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TWENTY-THIRD YEAR

1399th MEETING: 19 MARCH 1968

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 19 March 1968, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Ousmane Socé DIOP (Senegal).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1399)

Adoption of the agenda.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409):

Letter dated 12 March 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia (S/8454).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409):

Letter dated 12 March 1968 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia (S/8454)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The representatives of Jamaica and Zambia have asked to be invited to participate without vote in the Security Council's debate

on the item before it; these requests for participation can be found in documents S/8455 of 12 March and S/8469 of 18 March 1968. In accordance with the Council's usual practice, I propose, if there is no objection, to invite the representatives of Jamaica and Zambia to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. L. M. Barnett (Jamaica) and Mr. J. B. Mwemba (Zambia) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the first speaker on my list, the representative of Algeria.

3. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) (*translated from French*): As this is the first time that I have spoken since our Council has been honoured by the participation of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, my delegation has the pleasant duty and the great satisfaction of extending our warmest welcome to Ambassador Malik.

4. With due respect to those who have already welcomed Ambassador Malik, I should like to say that while the cold war has brought neither glory nor honour, neither does coexistence, as it is understood by those who have expressed their agreement with him, bring glory or honour.

5. In order to erase any doubts on this subject, one need only give some thought to the hot and cold wars being waged against the liberation movements of the third world by those who have been unable or have not known how to rid themselves of the reflexes they acquired during the cold war in conducting rearguard actions which, although they looked like offensives, were nevertheless retreats.

6. In this theatre of ours—and it is certainly no longer the puppet theatre it once was—there seems to be a simultaneous cult of the characters in Shakespeare and of the heroes of Greek tragedy. But, I suspect, heroes of the Shakespearean dramas are not necessarily those of the Greek tragedies. To continue a theatrical analogy which seems to have scored something of a success, one might hope that the spotlight would be turned upon action and not upon immobility.

7. A long struggle, lasting almost half a century, has enabled the socialists of Europe to bring about the state of coexistence for which we are all striving. Why, then, should we be surprised that the third world is fervently engaged in choosing, building and strengthening structures of all kinds which it considers appropriate? For there are some in the West who think that they can justify their refusal to change by seeking comfort in established situations.

8. These remarks are designed to give our new colleague a less one-sided picture of this Council. The reality of the situation is, moreover, sufficiently varied and complex to give everyone an opportunity of doing useful work; and, when the work is done jointly, it is bound to overcome frustrations and failures.

9. The Security Council is holding this urgent meeting today at the request of the African countries in order to examine the serious problem which the continued deterioration of the Rhodesian situation constitutes for peace and security.

10. The legitimate emotion that swept world opinion as a whole, and the anger aroused in all the African peoples by the murder committed by the racist régime of Salisbury, have given the world a sharp reminder of the tragic fate of the people of Zimbabwe. By that premeditated act, carried out in spite of numerous interventions, Ian Smith wished to give a spectacular demonstration, two and a half years after the unilateral declaration of independence, of his régime's intention of breaking all ties with the United Kingdom, although those ties were in fact only symbolic.

11. Salisbury's challenge, first to the administering Power, and then to the international community was no doubt the first sign of self-confidence in a régime which, faced with the constant hesitation of the administering Power and the ineffectiveness of the sanctions adopted against that régime by the United Nations, believes it can install itself and consolidate its position to the detriment of the Zimbabwe people.

12. This failure of the sanctions policy advocated by the United Kingdom results, in particular, from an international situation in which it is still hoped that the problems of southern Africa can be isolated from one another and that no attention need be paid to the close links between the common political problems facing the various parts of that region.

13. This idea has already been put forward on several occasions, but has obviously not been taken sufficiently into account by the Members of the Organization. It is to be feared that sooner or later the seriousness of situations which we can already foresee will oblige us to confront that hard reality. We can already see a foreshadowing of this in the fact that during the last few weeks the Council has devoted the major part of its work to the problem of South West Africa and that today it faces the problem of Rhodesia; there can be no doubt but that sooner or later we shall have to deal also with the question of South Africa itself.

14. With regard to the problem of sanctions, we should like to thank the Secretary-General for all the work he has done in order to be in a position to furnish the Organization with a detailed report on Rhodesia's trade. In this connexion we must express our regret today that, although many countries have demonstrated their obvious determination to implement the Security Council's resolutions, some countries continue to maintain profitable relations with that Territory.

15. It goes without saying that I am referring primarily to non-African régimes, neighbours of Rhodesia, which naturally have a particularly flourishing bilateral trade with that country. This is in fact one of the main direct consequences of the bogus policy of economic boycott, which is very fragmentary and which allows the countries concerned not only considerably to develop their own trade relations, but also to take part in triangular and clandestine trade, a phenomenon of which history provides us with many examples.

16. It seems, therefore, somewhat pointless today to recall that one of the absolutely essential conditions for a sanctions policy is the economic isolation of Rhodesia from its immediate neighbours, a policy which the United Kingdom would be perfectly capable of carrying into effect; I need not add that the Council would not hesitate to follow the same course.

17. We know, however, that the United Kingdom displays a certain diffidence regarding any policy which might involve a confrontation with the colonialist minority. This, no doubt, explains why in 1965 the United Kingdom laid the Rhodesian question before the Security Council and asked for the application of selective sanctions. That initiative in itself gave the administering Power a chance to water down its own responsibilities.

18. The British attitude has thereafter consisted in a self-interested slowing down and obstinate delaying of the search for a solution capable of re-establishing the democratic process in Rhodesia and allowing the Zimbabwe people freely to choose their own future in accordance with their own wishes and legitimate aspirations. This contradiction between the original attitude of the United Kingdom and its present attitude has led the Council into a state of paralysis preventing it from taking the necessary effective measures to re-establish the prior conditions for the application of the principle of self-determination.

19. In envisaging the possibility of resorting to selective sanctions, which the majority of African States denounced at the time as unworkable, the United Kingdom had wished to create the impression that it was implementing a phased policy which would inevitably lead to the extreme measures provided for in the Charter, namely, the use of armed force as a last resort. But in that specific field the failure of the sanctions envisaged by the Council became too obvious to make any demonstration necessary. The attitude of the United Kingdom gives indirect but unmistakable assurances to the Ian Smith régime which, in undisturbed calm, is strengthening its position by ways and means of which the distant echo reaches us daily.

20. We are deeply convinced that the Council will draw the lessons of past experience and express its will and determination to see the administering Power and the international community as a whole take energetic action to spare Rhodesia the upheavals of decolonization experienced in Palestine and, in so doing, safeguard southern Africa from the endless convulsions suffered by the Middle East. Here, as there, the policy of pandering to short-term interests by allowing foreign communities to assume the attributes of sovereignty at the expense of the indigenous

population, will lead sooner or later to violence, responsibility for which can be laid only upon those who have allowed, introduced and consolidated the power of those social groups which, because they are foreign, are usurpers.

21. Recent developments in Southern Rhodesia have merely confirmed once again that the entire responsibility for the present situation is first and foremost the United Kingdom's. Under the Charter it is for that country, as a colonial Power, to establish the conditions permitting the people of Rhodesia to acquire their independence. Despite our justified reservations, and without any real prospects that might support its contention, the United Kingdom has repeatedly tried to convince us that preliminary measures would be capable of bringing Salisbury to heel.

22. Far from taking the vigorous action required by a situation which was only too plain, the United Kingdom has preferred to indulge in bogus talks with a European minority which it did not hesitate at the same time to qualify as rebellious. It seems that these bogus talks have now been broken off and we are waiting with interest to learn whether or not the logical conclusion will be drawn from recent events, namely, that the only genuine and fruitful talks, in keeping both with the provisions of the Charter and with the true interests of the parties concerned, would be talks between the national leaders, who are the true representatives of the Zimbabwe people, and the colonial Power. There can be no doubt that if such a policy were followed, it would receive full support from the members of the Security Council and the unreserved adherence of the international community as a whole.

23. In fact, every one is aware that Ian Smith's constantly provocative attitude is based essentially upon nothing more than the generally shared conviction that in no circumstances will force really be used for the re-establishment of law. The United Kingdom has done everything possible to inculcate this idea in the minds of the present rulers of Rhodesia, and if the British attitude can be called a candid one, it is nonetheless a serious political blunder—on the assumption that it was adopted in good faith.

24. It would be extremely naive to think that the Ian Smith régime would be content with the reality of political power, without ultimately demanding its exterior attributes. This has been demonstrated by the hideous crime committed a few days ago. As we see it, that action has a twofold significance. On the domestic level, it was intended to strike a blow at the national liberation movement; on the international level, it was meant to sever one of the last ties still linking the régime to the United Kingdom, in an endeavour to carry the unilateral declaration of independence to its conclusion.

25. In the first case, the reply was not long in coming. The fighting, the arrests and the mass killings all bear witness to the limited effect the Salisbury assassinations have had on the national liberation movement. In the second case, it is for the Security Council to decide upon the measures to be taken and the actions to be carried out, first by the United Kingdom and subsequently by the international community. For if the United Kingdom is chiefly responsible for the present situation, that situation also requires that

our Organization put into effect measures to prevent the threatened conflagration.

26. It has now become necessary and urgent to reconsider the problem of sanctions, as provided for in resolution 232 (1966). For economic sanctions to be completely effective, it seems necessary that the borders of Southern Rhodesia should henceforth be tightly sealed. To that end, both South Africa and Portugal must be made to comply with the implementation of the sanctions adopted. Any other attitude will have to be considered a violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, particularly of Article 25.

27. Nevertheless, the only real problem confronting us here is to know whether the United Kingdom, enjoying international support and a position strengthened by a recognized legal responsibility, will for long go on refusing to consider the elimination, by whatever means, of the minority racist régime in Salisbury. If that is so, then the disquiet and scepticism shown up to the present by the African States regarding the true intentions of the administering Power would be fully justified.

28. We still dare to believe, even today, that the international community and the awakened consciousness of the African peoples will not allow certain recent tragedies to recur and that the Zimbabwe people will receive active support both from the African countries and from the international community in the unequal struggle imposed on them by the common front of Smith and his allies, Portugal and South Africa.

29. Let us repeat once again that the community of nations must give its support to the Zimbabwe people in their difficult and courageous struggle to recover their national independence and must join with the United Kingdom in exercising all the influence at its command in order truly to translate the principles of the Charter into concrete action.

30. Before concluding, my delegation wishes to put forward a number of suggestions:

(1) In view of the fact that Security Council resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 has recognized the legitimacy of the Rhodesian people's struggle and has also recognized the illegality of the institutions set up in Salisbury, the Security Council ought to enjoin the United Kingdom and the community of nations to regard those responsible for the Salisbury murders as international criminals.

(2) Since the United Kingdom has repeatedly stated that the failure of sanctions was due to a lack of co-operation on the part of certain States, this would be a suitable moment for the administering Power to put at the disposal of the Council all the facts which would enable it to take the most appropriate measures; in so doing, the United Kingdom will enjoy a greater degree of co-operation and will find that the obstacles which, we are told, have prevented its policy from bearing fruit will thereby be removed. From the same viewpoint, the United Kingdom could consider the possibility of sending a number of observer missions, so that the

precise scope and effectiveness of the sanctions applied could be determined. This would doubtless have the advantage, in the eyes of London, of avoiding a resort to force.

(3) These sanctions must be total.

(4) A last stern warning must be addressed to South Africa and Portugal.

(5) The United Kingdom should take immediate steps to put an end to the advertising for Southern Rhodesia and the movement of immigration into that country. In our view this is absolutely imperative, since—and this can never be too often repeated—we are trying to spare Rhodesia and southern Africa the fate of Palestine and the Middle East.

(6) All States Members of the Organization and its specialized agencies must be requested to break off all consular relations and not to recognize in any way any travel document issued by the Salisbury authorities.

(7) Those same States must be asked to put into effect all the measures provided under Article 41 of the Charter, including the interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication. This should cover all information media, such as the press, films, television programmes, etc.

(8) To prevent any pressure on or attack against Zambia—an attack which might be carried out under the pretext that Zambia is being used as a sanctuary for the Rhodesian movement—in short, to avoid any return to a situation of the kind which the Council has had under consideration for many months, the Council should, in conjunction with Zambia and with complete respect for the sovereignty of that country, envisage the most appropriate defence measures.

31. In conclusion, Mr. President, I should like through you to address a number of questions to the representative of the administering Power. These questions do not arise out of a desire to set up an inquisition, but, if the replies are forthcoming, they may allow the Council to consider the question in full possession of the facts, instead of in ambiguity and confusion.

32. On 30 August 1967, a man named Lardner-Burke, who called himself Smith's Minister of Justice and who is officiating today at Salisbury's sacrificial altar, had already announced the murders that were to take place on 6 March 1968.

33. What were the effective measures—not the delaying tactics—carried out by the administering Power to rescue those fighters from death?

34. Does the United Kingdom wish effective and adequate action to be taken to render the Salisbury criminals harmless? If this is the United Kingdom's determined desire, how can such an objective be reconciled with the attitude it has shown in its refusal of all confrontation with Salisbury and Pretoria?

35. The British Prime Minister indicated on 14 March that "in the present circumstances there can be no question of resuming contact with the Smith régime". Does this mean that although it does not at present envisage negotiations with Smith, London does not thereby rule out the possibility of pursuing such negotiations when the time seems right? How can such intentions be reconciled with the illegal nature of a régime and the patent responsibility for murder incurred by that régime?

36. Prime Minister Wilson said on 11 November 1965:

"... I think that the solution of this problem is not one to be dealt with by military intervention, unless of course"—I stress the words "of course"—"our troops are asked for to preserve law and order and to avert a tragic action, subversion, murder and so on."¹

37. We are forced to note that law has not been preserved, that order has not been preserved, that tragic action has not been averted, that subversion has become institutionalized, and that murder, violating the law and threatening order, is legitimizing the subversion which by definition constitutes tragic action. Neither before, nor during, nor after the giving of those assurances, have British troops been called upon to preserve law and order or to avert tragic action, subversion and murder. How can the United Kingdom reconcile the responsibility which it claims—and which no one denies to it—and the commitments it has entered into with its persistent refusal to employ force? In words of one syllable, does the United Kingdom wish to preserve law and order, does it wish to avert subversion and murder, or does it prefer to forgo military intervention?

38. In fact, the state of confusion which seems to surround London's political actions obliges us not to underestimate the hypothesis that the United Kingdom would probably not hesitate to intervene in Rhodesia, if the strong development of a liberation movement were to create a situation which would inevitably be interpreted as a threat to law and order and would therefore be described as the tragic action, suppression and murder obviously calling for military intervention. Not legality, but at least order—colonial order—would have been restored.

39. This should not be regarded in any way as an attack on the integrity or good faith of those who are here representing the administering Power, which has agreed to be responsible, if not to the Organization, at least to the Security Council. We felt it our duty to beg the United Kingdom, with all due deference, to enlighten the Council on certain questions which we believe to be crucial.

40. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I propose today to make only a first statement. I shall not attempt at once to answer a number of important questions and indeed charges put forward so eloquently by the representative of Algeria. I am anxious to deal with them and on another occasion, if I am permitted to do so, I shall give a considered reply to the questions and charges which he has raised. It would perhaps be a mistake to single out any particular accusations, but he made a number of statements which even now, without attempting a full reply, I should answer.

¹ Quoted in English by the speaker.

41. The representative of Algeria said that by adopting selective sanctions we sought to minimize our responsibilities. That I cannot accept. He said that we have sought to delay the search for a solution. That again I cannot accept. He said—at least I understood him to say—that we have given assurances to the illegal régime. That I certainly cannot accept.

42. I would say no more now on the presentation which he has made to us except that when he emphasizes that all the people of Rhodesia have a right to be consulted and that all the people of Rhodesia have a right to participate in the government of their country, then we are on common ground. That has been our position and that has been the basis of our policy throughout. When he sets as his purpose the aim of bringing the illegal régime in Salisbury to an end, then again we are on common ground. That is our purpose too and has been from the beginning. But I should like to submit to the Council that if we concentrate today on controversy between ourselves, we shall distract attention from our first and overriding duty. That duty is to make clear in unmistakable and unanimous terms our condemnation of the illegal executions carried out in Rhodesia earlier this month when five men were hanged. We all, I am sure, agree on that.

43. We should go further. I trust that a clear and unanimous call will go out from this Council, in the name of justice and mercy and carrying the authority of the United Nations, demanding that no more illegal hangings be carried out. This should be done without reservation and without delay. This is our first obligation; I trust that we shall not fail to meet it.

44. More than a hundred men have been awaiting hanging in Rhodesia. Many of them have endured the agony of the condemned cell for many years. Some, we hear, have now been told that they are not to be killed. But no one can be satisfied with that. Surely it is necessary for this Council, in full agreement amongst all of us and without any delay, to record our demand on behalf of the international community that the rule of law should not again be so flouted.

45. On the moral questions involved in these hangings, I shall not attempt to add to what has been said. I respect the strong, indeed passionate, feelings expressed by the representative of Algeria. I share them. He will understand that it has been a bitter experience in recent weeks to live with the hard fact that, while my country has constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia, we have not been able to stop actions so clearly illegal and so brutally inhuman. It is difficult for many of us to express our feelings; words are not enough, and in such questions Africans have a better right to speak than I have. But I ask them to believe that there are countless people in the world who, though they may have no special knowledge of Rhodesia or of Africa, have followed what has taken place with disgust and with anger. More than that, there are very many people who recognize that these actions are evil and ominous for the future.

46. The storm of protest has already been heard round the world. It owes its strength to the knowledge that grave injustice has been done and that men have been kept for

years in condemned cells and then denied the right of final appeal to the highest court. As the Commonwealth Secretary said in the House of Commons, the deprivation of the right to resort to the ultimate court of appeal on a capital charge is about the grossest breach of the rule of law that we can imagine.

47. The world-wide protest also owes its intensity to a sense of foreboding for the future. That comes from the concern which many of us so deeply feel for what may be regarded as the greatest task of our generation—the task of enabling people of different races in Africa and elsewhere to live in mutual respect and in the security of true equality.

48. If we agree that our first duty is to express the force of international condemnation and to call for a stop to these illegal and inhuman actions, the Council may decide to prepare and adopt a resolution to that effect at once. If that is the wish of the Council, we shall be ready to co-operate in such a first step. We see advantage in proceeding with such initial action, and in proceeding at once and in full agreement.

49. Last week we unanimously adopted resolution 246 (1968) on the Pretoria trial. That followed on resolution 245 (1968) which we adopted unanimously on 25 January 1968. I need not remind the Council that we all co-operated together to go forward in these expressions of international opinion in full agreement. I myself have no doubt that in spite of the reports which we have received on the response from the South African Government, those demonstrations of international concern and international condemnation and international demand were timely and valuable.

50. It would be well, I suggest, if we were to proceed with the same purpose and with the same urgency and the same unanimity to express international concern and condemnation and demand on the question now before us.

51. It may be said that the force of international opinion about the hangings in Rhodesia has already been made clear. That may be so; but I commend to you the proposition that it is for this Council to confirm and to reinforce what has already been so strongly felt and openly said here in the United Nations and indeed throughout the world.

52. Our first duty is to the prisoners in Rhodesia still under sentence of death—and new death sentences, so we hear, have recently been passed. Let us not hesitate or delay. Our first duty is clear.

53. I certainly do not suggest that we should stop or even pause when that first duty has been done. My proposal is that we should at once proceed to consider together the whole question of what further action can be taken to restore the situation in Rhodesia, to end the rebellion and to prepare for the advance to free, democratic government which we all, I am sure, wish to see.

54. I have no intention today to go over past events in Rhodesia, though I am ready to do so if that is the wish of the Council in the course of our debate.

55. One of the first acts of my Government was to give a warning of the consequences of an illegal declaration of independence, and we have throughout declared and maintained the principles on which we believe a just settlement should be based. Those principles may be open to criticism or susceptible of improvement. Some may say that in some respects they go too far, some may argue that they do not go far enough. But I very much doubt that there will be many here who will maintain that they are wrong. I believe that in international opinion they are recognized as a genuine and fair attempt to find the right way to go forward. They are principles which have guided us in the processes of decolonization elsewhere in the past. They continue to provide what we believe should be the framework for a settlement in Rhodesia. We have promised that there will be no going back.

56. We set ourselves to achieve our aims by peaceful means. We appealed at once to the Council to join with us and support us in that effort. We ourselves made proposals to the Council. We have faithfully taken action in accordance with the decisions of the Council. We have done so at economic sacrifice, in spite of the economic and financial difficulties my country has recently faced. No country has done more than mine to put the decisions of the Council into practical effect. We have in fact gone well beyond the requirements of the Council's resolutions. It would have been possible, some would say it would have been easy, to abandon our declared principles and save ourselves from further economic loss. We have refused to do so.

57. There have been delays and mistakes and miscalculations. We welcome and commend the actions of all those who have joined us in our efforts, but there have been those who were not prepared to answer the call of the Council. As the Algerian representative has reminded us, there have been evasions and failures. We have had these factors under constant review, both ourselves and in the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee. The time has come to examine together here what has been done and what more can now be done.

58. My earnest recommendation to the Council is that we should at once undertake a full and careful review of past action and future possibilities, and I accordingly place myself at the disposal of the Council for urgent consultation. I sincerely trust that that offer will be accepted in the spirit of full co-operation in which it is made.

59. I do not for a moment forget or deny the practical difficulties we must honestly face and the real limitations on what can in fact be done. We have not failed to state them. But I greatly hope that, however strong the feelings of members of the Council, and before they make up their minds, there will be a readiness to consult on the basis of the hard facts and the practical possibilities. I trust that we shall not run away from our responsibilities by resort merely to sweeping declarations and demands that cannot be met. I trust that the Council will not lightly abandon the course which by our previous votes we have set.

60. I trust that we shall not allow ourselves to be defeatist in the sense that we abandon further practical and effective action, limited and unspectacular though perhaps most of it

must be, in favour of mere invective and dispute among ourselves.

61. I do not need to remind the Council of our main obligation. It is to all the people of Rhodesia, and especially to those more than 4 million Africans who are being denied freedom of expression and the prospect of full participation in the government of their own country.

62. There are some who say that there is no way but by force, that the endeavour to use peaceful means was misguided from the start, or that, even if that was not so, the methods we have employed under the authority of this Council have now no further part to play, that there is no additional measure, no new pressure, no stopping of loopholes and no prevention of evasions which is worthy of consideration. I am myself convinced that that is not so. I am sure that there are effective measures still to be taken.

63. I go further. I would say that in spite of the difficulties and limitations of which I am all too well aware, we have a duty not to decide and declare that sanctions have failed, not to pronounce that one of the main weapons of international enforcement has proved useless. We have a duty to explore and to examine every effective and practicable method to supplement and sustain the measures we have already taken. This is not the time to give up; it is the time to go on. That is the decision which should go from this Council to Salisbury. We need to convince everyone, including particularly the illegal régime in Rhodesia, that we mean to go on. We need to convince them that in the end there will be no escape from the situation created by their illegal actions except by a return to the road of legality and democratic advance and free government which was so wantonly abandoned on 11 November 1965.

64. We all have difficult judgements and awkward decisions to make together. On some vital aspects of the problem before us we shall no doubt disagree. It would be surprising if it were not so. But I for one am convinced that this is a time when we must accept the limitations on our options, however galling those limitations may be, and go forward with deliberate and determined steps along the road which we have chosen.

65. It is a time not for gestures and generalizations and accusations, but for steady persistence. We have to make it quite clear that while we cannot hope to win at once, we are resolved not to give up and not to abandon our responsibility to the people who rely on us.

66. It is with this in mind that I repeat my recommendation that we should at once embark on a detailed and thorough consultation amongst ourselves on the measures which can and should be taken.

67. After listening to the representative of Algeria this afternoon I hope that I can take it—I believe that I can—that such consultations will be undertaken and carried through in a spirit of genuine co-operation to achieve common aims.

68. Lij Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): I should like first of all to join those who have spoken before me in

expressing a warm welcome to our new colleague, the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik. Ambassador Malik has been a very well known figure in international politics for more than two decades, and his present appointment to the United Nations brings to the Organization vast knowledge of and experience in international affairs, coupled with recognized diplomatic skill and competence, from all of which the Council and the Organization can derive a great deal of benefit. We of the African delegations are particularly gratified that the Soviet Government has chosen as its representative to the United Nations at this particular time so important for African problems a distinguished statesman who has been closely associated with Africa and its problems during the past years; and we are confident that this timely and significant appointment will help further to enhance the understanding and co-operation that exist between the African delegations and the delegation of the Soviet Union.

69. In welcoming Ambassador Malik to membership of the Council, my delegation wishes to assure him of its whole-hearted co-operation in the true spirit of the long-standing relations that have so happily existed between the Soviet and Ethiopian Governments and peoples.

70. I do not intend to speak at length at this stage of our debate on this very grave problem that we face in Southern Rhodesia. My colleague the Permanent Representative of Algeria has presented to the Council a clear, eloquent and comprehensive case for prompt and comprehensive action by the Council in order to bring this shameful rebellion to an end and thus restore to the people of Zimbabwe their rights to self-determination and independence.

71. I find it necessary, none the less, to seize the opportunity of this opening debate both to underline some of the points raised by my Algerian colleague and to indicate the main lines of action in which the Council should, in our view, direct its efforts. It also seems to me that as the Security Council embarks once again on what we all hope will be an historic and decisive debate on Rhodesia it is only fitting and timely that we should remind ourselves of the background from which this tragedy cannot be separated, the tribulations of our times, the terrible convulsions we are passing through.

72. The past year alone has witnessed more than its due share of hostilities, and the prospects do not seem any better for the year that has now begun. One such sore place in the world—a place where a large fire with the potential of turning into an inferno is building, where the smell of burning is already in the air—is of course southern Africa. There an obdurate colonialism, in league with racism, has raised a barricade against the advance of freedom and independence. Nor can the stand of this alliance of colonialism and racism in southern Africa be described as only one of resistance to what has often been called the wind of change. Colonialism in that part of Africa is desperately on the offensive. It tries to push as far back as possible the frontiers of independence in Africa. For it sees in the independence of the peoples of Africa a threat to its own precarious and ill-founded security and future.

73. At home it has unleashed a policy of vicious suppression of the indigenous peoples. A policy of racial

segregation and *apartheid* is being rapidly institutionalized on a massive scale.

74. This colonial alignment looks to the future with an air of false confidence, in the knowledge that it will always get some substantial support from abroad, from the Western world, whose civilizing mission it claims to be carrying out and whose interest it avows to protect and defend. At any rate it believes—and it has every reason to go on believing—that this support will be forthcoming so long as it is able to control the enormous wealth and resources of that rich and vast subcontinent.

75. In South Africa it has established a garrison State equipped to the teeth with the most up-to-date weaponry of aggression. The most brutal system of oppression has been established on the most avowed racist ideology, equalled in recent times only by that of nazi Germany. It has usurped in broad daylight a ward of the United Nations, the international Territory of South West Africa.

76. In the Portuguese Territories colonialism has unleashed its fury against those who have dared to question its legitimacy. A colonial war whose intensity and ferocity are growing day by day is raging, while the rest of the world, condemned by and large to a conspiracy of silence, remains unaware.

77. In Southern Rhodesia the situation which the Council in its resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 determined to be a threat to international peace and security is fast becoming an imminent threat.

78. If the past year has shown anything conclusively, it is that the challenge of colonialism, shorn of its paraphernalia, has been revealed in its true colours. It is an alliance of colonialism and racism, which has pulled together all its resources, mustered all its support, to defeat all that the United Nations stands for.

79. It has become all too obvious that the colonial problems in southern Africa cannot be treated separately if we are earnest in our search for an effective solution. The solution we should seek should be co-ordinated in one concerted move against all these problems. Anything short of this, in the face of all evidence of the new posture and tactics of colonialism in southern Africa, is bound to be unrealistic and inadequate.

80. The Security Council is once again considering the situation in Southern Rhodesia because it has been established that that situation constitutes a continuing threat to international peace and security—a threat that has been further aggravated by the recent political assassinations and persecutions of that country's freedom fighters. Indeed, the history of Rhodesia in the past ten years has been characterized by a steady and constant deterioration and by an ever-growing threat to international peace and security. This has happened not by accident but because of the refusal of one of the permanent members of the Security Council, a country which shares primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to discharge fully its responsibility under the United Nations Charter to the people of Rhodesia. Indeed, the Government

of the United Kingdom cannot escape responsibility to history for the situation that now prevails in Rhodesia and for all the consequences that have flowed therefrom.

81. When the United Nations General Assembly and the Special Committee on decolonization² first set out to consider the question of colonialism in Rhodesia, some six years ago, we continually addressed pleas to the Government of the United Kingdom to assume its direct responsibility to advance the people of Rhodesia to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

82. However, the United Kingdom refused throughout to co-operate with the United Nations, on the fictitious ground that the question of constitutional reforms in Rhodesia was in the hands of the minority Rhodesian Government which had been established following a so-called election in 1923, in which only an exclusively white electorate—about 10,000 in number—took part. The United Kingdom Government pleaded then, as it does now, that it had no competence to do anything to remedy the situation.

83. This policy of vacillation and refusal by the United Kingdom Government to discharge its full responsibility finally convinced Smith and his accomplices that the Government would not act if they revolted. When the threat of the unilateral declaration of independence became real, we again tried to impress upon the United Kingdom Government that it should not discount the use of force as a means of preventing the threat from being carried out. As is well known, no such declaration ever came, and Smith revolted, flouting the British Crown with impunity.

84. Since the unilateral declaration of independence, the policy of vacillation has continued. Step by step Smith has escalated his defiance, to the point of severing altogether his last link with the United Kingdom—namely, the authority of the British Crown—by refusing to accept the reprieve granted by Her Britannic Majesty the Queen to political prisoners condemned to death by his kangaroo court.

85. The situation in Southern Rhodesia has thus deteriorated to such an extent that the problem now is no longer one of ensuring the immediate participation on a democratic basis of the African people in the affairs of their Government. The nature of the problem has decisively changed. Smith has now embarked on a policy of racial segregation and *apartheid* which excludes altogether the participation of the indigenous people in the political life of their country. Already a bill to ensure the maintenance of separate communities in separate places has been passed. Another bill, the so-called Draft Property Owners (Residential Protection) Bill, provides for the eviction of people of one race from an area predominantly occupied by another race. The Municipal (Amendment) Act is designed to provide separate municipal facilities and services on racial lines. Segregation in sports participation and in the provision of hospital services has been instituted as a policy.

86. Inevitably, as the repression has increased, so has the resistance of the African population. Deprived of any legitimate means of redress, the African population has risen to the challenge and has decided to meet the violence of the oppressor by effective resistance. This resistance has apparently been so widespread and so much beyond the capacity of the Smith régime to deal with that South African counter-insurgency forces have been brought in to cope with the problem.

87. It is against that ominous background that the recent hanging of political prisoners has dramatically demonstrated how nervous and ruthless the authorities have become. They hope, perhaps against hope, that by meting out death sentences to freedom fighters they can silence them. In this, as in every other assumption they have chosen to entertain, the racists of Rhodesia are of course utterly wrong.

88. History shows that ever-increasing repression breeds further resistance, especially when the oppressed live by the hope of freedom and can count on the sympathy and support of progressive forces and public opinion. The struggle of the oppressed cannot simply be explained away as a common-law crime. This is particularly so when the power of the oppressor is based on force and repressive violence, and when the oppressed have no legitimate means of redress.

89. In this regard the General Assembly was right in proclaiming the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe to be legitimate and it was also right for the Special Committee on Decolonization to condemn the hanging of political prisoners and characterize it as political assassination.

90. While the nature and the extent of the alliance of colonialism in Southern Rhodesia was unveiled in the Zambezi Valley and the Wankie area as a result of the activities of the nationalist forces, it should be pointed out that these developments are only portents of a greater and more imminent threat to peace in that part of Africa.

91. As the resistance grows, as it is bound to grow, the alliance of colonialism, instead of looking into its own policies, will inevitably see in the neighbouring independent African States a threat to its security. There is thus a distinct possibility that colonialism in southern Africa will sooner or later unleash aggression against the neighbouring independent African States. In this connexion, I should like to support the suggestion made by my colleague the representative of Algeria, for the Council to take this into full account, and to prepare itself for such an eventuality.

92. Thus, in our assessment, the situation in Southern Rhodesia which the Security Council determined as a threat to international peace and security in December 1966, is fast becoming an imminent threat. It is against the background of this ominous development that the Council should address itself to an evaluation of the effects of the selective mandatory sanctions it had decided upon in December 1966 as well as in the light of such an evaluation to examining new and additional measures sufficiently adequate to remove the threat to international peace and security which now obtains there.

² Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

93. After everything is said about these selective mandatory sanctions, one thing stands out very clear: that is, despite the fact that these measures have been in operation for over a year, the Smith régime, instead of collapsing as was expected, is fast consolidating itself on the lines of the *apartheid* system pioneered by its spiritual mentors in South Africa. Nothing could be a more eloquent and telling proof of the failure of the so-called selective mandatory sanctions than the grim fact that the Smith régime is still on its feet today. So defiant has Ian Smith been that he was recently quoted as having said that Southern Rhodesia would be—and I quote his words—“stark, staring mad” to consider any alternative.

94. It is therefore pertinent to ask why these sanction measures failed, or whether they ever had any chance to work in the first place. My Government, and many other Governments of Member States, never had any illusion that they could or would work. For one thing, we had correctly analysed the nature of colonialism in that part of the African continent. We had predicted that South Africa and Portugal would sabotage any meaningful United Nations action. Secondly, we had felt that even if they were to be fully implemented, selective mandatory sanctions would only give Smith time to make the necessary adjustments to organize his economy with that of South Africa and the Portuguese in Mozambique, in order to minimize the impact of the decision of the Council.

95. The fact of the matter, however, is that the selective measures were not fully complied with by all States as they should have been, and yet these represent a decision of the Security Council which all Member States of the United Nations are in duty bound to carry out faithfully. The attitude of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa have been made absolutely clear: their attitude has been one of complete disregard of this decision of the Council. I shall take up this matter a little later in my statement.

96. Apart from these countries the evidence submitted to us in the Secretary-General's reports,³ prepared in pursuance of Council resolution 232 (1966), suggests that a number of countries have not also fully lived up to their obligation.

97. It is, of course, difficult to determine the extent of the violation of these sanction measures in each case. The Secretary-General in his various reports has explained to us how difficult it has become to get information on trade-flow to and from Rhodesia. The Smith régime is playing a cloak-and-dagger game with trade information. Quite a few statistical publications have been suspended, and the revelation of trade information has been decreed as prejudicial to the national interest. To a great extent trade to and from Southern Rhodesia has been “denationalized”, and most of the transactions are now being carried out through South African and Portuguese intermediaries. Nevertheless, a general pattern of violation of the sanctions,

and to some extent a picture of a more particular pattern, emerges from the reports of the Secretary-General, as well as from news reports in the international press.

98. The main indications are that any decrease in the export from Southern Rhodesia of agricultural products that may have been achieved by the selective mandatory sanctions, has been offset by increased export earnings from minerals. The evidence also shows that foreign investment in mineral extraction activities is actually increasing.

99. The fact that the Smith régime has been able to compensate farmers for all the losses they have sustained as a result of the sanction measures also suggests that outside resources from certain quarters must have been made available to it.

100. Selective mandatory sanctions have also provided the Smith régime with time to make the necessary adjustments and reorientation of production in its economy. The policy in this regard has been to shift to production of commodities for which there is a high demand in the world market. The production of groundnuts has been given high priority. The re-export of beef from Southern Rhodesia, according to press reports, has considerably increased since the unilateral declaration of independence. Also according to press reports, mineral exports, comprising asbestos, copper and chrome, have continued to reach world markets in ever-increasing quantities.

101. The inescapable conclusion from a review of the statistics supplied by the Secretary-General is that although the official figures submitted by Member Governments indicate in some instances a substantial decrease of trade between Southern Rhodesia and its traditional trading partners, it seems that at the same time there is a large volume of clandestine trade that has not figured in these official submissions. Since much trade in these countries is carried on by private concerns, it may well be that the Member Governments concerned did not exercise sufficient vigilance against those rechanneling their trade through middlemen in South Africa and Portugal.

102. Although the evidence of violation of the selective mandatory sanctions with respect to other countries may not be so all conclusive as to enable us to pin-point responsibility with respect to Portugal and South Africa, the evidence regarding their complicity and duplicity in sabotaging the sanction measures decided upon by the Security Council is a matter of official acknowledgement. Both Governments have not hidden the fact that they are not prepared to carry out the decision of the Council. Indeed, the Portuguese Government has gone so far as to challenge the legality of the decision of the Council. In its letters both to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General in connexion with this problem, Portugal has raised legal points on which it knew beforehand the Secretary-General could not give an answer. All this, however, has been done in a vain attempt to justify Portugal's unwillingness to carry out the decisions of the Security Council and its defiance of them.

103. Moreover, on 23 November 1967, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. Franco Nogueira, stated at a Press

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1967*, document S/7781 and Add.1 and 2; *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1967*, document S/7781/Add.3; and *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1967*, document S/7781/Add.4.

conference that Portugal made no secret of the fact that oil products were passing through Lourenço Marques to Southern Rhodesia and that the Sonarep refinery at Lourenço Marques was refining oil for Mozambique's own requirements and for "the same old clients as before". Needless to say, one of the notorious "same old clients" mentioned in this statement is none other than Southern Rhodesia itself.

104. South Africa has also not hidden its attitude of defiance towards the selective mandatory sanctions—so much so that the Government of South Africa has even obliged foreign business subsidiaries to obey its edict of defiance of the Council's decision. Thus, in June 1966, the Minister of Economic Affairs of South Africa declared that the South African Government would not tolerate foreign Governments issuing instructions to South African subsidiaries which clashed with South African policies. He said in fact that if South Africa does not "participate in a boycott action, then no South African company has a right to participate in a boycott".

105. It is also to be recalled that in a *note verbale* dated 22 June 1966 [S/7392] from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations that representative expressed, on behalf of his Government, reservations regarding the validity of resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966.

106. In the face of incontrovertible evidence, it is high time that both Portugal and South Africa should stand accountable for their conduct in terms of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. Under Article 25 of the Charter they are both under the obligation to carry out faithfully decisions of the Council. Such decisions of the Council are, of course, decisions of the Organization taken by the Council on behalf of the entire membership. Nobody can question the validity of such decisions nor disregard them without contravening thereby one's Charter obligation. Moreover, whatever controversy there may be or may have been in the past with regard to the interpretation of Article 25, there is none in this particular case, for the decision of the Council in resolution 232 (1966) was taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.

107. Now that the complicity and duplicity of the Portuguese authorities and of South Africa in defeating those limited sanction measures have become a matter of record, my delegation believes that no sanction measures, even if they were to be comprehensive, could work today unless they were to include the Portuguese Territories and South Africa as well. We have to recognize colonialism in southern Africa for what it is and devise resolute action in a way that can meet its changed posture and tactics.

108. The time has therefore come for the strict and effective application of general and mandatory comprehensive sanctions, without leaving any loop-holes which impede the prompt and efficient application of enforce-

ment measures. It is only through such action that sanctions can have a decisive impact on the internal situation in Southern Rhodesia, and it is only in this way that we can hope to remove the ominous threat to international peace and security that presently exists in southern Africa, and in Southern Rhodesia in particular.

109. Moreover, experience has shown that the mere promulgation of sanctions can never be enough on its own to ensure effective application and compliance. This is an indisputable lesson that we derive from the history of sanctions both from the time of the League of Nations and from that of the post-war period. It is not enough for the Council to request the Secretary-General to report on the progress of the implementation of the decisions to be taken here. The information brought to us by the Secretary-General is, of course, always very useful and the Secretary-General has no doubt done his very best, under the circumstances, to provide the Council with all information given to him by Member States. But such information, however useful it may be, does not enable the Council to ensure that its decisions are in fact implemented without all kinds of obstruction on the part of those whose desire it is to undermine the Council's effort.

110. In a situation like that of Southern Rhodesia where South Africa and Portugal are openly defying decisions of the Council, sanctions without some means of following up their implementation can have no effect. If the Council really means business, it must decide on specific and appropriate measures which can enable it to follow up the implementation of its decisions.

111. If Britain wishes sincerely to bring this rebellion to an end, it must demonstrate its good faith and its determination by assuming the direct responsibility that is Britain's and by playing the major role in the proposed process of implementation. Anything short of this will be a grave evasion of responsibility which history will never forget and Africa will never forgive.

112. These are, in the view of my delegation, the main lines of action that the Council should seriously consider and on the basis of which it must take urgent action. I reserve the right to intervene at a later stage.

113. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have no further speakers on my list. Before adjourning the meeting, I wish to inform the Council that, as a result of consultations which I have held, a number of Council members have expressed the desire that the next meeting should take place tomorrow at 3 p.m., in order to allow time for consultations. With the Council's consent, I shall now adjourn the meeting, on the understanding that the next meeting will take place tomorrow at 3 p.m. when we shall resume our consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.