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TWENTY-THIRD YEAR

**1433<sup>rd</sup>** MEETING: 19 JUNE 1968

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## NOTE

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## FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 19 June 1968, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Arthur J. GOLDBERG  
(United States of America).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1433)

#### 1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Letter dated 12 June 1968 from the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8630).

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

**Letter dated 12 June 1968 from the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8630)**

1. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now proceed with its consideration of the question before it, in the expectation, as I indicated yesterday, of concluding the discussion and proceeding to a vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America [S/8631].

2. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) (*translated from French*): The declarations made to the Security Council by the three Powers and the draft resolution they have submitted constitute, in the view of the sponsors and of those who have affirmed their faith in the non-proliferation treaty, a necessary supplement to that Treaty.

3. My delegation has already stated at some length its position of the problem of security guarantees. We shall not repeat all the criticisms we have already made but shall mention only a few of them. My delegation would simply point out, to begin with, that when it subscribed to the principles of the Charter it intended to abide fully by its obligations. Those obligations form an integral whole and we do not see how it can now be possible to make a selection among the fundamental principles for the purpose

of retaining only those likely to be of ephemeral advantage to us. Now more than ever, when contingent needs threaten the whole concept of international life, support for the principles of the Charter should be a duty for us all.

4. If the sponsors wanted to secure the approval of the United Nations, it would have been better for them to refer to all the relevant provisions of the Charter instead of just a few.

5. But how could they do otherwise when the intention is that a universal organization like the United Nations should endorse new machinery of a discriminatory nature? For example, the resolution provides for sanctions on a world-wide basis, whereas the benefit of nuclear "protection" accrues only to the signatories of the Treaty. In view of the bias in the draft resolution—and we have shown only one of its most regrettable features—the United Nations would be endorsing a treaty not in conformity with its principles and at the same time would be assuming the serious responsibility for creating machinery giving rise to many misgivings. What exactly is this machinery?

6. For a start there is the fact that the draft resolution gives the Treaty the character of a collective security pact under which only the signatories can benefit from the security guarantees.

7. Then there is the fact that it is quite unprecedented for the Security Council to act as guarantor for any treaty.

8. Furthermore, up to now the preservation and maintenance of peace has depended, within the framework of the United Nations, upon the agreement of the five permanent members. The new machinery, however, will require the agreement of only three of those members, thus upsetting the balance arrived at with such difficulty when the Security Council was established.

9. One of two things must happen. Either the members of the Security Council who are sponsoring the resolution will, in the event of a dispute, be able to secure the support of the other two permanent members, in which case why should that not be done immediately so as to forestall an abstention by France or the exclusion of China? Or, alternatively, it will prove impossible to obtain such support and the draft resolution will, in effect, amount to stripping the Security Council of its prerogative in respect of the maintenance and safeguarding of nuclear peace.

10. Is there any need to point out that the adoption of such machinery through this draft resolution, is tantamount to an indirect alteration of the Charter?

11. On this point there is sure to be some astonishment regarding the ambiguity in paragraph 1. If one accepts that the permanent members are the only Powers to possess nuclear weapons, sooner or later it will be necessary to take that elementary and fundamental fact to its logical conclusion. If, on the other hand, one yields to the temptation to adopt the view that the nuclear Powers are not only those which, under the Charter, and in their capacity as permanent members, have assumed a special responsibility in respect of the maintenance of peace, then it would clearly be necessary to amend the Charter. Either the United Nations will have to contemplate two categories of maintenance of peace or it will have to make a proper amendment to Article 23.

12. As a means of overcoming these differences, we recommended the adoption of certain principles, which have not been taken into account. During the debate in the First Committee,<sup>1</sup> we pointed out that the draft resolution appeared to be prejudicial to one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, namely, the People's Republic of China. We did not fail to point out that the absence of the People's Republic of China from the United Nations was one of the most serious drawbacks to the draft resolution and that no draft resolution of that character could be really effective so long as such an ostracism persisted. In our opinion, the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations is the ultimate criterion for the effectiveness of the draft resolution.

13. We also emphasized the discriminatory nature of the draft resolution, which creates two categories of States: on the one hand, the signatories, who will apparently have the benefit of nuclear protection, and, on the other, those against whom, it would appear, acts of aggression are virtually being sanctioned.

14. In this context, we are seriously concerned by the fact that the only States which would in practice be able to launch a nuclear attack are, in theory and by virtue of the draft resolution, exonerated from any possible sanctions. More specifically, it seems to us that the draft resolution as a whole fails to answer the only question requiring a definite reply in the present situation: namely, what use do the nuclear Powers intend to make of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons?

15. In that connexion, it is worth mentioning that China has repeatedly proclaimed that at no time and in no circumstances will it be the first to use nuclear weapons.

16. We know, too, that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is in favour of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, we know that France does not contemplate the offensive use of its nuclear arsenal. These last observations present us with the following alternatives: either these assurances are superfluous, since the two nuclear Powers which are not parties to the Treaty have adopted the positions that we have just described, or they are inadequate because, apart from the Soviet Union, the two other Powers do not appear to be willing to enter into

commitments like those entered into by the three other permanent members of the Security Council.

17. My delegation would like to express the wish that the present stage, now drawing to a close, will provide valuable lessons for the future. Indeed, the draft resolution threatens to create a dangerous precedent because it might be said that it revives the concept of protectorates. The community of nations cannot be launched upon the arduous path leading to disarmament by the revival of such antiquated ideas. Only discussions based on the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter will be productive. The Council will understand that, until this happens, my delegation will not be in a position to endorse the draft resolution before us.

18. Mr. President, our natural desire to strike a balance leads us to qualify what we have just said by offering you the only assurance within our power, namely, that, although our points of view appear to conflict, we had the impression, during all the discussions and negotiations, that basically your views do not necessarily run counter to what we advocate, sometimes forcefully and often with enthusiasm.

19. In order to soften the friendly reproach addressed to those who had expressed the hope that this discussion would come about normally and in due course, we would say that our anxiety to prevent any haste in the matter was to some degree due to our desire to have the benefit and enlightenment of your personal qualities right up to the last moment, when we shall have to assume the responsibility which has been yours during the current month. This anxiety was all the greater because your departure coincides with that of Mr. Nesterenko, the Under-Secretary-General. You will understand that one of your two successors might have felt some anxiety about the void thus created. We are saddened by this simultaneous withdrawal—not that we would be tempted to attribute it to some secret manoeuvre, but quite simply because the departure of both of you has emphasized a formidable moral responsibility. We take great comfort from the fact that the presence of Mr. Kutakov, a colleague who has become a partner and who is an advocate of the self-discipline of power, will ensure a smooth transition.

20. If, Mr. President, as someone has said, you have a French mind and the determination of a Turk, we shall be long in the dark about the origin of certain differences of opinion unless we adopt the philosophy of the Algerian proverb to the effect that your enemy is he who has the same ways as you.

21. I cannot conclude without paying a tribute to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, whose advocacy is respected as much by his Government as by the Council for the obvious reason that he is able to take an objective view of his duties in acting as representative of the Council in the United Kingdom and in his dealings with the Council as a person long since won over to the philosophy of the Charter and strongly imbued with its spirit.

22. The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank Ambassador Bouattoura for his contribution to our debate and to thank him very much for what he had to say about me. The

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, First Committee, 1571st meeting, para. 78.*

Ambassador and I have enjoyed very amicable relations. I have always admired the way he has represented his country in all of the organs of the United Nations, and indeed one of my most pleasurable experiences was serving under his Chairmanship at the meeting of the Economic and Social Council two summers ago.

23. When he was giving his quotation I was worried that he was going to give the one from the great British statesman Disraeli, when he said: "A practical politician is one who practices the airs of his predecessors". I have tried to walk in the way of my distinguished predecessor. He made no errors, but I suspect that I was guilty of many.

24. Mr. DE CARVALHO SILOS (Brazil): First of all, I should like to associate my delegation with those which have praised Lord Caradon for the skilful manner in which he presided over this Council during the month of May. I also wish to convey to you, Mr. President, the expression of the regret of my delegation at your departure from this Council and from the United Nations. For many years our two delegations have worked closely together in this Council and in other organs of the United Nations, often during crises which menaced world peace and security. On those difficult occasions I learned to admire your outstanding qualities as a statesman, jurist and negotiator. You have represented your great country with remarkable distinction and effectiveness. You have served the cause of the United Nations and of world peace with courage, intelligence and skill. We shall miss you for years to come.

25. In connexion with the draft resolution before us, I have been instructed by my Government to make the following declaration of vote.

26. Today the matter before the Council is not a particular crisis or an isolated incident, but a political question of a broader nature, pertaining to world peace and to the very system of collective security established in the Charter of the United Nations which is of vital importance to the existence of this Organization.

27. The Charter of San Francisco sets up a universal security machinery which includes, without any exception, all Members of this Organization. However, the guarantees referred to in the draft resolution now before us, unilaterally offered by only three of the five existing nuclear Powers, would be applied only to those Member States which become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Moreover, while the Charter establishes juridical obligations, the draft resolution and the unilateral declaration of the three great Powers are not but statements of intention. The draft resolution therefore falls short of assuring the guarantees against all kinds of aggression already contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations.

28. I would also like to mention the special importance that my country—as well as all other Latin American countries—attaches to the system of guarantees established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Article VII of the non-proliferation treaty provides that

the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."

29. However, not all the nuclear Powers which voted in favour of this treaty of non-proliferation have signed the second additional protocol of the Treaty of Mexico.

30. Hence it seems that the draft resolution presented to this Council by the three nuclear Powers refers to a new system of guarantees which, strictly speaking, was not shaped in accordance with the same principles and criteria which give form to the systems of guarantees of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

31. Moreover, the Council is certainly aware of the position taken by the Brazilian Government during the debates in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and more recently in the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly. On both those occasions we expressed our conviction that the draft treaty did not conform to the relevant principles laid down by General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and, more specifically, that it failed to establish an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities between nuclear and non-nuclear countries, including the question of security guarantees to be given the latter.<sup>2</sup> The system currently proposed also fails to meet this objective.

32. The draft resolution before us should be regarded as a collateral measure and a consequence of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Indeed, its first preambular paragraph, which has no direct bearing on the question we are now discussing, reproduces the substance of the terms of articles I and II of the Treaty.

33. Bearing those considerations in mind, and taking into account our abstention in the vote on the General Assembly resolution commending the non-proliferation treaty, my delegation, although appreciating the reasons which inspired its co-sponsors, is compelled to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution before us.

34. The PRESIDENT: I thank you, Ambassador de Carvalho Silos, for your contribution to our debate and for your very kind remarks concerning me. You have correctly recalled our common experience in many crisis situations during the past three years. If I may analogize, the United Nations is a university in crisis management; and in that university, you, Mr. Ambassador, representing your great country, have earned your degree. I thank you very much.

35. I should say to the members of the Council that before we adjourn, as Ambassador Bouattoura has indicated it would be only appropriate to say some additional words about Under-Secretary-General Nešterenko. With the Council's permission, I hope to do so on behalf of the Council before we conclude our debate.

36. Lij Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): As the Security Council concludes its consideration of the draft resolution on security assurances submitted by the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the United

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 1560th meeting, para. 65.

Kingdom, it becomes important that we give due recognition to the true significance of the pledge that we have reaffirmed to one another in this vital organ of the United Nations.

37. It may well be that, to a very large extent, the future working of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will itself depend on the sense of confidence that these assurances made here will generate, and on the extent to which they will create an atmosphere conducive to greater international understanding and co-operation.

38. For, although not organically linked with the text of the non-proliferation treaty so overwhelmingly commended to all States, for their adoption, by the General Assembly, the assurances that have now been given in the Security Council fall within the purview of that treaty and, as such, constitute a vital part of the mutual undertakings which serve as the stimulant for the further limitation and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

39. While we are, of course, aware that the declarations of three of the permanent members have not introduced anything new in the assurances they have given in other forums and on previous occasions, we nevertheless appreciate the fact and consider it significant that those declarations were made in the Security Council, the United Nations organ primarily responsible for international peace and security.

40. Rarely has the Security Council been engaged in such a task of constructive diplomacy in peace-building as in the opportunity provided by the present discussion of this vital question. For too long and all too frequently, and much to the detriment of its other vital duties, the Council has been called upon to exercise functions which can be characterized only as those of a fire-brigade hastily summoned to put out a brush-fire that has suddenly erupted. But in these momentous discussions now under way, the Council has been called upon to fulfil a function which the drafters of the Charter and the founders of the Organization envisaged for it, namely, that of peace-building and of providing effective guarantees for international security. That that function is being exercised in an atmosphere free of contentious debate is a matter the significance of which should not be lost on us. We can only hope that the present undertaking and the experience gained from it will further encourage the Members of our Organization, and more particularly the permanent members of this Council, to expand their efforts in the vital task of building and maintaining world peace.

41. It is also a matter of the utmost importance and significance that the problem of security assurances should be posed and answered in its correct perspective and its appropriate context. This is particularly necessary, in the view of my delegation, as the discussions that have taken place so far on this problem in other forums seem to have encouraged the assumption that a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would, somehow, establish new obligations and rights for Member States of the United Nations outside of the Charter. My delegation does not accept this to be the case.

42. Essentially, the question of security assurances is one of readapting the collective security system established

under the Charter of the United Nations, so that the organized international community could meet better and more effectively the exigencies of the atomic age. There is no question, in our view, of establishing yet another competing collective security system on the sole behalf of those States accepting the non-proliferation treaty.

43. Under the United Nations Charter, all Member States have accepted a treaty obligation to help the victim of aggression in accordance with the determination and the decisions of the Security Council. Moreover, under the Charter all the permanent members—I repeat: all the permanent members—of the Security Council assume a decisive role in the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As a confirmation of that great responsibility, the Charter not only grants those Powers the status of permanent membership but also allows them the right and privilege whereby no decision will be taken by the Council without their concurrence. Thus, at the time the Charter was drafted—that is, before nuclear power came into the world power structure as a decisive security factor—the Charter already contained a mutual balance of rights and obligations as between permanent members of the Security Council on the one hand and the other Member States of the United Nations on the other.

44. The addition of atomic weapons to the war arsenals of States could not have changed, and cannot now change, this mutual balance of rights and obligations within the framework of the collective security system established by the United Nations Charter. The fact that aggression is committed by means of atomic weapons or that the use of atomic weapons against another State is threatened cannot change the character of the obligations Member States of the United Nations have assumed under the Charter. All the permanent members of the Security Council, like all other Member States of the Organization, are under the Charter obligation to come to the assistance of a victim of aggression.

45. That is how we understand the assurances and declarations that have been submitted by three of the permanent members of the Security Council, and it is with those considerations in the back of our mind that we have studied all related problems with great care and attention.

46. With regard to the draft resolution submitted by three of the permanent members of the Council and the respective declarations they have made before the Council, my delegation's views are no different from those that I had occasion to express in the First Committee<sup>3</sup> when the draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was being discussed there.

47. My Government has always maintained and continues to maintain that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be the best means to ensure the security of all nations against the threat or use of nuclear arms.

48. Even if that should prove difficult to attain at the present time, there is in our view no reason why, pending

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 1561st meeting.

the signature of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon countries cannot make a clear undertaking not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances against States that do not possess such weapons. We regret to note the absence of any such pledge in the present drafts. We feel that such a pledge should be a cardinal principle of the assurances to be given by the Security Council and by those States that have atomic weapons in their arsenals.

49. In this connexion I wish to mention, in particular, that neither in the declarations that the sponsors of the draft resolution have made before us nor in the draft resolution itself is there any mention of General Assembly resolution 2153 (XXI), which called upon all nuclear-weapon Powers "to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against States which may conclude" non-proliferation treaties. That, in our view, is an unfortunate and unjustified omission.

50. It is also to be noted that operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution only welcomes the expression of the "intention . . . by certain States that they will provide . . . assistance, in accordance with the Charter". It seems to my delegation that the use of the word "intention" in this context is somewhat ambiguous. As I stated earlier, with or without this resolution, the permanent members, like all other Member States of the United Nations, have by signing the Charter entered into the legally binding obligation to come to the assistance of a victim of aggression, in accordance with a decision of the Security Council. That being the clear position of the Charter, we fail to understand the hesitancy in the expression used.

51. And finally I wish to reiterate the point I raised earlier in my remarks regarding the applicability of United Nations security assurances. We wish to affirm the principle that the collective security guarantee inherent in the United Nations Charter must be applicable to Member States without discrimination. At the same time we wish, of course, to see all Member States adhere to the experiment we have started together. Indeed, we appeal to all those Member States that have so far not found it possible to do so to join the overwhelming membership of the United Nations in the initiation and successful implementation of the vital experiment that the non-proliferation treaty will put into motion so that, united in a purposeful effort, we may all march together towards our goal of disarmament and peace.

52. These are some of the shortcomings and limitations that we recognize in the draft resolution and the texts of the declarations proposed to us. These are considerations which we do not intend to gloss over or ignore. But at the same time we believe, after careful consideration, that the non-proliferation treaty, coupled with the benefit to be derived from the assurances, however incomplete, given in the Security Council, represent an over-all positive gain for the international community. However weak and faltering it may be at this stage, the present non-proliferation treaty could serve, in our view, as the key in the ever-urgent need for general and complete disarmament.

53. It is that compelling consideration, more perhaps than any other, that impelled my delegation to vote in favour of the draft resolution commending the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which the General

Assembly adopted by such an impressive majority. In the same spirit, and in spite of the many limitations and shortcomings that we see in the draft resolution contained in document S/8631, my delegation will vote for the adoption of that draft submitted jointly by the delegations of the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. We do so in the hope that the treaty, coupled with the security assurances given here in the Security Council, will help to usher in a new era of mutual effort for the peace and well-being of all mankind.

54. In conclusion, I wish to take the opportunity of this meeting, which will probably be the last one that you will attend before you depart, Mr. President, to express to you once again the assurances of my highest consideration, and my very best wishes.

55. The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Makonnen for his remarks, and I in turn reaffirm to him that our friendship will endure long after my departure from these halls.

56. Mr. LIU (China): It was by an overwhelming majority that the General Assembly commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My delegation supported the resolution in the General Assembly in the belief that the Treaty, like the partial test ban treaty of 1963, is a significant step in the interest of international peace and security.

57. A non-nuclear-weapon State, as soon as it becomes a party to the treaty, renounces all rights to receive, manufacture, or otherwise acquire any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices or even to have control over such weapons or devices directly or indirectly. This renunciation is a far-reaching one. A non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation treaty cannot under any circumstances alter its present status. It is tantamount to renouncing the right to defend itself with nuclear armament even if it should itself be victimized by nuclear aggression or the threat of nuclear aggression.

58. Now the Powers sponsoring the Treaty have proposed to safeguard the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty. In the draft resolution [S/8631] before us they undertake to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression "... would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon-State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter." This has been elaborated in the identical declarations made by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

59. It would seem that neither the draft resolution nor the declarations add anything radically new to what has already been provided for in the United Nations Charter. Article 1 of the Charter, as we know, calls for: "... effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression . . .". As my delegation sees it, aggression is aggression, no matter what weapons are used. It is true that in the present context we are dealing with a specific type of

aggression—aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons. Such aggression, we are told, would “create a qualitatively new situation”. Yet the procedure of dealing with such a situation is no different from that already provided for in the Charter. From this point of view, it might have been doubted whether the draft resolution is at all necessary.

60. The criterion of any system of security assurances must be the degree of its effectiveness and credibility. The record of the Security Council with respect to the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression has unfortunately not been such as to inspire the confidence or dispel the fears of those non-nuclear-weapon States which live in the shadow of nuclear threat.

61. In a world as torn by rival ideologies and conflicting interests as ours is today, it is not always easy to foresee the circumstances in which aggression with nuclear weapons would occur or the forms such aggression might take. The difficulty is compounded by the virtual impossibility of arriving at a consensus on what constitutes aggression, nuclear or otherwise. If experience is any indication, even the most obvious and most flagrant form of aggression could be the subject of interminable debate. Given the speed and destructiveness of nuclear weapons, a delay of a few hours, nay, even of a few minutes, could afford the aggressor time enough to make short work of his intended victim.

62. However, my delegation is not unaware of the fact that no system of security guarantees can be watertight and absolute. The system of security guarantees embodied in the draft resolution is no exception. If it falls short of perfection, it is still better than none at all. The least we can say about it is that it affords the non-nuclear-weapon States more protection than they would otherwise have.

63. Moreover, the willingness of the three major nuclear-weapon Powers, which have long been divided by political and ideological differences of a seemingly irreconcilable nature, to reaffirm jointly their obligations under the United Nations Charter in the present historical context is in itself a matter of great political significance. It may be an exaggeration to say that by so doing they have revitalized the collective security system provided for in the Charter. It would be even more extravagant to claim that the co-operative spirit thus manifested presages the transformation of the balance of terror into an international nuclear deterrent within the institutional framework of the United Nations. There is none the less reason to believe that the sponsors of the draft resolution have now come to the realization that it is in their national interests to make a collective effort to safeguard the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Inasmuch as they command the overwhelming preponderance of nuclear-weapon power in the world today, what they have solemnly pledged to carry out cannot fail to have a deterrent impact.

64. My delegation attaches great importance to the fact that both the draft resolution and the declarations have reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, if an armed attack, including nuclear attack, occurs against a

Member of the United Nations. This is vital to all those who have relied on regional arrangements or other multilateral or bilateral arrangements for their national security.

65. It is in the light of these considerations that my delegation will cast its vote in favour of the draft resolution.

66. Before concluding, may I be permitted to make a very brief observation on the oft-repeated assertion that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vitiated by the fact that the Communist régime on the mainland of China remains outside it. As a matter of fact, in the eyes of the Chinese Communists in Peiping, the treaty is: “A big fraud and a big plot hatched by the American imperialists and Soviet revisionists in their counter-revolutionary global collusion against the peoples of the world who are struggling for independence and freedom.” This view was reiterated only a few days ago by Peiping’s so-called Foreign Minister in a speech on 11 June, and even more vehemently elaborated by the *People’s Daily*—Peiping’s official mouthpiece—in an article published and broadcast on 13 June.

67. Through the years the Chinese Communists have made it clear that they are unalterably opposed to the control and reduction of armaments until the victory of communism, presumably Mao’s brand of communism, is achieved on a world-wide scale. It is evident that nothing could have induced them to be a signatory to such a document.

68. If I may end on a personal note, Mr. President, I believe that my personal sentiments and my high regard for you and for your distinguished predecessor in the Chair need no reiteration. But I should like to take this opportunity to associate my delegation whole-heartedly with the tributes that have been expressed around the table.

69. The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank you, Ambassador Liu, for your comments and for your personal remarks. I admire very much the dignity, ability and dedication with which you, Ambassador Liu, have served your country and the United Nations, and I value your continuing friendship.

70. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): During the debate in the First Committee on the non-proliferation treaty a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States, while commenting on its provisions, carefully analysed and evaluated the wording of the joint draft resolution in document S/8631, which had originally been submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>4</sup>

71. Many of these non-nuclear-weapon States have expressed dissatisfaction with that text. A question of such supreme importance as the provision of security from nuclear aggression or the threat of nuclear aggression requires the most careful consideration by all non-nuclear-weapon States. It was the hope of the Pakistan delegation that the adoption of a resolution by the Security Council on security assurances would be deferred until after the conclusion of the forthcoming conference of non-nuclear-

<sup>4</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex II.



weapon States. What assurances would be considered adequate by the generality of these States is a question which will be discussed by that conference. My delegation would not wish to prejudge its conclusions.

72. However, the Security Council has already become seized of the matter. My delegation will, therefore, confine itself at this stage to certain preliminary observations on the joint draft resolution and the declarations made by its co-sponsors. In making these observations we shall bear in mind the statements made in the First Committee by a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States.

73. First, these assurances relate to aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty. It was pointed out during the debate in the First Committee that the draft resolution would have been a better instrument if, instead of mentioning "aggression"—which has so far neither been defined nor in practice determined—it had related itself to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

74. Second, as the protection is offered essentially within the framework of the Charter, the possibility that the Security Council could not be able, because of the use of the veto, to take the necessary action makes the protection uncertain.

75. Third, the second operative paragraph of the joint draft resolution makes it clear that the identical declarations of the three nuclear Powers are only statements of intention. In the debate in the First Committee several non-nuclear-weapon States expressed their dissatisfaction over that fact and called for a binding treaty guarantee to provide immediate assistance to any non-nuclear party that would be a victim of nuclear attack or of a nuclear threat.

76. Fourth, it seems only just and equitable, if non-nuclear-weapon States forswear the acquisition and production of nuclear weapons for their own defence, that the nuclear Powers should, in return, renounce the use of such weapons against those States.

77. Fifth, the first paragraph of the draft resolution recognizes that under the Charter protection against nuclear aggression or the threat of nuclear aggression is available to a non-nuclear-weapon State. A State's adherence to the non-proliferation treaty is not made conditional. However, in the second paragraph of the draft resolution, the Council is required to welcome the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. When the two paragraphs are read together we find there a certain ambiguity.

78. Sixth, the third operative paragraph of the draft resolution and paragraph 7 of the declarations made by the three nuclear Powers reaffirm the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, to individual and collective self-defence. I may say in this context, if only by way of parenthesis, that the right of self-defence, which is recog-

nized by the Charter of the United Nations, exists independently of the Charter and does not and cannot limit a State's option in the matter of obtaining assistance to prevent or counter a nuclear attack.

79. This paragraph—that is, the third operative paragraph—makes it possible for the three nuclear Powers, acting individually, to deter or suppress a nuclear attack, before the Security Council can act or if it is unable to act. At the same time, few of the non-nuclear-weapon States primarily affected other than those that are members of the NATO or Warsaw Pacts or even those States which are beneficiaries of firm unilateral guarantees outside the framework of the United Nations can entertain realistic expectations that the possibility will in fact become an actuality.

80. The element of deterrence to a would-be aggressor and the assurance of protection to its victim would both have been strengthened if it had been made clear, in the declarations of the three nuclear Powers, that they would respond to the request of any non-nuclear-weapon State so threatened, with effective assistance, regardless of whether that State was aligned in a military alliance or non-aligned. Already certain States have received such guarantees. In view of the present state of international relations the unilateral nature of the guarantee does not detract from its credibility.

81. Seventh, the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter are no longer adequate to the requirements of the right of self-defence in an age of nuclear weapons. Such a right can hardly be restricted to the actual occurrence of a nuclear armed attack. There are very few non-nuclear-weapon States that will be able to survive a nuclear strike and exercise their right of self-defence.

82. The three nuclear Powers in their declarations have stated that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State "would create a qualitatively new situation". Such a situation was not anticipated when the Charter was framed. Therefore Article 51 is inadequate to meet the perils of the age of nuclear weapons.

83. As the resolution is at present formulated, we fear, that it provides only very few States of the world with any real assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, apart from the non-nuclear-weapon States that are members of the NATO or Warsaw Pacts or those who are protected by the unilateral guarantees outside the framework of the United Nations. No doubt a substantial number of non-nuclear-weapon States are so geopolitically situated that, regardless of guarantees, they do not expect to be the object of nuclear attack or threat. There are also some others that may feel assured that in the context of the present world situation and its likely evolution, the joint draft resolution provides an adequate formula to meet any possible danger to their security that may arise in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, there are many other States which are not in those privileged categories and which feel more exposed. What of them?

84. The question may be asked: what, then, is to be done? Is a more dependable security system for the

non-nuclear-weapon States practicable in the present political context of the world?

85. Speaking at the 1566th meeting of the First Committee, on 13 May, I said:

“The question arises why the possibility of envisaging a system of universal collective security which would be free from the built-in limitations of the United Nations and its present composition should be inconceivable.”<sup>5</sup>

We must not forget that the Charter was conceived and concluded before the qualitatively new situation that would arise from the perils of the nuclear age could be foreseen. To inspire general confidence, security guarantees in our time must be based on a fuller recognition of the imperatives of this new reality.

86. The framework of the Charter would have to be reinforced by undertakings which would compensate for the weaknesses in the structure of collective security. If unilateral guarantees outside the framework of the Charter can be given without derogating from the authority of the United Nations, security assurances which are free from the built-in limitations of the Charter are not inconceivable. These assurances must be designed to meet not only the exigencies of the present political and power relations in the world but also the foreseeable developments in the future. The duration of the non-proliferation treaty will be twenty-five years. The formulation of these assurances must also take into consideration that time element. They must meet the security needs of the world, not only for today, when there are five nuclear Powers, but also for tomorrow, when there may be a greater number, should the restraint of the treaty not become universally operative and nuclear weapons not prohibited and destroyed.

87. Furthermore, the security assurances as formulated in the draft resolution beg the question whether in the context of the present realities of international life and the policies of the nuclear Powers they are likely to be universal in their practical operation, either as regards the source of the threat or as regards the victim.

88. It is true that there is a wide diversity of security interests in the world and that assurances must not be limited as regards time. If on this account the formula for security must be cast in general terms, there is no reason why it cannot be indicated that the protection offered is universal, without preference or exclusion.

89. The joint draft resolution is based on the assumption that the nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Security Council are not likely to commit or threaten aggression with the use of nuclear weapons. The Pakistan delegation fully shares this assumption in regard to the commitments, policies, restraint and responsibility of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—and also of France and the People's Republic of China. We cannot overlook the pledges of the latter two nuclear Powers. The representative of France stated in the General Assembly at the 1672nd meeting that nuclear armaments

were manufactured in France only for strictly defensive purposes and France did not intend to use them either to threaten or to attack anybody. The People's Republic of China has also made a solemn declaration that in no case will it be the first to use nuclear weapons.

90. Perfect security for all States against the peril of nuclear weapons will not of course be possible until, as the representative of France has pointed out, there is complete nuclear disarmament and destruction of nuclear weapons. We must perforce accept a security system which is less than perfect and short of the ideal. At the same time, if we ignore the other facts of life we do so at our own peril. As long as nuclear stockpiles are not physically dismantled, as long as the non-proliferation treaty is not universally adhered to, the possibility of a treaty breach will always remain, of the emergence of other Powers which will have acquired nuclear weapons, and even, in the unforeseeable future, of an existing nuclear Power changing its policies. It is such possibilities, which are more than theoretical, that we need to guard against.

91. We are not persuaded that what the formula in the joint draft resolution on security assurances offers to non-nuclear-weapon States is all that can now be devised to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

92. For all those reasons Pakistan will not be able to support the joint draft resolution of the three nuclear Powers.

93. Finally, Mr. President, may I associate myself with the warm tributes that have been paid by you and other distinguished colleagues to your predecessor, Lord Caradon. Last month the Council adopted some important resolutions. One of them was historic. The lion's share of the credit for that achievement, as for so many other resolutions and important actions of the Council, undoubtedly belongs to Lord Caradon, who in generosity of spirit and statesmanship embodies the great traditions of his great country.

94. At the last meeting of the Council in May [1428th meeting], I had the opportunity to pay my sincere tribute to you, Mr. President, for your outstanding services to the United Nations over the last three years. I sincerely reaffirm everything that I said on that occasion. You have set us all an example in human relations.

95. On Monday [1430th meeting] you gave us the assurance that you would leave us after the conclusion of the Council's pending business. Let me say to you plainly that my delegation did not in the slightest welcome your assurance. We shall greatly miss you and wish you all success in your endeavours.

96. I should not let this occasion pass without mentioning the dedicated services of the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Nesterenko, who is shortly leaving us—the services that he rendered to the United Nations and, in particular, to the Security Council.

97. Before taking up his present post in the Organization, he was the Ambassador of his country to Pakistan. It gives

<sup>5</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, First Committee, 1566th meeting, para. 191.*

me great pleasure to recall the outstanding role he played in improving and strengthening relations between his country and mine. My delegation extends to him its best wishes for the future.

98. The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Shahi for his contribution to our debate and for his very kind remarks. I, in turn, reaffirm what I had to say about him. I have enjoyed very much our relationship together, and the assurance that I gave the Council was intended to supplement the security assurances that it is adopting.

99. Mr. PARTHASARATHI (India): Mr. President, at the 1428th meeting of the Security Council, held on 29 May, I had occasion to pay you a heartfelt tribute. It is a matter of great gratification for my delegation to find that the Council is still privileged to be presided over by a person of your distinction and acknowledged ability. I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate the warm appreciation of my delegation for the prudent, impartial and diligent manner in which you have conducted the formal and informal consultations of the members of the Council, not only on the important issue under consideration today, but also on all other issues on which we have had the happy experience of being in contact with you.

100. Once again I should like to wish you every success in the important new fields in which you will find yourself and to express the hope that the close personal friendship that has developed between us will be maintained in the years to come.

101. I should also like to refer to the characteristic efficiency and the persistent devotion to duty displayed by Lord Caradon when he presided over our deliberations last month. It is a great tribute to him that his painstaking efforts and statesmanlike approach brought the prolonged consultations on the difficult question of Southern Rhodesia to a successful conclusion.

102. It is a matter of great regret to my delegation that we are shortly to be deprived of the able services of Mr. Nesterenko, the distinguished Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs. I have had the privilege of knowing him for the past six years and have valued him both as a colleague and as a friend. I should like to place on record the deep appreciation of my delegation for the exemplary efficiency and integrity with which Mr. Nesterenko has discharged his important functions. We wish him all success in his new appointment.

103. We are now approaching the end of our current deliberations on the vital question of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or the use of nuclear weapons. This question has been widely discussed both within and outside the United Nations for years. The Government of India attaches the highest importance to the solution of this problem.

104. In the view of the Government of India, the problem of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons arises from the possession, the continued stockpiling and the further sophistication of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. The real hope of security for non-nuclear-weapon

States lies in nuclear disarmament when nuclear weapons shall have been completely eliminated.

105. It is, however, obvious that action in this field of genuine and lasting security will take time and will have to be sought through stages. Until such time, and purely as an interim measure—that is, so long as nuclear weapons continue to remain in the armouries of a few countries—the nuclear-weapon States have a definite obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States that their security will not in any way be endangered by the use or threat of use of such weapons, and also that such weapons will not be used as an instrument of pressure, intimidation or blackmail. It is in this context that we have to consider the question of security assurances.

106. My Government would welcome any steps that might be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in concert with non-nuclear-weapon States to increase the effectiveness of the role of the United Nations for the purpose of providing security. The hopes of mankind rest on this. The obligations cast by the Charter on Member States, and more particularly on the permanent members of the Security Council, to ensure peace in the world, make it necessary for them to discharge their responsibilities in strict conformity with the Charter.

107. I should like to emphasize that any security assurances that might be offered by nuclear-weapon States could not and should not be regarded as a *quid pro quo* for the signature of a non-proliferation treaty. A non-proliferation treaty should be judged by itself and on its own merits. As I have already stated, the threat of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States arises directly from the possession of such weapons by certain States. That threat has nothing to do with the signature or non-signature of a particular non-proliferation treaty. That threat has existed in the past and will continue to remain, even after a non-proliferation treaty has been concluded, until such time as the nuclear menace has been eliminated altogether. The assurance of security to non-nuclear-weapon States is an obligation on the nuclear-weapon States, and not something which they could or should offer in return for the signature by non-nuclear-weapon States of a non-proliferation treaty.

108. The basis for any action by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is the Charter of the United Nations. Any linking of security assurances to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would be contrary to its provisions, because the Charter does not discriminate between those who might adhere to a particular treaty and those who might not do so. Under Article 24 of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and have agreed that, in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their behalf. Article 24 then goes on to say that in discharging its duties the Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The purposes and principles are contained in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. One of the cardinal principles is that of sovereign equality, that is, the equality of rights and benefits under the Charter for all Members of the United Nations. The second, and

equally important, principle is that all Members shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter. It would thus be clear that, while the permanent members of the Security Council have a special obligation and responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, they are precluded from adopting a discriminatory approach in situations involving the security of States, including that arising from the threat or the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

109. Unfortunately, it is precisely such a discriminatory approach that is adopted in the draft resolution contained in document S/8631, particularly in the second preambular paragraph and the second operative paragraph. The Security Council is being asked to take into consideration the concern of only certain of those States which have expressed a desire to subscribe to the non-proliferation treaty. I submit that this concept is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter. When the Security Council is called upon to make a determination in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, it does not first enquire as to whether or not a certain State has subscribed to a particular treaty. Its findings, recommendations and decisions are to be guided solely by the objective of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. The Charter is clear that the assistance of the Security Council should be available in equal measure to all States. Some nuclear-weapon States that are also permanent members of the Security Council intend, however, to provide or support immediate assistance by way of collective self-defence only to those non-nuclear-weapons States which are parties to a particular treaty.

110. My delegation has carefully studied the declarations made by the three nuclear-weapon States and appreciates the sincerity of the effort made by them to provide assurances of security to non-nuclear-weapon States. In the declarations, the three nuclear-weapon Powers themselves recall the provision of the Charter which calls for effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. In our opinion, it is the clear responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council to go to the assistance of any nuclear-weapon State that is threatened with or is the victim of nuclear attack, and not merely of those that may be signatories of a non-proliferation treaty. This is their special responsibility by reason of their possession of nuclear weapons as well as of their being permanent members of the Security Council. It would be inappropriate, therefore, for the Security Council to welcome the partial assurances mentioned in the second operative paragraph. It is in the interest of the international community that non-nuclear-weapon States be encouraged to remain in that category. This can be done only by ensuring the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States in conformity with the Charter, regardless of whether or not they sign the non-proliferation treaty.

111. In the light of what I have just stated, it is clear that the draft resolution contained in document S/8631 does not fully accord with the basic principles which should govern the problem of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation, therefore, cannot support the draft

resolution sponsored by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Nevertheless, we are reassured by the fact that all the rights and benefits enshrined in the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security continue to be available to all States Members of the United Nations.

112. Before I conclude, I deem it necessary to reiterate the policy of the Government of India in the nuclear field. It is our national decision to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. This policy has time and again been reiterated by the Government of India and has been firmly adhered to.

113. The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Parthasarathi for his contribution to the debate and for what he has again said about me. He knows, without my saying so again, my deep feelings of affection and respect for him.

114. There are no other names inscribed on the list of speakers.

115. In the absence of objections, I shall now put to the vote the joint draft resolution which is sponsored by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States and which was submitted to the Council on 12 June as document S/8631.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:* Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Algeria, Brazil, France, India, Pakistan.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 10 votes to none with 5 abstentions.<sup>6</sup>*

116. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I thank those members of the Council who have made kind and generous references to my Presidency of the Council last month. I wish to say that the consultations in which I had the privilege to take part last month with other members of this Council were one of the most satisfying experiences I have ever known. I have special reason to be personally most grateful to every fellow member of this Council.

117. Ambassador Bouattoura referred to my duties in this Council and elsewhere. I only regret that I was in this Council yesterday and not in the House of Lords. While we were acting unanimously here, I gather that the House of Lords on another issue was not. Nevertheless, I trust and believe that this Council's influence and example will carry increasing weight in many parts of the world, including the Palace of Westminster.

118. I would also wish on behalf of my delegation to pay a tribute to Mr. Nesterenko. He has served this Council and the United Nations extremely well and has earned the

<sup>6</sup> See resolution 255 (1968).

gratitude of us all. We confidently wish him well and further success in his future career.

119. Before we end our proceedings today, and now that our debate is over, I should like not only to welcome the resolution we have just adopted but also to pay my respectful tribute to the representatives of the two great Powers who have worked so hard with us and others to achieve the success in the Assembly last week and in the Council now.

120. As to you, Mr. President, it is almost impossible to add to the expressions of the admiration that we all feel for you. Winston Churchill used to say that he was half American and all English. You, Sir, can do better than that. You have Ambassador Berard's testimony on Monday [1430th meeting] that you have the mind of a Frenchman. Ambassador Erlep told us yesterday [1432nd meeting] that you have the will of a Turk. I hesitate to attribute to you any additional national characteristics. Certainly you have a mastery of politics, which we have all learned from the Greeks. We have also good reason to know that you have something of the obstinacy which is a characteristic common, I like to think, to the Russians and the British. So, if we are to believe all that is said of you we must conclude that you are some kind of international monstrosity. We content ourselves with thinking that, whatever characteristics of other nations you may have, you are certainly all American.

121. We remember that when you first were our President you gave us successful leadership in dealing with a most dangerous and explosive dispute. And now you are again our successful leader as we have taken such an important step towards world security in adopting the resolution today. We shall not forget the excellence of the leadership you have given us.

122. I would also wish to say a word to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, who, I understand, will be returning very soon to his great country. We are always glad to see him. When he comes we confidently expect agreement, and we expect action. We are never disappointed. Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador Malik make a formidable team, and we greatly respect them.

123. As I have sat here in the Council, I have occupied myself by composing these memorable lines which I dedicate to the Deputy Foreign Minister:

*"When prospects are dark and hopes are dim,  
"We know that we must send for him;  
"When storms and tempests fill the sky,  
" 'Bring on Kuznetsov', is the cry.*

*"He comes like a dove from the Communist ark,  
"And light appears where all was dark;  
"His coming quickly turns the tide,  
"The propaganda floods subside.*

*"And now that he has changed the weather,  
"Lion and lamb can vote together.  
"God bless the Russian delegation.  
"I waive consecutive translation."*

124. The PRESIDENT: I thank Lord Caradon for what he has said. I admire him particularly for the discretion he used after those last two lines in waiving consecutive translation.

125. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Security Council has just approved a decision on the question of security assurances for non-nuclear Powers. This action on the part of the Security Council, together with the General Assembly resolution which approved the draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is of extreme importance. It confirms and strengthens the appropriate provisions of the Charter relating to the actions of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security in the case of aggression with the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against non-nuclear States.

126. We may note now that the United Nations has successfully concluded an important stage. It has auspiciously cleared the way for the signing and ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United Nations has emphatically urged that this should be done without any delay. The coming into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the implementation of the measures it provides for will undoubtedly mark an important step towards a reduction of the danger of nuclear war and the creation of favourable conditions for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and will lead us forward towards nuclear disarmament and complete and general disarmament under effective international control. Undoubtedly this will meet the vital interests of all peoples.

127. Now, as we conclude our joint endeavours, I should first of all like to express my gratitude to all members of the Security Council for their efforts, their energy and their desire to achieve an effective solution.

128. I should like to associate myself, Mr. President, with the good wishes expressed to you by a number of representatives in the Security Council. Your most able leadership, your skill in conducting the proceedings of the Council and in quickly finding a correct and appropriate solution in various delicate and complex situations, have certainly contributed to the successful conclusion of this important stage of the Council's work.

129. Since you, Mr. President, will very soon be leaving your post as Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, I should also like to point out that you have been a worthy representative of your great country in this Organization. I need hardly mention the well-known and important posts which you occupied before your arrival at the United Nations. Your energy, your varied experience and your outstanding ability as a statesman are all noteworthy. Although the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on some issues considered in the United Nations were fundamentally different, we have nevertheless met with a desire on your part to co-operate and to maintain contacts.

130. We, and presumably other members of the Security Council, are aware that Mr. Goldberg will not be losing his connexions with the United Nations even after he leaves his

post as Permanent Representative of the United States. We have learned that he has been named Chairman of the Board of the United Nations Association of the United States of America. May I wish him good health and express the conviction that, while no longer an official representative in the United Nations, he will contribute to the solution of the important and urgent problems which still face the United Nations and mankind as a whole and serve the interests of maintaining and strengthening peace and progress for all the peoples of the world.

131. I should like to express my gratitude to the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon. I am unable at this moment to vie with him in eloquence, but I thank him for his kind words about the Soviet delegation and I should like to stress that we have based ourselves on a sincere desire to do our utmost to ensure that the tasks still facing the United Nations will be resolved in the interests of mankind and the maintenance and consolidation of peace. However, I should like to say to Lord Caradon that when one or two men are being praised highly one should beware of giving excessive praise lest it leads to certain consequences, though I do not think there will be such consequences in this case.

132. I should like to say a few words about the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Nesterenko. I think it is no secret that Mr. Nesterenko, while being a senior official of the United Nations Secretariat, is at the same time a good citizen of the Soviet Union. In this connexion, I should like to express our satisfaction at the favourable reactions and appraisals which we have heard here about his work in his post. He is returning to the Soviet Union where, undoubtedly, he will once again be in a position to use his experience and talents in his diplomatic career.

133. I should like to express the hope that his successor, Mr. Kutakov, will carry out the duties of Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations with all responsibility and will make a worthy contribution to the implementation of the tasks facing the United Nations.

134. The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov for what he has said and in particular for what he has said about me. I appreciate his remarks most profoundly. It has been a great privilege and honour to be associated with him and others in the work that this Council and the General Assembly have done. If we have concluded upon a successful note, it is in large measure due to the great contribution that he has made to this momentous undertaking on which we have embarked. It is an open secret that I am a profound believer in a *détente* between our two countries, a *détente* which is essential if world peace and security are to be ensured. Perhaps the most momentous development from the non-proliferation treaty will be the further advancement of that understanding.

135. I should now like to say a few words as representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. I wish to express the great gratification of my Government at the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council. We consider it to be a major contribution to international peace and security. Together with the declarations made by my Government and the other two co-sponsors in the

Council on 17 June [1430th meeting], this resolution lays a firm basis for ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon parties to the non-proliferation treaty.

136. On behalf of the United States Government, which is one of the depositary States under the non-proliferation treaty, I wish to reaffirm the pledge given in the General Assembly by the President of the United States.<sup>7</sup> My Government will move as speedily as possible, in concert with the other depositary States, to open the treaty for signature, and we hope to do so in concert with them at a very early date. We will sign the treaty on behalf of the United States as soon as it is opened for signature, and we will seek its speedy ratification by our Senate in accordance with our constitutional processes.

137. As we come to the conclusion of the consideration of this matter in the Council, I wish to thank all members, whatever their views, for their courtesy and co-operation in the expeditious handling of this important matter and for the serious and constructive tone of their contributions to our debate. In my capacity as United States representative, I wish to express particular appreciation for the great contributions throughout the entire consideration of this treaty over many years by the other co-sponsors of this resolution, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, both in Geneva and at the United Nations Headquarters. They have worked with great dedication in the interests of disarmament and world peace.

138. I wish also to thank our Secretary-General, whose great interest in progress towards disarmament has been expressed on many occasions. His interest has been an encouragement as well as a spur to us all.

139. Finally, I should like to pay tribute to the great role which the entire United Nations has played in this historic enterprise. The non-proliferation treaty and the security assurances which have been given in this Council and formally welcomed by it have been shaped and influenced by the principles of the Charter, by the United Nations as an institution and by many of its Members in the course of diplomatic exchanges and in the debates which have taken place here, in the recent General Assembly session and at prior Assembly sessions. I know of no episode in the history of the United Nations which better exemplifies the major purposes of our Organization: to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security and to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

140. The non-proliferation treaty is a giant step towards nuclear disarmament—in my view, the most important and significant disarmament measure adopted to date by the world community. Under the treaty the nuclear-weapon States are obligated promptly to negotiate further measures of nuclear disarmament. The United States will discharge that obligation in full measure. We shall not wait until the treaty comes into force. My Government has instructed our negotiators to commence such negotiations immediately. We shall carry on these negotiations fully mindful of the overwhelming desire of Member States, which we share, to rid the world community of the staggering burden of

<sup>7</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1672nd meeting.

armaments, so that the social and economic progress of human beings throughout the world can be advanced.

141. We shall face immense difficulties as we seek to move further along the road to disarmament and a more stable world order, and it would be foolish to minimize those difficulties. Yet, as we wrestle with those difficulties, what the United Nations has achieved in June 1968 in the General Assembly and the Security Council will serve as an inspiration and encouragement to all of us. In the further steps that we shall take together, we simply cannot fail—for the survival of all of us, our children and our grandchildren is indeed at stake.

142. Now I should like to say a word, if I may, as PRESIDENT of the Council. Several members of the Council have referred to the impending departure of our distinguished Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, Mr. Nesterenko, and I should like to sum up for all the members of the Council the feelings I know we all have. During his three years of service at the United Nations, Mr. Nesterenko has rightly earned wide respect as a hard-working, diligent and capable servant of the United Nations. He has consistently demonstrated a patience, attention to duty and expertise worthy of his high position. Beyond that, he has won many friends as a warm human being with a delightful sense of humour. We have all enjoyed his company as much as we have benefited from his advice and his good work. On behalf of the Council, I wish to express gratitude to Mr. Nesterenko for his outstanding service to the Council and to express the hope that he will find occasion to return to the United Nations, where he will find many friends and a warm welcome. We are sorry to see him and his family go, and they will carry with them the wishes of us all for success and happiness as he assumes new and important duties in his own country.

143. I give the floor to our distinguished Under-Secretary-General.

144. Mr. NESTERENKO (Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, I know that it is not the usual practice for an Under-Secretary-General to speak at this table, but it would be impolite if I did not reply to the kind words that have been said about me here. For the sake of brevity and accuracy I prefer, as you see, to speak in Russian, bearing in mind especially that Russian may soon become the fourth working language of this Organization.

145. In my brief statement I should like sincerely to thank you, Mr. President, and through you all the members of the Security Council, particularly those who felt able to say some kind words about me. Although I am not a woman, I find compliments pleasing—they are like balsam to my rather outworn heart. And if the words of greeting addressed to me were said not only out of formal politeness but as a token of respect for the work of members of the Secretariat, I, as one of the representatives of the Secretariat staff—like the Secretary-General, who is also here—find this doubly gratifying.

146. Believe me, our work is not so easy. It is not easy to refrain from expressing our feelings about the futility of the

Security Council's efforts or our satisfaction at its successes. But we staff members of the Secretariat do not have the right to make any comments. We avoid expressing our feelings, although sometimes it would be easier to do so than to conceal them. We try to adhere strictly to the rules which are laid down for us and we simply implement your decisions.

147. Naturally, I do not intend to exaggerate to the slightest degree my personal contribution, which has been extremely modest, but I should like to say that the years I have spent here have been entirely devoted to the work of the Secretariat. I should like it to be said of me that my work has been not destructive but constructive, as they say in English, and if the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom were to include me as well as the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, who, if I am not mistaken, is to be my future superior, among the doves from the communist ark, I should be very pleased indeed.

148. In any case, I have tried to make as large a contribution as possible to the cause we all serve, and I have endeavoured to carry out my duties in the manner I thought best. My task was made easier because I had the good fortune to work under the guidance of such an experienced and tactful leader as U Thant, our Secretary-General. I have already had an opportunity to express my gratitude to him privately and it is with great pleasure that I now do so publicly. I should like to say to him that he has been not only my superior but also my comrade in work, and I am happy to use this Russian word "comrade". I hope that he had the same feeling towards me.

149. Anyway, I went to him with my convictions and with my misgivings and we were able to discuss quietly a number of complex and at times very difficult problems. I should like to hope that the good relations which have existed between us will be inherited by Mr. Kutakov, my successor, who will soon be coming to sit in this not altogether comfortable, but I think useful, chair. I believe that he will enjoy the same good relations with all the members of the Security Council as I myself have had.

150. Mr. President, permit me once again to thank you, and through you, the members of the Security Council. If I could express any emotion I would express my appraisal of you as President of the Security Council and as the representative of your country. But as I have already said, I do not have the right to express any emotions—at least, until 21 June. If we by chance meet on 22 June, I shall be able to continue my conversation with you. I thank you, Mr. President, and all your colleagues.

151. The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Under-Secretary-General.

152. We have completed consideration of the item on our agenda. If there is no objection, and with my profound thanks for your co-operation and for all that you have said and done here today, I will declare the meeting adjourned.

*The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.*



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