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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 26 January 1968, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1388)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 25 January 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8360).

Adoption of the agenda

1. The PRESIDENT: This meeting of the Security Council has been convened in response to the urgent request of the representative of the United States and following consultations with the members of the Council.
2. The provisional agenda for this meeting is contained in document S/Agenda/1388. The first item is the adoption of the agenda. If I hear no objection, I shall take it . . .
3. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has asked to speak.
4. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): As the President has just said, the Security Council has been convened in response to a request made by the United States of America in the letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations sent to the President of the Council late last night [S/8360]. A study of that letter, with which the Council members are acquainted, leaves us in no doubt as to the motives behind it. We should like to draw attention to the actual way in which the matter was raised—the attempt made by the United States—during the consultations mentioned by the President to dictate its terms to other Council Members regarding the date and time for the Council meeting to examine its complaint, as well as the United States delegation's reluctance to take into account the fact that, owing to the short notice given, many members of the Council were unable to communicate even their position with regard to the time of the Council meeting. All this goes to show that the United States is, in this case too, in no way actuated by any desire to maintain international peace and security.

5. The Soviet delegation thinks that members of the Council should realize that the accusations levelled by the United States of America against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are as the United States knows completely unfounded. The aggressor in Korea is not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but those who have invaded the land of the Korean people, who for many years have continued to occupy the southern part of Korea and who are trying to impose upon the Korean People the puppet régime of a clique of corrupt traitors.

6. It is obvious that the main cause of tension in Korea is the presence in the Territory of South Korea of United States aggressive armed forces including the United States Navy in the waters off Korea.

7. It is a well-known fact that the United States of America and all its supporters have opposed the numerous proposals put forward by peace-loving States Members of the United Nations for the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from South Korea. The United States, pursuing its acts of provocation and aggression against the Korean people, has also systematically opposed the adoption by the United Nations of any decision that might put an end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of Korea. It has ignored the numerous warnings of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries about the dangerous and explosive nature of the situation created in Korea by the occupation of the southern part of that country by America and other foreign troops.

8. Thus only the United States and the States that support them in Korea are to blame for the fact that that country remains a hotbed of tension, which threatens peace and security in that part of the world and hampers any peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It can rightly be said that the United States is now reaping the fruits of its Korean policy, the poisonous seeds of which it has been sowing for many years on Korean soil and here in the United Nations. And no dramatic moves or defamatory attacks against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, such as the letter we now have before us, no other trickery on the part of the United States representative can help to twist the real facts.

9. Consequently, the request for a meeting of the Council is clearly nothing but a manoeuvre in the sordid game which the United States is playing. It is an attempt to shift the responsibility for the continuing tension in Korea from the guilty to the innocent, an attempt to disguise the continuing aggression of the United States in that country. We are well aware that the letter in question also mentions

an incident involving the American naval vessel *Pueblo*. But it is obvious that this matter must not and cannot be debated in the Security Council. The seizure of a foreign vessel which has invaded the territorial waters of any State with hostile intent is the internal affair of that State.

10. United States attempts to draw the Security Council into a consideration of its slanderous accusations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, far from reducing tension in the Korean peninsula, will only serve to aggravate that tension and the threat to the cause of peace and security in that part of the world.

11. The Soviet delegation therefore asks the members of the Council to adopt an objective approach and to reject the pretensions of the United States whose aim, as we have already explained, is to use the Security Council to carry out its iniquitous imperialist plans in the Far East and in the Korean peninsula in particular.

12. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): The representative of the Soviet Union, our colleague Ambassador Morozov, has not yet heard the evidence which I shall offer—after the agenda is adopted, as I am sure it will be—in support of the letter I have submitted to the President of the Security Council [S/8360].

13. It is characteristic perhaps of the Soviet Union to pass judgement before hearing the evidence. In Alice in Wonderland terms: "Sentence first—verdict afterwards". But what may be characteristic of Soviet justice is not the practice and tradition of this Council.

14. It is not overstating the facts to say that we have brought to the Council on an urgent basis a matter which affects the peace and security of an important area in the world. We have sought an urgent meeting of the Council because of our belief and conviction that if it is at all possible this situation should be dealt with and settled peacefully through diplomatic channels. Clearly, the primary diplomatic channel in the world today is the Security Council, the organ of this Organization with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

15. We shall be quite content to have the Council judge the merits of the situation after hearing about the situation. But whatever anyone's views are, or may be, about the merits of this situation, it would be completely incomprehensible, and I believe intolerable, to men of peace throughout the world if the Council were to shun its duty and to refuse to deal with this grave situation.

16. For this reason, I consider it an imperative duty of this Council to proceed promptly to consider the agenda item that we have proposed.

17. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): The United States delegation submitted a letter to you, Mr. President, yesterday evening, which we received this morning. We have hardly had enough time to read it carefully, to analyse it and to make the necessary preparations for a careful examination—not to speak of getting the proper instructions from our Governments. We are still waiting for more proper information on the problem.

18. The representative of the United States said that there is a situation of urgency, that there is tension in that area of the world around Korea. We recognize that there is tension, and it seems that that tension is increasing, not day by day but hour by hour, and is mainly created, originally and consistently, by the United States. It is already increasing to the level of hysteria.

19. Without going into the substance of the matter, I wish to mention that the violation of the frontiers of other countries is already becoming a consistent policy of the United States. Therefore, we were not too much surprised that another such occasion occurred, and this time in North Korea.

20. The letter also mentions tensions and problems in South Korea. If anyone is responsible in an international sense for the tension in South Korea, then it is no one else but the United States which occupies that country with many thousands of troops—and that is the real source of the tension.

21. By bringing this whole matter before the Security Council, the United States is reverting to a very old practice of sharing the responsibility—which it should bear itself for its actions—with the Security Council, with the United Nations, thus usurping the name of our Organization and of the Council. But bringing such aggressive acts before the Council and putting them before the members of the Council in a presentation as misleading as that contained in the United States letter, only creates further misunderstanding and further trouble and, besides, casts a very heavy shadow over the work of our Organization and does not promote peaceful co-operation or strengthen the cause of international peace.

22. The Hungarian delegation is of the opinion that a peaceful settlement is possible in Korea and elsewhere in the world. It could be implemented and achieved mainly by withdrawing the occupation forces of the United States in Korea and in other parts of the world and by letting the Korean people settle their own affairs themselves.

23. The Hungarian delegation thus is of the opinion that it is improper and untimely to bring this matter before the Security Council, and considers that the tenor of this letter debases the dignity of the Council and lacks seriousness. My delegation therefore strongly objects to the debate on this item, and objects to putting it on the agenda of the Security Council.

24. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): The representative of the United States has requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider certain events in the Far East which have undoubtedly brought about, to say the least, an increase of tension in the area of Korea.

25. I do not wish, any more than the preceding speakers, to enter into the substance of these developments at this point, but I wish to record why the Canadian delegation fully supports the inscription of this item on the agenda in response to the request contained in document S/8360. In doing so, my delegation is conscious of the heavy responsibility which the Security Council was meant to exercise

and should exercise when problems arise relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. This, after all, is the purport of the Council's responsibilities defined under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter.

26. The issue, as I see it at this moment, is whether the Council will take advantage of this opportunity to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the view of the Canadian delegation, the Council should not hesitate to do so and do whatever it can to deal with a dangerous situation brought to it by a Member State. Indeed, the fact that one of the major Powers in the world should today be seeking the assistance of the United Nations in overcoming a difficult problem through, as the representative of the United States said, diplomatic channels is surely something that should be welcomed by the Security Council and by all the Members of this Organization in whose name we act.

27. My delegation therefore believes that in the interest of peace, in the interest of a speedy and equitable solution, the Council should quickly agree to take up this question and find some appropriate means of helping to resolve it. One way might possibly be—and I only suggest this as an indication of why we should be seized of it—to arrange for an intermediary or intermediaries to exercise good offices in this matter. All I would say is that in the present mood of hostility in the area, surely the Council should lose no time in taking up the matter and bringing the healing touch of diplomacy to bear on the situation.

28. Reference has been made to various aspects of document S/8360, and I realize from the preceding statements that there will be disagreement as to the facts and as to the background. But surely—certainly as far as this delegation is concerned—the information available to us so far indicates strongly that the *Pueblo* was in international waters at the time of its seizure. And in that event those responsible for its seizure assumed a very heavy responsibility in holding it forcibly, the ship together with its crew, in clear violation of international law.

29. But one thing is crystal clear: the seizure in this event is a very unhappy omen for future peace in the area unless steps are taken to deal effectively, equitably and promptly with the consequences. And it is in this spirit I believe that the Council should proceed in adopting the agenda.

30. The PRESIDENT: I have no other speakers on my list. I call on the representative of the United Kingdom.

31. Sir Leslie GLASS (United Kingdom): The question we have to decide is whether the Council is to consider and deal with the serious situation which has been brought to our attention. We are not yet dealing with the substance of the situation. In my statement I shall therefore limit myself strictly to the question of the inscription of this item and the adoption of the agenda.

32. Article 1, Chapter I of the United Nations Charter sets out the first purpose of our Organization as being to maintain international peace and security. Article 24, sub-paragraph 1, of the Charter sets out that the Members of the United Nations confer on the Security Council

primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In this dangerous age, in many ways more dangerous than when the Charter was written, the members of the Security Council have an immense responsibility in the fearful issues of war and peace.

33. We have now before us a grave situation. No one who has studied the facts can fail to feel blowing here the chill wind of authentic danger. The world man-in-the-street does not have to be a brilliant diplomatist or military expert to see the obvious risks involved if this matter cannot be settled peacefully. Certainly it can be settled peacefully, but to achieve this the Security Council must play its proper part. It will surely be inconceivable to the peoples of the world if the Security Council of the United Nations does not urgently consider the question now put before it.

34. Many of us here worked in the Security Council through the long hot summer of the Arab-Israel war, whose dangerous consequences still remain an anxious burden on the world. When the situation which led to this war was building up there was some talk of "over-dramatization" of the situation, and a reluctance to get down to what is our clearly defined primary job of tackling issues of international security. The resulting delay had, my delegation believes, most serious consequences. We shall not easily be forgiven by world opinion if we make the same mistake again.

35. My delegation urges most strongly therefore that we now decide without further delay to adopt our agenda, and to proceed at once to consider the question which has very properly been brought to our attention. I hope and believe that we can reduce tension and find a satisfactory solution to this issue in the just and peaceful manner required by the Charter. To do this we need cool heads and good sense on all sides; but we cannot afford to waste any time. This is not a moment for procedural debate.

36. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): As the President has just said that there are no more speakers on his list, I should like to take this opportunity to make some additional remarks in connexion with the statement made by the United States representative and the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Canada which supported his position.

37. The United States representative continued to complain about the situation which endangered peace and had allegedly been brought about by the activities of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He somehow passed over the whole previous history of the question in silence and seemed not to have heard or to be aware of it, although, as I have already amply demonstrated today, it was the result of the aggression of the United States of America against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

38. The occupation for many years of the South of Korea by the United States armed forces, and the latest act of provocation when a United States naval vessel intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, are all that we need in the way of facts—and they

are fully substantiated--to deprive the United States representative of the moral right to present the matter to the Council in the way in which he has done in his letter to the President, dated 25 January. And if some still had any doubts as to the real intentions behind that letter, then the United States representative himself helped them to dispel all their doubts and illusions.

39. For that reason, the Soviet delegation continues to oppose, and will vote against, the inclusion on the agenda of the item proposed by the United States of America.

40. The PRESIDENT: I have no other speakers on my list on the question of the adoption of the agenda. As objections have been raised to the adoption of the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1388 by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Hungary, the Council will now proceed to take a vote on the adoption of the agenda.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

In favour: Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: Algeria, Hungary, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The agenda was adopted by 12 votes to 3.

41. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote.

42. Mr. MISHRA (India): Very briefly, I should like to explain the vote of my delegation, which was in support of the adoption of the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1388. The vote of my delegation should in no way be construed as agreement with or support for the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States [S/8360]. The vote of my delegation, on this clear understanding, is completely in accordance with the established practice of the Council.

43. Mr. BERARD (France) (*translated from French*): I should like to explain briefly the vote that my delegation has just cast. A particularly serious situation has just arisen in the Far East and the attention of the world is focused upon it. We have been asked to study this question in the Security Council. In accordance with the traditional policy of my Government, my delegation has agreed that the matter be studied here, but without committing itself on the substance of the problem and without subscribing to the arguments which may have been put forward by any other delegation—for example, by the United States delegation in the letter which was circulated to us. We feel that a discussion will give each party, each State, an opportunity of expressing its views, and it was in this spirit that we voted in favour of including the item on the agenda.

44. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) (*translated from French*): The Algerian delegation would like to explain very

briefly the negative vote it has just cast on the adoption of the agenda as it was presented to us. My delegation felt that the attitude to this matter revealed in the letter [S/8360] was somewhat lacking in clarity. I believe, moreover, that I am expressing what seems to us to be the feeling of the Council, when I say that we have very little substantiated information about what really happened in the Gulf of Wonsan. Furthermore, only one version of the event has been brought to our notice, and there is nothing about that version which allows us to believe that it is not marred by some degree of partiality, or at least by emotion little conducive to revelation of the truth.

45. In view of this, and since in addition it seemed to us that there was a tendency, conscious or unconscious, to dramatize the situation and thus to imbue with a sense of urgency and haste work that the Council should be carrying out as calmly as possible, we felt it our duty not to add our voice to the voices of those who supported the adoption of the agenda.

46. Our vote was motivated also by the fact that the adoption of the agenda implies, whether we like it or not, a certain orientation of the Council's work, and we felt that, in the absence of sufficient information on which to base a judgement, that orientation would not accord with the feelings of impartiality and fairness which I am sure inspire all delegations.

47. We know that the Council's usage sanctions the adoption of the agenda in the form in which it has been adopted, but our almost complete ignorance of the facts, or the rather questionable account which we have of those facts, was an additional factor prompting my delegation to vote against the adoption of the agenda.

48. Although Algeria is a new member of the Security Council, we believe we are right in thinking that in cases of urgency the Secretary-General communicates the agenda to the members along with the notice for the meeting. Here I refer to rule 8 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. Furthermore, to pursue this line of thought, it would have been useful if the Secretariat had put before us the first items of information which came to its notice; this would have been in conformity with rule 22 of the provisional rules of procedure. We realize, however, that these last two points could not have come into the picture, since the situation has already existed for many years.

49. This makes it obvious that the question, as it stands in the agenda, is bound up with a broader question which, as we all know, has severely shaken this Organization.

50. We are convinced that, whatever the outcome, the path chosen can lead to an aggravation of the situation, which, according to all the official declarations we have recently heard, is already extremely tense. I can assure you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council, that it was not without mental conflict and qualms of conscience that we came to take this decision. But the explanations of votes which we have heard since the vote was taken seem to support our conviction, if that were necessary.

51. The PRESIDENT: Speaking as the representative of PAKISTAN, I wish to state that my affirmative vote on the adoption of the agenda does not in any way prejudice the position of my Government on the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States. Our vote is without prejudice to the position of principle which my delegation has always taken on such questions, and must be construed to have been purely procedural. It does not in any way reflect our judgement on the matters of substance raised in the letter.

Letter dated 25 January 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8360)

52. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now begin its discussion of the question on our agenda. The first speaker inscribed on the list is the representative of the United States, but before I call upon him I should like to say a few words.

53. As we meet in the Council today, I am sure that all the members around this table are mindful of the extraordinary nature of the situation which has prompted the request for this meeting. It is clear that situations of this character, which involve one or more of the permanent members, throw into sharp relief the heavy responsibilities of the United Nations, but as we are conscious of our limitations, we are equally aware of our responsibilities. Perhaps the chief responsibility that rests on us, and which the Council is fully capable of discharging, is to inject the elements of moderation and restraint into situations of this character.

54. As far as the non-permanent members are concerned, they are armed with only their integrity and their judgement; nevertheless, they can help in preventing angry confrontations that might tear the fabric of peace.

55. With all humility, I would appeal to all Powers to heed the voice of an anxious humanity outside these doors in all continents, which implores us to be considerate of difficulties, objective in our judgement, and measured in our speech.

56. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): The United States has requested this meeting, as I stated in my letter of yesterday to you, Mr. President, to consider the grave threat to peace which the authorities of North Korea have brought about by their increasingly dangerous and aggressive military actions in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953,¹ of the United Nations Charter and of international law. We have asked that the Council be convened urgently at an hour when peace is in serious and imminent danger, when firm and forthwith action is required to avert that danger and to preserve peace.

57. A virtually unarmed vessel of the United States Navy, sailing on the high seas, has been wantonly and lawlessly

seized by armed North Korean patrol boats, and her crew forcibly detained. This warlike action carries a danger to peace which should be obvious to all.

58. A party of armed raiders, infiltrated from North Korea, has been intercepted in the act of invading the South Korean capital city of Seoul with the admitted assignment of assassinating the President of the Republic of Korea. This event marks the climax of a campaign by the North Korean authorities, over the past eighteen months, of steadily growing infiltration, sabotage and terrorism in flagrant violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

59. These two lines of action are manifestly parallel: both stem from North Korea. Both are completely unwarranted and unjustified. Both are aimed against peace and security in Korea. Both violate the United Nations Charter, solemn international agreements and time-honoured international law. And both pose a grave threat to peace in a country whose long search for peace and reunification in freedom has been an historic concern of the United Nations and of my country.

60. We bring these grave developments to the attention of the Security Council in the sincere hope that the Council will act promptly to remove the danger to international peace and security. For it must be removed, and without delay. And it will be removed only if action is taken forthwith to secure the release of the *USS Pueblo* and its eighty-three man crew and to bring to an end the pattern of armed transgressions by North Korea against the Republic of Korea.

61. My Government has stated at the highest level its earnest desire to settle this matter promptly and peacefully and, if at all possible, by diplomatic means. It is testimony to this desire that, in fidelity to the Charter, my Government has brought this matter to the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and which, together with other organs of the United Nations, has a special, an historic concern for peace and security in Korea.

62. It is imperative, therefore, that the Security Council act with the greatest urgency and decisiveness. The existing situation cannot be allowed to stand. It must be corrected, and the Council must face up to its responsibility to see it corrected. This course is far more preferable to other remedies which the Charter reserves to Member States.

63. Let me now turn to the facts concerning these two aspects of North Korean aggressive conduct on which the Council's action is urgently required.

64. At 12 noon on 23 January, Korean time, the United States ship *Pueblo*, manned by a crew of six officers, seventy-five enlisted men and two civilians, and sailing in international waters off the North Korean coast, was confronted by a heavily armed North Korean patrol boat identified as submarine chaser No. 35. The strict instructions under which the *Pueblo* was operating required it to stay at least thirteen nautical miles from the North Korean coast. While my country adheres to the three-mile rule of international law concerning territorial waters, nevertheless

¹ For the text of the Armistice Agreement entered into in Korea on 27 July 1953, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953*, document S/3079, appendix A.

the ship was under orders whose effect was to stay well clear of the twelve-mile limit which the North Korean authorities have by long practice followed.

65. The *USS Pueblo* reported this encounter and its location at the time in the following words—and I wish to quote exactly what was reported by radio at the time of the encounter:

“*USS Pueblo* encountered one SO-1 class North Korean patrol craft at 0300Z.”—that is at 12 noon Korean time. And then (I am repeating its broadcast)—“Position 39°25'2" NL, 127°55'0" EL DIW.”

I might explain that DIW means “Dead in Water”, the standard Navy terminology meaning that all engines are stopped and the vessel was stationary.

66. Now, with your permission, Mr. President, I should like to refer to this map² provided for the convenience of the Council and show the exact location of the *Pueblo* as given in these co-ordinates. If the members of the Council will look at the map, they will see a number 3 Blue. Number 3 Blue is approximately twenty-five nautical miles from the port of Wonsan. It is 16.3 nautical miles from the nearest point of the North Korean mainland on the peninsula of Hodo-Pando and 15.3 nautical miles from the island of Ung-do.

67. Now, at exactly the same time, the North Korean submarine chaser No. 35 which intercepted the *Pueblo* reported its own location in the number 3 Red—and this is a report now from the North Korean submarine chaser No. 35 monitored by us—and that location was 39 degrees 25 minutes North latitude and 127 degrees 56 minutes East longitude. Members will note the positions. In other words, these two reported positions are within a mile of one another and show conclusively that according to the North Korean report, as well as our own, the *Pueblo* was in international waters.

68. The report of its location by the North Korean craft, made by International Morse Code, was followed ten minutes later by the following oral message from the North Korean craft to its base:

“We have approached the target here, the name of the target is GER 1-2.”

69. Now we talk about the *Pueblo*, and that is the name by which the ship is, of course, known, but the technical name for this ship is GER-2, and this name was painted on the side of the ship. The message continued, and I again quote the Korean radio message in Korean words:

“Get it? GER 1-2: Did you get it? So our control target is GER 1-2. I will send it again. Our control target is GER 1-2.”

70. Inasmuch as the location of the *Pueblo* is, of course, a matter of vital importance, it is important to the Council to know that the information available to the United States as reported by our vessel to our authorities and to the North Korean authorities as reported by its vessel and transmitted

by its own ship was virtually identical, with only this small margin of difference, and interestingly enough the North Korean ship reported the *Pueblo* to be about a mile farther away from the shoreline than the United States' fix of its position. That distance between the Blue and the Red is about a mile, so you see the North Korean broadcast, monitored, was reporting what I have stated to this Council.

71. We have numerous other reports during this encounter consistent with the location I have described. Information other than co-ordinates corroborative of what I have said is by voice monitor; information on co-ordinates, as I have stated, was by International Morse Code.

72. The North Korean patrol boat, having made its approach, used international flag signals to request the *Pueblo's* nationality. The *Pueblo*, replying with the same signal system, identified itself as a United States vessel. The North Korean vessel then signalled: “Heave to or I will open fire on you.” The *Pueblo* replied: “I am in international waters.” The reply was not challenged by the North Korean vessel, which, under international law, if there had been an intrusion—which there was not—should have escorted the vessel from the area in which it was. However, that vessel then proceeded for approximately an hour to circle the *Pueblo*, which maintained its course and kept its distance from the shore. At that point three additional North Korean armed vessels appeared, one of which ordered the *Pueblo*: “Follow in my wake.” As that order was issued, the four North Korean vessels closed in on the *Pueblo* and surrounded it. At the same time, two MIG aircraft appeared overhead and circled the *Pueblo*. The *Pueblo* attempted peacefully to withdraw from this encirclement but was forcibly prevented from doing so and brought to a dead stop. It was then seized by an armed boarding party and forced into the North Korean port of Wonsan.

73. Now, reports from the North Korean naval vessels on their location and on their seizure of the *Pueblo* at this point show that the *Pueblo* was constantly in international waters. At 1.50 p.m. Korean time, within a few minutes of the reported boarding of the *Pueblo*, North Korean vessels reported their position as 39°26'NL, 128°02'EL, or about 21.3 miles from the nearest North Korean land. This is the point on the map here, and we shall be very glad to make this map available for the records of the Security Council.²

74. I want now to lay to rest, completely to rest, some intimations that the *Pueblo* had intruded into the territorial waters and was sailing away from territorial waters and that the North Korean ships were in hot pursuit. This is not the case at all, and I shall demonstrate it by this map. Now we shall show by times and the course of the vessel exactly what occurred, and you will see from this that the location of the *Pueblo* was constantly far away from the Korean shores, always away from the twelve-mile limit until it was taken into Wonsan by the North Korean vessels.

² The representative of the United States of America referred in his statement to two maps which he submitted to the Council and which are reproduced in the annex to the present verbatim record as map No. 1 and map No. 2.

75. The locations of the *Pueblo* are shown on the blue line, and the location of the *SO-1 035*, the first North Korean vessel, on the red line.

76. The *Pueblo*, far from having sailed from inside territorial waters to outside territorial waters, was cruising in this area here on the map, and this will be demonstrated by the time sequence—and when I say “this area” I mean the area that is east and south of any approach to the twelve-mile limit.

77. At 0830 hours Korean local time, the *Pueblo* was at the location I now point to on the map. It had come to that point from the south-east, not from anywhere in this vicinity. That is point 1 on the map, so that our record will be complete.

78. Point 2 on the map shows the position of the North Korean submarine chaser No. 35, as reported by that vessel at 1055 hours; and you will see that it—the North Korean vessel, not the *Pueblo*—is close to the twelve-mile limit.

79. Point 3 is the position reported by the *Pueblo* at 12 o'clock noon, and you will see that it is at a considerable distance from the twelve-mile limit, which is the dotted line. Red Point 3 is the position reported by the North Korean submarine chaser No. 35 at 12 o'clock noon, when it signalled the *Pueblo* to stop.

80. In other words, this is the position of the North Korean vessel, this is the position of the *Pueblo*; and the position of the North Korean vessel that I point to, the red line, is the position reported audibly by the North Korean vessel. There is very little difference in these two reports.

81. Point 4 is the position reported by the North Korean vessel at 1350 hours, that is at 1.50 p.m., when it reported boarding the *Pueblo*.

82. You will recall that I just told the Council that the *Pueblo*, in seeking to escape the encirclement, did not move in the direction which would have transgressed the twelve-mile limit.

83. All of this is verified not by reports solely from the *Pueblo*; all of this is verified by reports from the North Korean vessels which were monitored, and I think it is a very clear picture of exactly what transpired. Here, too, Mr. President, with your permission, we will make this available.

84. It is incontrovertible from this type of evidence, which is physical evidence, of International Morse Code signals and voice reports, that the *Pueblo*, when first approached and when seized, was in international waters well beyond the twelve-mile limit; and that the North Koreans knew this.

85. Further compounding this offence against international law, and the gravity of this war-like act, is the fact that the North Koreans clearly intended to capture the *Pueblo*, knowing that it was in international waters, and to force it to sail into the Port of Wonsan. That aim is made clear by

messages exchanged among the North Korean vessels themselves which we monitored, including the following:

“By talking this way, it will be enough to understand according to present instructions we will close down the radio, tie up the personnel, tow it and enter port at Wonsan. At present we are on our way to boarding. We are coming in.”

This is an exact voice broadcast from the ship, which acknowledges the instructions that it was following.

86. In the light of this, this was no mere incident, no case of mistaken identity, no case of mistaken location. It was nothing less than a deliberate, premeditated armed attack on a United States naval vessel on the high seas, an attack whose gravity is underlined by these simple facts which I should now like to sum up.

87. The location of the *Pueblo* in international waters was fully known to the North Korean authorities since the broadcasts not only were between its own ships but were directed to its shore installations. The *Pueblo* was so lightly armed that the North Koreans in one of the conversations which we have monitored even reported it as unarmed. The *Pueblo* was, therefore, in no position to engage in a hostile, war-like act towards the territory or vessels of North Korea; and the North Koreans knew this. Nevertheless, the *Pueblo*, clearly on the high seas, was forcibly stopped, boarded and seized by North Korean armed vessels. This is a knowing and wilful aggressive act—part of a deliberate series of actions in contravention of international law and of solemn international arrangements designed to keep peace in the area, which apply not only to land forces but to naval forces as well. It is an action which no Member of the United Nations could tolerate.

88. I might add, in the light of the comments of the Soviet representative on the adoption of the agenda, that Soviet ships engage in exactly the same activities as the *Pueblo*, sail much closer to the shores of other States, and one such Soviet ship is to be found right now in the Sea of Japan, and currently is not far from South Korean shores.

89. I turn now to the other grave category of aggressive actions taken by the North Korean authorities. Their systematic campaign of infiltration, sabotage and terrorism across the armistice demarcation line, in gross violation of the Armistice Agreement—not only in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone but also in many cases deep in the territory of the Republic of Korea—culminating in the recent raid against the capital city of Seoul, the Presidential Palace and the person of the President of the Republic. The gravity of this campaign has already been made known to the Security Council.

90. On 2 November 1967, I conveyed to the Security Council a report from the United Nations Command in Korea [S/8217], summing up the evidence of a drastic increase in violations by North Korea of the Korean Armistice Agreement and subsequent agreements pertaining thereto. That report to the Council noted that the number of incidents involving armed infiltrators from North Korea had increased from 50 in 1966 to 543 in the first ten

months of 1967; and that the number of soldiers and civilians killed by those infiltrators had increased from 35 in 1966 to 144 in the same period of 1967.

91. The further report of the United Nations Command for the whole year 1967, filed today [S/8366], shows a total of 566 incidents for 1967 and a total of 153 individuals killed by North Korean infiltrators. The United Nations Command in its report has further pointed out that, although North Korea had refused all requests by the United Nations Command for investigation of these incidents by Joint Observer Teams pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, the evidence that the attacks had been mounted from North Korea is incontestable. This evidence is subject to verification by these reports which are on file with the Security Council.

92. The terrorist campaign has now reached a new level of outrage. Last Sunday, 21 January, security forces of the Republic of Korea made contact with a group of some thirty armed North Koreans near the Presidential Palace in Seoul. In a series of engagements, both in Seoul and between Seoul and the demilitarized zone, lasting through 24 January, about half of that group were killed and two were captured. It has now been ascertained that the infiltration team totalled thirty-one agents, all with the rank of lieutenant or higher, dispatched from the 124th North Korean army unit; that these agents had received two years' training, including two weeks of specialized training for the present mission in special camps established in North Korea for this purpose; and that their assigned mission included the assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea.

93. I might add that the North Korean authorities make no secret of the political strategy and motivation behind those attacks. Their daily propaganda vilifies the Government of the Republic of Korea, and denies its very right to exist. Yet, that same Government of the Republic of Korea is recognized by seventy-seven Governments, is a Member of numerous specialized agencies of the United Nations, and enjoys observer status at the United Nations Headquarters.

94. It is obvious that this long series of attacks by North Korean infiltrators across the demilitarized zone—and by other groups of North Korean armed personnel which, travelled by sea, have penetrated into even the southern portions of South Korea—has steadily increased in its tempo and its scope until it threatens to undermine the whole structure of the armistice régime under which peace has been preserved in a divided Korea for fourteen years.

95. In the interest of international peace and security, this deterioration cannot be allowed to continue. It must be reversed promptly. The Armistice Agreements must be restored to their full vigour, and the weight and influence of the Security Council must be exerted to this vitally important end.

96. These are the facts of the threat to peace created by North Korea's aggressive actions on sea and land. With all earnestness I ask the Security Council to act firmly and swiftly to rectify this dangerous situation and eliminate this

threat to peace. Despite the most serious provocation—a provocation which every nation would recognize as serious and dangerous—my Government is exercising great restraint in this matter. We seek to give the processes of peaceful action all possible scope. We believe that those processes can work swiftly and effectively, if the international community—including the members of this Council, individually and collectively—so wills it.

97. But these peaceful processes must work. The present situation is not acceptable and it cannot be left to drift. This great and potent Organization of peace must not let the cause of peace in Korea be lost by default to the high-handed tactics of a lawless régime. Such a course would be an invitation to catastrophe. Therefore, let the Security Council, with its great influence, promptly and effectively help to secure forthwith the safe return of the *Pueblo* and its crew; and to restore to full vigour and effectiveness the Korean Armistice Agreement.

98. Fellow members of the Security Council, we have a clear and urgent responsibility under the Charter to help keep the peace. I trust the Council will discharge this responsibility.

99. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): In spite of the well-founded objections of a number of Council members, the United States has imposed on the Security Council consideration of its complaint against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

100. The Soviet delegation has already had the opportunity, at the beginning of this meeting, to show how completely unfounded are the accusations levelled by the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We have also emphasized in this connexion that the aggressor in Korea is not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea but those who invaded the territory of the Korean people, who for many years have occupied the south of Korea and are striving to impose by force upon the Korean people a régime which it does not want. We have noted that the request of the United States for a Security Council meeting is nothing more than a manoeuvre, an attempt to distort facts and conceal the illegal hostilities and the aggression which the United States has been engaging in against the Korean people for many years.

101. Having listened attentively to the statement made by the United States representative, we can say that it clearly confirms the evaluation of the situation made by the Soviet delegation during the debate on the adoption of the agenda.

102. We wish to emphasize most strongly, and in the most categorical terms, that we cannot ignore the specific conditions in which the United States undertook this obviously propagandistic manoeuvre in convening the Security Council. What are these conditions?

103. My distinguished colleagues are well aware that in the last few days war hysteria has been building up in the United States. Threats are streaming from Washington against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, mobilization measures are being taken in the United States, and

the United States Navy and Air Force continue to threaten the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Can this be viewed as proof of the United States' sincere desire to reach a settlement of the Korean problem which is in keeping with the desires and interests of the Korean people, and in the interest of international peace and security in that part of the world, as the United States representative tried to affirm in his statement today?

104. No, all this shows more clearly that the United States is trying to use the Security Council for purposes totally different from those which it should discharge as the highest organ in the Organization which, under the Charter, has the most responsible task of safeguarding international peace and security.

105. We have already said that no manoeuvres, no lectures with aids such as those used by Ambassador Goldberg, who for a while fenced in his own deputy and the deputy of the British representative by means of a map—to which, incidentally, we shall revert—no trickery and no such attempts of any kind will deceive world public opinion and all the peace-loving peoples of the world about the real aims and intentions of the United States in Asia, including the Korean Peninsula.

106. Nothing will help the United States to divest itself of its responsibility for the tense situation which is a serious danger to peace and which has existed for a long time on the Korean Peninsula as a result of the activities of the United States of America. The present aggravation of the situation in Korea is a direct result of the aggressive acts committed by United States and South Korean armed forces on land and sea against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The peoples and the Government of the Soviet Union condemn now, as in the past, such acts of aggression.

107. The persisting cause of tension in Korea is the continued presence on the Territory of South Korea of the aggressive forces of the United States. No person who is at all objective and impartial, regardless of his opinions and views, could deny this fact. These forces, and the military activities of the occupiers in Korea are bringing the danger of a new war in the Far East closer literally every day and every hour. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea quite rightly stated in its Memorandum to the General Assembly in October 1967, that since 1966 "there has been created the sharpest tension ever seen after the armistice along the military demarcation line in Korea, and a dangerous situation has remained unabated for more than a year now which may ignite war at any moment."³ Such was the conclusion of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, based on the analysis of many facts, of which we shall mention only a few.

108. It is well known that incidents and conflicts have been occurring systematically along the demarcation line in Korea on the 38th parallel. From the conclusion of the Armistice in July 1953 until September 1967, the United States and South Korean troops committed over 52,000

violations of the demarcation line—I repeat, over 52,000 violations. During that time there were 568 cases of artillery shelling of the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, more than thirty armed attacks, and over 800 cases of intrusion by military vessels into the coastal waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

109. More than 800 cases of intrusion by military vessels! We shall return later to the version of the incident which took up about three-quarters of the statement made by the United States representative today, but for now we wish to repeat once more that there have been over 800 cases of intrusion by military vessels into the coastal waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

110. There have been over 700 violations of the air space of that country by the military aircraft of the occupiers of South Korea. In 1967 alone, five times as many shots were fired by American troops at objectives on the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as in the whole of the previous thirteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement. These facts prove that acts of military provocation by the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, far from abating, have been increasing month by month in number and importance. In this connexion, the Memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea states: "Owing to such reckless provocations on the part of the United States imperialist aggressors, the demilitarized zone established under the Armistice Agreement has now virtually become a field of uninterrupted battles."³

111. The extension of the war activities of the United States militarists against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, is being combined with extensive measures to strengthen the South Korean army. This army is being equipped with modern weapons. South Korea is being supplied with guided missiles of the Hawk, Nike-Hercules and Nike-Ajax type, supersonic military planes, including fighter-bombers, heavy and medium-sized tanks, long-distance artillery weapons, large naval vessels and other weapons and military equipment.

112. More and more new military airfields are being built in South Korea, and South Korean ports are being equipped as military naval bases. One example comes easily to mind: the South Korean port of Chinhae has been transformed into a naval base capable of accommodating nuclear submarines and other naval vessels of the United States Seventh Fleet.

113. What the American masters do not tell their South Korean puppets is brazenly blurted out by these servants of American imperialism and traitors to the Korean people. They reveal the purposes of these military preparations in their statements. The inflammatory statements of responsible people, the so-called ministers of the puppet régime in Seoul have told us that "the Armistice Agreement has been rendered completely null and void", and again that South Korea "will not hesitate to start a war if necessary".

114. Is it not obvious that it is the presence of American troops in South Korea that is encouraging this spirit of

³ See document A/C.1/951 (mimeographed).

recklessness among the South Korean warmongers? They behave in an increasingly defiant manner, rejecting the peace-loving proposals made by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A certain element in South Korea makes no secret of their hopes of attempting a new armed invasion of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

115. That is where the real danger lies, another danger than the one about which the United States representative was discoursing and for which he could produce no evidence at all. That is where the real aggressive plans are prepared under the guidance of the foreign protectors. And let not the United States representatives try to prove that South Korea is being threatened from the North. There is no such threat. There are no foreign troops or foreign military bases on the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and no military preparations are being made there for an attack against South Korea.

116. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has proposed, in the interests of establishing peace and in order to ease tension, that an agreement should be concluded on the reduction of armed forces in North and South Korea and on the renunciation of the use of force against one another. Would not any objective and impartial observer regard this as the best proof of peaceful intentions? And if anyone in South Korea really wishes to help to ease relations between the two Korean States, all that need be done is to adopt the proposals made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

117. The Soviet delegation considers it its bounden duty to emphasize that unless an end is put to the dangerous military activities of the occupiers of South Korea, and unless American and all other foreign troops are immediately withdrawn from that Territory, events might indeed lead to the unleashing of a new war in Korea and to a further worsening of the situation in the Far East. This is all the more evident because, as the facts I have presented show, the South Korean régime is becoming ever more deeply involved in United States aggression against the Viet-Nameese people and in the new military adventures of the United States in Asia.

118. It should be remembered that as early as 1953, when a military treaty was signed between the United States and Korea,⁴ it was obvious that South Korea was considered as a permanent bridgehead for a policy of aggression in Asia. It is well known that in 1966, at the insistence of the United States, a treaty was also concluded between Japan and South Korea. There is also a military treaty of so-called mutual security between the United States and Japan.⁵ Thus, a kind of "triangle" is being built up which its creators intend to be the basis for a long-planned aggressive military alliance of North-East Asian countries, a so-called NEATO.

⁴ Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington on 1 October 1953.

⁵ Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Washington on 19 January 1960.

119. These new steps to set up an aggressive military block headed by Washington, in the Far East, are bound to cause concern to all those who are genuinely interested in strengthening peace in the Far East. The creation of this military group has posed an even greater threat to the security of States in this region, including the security of the Korean people who, it goes without saying, would not be among those least exposed. All this goes to show how absolutely necessary and vital it is that American and all other foreign armed forces should be immediately withdrawn from South Korea.

120. That is why we shall continue to insist that the occupation of South Korea by foreign troops is not only a cause of tension, but also a major obstacle to the unification of the country.

121. The presence of United States troops in South Korea leads to constant interference in the internal affairs of the South Korean people. It is a blatant violation of the fundamental provisions of the United Nations Charter and of the United Nations Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session. We only have to recall that since the South Korean régime was set up, Washington has concluded with it about seventy one-sided treaties and agreements, by which it has bound its South Korean protégés hand and foot, curtailing even their illusory so-called independence, which the United States tries so much to publicize. Shielded by the United States forces of occupation in South Korea, a military and despotic police régime has been set up to serve the interests of its overseas masters and blindly do their bidding. The anti-popular military fascist régime in South Korea is hated by the people and is propped up only by American bayonets. The American occupiers use the Seoul puppet régime to suppress the justified desire of the South Korean people for freedom, independence and the unification of their homeland in a united and independent State.

122. United States aggression in Korea is but one link in the chain of Washington's policies. Wherever one looks—South-East Asia, the Far East, Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific, the Caribbean—in every one of these areas hundreds of thousands of American soldiers have occupied or are occupying lands belonging to other peoples. There is a world-wide network of American military bases which are bridgeheads for aggression and bastions in the struggle against national liberation movements.

123. That is why the proposals constantly put forward by peace-loving States, including those put forward by many delegations at the recently concluded twenty-second session of the General Assembly, for the withdrawal from South Korea of all foreign forces have always been obstinately opposed by the United States and, let us add, by all those who continue to support the United States in this matter.

124. At the recent twenty-second session of the General Assembly, on the initiative of a number of socialist and other countries, a debate was held on the question of the withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United

Nations. That is where the United States representative should have spoken, and made not merely verbal peace-loving protestations, but practical peaceful proposals, supporting them with deeds which could put a real end to the extremely tense situation which persists in that part of the world.

125. But what has the United States done? All members took part in the debates on the matter in the First Committee of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly. What did the United States do there? It prevented the General Assembly from adopting a very important decision which would have at once created a completely normal situation in Korea and established conditions favourable to the peaceful unification of the country on a truly democratic basis.

126. The United States and its South Korean puppets have rejected in the past and are rejecting the many constructive proposals put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, proposals prompted by a desire to maintain peace and aimed at achieving a really peaceful solution of the Korean problem. Let us recall that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has proposed that Korea should be reunified peacefully through the creation of a single all-Korean Government which would represent all levels of the population through free and democratic general elections held by the Korean people themselves in the northern and southern parts of the country, without any interference from outside and, it goes without saying, after the withdrawal of the imperialist forces from South Korea. In an attempt to find a really peaceful solution to the problem, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has also put forward a proposal for establishing a confederation of North and South Korea as a temporary measure pending the complete unification of the country, in the event that the South Korean authorities should be unable to agree to free and general elections in the north and south of the country immediately after the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea.

127. In addition to proposals for the solution of a number of political questions, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has also proposed that economic and cultural exchanges, reciprocal visits and postal links should be organized between the two parts of Korea. Surely these are sensible proposals? Surely this a sensible approach and the right way to achieve a sounder climate in Korea and strengthen peace and security in that part of the world? The sooner these proposals are adopted, the sooner the situation in Korea will return to normal.

128. We repeat that United States and all other foreign troops must be withdrawn immediately from the territory of South Korea and the Korean people must at last be given the right to settle their own fate themselves after many years of suffering. That is their inalienable right, laid down in the Charter of the Organization, and confirmed in many decisions taken in this building by various organs of the United Nations, from the Security Council to the General Assembly.

129. This is an objective analysis based on facts and borne out by specific actions, which show the reason for the continuing state of tension in the Korean peninsula.

130. To conclude my review of the circumstances and facts I wished to mention in the statement I have made as a result of the consideration of this matter which has been imposed on the Council, I want to say a few words about the events connected with the detention of the American military vessel, the *Pueblo*.

131. I did not really wish to strain my eyesight when the United States representative, for want of arguments to make his statement sound convincing, twice resorted to the visual aids I have already mentioned. Frankly speaking, I was not particularly interested and am not interested in the whole course followed by the *Pueblo* and the various points where it happened to be at one time or another. I did not make too much of an effort because I knew that when the United States representative showed us the various points on the map presented by his delegation, he would not show us those co-ordinates where the United States naval vessel *Pueblo* was when it intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

132. That is exactly what happened. The point 39° 17' 4" latitude North, 127° 46' 9" longitude West, was not indicated by the lecturer's pointer which the United States representative wielded for so long and, as he apparently thought, so convincingly—but in my opinion not convincingly at all—during a lengthy exposition of the matter giving the one-sided American version of the events linked with the fate of the naval vessel *Pueblo*.

133. The United States representative referred here many times to various interceptions of radio messages, monitorings and the like, for which United States technology is famous. But there is one thing he did not tell us about. Unfortunately, despite the perfection of its technology, the United States did not manage to intercept the authentic description of what actually happened to the *Pueblo* when it was detained, and the reasons why it was detained, the description given by the captain of that vessel.

134. I do not know whether I can compete with the United States representative's knowledge of naval affairs, but speaking as a complete layman in such matters I must say that as far as I am concerned, the captain is the one best able to tell us at which point his vessel was when it was detained by a patrol boat of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is what the captain of the *Pueblo*, a man named Bucher, had to say about it; his statement leaves no doubt about the co-ordinates and the position of his vessel when it intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, nor does it leave any doubt as to the aims, or rather hostile aims, of this vessel in intruding into the territorial waters of the Republic in violation of that country's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

135. Bucher admitted that the vessel of which he was in command was engaged in espionage activities in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the instructions of the Central Intelligence

Agency of the United States. He testified that: "The *Pueblo* was studying the network of radar installations, the characteristics of various ports, the incoming and outgoing vessels, and the manoeuvrability of vessels of the Korean People's Army. In addition"—stated Bucher—"we spied on various military installations and the locations of armed forces along the eastern coast and reached a point located 7.6 miles from Nodo". This point is the one which the United States representative did not indicate with his pointer on his splendid maps and for which I have already given the co-ordinates (this, of course, is something I am adding, not something mentioned by Bucher, who did not talk about the representative of the United States and who could not know what he would be saying today). After giving those co-ordinates Bucher goes on to say that "it was at this time that a patrol vessel of the Korean People's Army appeared".

136. So we see how simple and, at the same time, outrageous the real facts are, as compared with the made-up version submitted here as an account of events. This is what actually happened along the coast of North Korea on 23 January. This is why, for sound reasons based on factual evidence, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in a statement made on the very day the events we are now examining took place, noted the following: "Today the vessels of our People's Army seized an armed espionage vessel of the United States imperialist aggressors which had intruded in the territorial waters of the Republic where it was engaged in hostile activities".

137. Is it necessary to add anything more in order to put an end to that version of the incident which the United States representative is trying to foist on us and which, I must say, he presents rather nicely—the second map was particularly pretty to look at, all in colours—but which had nothing whatsoever to do with the true facts of the case, as they say in the courts.

138. Today, as I listened to the United States representative presenting his version of the incident concerning the United States naval vessel, I remembered, as an old hand in this Organization, much that had been said at the Council table by the predecessors of the present United States representative that was, to put it mildly, untrue. They made such statements when they thought it appropriate and when it suited their political purposes.

139. Was that not the case with the United States spy plane that intruded into the air space of the Soviet Union? Was not the version at first presented as an explanation of these circumstances completely at variance with the truth? Such embarrassments have frequently befallen the representatives of the United States, and we can only regret that such a serious gathering as this Security Council meeting has to consider and listen to such inconsistent explanations and unfounded assertions which are contrary to the facts.

140. To conclude with this matter, we shall say that this constitutes yet another dangerous act of provocation on the part of the United States militarists against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The dispatch of a vessel of the United States Navy into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for the purpose of

conducting espionage and intelligence activities there, can only be described as a violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the elementary principles of international law, which, I might add, my colleague from the United States is always so eager to defend. From all that has been said, it is quite obvious that the detention of a foreign naval vessel in the territorial waters of any State comes within the internal jurisdiction of that State, and it is not for the Security Council to consider such matters.

141. For these reasons the Soviet delegation has opposed and still opposes the consideration of the slanderous accusation made by the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

142. In conclusion, since this discussion has been imposed on us, let us repeat that only the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from South Korea and the cessation of foreign interference in the affairs of the Korean people could pave the way for a speedy peaceful settlement of the Korean problem in the interests of the Korean people as a whole and of peace and security in the Far East and the whole world.

143. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United States in the exercise of his right of reply.

144. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): In view of the hour, I shall be very brief. Ambassador Morozov, the representative of the Soviet Union, has made a long, and as far as I can see, a largely irrelevant speech, more suitable to the First Committee than to this Council which is dealing with a specific complaint. When he finally and at long last came to the subject, he mentioned only two points, as far as I can gather. The first was the so-called confession by Commander Bucher. Now, I am very ready to recognize Soviet experience in coerced and fabricated confessions. But I had really hoped that in light of Soviet history the Soviets had learned to place little credence in them.

145. Ambassador Morozov complained that I did not mention a co-ordinate for the location of the ship released by the North Korean authorities after the ship was seized in the port at Wonsan—considerably after. I did not mention that co-ordinate for the very good reason that that co-ordinate was never mentioned in any report of location by the *Pueblo* or by the four North Korean ships on the spot engaged in the enterprise. They reported the location—and I have given this Council the exact words.

146. My colleague, Ambassador Morozov, is a distinguished lawyer, and he is well familiar with the old rule of law that it is the contemporary account at the time which is entitled to weight, not a subsequent one which may be invented to suit the needs of the party involved.

147. Finally, a country like the Soviet Union whose representative denied to this Council that Russian missiles had been introduced into Cuba, is hardly in a position to raise a question about the veracity of anyone at this table.

148. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Soviet Union in the exercise of his right of reply.

149. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I expected all kinds of criticism of my statement from the United States representative, but I did not expect him to rebuke me on the grounds that apparently, in his opinion, the Soviet delegation was speaking on irrelevant matters not connected with the agenda item.

150. I have to infer that this is all that the United States representative can say in reply to the concrete facts, figures, dates, events and statements and, above all, on the very fact of the long-standing presence of American occupation forces in the Korean peninsula. That is all that he could say in reply. Since he has imposed on us a discussion which we did not want and which we opposed, we must yet again emphasize that the United States, which has for years trampled Korean soil under the boots of its soldiers, has no moral right whatsoever to argue the matter here and to accuse the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of aggression.

151. It seems he did not like the fact that I had so little to say about this vessel. Here I really do not agree with the United States representative, and, I must say, he did not agree with his own letter [S/8360]. For if you look at the letter as a whole, and see how much space is devoted to general matters concerning unfounded accusations of aggression made against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in comparison with the space devoted to the *Pueblo* incident, then on balance the relative importance given to these matters in the document before you is the exact opposite of that given by the United States representative, who devoted about three-quarters of his statement to the question of the vessel. Of course, that is his own affair, and I would not have brought this up had he not reproached me for the way I presented my own statement.

152. Are we to understand, that all the rest, including the wild inventions—I really cannot call them anything else—contained in the third sentence of this letter, were put forward only to make this whole American conception and

the whole presentation of the matter somewhat more convincing. Are we to understand that even from the American point of view all this is intended as a camouflage to justify the intrusion of the American naval vessel *Pueblo* into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?

153. Having asked that question, I should like, for myself at any rate at least, to answer in the affirmative. Little importance can be attached to the information given about the vessel if a whole series of other fabrications, unconfirmed by any kind of evidence, had to be tacked on to this incident, which is one of the many dangerous armed acts of provocation carried out by the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Of course, there are various rhetorical devices that can be used to evade any analysis or examination of the factual data submitted in our statement, but that would hardly convince anyone here or world public opinion in general.

154. I think I can conclude as I began, by saying that a genuine relaxation of tension in the Korean Peninsula is necessary and possible. The basic prerequisite for achieving that objective which, from what he says, seems also to be the objective of the United States representative, is the immediate withdrawal of United States and other foreign troops from the territory of South Korea.

155. The PRESIDENT: There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. If no other representative wishes to take the floor at this stage, I shall declare the meeting adjourned.

156. After informal consultations with my colleagues, I wish to inform the Council that a majority of its members are in favour of holding a meeting tomorrow morning at 10.30 a.m. in order to continue the Council's deliberations on this question. As there are no further observations, I shall therefore convene the Council at that time.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.

ANNEX

Maps submitted to the Security Council by the representative of the United States of America in the course of his statement at the present meeting

(See maps at end of fascicle.)

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