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TWENTY-THIRD YEAR

**1407<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 24 MARCH 1968

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

*Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.*

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Sunday, 24 March 1968, at 4 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Ousmane Socé DIOP (Senegal).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1407)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
  - (a) Letter dated 21 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8484);
  - (b) Letter dated 21 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8486).

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Letter dated 21 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8484);
- (b) Letter dated 21 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8486)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the Security Council's 1403rd meeting, I propose to invite the representatives of the two countries which have requested this Council meeting, Jordan and Israel, to take places at the Council table for the duration of the discussion on this item. I also propose to invite the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Morocco, Syria and Saudi Arabia to take the places reserved for them at the sides of the Council Chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Farra (Jordan) and Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) took places at the Council table, and Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic), Mr. A. Pachachi (Iraq), Mr. A. T. Benhima (Morocco), Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) and Mr. J. M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the places reserved for them.*

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Security Council will now resume its consideration of the

question before it. I have no speakers on my list who wish to address the Council before we examine the draft resolution which I shall submit shortly.

3. At our last meeting, I informed members that some progress had been made in the negotiations. I must apologize for the delay in convening today's meeting, but we were continuing our negotiations which, I am happy to say, have led to the formulation of a text which will be read out in a few moments. It will be observed that in the preamble note is taken of the contents of the letters from both Jordan and Israel.

4. Before I ask the Council to vote on this draft resolution which, I believe, will meet with unanimous approval, I shall ask the Secretariat to read out the text.

*A member of the Secretariat read out the text of the draft resolution, as follows:*

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,*

*"Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8470, S/8475, S/8478, S/8483, S/8484 and S/8486,*

*"Having noted further the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as contained in documents S/7930/Add.64 and Add.65,*

*"Recalling resolution 236 (1967) by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire,*

*"Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,*

*"Considering that all violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire should be prevented and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,*

*"Recalling further resolution 237 (1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place,*

"1. *Deplores* the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

"2. *Condemns* the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;

"3. *Deplores* all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;

"4. *Calls upon* Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237 (1967);

"5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate."

5. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): With the consent of Council members, I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.<sup>1</sup>*

6. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I shall now call on those representatives who have indicated their desire to explain their vote after the voting. The first speaker on my list is the representative of the United States of America.

✓ 7. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): In my statement of 21 March I sought to make as clear as possible the position of my Government in the Council's consideration of the contents of the letters of Jordan and Israel which comprise our agenda. We were and remain gravely concerned by the disturbing events which led to this Council meeting. We were and remain opposed to violence from any quarter—military counter-actions such as that taken by Israel on 21 March in violation of the cease-fire resolutions, as well as the preceding acts of terrorism and violence, also in violation of the cease-fire resolutions. I stated to the Council on 21 March, and I repeat today:

"We oppose military actions in violation of the cease-fire resolutions of the Council; such actions create further complications in an already complicated situation. We oppose acts of terrorism, which are in violation of the cease-fire resolutions of the Council, and we are not blind to the additional problems they create. We believe, further, that military counter-actions, such as that which has just taken place on a scale out of proportion to the acts of violence that preceded it, are greatly to be deplored." [1402nd meeting, para. 5.]

8. We have long believed, as I also stated to the Council on 21 March, that the rule which should guide all the parties in these situations was first and wisely expressed many years

ago in Security Council resolution 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948. That resolution declared:

"Each party has the obligation to use all means at its disposal to prevent action violating the truce by individuals or groups who are subject to its authority or who are in territory under its control;"—and—

"No party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party."

✓ 9. We deem these principles to be applicable to the cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 which both Israel and Jordan have pledged to observe. Certainly if there is any lesson to be learned from the experience of years past, as well as the experience of recent days, the lesson is starkly simple: violence breeds violence. That is why we could not close our eyes to the fact that both types of violence have taken place, that both types must be the object of our concern, and that both types must be brought to an end if we are to move forward towards peace.

10. It is because the resolution just adopted by the Council takes into account all types of violence in violation of the cease-fire that my delegation was able to support it. The task of peace-making in the Middle East is already enormously complicated by the psychological and emotional wounds of past conflicts and disputes. If those wounds are ever to be healed, if the peace-making process set in motion by the Council in November 1967 is to have an even chance of succeeding, the duty of the Council and of all concerned is to eliminate resort to all types of violence by scrupulous compliance with the cease-fire resolutions and arrangements. It is with this consideration in mind—that a peaceful future cannot be built on a present characterized by acts of violence—that my delegation has joined in voting for this resolution.

11. While the resolution makes no express referral to Mr. Jarring's mission, surely he should be heartened and encouraged to persevere by the statements of individual members of the Council. My country, for its part, will not only continue to wish him well; we will also continue, in our contacts with all the parties, to act in accordance with the pledge I made before this Council when the resolution of 22 November was adopted—"a pledge to this Council and to the parties concerned that the diplomatic and political influence of the United States Government will be exerted in support of the efforts of the United Nations special representative to achieve a fair, equitable and dignified settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquillity" [1382nd meeting, para. 102].

✓ 12. And it is our hope, with the events of the recent past as grim and tragic reminders, that the parties themselves will be inspired to extend to Mr. Jarring their fullest co-operation so that he may all the more quickly fulfil his difficult mandate—that of establishing and maintaining contacts with the States concerned—in the words of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967: "in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution".

<sup>1</sup> See resolution 248 (1968).



13. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) *(translated from Russian)*: The Security Council has just adopted a resolution [248 (1968)] condemning Israel's new piratical attack on Jordan, carried out with the use of massive ground and air forces.

14. In its decision the Security Council has described those aggressive actions on the part of Israel as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the resolution on a cease-fire and cessation of military action in the Middle East. It warns the aggressor against similar acts of aggression and stresses in its decision that such acts of military reprisal on the part of Israel cannot be tolerated.

15. The resolution also stresses that in the case of a repetition of such acts the Council will have to consider such measures as are provided for under the Charter to ensure against a repetition of such acts. There are such provisions in the United Nations Charter, and the Soviet delegation has mentioned them.

16. The resolution just adopted is a serious warning to the Israel extremists, who are continuing their adventuristic and irresponsible policy, defying the United Nations Charter and the authority of the Security Council, exacerbating the situation in the Middle East and sabotaging the resolution of 22 November 1967 adopted by the Security Council. It is on record that when three questions were asked by the Soviet delegation at the 1405th meeting, namely: (a) does Israel recognize that resolution? (b) does it agree to its implementation? and (c) does it agree to the withdrawal of its troops from the occupied Arab territories—which is the major question in this resolution, no reply was forthcoming.

17. By the position it has taken, Israel is impeding Mr. Jarring in the fulfilment of his mission.

18. The Soviet delegation has voted in favour of the resolution just adopted by the Security Council, which it regards as a definite and firm action designed to bridle the aggressor. The Arab States directly concerned that have fallen victim to the Israel aggression were able in these specific conditions to agree to such a resolution by virtue of the fact that it contains a serious condemnation of this new act of Israel aggression and a serious warning for the future.

19. However, the decision taken by the Council is the very minimum of what the Security Council should have done. All of us around this table and in this room know why the Council was not able to take a more radical decision and why we needed so much time—four interminable days—to work out a draft resolution. Here in the Council and outside the Council Israel continues to receive protection and support and attempts are made to justify and excuse the aggression and the aggressor.

20. The statement of the United States representative after the vote on the draft resolution, in which he attempted to give a one-sided interpretation of the decision taken by the Council, is new and striking confirmation of the general line of United States policy in connexion with Israel's aggression.

21. The Soviet delegation has already pointed out that the United States representative is trying to place the aggressor and the victim on the same footing or, as the English say, to put them in the same boat. He is attempting to achieve this by his interpretation of the resolution that has been adopted. Israel can take such an interpretation as an opportunity to act arbitrarily, by referring to so-called terrorist acts by the inhabitants of Arab territories now occupied by the aggressor.

22. But the experience and history of war and the occupation of foreign territories, and particularly the experience of my own country, the Soviet Union, when the most densely populated and economically advanced part of the country was occupied by the Hitlerite aggressors, gives us grounds for assuming that the aggressor may concoct any story, any pretext for new piratical acts of aggression. Therefore, I should very much like the United States representative to understand that such pretexts and justifications by the aggressor for his so-called retaliatory measures are, apparently, incomprehensible to him because his country is fortunate in that it has never experienced occupation by an aggressor; the people of his country have never suffered under the heel of an occupier or aggressor. So it is very easy for him to take this attitude to territory occupied by the enemy and to the feelings of the people who are subjected to the occupying forces.

23. We have experienced attempts by Israel arbitrarily to interpret the previous resolution of the Security Council. This was mentioned in our statement, and it is also mentioned in the statement of the Soviet Government of 22 March 1968 which I read out here for the benefit of the members of the Security Council [1405th meeting, para. 12]. Referring to the previous resolution of 22 November 1967 [242 (1967)], it stated: the Security Council resolution on the Middle East is not a recommendation or an opinion which Governments are free to follow or to ignore. However, Israel is beginning arbitrarily to interpret that resolution in its own way, to claim that it is not a resolution but merely an agenda for negotiations, and that it is not binding upon it.

24. No one has given Israel the right to interpret Security Council resolutions in its own way. There is a danger that your statement today, Mr. Goldberg, may give Israel cause to interpret this resolution too in its own way, and under the pretext of so-called retaliatory measures it may once again commit acts of aggression against the Arab countries. We are faced with such a danger and I shall be happy if this does not happen. I think the Security Council will also be happy if it does not happen.

25. This is the situation with regard to the question of interpretation.

26. The Security Council can hardly force the Arab population who are under the heel of the occupier to kneel down, fold their arms meekly before the occupier, and embrace him. Can any Arab State and its Government bear responsibility for the atrocities being committed by the invader in the occupied territory? This aspect is not touched on here. Therefore, anyone who has experienced occupation or who has experienced violence against the

population of his country on the part of the aggressor, invader or occupier, will realize that the aggressor cannot expect to be loved by the population of the country he occupies and cannot rely on that. Both for the aggressor and the occupier, the best thing would be to take the line of compliance with the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and to withdraw its troops to the positions of 5 June 1967. Then there would be neither occupied territories nor any foreign population oppressed in those territories, and there would be no conflicts. That would be the most sensible solution for the aggressor.

27. The resolution just adopted by the Security Council does not need any special commentaries. It does not and cannot contain any prohibition against hating one's enemy, those who have occupied one's country, nor any demand that one should love the enemy, aggressor or occupier of one's country.

28. Moreover, an understandable misgiving also arises on a more general plane. Is this not an attempt to ensure that the people of occupied territories should act in such a way in other cases, and not only in this instance? Unfortunately we are witnessing occupation by foreign troops and oppression of the population in occupied territories elsewhere—in Viet-Nam, for example. Is there any wish or intention on the part of anyone to expand this thesis to include that, too?

29. In this context, attempts to read into resolution 248 (1968) adopted today by the Security Council a meaning which suits the aggressor would contradict that very resolution. It would be a kind of rearguard action for those who suffered defeat for four long days and were compelled to retreat from their previous, more rigid intentions.

30. The resolution adopted by the Security Council speaks for itself. It contains a serious condemnation of Israel's new act of aggression and gives us basis for hoping that it will both serve as a lesson to the aggressor and benefit the Arab countries—and that besides teaching the aggressor a lesson, it will serve as a severe warning to him.

31. The Soviet Union, as is stressed in the statement of the Soviet Government of 22 March 1968 emphatically affirms its determination to press, together with other peace-loving States, for an end to Israel aggression and the elimination of all its consequences, for the return to their lawful owners of the territories captured from Arab States as a result of the aggression of 1967, and for the achievement of the necessary political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in that area.

32. Mr. SOLANO LOPEZ (Paraguay) (*translated from Spanish*): At the 1403rd meeting, held on Thursday evening, 21 March, I expressed my delegation's concern at the grave events that had taken place that day on Jordanian territory, east of the River Jordan. I said that I deplored the violation of the cease-fire, as I had previously deplored other violent incidents and violations of the cease-fire that had occurred in the area of the Israel-Jordan sector. I said that my delegation could not condone or justify such

violence and I gave a general outline of the action that should be taken immediately by the Security Council with a view to avoiding any recurrence and re-establishing the *status quo* which, being itself the result of war, remained precarious and provisional. But at least in the present circumstances, I said, the peace-making mission could continue, with the patience and perseverance of the special representative of the Secretary-General, whose mission has the full support of my delegation.

33. The resolution we have just adopted is in line with the views I expressed, and is therefore acceptable to my delegation. For this reason we cast our vote in favour, to enable it to be adopted unanimously.

34. In making this very brief explanation of vote, I feel compelled, on behalf of my Government, to express the hope that a happier future in just and stable peace lies ahead for the sorely-tried region of the Middle East. We are anxious to do all we can to achieve such a just and stable peace.

35. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I said when I welcomed the Soviet Ambassador a few days ago that we in this Council have fatigue and frustration as our constant companions. Those companions have walked with us through recent days and nights. I said, too, that our own reward is that we never abandon the search for common ground of agreement. We have not abandoned that search in the past week.

36. Even in the fatigue and frustration since last Thursday morning, I rejoice that there has been kept alive amongst us the desire for agreement and the readiness to consult and the courage to compromise. I stated the position and policy of my Government when I spoke last Thursday [1403rd meeting] and I have no need to repeat it now. But now that we have consulted and agreed and voted together, there are three things I should emphasize. I shall do so as shortly as possible.

37. First, the wide area of agreement between us was throughout our consultations greater than the gap of disagreement. The fact that we worked so hard to narrow and finally to close that gap should not lead us to forget that much of the resolution was never in dispute. Ambassador Pachachi, who always speaks to us so clearly and thoughtfully, in measured eloquence, but also with great force and conviction, pointed the way for us when he said last Friday:

"Therefore, the action to be taken by the Council should be based on the following: It should be an expression of its opposition to bloodshed and slaughter; it should be a warning for the future against the perpetration of such acts; it should be an expression of concern for the principles of this Organization and its own resolutions; it should be a warning that such acts will only result in the weakening of the peacemaking process of the United Nations." [1405th meeting, para. 57.]

We welcome that wise and strong lead.

38. The second contention, which I particularly wish to emphasize, arises from the fact that in the resolution we

have just passed we refer back to resolution 236 (1967), in which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire. What took place last week was not an isolated incident. It was the culmination of a train of events which goes back a long way. To attempt to deal with last week's events in isolation we thought would be to fail to recognize the realities of the situation as a whole. Many of us felt it essential to make it clear that no violence will be condoned; all violence must be stopped if there is to be hope for the future.

39. Our purpose has been and surely must remain to escape from the vicious circle of violence, a vicious circle to which all violence contributes. It is only by an escape from that vicious circle that we can have hope for the future.

40. In turning to the future, let me repeat the third argument, which seems to me to transcend in importance everything else. No one in this debate has disagreed with the resolution of 22 November 1967. Everyone accepts it. Valuable statements have been made. A few days ago the Prime Minister of Jordan gave the assurance that the Jordanian Government respected and accepted the resolution, unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council, that they bound themselves to implement it, and that they considered this resolution as a sound formula for a settlement of the current crisis.

41. The Prime Minister of Jordan concluded his statement by saying that the United Nations envoy, Mr. Jarring, had been charged with a mission and that the Jordanian Government wished him success in the discharge of this mission in order to serve stability and the cause of justice and peace. Those were the words of the Government of Jordan.

42. And here in this Council there have been important statements, and if I were to select one I think that I might choose the statement made by the Soviet Ambassador who told us in clear, simple, forthright language earlier in this debate: "... The Soviet Union does not vote for resolutions it does not recognize. The Soviet Union voted for the resolution concerned." [1405th meeting, para. 126.] He went on to say: "The Soviet Union voted for all parts of that resolution; it therefore recognizes all the parts." [Ibid., para. 128.]

43. That is the kind of direct and categorical statement we like to hear from the Soviet Ambassador. Having heard his speech this evening, I would respectfully say that he is at his best when he is being positive.

44. We have a sound framework for future settlement. We have a representative of the Secretary-General universally trusted and respected. We have on all sides, I am sure, a longing for the end of violence and suffering. We leave the past. Let us apply one test from now on. That test should be the test of whether what we do and what we say will enable us to escape from all the frustrations and bloodshed of the past and to contribute in everything we do and say to a cause we can be proud of, with justice for the refugees and a stable peace for everyone at long last.

45. I read in today's papers discussions whether time is on one side or the other. Time is on no one's side. How much

harm delay has done already. Only the devil would advocate delay now. Delay has been and is on the side of conflict. Delay has been and is on the side of the suffering of the innocent. Delay has been and is on the side of violence and bloodshed. Delay is on the side of condemning another generation in the Middle East to hopeless hate. All of us, as we come to the end of our debate, must surely be anxiously aware that there is no time to be lost. Now is the time and great is the urgency to turn from what divides us to what unites us in practical advance.

46. Mr. DE CARVALHO SILOS (Brazil): I should like to place on record the following explanation of vote.

47. My delegation supported the resolution just adopted because the text takes into account the two main points which were stressed in the statement that I made here on 21 March. In that statement I emphasized the necessity for condemning in a very clear-cut way the large-scale military operation undertaken by Israel on the east bank of the Jordan River. I also pointed out that my Government strongly deplored all violations of the cease-fire including—and I quote from my statement: "the series of armed attacks launched from Jordanian territory through and beyond the cease-fire line, on the west bank of the Jordan River, now occupied by Israel forces" [1403rd meeting, para. 55].

48. It is my delegation's contention that the expression "violent incidents", which appears in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution just adopted, covers those armed attacks and all acts of violence, including those referred to in the Secretary-General's report of 21 March [S/7930/Add.64].

49. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I should like, Sir, very briefly to explain the vote of the Canadian delegation on the resolution which, under your patient and wise leadership, has been adopted unanimously.

50. When I spoke in the Council on 21 March I made clear that the large-scale military action recently undertaken by Israel in Jordan had brought about a highly dangerous situation in the Middle East. This action, which has now been forthrightly condemned by the Security Council, was preceded by a mounting number of incidents of infiltration or sabotage in areas under Israel control. My delegation recognizes that the resolution just adopted concentrates its attention on the major military action by Israel which clearly could not be condoned by the Council. In voting in favour of this resolution, however, my delegation wishes to make it clear that it attaches importance to the fact that the Security Council does not condone violent incidents, whatever their source. The Canadian delegation sincerely hopes that the passage of this resolution will help to ensure that the cease-fire will be scrupulously observed by all concerned, for if it is not observed the people of the area will be drawn into a vicious circle of escalating violence.

51. I must say too that I would have liked to see the resolution contain an appropriate reference both to UNTSO and to Mr. Jarring's highly important mission. Now that a decision has been taken on the immediate issue raised in the

Council the Canadian delegation would urge all those concerned to give Mr. Jarring's mission the full co-operation and support which it deserves and very much needs if it is to be a success, for this surely represents our best and most urgent hope for peace in the Middle East.

- ✓52. Mr. BORCH (Denmark): At our meeting of 21 March I explained my Government's concern over recent developments between Israel and Jordan. In that connexion I stated:

"... we must deplore all violations of the cease-fire established and maintained in accordance with several resolutions of the Security Council.

"We must oppose violence and the resort to force and insist upon complete compliance with the cease-fire resolutions." [1403rd meeting, paras. 49-50.]

I then went on to state that violations of these resolutions, in our opinion, poisoned the atmosphere and carried with them the risk of continued and increased conflict and could not but impede progress towards the objectives of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). That resolution was adopted unanimously by the Council, and it seems to me that the debate in the Council preceding today's vote has borne out that there is still agreement on the ultimate objective of our efforts. Therefore, it is a source of great satisfaction to us that the resolution adopted today could also be supported by the entire membership of the Council because even if the subject matter of that resolution is in itself of a limited scope, it has a direct bearing on the broader political problems which have beset the Middle East for decades.

53. In our opinion, only a scrupulous and complete adherence to the cease-fire by all concerned can ensure an atmosphere which will be conducive to the furtherance of the diplomatic process in which Mr. Jarring is engaged on behalf of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, with a view to establishing a just and lasting peace in the area. It is therefore our hope, indeed, our demand, that all concerned abstain from all violence.

54. The resolution adopted by the Security Council today reflects our main considerations. While dealing with particular emphasis with the military action of Israel on 21 March, the resolution at the same time also deals clearly with all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire. My delegation therefore voted in favour of that resolution.

55. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Although the three sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document S/8498 of 23 March agreed not to press their text to a vote, there are some facts in this connexion which I should like to put on the record. That is necessary in view of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the final agreed text.

56. The three delegations—that is, India, Senegal and Pakistan—submitted their draft because three days of intensive consultations between them and their African colleagues on the one side and some Western and Latin American members of the Council on the other had failed to produce an agreed text that could be adopted unani-

mously. But in deference to the views of the four Western and two Latin American States members of the Security Council, the three sponsors submitted their draft in milder terms than the commitment embodied in the language of resolution 228 (1966) required. The commitment was to take further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of actions of military reprisal.

57. Furthermore, after submitting their draft resolution, and despite the great urgency of the issue, India, Senegal and Pakistan still refrained from introducing it in the Security Council yesterday and asking for an immediate vote. They refrained because they believed that further consultations should take place in a final effort to reach a compromise text that would command a unanimous vote. It is a matter of satisfaction to us that the Council has now been able to act with unanimity.

58. It is with sorrow that my delegation has voted for the resolution just adopted by the Council [248 (1968)]. We have condemned Israel for its military attack along a front of nearly 100 miles, mounted in division strength, with aircraft, tanks, artillery and all kinds of modern weapons, against a defenceless State whose only armour is the courage and steadfastness of its people. While condemnation may to some extent satisfy the universal conscience, it cannot bring back to life the hundreds of people who have been killed on the side not only of Jordan but also of Israel. The resolution does not ask for reparations from Israel for the untold damage and destruction to property and means of livelihood that Israel has inflicted upon a poor country.

59. *The New York Times* of 23 March 1968 carries the following eye-witness report by one of its special correspondents of the damage:

"The column's route"—that is, the Israel military column's route—"was marked on either side of the main north-south road parallel to the river by houses reduced to rubble. Not a single building on the road remained intact for more than half a mile".

60. My delegation takes note that the draft resolution that has just been adopted unanimously by the Council calls upon Israel to desist from such acts in contravention of Security Council resolution 237 (1967). We expect that, now at least, Israel will refrain from such acts of destruction.

61. Operative paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted "Deplores all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire". In the view of my delegation, the inclusion of this paragraph does not in any way imply that the sporadic acts of terrorism alleged by Israel are to be equated with the large-scale military attack by Israel on 21 March. Operative paragraph 3 does not in any way qualify the condemnation in operative paragraph 2. The Security Council cannot tolerate military reprisals, much less a massive armed attack by a Member State on another Member State on the pretext of retaliation against alleged acts of terrorism or sabotage. To do so not only would be destructive of international law and the United Nations Charter, but would also open the door wide to even graver aggressions in the Middle East.

62. The Government of Jordan has stated that it is in no position, in spite of its best efforts, to control the activities of resistance movements. We cannot permit an interpretation of operative paragraph 3 that would, in the event of any future incident, enable Israel to claim the freedom to launch any military attacks against Jordan or any of its other neighbours. It is always notoriously easy, as is borne out by the history of two World Wars in this century and by that of colonial wars, to stage incidents and to use them as pretexts for launching wars of aggression. We cannot be a party to binding Jordan to unjust conditions which it is not in a position to fulfil, and, in the event of non-fulfilment, to expose it to the mortal danger of a massive armed attack.

63. Pakistan must therefore reject any such interpretation, for it not only would destroy the very foundations of international relations and the United Nations order, but would condemn small and weak States to live in fear and trembling before their stronger neighbours.

64. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) (*translated from French*): My delegation had no intention of speaking, now that the Council's discussion of Israel's aggression of 21 March 1968 has culminated in a unanimous vote. However, in view of the remarks we have heard tonight, I deem it a duty to make the following statement.

65. If we attempt to sum up the situation to which the Council has been devoting its attention for the past few days, we must note that the *de facto* authorities in Tel Aviv committed a deliberate and premeditated act of massive armed aggression against the free territory of the Kingdom of Jordan. No one denies that this was a clear case of aggression which is condemned both by the Charter and by law. That fact has never been denied; indeed, we have seen that the spokesman of Zionist diplomacy went so far as to give the Council a report on the acts of military aggression perpetrated by the authorities he represents.

66. These two striking and incontrovertible facts are central to the serious situation that the Security Council is considering.

67. Bearing these facts in mind, the delegations on the Council, in their continuing concern for fairness and impartiality, have sought to describe the situation in the text before us and to draw the appropriate conclusions, condemning the aggression committed and seeking to prevent any repetition of such acts, which constitute a flagrant violation of United Nations resolutions.

68. Being firmly convinced that there is a desire for a dialogue and that such a dialogue would be useful, and being anxious to arrive at some agreement which would safeguard the integrity and authority of the Security Council, Algeria responded promptly to the appeal that was made and agreed to engage in detailed discussions with all genuine members of the Council.

69. Disregarding the discussions in this Council and anxious to avoid condemning a clear case of aggression, some have felt obliged to inject an idea which may in future be dangerous to all nations and which denies the fundamental right of a people to resist enemy occupation. The

right to self-defence and survival is a sacred right of which no people can be deprived. The natural tendency of peoples to resist foreign occupation is, and always will be, strong enough to defy all armies of aggression.

70. The main task the United Nations has set itself is to assist peoples to achieve freedom and independence; hence, it would have been inconceivable for its highest organ to condemn in any way peoples which have the audacity to stand up to an invader. Such an action would have directly encouraged oppressive forces everywhere to crush the world's peoples; it would have been an invitation to Ian Smith and South Africa to overrun Zambia, the Congo (Kinshasa) and the Republic of Tanzania with their armed hordes; it would have amounted to a sanction of the aggression still going on in Asia. In other words, the peace of the world, already so greatly disturbed, would have been further weakened.

71. For our part, we cannot, while remaining true to ourselves, condemn the means employed by an oppressed people to reaffirm its existence. The situation was clear enough. The whole world knows who are the enemies of freedom and independence; the whole world now knows who it is that condones aggression. Indeed, peoples living under foreign domination can now rely only on their own will to set themselves free, whatever the cost.

72. Reason has triumphed in the end; such ideas have been unacceptable to members of the Council. Even before the emergency meeting was convened, Jordan had warned the Security Council of the concentrations of troops and preparations for aggression, and the Council acted on Jordan's complaint by giving it full consideration and by drawing the necessary conclusions. The complaint resulted in the unequivocal condemnation of the Zionist aggression against Jordan. The international community at one and the same time condemned both the aggression and the occupation. Jordan's cause and the cause of the peoples in the occupied areas were given a favourable hearing. The decision stands as a warning to the Zionist authorities against any repetition of reprisals or of similar violations.

73. If such acts occur again, it will be the Council's duty, in accordance with its decision, to take the effective measures provided for in the Charter so as to put an end to the continuing aggressive behaviour of the Zionist authorities.

74. We are pleased to note that the international community has taken a clear stand against the aggressor. We are not surprised that there have been certain interpretations intended to justify the reprisals and to deny the peoples' legitimate right to resist occupation. Obviously, with the rest of the international community, we reject such an interpretation, which would camouflage the problems engendered by aggression and occupation.

75. It is the duty of each one of us, and especially of the Great Powers, to demand the withdrawal of the occupying forces because—and this too is self-evident—it is occupation that brings resistance into being. If we are to pave the way for a solution, we should rather denounce the dynamitings, the large-scale repression and mass assassination, and the

whole policy of evicting people from their homeland. In some of the statements we have heard this evening stress was laid on certain interpretations; it should be noted, however, that the latter are completely at variance with the terms and the spirit of the resolution we have just adopted.

76. Attempts have been made to interpret the text just adopted by the Council in a way to which it simply does not lend itself. Algeria, for its part, voted for the resolution and for nothing else. Such attempts to translate the resolution we have just adopted into unofficial language have even run counter to logic. For our part, we shall continue to respect by our actions the words which so gloriously apply to those who are fighting for national freedom in Palestine: to fight against tyrants is to obey God's law. These are the words of a great American and were spoken, as my neighbours to the right must know, by President Jefferson. As far as we are concerned, in remaining faithful to ourselves, we shall remain faithful to that adage.

77. Before concluding, I should like to thank the delegations of India, Pakistan and Senegal for their untiring efforts, which have greatly helped us to reach a unanimous vote today. In so doing, I am sure that I speak for many delegations both inside and outside this Council.

78. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation voted in favour of the resolution that has just been adopted and which was the result of a long debate and even longer consultations during which members of the Council and other Members of our Organization have given testimony concerning the events in the Middle East. The facts have been established objectively and, on the basis of those facts it became perfectly clear that Israel committed a premeditated, cruel aggression against Jordan—in the words of Prime Minister Eshkol, "a punitive action". This act of aggression was a clear contradiction of the principles of the Charter; therefore, the resolution unequivocally condemned it. At the same time, it was a violation of several resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the cease-fire in the Middle East.

79. In the view of the Hungarian delegation, the resolution is not complete, and we fully agree with the statement of the representative of Pakistan that due reparation should have been considered and included in the resolution to indemnify the victim of the aggression, namely, Jordan, and the families of those who were killed and wounded in their own country by the aggressor. We still feel that, despite the fact that our resolution does not contain such a stipulation, that obligation in reality exists and Israel is responsible for the consequences of its action.

80. The resolution just adopted deplores, in its operative paragraph 3, violent incidents and violations of the cease-fire. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, the reprisals that are practised by Israel civilian and military authorities in the occupied areas, the numerous armed violations of the cease-fire, the persecution of the civilian population, the destruction of their homes, the destruction of communities and cultural institutions, the destruction of human life, the colonization of occupied areas and the infiltration of settlers across the armistice lines into the

occupied areas are all clear violations of the cease-fire; and these are the acts which culminate in violent incidents.

81. At the same time, the Hungarian delegation wishes to state very clearly that, on the basis of the Charter and general international law, the civilian populations in the occupied areas have every right to fight against the oppressors, to fight for freedom and independence. It is legitimate self-defence against the aggressors, against the occupiers.

82. The resolution demands that Israel should cease all these illegal actions in contravention of the Charter, and observe the principles of peace, national sovereignty, and the right of self-defence, and human rights in general.

83. During our debate, in all the numerous and lengthy statements by the Israel representative, we did not hear any mention of the basic principles of the Charter of our Organization, nor did we hear any statement that Israel is ready to abide by the resolutions of the Security Council.

84. The Security Council is the main body of our Organization responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. On the basis of that task, our resolution reiterates the demand for the observance of the cease-fire in the Middle East. In the view of my delegation, the members of the Security Council—in fact, all Members of the Organization and especially those permanent members of the Security Council having close relations with Israel—should make every effort to induce that Government to desist from further acts of violence and to abandon its expansionist policy. It is their duty to force Israel, if necessary, to implement Security Council resolutions 236 (1967), 237 (1967), and 242 (1967), the basic demand of which resolutions is the withdrawal of all forces from all the occupied areas behind the lines of 4 June 1967.

85. Israel, as a result of this resolution and the previous ones, should fully respect the sovereignty of Jordan and the other Arab countries and should respect the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples.

86. Mr. BERARD (France) (*translated from French*): Any country which, like my own, underwent during the last World War the terrible experience of military occupation of part or all of its territory, with all that this involves in the way of suffering and inevitable reaction, knows that a clear distinction must be drawn between military operations carried out with deliberate intent and carefully prepared by a Government, and acts which are perpetrated by individuals or groups of individuals prompted by obvious feelings.

87. While asking that the cease-fire should be strictly and generally respected, my delegation wished to make this point and to say that it would obviously be unacceptable to try to place the two sides on the same footing or even to establish any parallel between them. We consider that the resolution just adopted by the Security Council leaves no doubt on that score; that is why we voted for it.

88. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Iraq.



89. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq): The representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, has done me the great honour of quoting some parts of one of my statements before this Council. However, the account he has given of my views was not complete. In that same statement I said:

"Any resolution which . . . tries to confuse the issue by introducing the question of the so-called terrorists can only encourage the aggressors to undertake similar actions in the future and undermine the authority of this Organization and the resolutions of the Security Council." [1405th meeting, para. 57.]

90. Moreover, a more complete account and picture of my views might be found in the first statement I made before the Council when I said that the Council is called upon to make it clear:

"... that actions of this kind cannot be tolerated by the international community, but must be roundly and clearly condemned as acts of aggression? Therefore, we support the view of representatives who spoke before me that the Council must invoke Chapter VII of the Charter and take enforcement and punitive measures against Israel including the imposition of sanctions." [1402nd meeting, para. 103.]

91. Those are the complete views of the delegation of Iraq on this question.

92. It is for this reason that we did not find the resolution adopted by the Council to have gone far enough, since similar resolutions in the past have not deterred Israel from undertaking aggressive actions against Jordan and other Arab countries. But it is our hope that the strength and unanimity of the views expressed by the members of the Council this time may have some deterrent effect.

93. Yet, we must admit that the resolution contains certain positive elements. It is quite clear that it is addressed to Israel and the actions undertaken by Israel on 21 March. There is an observation that the military action taken by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature. There is a clear condemnation of that military action as a violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire. There is a paragraph which calls upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237 (1967). The effort made in this Council somehow to equate that act of aggression with the legitimate activities of self-defence undertaken by the patriots and the people of Palestine against the usurpers and occupiers of their homeland has been fully and brilliantly answered by the representatives of Pakistan and Algeria.

94. I should just like to make one comment. The representative of the United States again mentioned resolution 56 (1948) adopted by the Council on 19 August 1948, and said that the provisions of that resolution are applicable in this case. But it is well known to the Council that that resolution was adopted pursuant to resolution 54 (1948) adopted on 15 July 1948 under Chapter VII of the Charter. That resolution of 15 July 1948 was superseded by the General Armistice Agreements, as is clearly stated in

Security Council resolution 73 (1949) of 11 August 1949 approving the Armistice Agreements. Therefore, it is not possible to invoke resolution 56 (1948), and if it is to be invoked, at all, it has to be done within the framework exclusively of the Armistice Agreements.

95. Are we therefore to gather from this that the United States feels that the Armistice Agreements are still in force and therefore supports the view of the majority of the members of the Council and the United Nations that the unilateral denunciation of the Armistice Agreements cannot be valid and cannot be accepted? If that is the case, is it not the duty of the United States to use its influence, as the representative of the United States informed us many times in this Council, on Israel to respect scrupulously and abide by the Armistice Agreements? And the first step to be taken in this scrupulous respect is the immediate, unconditional and total evacuation of the territories occupied in June 1967.

96. Besides the legal aspects concerned and besides the fact that this resolution cannot in any way be applicable to the individual activities of the freedom fighters, the right of these fighters to defend their homes and to rise against the aggressors and usurpers and occupiers of their homeland is not only based on the United Nations Charter, but is based on a timeless and much higher moral law: the law of self-defence, the right of every people to defend their homes and to resist the aggressors and occupiers of their country. This the patriots will continue to do so long as Israel occupies the lands of their ancestors.

97. The reluctance, in fact the refusal, of the representative of Israel—in spite of the question addressed to him whether his Government accepts and is ready to implement resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council adopted on 22 November 1967—to give an answer can only mean that they do not intend to abide by that resolution. Therefore, there is an added reason, justification and cause for the freedom fighters to continue their struggle until their land is liberated from the aggressors.

98. The representative of Israel, in answer to the representative of the Soviet Union, referred the Council to a document in which the Foreign Minister of Israel in a three-page statement referred almost exclusively to the position allegedly taken by the United Arab Republic. But only three lines in that document were devoted to the question of Israel: the old position of direct negotiations which, as I have said before, was expressly excluded from the resolution of 22 November 1967—excluded not by accident but deliberately excluded in the long weeks and months of discussions and deliberations that preceded the adoption of the resolution. Therefore, we can take that not only as a refusal of the resolution but as a disgraceful attempt to mislead the Council as to the true intentions of Israel.

99. Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to you, Mr. President, and to the members of the Council for allowing me to take part in these debates, and to express the gratitude and thanks of our people to all those members which have supported the right of the people of Palestine to fight and regain their homeland, to all those members

whose position was resolutely and unambiguously against the aggression perpetrated by the Israel occupiers.

100. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now call on the representative of Morocco.

101. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (*translated from French*): The Council will recall that, immediately after the voting on resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, some delegations asked to speak in order to give an interpretation of the text which had just been voted upon. Today we are faced with a situation which is identical not only as regards the formal sequence of events in the Council but also as regards the reasons which presumably have induced certain delegations to resort to the same procedure again this time.

102. We also recall that in the course of the contacts and negotiations culminating in the resolution of 22 November tremendous obstacles had to be overcome before a text could be worked out that would reflect a political situation both the immediate facts and the long-range consequences of which could give rise to certain difficulties.

103. Today, however, the events which have been put before the Council for consideration are characterized by a flagrant violation of the Council's cease-fire order. Therefore, I do not think that we have been faced this time with the same difficulties in interpreting the facts that we had to overcome as in the case of the resolution of 22 November or that we have had the same misgivings as to the implications of the situation for the future. The text which the Council has adopted today is quite clear, it requires no interpretations based on what the resolution does not say or disregarding what it says.

104. I am thinking here of an observation that was addressed to Mr. Eban by one of the members of the Council when, in connexion with certain paragraphs of the resolution of 22 November, Mr. Eban had been trying to broaden the meaning of the resolution by summarizing, not the resolution itself, but the discussions preceding its adoption.

105. I have before me the resolution which the Council has adopted today. It seems to me, first of all, that the text itself reveals a strict logic and leaves no room for any personal interpretation.

106. Apart from the mention of Jordan in the first line of the preamble, the text refers to Israel four times. First the Security Council recalls the military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan. It describes that action as being of a large-scale and carefully planned nature. Next the Council recalls resolution 237 (1967) in which it called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants. Thirdly, the Council condemns the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter; and last but not least, the Council calls upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237 (1967).

107. I think that there is a certain structure, a certain balance, in the drafting of resolutions. This text refers to Israel by name four times in connexion with specific past

acts and, moreover, with future acts. The Council saw no necessity to address itself directly or indirectly to the Government of Jordan, still less to the people of Jordan, in keeping with the tradition whereby the United Nations never addresses itself to peoples as such.

108. Consequently, as we see it, the provisions of this resolution consist of a reminder of certain acts committed by Israel, an actual condemnation of Israel and a specific request to Israel to desist from such acts in the future.

109. Those delegations which have attempted to invoke what might be called the "silences" of the resolution in order to place the two parties concerned—the victim and the party responsible for the incidents—on an equal footing have simply been using the text in a way which may have some value as far as public opinion in their countries is concerned or for the fulfilment of their professional duty in the Council, but the public law which governs the procedure of this Council and is reflected in its decisions makes no provision for interpretations of that kind. On the basis of this text, which the Council has adopted unanimously, it should be quite clear that there is no direct or indirect allusion to the Government of Jordan, still less to the Jordanian people.

110. Eminent speakers who have preceded me have said that occupation engendered resistance. The Israel Government and those who closed their eyes to its June aggression could hardly have any illusions as to the inevitable result of such activities, i.e. the emergence of a liberation movement, which, indeed, has been continuing without a let-up for the past twenty years and is now moving in a direction which is in keeping with the new developments in the area. Therefore, it cannot be expected that a people who have been the victims of an aggression and who did not sense justice from the international community at the time of that aggression will heed an appeal addressed to them today, considering the failure to condemn at the time the aggression which led to the occupation. We cannot expect that this appeal—which is perhaps being made today with genuine sincerity—will be heard by those who are daily shedding their blood and who, bound hand and foot, are being handed over to the invader.

111. Mention has also been made of the resolution of 1948, and my colleague from Iraq has dealt with it appropriately. I do not by any means wish to challenge the qualifications of a jurist of the head of the United States delegation. If I am not mistaken, he quoted from the resolution of 1948 [56 (1948)], and on the basis of that quotation he made certain comparisons with the present text, and certain deductions. I believe that in rhetoric this is called sophistry. While it may have its place in literature, it is not so acceptable in law. Thus the countries which are now invoking that 1948 resolution forget that it was adopted at the time in a specific context and fail to realize that it cannot be applied today, in the form in which it was drafted, to an entirely different political situation.

112. We have also been told today that we should see in this resolution an encouragement to Mr. Jarring's mission. You will recall that we placed all our hopes in this Jarring mission when it was challenged during the November 1967



debate. Consequently, we are *a priori* in favour of that mission. I think it can be said that since Mr. Jarring went to the Middle East the Arab countries have spared no effort to facilitate his task, having regard at the same time to the need to safeguard dignity. If this mission has been rendered more difficult—I do not mean that it has been rendered impossible, but it has in fact been made very difficult—that is due to the successive violations of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 as a result of which the representative of the Secretary-General today finds himself in a new situation.

113. In the statements made today, attempts have been made to include the Jarring mission in the text on which the Council has voted. Yet that mission is an entirely separate matter. The Council did not appoint Mr. Jarring to go and ask the peoples under Israel occupation, on behalf of the Secretary-General, to keep their hands firmly tied until such time as Israel deigns to facilitate Mr. Jarring's mission. Mr. Jarring will find the most effective support in the Arab capitals, but he cannot expect us to agree, as some statements today seem to suggest, that his mission could involve any appeal concerning acts of liberation. We want to ensure that the statements which have been made in order to put consciences at rest or to relieve existing pressures are not invoked against the Council—because it did not refer to the matter—or, more particularly, against the party which Mr. Jarring is addressing on the Arab side. That is totally unacceptable. Such are the observations I wished to put forward concerning the logical interpretation to be placed on the resolution adopted by the Council.

114. Perhaps the Council will allow me to make another observation. I shall try not to dwell for very long on this point, but, at the time when the Council is ending its debate, I feel that a reference to it is important. Several attempts have been made to place these two kinds of incidents on an equal footing; this occurred three times in the statement of the United States delegation. Yet we cannot put these two kinds of incidents on the same footing. There has been a violation of the cease-fire by the occupier, and international law includes provisions which impose certain specific obligations on the part of the occupier. International law includes no provisions imposing obligations on those whose territory is occupied. I certainly do not wish to rake up historical memories which may be painful for one country or another. However, benefiting from Lord Caradon's long experience as Governor of Cyprus, I should very much like to ask him whether, at that time, there could have been any international appeal requesting the population of Cyprus to stop intervening and if the authorities of the time had secretly agreed to prevent the Cypriots from one day fighting against the occupier.

115. I have no knowledge at all of what measures were taken by the United Kingdom Government responsible for the Palestine Mandate when the Hagannah and the Stern Gang went into action and assassinated indiscriminately both the Arab inhabitants and certain United Kingdom officials accused of favouring the Arabs.

116. I think that I see at this Council table the representatives of countries which have all experienced occupation at some time in their ancient or modern history; no one could

expect that Council members representing such countries would vote for a resolution condemning or deploring acts of resistance. There are even, I believe, some distinguished representatives here whose present careers are the culmination of journeys which had their starting-point in patriotic action, and many countries today accord to those who were members of the "resistance" and "comrades in the liberation" the most signal honours that a man can be given.

117. I do not think that, after having totally disregarded the international law which should have protected the Arab population under occupation, we can now ignore these moral values which are inherent in the very dignity of peoples and which imply for every citizen whose territory is occupied not only the right but also the duty to use all the means at his disposal to make life difficult for the occupier—let us boldly use that expression—until such time as the occupier understands that he can no longer remain in the territory with impunity.

118. I have perhaps taken the liberty of directly questioning the actions of certain countries and of referring to the heads of some delegations by name. I have been a member of this Council, and my colleagues know that I am not accustomed to resorting to personal exchanges. But, in view of the importance and the consequences of this resolution, we must not allow any misunderstandings to remain which might add to the ambiguities that some have deliberately tried to introduce into the wording of texts with a view to exploiting them—of this we are unfortunately certain—in due course, when incidents arise. The occupation will not be ended overnight, and life under occupation inevitably engenders resistance.

119. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now call on the representative of Israel.

120. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): Our debate has now come to a close and the Security Council has adopted a resolution which refers to both the Israel and Jordanian complaints on the agenda. The Security Council had before it two complaints. Some statements made in the course of debate and the draft resolution distributed in document S/8498 suggested that the Council deal only with one of them. Two States came to the Council for redress. Some suggested that the Council should wilfully disregard one of those States. Two States appeared before the Security Council. Jordan told the Council that it will persist in warfare, that it will take no action to prevent violations of the cease-fire by raids, terror and sabotage, that it does not intend to do anything to prevent the situation from deteriorating even further.

121. What was the response given by the proponents of the Arab cause to this Jordanian attitude? They would have given Jordan a green light to pursue its policy of active belligerency. They would have given sanction to the war machine of terrorism to mount its offensive against Israel. They would have promised Jordan and the terrorist organizations to which it grants sanctuary immunity from Israel's defence measures and from international censure.

122. On the other hand, there is Israel, subjected to war for twenty years, asking nothing of its neighbours but to be

left in peace. We have had our dead and wounded. Our houses are being dynamited, our roads are being mined, our children are not safe in their movements.

123. What did Jordan and its supporters propose? That all this should be of no concern to the Council, that the Council should be interested in one thing only: that Israel should not react, that Israel should not defend itself, that Israel should remain inert and wait passively for the slaughter.

124. Any resolution on the Middle East which would not have censured terrorist activities would have been most unfortunate. I said yesterday and I repeat today: Do not belittle the dangers and the threats and assaults the people of Israel are facing. Do not disregard the warfare that is being carried on against us openly, defiantly, persistently. Do not ignore the armed attacks, the incursions, the mining of roads, the killing of innocent civilians. Understand that the people of Israel love its land, its hearth, its brothers and sisters like any other people in the world. Every stone in our land is a witness to thousands of years of Jewish tenacity, devotion and sacrifice. Every blade of grass is permeated with Jewish blood, of those who fought the Romans, the Crusaders, the Ottomans, the British and the Arabs. We shall not yield, we shall defend our rights with all the strength within us.

125. Jordan's reaction to this debate and its conclusion may well determine whether we will have to do it again on the battlefield or at the peace table.

126. We cannot, of course, accept the condemnation of the military action which the Israel Defence Forces were compelled to undertake against terrorist bases on Jordanian territory. We are most unhappy to have to take such actions. They involve loss of life on both sides and we wish we could avoid them. However, when they prove necessary, in self-defence, we cannot accept censure of them, especially not from an organ operating within the terms of the United Nations Charter, which enshrines the right of every State to self-defence.

127. The words of the resolution which refer to the problem of warfare by terror and sabotage are not of our choosing. Yet we take note of the fact that the resolution deals not only with the military action taken by Israel against terrorist bases on Jordanian territory but also with violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire, and does not overlook past incidents.

128. My delegation has noted with appreciation the fact that those members of the Council which do not identify themselves with the point of view held by the forces of war in the Middle East have recognized the dangerous and pernicious character of the armed attacks, raids and acts of sabotage which necessitated Israel's action against the terrorist bases.

129. In the course of the debate in the past three days, the representative of Ethiopia advocated the avoidance of hostile acts on all sides. The representative of Brazil spoke of "the series of armed attacks launched from Jordanian territory through and beyond the cease-fire line"; he

defined that kind of action as constituting "an unmistakable violation of the cease-fire resolutions" [1403rd meeting, para. 55] and as worsening the situation in the Middle East. The representative of Canada spoke of "a mounting number of incidents, of infiltration and sabotage" [ibid., para. 38] which preceded the military action of Israel in Jordan and underlined that "the Security Council, summoned to deal with the present situation, cannot condone these acts of violence" [ibid., para. 40]. That point of view was also expressed by Lord Caradon when he said: "We deplore the acts of violence which preceded today's attack" [ibid., para. 8], and by the representative of Denmark when he stated: "we must deplore all violations of the cease-fire" [ibid., para. 49]. The position of the United States was no less explicit on this issue. Ambassador Goldberg declared: "We oppose acts of terrorism, which are in violation of the cease-fire resolutions of the Council, and we are not blind to the additional problems they create" [1402nd meeting, para. 5].

130. Today we have heard further statements by members of the Security Council making it clear that terrorism cannot be condoned and must be censured and stopped.

131. A note that jars with the general condemnation of terrorism was introduced here by the representatives of Pakistan, Algeria and the Soviet Union. That is not surprising. Pakistan has never wavered in its identification with the Arab denial of Israel's basic rights. Algeria, a State that participated in the June 1967 hostilities, rejected the Security Council's call for a cease-fire and openly proclaims that it will persevere in its illicit war against Israel. Nor is it surprising that the Soviet Union joined Pakistan and Algeria in that position. The role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East has been and remains a sinister one. It has for years now supported unreservedly the forces of Arab war, aggression and hatred in the area. It has supplied and continues to supply unlimited quantities of arms to Arab Governments which openly wage war against a State Member of the United Nations and proclaim their aim to destroy it. We do not know of any effort made in the past by the Government of the USSR to bring about a peaceful agreement between Israel and the Arab States. Though the Soviet Union voted for Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which called for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, the world still awaits a statement from the representative of the Soviet Union and his Government that they support the promotion of agreement between Israel and the Arab States and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area.

132. We must all look to the future. When we do, the true picture of the fundamental elements in the situation comes into focus. The Middle East is still in the throes of war. It is a war which has been waged relentlessly since 1948 by the Arab States against Israel. It is a war pursued in utter defiance of the United Nations and of world opinion. It is a war which has deprived Israel of the basic right of a State: the right to live at peace with its neighbours. It is a war which has left the area without recognized boundaries and without security. This has been a long, drawn-out war, a sanguinary war, a tragic war. There is only one way to end it: by establishing peace. There is no compromise between war and peace. It is either war or peace.

133. Israel is ready for peace and hopes that the Arab States will in the end accept the reaching of an agreement on it. So long as they do not, so long as the war continues, we can at least try to maintain the cease-fire. Israel will abide by its obligations under the cease-fire. However, the cease-fire can exist only on the basis of full reciprocity. It is this that we expect from the Arab States. If they fail to fulfil the cease-fire, if they violate it in any way whatever—by attack of their forces, military or paramilitary, by raids perpetrated by irregulars or marauders, by terror or sabotage—they must understand that Israel, like any other State in its position, will maintain its right and duty to take all necessary measures for the security of the territory and the population under its responsibility.

134. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now call on the representative of Jordan.

135. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): At the very outset I should like to pay a tribute to you, Mr. President, for having convened promptly the first meeting of the Council on this item and for your consideration in ensuring that the item, so important to Jordan, would be discussed without any interruption other than for fruitful and constructive consultations.

136. We also pay a tribute to all the delegations round this table which voted for the decision unanimously adopted this evening. We pay a special tribute to the delegations of India, Pakistan and Senegal for their most constructive and helpful contribution.

137. We are glad to see that the resolution which, under your wise leadership, Mr. President, was adopted unanimously by the Security Council this evening establishes no link between the wanton Israel aggression and the allegations and charges made by Israel. That is encouraging, since the Israel representative tried time and again during the Council's deliberations to present pretexts and justifications for Israel's premeditated plans against Arab lands and the Arab people. The Council has in effect rejected all Israel's claims and allegations concerning so-called individual incidents of terrorism. On that question the resolution is very clear; the text of the decision taken by the Council is very clear. When a document is clear, there is no need for interpretation. One need only look within the four corners of the instrument. One need not seek other material to interpret or explain a document that is clear. The decision is clear on its face. That is why my delegation supported it. We would have objected to any formula which could have led to misinterpretation in the future or to vagueness that could have been exploited. For we have been the victims of too many vague instruments.

138. In resolution 228 (1966) the Security Council emphasized "to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated". In this case the Council has gone a step further but, in our opinion, not far enough. Ambassador Malik, our distinguished colleague, quite rightly called the resolution the very minimum that the Security Council could have adopted.

139. The Security Council, by its decision this evening, warned Israel that it would have to consider adopting

further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts by Israel, and called upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237 (1967). That resolution was adopted by the Security Council unanimously, with no abstentions. It called upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place, and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities. Incorporating mention of that resolution in an operative paragraph of the resolution adopted this evening had a definite purpose and was the decision of the Security Council.

140. The background is well known. We have 450,000 people expelled by Israel as a result of the aggression of 5 June 1967. We have leaders of the west bank, expelled arbitrarily by the Israel authorities. We have the Nazi-like deeds, the Nazi-like practices; we have Hitlerite statements, some of them just made by Mr. Tekoah.

141. The idea behind resolution 237 (1967) and its incorporation here is very obvious.

142. We submit that the nature and scale of the attack against Jordan and Jordanian citizens should have moved the Council to apply the provisions of Chapter VII calling for sanctions. This is all the more so since this is not the first time you, the Council, have condemned Israel, nor is it the first time you have censured Israel. You have done this seven times now. Seven times you have blamed, condemned, censured, emphasized and what not. But the Israelis have so far shown the same arrogance, the same defiance, the same challenge, the same undermining of the authority of the Council.

143. You will remember that the first decision was taken against Israel on 18 May 1951 [*resolution 93 (1951)*], when Israel violated the cease-fire and the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria.

144. The second condemnation was on the well-known massacre of Qibya. You adopted a decision on 24 November 1953 [*resolution 101 (1953)*], saying that the Qibya attack was inconsistent with Israel's obligations under the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan and the Charter. That language sounds familiar; we keep hearing it whenever we come to the Council. In that case of Qibya you, the Council, censured Israel.

145. The third condemnation was on 29 March 1955. The Council condemned the attack that was made by Israel regular army forces against the Gaza Strip on 28 February 1955 [*resolution 106 (1955)*]. Here again you condemned Israel, using the same language, the same terms.

146. The fourth condemnation was made by the Council on 19 January 1956. May I mention in this connexion, too, that the United States and the United Kingdom sponsored all these resolutions, without exception. As I said, on 19 January 1956, this Council condemned the attack of the Israel regular army on Syria as

"a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution 54 (1948), of the terms of the General

Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations" [resolution 111 (1956), para. 3].

The Council then warned that it would "have to consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace" [ibid., para. 5]. Thus, in 1956, you referred to the measures incorporated in Chapter VII. You specifically mentioned "measures", in 1956; this was before the invasion of Sinai, this was in January 1956. You mentioned specifically the term "measures", and "measures" is found only in Chapter VII.

147. The fifth condemnation was in 1962. The Israel regular army forces were waging a series of violent mortar attacks against certain villages in Syria. The Security Council, on 9 April 1962, unanimously adopted a resolution [171 (1962)] in which the military action of Israel was condemned; and not only this, but Israel again was warned that the Council would have to consider further measures—again you emphasized the term "measures"—under the Charter to maintain or restore the peace. That was in 1962.

148. What was the sixth condemnation? The sixth violation, the sixth aggression is well known to all of you. You have discussed it while you were conferring on this item; you referred to it in your consultations, I am sure. This was the massacre of 13 November 1966. I came before this Council and presented the facts of that aggression. And what did the Council do? In its resolution 228 (1966) of 25 November 1966, the Council, first, deplored the loss of life—as it did today; second, censured Israel for the large-scale military action—which was almost the same as we did this afternoon; and third, emphasized to Israel that actions of military reprisal could not be tolerated and that if they were repeated, the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts—and now we have a decision which speaks about the Security Council's having to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter.

149. The behaviour of Israel as condemned by the Security Council—a condemnation now in the official records of the Council—leaves no room for doubt that Israel has never intended and certainly does not intend now to see tranquillity established in the area. This is our conviction, and it is reinforced day after day. The statement which we have just heard, the threats which we have just heard, the Hitlerite warning which we have just heard, leave no doubt, but rather re-emphasize our conviction that the Israelis are there to expand, to commit aggression, to say: "We shall not yield." Those were his words. The Israelis are here to say: "We shall look to the future and forget about the present." It is the present which molds the future. Without the present, the future is a vague term. When you occupy the land in violation of every human right and of every principle of the Charter, when you refuse to abide by the resolutions, when you come openly, as you did yesterday, and say that you only accept the goal of the resolution, not the resolution, not its implementation, but that you accept whatever you wish to accept; that you have a veto on every single paragraph in the resolution and that veto is not given by the Council but you are imposing it on the Council—this

is what the Council heard yesterday, and again this afternoon from Mr. Tekoah.

150. But along with this is heard the song of peace. We hear that they are not for war; but they are occupying almost half of Jordan through war. We hear that they are not for expelling; yet they are expelling 450,000 persons in violation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967). They are for threats. For them, the Security Council is nothing but a mental exercise. The Israelis are not here to abide by your will, but to indulge in mental exercise. I do not consider this a debating club. I do not believe that it is anything but a serious organ, the highest organ of the United Nations, the organ for peace.

151. It appears, however, despite all the condemnations, despite the seven decisions which have been taken, that the Council still feels that it should be patient with Israel, that its patience is not yet exhausted, in spite of open defiance. Hence, the Council has decided to offer Israel one final chance. We are given to understand that this will be a final warning. As Mr. Malik said this afternoon, it is a serious warning for the future. The Council is giving a serious warning for the future. We do hope that it will be the final warning because arrogance should have a limit; aggression should have a limit; the continued occupation of territories belonging to Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Republic and the Palestinian people should have a limit. Otherwise, the prestige of the Security Council would also have a limit. The threat is not only to Jordan; it is to the Council and to every one of you in the Council. It is good to be patient, but human endurance has a limit. I do hope that this is the final warning and that Chapter VII will be invoked.

152. I say this because I received a cable a few hours ago. While this important and urgent item was being debated—while this aggression committed and admitted by Mr. Tekoah's people was being discussed—at 2.10 this afternoon, this very day, 24 March, Israel forces shelled Jordanian positions for two hours. Villages also were shelled on the north of the east bank near Shunah, using 106-mm guns. A civilian and one child were injured.

153. You can read the writing on the wall. Before even adopting this resolution, the Council heard the statement of Mr. Tekoah and sensed the spirit of that statement. It heard the threats, the warnings, to the Council, and then to Jordan. While the Council was deliberating or consulting in these rooms the Israelis were attacking Jordanian positions—Shunah in the north—injuring a child and another civilian.

154. And now I shall stop, and I leave it to the Council to ponder as to who is the aggressor and who is for peace.

155. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Pakistan in the exercise of his right of reply.

156. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): I was rather surprised that the representative of Israel referred to the draft resolution contained in document S/8498, when India, Pakistan and Senegal had made every effort to arrive at unanimity and had refrained from introducing that draft resolution in order to enable the Council to act with unanimity.

157. The reason that resolution was introduced is that in operative paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 228 (1966) the Council:

*"Emphasizes to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that, if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts"*.

158. I have already stated that in deference to the views of the four Western and two Latin American States members of the Security Council the draft resolution in document S/8498 was submitted in milder terms than the commitment embodied in the language of resolution 228 (1966).

159. The representative of Israel, in referring to Pakistan, said that Pakistan had never wavered in its denial of Israel's basic rights. In reply, let me just say this: Pakistan's record is clear; Pakistan has nothing but good will for the Jewish people; but Pakistan finds it against its conscience to deny the basic rights of the people of Palestine. Pakistan upholds the right of self-determination and the human rights of all peoples, including the people of Palestine.

160. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

161. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I shall not answer the slanderous statement of the Israel representative, but I cannot overlook his attempts to distort the position of the Soviet Government.

162. The position of the Soviet Government was clearly and explicitly set forth in the statement of 22 March 1968 which, on that date, I brought to the notice of members of the Security Council at its 1405th meeting. That statement pointed out that the Soviet Union resolutely declares its determination to strive, together with the other peace-loving States, to put an end to Israel aggression and to eliminate its consequences. The Soviet Union, together with all other peace-loving States, reaffirms its determination to press for the return of the territories seized from the Arab States as a result of the aggression of 1967. The Soviet Union, together with all peace-loving States, will strive for the achievement of the necessary political settlement in the Middle East, based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States.

163. The Soviet position is clear and definite, and no slanderous inventions on the part of the Israel representative can distort the substance of the matter.

164. As far as the Israel Government is concerned, it must strictly comply with the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and must first of all withdraw its troops from all occupied Arab territories. It must know that its challenge to the interests of international peace and security and its sabotaging of a political settlement in the Middle East cannot remain unpunished. So long as the leaders of Israel, enjoying as they do support from outside, maintain their positions with regard to the

annexation of foreign Arab territories, the Soviet Union and other countries friendly to the Arab States, who advocate a stable peace and a durable peace settlement in the Middle East, will help the victims of aggression, for in so doing they are fulfilling their international duty in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the interests of the maintenance of peace. No one should entertain the slightest doubt on that score.

165. Today's statement by the representative of Israel confirms the misgivings expressed in the Soviet delegation's statement at the beginning of the meeting to the effect that the interpretation given by the United States representative and the subsequent reply to my statement by the representative of the United Kingdom seemed to give the Israel aggressor some basis for making such unrestrained remarks in the Security Council in disregard of the resolution that had just been adopted.

166. Lord Caradon should note that everywhere, among all peoples, experience is considered a very important thing that should be taken into account. I think that he is a living confirmation of this. Experience shows that he should no longer be engaging in those activities in which he has been engaging for a long time. And in the light of experience I too would like to point out to the Security Council: experience teaches the Council that Israel is already disregarding a resolution—Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. This is precisely why the Soviet delegation found it necessary to make a statement—so that Israel would have no doubts on that score.

167. The Security Council condemned Israel's new act of aggression against Jordan, and no verbal subterfuges, justifications or excuses can wipe away that stain of disgrace. Therefore, if someone wants to interpret the resolution in such a way as to leave Israel some loop-hole for new acts of aggression, how are we to consider such an approach, such a position? I think we can only regard such an approach, such a position, as direct encouragement of Israel to undertake new acts of aggression against Arab countries under any pretext.

168. A distinguished jurist has just quoted here a 1948 resolution of the Security Council. I shall not touch on its substance, the extent to which it is or is not applicable, but I do draw attention to the fact that the United States representative quoted a passage from that resolution to the effect that no violence should be done to individuals under the control of the authorities concerned. The United States representative wishes to apply that provision indiscriminately to the present situation, in which the occupied territory is controlled not by the authorities of Jordan or any other Arab State, but by the Israel authorities and Israel is trying to use any discontent shown by the oppressed and terrorized inhabitants of that territory as a pretext for new acts of aggression and for a massive attack on an Arab country. Who can justify such an action? Certainly not the Security Council, and this is reflected in the resolution which we have just adopted.

169. This is the situation as it exists, and therefore the Security Council must warn—and it does so in the resolution—against any repetition, on any trumped-up

pretext, of similar acts of aggression. It must warn Israel against disregarding this resolution as it disregarded the previous one.

170. This is the substance of the Soviet delegation's position.

171. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the United States who wishes to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

172. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I shall exercise my right of reply very briefly. I do not want to prolong this debate as the hour is late, but it is really to try to set the record straight. In our discussions here it has, as I said in my original intervention, been a source of great comfort that so many speakers, including the representative of the Soviet Union, have voiced support for Mr. Jarring's mission. In our discussion on Friday we had an exchange on that subject—the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Malik and I. I derived considerable encouragement from that discussion because in our exchange I thought I heard the representative of the Soviet Union say that the Soviet Union had accepted the resolution of 22 November—and in all its parts. I have since received the transcript of the provisional verbatim record, and perhaps this is just a mistake; if it is a mistake I would hope that it would be corrected, because I think we are dealing with something very important. My own delegation, as I tried to make clear, accepted the resolution of 22 November on 22 November, we accept it now, we have given it support all the time in all its parts, and, I repeated today, we pledge our full support for it.

173. Regrettably, I am not familiar with Russian, but I have before me the Russian and English texts of the discussion where our exchange took place. The English text, which I have before me, shows Mr. Malik as saying: "The Soviet Union voted for all parts of that resolution; it therefore recognizes all the parts." [See the 1405th meeting, para. 128.] I had thought that the representative of the Soviet Union, even in the English text, had said "accepted all the parts". I would hope that that would be corrected. I am advised by my language experts that in the Russian text "it therefore recognizes all the parts" is omitted. I would hope that this is an omission. I am reluctant to try my Russian which is very inadequate, but if you will not criticize my attempt I will try to read the words that are omitted: «поэтому он признает все части его» (it therefore recognizes all the parts).

174. I do not know whether the representative of the Soviet Union has had an opportunity to see the provisional verbatim record. I would hope that that would be corrected so as to conform to what I understood him to say, because I think this is very important. More than that, I would hope that he would join in the statement I made today pledging complete support for this resolution.

175. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

176. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I am flattered that Mr. Goldberg reads my statements so attentively and that, for the purpose of better understanding, he has even begun to learn Russian. I wish him every success. I am ready to give him an answer to or explanation on any question, including what the word «признать», means in Russian, after he has answered my three questions, which he remembers very well. I do not wish to repeat them, in order not to detain the Security Council.

177. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of the United States who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

178. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): If it is not impolite, I will say that that is the traditional way of drawing a red herring across a subject. As far as we are concerned, we accept the resolution, we support it in full measure, we will do everything we can to support Mr. Jarring's mission, and we would hope the Soviet Union would do likewise. We do not accept the Soviet interpretation of the resolution. We made that crystal clear in our intervention at the time the resolution was adopted, and in the interventions in this debate. I should like to recall some history in this connexion.

179. The resolution adopted on 22 November—Mr. Malik was not here, but I am sure he is well familiar with the record—drew a major part of its inspiration . . .

180. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

181. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I was not referring to the United States position with regard to this resolution. My questions concerned the following. I shall mention them, since the United States representative seems to have forgotten. I asked him to indicate, in the course of the discussion here, where and when a statement had been made by the Government of Israel to the effect that it accepts this resolution—recognizes it, to use the Russian word that you used just now—and agrees to its implementation. Where has the Government of Israel stated that it agrees to withdraw its troops to the 5 June line? Those are my three questions, and I was not asking about the attitude of the United States to this resolution. Why am I mentioning this? Today . . .

182. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the United States on a point of order.

183. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): Mr. President, this is not a point of order being raised by the representative of the Soviet Union. It is a rude interruption of my comments. It is not the custom in the Security Council, as he well knows, to interrupt a presentation. A point of order is a parliamentary question of order. I do not recognize the right of the Soviet representative to tell me how to speak. I shall not interfere at any point with his presentation and I do not recognize his competence to interfere with mine. I shall answer questions in my own way, and I shall not answer them in his way. His way happens to be a very simple application of the old lawyer's



concept. You ask the question: When did you stop beating your wife? I do not answer questions of that kind.

184. I have said that I speak for my Government. My Government accepts the resolution in all its parts. I would like to see the Soviet representative correct the record to show that there has not been eliminated from the Russian text of the 1405th meeting the words "in all its parts". That is the question I raised. I have given the answer that I am prepared to give and I shall not make an answer tailored to the Soviet representative's prescription.

185. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The representative of Saudi Arabia having asked to speak, I now call on him.

186. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I have lived long enough to foresee that the legal quibblings which we have witnessed in this Council, will, more than at any time in the past, lead to a confusion in the interpretation of the text. I regret to say that the resolution just adopted will not bring peace to the Holy Land, due to the diametrically opposed interpretations given to it in the Council. I am afraid that the interpretations of the resolution will intensify the conflict in the future and pave the way for broadening the scope of that conflict.

187. The interpretation given by the representative of the United States, not by implication but directly, equates the freedom fighters, the so-called terrorists—called "terrorists" by the Israel representative—with the flagrant aggression of Israel on Jordan. Inasmuch as I happen to be a Monarchist, I seem to veer towards the interpretation of the Soviet Union, not because it harmonizes with the interpretation given by my Arab colleagues but simply because it stands to reason that a freedom fighter need not be labelled a terrorist. This is a question of semantics.

188. I heard my colleague, Ambassador Goldberg, mention the other day that violence breeds violence. How true, how true. But I do not know where Ambassador Goldberg, and many other Americans for that matter, were in 1920. This was an isolationist country in those days, more or less. It was more so in 1914 when President Wilson was hesitant as to whether to enter the First World War or not. But when during the British Mandate the Zionists were allowed to immigrate into Palestine, then there was violence between the indigenous population, whom we knew as Palestinians, and this extraneous group of eastern Europeans, who thought that because of religious sentiments which motivated their movement they had a right to Palestine.

189. The violence started in the twenties. The indigenous people of Palestine were a peaceful people. We never heard of troubles, even under Ottoman rule, between the Moslems and the Christians, on the one hand, and the Moslems and the Jews on the other hand. They were living like brothers. The Holy Land was really holy—considered holy by the Jews, by the Moslems and by the Christians. The violence started with that incursion of Zionists into Palestine. Leave aside the words "the Arab homeland". I myself had my best friends at the American University of Beirut. They were Jews.

190. We did not consider a Jew as a Jew. We had no discrimination between Jew, Christian and Moslem. What brought that violence? The incursion of those eastern European groups who used a noble religion, Judaism, as a motivation for a political end, and I dare say now, for an economic end. For I have received literature from none other than Zionists. About a week or ten days ago, I found on my desk four supplements of *The Miami Herald*, all on Israel. There was a quarter of a page devoted to how one could order a pamphlet—of eighty-eight pages I believe—from a publisher in Chicago, explaining what the future of Israel shall be.

191. That advertisement was in one of the four supplements. Saudi Arabia had one supplement in *The New York Times*. Greece had a supplement. Pakistan had a supplement. Once in a while all nations, in order to advertise their countries, have a supplement. But they had four supplements in *The Miami Herald*. I return to that advertisement. It had three vignettes.

192. The first one was "Israel Yesterday". That showed not the demarcation lines of the partition, but the lines that were set by Israel—without showing any action on the part of the Security Council—and that contain territories beyond the partition lines. Then there was one which said: "Israel of Today", showing the occupied territories in black ink, merged with the *de facto* Israel of 1948. Then there was "Israel of the Future". Believe it or not, my dear Ambassador Goldberg—I will send you that advertisement; it is in an American newspaper—it extends from Sinai to the Taurus mountain; even the sanjak of Alexandretta is part of it. A good part of Syria is merged with it. Jordan? I do not know what they have done with it. They have left almost nothing of Jordan. It is the Transjordan of the 1920s. They have taken out also a good part of Jordan.

193. I have been shown maps printed and issued in Israel including even Medina, Saudi Arabia; I do not know whether Medina was mentioned in the Bible, but it seems they went beyond the nomenclature of the Bible. What are you laughing about? This is serious. There is going to be war, and war which I deplore. That is the violence which has bred violence to which my good friend Ambassador Goldberg referred. I agreed with him that it is a chain reaction of violence: one day I strike you, the next day you strike me; it becomes interminable.

194. But time and again here in this Council—and the whole resolution revolves around this question as being a question between Israel and the Arab Governments or the Arab countries—I have had to state that there is a people called the Palestinian people which numbers about 2 million. Do you blame them if they are patriots? They have lost their land, they have lost their houses, they have lost their patrimony. As I said, some of them may have been Jews.

195. We have no quarrel with the Jew as such. We have a quarrel with an eastern European group of usurpers who happen to be Jews. They could have been Christians, they could have been Moslems, they could have been pagans. The question is not in the religion.

196. Just because a resolution was adopted by the General Assembly in 1947 to establish a State called Israel [181 (II)] on the grounds that certain Biblical passages could be interpreted as giving a people a geographical location—here also we have different interpretations. You are talking of interpretations of this resolution. My interpretation of the Bible—and I am a student of the Bible—is that Zion is Zion of the spirit. The Bible is my Bible too. It is not only the Jewish Bible. The same Bible is my Bible personally. I interpret, and many like me interpret, Zion as Zion of the spirit, not the territorial interpretation.

197. Do you mean to say that those Zionists converted to Judaism, as I said, in the seventh or eighth century—consult the Jewish encyclopaedia—are more Jews than our brothers the Jews of the Orient? They never claimed that this was going to be only an enclave for the Jews, that Palestine was to be an enclave for the Jews. Those are the real Jews, the genuine Jews, the Jews of the area. There is no such thing as blood being the same, but, so to speak, their blood and ours are the same; they are the Semites. They never claimed that the Holy Land is theirs. That is a European claim, it is a colonial claim. Who do they think they are fooling? Are all those Eastern Europeans devout? Even the Christians here say, "God is dead". Of course they mean the traditional God. They are like other people, they are like Moslems who nowadays have become secular. They are like Christians who become secular, but the reason is political and economic.

198. You have only to read Nahum Goldman's declaration made about twenty or twenty-five years ago. He said, "Palestine is the cross-roads of three continents, and we should take it because anyone who takes it controls those three continents." I wish I had brought it this morning. I wanted to put it into my pocket, but I forgot it. I hope that you will not think that I am just claiming something. Those are the words of Nahum Goldman, an American Zionist.

199. We have no grudge against Jews having come to live in Palestine. Just because the United Nations—we have seen what the United Nations has done, and with all due respect I am still dedicated to the United Nations, hoping against hope that it will still work.

200. And interpretations are dangerous because the interpretation of Ambassador Goldberg carries more weight than a hundred interpretations like mine. Why? Because he has power behind him. We have no power. What is the use of our interpretation? A good thing perhaps—I am not sure of it—is that it will be neutralized by the interpretation of Ambassador Malik because God help us if Ambassador Malik and Ambassador Goldberg begin to speak Russian to each other. I am glad that somebody has an interpretation that differs from the interpretation of Ambassador Goldberg. They even began to speak Russian and to understand each other in Russian. But in the last analysis each one's conscience will dictate to him what is right as a person, if not as the representative of a strong Power. After all, that is the most precious thing we have, that voice of conscience.

201. I do not speak from hatred. The Arabs do not hate the Jews, and we will repeat this a thousand times. Jews

faired well in Arab lands when the Arabs were in their glory. Even when the Arabs were trodden down they never molested the Jews. It is you Western people now—perhaps out of a guilty conscience, I do not know—who are trying to say, let us boost Israel. At whose expense? At your expense? At somebody else's expense? What right have you to establish an enclave there? It is just for your economic rights. You do not fool us, it is a wedge.

202. Where is Mr. Balfour's empire now?—fifty years, 1917 to 1967. He told Sir Ronald Storrs. We know Sir Ronald Storrs. It has not been long since he died. He mentioned this to a friend of mine. He was in the Arab Office in Cairo. He told him, "What are you doing Sir? This can be interpreted in different ways, this declaration"—later called the Balfour Declaration. He said every word of this, as I am not paraphrasing: "This was studied in the interests of the British Empire." Now our friends the Americans—what have we the Arabs done to the Americans, or to the Jews for that matter? They come and bolster Israel. If they were bolstering the Jews as much as they did when they were under the Nazis, we would also be foremost with them because we do not want to see either Jew or Gentile subjected to the inhumanity of man. But this is a political and economic question and I have a right to talk about it because it has lived with me for forty-eight years, since 1920. Most of you here talk academically, just as sometimes people are not concerned about a certain country but still have humanitarian feelings about it. Suppose I hear that there has been a flood in China which caused the drowning of 2,000 people. I have never been to China. From humanitarian feelings I would feel sorry, but the next day I would eat as if nothing had happened. We say in Arabic that a live coal burns only the place where you put it. You have not suffered. This bridge which is Palestine, Lebanon, Syria has witnessed many conquerors in 6,000 years of history. But where are they today? They came and are gone. But the indigenous people of the area—I am not calling them Arabs—remained. They suffered, they produced prophets. Those same prophets are our prophets, the prophets of the Holy Land from Abraham down. They are our own prophets too. They are not the prophets of those converted Jews from Eastern Europe. They are claiming them. Good Lord, they are *plus royaliste que le roi*.

203. I am afraid—with all respect to you, Mr. President, and members of the Council—that this interpretation, diametrically opposed, as I said, will give rise in the future to mischief because it will open the field to power politics. The United States will interpret it one way, the Soviet Union the other way—and we are the people in between. That reminds me of another Arabic proverb, which says: The ocean had a quarrel with the wind, but the poor sailor paid the price. Well, we are the sailor. We are the sailor in that area.

204. We are talking as people who have suffered. You are talking here academically, putting certain constructions on words. But what about the Palestinian people? The Palestinian people, not the Arab people. Do they not count? Perhaps that is what you think, but they think that they do count. They are taking the law into their own hands. They have found that the Arab countries cannot



help them. And do you think that any Arab country would dare quell them? Remember the assassins—the *hashshashin*, and the Old Man of the Mountain. Many times, because I am dedicated to peace, I have counselled patience to them. But what right have I to counsel patience when I cannot produce any practical results. Neither can the Arab countries produce any such results because they are being torn apart by power politics. The Palestinian people have begun to take up arms. Do you think anyone will be able to suppress them? They will kill them like birds. They are dispersed throughout the Arab countries. They would kill the Arabs even before they killed the Jews—or the Zionists; I do not want to use the term “Jews” lest you think there is any animosity between the Arabs and the Jews.

205. This is where the mischief lies in this dangerous interpretation, this resolution. It will give the Israel authorities the “right of hot pursuit”. Even if the distance is 200 miles, they can send a plane and say, “Well, there is an El-Fatah group there”, or “There is a liberation group there, and we have a right to put an end to them”. Do you see now where the mischief lies in this academic document, this resolution which you have studied and conferred about here for days now?

206. As for the condemnation, what do the Israel authorities care about condemnations? Six condemnations, and I think this is the seventh, and with what result? Nothing. They just laugh up their sleeves. And they are right to laugh up their sleeves. “O Pharaoh, who made you such a Pharaoh?” “I found no one to repel me.” This is their position. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, perhaps, wants to have a confrontation. Maybe they are right; maybe there will not be a third world war. But maybe too one day there will be. This is what is worrying me as a United Nations man. There may one day be a confrontation—miscalculation, one great Power trying to take advantage of another in an area which is not its own. That is the problem. Then where do we land? We—the small Powers and the great Powers too—will end up in smoke. Then what will all these deliberations and legalistic quibblings avail us?

207. Even the galleries now are half empty. The people there know that we talk and talk. The hopes that the United Nations raised on the horizon in 1945 and 1947 are dimming day by day. Those hopes will be extinguished unless we turn over a new leaf in this Organization and heed the voice of wisdom, the voice of those people who, like U Thant and the Pope, exercise no temporal power. We still go by the standard that if you do not have power behind you, you have a weak mind. And here I would point out, once again quoting the Bible, that the prophet Jeremiah did not have power. He counselled wisdom to the king in the Palestine of those days, but the king would not heed his advice. Jeremiah’s was the voice of wisdom. And where did the Jews end up? In Babylonia, because they did not heed Jeremiah’s counsel. We all know the Lamentations of Jeremiah; they are all in the Bible. They make good reading and they are good advice even to our generation.

208. We, the weak, we have minds, we have brains. We seek to gain no advantage. We happen to be weak, but we tell you: Leave us alone. Let us work out our destiny. You come and you plant among us an alien people. Their

religion happens to be Judaism. We have no quarrel with Judaism.

209. Again I say, Leave us alone. But you do not leave us alone. What have we done to you? Whether we are Arabs or non-Arabs, the people of the area, we have invited you to come and exploit our resources, to be partners economically with us. But why do you not let us evolve our own traditions, our own customs, our own way of life? Do we interfere with your way of life? Are we imposing ourselves on you? Yet you band together here in two camps against us. What have we done? I am not talking of Saudi Arabia; I am talking of the Palestinians, whom we have in large numbers in Saudi Arabia. They are scattered in camps, 2 million of them, all over the Arab countries. Do you think they are going to be docile? Do you think you can restrain them? I feel duty bound to say that they will not be restrained. I am sorry to say that. The Israelis will tell me that they did not take my home. They will tell you they did not take your home and your lands. “They took our home and our land”—they told me that in Beirut, they told me that in Damascus, they told me that everywhere I found Palestinians. And here you sit discussing this question, this dispute between my good friend Mr. El-Farra and the representative Mr. Tekoah.

210. You cannot erase the Palestinian people, you cannot eradicate them. You have to admit that they are there and will always be there. If they had come to the Holy Land as Jews, they would perhaps have benefited a hundred-fold from all the Arabs. If they had come as Jews, not as Israel citizens, the economic doors would have been open to them.

211. Now there is always conflict; and I am sorry to say it will continue. I have no rancour, no hatred against you as people. I feel sorry for you because I know what happened to the Crusaders in the long run, what happened to all the invaders after that. The indigenous people of Palestine are attached to their soil, and you should have been attached to the spirit of Zion and not to any construction put on the word, as if it were only a material thing, as if it were only earth. Zion is of the spirit. And when Zionism becomes Zion of the spirit, then and only then will peace be established in the Holy Land.

212. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Israel.

213. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): I ask your indulgence, Mr. President, to make a brief observation on the report brought to the Council’s attention by the representative of Jordan concerning a border incident which occurred earlier today.

214. The representative of Jordan referred to an incident that took place, according to him, at 2.15 hours this afternoon. He did not, however, tell the Council what had happened in the preceding five minutes. Today, at 2.10 hours—not 2.15, but five minutes before the hour mentioned by the representative of Jordan—artillery and rifle fire was opened from Jordanian military positions situated on the east bank of the Jordan River against Israel forces in the Beit She’an area on the west bank of the river. At the

same time, Jordanian forces opened fire from recoilless guns on a civilian tractor working in the fields east of Neve Ur. I have before me a report of *Agence France Presse* which reads as follows:

"Jordanian forces sparked off a two-hour exchange across the Jordan today when they fired at troops and a tractor driver on the Israel bank."

215. From the statement made by the representative of Jordan I gather that Jordan expected Israel forces not to return fire. I regret this misunderstanding. Such misunderstandings may be the causes of dangerous consequences. The Israel forces, of course, returned fire in self-defence; and the only way to avoid Israel fire against Jordanian military positions is to make certain that Jordanian positions do not attack Israel forces or Israel civilians.

216. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

217. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Obviously there is some misunderstanding here. Mr. Goldberg is trying to interpret the question which I asked him as a desire for him to answer in the way I wish him to. I had no such intention whatsoever.

218. When he began to reply concerning the United States position on the resolution of 22 November I had the most sincere desire to help him, to dispel any misunderstanding, as the questions which I had asked earlier were not about the position of the United States. To my mind, the matter is quite clear.

219. I shall now reply to the question he put to me. According to the Russian text of the provisional verbatim record of the Council's meeting of 22 March 1968, I stated:

"... the Soviet Union does not vote for resolutions which it does not accept and does not recognize. The Soviet Union voted for this resolution" [*see the 1405th meeting, para. 126*].

In reply to a further question, I said: "The Soviet Union voted for all parts of that resolution." [*Ibid., para. 128.*] What further reply or clarification does Mr. Goldberg require? I have not yet had time to read the English text, but the Russian text says, and I repeat: "the Soviet Union does not vote for those resolutions which it does not accept and does not recognize. The Soviet Union voted for this resolution". And in explanation we added "... for all parts of that resolution". I believe that that reply was perfectly clear.

220. But since Mr. Goldberg has reminded us of the history of the discussion, I have every reason to remind him also—even though I was not present, I am familiar with the discussion on this question—that my colleague and friend Mr. Kuznetsov stated at the time the vote was taken on that resolution:

"the 'withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict' becomes the first neces-

sary principle for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Near East" [*1382nd meeting, para. 119*].

221. It is precisely on that basis that I have shown interest in Israel's position as regards recognition of the resolution, its implementation and the adoption of measures for the withdrawal of forces from the occupied territories to the 5 June line. This question is particularly urgent because today the United Kingdom representative referred to an official statement by the Government of Jordan that it recognized the resolution and agreed to its implementation. Before that there was an official statement by the Government of the United Arab Republic. But no such official statement has been made by Israel, or by those who help and support it. That is essentially the difficulty in solving the question of the Middle East and reaching a political settlement.

222. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of the United States to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

223. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I appreciate the response of the representative of the Soviet Union. I shall always be glad to answer a question put to me about the position of the United States; indeed I have done so and my reply appears in the record today as well as in the record of our previous exchange.

224. With respect to the question which I put to the representative of the Soviet Union, it has still not been answered. In the English text of his statement, the words "... it therefore recognizes all the parts" appear. In that part of his intervention those words are omitted from the Russian text of the provisional verbatim record. I think that the record ought to be corrected. It was an important statement which we welcomed, and I should hope that steps would be taken by the Soviet delegation to have the record corrected. In any event, we shall address a letter to the Secretariat requesting that the Russian text should conform to the English text. This is a very important aspect of our debate. I said that I had tried to give a specific statement about our position. It was a very clear position and it has been clear throughout. We made it clear at the time when the resolution was adopted. We are faithful to that resolution in all its parts. We accept it. We shall support it. That is the position of my Government. We shall not support an individual interpretation. We shall support the resolution, and I made clear in my intervention at the time, and since, what our interpretation of the resolution was.

225. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

226. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I think we can ask the Secretariat and the translators to compare the Russian and English texts and make the necessary corrections. There is no problem.

227. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Jordan to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

228. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): Mr. Tekoah just said that I had referred to the time of the Israel attack as being 2.15 p.m. He took five minutes off, saying that at 2.10 we had attacked first. It so happens that I was reading from a cable; I said that this thing had happened at 2.10; I said it twice: at 2.10 the Israelis shelled Jordanian positions. I do not think Mr. Tekoah did not hear me; I said that twice.

229. But this has become a habit. The other day, he said that I had mentioned the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. I never mentioned them. Now he is referring to a certain hour which I never mentioned. And we have all the witnesses here who heard me mention the hour twice. But to subtract five minutes and say "you attacked first" is an example of something which I think we have experienced before.

230. In this connexion, let me pose a question: Why is it, if they are really worrying about violations, that they do not reactivate the machinery in the area, the Mixed Armistice Commission? Let the Mixed Armistice Commission investigate this incident or that; have both parties meet under the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission; then determine the facts and see who is the one who committed the aggression.

231. Let me now refer to the complaint about the bus. You have heard a great deal about the bus—two killed and other students injured. But if we go back a little further we will find that the very same story of the bus, in the very same area, was fabricated against Jordan—in the very same area, near Eilat. It came before the Mixed Armistice Commission; they heard both parties; they established the facts. Then what happened? I have here a book by the late Commander Hutchison, who presided over the Mixed Armistice Commission between Jordan and Israel when it investigated Israel's charge. Here is what he said:

"All members of the UNTSO, as well as others who were privileged to read the complete investigation report, agreed that the evidence did not tie Jordan to the incident".

The very same incident of 17 March 1954 was presented to the machinery in the area and they reached this decision. The late Commander Hutchison continued:

"Many Israelis who long for peace with the Arabs and are not inclined to blame all of their troubles on Jordan expressed the belief that the vote had been correct. Some of these people expressed themselves publicly, but they were not able to penetrate the wall of hatred the Israeli Press and radio were building up against the MAC [*Mixed Armistice Commission*]."<sup>2</sup>

232. Later on the Mixed Armistice Commission could no longer function because it could not meet the designs, the aims, the goals, the future expansion of Israel. So now there is no machinery in the area, and the way is open to Mr. Tekoah to come here and present any complaint. If I say 2.10, he takes five minutes off and says 2.05. I did not

say 2.15; I said 2.10, and he is admitting that the firing took place at 2.10. That corroborates my statement.

233. If the Israelis are really sincere about knowing the facts, let us reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commission; let the only machinery in the area recognized by the Security Council function. Let them go to the spot and investigate; let the observers be on the 5 June line; let the Israelis get out of the territories they occupied by force. Let them show by their behaviour that they are really for peace, but not sing the song of peace to accommodate certain elements.

234. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call now on the representative of Israel to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

235. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I apologize to the members of the Council for asking to speak again. Concerning the problem of the hour at which the incident allegedly started, I leave it to the tape of the proceedings to show whether the representative of Jordan mentioned 2.10 or 2.15. I should like once again, however, to refer to the communiqué published by the *Agence France Presse* today:

"Jordanian forces sparked off a two-hour exchange across the Jordan today when they fired at troops and attacked a driver on the Israel bank."

236. The Jordanian representative read out some extracts from a well-known book by a gentleman who served at one time as Chairman of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission but who also served as the director of the pro-Arab organization "The Friends of the Middle East". He did that apparently in an attempt to question our reporting with particular reference to the incident a few days ago in which we had thirty casualties as a result of a school bus being attacked north of Eilat.

237. This incident is referred to in this morning's issue of *The New York Times*, which published an interview with King Hussein. King Hussein, when asked about the attack last Monday on the school bus near Eilat resulting in thirty casualties, as I said, declared:

"We found there had been no crossings into Israel territory from Jordan in that region."

However, on 22 March—just a few days ago—Radio Baghdad broadcast a communiqué of the Palestine Liberation Front established in Jordan, operating from Jordanian territory, claiming credit for the attack on the bus.

238. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

239. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I should not wish our proceedings this evening to be ended without my saying two things. First of all, when I spoke earlier, I was quoting from what had been said by the representative of Iraq, Mr. Adnan Pachachi. If I failed to give a full picture what he had said to us previously, I should like to offer him my very sincere apology.

<sup>2</sup> E. H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce* (New York, The Devin-Adair Company, 1956), p. 54.

240. The second thing I would wish to say is in relation to the speech made by the representative of the Soviet Union. I am not sure that I exactly understood him, but I gathered that he suggested that something I had said might possibly be used as a justification or as an excuse for conflict or violence. All I would wish to say is that that is exactly the opposite of the truth as far as the position of my Government is concerned.

241. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Jordan to speak in the exercise of his right of reply.

242. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I shall be very brief. I do not want to tax the patience of this distinguished organ of the United Nations.

243. First I simply should like to say that the French news agency is a respectable agency; but the question is not what it published, but the source. I wonder whether this source was the spot where they were observing the shooting of the Israelis or the others. Or was the source given? And if the source is given, and one looks at the source, one sees where the report was received from; then that gives more information about the validity and credibility of the report.

244. Secondly, this agency is not a United Nations organ. If the United Nations machinery was unable to find

anything but fabrication in the Israel charges, how would hearsay evidence seem?

245. Thirdly, let me say that this Commander stated in his book that when he went to the area he was pro-Israel. We did not convert him. He was converted by the truth, by what he experienced. He is not the only one. There is van Horn who wrote a book about Israel diplomacy—I will not mention this other work out of respect for the Security Council. General Benneke was also a man who worked hard to serve peace; he was dedicated to peace. He wrote a book about this behaviour; this behaviour is well known, and the book is there for everyone to read. These are distinguished United Nations figures and we should like to see their reputation and dignity protected in this Council.

246. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have no more speakers on my list. With the consent of the Council, therefore, I shall adjourn this meeting.

247. Before doing so, I should like to inform members that as a result of the usual consultations it has been agreed that the Security Council's next meeting will take place next Tuesday at 3 p.m., when we shall continue our consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia; it is understood that Monday will be given over to informal talks and discussions on that subject.

*The meeting rose at 10.15 p.m.*