



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

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## NOTE

*Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.*

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 13 June 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

*President:* Mr. M. SOLANO LOPEZ (Paraguay).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Algeria, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1475)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1)

Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252).

### Adoption of the agenda

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The provisional agenda for this meeting of the Security Council appears in document S/Agenda/1475, which members of the Council have before them. If there are no objections, I shall consider it adopted.
2. I call on the representative of Algeria on a point of order.
3. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*translated from French*): I merely wish to point out that the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) has prepared a report on the progress of its work. I should like to suggest that that report be taken up as the second item of our agenda.
4. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Council has heard the proposal made by the representative of Algeria. The Committee established in pursuance of Security

Council resolution 253 (1968) has already submitted a preliminary report, distributed earlier as document S/8954. I take it that the document being circulated now is the second report by that Committee. If I hear no objections from the members of the Council, I shall consider the proposal by the representative of Algeria adopted.

*The agenda, as amended, was adopted.*

### Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1)

Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252)

5. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Security Council will now take up the item it has to consider, in accordance with the request for an urgent meeting contained in the letter addressed to the President of this Council on 6 June by the representatives of fifty-nine States Members of the United Nations, which is reproduced in documents S/9237 and Add.1.
6. Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to draw attention to document S/9244 which has been circulated. That document contains the letter sent to me by the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, transmitting to the Security Council the text of a resolution on the situation in Southern Rhodesia adopted by that Committee on 10 June this year.
7. I also wish to draw the Security Council's attention to the first report by the Committee established in pursuance of Council resolution 253 (1968), which appears in document S/8954. The Committee's second report is contained in document S/9252.

8. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*translated from French*): The problem of Rhodesia has already been the subject of many Security Council meetings. The situation that has prevailed in that region of Africa since the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith has been recognized as sufficiently serious to constitute a threat to peace.

9. A little over a year ago a resolution [253 (1968)] was adopted by the Security Council specifying a series of measures designed to combat the racist régime in Salisbury and bring about its downfall. But what is the position now? That régime, which should be in the throes of overwhelming economic difficulties and the downfall of which we should be expecting daily, is ready for a new stage in its process of consolidation and an even more blatant reaffirmation of its racist character. That is a fact which we consider the more grave because it provides irrefutable proof of the ineffectiveness of the economic sanctions decided upon by the Security Council and challenges the authority of the international institutions in a manner which cannot be tolerated. Thus a renewed consideration of the problem of Rhodesia by the Security Council is clearly indispensable, not only to see what conclusions can be drawn from a policy whose failure has become obvious, but also to prescribe the measures called for by a dangerously developing situation which may gradually become completely out of hand.

10. The decision by the self-proclaimed government in Salisbury to submit its draft constitution to a referendum should not cause any surprise, for it was obvious that the failure of the actions taken by the administering Power as well as by the international organizations would give that basically illegal régime more and more confidence and prompt it to take bolder and bolder attitudes, encouraged by its continuing escape from punishment.

11. In any case, there is no need for us to discuss that decision or to comment on its worth, because, even if the draft constitution were not marked by its outrageous racism, the decision would deserve condemnation as the product of a régime that has already been condemned. But the text which Ian Smith proposes to have adopted is of interest because it reveals, if that is still needed, the intentions of the racist minority and the future that they have in store for the Africans in Rhodesia.

12. The text has at least the merit of being clear, announcing in forthright terms the most despicable racism in its most brutal form. The self-proclaimed Rhodesian government feels that the present constitution contains a number of clauses that it considers unacceptable. It identifies these clauses as "those which provide for future government of the country by the African majority and hence inevitably the domination of one race by another". What are we to think of this concern to avoid the domination of one race by another when it is voiced by a white minority which has at its mercy an entire country, with its riches and its indigenous population? No doubt its object is to prevent the Africans from remaining indefinitely dominated by the white minority that the draft constitution provides for an assembly made up of fifty white members and sixteen members elected by the African majority, and guarantees the white minority possession of

at least half the land. Surely nothing less could be expected from a régime which has never concealed its segregationist convictions and which has so far successfully defied the bans imposed by the administering Power, the condemnation of world opinion and the resolutions of the Security Council.

13. That, in our opinion, is the crux of the problem. We do not think that the remedy lies in yet another condemnation of the Salisbury régime, on top of all the previous condemnations that have had no effect, thus discrediting the most eminent international institutions and sharpening the audacity of the racist minority in Rhodesia.

14. Once again we come before you on behalf of all of Africa, on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, to ask the Security Council to confront this problem with all the attention it deserves, to weigh its gravity and to handle it with all the energy necessary to end this criminal venture whose continued existence is a blot on the honour of mankind.

15. Ever since the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith, the white minority in Rhodesia has been in a state of rebellion against the United Kingdom. The administering Power bears full responsibility for this rebellion; that is a fact which we have always maintained and which the United Kingdom Government itself asserts. While refusing to apply the determined measures called for by the African countries, that Government has repeatedly said it would quell the rebellion of Ian Smith and claimed that it should be trusted to bring the law back to Rhodesia. The Security Council has given it its full support in adopting its policy of economic sanctions and associating all the States Members of the United Nations with them.

16. The United Kingdom Government entered into genuine negotiations with Ian Smith to persuade him to abandon his project. How does it now intend to react to the latest decision by the self-styled government in Salisbury, which is getting ready to cut its last ties with the parent country? We are told that the referendum may result in a defeat for Ian Smith and that it will then be possible to discover among the white minority in Rhodesia some more understanding spokesmen. If that were indeed the attitude of the Government in London, we should find it hard not to regard it as a new abdication fraught with grave consequences.

17. Yet it has become clear that the way chosen by London has only produced very disappointing results. The time has come to recognize that and to draw the necessary conclusions. We do not doubt the sincerity of the United Kingdom Government when it proclaims its will to restore the situation in Rhodesia. But we are not convinced that, in order to do so, it has made the effort necessary to arrive at a positive result. And we have been even less convinced since we had the opportunity to observe that London was capable of taking immediate action with the utmost vigour elsewhere—when the rebellion was not the act of a European minority.

18. We also think that the Security Council must appraise the measures it has adopted in past resolutions, particularly

in its latest resolution [253 (1968)] of 29 May 1968. It is clear that the proposed sanctions, after being in effect for a year, have not yielded the expected results. According to a United Kingdom estimate, the value of exports from Rhodesia to countries outside Africa has amounted to £44 million. Add to that the exports arranged with the complicity of South Africa and Portugal, and it can easily be seen that the effect of the sanctions has been insignificant and that resolution 253 (1968) has been only partially applied by several Member States. Furthermore, it must be noted that the flow of European immigrants into Rhodesia is swelling while at the same time increasing numbers of Africans are emigrating to neighbouring countries. The provision in resolution 253 (1968) which recommends all Member States to discourage their citizens from emigrating to Rhodesia has thus been disregarded.

19. The report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) is most enlightening on this point. Admittedly the United Kingdom Government has from time to time supplied the Committee with very useful information on the disregard of this resolution by a number of Member States. On the other hand, it has done nothing to end the minority régime in Rhodesia as stipulated in paragraph 2 of resolution 253 (1968). Worse still, by announcing prematurely that it would not use force against the rebel colony and by restating that position despite the growing strength of the Smith régime and the failure of economic sanctions, it has indirectly reassured the régime in Salisbury, which, undisturbed, is extending its policy of *apartheid* in Rhodesia.

20. The policy of economic sanctions has proved ineffective largely because Rhodesia has had the benefit of outward and inward trade routes provided by its allies—by South Africa and by Portugal through Mozambique. Obviously the frontiers of Rhodesia cannot be sealed unless these trade routes are closed or the economic sanctions are extended to include Rhodesia's allies. As it does not seem likely at present that the agreement of States that have extensive economic relations with South Africa and Portugal will be obtained, it becomes clear that the policy of economic sanctions is doomed to remain ineffectual, however sincere its intentions may be.

21. An unbiased look at the experience of the past year therefore leads to a statement of the problem in completely unambiguous terms. In taking up the Rhodesian question the Security Council recognized and admitted that it involved a situation which endangered peace in that region of the world and hence world peace as a whole. That assessment is still valid; more than that, it has been sadly confirmed by the way in which the situation has developed and by the most recent events.

22. To ward off this danger the Security Council has taken a series of measures which in practice has yielded almost insignificant results. The countries of Africa, which are naturally and justifiably more keenly aware of the menace facing them, therefore call on this august body for action to guarantee their security. The administering Power, still primarily responsible for the situation in Rhodesia, refuses to take more vigorous steps to bring the Ian Smith rebellion to an end.

23. How are we to answer Ian Smith when he declares "We must not flinch now that we are so close to our goal"? It is beyond comprehension that the international community does not show equal determination in the defence of a just cause, the cause of all the people of Zimbabwe, already gagged by the Salisbury racists and now threatened with perpetual slavery. Unless today we make the necessary effort to lance this abscess, we may be preparing for a future day, perhaps not far off, an explosive situation which will be much harder to contain.

24. The Security Council, in our opinion, has at its disposal more comprehensive and more forceful means of action than those it has called into play so far. It ought to apply them with the firm resolve that the situation demands, using the full weight of its authority to see that its decisions are more strictly put into effect. The administering Power, for its part, must acknowledge its duty and at last respond to this ever more aggressive rebellion by taking an unequivocal and unwavering stand. The Charter has entrusted it with the task of creating the conditions for the Zimbabwe people to gain their independence; it will remain answerable for any encroachment upon the inalienable rights of the African people of Rhodesia.

25. Mr. MUDENDA (Zambia): Mr. President, allow me first of all to say how greatly honoured I am to be accorded this opportunity to address your august Council. As the distinguished members of this Council know, Zambia is comparatively new on the Security Council, having taken its seat only this year. And yet, our trust and hope in the General Assembly, and in this Council, whatever its shortcomings, form one of the pillars of our foreign policy. Indeed, in this imperfect world, we see the Council, especially in the field of maintaining international peace and security, as the only guarantee to human survival so far.

26. It is with this expectation that I bring you, Mr. President, and all your distinguished colleagues, the greetings and wishes of my President, His Excellency, Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda. It is also because of that trust and hope that my Government has placed in you that I have come here so that, together, we may re-examine the situation in Zimbabwe.

27. Nearly three and a half years ago, a small group of power-hungry men in Rhodesia staged an open rebellion against the United Kingdom, the administering Power. Unlike other rebellions that of 11 November 1965 was not for the purpose of overthrowing a colonial master, even though the action of the rebels may have humiliated the administering Power. The rebels embarked on the enterprise for two reasons only. First, to entrench their privileged position and, second, to deprive the indigenous inhabitants of Zimbabwe for all time of the right to self-determination and majority rule.

28. Once they declared themselves independent the rebels proceeded, with characteristic brutality, to suppress the manifest popular resistance of the people of Zimbabwe. To do this, they instituted a two-pronged attack. First—force: in this regard, military force has been brought into play to put down African resistance, and prisons, detention and restriction camps have been filled with leaders of the

resistance. Second—the so-called constitution: emboldened by the reassurance that the administering Power would never use force against them in whatever circumstances, the rebels seized the first opportune moment to “legitimize”, as it were, their illegitimacy and in the ensuing so-called constitution try to enshrine their privileges for ever, to the total detriment of the majority of the inhabitants.

29. In the resulting conflagration, the administering Power assumed the hopeless posture of resignation, almost tantamount to tacit acceptance. The rebels’ racist neighbours provided military and economic support to them, and collectively the minority régimes began to threaten the stability and sovereignty of independent States, like mine, to the north of the Zambezi River.

30. Having briefly outlined the Rhodesian situation, I now wish to explain our motive for requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council. We have not come here, in case there is some doubt in certain minds, to consult about the illegality of referenda by illegal régimes. To us it is obvious that an illegal régime does not attain respectability, let alone legality, merely because overnight the same unrepresentative clique produces a new constitution. It would, therefore, be over-indulgent on my part to take much of your precious time discussing the forthcoming referendum in Rhodesia. Suffice it for me to say merely that any so-called “constitution” promulgated by the rebels, especially if it is, as it can only be, a rejection of the principle of self-determination, will never be recognized by my Government. I have every hope that this will be the view of all peace-loving nations.

31. The basic issue is the existence of an illegal racist minority régime in Rhodesia which has denied the majority of the people of Zimbabwe the right to self-determination. That is the basic issue. To remove that régime and to bring about the effective application of the principle of self-determination, majority rule and sovereignty is our goal.

32. Fortunately, having addressed itself to the Rhodesian question for some time, as early as 1966 this Council, in its wisdom, determined “that the . . . situation in Southern Rhodesia” constituted “a threat to international peace and security” [*resolution 232 (1966)*]. Indeed, even before it had so determined, the Council embarked on various measures aimed at toppling the illegal régime in Rhodesia. Those measures, voluntary and limited at first, but later widened by Security Council resolution 253 (1968), have been in operation long enough to give us a good indication whether they had any chance of success.

33. My country has been convinced from the very start that the sanctions were doomed to failure. Our co-operation with the sanctions policy, which has been to the best of our ability, has not affected our conviction as to the futility of that policy. Although we do not know the results of the review by the Sanctions Committee, we have no doubt at all that the conclusions will not be of a nature to cheer the advocates of sanctions. But the sad fact is that we all knew, without having to wait this long, that as long as South Africa and Portugal were determined to frustrate the sanctions, they had not the slightest chance of succeeding.

Speaking on this very subject in the General Assembly on 15 November 1966, my President stated:

“We remain even more convinced that nothing short of force or mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Articles 41 and 42, will bring about the conditions favourable for the normalization of the administration of Rhodesia.”<sup>1</sup>

34. The obvious course of action for the Security Council in the face of this defiance by South Africa and Portugal would have been to extend the mandatory sanctions against the two culprits: namely, South Africa and Portugal. In our view, that was the logical thing to do if Chapter VII of the Charter is to be meaningful. But, alas, one of the actors in the Rhodesian tragedy had already come out with an interesting formula: no force, no sell-out, no confrontation with South Africa. That monstrous contradiction has brought to nil all the efforts of the Security Council and of all the countries of the world. I am satisfied that, as long as that contradiction remains, the sanctions policy will not succeed; and if we continue with that policy without plugging the obvious loop-holes, posterity will look at us as people who tried to carry water in baskets.

35. It may be necessary at this stage briefly to outline the kind of steps we believe are necessary to bring about the desired results in Rhodesia. If the Security Council wishes to succeed in Rhodesia, then it must be prepared to apply the provisions of Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. South Africa and Portugal will have to decide whether they wish to co-operate with the noble efforts of the Council or obstruct this Council’s decisions for the sake of merely supporting an illegal racist minority régime in Rhodesia with the consequences this may entail.

36. If, however, for reasons of trade and colour or racialism, as well as global military strategy, certain members of the Council are not prepared for a confrontation with South Africa, the alternative is the use of force in Rhodesia itself. We have been realistic enough to know that the loss of life would have been, and would still be, minimized if the administering Power had used that force, rather than the Security Council or any other organ of the United Nations. Unfortunately, however, hitherto the United Kingdom—and we must stress that Rhodesia is its responsibility—while at first talking about its intention to quell the rebellion, to restore constitutionality and ultimately prepare the people for majority rule in Zimbabwe, has ruled out the only weapon it could have used to achieve those objectives. Instead, the United Kingdom has resorted to manoeuvres which ultimately aimed not at quelling the rebellion any longer, but rather at ending illegality.

37. However, we all know now that those manoeuvres failed to succeed basically because what the rebels wanted, as is now indicated in their latest proposals, could not possibly be a basis for any negotiations, even for those who would wish to negotiate with the rebels. The rebels had in mind the creation of a permanent police State, with censorship, preventive detention and restriction, abolition

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 1464th meeting, para. 50.*

of an appeal system after trial on political charges, compulsory powers to search and seize property, and the denial of bail. All these measures, which do not obtain even in the South African Constitution, could not be openly granted on the *Tiger* or the *Fearless*.

38. The principal arguments against the use of force by the administering Power were that there would be an unnecessary loss of life and property, that the African people of Zimbabwe would suffer most in the event of an armed conflict, and, further, that possibilities for a negotiated settlement existed. Unfortunately, today there is no possibility for a negotiated settlement; nor can we lightly talk about avoiding the loss of life, because a lot of lives have already been lost, and a lot more will be lost.

39. While previously the administering Power had given the indigenous people the impression that majority rule would eventually be granted—indeed, while the disastrous proposals on the *Fearless* put off majority rule for a rather lengthy period of time—the present impasse has for ever put off the possibility that Britain will grant independence to the people of Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule. The mirage has disappeared; the people of Zimbabwe know where they stand; as a result, their determination to rid themselves of the oppressive racist minority régime has grown immeasurably.

40. The racial war which we all wanted to avoid is, I am afraid, with us. One would like to ask whether the British Government, which has in the past claimed to be a practical peace-keeper, will want to continue to sit idly by while southern Africa is engulfed in strife. Does it still see a distinction between peace-keeping operations in the Mediterranean, or so-called police action in the southern Atlantic, and the use of force south of the Zambezi River? And, if they do, what is the distinction?

41. Whatever is the answer to those questions, the administering Power would be better advised to know that force is the only answer; and the question is merely whether that answer is to be supplied by the administering Power or by the indigenous people of Zimbabwe themselves.

42. To sum up, I should like to reiterate that, whatever internal changes may take place in Rhodesia, all those changes stem from one cardinal issue: legality. To us, all that matters is the right of the people of Zimbabwe, as a whole, to self-determination, majority rule and independence. The restoration of constitutional rule can only be a step towards that final objective. The United Kingdom, in its capacity as the administering Power, has the responsibility for the human blood which is flowing in Zimbabwe.

43. We are aware that several capitalist countries still have clandestine connexions with Rhodesia but we are satisfied that if Portugal and South Africa were prevented from co-operating with the rebels those activities would also come to an end. The sanctions have failed. Therefore we have no choice but to use force to put down the rebellion, and it is logical and, given the racial nature of the conflict, proper that the United Kingdom should use that force. Unless such measures are taken, the racial conflict will

escalate—I repeat, the racial conflict will escalate—and will spread beyond the borders of Zimbabwe, and the administering Power will continue to be held responsible for the inevitable flow of blood.

44. I am happy to say that the people of Africa have clearly demonstrated that they are not racialists. Nevertheless, let me make it quite clear that in the twentieth century the people of Africa will not accept domination in their own countries by white people. The oppressed millions of Zimbabwe who have been let down by the timidity, the tepidity and the duplicity of the British Government will continue to struggle for freedom. Zambia's concern is to avoid bitterness, to avoid loss of life and to attain majority rule under conditions that are conducive to harmony.

45. I hope I am not being over-optimistic in believing that the Council shares Zambia's concern in regretting the bitterness that will inevitably be generated by the armed struggle in Zimbabwe. I believe that the Council deplors the loss of life in Zimbabwe. I am convinced that the Council has the capacity to take effective measures on this matter. Should the Council fail to take effective measures, it will have helped to consolidate racialism and oppression in southern Africa. On the other hand, if the Council takes effective measures now, it will have made a great contribution to the welfare of mankind.

46. Mr. BOYE (Senegal) (*translated from French*): The first words I have to say, Mr. President, are to offer you the congratulations of my delegation, which, for many months now, has been in a position to admire your smiling courtesy, your tact and your ability. Nor shall we forget your predecessors, who have presided over our Council with distinction in recent months.

47. We come before this Council today to focus the world's attention on some extremely serious developments that have actually been taking place for some years in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. You will not hear any insults from me: they would not help the freedom fighters in Southern Rhodesia; furthermore the situation is one that must be treated with dignity, lucidity and absolute composure. But I am entitled, am I not, to hate evil?

48. The decision by the white minority in Salisbury to hold a so-called referendum on 20 June next in order to have a constitution adopted was, in fact, predictable. Ian Smith still defies international opinion without caring about the decisions of the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly, because he has the benefit of certain favours from several great Powers.

49. We were told here last year that the economic sanctions imposed against Ian Smith's illegal régime would be sufficient to make the *de facto* authorities in Salisbury back down. We expressed our scepticism at the time and declared that force was the only way of putting Ian Smith and his clique out of mischief and preventing them from disturbing international peace and security.

50. Our words are regrettably borne out by the situation today and, knowing intimately the course of events in Southern Rhodesia, we affirm once more that the use of

force is the only way to bring down the régime of Ian Smith and his clique and to enable the Zimbabwe people to exercise freely their right to self-determination.

51. It would not, moreover, be the first time that the Government of the United Kingdom had resorted to the use of force against one of its colonies. The most recent intervention by that Government, as you know, was directed against the little island of Anguilla. But of course, Anguilla is not Southern Rhodesia: the moral, sentimental, economic and financial interests to be safeguarded in Rhodesia are certainly more important to the United Kingdom than those in Anguilla; moreover, the authorities in Pretoria who protect the white minority of Salisbury must be treated gently. With each passing day the system of *apartheid* becomes more firmly implanted in Southern Rhodesia.

52. As you know, the two mainstays of racial segregation in Southern Rhodesia are the law governing the housing and registration of Africans in urban areas, and the law on land distribution. That is a strangely similar situation to the one existing in the so-called Republic of South Africa.

53. In an investigation that I conducted as leader of a group of experts, we collected some impressive evidence which led us to the conclusion that the system in force in Southern Rhodesia was similar to that infesting South Africa. Yet voices in Western Europe are silent, though they are always ready to wail over certain situations in Africa which Africans alone have the duty to settle.

54. One witness, speaking of the white Rhodesians, told us:

“They are people who are enabled by the economic and social structure in Rhodesia to live as they imagine their superiors used to live in Europe. In other words, a mechanic will go there and have an income that automatically allows him a house, servants and membership of a club . . . which has nothing in common with the manner of living of the working class he belonged to in his country in Europe.”

55. To illustrate that statement I should like to inform you, if you do not know already, that the leader of the Rhodesian settlers, Mr. J. Douglas Smith, is the son of a Scottish immigrant, a knacker by trade, who, after working in a butcher's shop in Bulawayo, later became the owner of a ranch near Salisbury. To bring into focus the collusion between the authorities of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, I may mention that in Southern Rhodesia the number of prison staff recruited from South Africa has increased. At the Salisbury prison, for example, it is estimated that about 80 per cent of the white warders or officers are Afrikaans-speaking. One English-speaking warden complained that he was leaving the service because a knowledge of Afrikaans was being made a prerequisite for employment. The same English-speaking warden stated: “The South Africans will show the Rhodesians how to treat the Kaffirs.”

56. We are not surprised, therefore, to see the same detestable tortures being used against the freedom fighters

in Southern Rhodesia as in South Africa: sharpened bicycle spokes thrust into the urethra; testicles squeezed with pincers; live snakes put into occupied cells; fatal beatings during interrogation; electric shocks; execution of injured freedom fighters; random firing on villagers under the pretext of “killing freedom fighters”; prisoners thrown out of helicopters in flight.

57. We should very much like to know the reaction to this picture of inhuman and degrading torture of those who are so concerned about what is going on in a certain part of Africa among Africans.

58. According to *The New York Times* of 11 December 1968, 118 prisoners were then awaiting execution in Southern Rhodesia.

59. More serious still—if a scale of gravity can be established in this hateful system—the courts have become an instrument for the defence of white supremacy.

60. But we must be honest and recognize that some whites do attempt to show their opposition to the development of totalitarianism. One witness said to us:

“In this society the white liberal who opposes the régime is particularly vulnerable; he can easily be destroyed. If, for instance, he wants to break through the colour bar he literally cannot do it; he cannot join his friends and colleagues who happen to be black and go and live with them. That is quite impossible because by so doing he would be committing an offence, contravening the law on the housing and registration of Africans in urban areas, which states among other things that any European living in an African area, or the reverse, is committing a punishable offence.”

61. Recently, on Saturday 7 June 1969, I read the following news item published by *France-Press* Agency:

“The five Catholic bishops of Rhodesia, in a pastoral letter, bitterly condemned Prime Minister Ian Smith's latest draft constitution.

“‘That draft runs in many respects completely counter to Christian teaching’, the bishops stated; and they emphasized that it must therefore be rejected ‘for the good of our people and of all men of goodwill’.

“The bishops are distressed to find no trace whatever of a sense of justice or of brotherly love in the draft, which they consider was composed not with the common good in mind but with the deliberate aim of ensuring the permanent domination of one segment of the population over the other.

“‘This policy, which is completely irreconcilable with divine law, will one day have the most tragic consequences for the whole country’, the prelates continued. ‘It can only bring us hatred and violence’, they added.

“The bishops concluded, ‘If this draft is actually used as the basis for a new constitution, it will be extremely difficult for us to counsel moderation to a people who

have shown such patience during the long period in which discriminatory laws have been in force and who are now subjected to this provocation'."

62. On 8 June *France-Presse* Agency gave us a further report:

"In a joint declaration on Sunday, most of the Christian churches in Rhodesia clearly indicated their disapproval of Mr. Ian Smith's plans for a constitution, which will be submitted to a 'referendum' on 20 June.

"The Anglican bishops of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, the Catholic Archbishop of Salisbury and five of his bishops—who had severely condemned the draft on Saturday—the heads of the Methodist, Presbyterian and Congregationalist churches and the United Church of Christ, the Bible societies and the consistories of Salisbury and Bulawayo all declared that the artificial restrictions placed in the draft on the development of the individual were incompatible with the Christian conscience.

"The church dignitaries criticized the fiscal, electoral and agrarian provisions of the draft, and the grounds given for the method of granting civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression. 'No government that is truly intent on serving the people would agree to base its authority on such proposals', they stated, emphasizing at the same time that the draft utterly contradicts the teachings of freedom and justice in the New Testament."

63. Despite all these voices that have been raised, despite the heroic struggle of the indigenous people of Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith continues to shut thousands of people up in uninhabitable camps where wild animals live, and goes on executing freedom fighters in contempt of the decisions of the administering authorities. It is high time the United Kingdom showed a firmer hand, as it managed to in Anguilla, and used all means, including force, to put an end to the racist régime that infests Southern Rhodesia under the protection of the fascist régime in Pretoria.

64. We hope and pray for the establishment in that part of southern Africa of a multiracial society founded on the principles of equality, peace and liberty, where every individual will be able to live a 'decent life and enjoy the benefits of modern scientific progress.

65. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I intended to speak as early as possible in this debate, and as I have listened to the eloquent speeches made this morning, I wished all the more that I could have spoken earlier. I would wish, too, before going further, to pay very sincere tribute to the very remarkable speeches to which we have listened this morning. As I listened to those speeches, I remembered that Scripture tells us that the Lord was not in the great and strong wind, nor in the earthquake nor in the fire, but in a still small voice.<sup>2</sup> And in a still small voice I wanted to put a limited but straightforward proposition to the Council.

66. It did not seem to me that this was the best occasion to attempt to review the long and unhappy story of illegal

actions in Rhodesia. We shall have other opportunities to do that. Still less did it seem to me an occasion when we wished to show to Rhodesia and to the world divisions and disputes here in the United Nations. It also seemed to me that it would be well at this moment to avoid violence of accusation amongst ourselves. Rather, I thought that today was an occasion when we should consider together what action is best suited to the needs of the time. It seemed to me of the utmost importance that we should act together and act unanimously. So it can be that what we do and say together today will have the maximum effect.

67. My mind goes back to November 1965 when we first met together in this Council to take action following the illegal declaration of independence. I well remember that we then decided to condemn that action by the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia, and we also called upon all States not to recognize this illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering any assistance to it.

68. That was our first act together. I remember the proposal put to us by the Ambassador of Jordan [*1258th meeting*]. I well remember that we readily rallied to his proposal. It was an historic decision, and it is important to see that no country in the world has disregarded the call we then made. No country in the world has recognized the illegal régime.

69. Since then my country has repeatedly brought proposals to the Council for economic measures against the illegal régime leading up to resolution 253 (1968) of May 1968 imposing for the first time in history comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. Our decision was unanimous [*ibid.*]. I do not pretend that there were not serious differences between us, as indeed there still are, but that resolution, adopted just over a year ago, was, as all of us who then were present well remember, a major effort in international compromise and co-operation.

70. Now, we are faced with a new development. It is a development of some importance but its importance must not be overrated. The minority régime in Rhodesia has called for a referendum amongst the minority in Rhodesia and that minority referendum is to take place on 20 June. What is the right action to take in this Council in the face of that new development? It is my earnest argument to the Council that our reaction should be not to divide but to unite. If we divide we give comfort and support to a régime whose policies we all regard with disgust. We should give comfort and support at a time when we should be giving exactly the opposite. But if we unite and speak with the authentic voice of the whole international community, then we can exercise a valuable influence.

71. What then do I propose? I propose that we should condemn the illegal régime. We should condemn the denial of human and political rights. We deplore the limitation of the referendum to a minority. We should, above all, condemn the proposals for a new constitution. That is the action which I strongly recommend to the Council.

72. Again, I repeat that it seems to me of the utmost importance that prior to the referendum next week we

<sup>2</sup> See I Kings 19: 11-12.

should act in unity. The last thing we should do would be to divide in disagreement and dispute.

73. What can we say about the referendum? The minority in Rhodesia will say what they want. Are they determined to drift further into political isolation and international ostracism and economic stagnation? Or have they the courage and the good sense to break away from that negative and reactionary course, and seek not frightful conflict but fruitful conciliation?

74. That is the choice they have to make. We should leave them in no doubt that if they vote for isolation and conflict they will do so in the face of the condemnation of representatives of the whole world.

75. What can we say about the proposed constitution? Certainly it is not necessary to go into detail. Nearly every clause discloses racial discrimination and racial repression and racial injustice. The provisions of this so-called constitution offend against every decent democratic principle. They entrench for ever the position of the minority. They provide for only a handful of popularly-elected African members of the lower house of the legislature and none at all in the upper house. To the so-called declaration of rights there is no judicial safeguard and so no possibility of challenge by the courts to any legislation adopted by the minority-dominated parliament. Franchise qualifications are not entrenched and not included in the constitution itself. It would even be easy for the white members of Parliament to secure amendment of the entrenched clauses of the constitution.

76. This is a blatantly racist constitution. So its authors have admitted. So it is recognized by the world. We have an obvious duty to condemn it and to condemn it unanimously.

77. So I come back to the contention which I am so anxious to put before the Council. It is that prior to the referendum next week we should at the earliest possible moment declare our unanimous condemnation of the constitution. We should, moreover—going back to the first action we took in 1965—call on all States to refuse to recognize the illegal régime in whatever form. That is the right action to take on the referendum.

78. What should take place thereafter? Let me tell the Council what I think should take place. The British Government will wish to consult other Governments, particularly African Governments, after the referendum. My Government is already committed to continuing consultation with Commonwealth Governments. That commitment was confirmed at the Commonwealth Conference earlier this year.

79. All of us must then face the hard facts and consider together what more can be done. I can assure the Council that we shall not go back. As my Foreign Secretary said in the House of Commons last month:

“It is quite clear that Her Majesty’s Government and indeed all the Governments of the world—because this is mankind’s problem—must resolve to pursue steadily the

present course of denying recognition and maintaining sanctions against an illegal régime which denies human rights.”

80. Our commitment is clear. I trust that our actions will be opportune and well directed. On the general situation in Rhodesia we can consult together later. What we need to do now is to act, and to act quickly and to act unanimously.

81. Let me finally say this. I have myself been concerned in the problems of Rhodesia and of all southern Africa for a number of years. I do not need to be told of the evils of racial discrimination and racial domination. They are monstrous evils. As the representative of Senegal has so rightly said, we are all entitled to hate those evils. So I have long been convinced of these evils. If the policies of racial injustice are pursued in southern Africa they will, so I have long believed, lead to conflict and to catastrophe of vast proportion. I do not underestimate the dangers.

82. Moreover, I have long maintained that no solution of the racial problems of southern Africa can be found except on the basis of consultation with the people, all the people. Their interests must be paramount.

83. Of all the principles which have been stated and confirmed in the long consideration of this matter, the principle I have always thought most important is the principle that no settlement can be accepted which is not approved by the people of Rhodesia as a whole. In the words of my Government, that principle is “transcendent and overriding”.

84. Moreover, I do not believe that solutions will be found by violent speeches or wild gestures. We all know the necessary, the unavoidable, limitations. I have often said that the task in southern Africa is a job not for the cavalry, but for the sappers.

85. Our progress must be slow. I greatly hope that it can be well considered and wisely judged and unanimously agreed.

86. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): The Security Council should no doubt be grateful to the fifty-nine Asian and African States Members to whose initiative we owe the present meeting. We are also beholden to the Foreign Minister of Zambia and the Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs of Algeria for coming here and, by their cogent and forceful statements, infusing in us a due sense of urgency and of the gravity of the situation that obtains in Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the fact cannot be over-stressed that in considering the situation we are not so much accommodating a demand of one or more Member States as we are discharging a responsibility independently of that demand.

87. The problem of Rhodesia has been the subject of action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Consequently, it remains the continuing responsibility of the Security Council to keep under review the efficacy or otherwise of the measures which it has taken towards bringing the illegal minority régime to an end. The question before the Security Council is whether or not the sanctions imposed under resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May

1968 have been effective and, if not, how they can be reinforced by other possible measures under Chapter VII. This is a question altogether different from an adjudication of rights and wrongs, a balancing of claims and counter-claims. There is no controversy here of questions of law or morality. The issue before us is predominantly of an executive nature; it has to be faced with candour. If acrimony is undesirable, equivocation is also out of place.

88. Last month the illegal régime dared to throw an open challenge to the entire international community by announcing its plan to perpetuate the domination by a small white minority over the majority in Rhodesia more than sixteen times its number. The question inescapably arises: what further measures is the Security Council prepared to adopt?

89. The so-called constitutional proposals and the plan to submit them to a "referendum" serve notice to the United Nations that the Salisbury clique is determined to deny to the people of Zimbabwe their inalienable right to majority rule and independence and to impose on them the system of *apartheid* for all time to come. Nothing could make it clearer that the usurper régime has finally refused to recant its unilateral declaration of independence. It has defied sanctions. It is prepared to repudiate the British Queen and Parliament. It has slammed the door to negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom. The breach is therefore irrevocable.

90. This is not a subjective evaluation. The world press views the recent developments in the same light. To give but two examples: *The New York Times* commented in an editorial of 24 May that the new constitution "stripped away Mr. Smith's remaining trappings of moderation and exposed him for what he unquestionably has been all along, a white supremacist". The *Washington Post*, on 5 June reported from Salisbury that there is "a growing feeling among Government supporters here that South Africa and Rhodesia ultimately are going to be thrown together".

91. For its part, the Government of the United Kingdom now seems to appreciate that all the efforts for a compromise, whether desirable or not, have now totally collapsed. Indeed, in his television interview on 20 May, as reported in *The New York Times* of 21 May, Prime Minister Wilson, referring to a negotiated settlement, recognized that "Perhaps there never was a chance".

92. I need hardly dwell on the so-called constitutional proposals of the Ian Smith régime. They are predicated on the assumption that the white, being white, has the inherent right to rule over the non-white and that there is no such thing as the dignity and worth of the human person as far as the African or Asian is concerned.

93. My delegation would urge that the Security Council at once condemn the impending so-called "referendum", that it rule null and void any verdict in favour of the so-called constitution, and proceed forthwith to the consideration of further measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to reinforce the sanctions in order to end the settler régime and remove the threat to peace.

94. In considering these further measures we must keep two things in view: first, the facts regarding the effects of the sanctions under resolutions 217 (1965), 232 (1966) and 253 (1968), and, second, the scope of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

95. As far as sanctions are concerned, it cannot be gainsaid that so far they have failed to make any decisive impact on the economy of Rhodesia, far less on its political situation. In its annual survey of economic development, published in April last, the Smith régime claimed that it had succeeded in breaking economic sanctions in 1968, and forecast an even better economic outlook for 1969.

96. What are the facts? There has been a net capital inflow of £25 million into Rhodesia in 1968 which has almost entirely offset the deficit in current account. Agricultural production is likely to increase markedly in 1969. Higher sales of products, including nickel, may also ease the strain on Rhodesia's external payments. Manufacturing output is at a record level. Taxation has not increased. No immediate necessity is being felt for devaluation of the Rhodesian pound. European immigration into Rhodesia in 1968 exceeded the figure for 1965. The general level of economic activity, which declined in 1966 under the immediate impact of sanctions, is now slightly above that of 1965 in real terms. All these facts appear to lend confirmation to Ian Smith's assertion regarding the state of the economy.

97. In the face of these facts, it would be self-deception on our part to conclude that economic sanctions have had more than a marginal effect or have caused anything more than a partial dislocation of Rhodesia's economy. During 1968, in which the scope of sanctions against the illegal régime was extended to cover Rhodesia's imports also under this Council's resolution 253 (1968), the illegal régime claims that its exports fell from \$264 million in 1967 to \$256 million only, that is, a decline of a little more than 3 per cent, while the value of its imports rose from \$262 million for that year to \$290 million.

98. South Africa alone accounted for \$80 million of Rhodesia's exports and a very large part of its imports. The Governments of South Africa and Portugal, in defiance of the decisions of the Security Council, refused to take any measures to implement the provisions of the various sanctions resolutions and continued to maintain close economic, trade and other relations with the illegal régime and to permit the free flow of goods from Southern Rhodesia through the territories of South Africa and the colony of Mozambique and their ports and transport facilities.

99. The illegal régime also carried on a clandestine trade with other States which, according to one estimate, in 1968 amounted to approximately £44 million. The origins and destinations of goods were disguised by false documents and false labels. Many States failed to prevent their nationals from engaging in activities to promote the export of goods of Southern Rhodesian origin and the import into Southern Rhodesia of goods needed by the illegal régime or the use of ships and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals.

100. It has become very clear that as a result of the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to take the necessary measures and the failure of some other States to fully implement the provisions of resolution 253 (1968), sanctions against the illegal régime have not yet brought about the results desired by the Security Council.

101. Speaking in the Security Council at its thirteen hundred and thirty-first meeting on 8 December 1966, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom said:

“The object of the programme of sanctions has been to reduce Rhodesian economic activity and prospects to a point where even the most stubborn members of the Rhodesian Front party could see that there would be no tolerable economic future for their country if their present policy were pursued. The best way of achieving this was and still is to strike directly at Rhodesian earning power by action against the exports which are most important to it in international trade.” [1331st meeting, para. 12.]

102. Mr. George Brown gave this rationale in the context of the debate which led to the adoption of resolution 232 of 16 December 1966, imposing selective mandatory sanctions on the export of fifteen major groups of commodities considered to be of critical importance to Rhodesia's foreign trade. Resolution 253 (1968) extended the scope of sanctions to include Rhodesia's imports and in other directions. And yet, after three and a half years of the application of sanctions, the economic pressures on the illegal régime have remained so tolerable that the Rhodesian Front feels emboldened to cross the Rubicon and to slam the door to all negotiations for a settlement with the administering Power.

103. The history of this denouement has been melancholy and unedifying. At every stage, beginning with the notice by the Salisbury régime to proclaim a unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom as the administering Power, thought it the path of wisdom to assure Ian Smith that force would not be used to quell the rebellion. This was the constant theme in the pronouncements of British statesmen—in the British Parliament, at the Commonwealth Conferences and in the United Nations. Is it surprising that as he took each further step on the path of illegality and interposed each additional obstacle to the advance of the Rhodesian Africans to majority rule, he felt emboldened by these repeated assurances.

104. The administering Power, with its long experience of an imperial role, chose to adopt the entirely novel tactic of confronting armed rebellion by argument and persuasion.

105. That is how the United Kingdom reacted to the unilateral declaration of independence. That was its position at the *Tiger* talks. It adopted the same attitude at the *Fearless* meeting.

106. At each of these critical moments, the United Kingdom was compelled to retreat. First, the administering Power implied that it would condone the rebellion if it was ended and the illegal régime returned to the path of

legality. Then it was announced that the United Kingdom would not insist on a withdrawal of the UDI, if Ian Smith agreed to a “broadbased administration” including Africans. The stand on no independence before majority rule was relaxed.

107. Finally, even the hope of securing some democratic advance, let alone guarantees of unimpeded progress towards majority rule, has been brutally shattered by the so-called constitutional proposals.

108. Now that the illegal régime has finally ended all hopes of a negotiated settlement, how does the administering Power plan to end the rebellion and fulfil its solemn obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to lead the people of Zimbabwe to unimpeded majority rule and independence?

109. We feel that the moment of truth has arrived. Would it be too much to hope for an agonizing reappraisal?

110. It is indeed disturbing that *The Times* of London of 22 May should, in an editorial, conclude that: “The eventual decision is likely to be the result of the world's increasing reluctance to police the policy of sanctions and the growing indifference of the British electorate.”

111. If the administering Power were to permit itself to be influenced by such a thought, world confidence in its good faith and fidelity to its Charter obligations would be undermined. If the United Nations should weaken in its resolve to pursue the policy of sanctions against the Smith régime, it would do well to contemplate the history of the League of Nations after its failure to enforce sanctions against Mussolini.

112. Speaking at the time of the adoption of resolution 253 (1968) at the 1428th meeting of the Security Council, I said that that resolution was not the end of the road and that further measures must follow until the rebellion in Rhodesia was ended and the people of Zimbabwe attained their freedom and independence. It is to this thought that I should now like to turn.

113. In the deliberations of the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council, it became only too manifest, on the basis of all the evidence at its disposal, that principally because of the defiant attitude of South Africa and Portugal to implement the sanctions resolutions of this Council, the economic pressures against the illegal régime have not been sufficiently serious to bring the stubborn and recalcitrant men in Salisbury to the path of reason and legality.

114. Therefore, it is the view of my delegation that unless the Security Council turns its attention to a consideration of extending the sanctions to Portugal and South Africa, at least in respect of the major commodities groups imported and exported by Rhodesia, the present sanctions cannot succeed.

115. It is a matter of record in the documentation of the Sanctions Committee that despite the mandatory prohibition in paragraph 4 of resolution 253 (1968), there was a

net capital inflow of some £25 million into Rhodesia, of which £21 million was in the corporate sector, which enabled the illegal régime to offset almost the entire current account deficit of £26.8 million. In the view of my delegation, ways and means must be devised forthwith to stop this inflow from all sources, including subsidiaries of foreign companies and by suppliers of credits for capital goods.

116. Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 253 (1968) deal respectively with emigration, possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter and the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia. States not complying with the provisions of these paragraphs contend that they are not obligatory. It is therefore necessary to strengthen those provisions in a suitable manner to make their impact felt by the illegal régime. In particular, my delegation considers it important to make it clear in unmistakable terms that all the twelve countries which continue to maintain consular representation in Southern Rhodesia must withdraw such representation without delay. Resolution 217 (1965) in paragraph 6 called upon all States not to recognize the illegal régime and not to entertain diplomatic or other relations with it. That provision needs to be complemented by the prohibition of consular representation in order that the *apartheid* régime in Salisbury may be effectively ostracized by the international community.

117. These are some of the further steps that, in the view of my delegation, the Security Council might consider taking to meet the new and the gravest challenge yet thrown out by the illegal régime. I should, however, like to make it clear beyond any doubt that any action which may be taken by this Council does not in any manner absolve the United Kingdom Government of its solemn responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations and the constitutional law of the United Kingdom to quell the racist minority rebellion in Southern Rhodesia by all necessary means without exception.

118. The Pakistan delegation stands ready to enter into consultations with the delegations of other States members of the Security Council to reach agreement for taking further effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter commensurate with the objective of ending the illegal régime and removing the threat to peace in southern Africa.

119. Mr. YOST (United States of America): The Security Council meets at a deeply disturbing moment in the troubled history of the problem of Southern Rhodesia. On 20 June there will be presented to the voters of that Territory certain proposals for a new constitution and for the conversion of the Territory into a so-called Republic. Those proposals emanate not from the United Kingdom, which is the lawful sovereign Power, but from an illegal white minority régime. They will be voted on not by an electorate representative of the 4.5 million people of the Territory, but by some 90,000 voters, nine-tenths of whom are white in a country whose population is about 95 per cent black. The proposals themselves are conceived in racism. Their design is to perpetuate the rule of the white minority and to render majority rule or the attainment of political equality by the members of the black majority for

ever impossible. That this is the deliberate aim of the new constitutional proposals is undeniable. The evidence on this point is clear. It can be found in the introduction to the document published on 21 May by the régime in Salisbury and entitled "Proposals for a New Constitution for Rhodesia".

120. The first paragraph of that document explains the need for a new constitution by declaring that the Constitution of 1961 "contains a number of objectionable features, the principal ones being that it provides for eventual African rule and inevitably the domination of one race by another, and that it does not guarantee that government will be retained in responsible hands". It then asserts that the new constitution "will ensure that government will be retained in responsible hands". By that phrase the authors clearly mean that the rule of the white minority is to be guaranteed in perpetuity. Evidently they do not object to the domination of one race by another so long as the dominant race is white.

121. The intentions of the régime have been further expounded in recent statements by Mr. Ian Smith. In a speech on 7 May he explained the purpose of the new constitution as "to retain Western civilization in Rhodesia" and "to stem the tide of rampant black nationalism on the Zambezi". In a radio address on 21 May, he complained that throughout the discussions with the United Kingdom "the British have been obsessed with the question of majority rule".

122. It is a curious view indeed which sees nothing in common between Western civilization and the concept of majority rule; but that is the view which appears to prevail among the constitution writers in Salisbury.

123. I shall comment only briefly on the constitutional provisions. The provisions on franchise and on the composition and powers of the legislature were written to assure that the decisive political power will remain for ever in white hands. The main legislative power is to be lodged in a lower house consisting at the outset of fifty Europeans and sixteen Africans. Half of the Africans will be chosen by tribal councils. Provision for an eventual increase in African representation in the lower house is tied to an income tax formula that is virtually certain to prevent any such increase for many years to come; and an African majority in either house is completely ruled out.

124. The provisions on land tenure stipulate that the European and African areas are to be approximately "equal" in size, if not in quality—meaning the same quantity of land for the 5 per cent who are white as for the 95 per cent who are black. Given the distribution of political power, it would not be surprising to see the ruling minority change the recipe even further to their advantage.

125. One other feature deserves notice: a chapter entitled "Declaration of Rights". It is a curiously ironic title for a chapter which explicitly authorizes, among other things, preventive detention, restriction of individuals without bail or trial, the power to require an accused person to testify against himself; and censorship of broadcasting, newspapers and other publications. As if these provisions did not give

enough scope to a police state, it is further provided that, if a bill in parliament is found to violate the Declaration of Rights, it can nevertheless be enacted if the upper house holds it to be necessary in the national interest, or if the lower house decides to pass it anyway.

126. With such a flimsy bill of rights as this, no man, whether white or black, can feel that his liberty is safe. For the sake of denying the rights of the black majority, the members of the white minority are being asked to leave their own liberties unprotected.

127. Since these proposals—despite all the trappings of law in which they are dressed—are intrinsically unjust, and since they emanate from an unlawful régime, they will be without legal effect, regardless of the results of the voting on 20 June. Nevertheless, their political significance is a matter of grave concern. By these steps the present authorities in Salisbury propose to turn their backs on the United Kingdom and on the long effort to find a basis for independence which would be lawful, acceptable to all the people, and compatible with the principle of majority rule. The same authorities who announced a spurious independence in 1965 have now, it seems, abandoned all pretence of wishing to legitimize their country's status in the international community. They have abandoned all pretence that the 95 per cent of Rhodesians who are black might ever, at any time, aspire to their just share in the government of their own country. They have set their faces toward a bogus, usurped independence based on perpetual white supremacy in a nation that is overwhelmingly black. The road which they thus propose to travel is lonesome and dangerous. It is all too likely to lead to the racial polarization, extremism, and lawless violence which its proponents profess to fear.

128. The conclusion is inescapable that the régime in Salisbury has arrived at this racist policy because of a fundamental misreading of the events of recent years in Africa. They seem literally to see all events in terms of black against white, and to perceive no alternative except that one must dominate the other. If this were to become the ruling principle of political life in Africa, the destiny of that continent would be tragic indeed.

129. Fortunately, other and wiser voices can be heard in Africa today. There are many among the white minority in Southern Rhodesia itself who have expressed deep misgivings about the policy of the Smith régime. In recent weeks we have seen growing evidence of such misgivings among churchmen, educators, students, journalists and business leaders within the white community. Their views, in turn, are in harmony with a larger body of opinion elsewhere in Africa. I refer to those who see the future hopes of Africa for peace and progress founded on the principle of non-racialism.

130. Only two months ago that principle was given particularly eloquent expression in what may well become a major document in African history: the Lusaka Manifesto of Central and East African States, signed by the leaders of fourteen nations on 16 April. Proceeding from the belief "that all men are equal", the Manifesto contains a passage

so precisely relevant to the situation in Southern Rhodesia that I wish to quote it at this point:

"Our stand towards southern Africa . . ."—the Manifesto declares—"involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins; and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and *apartheid* policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these States, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society. . . .

"To talk of the liberation of Africa"—the Manifesto continues—"is thus to say two things. First, that the peoples in the territories still under colonial rule shall be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government. Secondly, that the individuals in southern Africa shall be freed from an environment poisoned by the propaganda of racialism, and given an opportunity to be men—not white men, brown men, yellow men, or black men."

131. In the light of the Lusaka Manifesto, words about "stemming the tide of rampant black nationalism along the Zambezi" come with singular ill grace from Mr. Ian Smith. Not only from London, but also from his neighbours in Africa, he and his associates have been invited for years to accept the hand of friendship and co-operation. They have spurned that invitation, apparently in the belief that either the white minority must suppress the black majority, or the other way around: that no middle ground, no equality, is possible. Yet in truth, the only possible ground on which to build peace and progress in Africa is precisely the middle ground of non-racialism. The course of action which Mr. Smith and his colleagues now advocate cannot lead to peace and progress, but rather to extremism and bitter strife in which the cause of peace is sure to suffer.

132. We have all learned that the evils of white racism in southern Africa, and particularly in Southern Rhodesia, are more durable than we had feared. But their duration does not make them any less evil, nor does it make our united opposition to them any less important.

133. In November 1965, when the Rhodesian authorities first announced the purported "independence" of their country, they sought to mislead public opinion by dressing up their announcement in the stolen plumage of the American "Declaration of Independence", beginning with the very opening words "When, in the course of human events . . .".

134. Never were noble words borrowed to camouflage a more sordid enterprise. This so-called "independence" was claimed, and is still claimed today, not for the 4.5 million people of Southern Rhodesia, but only for the 5 per cent of

them who happen to be white. It is an independence conceived from the outset in racism, and maintained—as the new constitutional provisions clearly show—by the ugly practices of the police state. From those practices, no dissenter, be he black, brown or white, can hope to remain immune.

135. It is little wonder that the so-called “Unilateral Declaration of Independence” in 1965, even while it borrowed the celebrated phrases of Thomas Jefferson, skipped silently over the most famous words of all from the American original of 1776: The “self-evident truth” that “all men are created equal”. For obvious reasons, the authors of the Salisbury document had no stomach for that little word “equal”. Yet it is a word that will not die; and indeed we live in a time when it has begun at last to take on its full meaning for men of all races. It finds expression in the United Nations Charter, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and now in the Lusaka Manifesto. No amount of censorship or police repression can bury it. Its realization is one of the essentials of enduring peace in Africa and in the entire world and one of the goals to which my Government remains unalterably committed.

136. I can only conclude that at this time, before the referendum among the minority takes place, we in this Council should condemn the proposed constitution, which would further entrench the illegal racist régime, and should

also again condemn that régime itself. This action should be taken at once, well before 20 June. Having taken this action, we can then consult together about what further steps on the part of this Council in regard to Southern Rhodesia might be appropriate, useful and effective.

137. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I have to inform the members of the Council that during this meeting I received a letter from the Chairman of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), submitting to the Council the Committee's second report. This is now being circulated as document S/9252 in all the working languages of the Council.

138. I still have a number of speakers on my list but, in view of the lateness of the hour and if the Council agrees, I propose to close this meeting.

139. As agreed in informal consultations held during this meeting, our next meeting on the subject of Southern Rhodesia will take place this afternoon at 3.30 p.m.

140. In closing I should like very briefly to express my gratitude to the representative of Senegal for his kind words about myself.

*The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.*

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