



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR

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MEETING: 24 JUNE 1969

NEW YORK

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## NOTE

*Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.*

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 24 June 1969, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. M. SOLANO LOPEZ (Paraguay).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Algeria, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1481)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1-2)

Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252).

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland,

Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1-2)

### Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): In accordance with previous decisions taken by the Security Council and with the consent of its members, I shall invite the representatives of Mauritania, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea, Somalia, India, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Burundi to participate, without the right to vote, in the debate on the item before the Council.

2. In view of the limited space at the Council table, I propose, in accordance with past practice in similar cases, to invite the aforementioned representatives to take the seats reserved for them in the Council chamber, on the understanding that when they wish to address the Council they will be invited to take seats at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. A. Ould Daddah (Mauritania), Mr. W. E. Waldron-Ramsey (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. A. Touré (Guinea), Mr. M. Warsama (Somalia), Mr. A. S. Gonsalves (India), Mr. M. Fakhreddine (Sudan), Mr. J. M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) and Mr. Nsanze Terence (Burundi) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.*

3. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Council will now continue its consideration of the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

4. The first speaker on my list is the representative of the Soviet Union, whom I now call upon to speak.

5. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, it is the intention of the Soviet delegation to make a statement on the substance of the draft resolution before the Security Council, which has been submitted by five of its members.

6. The members of the Security Council have almost unanimously judged the referendum carried out by the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia to be illegal. This "referendum" has also been condemned by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in a statement he has issued. They have condemned the so-called constitutional proposals as devoid of any legality, and have stated that no

"constitution" proclaimed by a racist minority régime can have any legal force.

7. Thus the discussion on the question of Southern Rhodesia in the Security Council has given a clear and unambiguous warning to the racist fascist régime in Salisbury and has shown that to whatever falsified referenda or constitutions that régime may resort, it has been and continues to be illegal and should not be recognized by any State.

8. Those who have considered that a mere condemnation of the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia and of its criminal acts was inadequate and who have called for the adoption of the most effective measures against it have once again been proven right. In fact, this question is still unresolved.

9. A number of views and proposals along those lines have been put forward during the discussion. That is also the purpose of the draft resolution submitted by the representatives of Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia. The overwhelming majority of the members of the Security Council and the representatives of other States Members of the United Nations who have spoken here have resolutely and justly criticized and condemned the policies of the administering Power with regard to the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, a minority régime of foreign invaders who have illegally usurped power over the four million people of Zimbabwe. It is the duty of the administering Power to take effective measures that could really put an end to that bloodthirsty régime of terror, racial violence and oppression.

10. All the representatives who have spoken here, and the Security Council's Committee of Seven on Southern Rhodesia in its official report, have recognized that the sanctions applied so far have proved ineffective: they have not led and cannot lead to the removal of the racist régime. Even the Southern Rhodesian racists declare them ineffective.

11. In the economic survey submitted by the Smith régime to the Southern Rhodesian "parliament" on 17 April of this year it is stated openly, with cynical frankness and in mockery of the United Nations, that the past year, 1968, was successful for Southern Rhodesia, despite the sanctions. According to official data compiled by the United Nations Secretariat and submitted to the Committee of Seven on Southern Rhodesia, imports into that country in the past year rose to \$290 million compared to \$262 million in 1967—an increase of \$28 million. It is not difficult to see that the Southern Rhodesian racists have every reason to be satisfied with that state of affairs and to say openly that 1968 was successful for them despite the sanctions.

12. Let us hope that the representative of the administering Power will not dispute the accuracy of those data, as he attempted to do at the 1476th meeting of the Council. The United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, even in its note sent on 24 May 1969<sup>1</sup> to the Chairman of the

Committee of Seven concerning the effects of the sanctions on Southern Rhodesia's economy, officially admitted that in spite of the implementation of mandatory sanctions Rhodesian exports in 1968 had declined only by slightly more than 3 per cent. from those of 1967 and that imports had increased by 12 per cent. That is official United Kingdom testimony to the ineffectiveness and failure of the sanctions.

13. Why has this occurred? The answer is not difficult to find if one examines the statistical data on the volume of trade between Western countries and South Africa for the first eleven months of the past year: that is to say, approximately for the period since the introduction of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

14. Those data provide evidence of the huge volume of this trade. During that period trade between the United Kingdom and South Africa, for example, amounted to \$1,236 million, and trade between the United States of America and South Africa totalled \$654.7 million. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to the fact that during this period there was a considerable increase in the volume of trade between Western countries and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Data concerning these matters are included in the surveys for January 1969 of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

15. South Africa and those two Portuguese colonies are neighbours of Southern Rhodesia. Goods imported into those countries from Western countries are easily passed on to Southern Rhodesia.

16. This has been confirmed by United Kingdom sources as well. Jerome Caminada, the foreign trade editor of the United Kingdom newspaper *The Times*, a leading organ of major monopolistic capital in the United Kingdom, recently visited South Africa and Rhodesia. Upon his return to London he published an article in that newspaper on 20 May of this year, in which he frankly stated (I quote):

"British goods are still entering Southern Rhodesia by various routes, and the British exporters . . . know this. West German and Japanese products are certainly going in . . . But if anyone abroad still wonders how it is that in spite of the 'mandatory sanctions', Rhodesia continues to be served, particularly in petrol and oil, the key lies in South Africa."

Thus the explanation is quite simple. The camouflage is perfectly obvious.

17. It is not difficult to see that there are also indirect and hidden ways and means of circumventing and violating the sanctions. And the responsibility for this is not borne only by South Africa and Portugal. Considerable responsibility rests on those States which trade on such a large scale with those two United Nations Member States which are violating the Security Council resolutions on the application of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

18. In this connexion the attention of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole should be drawn

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year Supplement for April, May and June 1969*, document S/9252 and Add.1, Annex II, pages 294-295.

to the flouting and systematic violation of United Nations decisions on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by a State which is not a Member of the United Nations—West Germany. According to official data submitted to the Security Council by the Committee of Seven on Southern Rhodesia, in 1968 West Germany's trade with Southern Rhodesia amounted to \$26 million.

19. By continuing its large-scale trade co-operation with Southern Rhodesia, West Germany is challenging not only the United Nations but all the African States and their peoples. It also continues to maintain official consular relations with the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia; it has a trade mission and an agency of its airline in Salisbury. At the same time it is also expanding its trade and economic links with South Africa and Portugal.

20. In point of fact, West Germany is now one of the main actual allies and patrons of the anti-African fascist and racist military bloc which consists of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. All these facts fully support the appraisal made of the policies of West German imperialism in the basic document of the International Congress of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, adopted on 17 June of this year.

21. The document points out that West German imperialism is pursuing a policy of neo-colonialism and expansion towards the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. West German imperialists, together with the imperialists of other Powers, are giving political and military support to the fascist and racist régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The States and peoples of Africa cannot fail to draw attention to this anti-African policy of West Germany.

22. In the light of all those facts the Council must obviously take a decision that will not only strengthen the earlier sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia but also close other gaps through which flows the illegal trade with Southern Rhodesia.

23. In order to achieve this, as many representatives here have already pointed out, there is no other way than to extend the sanctions to South Africa and Portugal. Unfortunately, in regard to the proposals for this most urgent and just measure which have been properly put forward by the representatives of the African and Asian countries, the sponsors of this draft resolution have encountered stubborn resistance and opposition from the representatives of certain Western countries, primarily the representative of the United Kingdom.

24. The Soviet Union, like all other States which cherish the ideals of freedom and independence and which do not limit themselves to words but are actively opposing racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, cannot fail to condemn such conduct in the most categorical manner. That is why the Soviet Union delegation considers that the draft resolution which has been submitted by five States members of the Council, and which provides for the application of effective measures not only against the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia but also against the South African and Portuguese allies, deserves attention, approval and support.

25. While our assessment of the draft resolution sponsored by the five Afro-Asian countries members of the Security Council—Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia—is on the whole positive, we should of course prefer the Security Council to adopt a stronger resolution. In this connexion we cannot refrain from making some comments on the separate paragraphs of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 5 refers to the need to apply sanctions against the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. During the discussion, many representatives have rightly pointed out that the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia is the assistance and support given to the Rhodesian racists by Portugal and the Republic of South Africa. This paragraph of the draft should therefore refer, not to the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, but rather to Portugal itself.

26. A positive factor is that the sponsors of the draft resolution have studied the views expressed during consultations by a number of representatives to the effect that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia should be implemented not only by States Members of the United Nations but by all States without exception. Otherwise the obligation to apply sanctions would not extend to States which are not Members of the United Nations and which, as has already been pointed out here, include countries that are continuing to maintain diversified and broad ties with Southern Rhodesia. In our view, however, there are also other provisions of the draft which, if it is adopted, should be executed not only by Members of the United Nations and specialized agencies but by all States. We also consider that, in general, appeals by the Security Council for the implementation of such decisions should be addressed to all States without any exception, and not only to Members of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

27. On the whole, the Soviet Union delegation considers the draft resolution acceptable and it intends to vote for it. Approval of the draft will be of some importance in implementing the Security Council's decisions and the General Assembly resolutions directed against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia and in assisting the people of Zimbabwe in their just struggle for independence.

28. In conclusion, Mr. President, we should like to state with all possible gravity that the Security Council will be assuming a heavy responsibility if it proves incapable of taking effective steps in the present situation.

29. The representatives of African and Asian States have stressed in their statements that the African peoples do not wish for bloodshed; but they have also warned that the Zimbabwe people's cup of sorrow, which was already full to the brim, is now spilling over and that there is a limit to human patience. History and the examples of many countries that have won their freedom and independence through force of arms show that no amount of resistance by the imperialists and colonialists and their racist allies can halt the sacred struggle of peoples for their national freedom and independence. There can be no doubt that no one and nothing will halt the struggle of the Zimbabwe people against the racist tyrants and oppressors, a struggle supported by all freedom-loving peoples.

30. Those who continue indirectly to connive at and support the racist régime will inevitably be faced by a wave of anger from the African peoples that will not stop when it has swept that régime from the face of the earth; the mighty wrath of the peoples will also fall upon the entire system of imperialist oppression and exploitation.

31. As has been rightly pointed out in the basic document of the Moscow Congress to which I have already referred, imperialism uses racism to divide peoples and preserve its domination, and therefore the eradication of racism is closely linked with the struggle against imperialism as a whole, against its ideological foundations.

32. Mr. CAÑADAS (Spain): My delegation has listened with close attention to all that has been said in this debate. For this reason, to assist the Council in its search for solutions I should like to refer to the conclusions which my delegation has reached by the application of pure logic.

33. In the view of my delegation not only is the situation prevailing in Rhodesia unjust, illegal and inhuman but it also endangers coexistence between the races over an entire continent and may degenerate into a conflict of vast proportions and incalculable consequences.

34. The responsibility for anything that may occur is primarily and eminently British, since the United Kingdom is the administering Power. In support of this statement I might cite all the African representatives whom we have heard here. British responsibility, however, has very deep roots; it goes back a long way into the past, practically to the very origins of the colony, to the time when a white population began to be brought in. Here it is relevant to recall the statement of the representative of Tanzania at the 1477th meeting of the Council.

35. Furthermore, the causes of the failure of the measures applied up to the present time are well known. The main cause has been the policy of the administering Power; then there have been the subsidies and support given in various degrees by some States which seem to have continued trade with Rhodesia at such a rate that the economic system of the Smith régime has not suffered perceptibly.

36. To refer to the first of these, it is obvious that, from the very beginning of the rebellion, the rebels knew that they could trust the attitude of the administering Power to be indulgent, and that the economic interests involved in the territory, primarily British, would endeavour to help them by all possible means.

37. If anyone should doubt this, I should like at this point to quote word for word an extract from the *Gibraltar Chronicle* of 13 December 1966, about the interview between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith. The paper reported that the Dean of the Anglican Cathedral of Gibraltar had said these words on the occasion of a great religious ceremony held to pray for the success of that interview:

“May God forgive Wilson and his collaborators for betraying those much-maligned men: Ian Smith and his people, for betraying all the British colonial authorities who since the days of Cecil Rhodes have worked to bring

law, order, justice, tolerance and a gradual civilization to what was the jungle. May God forgive them, lest through their fervour and madness everything once again turns into a jungle.”

38. Obviously this appeal, carried in a newspaper that is traditionally close to the British military authorities in another colony, must have produced its effect on Smith's followers.

39. My delegation has on numerous occasions heard the representative of the United Kingdom state emphatically, when referring to another group of settlers living in the south of my country, that the desires of the population are “paramount”, according to the United Nations Charter. Well, in Rhodesia there is also a population, and one consisting of almost five million blacks, whose desires should be “paramount”—a word which according to the Oxford dictionary means “supreme” or “pre-eminent”, unless of course the “paramount” desires of the population are in both cases those of the imported settlers who are alien to the territory.

40. I want the position of my delegation to be clearly understood. As a Member of the United Nations, my country fulfils its obligations and upholds the principle that all Members, all without exception, must also fulfil theirs. We therefore disagree with those who ignore their obligations or refuse to abide by them. In the first place, there are some who contemptuously flout their obligations, and some who put forward legal arguments with which one may or may not agree but which should be answered. Secondly, what my country will never accept is open injustice in any measure, or one scale of values for the great and another for the small.

41. I will state clearly and frankly that my delegation has serious objections to the draft resolution which is to be voted upon.

42. For reasons of justice, as I explained a few moments ago, my delegation cannot accept that the main weight of the proposed measures should be discriminatory.

43. For reasons of balance my delegation also fails to understand how it is possible to state that the United Kingdom has a special duty to do something or other, and at the same time to decide that other States should take specific measures.

44. For reasons of utility too it fails, since we fear that by spreading the duties over different countries instead of concentrating on those which should be discharged by the United Kingdom, we should be helping the rebel settler group and not protecting the Zimbabwe people as we are trying to do.

45. And it fails for purely technical reasons, since to emphasize a responsibility does not imply positive action—as is stated in paragraph 1—and since paragraph 5 is ambiguously phrased, quite apart from the injustice to which I referred before.

46. My delegation, however, wishes to thank the co-sponsors for the efforts they have devoted to the subject,

and would draw attention to the flexibility and patience they have shown in listening to and even adopting other objections which I expressed in my private meetings with them; nevertheless, my delegation would have preferred a more simple and more forceful resolution which would have laid exclusively at the door of the administering Power the responsibility which is its alone.

47. I should also like to say that the decision to ask the United Kingdom to take determined measures does not seem out of proportion to the situation facing us. Pragmatism should not operate only in the interests of those who prefer the *status quo*. There have been times in history when drastic action was not taken in time, and the result was more painful or cruel than what had been rejected out of self-interested pragmatism.

48. My delegation understands how serious is the use of force, but also accepts with full awareness of its implications the idea that sooner or later force may have to be used. We feel it better that force should be used in time, on a limited scale, than that it should be unleashed when no one can hope to keep it within bounds. Furthermore, force does not always mean military action. The mere mention of it by the administering Power might be a sufficiently serious warning to the Rhodesian leaders.

49. In any case the administering Power can in no way feel repelled by such use of force, because it had resorted to force quite recently.

50. Up to the last moment we had hoped that British pragmatism would find a clear-cut course of action which would lead to a just and equitable solution of the problem. We still hope so; but if all the administering Power can suggest at this hour is what we have just heard, and if it does not offer us a valid alternative which, while safeguarding the rights of the Zimbabwe people, brings peace to a whole region of Africa, then, with the reservations we have entered, and requesting a separate vote on the paragraph of the preamble which begins "Noting" and on operative paragraphs 4 and 5, my delegation could vote in favour of the rest of the draft resolution contained in document S/9270/Rev.1.

51. Lastly, my delegation would emphasize that it is not insensitive to the argument that it would be desirable to maintain the unity of the Council and to ensure that our resolutions are unanimously adopted. But what can we do if the members who are not in agreement with this draft do not even suggest other more promising alternatives?

52. My delegation has expressed its point of view, its reservations and its opinions very frankly but, rather than remain petrified in the face of this situation, prefers to speak out for the only possible solution open to us.

53. Mr. LIU (China): I have asked to speak in order to give a very brief explanation of vote.

54. The position of my delegation on the question of Southern Rhodesia has been made clear at previous meetings of the Security Council. We are unalterably opposed to the illegal racist régime in Salisbury. We are in

favour of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against that régime and have faithfully carried out the obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Council. We are committed to the support of any appropriate action calculated to protect the rights and interests of the people in Rhodesia, realizing that the main burden of any enforcement action necessarily falls on the administering Power.

55. It may thus be said that my delegation's views are in large measure reflected in the draft resolution contained in document S/9270/Rev.1.

56. With regard to paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, however, my delegation has some reservations. We are not convinced that commercial relations with Rhodesia have been maintained by only the two countries named in that paragraph; nor are we satisfied that the extension of sanctions to those two countries will be the most effective means of defeating the illegal régime of Ian Smith. At the present stage we are not prepared to concede that the sanctions thus far invoked against the Smith régime have proved totally futile, and we would urge that all Member States reaffirm their solemn obligations and redouble their efforts to enforce the measures designed to inflict damage on the Rhodesian economy. My delegation will have to abstain on paragraph 5 if and when it is put to the vote separately.

✓ 57. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to inform members of the Council, and particularly the representative of Spain, that I have been able to consult the co-sponsors of the draft resolution [S/9270/Rev.1] about the possibility of a vote by division. They have indicated that they wish the draft resolution to be put to the vote as a whole and not by division. Since a condition was implicit in the request by the representative of Spain, that is the co-sponsors' reply.

58. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Saudi Arabia. I invite him to take his seat at the Council table, and call on him to speak.

59. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I wish once again to thank the President and the other members of the Security Council for granting me permission to make a further statement on the item under discussion.

60. I have asked to speak before the vote is taken because I feel it behooves me to make a particular appeal to members of the Council, and especially to my good friend Lord Caradon, to initiate action that will yield some palpable results in the not too distant future, lest the situation worsen and get out of hand. If the situation were to worsen and get out of hand, regrets would be of no avail.

61. I am sure that most, if not all, of us are thankful to Lord Caradon for summing up with candour the plight of his Government regarding the situation in Southern Rhodesia. A dastardly, unjust Constitution has been promulgated by the white régime in Salisbury which bars the indigenous population from enjoying the primordial human right: the right of self-determination. We find that, while

almost every country is emerging from antiquated forms of government, Mr. Ian Smith and his clique are retrogressing into the days when spurious racial superiority was glorified. They have set themselves apart from the rest of Africa as belonging to an exclusive species of human being. We all know that racial discrimination is no longer permissible in the era of the United Nations.

62. Members of the Council will be taking a vote this afternoon. The die is cast. Only the sponsors of the draft resolution and possibly two other members—the representatives of Hungary and the Soviet Union—will vote in the affirmative. Certainly we shall immediately thereafter hear the reasons why the other members had to abstain. But I submit that even if the draft resolution were adopted unanimously the result would still be negative. The reason is simple. Neither the United Kingdom nor any of the great Powers that wield world influence are willing or prepared to intervene in Southern Rhodesia. Lord Caradon told us unequivocally that his Government is in no position to wage war against the white minority in Southern Rhodesia. I anticipated Lord Caradon; I said before he spoke that the United Kingdom could not be blamed if it could not afford the financial burden of waging such a war. No intelligent person, not to speak of a Government, would embark on such a disastrous venture. On the other hand, I did some research on the question by writing to some friends in the United Kingdom—what you would call friends of the liberal type—and they told me that any Government in the United Kingdom would fall if it tried to dislodge Mr. Ian Smith's régime by force of arms.

63. Therefore, what should the world community do? We are 126 Members here in the United Nations, and this Council is entrusted with keeping peace and security in the world. Mr. Ian Smith and his clique have not only defied the United Nations but they have violated the most rudimentary elements of decency, not only by their sanctimonious attitude but by adopting a constitution which, to say the least, will fossilize the white community in Africa. One day, when Africa rises, this fossil will be broken into smithereens. We decry this, because, after all, I do not believe that all the white people in Southern Rhodesia, or in South Africa, for that matter, are of the same persuasion that there should be white supremacy in that continent. What could be worse than barring a people from shaping its own destiny in its own homeland—and in the era of the United Nations? But it has been proved time and again that economics is more important than politics. Policies of States are like satellites that revolve around the sun of economic national interests. Many wars have been rationalized by propaganda as being waged to uphold noble principles. The youth of today and the youthful among us, even of my age—we have some youthful adults among us, I hope—know very well that wars are being waged to protect certain economic interests.

64. Lord Caradon no doubt will assure us that his Government will steadfastly continue to be seized of this problem and will conduct conversations with African States and with members of the Commonwealth. I do not know how this Commonwealth works now. It is a Commonwealth for whom? There must be a ledger in this Commonwealth arrangement. I am sure that Lord Caradon and his

Government are sincere in what they are going to undertake, in talks and conferences and in holding caucuses with the black and the white in their political arrangement. But what would be the result for the indigenous people of Southern Rhodesia, and for that matter for the people living in South-West Africa, given the name "Namibia"? The result would be zero. Conversations conducted in this manner would be outside the scope of serving any purpose or yielding any fruits to the indigenous people of that region.

65. If I have taken the floor today, it is to make sure that the Government of the United Kingdom will not make the same mistake it has made irreparably in another part of the world, in one of its Mandates—in the Middle East. I do not want anybody to think that I am going to drag the Palestine question into our deliberations. Far be it from me to mix issues; but I am drawing a parallel and it is a dangerous parallel. I remember that, in the thirties when I was in London immersed in negotiations with the Arab leaders who came to the British capital to find a solution for the Palestine question, the United Kingdom did its very best, especially under the Labour Government, to find a solution. They sent commissions, called Royal Commissions—I am not going to enumerate them—but finally, when the British had economically lost the Second World War, although they were victors, they could no longer afford to be confronted with that situation in Palestine and in 1947 they threw the Palestine question into the lap of the United Nations. What has happened since then? Although some of us warned them that they were doing wrong, that they were responsible when the Mandate was given to them for preparing the indigenous people for self-determination. They washed their hands of it. They said, "There is an organization called the United Nations, which should be seized of the situation." The situation in the Middle East is one of the gravest confronting the world today. What assurance do we have that the Government of the United Kingdom will not finally give up and say, "After all, we did what we could; we held conversations; even our Prime Minister left his homeland to meet this usurper, Mr. Ian Smith"? He met him somewhere twice, I believe—I do not know how many times. Once it was near Gibraltar, and I do not think Spain raised any objection then. The negotiations came to nought.

66. I am confident that the United Kingdom Government will pursue the task and not leave any stone unturned. But from the way in which Mr. Ian Smith is behaving I cannot see that anything good will come of it for our African brothers who are still under the yoke of this mad white clique. How do I know that? I did not read out the whole dispatch that was given to me the other day by none other than a correspondent of the UPI. I did not want to vitiate my argument by reading out everything that the telegram contained in one dose. But to bolster my argument today I shall read out two paragraphs of that dispatch which contain the important part of the declaration made by Mr. Ian Smith: "The Premier"—of course they had to call him the Premier; I do not know what the United Kingdom would call him: the usurper. But this dispatch is from Salisbury and the correspondent would have been shown the door if he had said "the usurper", he had to call him the Premier, meaning Mr. Ian Smith. I respect him, I call

him Mr. Ian Smith—"defended constitutional proposals basing parliamentary representation on tax payments. He said European residents paid most of the taxes and deserved the seats in Parliament".

67. But Rhodesia did not get its name until the great Cecil Rhodes built up that part of Africa for the Empire less than a century ago. They went and exploited the land. It is good for people from outside to exploit the land if they treat the other members of the community—who may not have the "know-how"—as themselves. They are supposed to be Christians. I am sure that they go to Church every Sunday and pray to God Almighty. I do not know; they may think they are the shadows of God because they set themselves apart sanctimoniously, as people who are above other *homo sapiens*, forgetting that they could also get pigmented by freckles, if they have sensitive skins. I have seen some white men and women with such freckled sensitive skins that you did not know if they were brown or white. This is not funny any more. They set themselves up as a superior race.

68. But that is not all. There is something more serious. I am glad I am not a Zambian. If I were a Zambian I would hit the ceiling. The telegram goes on: "Smith also called on the memory of Rhodesia's founder, Cecil Rhodes, and said he believed in 'equal rights for civilized men' ". Then the telegram quotes the following from Mr. Ian Smith: "If we do not maintain civilized standards we could end up like Zambia, a neighbouring negro nation." Zambia, they are subhuman, they are uncivilized. I would like to ask Mr. Ian Smith if he cares to read some of the proceedings of the Security Council. Perhaps he does not deign to do so. What does he mean by civilization? Is it having bathtubs, is it having hippy clothes, is it having perfume? I address this to many white men who think that because of the colour of their skin they are superior. Do these people think that those who are inventing lethal weapons, bacteriological weapons, poison gases and napalm, are civilized? Thank God that Africa and Asia did not go that far in civilization, that spurious civilization. This reminds me of two lines by none other than Thomas Hardy, who was a poet as well as a novelist. He said that after two thousand years of Christian mass we have got as far as poison gas.

69. When will the white man wake up and think that he is a brother to all *homo sapiens* whatever the colour? If the British Government is not in a position to do anything, what assurance do we have that these people will not colonize the indigenous population of that region in the African continent, not only in South Africa? Whatever is said about Portugal—and I do not hold a brief for any of its policies—at least I think that they are more human than those people who come with lily-white skins. This does not apply to all lily-white-skinned people; I have known some who are very human and who are very good friends of mine. Most of the Portuguese are brown. We must remember what happened in Brazil. Brazil is a multiracial society because of the presence of Portugal in Brazil at one time. And we should also salute Spain, another Mediterranean country that has not set itself apart from those with tinted skins. I am white, I am not brown. I must say that I am ashamed of many white people—as if human rights reside in the skin.

70. Now, what we should be trying to get out of our good colleague Lord Caradon is this: Will we have assurance from

his Government—not necessarily today, of course—that once they give up trying to persuade Ian Smith, they will not then be tempted to throw this question into the lap of the United Nations, as they did the question of Palestine in 1947? We should have that assurance; otherwise some of my African friends might be caught napping.

71. That is the least I can say, because I know that this draft resolution, even if it gets a unanimous vote, has no teeth to it. Nobody will comply with the sanctions. And I do not blame them. As I said, economics is more important than politics, not only in Europe but in other parts of the world as well—in almost every part of the world; let us be frank. We have not transcended our national economic interests; were it otherwise, this world would be a utopia.

72. If my colleague from the United Kingdom will allow me, I should like to draw his attention to another point. Let us assume that the United Kingdom, in its own wisdom and in co-operation with others, does find some sort of solution short of waging war against Mr. Ian Smith and his cohorts; would they be willing to see to it that that solution was a practicable one, not merely a piece of paper, like many other resolutions of the Security Council adopted thus far; and second, are they willing to set a target date for carrying out that solution?

73. Some of us have become hard-boiled by experience; we cannot go floating along on hopes for solutions that no longer can beguile the peoples of the world, not even the peoples living in Asia and Africa.

74. First, we should have the assurance that the United Kingdom will not give up and throw this problem into the lap of the United Nations, with the announcement that Southern Rhodesia is no longer its colony. No one would then believe the United Kingdom's claim that it acted in good faith, even though they may have acted by default. Secondly, should there be some solution worked out by the United Kingdom and its friends, including African States, would it be a practical solution, and would they be willing to fix and state a target-date for its implementation? Otherwise, everything will be of but academic value and not worth the ink and paper used to write it.

75. I know that my colleagues here are eager to vote and go away. I know also very well that there are some bitter representatives who have precipitated this vote. They told me, those bitter representatives, "We want to show the whole world how the white man is treating our most vital problems—problems touching upon the dignity of the human person—in a cavalier manner that is tantamount to hypocrisy". I tried my best to tell them that they should exercise patience and give the United Kingdom another chance to work out something that may in the end bring about a solution. But if the United Kingdom fails, then we have to turn to the two world Powers that can do something about this question. Where there is a will there is a way. When one of those Powers thinks certain treaties have been violated, it mobilizes an army, with its allies, of close to a million. I am not going to drag another item into the discussion, however. And when another Power thinks its interests are threatened, it mobilizes its forces and marches out into other parts of the world. But what are

they going to do, as Members of the United Nations, about Africa? Just watch the difficulties of the United Kingdom and do nothing about the whole situation? Is that right? Is that in conformity with the high purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations? I do not think so. That is why in my first statement on this item I suggested [1478th meeting, para. 67] that the representative of the United Kingdom try to consult with those two Powers, both of which are more solvent financially than is the United Kingdom nowadays; that they could perhaps jointly send a warning or use more persuasive arguments with Mr. Ian Smith to change his policy, to get him to stop degrading himself by setting himself on a level higher than his fellow men, the indigenous people of Southern Rhodesia.

76. Let us be frank, let us not fool ourselves any further. Why cannot these two world Powers assume some responsibility here? Of course, the main responsibility rests with the United Kingdom. It has not disengaged itself from Southern Rhodesia; it is still the metropolitan Power. The danger is that it might disengage itself and leave the whole question hanging in the air. This is what my African brothers and colleagues should bear in mind. They should not exasperate the United Kingdom at this stage. They should doggedly keep asking the United Kingdom and other Powers: What are you going to do about this problem?

77. There is an alternative: if nothing is done in due time those African States should put their heads together. Today they are weak, but they are not going to be weak for ever. They are buying arms, and there will be massacres—massacres by the masses—not necessarily in Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. The whites there can fortify themselves, but I dare say that when the masses are aroused and mobs are enraged, they may slaughter any white man in Africa. What will prevent them from doing so? It will be a calamity, because we shall have anarchy followed by dictatorship. All the wisdom of the African leaders will not be able to restrain the mobs or the crowds. There will be some sort of revolution against man's inhumanity to man. We do not want to see that happen, and that is why I asked to speak—in order to make sure that things are put in their real perspective and to express the hope that with the wisdom that we will think the United Kingdom has, something novel will be devised in order to put an end to this very sad situation.

78. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): At yesterday's meeting I informed the members of the Council that the five States sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document S/9720/Rev.1 had postponed their request for a vote on that draft resolution until today's meeting. I have no representative listed as wishing to speak to this draft or to explain his vote before the voting. Accordingly, in compliance with the request of the co-sponsors, I shall put to the vote of this Council the draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia, contained in document S/9270/Rev.1.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:* Algeria, China, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zambia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Colombia, Finland, France, Paraguay, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*The result of the vote was eight in favour, none against, with seven abstentions.*

*The draft resolution was not adopted having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of nine members.*

79. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to explain their vote after the voting.

80. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I wish to speak briefly in explanation of my vote. I shall not at this stage reply further to the speeches which have been made in this Council. I would only say that it has been remarkable to hear the representative of Hungary speak of self-determination, and the representative of the Soviet Union speak of the freedom and independence of small peoples, and the representative of Spain speak to the theme that the interests of the inhabitants should be paramount.

81. I thank my friend the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia for speaking to us in a sincere spirit. I have carefully noted what he said. I do not think that he should discount what my country has been prepared to do and is certainly prepared to continue to do. He spoke of the fear that my country would disengage from its responsibilities. I would tell him as a matter of information that earlier today in the House of Commons in London my Foreign Secretary announced that Her Majesty's Government has decided that it would serve no useful purpose to maintain the United Kingdom residual mission in Salisbury and that Rhodesia House in London should be closed. That was a necessary act in view of what has taken place, but it is certainly not an act of disengagement from our responsibilities. For, in the course of his speech in the House of Commons today, the Foreign Secretary said:

"The action in the Security Council which is imperatively needed is the rigorous observance of the existing sanctions. Her Majesty's Government have been most careful to observe sanctions and to co-operate fully with the United Nations Supervisory Committee in dealing with any cases of reported evasions of sanctions. We shall press strongly at the Security Council for the resolute observance of the policy which the Council has already laid down."

82. I have endeavoured to explain thoroughly and carefully—and, I believe the Council would be prepared to admit, honestly—what can be done and what cannot be done at this particular stage. The Council well knows that I have advocated that we should act together and act unanimously and act within our clear capacity. I greatly regret that we have not done so. We have not gone forward; we have gone backward.

83. I equally regret that our offers of consultations with other members were not accepted. The tradition of this Council, as we all very well know, is that even when we disagree, there should be consultation between us. Indeed, particularly when we disagree, consultation is our obliga-

tion. Our overriding duty as members of this Council, so I have always believed, is not to cause or intensify divisions and disputes but to search diligently for agreement. I greatly regret that the promoters of this draft resolution were not prepared to observe that duty.

84. As to the so-called referendum, I need only refer to the Secretary-General's forthright statement and to the statement made by you, Mr. President, on behalf of all of us last week. We are all fully agreed, as you stated, that the referendum was illegal. We are all fully agreed in condemning the so-called constitutional proposals as invalid. We are all fully agreed in declaring that any constitution promulgated by the régime of the racist minority could have no legal effect. We are all fully agreed, moreover, in renewing our call to all Member States not to recognize the illegal régime in any way.

85. As for my Government, we stand by our commitments. We shall not give up. We shall press on. We shall maintain, and wherever possible intensify, sanctions. We shall continue to play our full part in the work of the Security Council Sanctions Committee. We shall, as we have undertaken, consult with Commonwealth and other Governments, particularly African Governments. We shall not recognize the illegal régime or any of its illegal acts. We have openly and clearly stated in this Council what we can do and what we cannot do. We shall continue to honour our commitments and our undertakings.

86. Mr. MUUKA (Zambia): At this stage we should like to thank all those who supported the draft resolution on which the Council has just voted. We should like to thank the various Members of the United Nations that participated in the debate on the question. We should like to thank the sixty nations that saw fit to call for a meeting of the Security Council to deal with the problem. Indeed, we should like to thank even those who abstained from the vote on the draft resolution. Why do we thank them? We thank them first of all because of the contributions they made to the debate. Furthermore, we thank them because they agreed that this matter should be discussed; that is to say, they too saw the seriousness of the situation, as we saw it ourselves.

87. During the statements both of members of the Council and of other representatives who had asked for an opportunity to address the Council on the question, it was very clear that everyone condemned Rhodesia's defiance of the decisions of the United Nations and the Security Council, indeed Rhodesia's defiance of world opinion. But condemnation was extended to Portugal and South Africa.

88. Every one of the speakers condemned the Ian Smith régime for continuing to trample on human rights and to oppress the people of Rhodesia, using the sole criterion of colour. We were delighted to hear the unanimous condemnation of the illegal detention of the liberation leaders in Rhodesia, the unjustifiable restrictions, the imprisonments, and so forth. Indeed, this very Council addressed itself earlier to the unfortunate assassinations that had taken place in Rhodesia. When such a broad cross-section as is represented in this Council condemns everything that the illegal Smith régime has done, and when such condem-

nation is also expressed by others outside the Council, one can only be delighted, even if one does not agree on the methods to be used to defeat that régime. One can only be delighted that there is unanimity about what the régime is doing in Rhodesia.

89. I should now like to go back to the draft resolution that has just been rejected. I go back to it for one simple reason. The matter is still with us. And if the matter is still with us, I have no doubt that the arguments that we have heard in the past and during the last two weeks will also come back. Instead of leaving those arguments for yet another debate on the matter—for I have no doubt that there will be another debate—it might be useful to deal with some of them at this stage.

90. My delegation listened with great attention to the representative of the United Kingdom when, on 19 June in this chamber, he asked the question: What can be done? [1479th meeting, para. 29.] Indeed he asked that question again this afternoon. Clearly that is the question that everybody in this Council has been asking. It is the same question that the United Kingdom asked when Smith and his men unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent. It is the same question that the United Kingdom asked when it came to the United Nations with a view to finding a solution to the Rhodesian question. To our mind the answer has been obvious; and we have no doubt that the United Kingdom Government too must have been aware of the answer. It is a simple answer. What can be done? Quell the rebellion. In adopting resolution 232 (1966) and resolution 253 (1968) the Security Council was, of course, trying to find an answer to the question, "What can be done?", by adopting measures such as those suggested to this Council by the United Kingdom Government. The measures imposed under the two resolutions, unfortunately, have failed to bring about the required political change in Southern Rhodesia, and four-and-a-half million Africans still groan under the yoke of 220,000 white oppressors. Experience in the application of economic sanctions against any State has shown that sanctions not backed by force from the start are doomed to failure.

91. My Government and my delegation have on numerous occasions called upon the United Kingdom as administering Power to use force to re-establish its own authority which has been usurped by a clique of power-hungry settlers. Many other representatives in this chamber also have made a similar call. In doing so, we have explained that it is not because blood enchants us—far from it—but rather it is because we are truly convinced that unless we take that action now we shall soon be faced with an uglier situation. We must take preventive measures before southern Africa is completely engulfed in a racial war.

92. I still return to the question, "What can be done?". My delegation has never been convinced that efforts by the United Nations can succeed unless the United Kingdom, as the Power responsible for Rhodesia, changes its policy. Britain has treated the rebellion with duplicity. On the one hand, it has sought to quell the rebellion, and has told the world so; on the other, it has proceeded to give the rebel régime the assurances of success and survival by stating unambiguously that the use of force against white fascist

rebels is out of the question. It has sought to impose effective economic mandatory sanctions, and at the same time it is opposed to measures that are intended to tighten the stranglehold on Rhodesia—namely, measures of the kind we suggested in the draft resolution that has just failed of adoption.

93. We reject the assertion by the representative of the United Kingdom that the use of force by that country against Rhodesia would be tantamount to invasion. Rhodesia is a colony of Britain and therefore a territory of Britain, and the exercise of discipline on the part of that State cannot legally amount to an invasion. Britain would not be starting a war. It was asserted last week in this Council that we should not encourage measures designed to start a war in southern Africa. If Britain were to intervene, would it be a question of starting a war in southern Africa? Our view is that Britain would not be starting a war, for it cannot start a war against itself. In any case, by intervening with force, Britain would only be averting an armed conflict which has already started between the fascist forces and the freedom fighters. It is not fear of invasion or of starting a war in Rhodesia; it is, as one British Conservative Member of Parliament said, fear of shooting their kith and kin. Had the coloured people been in rebellion, Her Majesty's forces would have been there to shoot. Last week we were reminded that the various examples of Anguilla, Cyprus and several other places were, after all, removed from this question, basically because in Rhodesia since 1923 the white minority has been enjoying a large measure of self-government. I should like to know what the political status of both Anguilla and Cyprus was at the time the British Government took action to deal with the situations in those Territories. In any case, the fact that Rhodesia enjoys a measure of self-government does not, I submit, in itself imply that it can with impunity declare itself independent and oppress the majority of the people, while the United Kingdom stands by and watches, merely because it is self-governing. If the situation demands the use of force, pacifism facilitates escalation—and Munich is a reminder. Besides, Chapter VII of the Charter was, in our view, meant for situations like that of Rhodesia, and there is no doubt in our minds that, if force had been used in 1965 immediately after the unilateral declaration of independence, it would have had the least ugly consequences.

94. In his speech on 19 June the United Kingdom Ambassador stated that his country could not now justify an economic war against southern Africa [*ibid.*, *para. 43*]. What, then, is this exercise in sanctions about? How, then, is the Security Council policy of economic sanctions to be intensified and tightened? It is all very well to talk about tightening the sanctions, but we know that South Africa and Portugal still frustrate the policy we have followed for the past three-and-a-half years. Is it still possible, is it still meaningful, to talk about tightening the sanctions now, if we are not prepared to take action against those two countries? In any case there are numerous clandestine arrangements that have been made between British and South African firms to help Rhodesia beat the sanctions. *The Financial Times* of London reported in October 1965:

“British companies operate in Rhodesia through subsidiaries of their southern Africa subsidiaries; in others,

British and southern African minority shareholders are combined with local Rhodesian capital—sometimes in private companies and disguised as bank nominees.”

95. The position is likely to be the same today. This very year another British newspaper reported:

“... it is in fact open to any British firm to continue to develop normal relations with its South African associate and for that South African associate to act as agent for a Rhodesian company. For as long as elementary precautions are taken to disguise the origin of Rhodesian exports and the destination of imports, a large proportion of international business can go on as usual.”

It has gone on, and it is for this reason that the rebel colony has been able to defy hostile international opinion and survive the sanctions measures. The same newspaper recently reported:

“Today, there are nearly 400 British companies with subsidiary or associate companies in southern Africa, and more than 190 subsidiary or associate companies in Rhodesia. Among the latter are giants of British industry such as ICI, Courtalds, Unilever, Shell and BP, British Leyland Motor Holdings, Hawker Siddeley, . . .”

and several others. If you are to enforce sanctions against Rhodesia and yet allow this open trade to go on, what do you intend to achieve?

96. Enough has been said about other States involved in this monopolistic network, and I will not endeavour to go into further details. I think the appeals made to them are sufficient, even though we do not think the sanctions road is the right one to follow.

97. It was in the light of those failures that my delegation co-sponsored the draft resolution just rejected by this Council. If Britain still claims any moral responsibility over Rhodesia, we believe this was the time for it to act positively to avert further bloodshed—not to start a new war.

98. Last week the representative of the United Kingdom said he understood that quite a number of the representatives who had spoken in the debate might have been emotional or felt strongly over the situation and he said he would be surprised if the opposite were true [*ibid.*, *para. 30*]. Much as we believe that the Rhodesian ulcer is most painful to the African body politic, it is obvious that the situation existing in Rhodesia at the moment has been condemned by the whole international community. And if some of our speeches appeared a little emotional, it was not because we are very easily given to emotion; rather it was because we are confronted with a situation whose gravity we cannot underestimate. Besides—and this is the important factor—it is our feeling that what we really are agreeing not to deal with at the moment is going to develop into something more serious in the future, and it is that feeling which perhaps makes us emotional in what we say.

99. But I am very happy because I do realize that the representative of the United Kingdom himself felt very

strongly about the Rhodesian question even before there was a situation as serious as the present one. At that particular time he decided to resign. There are very few of us who can leave our jobs for the sake of what is happening in another part of the world even if that part of the world is under the authority of our Government. I have taken pains to try and imagine how he must have felt at a later stage when the British Prime Minister and Ian Smith were trying to find a solution, so-called, to the Rhodesian question without any consultations whatsoever. I think that that must have been another painful moment for our colleague because he believes as he has demonstrated that it is important that there must be the element of consent in whatever is done in Rhodesia.

100. Again to prove that emotions are not just on one side, I should like to cite a statement by somebody who is very well known to quite a number of us. He is a very distinguished British Member of Parliament, Mr. Michael Foot, and this is what he said immediately after the unilateral declaration of independence:

"If, in six months' or a year's time the situation were to be that Mr. Smith and his illegal Government still hold plenary power in Rhodesia, still clamping their police state on the 4 million Africans, this country"—that is to say, the United Kingdom—"will have suffered one of the most humiliating defeats in its history—a defeat from which our reputation could never recover all over Africa. Our position would be utterly devoid of its moral authority throughout the world."

101. Now that is an emotional speech. We do understand that one cannot but look at that problem with emotion because it concerns human beings.

102. Today we have decided not to act in the only way that we could have acted if we were going to do something in Rhodesia. It is not for me to try to analyse the motives for which delegations voted this way or that. It is certainly not my Government's right in any way to try and find out how the other Governments of the world look at the question of Rhodesia. But what I do believe is that given the Security Council, given the United Nations, and concerned as we all are about international peace and security, we cannot but find a meaningful solution to the Rhodesian question. We may have postponed that decision today, but I have no doubt that we shall come back to the problem. I am only hoping that it will not be too late then.

103. Mr. BERARD (France) (*translated from French*): My delegation has already several times set forth the views of the French Government on the illegality of the Salisbury régime and on ways of putting an end to the rebellion. It will therefore be sufficient for me to recall that my delegation, despite its reservations of principle, voted for resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 as a concession to the deep feeling sustained in Africa by the continuation of this regrettable Rhodesian crisis. My country has scrupulously applied the measures then unanimously adopted, but it still entertains doubts about this barely feasible project, from which it was to be feared that the United Nations might emerge with diminished prestige. The concern my delegation felt at that time is bound to be strengthened by

the proposals which have just been put to the vote and are intended to declare a sort of economic war on the whole of southern Africa.

104. For those reasons my delegation has found it necessary to abstain on the text submitted to us.

105. Mr. MORALES SUAREZ (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): With regard to the vote which the Colombian delegation has just cast, I should say this.

106. First, the countries of Latin America actually came into international life through the ending of a colonial régime. They cannot fail to regard with sympathy the efforts and struggles of those peoples which still do not enjoy the prerogatives and rights which result from full independence and a genuinely democratic form of government.

107. Secondly, the régime which prevails in Southern Rhodesia has from the outset contravened every rule of law, not only by the procedures it has adopted but also by the very act which created it. Colombia could in no circumstances appear to participate or sympathize with the illegal adventure of the Southern Rhodesian régime.

108. Thirdly, within the United Nations the Colombian delegation has shown the African countries complete understanding and given them equitable and honest treatment; it has also given abundant proof of an unfailing interest in their problems.

109. My delegation felt compelled to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia simply because the use of force is essentially a step of such extreme gravity and such unpredictable consequences that only after every alternative had been exhausted could force be used, and then only with the high sense of responsibility which should mark the acts of this Council.

110. Mr. YOST (United States of America): The United States deeply deplores the spectacle of one per cent of the population of Rhodesia deciding to impose on the vast majority of voteless Rhodesians Smith's proposals for a new constitution which would clearly intensify and institutionalize political control of Southern Rhodesia by that minority. As I said on 13 June in this Council [*1475th meeting*], my Government believes that this Council should condemn both the illegal régime and the proposed constitution. I argued that we should have taken such action before 20 June. Unfortunately, we could not seem to reach a consensus on a form of wording which would have expressed the condemnation we all believe is both deserved and required.

111. We have been faced with a draft resolution which my Government could not support. I regret that we have all been placed in this situation, because the only beneficiary of our differences is the illegal régime we seek to condemn. This Council has exerted an effective influence on the Rhodesian situation only when it has worked on the basis of unanimity. I find it disturbing that in consideration of a subject on which we have previously acted effectively, we now find ourselves divided in opinion as to what our next

step should be. Clearly, the only ones who will find any solace in this state of affairs are Mr. Smith and his friends.

112. To turn specifically to the language of the resolution we had before us, I should like to point out that while the United States finds itself in broad agreement with its aims and agrees fully with many of its provisions, there are other portions to which our objections are well known. In particular, we have consistently maintained that the use of force is not the appropriate way to bring this problem to a solution. We have heard the representative of the United Kingdom say that his Government is not prepared to use force in this situation, and we respect the cogent reasons he has set forth for not doing so. The duty of this Council is to maintain international peace and security. The use of force in this case would, in our view, serve to jeopardize rather than to support that objective.

113. Another major defect in the draft resolution was its extension of economic sanctions to South Africa and Portugal. The United States has frequently explained why we consider that such an extension would not be productive in dealing with the situation in Southern Rhodesia. To apply sanctions to neighbouring countries simply because they have not yet been adequately or successfully applied to Rhodesia itself would seem to us to be a dubious course, introducing additional grave complications into a situation already complicated enough. We cannot agree that it would be either wise or responsible for this Council to do so.

114. Finally, my Government also had difficulty with operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, in view of our traditional position supporting a free flow of information throughout the world.

115. In sum, the United States deeply regrets the travesty foisted upon the world by Mr. Smith and his friends in Southern Rhodesia, and we are particularly distressed that the members of this Council have been unable to find agreement as to how we should proceed in the face of this continuing injustice.

116. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): The representative of the United Kingdom in his brief remarks referred to the socialist countries, including my own, with caustic comments. He sought to avoid the merits of the question under our scrutiny, the main problem being the self-determination of the Zimbabwe people. That was the idea we advanced in our statements, in complete unison with the African and Asian representatives in the Council. It seems to me that the reply and the references of the representative of the United Kingdom applied at the same time, and even principally, to the statements of the African and Asian delegations on this Council.

117. The representative of the United Kingdom tried in vain to create here the impression that this question is a problem between the East and the West. It is a colonial issue, and it is a lost issue. And I would emphasize that, as regards self-determination, we have nothing to learn from the biggest colonialist Power in the world.

118. Mr. YUNUS (Pakistan): At the very outset of this debate, we placed before this Council our views [1475th

*meeting*] on the present situation in Southern Rhodesia. We underlined the self-evident responsibility of the administering Power in respect of the situation, as well as the dangers inherent in it. We also commented in detail upon the failure of the present sanctions and we indicated what, in our opinion, would constitute the minimum measure of action that would be commensurate with the requirements of the case. I need not recapitulate our views on the farcical referendum staged by the illegal Smith régime, nor comment on its result. As a matter of fact, the position in Southern Rhodesia is crystal-clear to all of us. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in anybody's mind in this chamber regarding either the facts of this case or its merits from the point of view of the Charter or of the vital interests of the international community. We are all agreed that a catastrophe may be impending in southern Africa, and that the dangerous and tragic trend of events in that part of the world must be reversed. Despite this agreement in principle, however, there is a lamentable lack of political will to take action that would be commensurate with the requirements of the present situation. National economic interests prevail.

119. It is said that resolution 253 (1968) should continue to be applied and strengthened, and that we should do a little more of what we are already doing, and this time a little more diligently. No one need disagree with that advice. That would probably be done, with or without another resolution, perhaps through the already-existing mechanism of the Council's Sanctions Committee.

120. None of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution which this Council has just declined to adopt—in any case, definitely not Pakistan—will withhold its full co-operation from such efforts. But that has not been either the principal issue or the main hurdle. The question that needed an answer was whether the Council would take the action which was clearly called for to meet Smith's challenge. That was the main concern of the co-sponsors of this draft resolution. A mere condemnation of the sham referendum in Southern Rhodesia was not the aim of the sixty Afro-Asian States which called for a meeting of this Council. That referendum stands condemned from the standpoint of all that is decent and wholesome in the values which all of us hold dear and sacred. Members as well as non-members of this Council have, one after the other, said so in unmistakable terms.

121. The Afro-Asian request was made to stir the conscience of this august body, the Security Council, which holds the key to coercive action by the international community. In that respect, today, and during the course of last week, we have been disappointed. But we believe that we must not relent. Our efforts to achieve our aim must continue in concert with other Member States in the hope that an effective solution acceptable to all will be found, and that the justice of the cause of the Zimbabwe people will prevail.

122. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I now call upon the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

123. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, I only wish to make some brief comments in exercise of my right of reply.

124. Experience of life shows that malice and slander have always been and continue to be signs of falsehood and impotence. We have been witnessing this over the more than fifty years of the existence of the Soviet State. During the post-war period this kind of slander and malice has been heard frequently in the Security Council and other United Nations bodies, directed against other socialist countries.

125. There was a weak echo of this today in the remarks made by the representative of the administering Power about the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. We, the Soviet peoples, are proud of our contribution to the cause of the liberation of peoples. Our country lost twenty million persons in order to save the peoples of Europe and the rest of the world—including the people of the United Kingdom—from fascist enslavement under Hitler's imperialism. Without that great sacrifice the representatives neither of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union nor of other countries would be able to sit round this table and discuss problems concerning the liberation of peoples from racism, colonialism and imperialism, because the entire world would be under the heel of Hitler's Reich. As we know, Hitler proclaimed that the Reich's domination of the entire world, including the United Kingdom, would last a thousand years. It was our sacrifices, together with those made by all other freedom-loving peoples, that made it possible to save mankind from that dreadful threat. That is why we are so merciless in our condemnation of imperialism, racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

126. Of course my friend Mr. Csatorday and I are honoured by the special attention shown us by the representative of the administering Power: he replied only to us and to the representative of Spain—but here the question of Gibraltar is involved. The representatives of the African and Asian countries have received no reply from the representative of the administering Power, despite the criticism and serious condemnation contained in all their statements. The fact that those against whom such criticism and condemnation were directed found nothing to say in reply speaks for itself.

127. What conclusions may be drawn? What has been shown by the debate and in the vote on the draft resolution submitted by five African and Asian countries on behalf of the sixty countries of Asia and Africa on such an urgent question of our time, the question of racism and of man's inhumanity to man? They have shown quite clearly that, first, racism is a product of imperialism and colonialism; secondly, that imperialism continues to defend racism; and, thirdly, that the vote dealt a serious blow to the hopes of those States, Governments and peoples of the sixty African and Asian countries which had faith in the Security Council and believed that it would really do something this time. However, that has not happened. Everyone knows who is responsible for that situation; it was vividly demonstrated in the vote and therefore no amount of malicious and slanderous insinuations directed at the socialist countries can conceal the facts. There can be no doubt that the peoples of Asia and Africa and all the other freedom-loving peoples of the world will draw the appropriate conclusions from this.

128. I do not insist on consecutive interpretation on the usual understanding.

129. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): At this stage of our discussions I should like to speak as the representative of PARAGUAY to explain the reasons for my delegation's abstention in the vote on the draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia.

130. The general position of my country with regard to the unilateral declaration of independence, the validity of which we do not recognize, and to the illegal minority racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, which also we do not recognize and with which we have no relations whatsoever, is well known and need not be reiterated at this time. Within this general setting our ideas and aims are those of the greater part of the provisions contained in the draft resolution which has just been put to the vote.

131. However, the following provisions prevented us from voting for the draft resolution and thus supporting its adoption.

132. In the report [*S/9252 and Add.1*] submitted by the Committee set up in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968), and particularly in its paragraph 45, the Committee—of which my country is a member—drew attention to the conduct of South Africa and Portugal with regard to the implementation of that same resolution.

133. That statement therefore represents the views of my country. I should add that, although South Africa and Portugal are the chief countries which trade with Southern Rhodesia and thus support the illegal Salisbury régime, they are not the only ones. In the present circumstances—namely, on the first occasion that the Council considers the subject since the report was submitted and assesses the results of the above-mentioned resolution—we feel that operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution reflects the findings of the report.

134. The draft resolution, however, also includes operative paragraph 5, which would decide "that Member States and members of the specialized agencies shall carry out the measures dealing with imports and exports envisaged in resolution 253 (1968) and in the present resolution against the Republic of South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique". Incidentally I wish to state quite clearly that, if there is any trade between my country and South Africa or Mozambique—which I doubt—it is in any case very small, of no relevance to our own economy, and of even less to the economies of those two political entities.

135. The decision to extend the proposed measures to South Africa and Mozambique is one which my Government could take only after a detailed and careful examination of their scope, significance and advisability. Just as my country faithfully and conscientiously fulfils all its duties as a Member of the United Nations, it bases its attitude to decisions of the type that we are asked to adopt on a full awareness of its responsibility. Such a decision could be taken only at the very highest level and, I repeat, after a full and conscientious study. These requirements have not been met.

136. Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, generally speaking, reiterates the exhortations contained in

operative paragraph 2 of resolution 253 (1968), with some variations such as the change from an exhortation to an urgent appeal, and with one important addition: that of "the use of force" to the measures which the Council urges the United Kingdom to adopt.

137. The exhortation contained in the second paragraph of resolution 253 (1968) is obviously wide enough to cover all the alternatives available to the Territory's administering Power—that is to the United Kingdom. The use of force to quell the Rhodesian rebellion is certainly one of the rights of that Power; and this right, as such, is incontestable. Since it is a right, the decision whether and when it should be exercised is for the administering Power. In any case, the feelings of a great many members of the international community on this alternative have already been repeatedly expressed.

138. It would be illusory to think that the adoption of the paragraph in question would bring some kind of pressure to

bear on the United Kingdom, since, as its highest representatives have stated, the United Kingdom cannot exercise that right. With or without this paragraph, everyone knows that pressure is exerted by a large number of Member States of the United Nations; the resolution with which we are concerned would not add anything effective.

139. My delegation believes that there are many ways of using resolution 253 (1968) and the powers of the Committee set up under its article 20 to give effect to the sanctions already adopted and obtain universal compliance with them. We believe that the Sanctions Committee should diligently explore those ways.

140. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I wish to state that there are no other speakers on my list.

*The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.*