate and effective steps or measures in accordance with the relevant articles of the Charter to implement its resolutions;

"4. Deplores the loss of life and damage to property inflicted as a result of violations of resolutions of the Security Council."

35. We are hopeful and indeed confident that the Security Council will act in unanimity—as it did on 12 May 1970—by adopting the draft resolution I have just read out. It is further the hope of my delegation that this draft resolution will be voted upon without delay.

36. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): To meet the wishes expressed by very many members of the Council, I intend to take a vote as soon as pos-

sible, but before embarking upon the voting procedure I shall of course call on those who wish to speak.

37. Mr. VALLEJO ARBELÁEZ (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I had hoped that the conversations preceding the vote might have led to an agreement that would have shown unanimity in the Council, in spite of the fact that in my statement last week [1541st meeting] I announced that Colombia would refrain from following the path of academic resolutions which do not lead to peace and that it was necessary that we find a new road. At that time I suggested some possible ways and I stated also that in the past Colombia had always supported proposals to condemn all acts of violence which might shatter the hopes for peace. Here again Colombia censured the action of Israel when it committed an act of violence on the frontier.

38. At the same time we noted that that act by Israel had been preceded by other acts of violence perpetrated by the Palestinian guerrillas and that at some time it was necessary to condemn them too or to issue a warning that these frontier operations must be ended since they must inevitably lead to violence and revenge, which the Security Council cannot accept.

39. However, Colombia was ready to go along with the rest of the fourteen members of the Security Council if they had come to an agreement, but since a unanimous agreement was not arrived at, my delegation finds itself in the unfortunate position of having to abstain and not voting together with the undoubted majority that will support the draft resolution. It is not that the draft resolution is in any way contrary to the views of Colombia. Generally speaking, the resolution contains elements all of which Colombia might support but perhaps there is a certain imbalance in the sanctions contained in the draft resolution which Colombia might be willing to accept also. Yet that is not the reason that dictates the attitude of Colombia.

40. The argument that Colombia has adduced is that with this type of document we shall not achieve peace. Since the Security Council has not taken a new and entirely different way—as in my statement I hinted might be worthy of study but unfortunately did not commend itself for Council consideration—my delegation will have to abstain from the vote on this draft resolution. This is an explanation of the vote that we shall cast.

41. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation would like at today's meeting of the Security Council to make the following brief comments on the subject under discussion. The first is a general statement of principle concerning the essential element of a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East, in other words, the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967.

42. The second relates directly to the draft resolution which has just been submitted in connexion with the Council's discussion of the new act of aggression committed by Israel against Lebanon.

43. The lengthy and thorough discussion of this new act of aggression has made it even clearer and more obvious to everyone, and particularly to the Security Council as a whole, that the fundamental and crucial precondition for a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East and for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area, on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), is the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967. It has also become even clearer and more obvious to everyone that it is precisely the absence of agreement on this crucial and fundamental aspect of the problem of working out a settlement in the Middle East which is the main obstacle to progress towards an agreement in the meetings between the four Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council, the purpose of which, as everyone knows, is to promote by every means the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

44. At the 1540th Security Council meeting on 14 May, the Soviet delegation was somewhat encouraged by the statement of the United States representative, Ambassador Yost, in which, as we understood from the interpretation, he seemed to be speaking of agreement by the United States to the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. However, our hopes proved illusory; they were quickly dispelled when exposed to the facts. When we referred to the text of this statement of Ambassador Yost's, as contained in the verbatim records of the Security Council meeting of 14 May, it immediately became clear once again that the United States representative had merely confined himself to a repetition of his usual stereotyped formula, i.e. "the United States supports the principle of withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in June 1967" [1540th meeting, para. 32]. He even made reference in that connexion to the words of United States Secretary of State Rogers. However, he took great care, as usual, to avoid any reference to the need for the complete withdrawal—I repeat, the complete withdrawal—of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories.

45. Everyone can see that the distance between the United States declaration of support for and its actual implementation of that principle, as revealed by the facts, is enormous. On this question too there is a great discrepancy, I might even say a total inconsistency, between the words and the deeds of the United States.

46. As the Soviet delegation has already pointed out in the Security Council [ibid., para. 108], what happens in practice—and this is something which is also shown quite clearly in the statement by Ambassador Yost to which I have referred—is that the United States, while declaring token agreement with the principle of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories, makes this agreement conditional upon such demands as "alterations" and "rectifications" of the borders between Israel and the Arab countries, which in fact is tantamount to handing over to Israel a considerable portion of the Arab territories it has occupied.

47. What does this mean? It means in fact that the United States is opposed to the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories and is supporting Israel's imperialist and predatory policy, the aim of which is to annex a considerable portion of the occupied Arab territories. It means that the United States has adopted a policy and practice, condemned by international law and by the United Nations Charter, of rewarding aggression by leaving the Arab territories in the hands of the aggressor who has invaded and occupied them.

48. Of course no peace-loving State which is sincerely seeking a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can accept such a position or such an approach to the implementation of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

49. Consequently, the conclusion is inescapable that the statement made by the United States representative, Ambassador Yost, in the Security Council concerning the alteration of boundaries holds out no promise of progress on the all-important question on which a Middle East settlement hinges, namely, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the territories occupied by Israel to the positions they held prior to 5 June.

50. There can likewise be no doubt that this negative and unjust pro-Israeli position taken by the United States has been and is having, and will continue to have until it is changed, a negative effect not only on the progress of discussion concerning the question of a political settlement in the Middle East, but also on the development of the whole situation in the Middle Eastern region.

51. As a result of the adoption by the United States of this position with regard to the question of a Middle East settlement, and of the considerable financial and military assistance—to say nothing of moral and diplomatic support—which it has given the Israeli aggressors, as referred to by the Ambassador of Morocco again today in his brilliant statement in which he cited specific facts, the situation in the Middle East is steadily deteriorating and becoming an ever greater threat to international peace. The responsibility for this situation rests squarely with the United States and with its protégés, the Israeli aggressors.

52. Now a few words on the draft resolution just submitted by the representative of Zambia in connexion with the Security Council's consideration of Israel's new act of aggression against Lebanon. The Soviet delegation feels compelled to note the regrettable fact that any draft resolutions of the Security Council which concerns Israel are born in convulsions and anguish. This has become a regular occurrence in the annals of the Security Council since the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967.

53. The wicked fairies, whom the delegations of certain countries, primarily the United States and some of its traditional followers, consistently and actively endeavour to impersonate, do their utmost in such cases to ensure that the child, i.e. the draft resolution,

will not be born at all, or, if it is born, that it will in any case be weak, sickly and helpless. It would be no exaggeration to say—we are all well aware of it—that during the consultations held among members of the Security Council for the purpose of elaborating a draft resolution on the item under discussion, proposals for the adoption of effective measures against the aggressor were originally formulated and put forward which took fully into account the needs of the hour and of the situation and the realities which had emerged in the Middle East. It was a question of describing Israel's new aggressive attacks against Lebanon clearly and unequivocally as a manifest and obvious threat to international peace in the area and applying to Israel appropriate and effective measures as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. At the very least, Israel was to be warned clearly and unequivocally that those measures would be applied to it if it continued to pursue its policy of escalating aggression against the Arab States.

54. We must, however, note once again—and this too is now clear to all of us—that certain extremely important provisions, at least as originally formulated, have now been removed from the draft resolution, thanks to the efforts of the United States delegation and other individual delegations which follow it and which in this instance are playing the role of the wicked fairies and the invidious role of the defenders and protectors of the Israeli aggressors. Of course the attempts of the United States delegation and of those which join with it in supporting the Israeli aggressors have not been entirely successful. The child, in spite of all the violence directed against it, was not stillborn, even though you could hardly call it very healthy. It is unquestionably weaker than the embryo was to begin with, but in any case, the attempts to destroy completely the draft which is now before the Council for consideration having failed, the text does provide for condemning Israel for its new armed attacks against Lebanon. It also provides that, in the event of a repetition of such acts of aggression by Israel, the Security Council should adopt the effective measures envisaged in the relevant articles of the United Nations Charter.

55. It is therefore possible that the Council's adoption of even such a draft resolution as this will have a certain salutary effect on both the aggressor and his protectors. We shall wait and see how the latter vote on this draft resolution.

56. The Soviet delegation will base its position on the draft resolution on the statement I have just made.

57. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I will now put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Zambia.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Burundi, China, Finland, France, Nepal, Poland, Spain, Syria, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Colombia, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.⁵

58. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on all those who wish to speak in explanation of vote.

59. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): The Security Council has condemned the armed attack made by Israeli forces against the territory of Lebanon. At the same time, we are gravely concerned about all violations of Security Council resolutions. We deplore the loss of life, the destruction and the suffering on both sides of the border between Lebanon and Israel, and the sense of insecurity and tension prevailing throughout the entire area.

60. Having said that, I wish to recall something you said, Mr. President, in the statement you made as representative of France at our meeting last Friday. You said: "this is no longer the time for pronouncing anathemas" [*1541st meeting, para. 52*]. You also said, and again I am quoting from your statement: "If the distressing events in Lebanon could make it possible for us"—the four permanent members—"with the encouragement and the support of the Council, to advance more boldly upon the only possible route at the present time, the route of peaceful settlement, then it will be a case of an ill wind having blown somebody good." [*Ibid. para. 5*]

61. What you said, Mr. President, has in fact been the dominant theme of the debate on this question in the Council. Virtually everyone around this table has expressed deep concern about the continued deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, about the increased danger of military escalation in the area, and about the futility of dealing in this Council from time to time with one act of violence or another, without coming to grips with the essence of the problem.

62. To quote the representative of Colombia, "Our role is not to regularize war but to seek peace" [*ibid., para. 19*]. But while the war in the Middle East is reaching new levels of violence, the peace-making process is at a stand-still.

63. I was particularly struck by something said by the representative of Zambia in the statement he made on Thursday.

"As things stand now,"—he said—"we run the risk of making the same historical error made during the time preceding the June 1967 war: the error of leaving things to drift towards tension, confrontation and conflict." [*1540th meeting, para. 5*]

64. The parallel is indeed ominous, but at the same time it must be recognized that there is a fundamental difference between the situation today and the one pre-

⁵ See resolution 280 (1970).

ceding the June 1967 war. Three years ago, the Security Council was hopelessly divided on the question of the Middle East, and failed to agree even on an analysis of the problem, not to speak of agreeing on how to solve it.

65. Today the members of the Security Council, including the four permanent members, which are engaged in their consultations on this question, agree that the situation in the Middle East is dangerous and that an urgent effort for peace should be made. Even more important, they unanimously support Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which, for the first time in twenty years, offers a comprehensive political settlement of the questions at issue between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

66. In the search for a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East the four Powers obviously have a special role by virtue of their great power and influence in the area. But, of course, the parties to the conflict themselves must have primary responsibility for co-operating fully in any effort to turn away from violence and set in motion the process of making peace. The debate of the last few days in the Security Council has demonstrated that the members of the Security Council strongly hope that the four Powers, which for more than a year have been engaged in their consultations, will intensify their efforts so as to facilitate and expedite the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and to enable the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, to resume at an early date his activities designed to promote agreement and assist in efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of resolution 242 (1967).

67. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): We voted for the resolution adopted today, having worked to make it acceptable; its previous form was unacceptable to us. We knew that we could not undo the violent events that brought us here. We could not remove the suspicion, the mistrust, the hate which those events intensify. We knew that we could not by any immediate resolution of ours here in this Council remove the mounting dangers; but we were prepared to condemn the escalating violence, as we have condemned all acts of violence or retaliation in the past. It is in that context that we condemned the premeditated military action on Lebanese territory. There is no escape, no settlement, no peace to be won by violence.

68. At the same time we were not prepared to vote for a resolution which took no account of the over-all situation. We were not prepared to vote for a resolution which was wholly one-sided. We had to take into account violations of resolutions of the Security Council from whatever quarter. We could not disregard death and destruction on either side. We look back on the many occasions when we have had to deal with resolutions of this kind in this Council, and we must say again that violence solves nothing. Violence does not prevent violence. Violence breeds violence.

69. I must also express our regret that we were not able in this Council to say anything in agreement about the future. We know that serious and sustained efforts were made to turn from the past and to record support and encouragement for continuing efforts to search for an accepted settlement. It is a reproach to us all that those efforts did not succeed.

70. I make no excuse for going back to what I said earlier in our debate. We should keep uppermost in our minds the aim of reaching agreement. We should not impede or frustrate the discussions going forward in the Four. We should seek to facilitate and accelerate those discussions. The place to pursue those discussions is not here and now but in the meetings of the Four and their deputies which are going ahead, and not by offensive obstruction. We should encourage the Four to proceed with all speed and with a greater sense of conciliation and urgency, to report as soon as possible on their deliberations to the Secretary-General. Then we can hope that Ambassador Jarring will soon renew his consultations with both sides. Only by that means can the hope of a peaceful settlement be kept alive. Only by that means can the way be opened for new initiatives "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement" [see resolution 242 (1967), para. 3]. When I speak of new initiatives, certainly I do not exclude any new idea or proposal of the kind which has been suggested to us, for instance, by the Ambassador who spoke to us just now. We must keep open minds about methods and procedure.

71. It is natural that there should be a desire to condemn, to score, to win victories in a vote. We have often condemned violence in the past. We do so again now. It has already been asserted in this debate that there will be no value, no advance, no benefit merely from repeating condemnations. We all know that condemnation is not enough.

72. All of us want to see some positive action. In what direction? In increase of tension and fierce feeling and in accusation and counter-accusation, and in abuse and negative repetition? Surely the action should be in the direction that we have already authorized and approved. It should be in urgent pursuit of the discussions based on the resolution which this Council passed unanimously two and a half years ago. The reproach is that we have tolerated such serious delays and we have allowed ourselves to be diverted; we have been more anxious to defend our own separate positions than to work together.

73. Harsh things have been said in this debate, wounding accusations, misrepresentations and unjustified allegations. I shall not seek to answer them now. It is of paramount importance that the agreement we reached in November 1967 should not be jeopardized and destroyed. The processes of consultation and negotiation should proceed without hindrance, and proceed with renewed determination and much greater urgency. I have never said that progress will be easy. I have never spoken in over-optimism or complacency.

but I have always advocated that agreement should be relentlessly pursued.

74. Surely it is our duty to take the course of conciliation. It is the only way of hope. If we fail to take it now we shall have failed all those who look to us to find a way to end the violence and to work for a just settlement.

75. The choice is very clear today. The lead which you, Sir, have constantly given us also provides ground for believing that an immediate return to the four-Power talks is the right course. We may not there succeed; but we must most certainly try; and from this Council in which ultimate responsibility must lie I trust that we shall find not obstruction but encouragement. This Council demanded withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Lebanon [resolution 279 (1970)]. That action was right; it was opportune; it was unanimously decided.

76. I believe and I am sure that the right course is for us to follow-up what we did together in that first resolution by making another urgent effort—an effort in the wider field of conciliation and settlement. For our part, we are impatient, restless to press ahead, to make up for so much lost time, to overcome the enemy of delay, to persist in spite of all discouragements and never to give up.

77. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): May I first of all pay a tribute to the representative of Zambia for the constructive role he played in bringing our deliberations to an end today by the adoption of the resolution on which we have just voted by an overwhelming majority of the Council.

78. My delegation wishes also to pay a tribute to the two delegations of Zambia and Spain for the very constructive role they played on 12 May when they suggested the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Lebanon in resolution 279 (1970) which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council.

79. We voted in favour of the resolution that has just been adopted. Nevertheless, I wish to make it clear that this resolution does not represent the stand of the Syrian delegation on the Israeli attack on Lebanon, a stand which we made clear at the outset and especially in my statement of 13 May [1539th meeting].

80. We believe that this resolution falls far short of what we had conceived it to be at the beginning. Indeed, it is no secret now that we have negotiated various drafts and we still maintain that we would have liked the present resolution to contain paragraphs that had been omitted during the consultations between the various delegations of the Security Council. Specifically, paragraph 3 of a draft resolution that my delegation submitted, which read:

“Determines that such premeditated armed attacks constitute a grave threat to peace,”
and paragraph 5 thereof, which read:

“Declares that such armed attacks can no longer be tolerated, and repeats its solemn warning to Israel that if such armed attacks were to be repeated, the Security Council would, in accordance with resolution 262 (1968), and this resolution, take adequate and effective measures as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter to implement its resolutions.”

81. Paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted which embodies most of the paragraph I have just read out, has omitted the reference to Chapter VII of the Charter. I do not say this just to bring more acrimony into our debate; far be it from me to do so. But, within the meaning of the Charter, and the context of the resolutions that have been adopted by the Security Council on Israeli attacks against Arab countries, including two attacks on Lebanon, for all of which Israel was condemned, let me remind the Council that between 31 December 1968 and 15 September 1969 five resolutions were adopted by the Council, all of which contain a paragraph such as paragraph 3 of resolution 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968 in which the Council

“Issues a solemn warning to Israel that if such attacks were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to the decisions.”

A similar warning is to be found in resolution 265 (1969), paragraph 3 of which reads:

“Condemns the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and warns once again that if such attacks were to be repeated, the Council would have to meet to consider further more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks.”

82. I shall not tax the patience of the Council by reading all the corresponding paragraphs in the three other resolutions condemning Israel in a similar context, but certainly the question should arise why the resolution just voted upon has completely omitted the reference to Chapter VII and the only adequate and valid measures that should have been adopted to stop the attacks of Israel and its continued aggression.

83. The argument was advanced that if we adopted such a paragraph, specifying the invocation of Chapter VII, that might lead to weakening the authority of the Council because we cannot implement such a paragraph. This argument, amounting to a justification for weakening the resolution by not referring specifically to Chapter VII, was and is a rationalization, not a legal or a realistic argument. We have been told, as I said, that if action was demanded which could never be implemented it would lead to a weakening of the authority of the Security Council. It is alleged, furthermore, that if such a clause were adopted, the Council would never be able to implement its decision.

84. The fallacy of that argument is too obvious. It condemns the Security Council to live for ever in a

vicious circle of incapacity which it can never break. It paralyzes its authority for ever. We had a most recent precedent when the United States and the United Kingdom vetoed the resolution on Southern Rhodesia because it called for action [1534th meeting]. Such an argument will continue to be invoked whenever it does not suit the interests of some particular Power. Practically, it constitutes a perpetuation of attacks of aggression such as those that have been carried out by Israel. However, we consider paragraph 3 of the present resolution as meaning that the next step will be taken under Chapter VII. That is why we voted in favour of the resolution.

85. I come now to what has been referred to in the Fourth paragraph of the preamble and in operative paragraph 4 as "violations of resolutions of the Security Council". Much has been said, much is being said, and much will be said about violations, but let me say, at the outset, that violations, like any act, do not take place in a vacuum. It is a law of physical nature, as well as human nature, that every action is followed by a reaction. Indeed, this principle was excellently expressed in the intervention of the representative of Spain on 15 May 1970, when he said:

"Consistent with this view, my delegation wishes to stress some aspects of the matter: the delegation of Israel alleges that it suffers constant aggression from the Palestinian guerrillas; it very often refers to bombings, shellings, armed attacks and aggression of all kinds. My delegation laments the fact that there are constant violations of the cease-fire resolution, with the inevitable victims. Yesterday [1540th meeting] the representative of Syria recalled how, after having approved resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967), the Israeli army proceeded to occupy the Golan Heights." [1541st meeting, para. 24.]

86. The Golan Heights are still occupied, as well as all the other occupied Arab territories in Jordan, the United Arab Republic and Syria. So the very first act of violation is the one to be emphasized, and that is the negation of the principle of the Charter, the non-acquisition of territory by force, and not permitting the attacker or the aggressor to benefit from the fruit of aggression.

87. Let me once more remind the Council that Israel has not abided by the Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem and on accepting a representative of the Secretary-General to investigate the situation of the population in the occupied areas, or its resolutions on Lebanon. It should also be remembered that the humanitarian resolutions as well as the resolutions on Jerusalem were adopted by the General Assembly. These are acts of violation.

88. I come now to the third and last point in my explanation of vote. Today, in paragraph 2 of the resolution just adopted, Israel is condemned for "its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter". It will be recalled here that when the debate opened the analogy was drawn between the Israeli thrusts into Lebanon and the United

States attack on Cambodia. This analogy, as I showed in my statement of 13 May, was made not by Arab spokesmen but by American editorial writers. Indeed, no less a person than His Holiness the Pope drew this analogy, as reported in today's *New York Times*, where it is stated:

"Pope Paul VI, in an address to a consistory of cardinals and bishops, made a 'pressing appeal' today for a negotiated settlement of the conflicts in Indo-China and the Middle East."

89. So right from the beginning His Holiness also draws the analogy. Therefore my delegation understands the condemnation of Israel today as being a double condemnation both of the policy of Israel and its premeditated military action against Lebanon and of the premeditated military action of the United States against Cambodia. Of course the analogy is not complete because China and North Viet-Nam are not Members of the United Nations or the Security Council, but that does not detract from the validity of the analogy that the condemnation applies in both cases.

90. Mr. YOST (United States of America): The basic approach of my Government to the latest tragic events in the Middle East was stated in some detail during my intervention last Thursday [1540th meeting]. In that statement, I made it abundantly clear that the United States fully supports Lebanon's political independence and territorial integrity. I also stressed that we could not condone any threat to Lebanon's independence and territorial integrity from any source.

91. We particularly regretted the large-scale Israeli attack of 12 May and the accompanying loss of life and destruction of property. We have never hesitated to condemn such massive and disproportionate attacks. This was a heavy blow at a time when Lebanon's leaders are struggling to cope with severe and unique problems under trying circumstances of which all of us are aware. We were happy to support resolution 279 (1970) and we were happy when Israel withdrew its forces completely from Lebanese territory.

92. At the same time we cannot overlook the serious provocations from Lebanese territory which preceded Israel's attack. Israel as well as Lebanon has a right to political independence and territorial integrity. The Charter's provisions are equally applicable to all Members. In our judgement the present resolution, in spite of some improvement over previous versions, is still unbalanced. It does not, in our judgement, take sufficient account of the repeated violations of the cease-fire originating from within Lebanon and of the numerous casualties, including civilian casualties, resulting from these violations. Though we should not wish our abstention to be construed as equating the provocation with the Israeli response, we do not believe that the adoption of a one-sided resolution by the Council at this stage will assist in efforts to facilitate a lasting settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). It is only through the achievement of a peaceful political settlement that the cycle of provocation and response, which constantly aggravates the conflict, can be broken.

93. I should like to reiterate once more our strong belief that all States in the area should make clear by actions as well as words their desire for the achievement of a just and lasting peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). My own Government is fully committed to this objective, and it is our intention to look beyond this unhappy chapter in the history of the Middle East, to redouble our efforts to facilitate the implementation of that resolution in all its parts and without reservation. We hope we may have the co-operation of the Soviet Union in doing so.

94. As I said a few days ago, however, I am not encouraged by the performance of the Soviet representative during this series of Council meetings. He has not in a single one of his statements to us given the slightest sign of a desire to contribute to a peaceful settlement in the only way by which such a settlement is conceivable, that is, by calm and quiet statesmanship, by conciliation, by accommodation. On the contrary, he has seized every opportunity to envenom the atmosphere, to make propaganda and indeed to persuade us that a total lack of objectivity and impartiality characterizes the Soviet position.

95. Peace never has been and never will be achieved by such means. The representative of Finland has just noted that efforts towards peace are at a standstill. I can only express the hope that, after due reflection and in a quieter and less public atmosphere, the Soviet Union may decide to resume a serious, joint effort with many others to work towards peace and to exert its influence, as the United States intends to do, for a full implementation of all parts—not just a single part—of resolution 242 (1967).

96. Mr. SAVAGE (Sierra Leone): My delegation has great sympathy and respect for the delegation of Lebanon. The brave and peace-loving inhabitants of that country have demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt whatever their willingness as well as readiness to live in peace in the Middle East.

97. My delegation has already expressed its position on the matter under consideration in its unstinted support of resolution 279 (1970), adopted unanimously by the Council last week [*1537th meeting*]. The resolution just adopted does not appear to us to have advanced the cause of peace in any way. Its stipulations, in the view of my delegation, have already gained expression in resolutions 262 (1968) and 270 (1969).

98. In addition, my delegation holds the view that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot and will not be achieved by means of piecemeal measures, especially if those measures fall short of the desired objectives. In other words, it is inconceivable to expect peace in the region unless the fundamental issues are settled once and for all. With this in mind my delegation would earnestly urge those responsible for the maintenance of peace in the Middle East, particularly the four big Powers which have been engaged in talks, to consult more actively towards the attainment of this all-important goal. In this connexion also, we should like to see the Jarring mission reactivated.

99. It is for these reasons and considerations that my delegation abstained from casting its vote on this occasion.

100. Mr. KUŁAGA (Poland): For several days we have been discussing the recent Israeli armed attack against Lebanon. Conclusive evidence has been given to the effect that what we are dealing with is a clear case of aggression committed by Israel. Having adopted an interim resolution the aim of which was to compel the aggressor immediately to withdraw its troops from the territory of Lebanon, the Security Council had to follow it with appropriate judgement of that aggressive act and with a decision strong enough to prevent its repetition.

101. The latest Israeli attack on Lebanon certainly constitutes, as we have pointed out in our intervention, a serious escalation in that country's aggressive policies. As such it calls for condemnation, for Israel cannot be given a premium for the swiftness of its attack or for the contempt it demonstrates with regard to the Council's deliberations and allegedly futile action.

102. The Council has already twice condemned Israel [*resolutions 262 (1968) and 270 (1969)*] for its premeditated military attacks on Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the Security Council resolutions. Twice also a solemn warning has been addressed by the Council to Israel [*ibid.*] that actions of military reprisal in grave violation of the cease-fire could not be tolerated and that, should Israel repeat them, the Council would have to consider more effective steps envisaged in the Charter in order to enforce its decision and to prevent such acts in future.

103. It is now clear to us all that Israel chose to ignore those resolutions and to disregard the warnings which they contained. It is self-imposing that we should not tolerate that defiance and that the Council should take appropriate measures that would make the aggressor feel the impact of international condemnation and of international will to curb its aggressive activities. Any manifestation of a lenient attitude on the part of the Council in respect of such attacks, whatever excuses might be offered, any endeavour to refrain from action against those attacks under the pretext of preserving a so-called balanced approach towards both parties—that is, the aggressor and the victim of aggression—would not, in our opinion, bring closer a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem but, on the contrary, would only serve to aggravate the already dangerous situation in the area by encouraging the aggressor.

104. In the opinion of my delegation, the salient elements of the present debate of the Security Council have been the condemnation of Israeli armed attacks and the reaffirmation of the determination to insure against the repetition of such attacks. We have also seen a manifestation of both concern about the deteriorating situation and an overwhelming desire to provide the necessary conditions for speedy and decisive progress on the road to the political solution of

that problem as envisaged in Security Council resolution 242 (1967)—in particular, the crucial point concerning the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories.

105. We voted in favour of the resolution that has just been adopted. We know that in the process of its elaboration forces and interests have been at work—the same interests which are rendering impossible the solution of the question of the Middle East, which are arming the aggressor, which are hampering the action of the Security Council. These must have been reflected in the contents of the resolution which we have adopted. However we have, I would repeat, voted in favour of this resolution. We wish to associate ourselves with the condemnation of Israel's act contained in paragraph 2 of the resolution, as well as with the solemn warning that if such armed attacks were to be repeated, the Security Council would take adequate and effective measures as envisaged in the relevant provisions of the Charter. To us, this means all the measures provided for in the Charter, including those under Chapter VII.

106. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We have concluded the explanations of vote. I now call on the representative of Israel.

107. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): The Security Council has terminated its deliberations on the Israeli and Lebanese complaints regarding the continued deterioration of the situation. To you, Mr. President, and to members of the Security Council, I should like to express our highest esteem. I cannot stress sufficiently our profound appreciation of the personal friendship which binds us to the representatives at this table, including those whom events in recent years have separated from us. Nor need I say how much importance we attach to the understanding and close co-operation which mark relations between Israel and States members of the Council. It is in this spirit, and yet in sober candour, that I should like to assess the conclusions of our debate.

108. We have, of course, taken note of the statements by representatives who voiced anxiety at the armed attacks directed against Israel from Lebanon. We also note that the resolution just adopted expresses the Council's grave concern about violations of Security Council resolutions and deplores the loss of life resulting from such violations. However, the adoption of this one-sided Syrian-inspired text is clearly another of the seasonal ceremonies from which Israel, the merits of its case and its fundamental rights are in fact barred.

109. The Council seems always to go through the same motions. The debate revolved around Israel's action against bases of aggression on Lebanese territory and the armed attacks against Israel which had made that action inevitable. The resolution confines its interest to the Israeli defensive action and fails to mention on an equal basis the acts of aggression perpetrated against Israel. In the area Israeli towns and vil-

lages are being shelled and innocent Israeli civilians are murdered in a premeditated and publicly proclaimed war of attrition. The Security Council resolution focuses its attention on the Israeli action, carried out with the utmost care to avoid civilian casualties.

110. In the Middle East the Arab States openly wage war against Israel. The resolution adopted here seems to counsel Israel not to defend itself, not to protect its territory and its citizens. Of such texts the prophet said, "They have eyes and see not, they have ears and hear not".

111. I should like to express our appreciation to those delegations that have refused to associate themselves with the resolution. By the double standard applied to Israel and its failure to address itself explicitly to the obvious causes of the deterioration in the situation, the resolution adopted appears regrettably to be another nail in the coffin of the Security Council's ability to deal with the Middle East situation equitably, realistically and constructively.

112. The situation reflected in today's experience is not new in the history of my people. We still remember that our fathers struggling for equality were sometimes charged with being offensive. We remember how in certain parts of the world Jews were not allowed to defend themselves, how they were punished for striking down attackers. We have not forgotten how pogromists were hailed by some for murdering Jewish women and children. As in the past, we have no intention of allowing injustice and abuse to affect us. We are determined to remain firm in our struggle, to ensure for Israel the rights enjoyed by all other nations.

113. We shall tirelessly continue to search for peace with our neighbours. We shall seek to maintain scrupulously the cease-fire established between Israel and the Arab States. We shall always defend ourselves against armed attack and protect our people from aggression until our neighbours realize that peace is better than war.

114. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): For many years now, going back to the unlamented days of the cold war, United States representatives have had the habit of trying to compensate for their own lack of arguments by making slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union and its position. It is unfortunate that in the present instance too the United States representative, Ambassador Yost, has resorted to this method. Many times over the years I have had occasion in such cases to tell the United States representatives that they should thank God that the Soviet Union exists and that they thus have something to slander. But I would advise them to desist from this abominable practice of shifting the blame on to someone else.

115. The point I made is quite simple: the crucial, fundamental and essential factor in a Middle East settlement is the complete withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all territories they have occupied in that area to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967. What

is unjust about that, of what is Ambassador Yost accusing the Soviet Union? We are insisting that justice should be done and we say frankly and openly before the Security Council, the United Nations and the whole world that this is the position which is just, clear and honourable. Aggression should not be rewarded. I recall that a former President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, made such a statement: aggression should never be rewarded. Evidently, the United States position has now changed and the discussion of this item in the Council has shown us all quite clearly that Ambassador Yost has actively attempted to shield the aggressor and reward him for his aggression. We can under no circumstances agree to that. Ambassador Yost is waiting in vain for support for his position.

116. I might in this connexion quote the following words from a recent statement by the President of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Nasser, published in *Pravda* of 3 May 1970:

“We will never surrender and will never cede a single inch of our land. We do not want destruction. Our aim is to liberate our lands. All we are striving for is genuine peace, based on justice.”

117. If the United States also desires the peace about which Ambassador Yost has spoken at such great length here, it can ensure that Israel withdraws its troops from all occupied Arab territories. This is a very clear and fair statement of the question.

118. With regard to the Soviet Union and the position on the question of a Middle East settlement, I said in a statement made on behalf of the Soviet Government here in the Security Council on 13 May:

“The Soviet Union is firmly in favour of a lasting peace being established in the Middle East, so that the national strife, hostility and war inflamed by imperialism may be a thing of the past. . .

“There is only one road to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East: the withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from all the territories occupied by it.”
[1539th meeting, paras. 54 and 55.]

That is the Soviet Union's position. No one in the world, not even Ambassador Yost, will succeed in slandering the Soviet Union for this clear, frank and just position. Our country firmly supports and consistently advocates a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The corner-stone of such a settlement is compliance with the just demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories seized by Israel during the aggression of June 1967. The sooner the United States delegation and Administration and their Israeli friends understand this, the better, and the sooner will it be possible to reach agreement in the four-Power talks in an atmosphere of calm, on a settlement of this and all the other questions involved in a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

119. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Lebanon.

120. Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon): Mr. President, allow me first of all to express to you the Lebanese delegation's warm thanks for the way in which you have conducted the deliberations of this Council in examining the Lebanese complaint in regard to the military attack by Israel upon Lebanon. My delegation has been greatly moved, particularly by the new, vivid and vibrant expression that you have given to the traditional friendship existing between France and Lebanon.

121. At the same time I wish to express my delegation's thanks to all delegations that have supported our case, that have condemned the aggression, that have felt with our victims, that have co-operated with us in deliberations and negotiations in order to come out with a resolution inspired by the spirit of justice and equity prevailing among the majority of the Security Council and not inspired by any particular delegation around this table. My thanks go to the representative of Zambia who submitted the draft of the resolution which has just been adopted. To him, to his delegation and to his country, Lebanon will always be grateful. To the representative of Spain, a country with which we have had warm traditional links of friendship goes our gratitude also for promptly acting in introducing on 12 May a draft resolution [see resolution 279 (1970)], which called upon Israel to withdraw immediately all its armed forces from Lebanon.

122. I thank all the delegations that have supported the resolution today. I understand that some delegations had reservations regarding the resolution and for that reason they were not in a position to vote for it.

123. The representative of Sierra Leone reminded us the other day [1539th meeting] of an important fact, that in Sierra Leone there exists an important Sierra Leonean community hailing from Lebanon, loyal to Sierra Leone and working with its brethren for the development of that beautiful country. We were very grateful for the kind words that the representative of Sierra Leone addressed to my delegation today. In other countries, such as Nicaragua, Colombia and the United States, we have also very important Lebanese communities. I wish I had with me today the dozens of telegrams that I have received from Colombia and from different parts of the United States showing the concern and anxiety of those communities about the aggression committed by Israel against southern Lebanon, especially as tens of thousands of those people hail from that particular region which was subjected to the murderous gunning of the Israeli Army—from Marjayoun, from Hasbaya, from Shaba and from other places. Those people have always formed a very important link in the friendship between Lebanon and those countries. I only have to mention that in the United States alone there are nearly one million good loyal Americans hailing from Lebanon, always anxious and concerned about the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the peace of Lebanon.

124. Naturally we would have liked to have a stronger resolution and a resolution adopted unanimously by the members of the Council. Warnings have been given

to Israel in the past, but those warnings have not been heeded. It seems that we shy away not only from the invoking of Chapter VII of the Charter but also from the mere mention of some of the wording of Chapter VII of the Charter as if it were taboo. This attitude could be used by an already known aggressor or a would-be aggressor as a sanctuary for his actions. We hear every now and then that policemen shy away from scenes of crime to avoid involvement and danger. Is that the trend of our days in international and municipal affairs? We of the United Nations cannot afford to go on marking time, simply adopting resolutions and walking away glad that the debate is over and that the contents of a new paper or resolution have been added to the jurisprudence of United Nations international law. We certainly cannot find satisfaction in Horace's saying, "The years as they pass plunder us of one thing after another".

125. We agree with Lord Caradon that nothing should be said or done to impede the progress for peace in the Middle East. The peace in the Middle East is not disturbed by the Arab people. It is disturbed by the occupier of Arab territories, who has been there for nearly three years now. May I remind the Council that the attack against Lebanon was mounted mainly from the Golan Heights in Syria, which are under the Military occupation of Israel. It is inadmissible both to occupy territories and at the same time to use those territories as a springboard for an attack against neighbouring countries.

126. Allow me, finally, to recall what Horace said, and there is no doubt that this applies to Israel: "If

you do not know how to live aright, make way for those who do. You have played enough, have eaten enough and drunk enough; it is time for you to leave the scene." It is time for Israel to leave the scene of occupation and live in peace.

127. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The debate is now concluded. It remains for me, as President of the Security Council, to thank all members of the Council for the effort of conciliation they have made in order that the will of the Council might be expressed in a clear resolution which, while it did not obtain the desired unanimity, has nevertheless received wide support.

128. But beyond a resolution and the votes, the Council has clearly expressed its will that its resolutions should be respected by all and not only respected but implemented—particularly resolution 242 (1967), which still remains the basis for a peaceful settlement.

129. Another element has become manifest, namely, that many members of the Council have stressed the fact that all possible efforts should be made to ensure implementation of the resolution and that in particular the consultations taking place among the four permanent members be pursued and speeded up in order to facilitate such a settlement. In other words, everyone is aware of the fact that for the Security Council and for the United Nations, there can be only one victory: that of peace, a just and lasting peace.

The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.