



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SECOND YEAR

**1360**<sup>th</sup> MEETING: 14 JUNE 1967

NEW YORK

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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1360) .....	1
Adoption of the agenda .....	1
Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902) .....	
Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907) .....	
Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910) .....	1
Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israel forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" (S/7967) .....	

## NOTE

*Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.*

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 14 June 1967, at 11 a.m.

*President:* Mr. Hans R. TABOR (Denmark).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1360)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902).
3. Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907).
4. Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910).
5. Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israel forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" (S/7967).

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

**Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902)**

**Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907)**

**Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)**

**Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israel forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" (S/7967).**

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Council, I shall now, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Israel, the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan to take places at the Council table, and the representatives of Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia and Libya to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, in order to participate without vote in the discussion.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. Kidron (Israel), Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic), Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) and Mr. M. H. El-Farra (Jordan) took places at the Council table, and Mr. S. Chammas (Lebanon), Mr. K. Khalaf (Iraq), Mr. M. Tabiti (Morocco), Mr. J. M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mr. S. Al-Shaheen (Kuwait), Mr. M. Mestiri (Tunisia) and Mr. W. El Bouri (Libya) took the places reserved for them.*

2. The PRESIDENT: Before the Council resumes its discussion of the four items inscribed on its agenda, I should like to point out that the following five draft resolutions have been submitted for our consideration: a Canadian draft dated 7 June [S/7941]; a USSR draft dated 13 June [S/7951/Rev.2]; a United States draft dated 9 June [S/7952/Rev.2]; a three-Power draft dated 13 June [S/7968/Rev.1]; and another United States draft dated 10 June [S/7971].

3. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I trust that my fellow members of the Council will not think it amiss if I start by speaking with concern about the role of the Council and the role that the Council should play in this world crisis. I do so in the strong and deeply-felt conviction that only by international understanding and international co-operation can we hope to overcome the growing dangers of the world, and my justification for doing so lies in my respect for the United Nations and my faith, in spite of

setbacks and disappointments and failures, in the purposes of the Charter.

4. The United Nations is the forum for the expression of world opinion. Every Member nation has a voice, every Member has a right to be heard. So it should be. But in this Council we are not here only to express our national policies and to defend our national interests. In the exercise of the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security we, the members of the Council, are charged with a much heavier obligation.

5. I believe that in dealing with the crises and the conflicts of the world, people everywhere look to us in this Council, so I am sure, not to increase the crises, still less to intensify animosities. We are not here to take sides, to score off one another, to poison relations, or to intensify distrust.

6. We have all accepted very different obligations. We have tasks much more difficult. We are here to practise tolerance, to make an effort to understand, to find common ground, to harmonize the actions of nations, to develop friendly relations, to seek just and honourable solutions, to establish and keep a peace firmly based on international authority.

7. Such purposes may seem remote and very difficult to attain against the background of recent exchanges in the Council, but they are nevertheless obligations which we have undertaken and from which we cannot escape. It would indeed be a disaster if we gave an anxious and confused world the impression that we are interested not in peace and justice, but merely in intensifying dispute and increasing confusion and reproducing hate.

8. We are all acutely aware that we face a crisis of the utmost gravity, potentially as dangerous as any the world has ever faced. We know that the difficulties and the dangers are immense. We know that intense national and religious feelings are now fiercer than ever. We know that millions are involved and that many thousands of innocent people are suffering. We know what a Herculean task we face in our effort to restore order and justice.

9. I am alarmed, to put it at its lowest, to imagine what the world will think if we give the appearance of inflaming enmities rather than showing an overriding concern to search for agreement. As we embark on an endeavour to carry out such a heavy responsibility I am bold enough to appeal again, with full respect and sincerity, that we should make a further supreme effort to work together, and work in mutual esteem, and work with an overriding sense of our unique obligation.

10. In the hope that we can set out on the second phase of our work in a better spirit, I shall not go back over the past three weeks. All I would say about our past debate is to remind the Council that from the first I advocated the necessity for the Council to meet and act, and that every time we have met in the Council the voice and the vote of my delegation have been on the side of urgent action. We were amongst the first to wish to endorse the Secretary-General's appeal as soon as he came back from Cairo. We still believe that if the Council had done so and had taken

hold of the situation last month, the war could have been averted altogether.

11. By contrast to earlier delays and hesitation, the Council has been in almost continuous session since the war started. Again for nearly two days there was delay and hesitation. We cannot now calculate the consequences. But from the time of the first cease-fire resolution [233 (1967)], adopted at 7.15 p.m. on Tuesday, 6 June, we have acted together promptly and effectively.

12. The representative of Mali said recently that we were achieving nothing and getting nowhere. On the contrary, I believe that the series of actions we took following the first cease-fire resolution last Tuesday has been necessary and right and timely. What is more: it was successful. And we made it clear that we should unhesitatingly condemn any breach of the cease-fire.

13. It is worth reflecting, in view of the doubts and misgivings which exist in the world about the effectiveness of our Organization, that no other authority in the world could have successfully called for a cease-fire and then successfully insisted on its observance. The United Nations once again showed itself capable of fulfilling its main task of stopping a war. Would that it could have prevented that war. Now we must show that, the war having stopped, the United Nations can contribute to a just peace. If we are to do so in the circumstances which now face us, we shall need understanding and wisdom and courage greater than we have shown before.

14. If we set out on this formidable journey bickering and disputing amongst ourselves, we can have little or no hope of success. We in the Council have acted unanimously and effectively and successfully for a week. That gives us some confidence. We can also take encouragement from the way the representatives of the United Nations in the Near East have so admirably and successfully represented us. Every member of the Council takes pride, I am sure, in the decisive part played by General Bull in bringing about a full cease-fire, and we all pay tribute to his endeavours and those of all who have worked so well with him. It is worth reminding those who enjoy emphasizing the failures and shortcomings of our Organization that only a United Nations team could have acted as it did and stopped the war in Syria. I am sure that we are united in seeing the need to support and strengthen and expand the United Nations team which has served us so well. And we are also, I am sure, united in our demand that General Bull and his staff should be enabled at once to return to Government House in Jerusalem.

15. It was the resolutions adopted by this Council, backed by the speed and skill and bravery of the United Nations staff on the spot, which now enable us to turn to the problems of disengagement, withdrawal and the building of a just and lasting peace.

16. We must at the same time take immediate action to do everything we can to alleviate the suffering caused to civilian populations and to prevent a refugee problem even more disastrous than that which we knew before. The representatives of Jordan, Syria, Tunisia and Morocco all

ke to us movingly on that question yesterday. This is an international responsibility, and I say now that my Government pledges that it will participate in any international initiative to deal with the problem. We hope that other nations will match our action. We recommend, moreover, when the draft resolution put forward by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia has been adopted, the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Governments concerned and the United Nations agencies already established, should as a matter of special urgency secure for us a thorough report on the situation and the need. This is another field in which the effectiveness of international action is already proved and in which we can and must act at once.

I well recognize that this problem of relief and rehabilitation on a vast scale is no substitute for other urgent action. But I am sure that it is an essential preliminary to a just settlement, and a vital element in it.

It was with these factors in mind that my Government warmly welcomed the initiative of Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia in putting forward a draft resolution [7968/Rev.1] based on the urgent need to spare the civilian populations and prisoners of war from needless suffering. Indeed, we think that this Council should call for assurances to the civilian and refugee populations that they will be allowed to remain peaceably in their homes. It is unnecessary for me to draw attention to the fact that under international law the rights of a military occupier to interfere with the civilian life of occupied territory have strict legal limits. Perhaps the best action to be taken at the moment would be to supplement the assurances given us yesterday by the representative of Israel by a call on the Israeli Government to permit the immediate entry of a team of observers to satisfy the world that there is no truth in the allegations that pressure is being brought to bear on the Arab civilian population to leave their homes.

Here in this Council on 10 June [1355th meeting] I speak for myself on the question of the sufferings of innocent people, including the refugees. I now speak for my Government too. We have many other tasks to face, but this one is more important and none is more urgent than this.

Speaking in the House of Commons yesterday, George Thompson, the Minister of State, said:

“Meanwhile we have information that large numbers of refugees have already crossed to the east bank of the River Jordan. It seems plain that a relief problem of major proportions is building up. The voluntary organizations in this country are considering what they can do. Her Majesty’s Government have agreed to make financial provision for emergency relief in Jordan and we are presently considering what we can provide from British Government stocks in Cyprus as a first step.”<sup>1</sup>

I sincerely trust that the Council will give its immediate attention to the crying need of the innocent sufferers in all areas of conflict.

<sup>1</sup> See *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Special Reports, Fifth Series, Vol. 748, Session 1966-1967* (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1967), col. 318.

21. I now turn to the question of disengagement and withdrawal. No one believes that those purposes can be achieved merely by passing a resolution here. We know that disengagement and withdrawal cannot in fact and in practice be secured without discussion and action, not in New York but on the spot. We know, moreover, from previous experience—in Kashmir, for instance—how necessary discussion with the military and civil authorities concerned must be.

22. I suggest to the Council that it is essential that we should give our minds to the practical problem instead of engaging in an exercise in propaganda.

23. How then can we best work for disengagement and withdrawal? General Bull and the United Nations staff working with him have already made an important start, and can no doubt play a very useful role in the future too. I fully agree with the representative of India when he urged the strengthening of United Nations machinery in the area.

24. I agree with him too that the Council should at once consider whether the Secretary-General should depute a personal representative, not only to help in reducing tensions but also in restoring peaceful conditions. The representative of India further proposed that this special representative of the Secretary-General should also ensure the safety and security of the civil population. I am not sure that this task might not be entrusted to some other representative or team or organization but, as I have said already, I fully agree with him that certainly there must be no delay.

25. I believe that we should go further and be considering also the appointment of a mediator who can at once undertake discussions with the Governments concerned so that an immediate start can be made in setting the foundations for a just and lasting peace.

26. It is on these practical suggestions that we should concentrate. Moreover, it is my conviction that every member of the Council knows very well that it is only by such practical action that real progress can be made.

27. I was greatly impressed with the practical and constructive speech made by the Canadian representative last night. He set a clear course for us to follow.

28. Last week we worked together to bring about a cease-fire and to make that cease-fire effective. By working together we achieved our purpose. It will be a tragedy not only for the United Nations but also for the peoples concerned if an endeavour to create division and dispute now leads us to frustration.

29. It was only a day or two ago that we finished our first task of achieving and maintaining a cease-fire. Now that that has been done, we move to greater tasks of the utmost complexity and immense difficulty.

30. There are two roads we can follow. Either we can add to the anguish and perpetuate the bitterness and divide in hopeless dispute and deadlock. Or we can make a further great effort together to give our minds to practical means of overcoming the formidable barriers before us.

31. The first course, the course of deadlock, may appeal to some—and I know enough from personal experience how deep distrust and despair have sunk—while to advocate and follow the other course of international succour and international co-operation in steady and persistent practical effort to restore order and justice will be unpopular with some, and may very likely be unfairly misjudged.

32. But I repeat that I believe that every speech we make and every resolution we consider should be judged by the negative tests of whether they inflame passions or not and whether they increase animosities or not. They should also be judged by the positive tests of whether they are directed towards peace or not, and whether they are likely to contribute to a just settlement or not.

33. Those are the tests we have sought to apply from the beginning. It will need some courage and some faith to apply them from now on. Whatever we do today, I trust that we shall together continue to keep alive the hope of establishing order and justice throughout the Near East. I trust too that we shall never abandon the determination to make the United Nations an effective instrument for that purpose.

34. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have just received a letter [S/7984] from the representative of Pakistan in which he asks to be invited to participate without vote in the discussion. Accordingly, if there is no objection, I shall invite him to take a place at the Council table in order to participate in the discussion of the questions before us. There being no objection, I take it that it is so decided.

35. The representative of Jordan has indicated that he will yield his seat at the Council table in order to permit the representative of Pakistan to make a statement. I should like to express my appreciation to the representative of Jordan for his courteous gesture. I now invite the representative of Pakistan to take a place at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Shahi (Pakistan) took a place at the Council table.*

36. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Pakistan to make a statement.

37. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and to the Council for according me permission to participate in this discussion without vote. I asked for this permission, under my Government's instructions, because Pakistan is directly affected by the immeasurable tragedy that has been enacted in the Arab homeland. I also wish to thank the representative of Jordan for the courtesy that he has extended to me in permitting me to speak from his seat at the Council table.

38. Our involvement in the Palestine problem has diverse roots. We are concerned with the life and liberty, the dignity and honour of the Arab nation. We are one with the Arab people in their weal and woe. We share with the Arabs the imperishable heritage of Islam which comprehends the vital elements of the Judeo-Christian tradition and emancipates us from all bigotry, whether of religion or of race. We are stirred to the depths of our being when the greatest

shrines of Islam and Christianity are shown disrespect and the Holy Land, the land of Moses and Jesus and Islam, is, as Pakistan's Foreign Minister said in 1947, "nailed and stretched upon the cross". Second, the Palestine problem, in all its phases, is but a manifestation of colonialism, albeit the most brutal one.

39. Here are the words of a famed Jewish intellectual and writer, Arthur Koestler, who wrote in his book *Promise and Fulfilment*: "From the point of view of national sovereignty and self-determination, Israel is a historic injustice."<sup>2</sup> There can be no objective dearer to the hearts of Asians and Africans than the elimination of this injustice.

40. Colonialism has diverse forms but its most virulent racist form is witnessed as much in the conduct of Israel as it is in Rhodesia and South Africa.

41. But, if I appear before the Security Council today, I am moved primarily by the anxiety which is gnawing at the hearts of Asia and Africa—indeed, of small countries all over the globe—about the decline of the morality of this Organization. The history of the Palestine problem is a history of the Charter of the United Nations being systematically torn to shreds. From the last week of May until today, the Security Council has been on trial before humanity—before, at least, that part of it which despises conspiracies, condemns iniquities, abhors aggression and refuses to bow before the forces of might.

42. We are pained to observe that the Council has failed in this trial. Humane opinion all over the world—and I am not thinking only of Asia and Africa—cannot remain unmoved if this Organization makes obeisance before the forces of aggression. Shall we let it prostrate itself before a *blitzkrieg*?

43. This is not the first time that Pakistan urges the Security Council, or the General Assembly, not to deny justice to an Asian and African people, the great Arab nation. In 1947, when twenty-nine Members of this Organization, a minority of the world community, were induced into voting for the territorial mutilation of the Holy Land, we warned, and I quote from the statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan at the 126th plenary meeting of the General Assembly:

"In the hearts of the populations of all the countries from the North African Atlantic Coast to the steppes of Central Asia, you sow doubt and mistrust of the designs and motives of the Western Powers. You take the gravest risk of impairing, beyond the possibility of repair, any chance of real co-operation between East and West, by thus forcibly driving what in effect amounts to a Western wedge into the heart of the Middle East."<sup>3</sup>

In the same statement, he said:

"Remember, nations of the West, that you may need friends tomorrow, that you may need allies in the Middle

<sup>2</sup> London, Macmillan, 1949, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings*, vol. II, 126th meeting, p. 1377.

East. I beg of you not to ruin and blast your credit in those lands."<sup>4</sup>

44. Today, twenty years later, Pakistan is impelled to repeat the same warning. The circumstances of the last three weeks have lent it further point and poignancy. To all those who entertain hopes that, under the heels of the aggressor, the Arab countries can be made to accept a peace settlement that otherwise they would not even remotely contemplate, we say, without rancour: "The hope is not worthy of you. Please, for the sake of decency and civilization, do not try to profit from the calamity that has befallen the Arabs, indeed, all Asia and Africa." It is said in the Book of Proverbs: "He that is glad at calamities shall not be unpunished."

45. All these years, we have been confronted with a strange resistance, in the Western mind, to an understanding of the human and moral aspects of the case. First, we were told of the West's desire to make amends for its centuries-old persecution of Jews and the genocide practised by Hitler's hordes. But the truth was that the Jews were oppressed and decimated in the West and not in Asia and Africa. Repentance and reparation, therefore, should have come from the Western world and not been exacted from the Arabs.

46. Then, we were told of the surge of sympathy for the Zionists among the liberals and progressives of Europe and America. But, we asked, and we ask today, what principle of liberalism and progress could justify the uprooting of a people from its land and the planting of an alien population on it? Is it liberal or progressive to rejoice over aggression and hail the aggressor as the victor? Does the liberalism of the West stop at the confines of the West?

47. Then, again, there was scepticism about Israel's expansionist aims. Certainly, this should have been dispelled by the consistent pattern of Israel's actions, in 1949 and 1956. But, if it was not, can any doubt still exist after the most recent statements of Israel leaders that they are determined to annex the Arab territories that, by the sheer perfidy of their attack, they overran last week?

48. If I refer to the roots of the Arab-Israel problem, it is because of the imperative that the United Nations should not consider it in a vacuum. It should not ignore the chain of causation embedded in it. The world knows how attempts have been made to fasten on the Council a different approach. It is an approach which would detach the Palestine question from the struggle for freedom in Asia and Africa. It is an approach which ignores the law of the Charter and the ethical standards of State conduct on which that law is founded. Can the world convince itself that this approach is even-handed, when it asks the victim to negotiate with the aggressor under the auspices of the Security Council? We are among those who have been astonished and dismayed at the prevalence of this approach. We do fear that, if the Council succumbs to it, a mortal blow will be dealt to the future of the United Nations.

49. Our fears have deepened as we followed the Council's proceedings during the last three weeks. However, before I

discuss their impact, I must not fail to pay a tribute to those members of the Council which have upheld the cause of justice and the purposes of the Charter. The world applauds their stand on principles. But the fact is that, their interventions notwithstanding, the whole drift and tenor of the Council's proceedings so far has amounted to an acquiescence in aggression. Permit me to analyse it briefly.

50. The Council was convened to consider the situation in the Middle East in May, following the exercise of its sovereign rights by the United Arab Republic. The issue of navigation through the Strait of Tiran was essentially one of a juridical nature. But it was immediately turned into a *casus belli* by Israel and represented as a threat to international peace. Before the Security Council could deal with the crisis which was a direct result of nothing but Israel's threats of force, efforts were concerted to formulate a declaration of maritime powers. It was reported that the declaration would legalize the use of force by Israel to break the so-called blockade or at least to provide a political and legal cover to it.

51. No such declaration by any number of maritime States could, under the rules of international law, legalize the use of force that is totally outlawed by the United Nations Charter. The Charter permits the exercise of the use of self-defence only if an armed attack, I repeat armed attack, occurs. Even in that contingency, the right of self-defence can be exercised only until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.

52. The denial of a right of passage through the Strait of Tiran was not tantamount to a blockade of Israel whose trade with the world still remained unhampered along the Mediterranean coast. Yet the issue, which, as I have said, was of a juridical nature, was converted into an issue threatening international peace and security. The concept of *casus belli* being completely foreign to the Charter, what we all were made helpless spectators of was nothing but a reversion to a pre-Charter mentality.

53. It is this process which created an atmosphere, an international psychosis, in which Israel was bound to feel emboldened to launch aggression on its Arab neighbours. It was bound to foreclose any possibility of peaceful negotiations which had begun to open with the expected visit of the Vice-President of the United Arab Republic to Washington. Its record of aggression, as recently demonstrated in its brutally demolishing the village of As Samu on 13 November 1966 and its unmistakable threats against Syria in May, was completely forgotten. It was forgotten that Israel is unique among Member States of the United Nations in having provoked the censure of the Security Council a number of times. Instead, the image was cultivated of a small, helpless nation being strangled to death by its predatory neighbour.

54. When Israel took advantage of this situation, as it could be anticipated it would, and invaded the territory of Egypt and Jordan on 5 June, what took place was the most clear-cut act of aggression in the history of the United Nations. That Israel fired the first shot and, in fact, subjected both the United Arab Republic and Jordan to a Pearl Harbor is plain as daylight.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1367.

55. I have been wondering all these days how the decency of mankind will accept, and how generations yet unborn will understand, the fact that when aggression took place on the scale and with the clarity that it did on 5 June, the Security Council's natural response was effectively blocked. This response could be none other than one of condemning the aggressor forthwith and of calling for the immediate withdrawal of his troops. Instead, what did the Council do? It called for a simple cease-fire.

56. Nothing is more basic to the law of the United Nations than that cease-fire is always linked with the withdrawal of the combatant forces to their respective borders. Here let me recall what the Security Council did on 20 September 1965; it called on India and Pakistan to cease fire and to withdraw their forces [*resolution 211 (1965)*]. But that precedent was not followed in the present case. At a time when the armed forces of Israel were on the soil of the United Arab Republic and Jordan, and no armed forces of the United Arab Republic and Jordan were inside Israel, what, in fairness, could be the explanation of the Council's failure to call for the withdrawal of the invading armies?

57. It is said that what may be achieved by Israel's armies being permitted to remain on the soil of Egypt, Jordan and Syria is a peace of reconciliation. But we know better. It is not a peace of reconciliation which will result from permitting Israel's aggression to remain unvacated. It will be a *diktat*.

58. But let me make one thing plain. We will not be a party to the imprimatur of the United Nations being lent to any scheme that, in reality, is nothing more than a plan to humiliate and coerce the Arab countries into submission.

59. It is incredible that the most brazen aggression has taken place in the history of the United Nations, comparable to any war of aggression by the Nazi hordes in Europe, yet so far the Security Council has failed to issue a word of condemnation.

60. It is amazing that misleading statements were uttered by Israel before the Council even after the cease-fire went into effect. The records of the Council show that Israel denied bombing Damascus and advancing on the territory of Syria precisely at the moment when it was doing both. To the mass of mankind which assumes that a certain degree of civilization should invest international relations, such effrontery is shocking. Yet somehow the reaction of the Council, which should have been one of outrage, was curiously inhibited.

61. The evidence regarding Israel's conduct is overwhelming. Prior to its aggression, its leaders proclaimed that they had no territorial conquests to make. Yet, after the aggression, these same leaders swear that Israel will not return to the armistice lines. Is this not an attitude of utter defiance—*not to speak of the United Nations*—those very Powers which have solemnly proclaimed that they will preserve the independence and territorial integrity of all nations in the Middle East?

62. The United Nations has reached a watershed in its history. It has allowed considerable damage to be done to it. There are voices, most laudably the voice of His Holiness

the Pope, being raised in the world for a peace based on reason and justice, and not on force, a voice for the promotion of right and not of territorial aggrandizement.

63. Pakistan is among those who feel that the damage to the United Nations, in fact, to civilized values embodied in the Charter, can yet be repaired. There is no way of repairing it except by taking three measures: first, a condemnation of the aggression committed by Israel; second, a demand under Article 39 of the Charter for the immediate withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel to the demarcation lines laid down in the General Armistice Agreements; third, after the completion of withdrawals active participation by the Security Council in the exploration of ways and means by which the substantive resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the Palestine problem can be implemented.

64. These resolutions, it needs hardly to be mentioned, relate to Israel's frontiers, to the repatriation of Arab refugees and the status of Jerusalem. There are some who would seek to counsel the parties, in the name of "realism", to accept what are called "the hard realities" of the situation in West Asia. Behind these phrases lurks nothing but the philosophy, if philosophy it can be called, of the *fait accompli*. It is only this Machiavellian notion of the *fait accompli* which is now being invoked to bless Israel's further expansion.

65. In the name of the principles of the Charter, in the name of justice, and for the sake of the peace and security of nations that are weak and small and constitute the bulk of mankind, Pakistan is among those who appeal to the Security Council to do its duty under the Charter and to condemn and undo the aggression. We cannot revive the thousands who lie dead on the plains of Sinai or in the hills and valleys of Jerusalem. We cannot comfort those who have lost all they loved. But, surely, we can ensure that the international community does not bless a resort to force nor reward the aggressor with the fruits of his crime.

66. Mr. RUDA (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): A Security Council resolution condemning a Member State for aggressive activities is a step of such weight and importance, according to the Charter and United Nations practice, that it calls for an assessment of the over-all situation and a careful analysis of the facts.

67. As is necessary in this case, my delegation has analysed very carefully all the facts submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General, the parties concerned and other members of the Council. My delegation considers that these facts provide us with a vague picture of the situation, some aspects of which are controversial.

68. On other occasions, we have not hesitated to condemn the condemnable, when that course was indicated by an objective picture of the situation, fleshed out by definite and concrete facts. In November 1966 we did not hesitate to condemn Israel vigorously and to support resolution 228 (1966), which censures that country for the military action taken against Jordan in the Hebron region on 13 November 1966. The facts placed before the Council on that occasion left no room for doubt. But we cannot take the same stand

when the facts have not been presented with the same clarity for our appraisal.

69. My delegation would now like to comment on the other aspect of the Soviet draft resolution, which refers to the occupation of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan and to the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel troops.

70. Since its first statement in this debate, my delegation has consistently contended that the Council's first task was to maintain international peace and security by every possible means. The adoption of three resolutions by the Security Council brought about an effective cease-fire on the Arab-Israel frontier. The countries involved in the conflict accepted the Council resolutions, and made their acceptance known in the appropriate way. My delegation therefore considers that the Council's first task, namely, to prevent hostilities from spreading and to bring about a cease-fire, has been fully accomplished, owing particularly to the sense of responsibility shown by all members of the Security Council in this emergency.

71. However, my delegation is not ready to leave things as they now stand, and from the outset has stressed that once the necessary atmosphere of calm has been created, an effort must be made to establish conditions conducive to dealing with the problem of final and permanent solutions. It is true that the Middle East has been beset by problems continuously for almost twenty years and that there are as yet no signs of a desire to seek a peaceful solution. My delegation, however, believes that a peaceful solution can and must be achieved, for it involves not only the interest of the parties concerned, but also the permanent interest in peace of all the Members of the United Nations. We believe that no political progress can be made unless the parties lay down their arms and conditions are established enabling them to express their desires freely and without hesitation. In short, as we have said in previous statements, we believe that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved if positions of force are maintained. We believe that any settlement reached under the threat or use of force, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, would be invalid and would not lead to a definitive solution of the problem.

72. For all these reasons, my delegation is firmly convinced that at this stage it is the Council's duty to seek to establish conditions whereby no one will negotiate under the threat of coercion. We believe that these conditions cannot be attained unless on the one hand, troops are withdrawn, and on the other, free passage through international shipping lanes is assured. In a word, this means abandoning a belligerent spirit and establishing spiritual conditions conducive to peace. We believe that both parties should be placed in a position where they can express their wishes freely. Consequently, we cannot support operative paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft resolution. Although we believe that the withdrawal of troops is one of the basic conditions for peace, neither party should be subject to pressure. Furthermore, we believe that the Middle East problem can be solved only by peaceful means, and that the first step to be taken or the first method to be used should be the creation of a climate of understanding, which would facilitate agreement between the parties.

73. Mr. SEYDOUX (France) (*translated from French*): We understand the concern which prompted the Soviet delegation to submit its draft resolution. We believe that conquest by force of arms cannot confer the right to occupy a territory. As a question of principles, we can only support the Soviet proposal. But, having said that, what can we in fact expect from such an initiative? Either the draft resolution will not be adopted or, if it is, its chances of being implemented are questionable.

74. With regard to the future, it is true that the Arab States may consider that it is difficult for them to hold talks as long as their territories remain occupied. Israel, for its part, would like to be sure that the way is open to an understanding in that part of the world. The French delegation therefore considers that we should work together to facilitate talks when the time comes which could lead to agreements acceptable to all parties. My delegation's vote on the Soviet draft resolution will be based on these considerations.

75. Mr. MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to explain my delegation's position with regard to the draft resolutions now before the Council.

76. Taking together the two draft resolutions, the one presented by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [*S/7951/Rev.2*], and the one presented by the United States of America [*S/7952/Rev.2*], my delegation finds that many of the problems and issues raised in these documents are also of great concern to our Government. We agree with the view that now that the Council has succeeded in ending the military hostilities through its four successive and unanimous cease-fire resolutions, it should immediately proceed to the subsequent steps having to do with the prompt withdrawal of forces to their original positions in accordance with long-standing principles and precedents of the United Nations, and should also undertake the creation of conditions that can enable the Council to obtain a just and equitable settlement of all the issues involved.

77. The preliminary views of my Government with regard to subsequent steps to be taken by the Council were stated in clear terms in my previous statement before this body. My Government is convinced that an honourable peace must be based only on an honourable foundation, and that it is only such a settlement, reached honestly and equitably, that can bring lasting peace to this troubled region. That was why we have insisted, and continue to insist, on the prompt withdrawal of forces and on the creation of just conditions for a negotiated settlement of what the Secretary-General, in his report, has called the underlying causes of the present crisis situation in the Middle East. This demand for prompt withdrawal and for the establishment of just and impartial conditions for settlement is one that we shall continue to uphold and advocate, for we believe that no peace can be lasting if it is not made under impartial conditions acceptable to all parties concerned.

78. We also believe that the United Nations has a very important and most urgent role to play in promoting the right atmosphere and creating the right conditions for a lasting settlement in the Middle Eastern area. It is for this

reason that we favour the reactivation of a United Nations presence, and we continue to urge that this be done without delay. In this connexion, we cannot but be disturbed and dismayed by recent statements reported to have been made by high-ranking Israel officials, expressing unwillingness to accept United Nations participation in the settlement of outstanding disputes and stating the untenable contention that Israel has the right arbitrarily to decide the disposition of territories of sovereign States now under Israel's military control. Such regrettable statements cannot but be harmful to the prospects for lasting peace in the area of the Middle East. We therefore urge Israel to abandon stands which are not compatible with the principles and practices of the United Nations Charter. We would also appeal to all parties concerned to turn to the way of negotiation and peaceful settlement of disputes and to accept the auspices of the United Nations for such settlement.

79. While taking such clear positions with regard to the issues involved, my delegation has felt duty bound to counsel, both in private consultations and in the Council's meetings here, against taking any action which may increase already known difficulties by leading to a divided approach and creating an atmosphere that will not be conducive to the kind of necessary and urgent action that we feel the Council needs to take in order to bring peace and stability to the area. We continue to believe that the cause of peace in the Middle East can be served best by concerted action on the part of the Council, and more particularly on the part of those permanent members that have both the power and the influence to contribute to a lasting settlement. It is therefore with some regret and misgiving that we see the major Powers beginning to take differing and somewhat conflicting lines on this urgent and vital issue. This certainly does not augur well for the peace-making so urgently needed and for finding a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East.

80. I respectfully submit that this present time of grave crisis is not the moment for big-Power division. Rather is it the time for concerted action on the part of major Powers which should act together to save the peace and to bring to this troubled area confidence and stability, coupled with the promise of progress and better life for the future.

81. I do not doubt, of course, the good motives of either of the authors of the two draft resolutions that are before us. I hope and pray that, likewise and in the same spirit, the authors of the draft resolutions will understand and appreciate our position and difficulty if we are obliged to say to them that neither of their proposals meets fully with our own view of how best the Council should proceed to meet the urgent requirements of the Middle East crisis.

82. We feel that time and mutual consultation are of the essence when the Council has to take such far-reaching steps as those now proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States of America, respectively. We need time to study and weigh the terms of the proposals. We need the opportunity to consult first with the authors of the draft resolutions themselves, and then with other colleagues, members of the Council, while at the same time contacting our Governments with a view to obtaining the necessary instructions to act for and on their behalf.

83. Unfortunately, this has not been possible under the present circumstances. Even though it is true that the draft proposals have been before us for some time, we, and I believe other delegations, have been under the impression that there would be time and opportunity to make suggestions, to suggest amendments, or to find, perhaps, some other way of reconciling the divergent attitudes and positions taken by the two major Powers. At the same time, we have been studying the suggestions made by other delegations. My delegation, for one, found of timely interest and usefulness the suggestions made by the representative of India in his statement to the Council on 9 June 1967 [1352nd meeting].

84. The Council will recall that in the statement under reference the representative of India made a preliminary outline of three steps that he felt the Council could take after having ensured the cessation of hostilities. If I remember correctly, the substantive part of the Indian suggestion was as follows. First, the representative of India suggested the prompt reactivation of the United Nations machinery in the area to enforce the cease-fire and to secure withdrawal on the lines proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 26 May 1927 [S/7906]. With regard to the enforcement of the cease-fire at present, I should like to associate my delegation with all those who have spoken before me, in expressing gratitude to General Bull and to the United Nations personnel serving under him, for the excellent work that they are doing on our behalf.

85. Coming back to the Indian suggestion, the representative of India invited the Council, also, to consider whether the Secretary-General should be requested to depute a personal representative to the area to help in reducing tension, in restoring peaceful conditions and in ensuring the safety and security of the Arab civilian population in areas occupied by Israel. Finally, and looking to the future, the representative of India made the useful and relevant suggestion that the Council should earnestly consider the steps to be taken to stabilize peace in the area.

86. When in my statement of 6 June 1967 I said:

"We consider this"—I was referring to the cessation of hostilities—"to be the first vital step that the Council has to take, and we shall of course continue to add our modest but genuine efforts to those of the members of the Council in the urgent steps we must take together in order to bring a just and lasting peace to this war-tormented region." [1348th meeting, para. 28.]

I was, of course, thinking of action very much along the lines suggested by my friend and colleague, the representative of India.

87. As things stand, we do not seem to have the opportunity we had hoped for, to share views on these and other constructive and far-reaching suggestions; and I must say that the lack of such opportunity for concerted endeavour and action is a matter of deep regret to the Ethiopian delegation.

88. If time was allowed for study and consideration of the draft proposals now before us, then of course my dele-

gation would be only too glad to give these documents all the attention and serious consideration they rightly deserve. But since the draft proposals are going to be put to the vote as they now stand, my delegation, in line with the explanations I have already given, will find itself obliged to abstain on both drafts—not because we do not share the serious concern expressed in these draft proposals, nor indeed because they do not contain points with which we agree, but because we find neither text fully satisfactory in its present form. We shall therefore abstain from the vote on both the draft resolution presented by the Soviet Union [S/7951/Rev.2] and the draft resolution presented by the United States [S/7952/Rev.2].

89. Mr. IYALLA (Nigeria): In a previous intervention in this series of meetings of the Security Council, I reiterated my delegation's firm conviction that the Council should now proceed to the substantive issues relating to the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East and that the very first matter requiring the Council's urgent attention was that of the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories and within their boundaries, as they were before the outbreak of hostilities. We still think that the Council should discharge its responsibility in that regard and embark immediately on the consideration of measures necessary for the immediate disengagement and withdrawal of forces, no matter what statements and pronouncements may or may not have been made elsewhere. Thus, on this issue there can be no doubt about where we stand.

90. However, the draft resolution in document S/7951/Rev.2 of 13 June 1967, which we saw in its present form for the first time yesterday afternoon, touches upon a number of other far-reaching issues, the implications of which my delegation would have liked to consider more carefully; and we would have wished perhaps to consult more fully with the sponsors and other members of the Council.

91. There are considerations as to whether our essential purposes and the ends we seek to achieve would be best advanced in this manner. There are also questions as to whether the timing of some of the proposals before us is the most opportune. While, therefore, we agree with and support the principles on which these proposals are based, since we do not and cannot condone aggression from any quarter and have clearly stated that we strongly advocate the urgent withdrawal of forces in the present situation in the Middle East, my delegation would find it difficult to pronounce itself definitely on the draft resolution in its entirety, as it stands, at the present time.

92. I would strongly suggest for your consideration, Mr. President, that, subject to the agreement of the representative of the Soviet Union, the draft resolution, if it is to be put to the vote now, should be put to the vote paragraph by paragraph.

93. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, the USSR delegation wishes at this stage to explain its attitude to the Canadian draft resolution [S/7941].

94. Apart from the fact that this draft resolution has long since become obsolete, it contains provisions which must at

the very least be described as vague and full of obscurities. Since the adoption of a draft resolution along these lines might have far-reaching consequences, the Soviet delegation objects to a proposal which is like a "cat in the bag", as it were. Implementation of this draft resolution might even lead to a violation of the United Nations Charter. In view of what I have just said, Mr. President, the Soviet delegation will vote against the Canadian draft resolution.

95. With regard to the three-Power draft resolution [S/7968/Rev.1] concerning the need to spare the civilian populations and the prisoners of war in the Middle East from additional sufferings, the Soviet delegation wishes to make the following observations. This draft resolution deals only with one aspect of the problem; and this in itself cannot be regarded as satisfactory in the present circumstances and does not meet the requirements of the case.

96. The question of the sufferings of the civilian population, as a result of Israel's aggression and the occupation of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic by Israel authorities, is of course a real one; but in order to put an end to these sufferings it is essential to take energetic steps to bring about the withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from the territories they have seized. This is the best way of protecting the civilian population from the calamities of war.

97. We reject as unfounded the various arguments and excuses which have just been advanced by certain speakers, to the effect that the circumstances in which the crime of aggression was committed are not yet clear, etc., and that it is not altogether appropriate to raise the question of the withdrawal of the interventionist forces from the territories they have seized. After unleashing an aggression and invading the territory of sovereign Arab States the Israel forces of aggression have occupied territories and are refusing to withdraw from them. We would ask those speakers what further evidence is needed of this most flagrant violation of the sovereign rights of States, this violation of our Organization's Charter. What points are still obscure? What further evidence is required of this monstrous aggression and occupation?

98. At the same time, these speakers even take the view that the interventionist and occupation forces must not be disturbed. They urge us not to touch them or bother them. Arguments of this kind are unintelligible to us, and so we reject them. The peoples of the Arab countries whose territories have been seized by the aggressor will be exposed to sufferings until the piratical armies of occupation have been expelled from Arab territory.

99. However, in view of the good intentions of the sponsors of this humanitarian draft resolution, the Soviet delegation will not vote against it.

100. The PRESIDENT: I call on the next speaker on my list, the representative of Syria.

101. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the supplemental information which has been received by the Secretary-General and distributed to the Council since the start of this meeting. This information is contained in

document S/7930/Add.7, dated 14 June 1967; paragraph 1 (vi) (c) reads as follows:

“Movement of Israel forces approximately 2 km east along Kuneitra-Damascus Road since 0515 hours, Zebra, 11 June (report from observers, Damascus).”

102. In bringing this matter to the attention of the Security Council, I wish at the same time to invoke resolution 236 (1967) adopted by the Council on 12 June 1967, operative paragraph 3 of which reads as follows:

*“The Security Council,*

*“... ”*

*“Affirms that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire.”*

What was reported in paragraph 1 (vi) (c) of the report of the Secretary-General, which I read out, definitely constitutes a forward military movement of the Israel army of occupation inside Syrian territory and therefore should be assessed and considered under operative paragraph 3 of resolution 236 (1967). It constitutes a condemnation of the violation of the cease-fire.

103. Therefore I invoke operative paragraph 1 of resolution 236 (1967) which states:

*“Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire.”*

That being the case, this same resolution also stipulates the following in operative paragraph 4:

*“Calls for the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 1630 hours GMT on 10 June 1967”.*

104. I think that here we have a clear-cut case of a violation committed by the Israel forces of occupation inside Syrian territory. All the operative paragraphs of resolution 236 (1967) should properly and adequately be invoked here.

105. This incident is indicative in itself. We listened yesterday to a very eloquent statement made by the Israel representative, picturing his State as a peace-loving one that seeks to have peace with its neighbours. Surely those measures do not constitute a step towards peace; if they are anything, they are the negation of the very spirit of peace.

106. At the same time, since I have been in communication this morning with my capital city of Damascus, I wish to affirm once more what I said yesterday about two major developments that have been going on continuously, and that is the premeditated mass ousting and expulsion of the Arab population from the occupied territories by the Israel forces of invasion. Thus we now have in Damascus itself tens of thousands of Syrians who have flooded the capital from the area where the Israel army advanced. Since authority has been given to the Secretary-General in

accordance with operative paragraph 2 of resolution 236 (1967), which I invoked, we hope that an investigation will be made on this matter of the refugees and that the Council will be informed.

107. I also wish to confirm here the second point I made yesterday, and that is the crimes which are being committed up to this very moment, when the Council is meeting, by the Israel occupation forces in a most savage and barbarous manner against civilians and their property by means of destruction and annihilation which are still continuing without abating or stopping. I think that those who want the truth about the real intentions of Israel and its aggression now have it in the report of the Secretary-General which I cited. It is also in resolution 236 (1967) that was adopted only two days ago by the Council. There is enough proof there to convince them.

108. The PRESIDENT: As President of the Council, I give the floor to the representative of China.

109. Mr. LIU (China): My delegation whole-heartedly supports the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia [S/7968/Rev.2]. The new wave of refugees, whose plight has been so movingly described by Ambassador El-Farra of Jordan, is indeed a matter of serious concern to the international community. The refugee problem resulting from earlier hostilities in the Middle East has already occupied the attention of the United Nations for nineteen years and in the opinion of my delegation it constitutes one of the underlying causes of the present conflict. The three-Power draft resolution will help towards alleviating the suffering of the victims of war and I believe it has a significance over and above its humanitarian aspects.

110. With regard to draft resolution S/7951/Rev.2, my delegation will abstain from the voting. In doing so, my delegation wishes to make it clear that we are opposed to the use of force, as is enjoined by the Charter of the United Nations. We are opposed to the use of force for the purpose of bringing about territorial changes. We are, however, not unmindful of the declarations that have been repeatedly made by Israel that it has no territorial designs against its neighbours. Those declarations, we believe, are solemn commitments, for history has clearly shown that no secure peace can be built upon the basis of territorial changes that are brought about by the use of force. Now that the cease-fire has come into effect, we earnestly hope immediate steps will be taken so that a just and permanent peace may become a reality and political independence and territorial integrity may be made secure for all the countries in the Middle East.

111. Mr. MATSUI (Japan): My delegation notes with satisfaction that the parties to the conflict in the Near East seem to be complying with the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council. This, as we all know, is the essential first step towards lasting peace in the area.

112. With the cessation of armed hostilities, it is now urgently necessary to proceed with the utmost dispatch to the next phase, that of constructing a durable peace: first, the settlement of immediate problems resulting from the

conflict—and they are many and difficult—and then the construction of a definitive and lasting peace for the future.

113. The enormous difficulties and extraordinary complexities involved in these important tasks are obvious to all. But the Security Council, in the interests of humanity and the peace of the world, dare not side-step these tasks, dare not procrastinate, dare not relax in its efforts to deal with them positively, realistically and constructively.

114. Old concepts of war, outlawed by the Charter, the equation of national objectives with the spoils or fruits of war, must give way to the serious tasks of building, on the basis of equity, justice and humanity, a lasting peace from the wreckage of hostilities.

115. To fulfil this task, there is no doubt that the most careful deliberation is required. All elements, related directly or indirectly to the questions before us, must be fully considered. There is no doubt, furthermore, that it is necessary for the Council to proceed in complete unity and full strength in order to achieve maximum results; the strength of the unanimous will of the Council has been demonstrated; it should continue to govern further decisions by the Council. Every effort must be made to avoid divisions in the Council; common ground is our objective; we should all seek it most diligently. This is the basic position of the Japanese delegation concerning our further work in the Council.

116. A draft resolution has been submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union [S/7951/Rev.2]. My delegation has studied it very carefully. It appears to my delegation that the approach taken by the Soviet delegation differs from that of my delegation, which I have just advocated. My delegation doubts that this draft would facilitate the further unified and co-operative efforts required by the Council. My delegation, therefore, will abstain on that draft resolution.

117. At this point, I wish to stress that equitable, just and lasting solutions, which is what we seek, can only be achieved on the basis of peaceful means fully acceptable to all parties concerned. The peace we seek simply cannot and must not be based upon positions of strength. Any attempt to construct the edifice of lasting peace on such foundations is doomed to failure.

118. My delegation has already expressed its deepest sympathy and grave concern regarding the fate of those innocent victims of the war, the Arab refugees who had been living in the occupied territory of Jordan. They must be helped to the fullest possible extent. Also, the maximum possible humanitarian treatment must be accorded to civilians and captured military personnel in the occupied areas. In addition, all parties concerned should do their utmost to relieve the sufferings of what may be thousands of hapless soldiers, particularly in the Sinai desert, who, according to late reports from Geneva, are struggling to return to their homeland, without water, food or transportation.

119. For all these reasons, my delegation most wholeheartedly supports the draft resolution submitted by the

delegations of Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia [S/7968/Rev.2].

120. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Israel, to whom I now give the floor.

121. Mr. KIDRON (Israel): I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity once again to address the Council on the matters before it. I should like at the outset to address myself to the substance of the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia on the question of the civil populations in the area of the recent armed conflict and the question of prisoners of war. I wish to assure the representative of the United Kingdom, and other representatives who have spoken on this subject, that the Government of Israel is fully aware of its legal responsibilities and deeply sensible of the human problems involved. But I would, with great respect, remind the Council that it is only a few days since the firing stopped. During this short period, the Israel authorities have made Herculean efforts to restore normal civilian life in the area. In the Gaza Strip life goes on fairly normally. Whatever services existed before, exist and operate today. There has been no movement of civilians from the area and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees is operating normally. In Jerusalem and the west bank there was, as I stated yesterday, some movement eastward away from the scene of battle. Many of the people moving went to join their families on the east bank; many of them were Jordanian troops who had cast aside their uniforms and were fleeing home. But the numbers have been vastly exaggerated. There has been no mass exodus, as has been alleged. In fact, there is now a large-scale movement in the opposite direction across the Jordan, from the east bank to the west bank.

122. And in the same way that the Israel authorities neither instigated nor encouraged the movement eastwards, they are not interfering in any way with the movement westwards. But why are these people coming back? It is because in spite of the years of vicious incitements and propaganda, they have discovered no doubt that the Israeli is not as bad as he is painted, that his attitude is humane and decent and that he is making a genuine and sincere effort to help the civilian population.

123. The most abiding impression of life now on the west bank, and this is reaffirmed and supported by press reports which have come from foreign journalists who have been permitted to go freely to the west bank in the last few days, is that life is returning rapidly to normal. Local authorities are functioning nearly everywhere, municipal services, water, electricity, sanitation and public transport have been restored. Hospitals, pharmacies and shops have been opened and there are ample stocks of food. Public order is maintained with the aid of the local Arab police. The Holy Places are protected by Israel police and the ecclesiastical authorities concerned have expressed their appreciation of the exemplary order maintained.

124. The Security Council no doubt will be pleased to know that very little damage was caused to the Holy Places and other sites in the fighting. This cost the Israel forces and the civilian population on the Israel side of Jerusalem

heavy casualties, as Jordanian artillery was sited among the Holy Places and the Israel troops were not permitted to reply and were actually prevented by order from replying for fear of doing damage to the Holy Places.

125. On the question of prisoners of war, as I stated yesterday, we have approached the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross which is now in Israel and requested it to take immediate steps in order to secure a rapid exchange of prisoners. We hope that the other side will do the same, as we have certain anxieties on this score to which I shall advert in a few moments.

126. On this general question of prisoners of war, on which the Argentine, Brazilian and Ethiopian draft resolution touches in legal terms, I wish to inform the Council of the Israel attitude.

127. The Israel Defence Forces make every effort to disseminate the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 and to teach the laws of war to all ranks in the Israel army; the Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war has been published in the official publications of the Government. It has been reproduced in official orders of the General Staff and it forms part of the syllabuses of the Staff College, the Administration College and the War College. Its provisions form part of the examination arrangements of these institutions. Every effort is made to ensure that all members of the Israel Defence Forces are fully aware of the Geneva Conventions and of the laws of war and that they fully abide by them. Strict orders have been issued to ensure that this is done.

128. I wish to assure the Council that the practice of the Israel Defence Forces in this regard is in full accord with the precepts. Prisoners of war are treated with humanity and with full regard to their legal and human rights, as prescribed in the Conventions. They are housed and fed on exactly the same terms as members of the Israel Defence Forces, although, as someone has said rather cynically, this might not always be an advantage.

129. It should, of course, be understood that we have no particular interest in keeping prisoners of war, and we would be most happy to permit them to return to their homes and families in precisely the same way we would like to receive from the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria those of our men who were unfortunate enough to fall into their hands.

130. Besides this approach that we have made to the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, I wish to inform the Council that large numbers of Egyptian soldiers who are still roaming around the Sinai desert are being permitted and encouraged to go along the only roads leading back to Egypt. They are not being taken prisoner unless they give themselves up, and although the Egyptian Government has cut off the water pipeline which supplied these people in the past, water is being dropped to these men from the air in order to spare them unnecessary suffering in the harsh conditions of the desert.

131. I should like to mention certain of our anxieties on this question of prisoners of war. We have received most

disquieting news of the treatment of Israel prisoners in the United Arab Republic. A few days ago, the press carried a report of the hacking to death of an Israel pilot who had come down on Egyptian soil. We have since received a report of two Israel prisoners who have similarly been put to death in another area in the United Arab Republic. We also have unfortunate, miserable and tragic memories of the way in which Israelis who had the misfortune to fall into Syrian hands during the course of the past seventeen or eighteen years have been treated. I myself have had personal experience of this, as for many years I tried to negotiate through the United Nations and the Secretary-General, who knows this subject very well, through the International Committee of the Red Cross and through any international organization which could possibly have any interest or any concern with prisoners in order to try to get our people who were held in Syria under the most unspeakable and inhumane conditions back.

132. For a number of years, the Syrian authorities denied that there were any Israelis in their prisons. Eventually, at the end of 1963 some of them were returned. Of the eleven who came back, seven were immediately put into mental homes because they had broken down under the sufferings and the tortures they had endured in Syrian prisons, and one of them later committed suicide. A little while later another four were exchanged, and of those three had to be hospitalized under the same condition. And all through this period, the Syrian authorities successively denied that any Israelis were in their hands. It was only when Israel had collected a number of Syrians, terrorists and saboteurs who had come into the country in order to commit crimes, a larger number than Israel prisoners in Syria, did the Syrians disclose that they had Israel prisoners and agreed to exchange them. It is for that reason that we have a vital interest that prisoners should be exchanged as soon as possible and that these victims of war should be permitted to go back to their homes.

133. Finally, I should like to refer to certain expressions mouthed yesterday by the representative of Jordan. I do not wish to enter into a sterile polemic with the representative of Jordan. The majority of the members of the Council are trying to look forward to a constructive settlement of the situation in the Middle East. The representative of Jordan yesterday was trying to drag us back to the rancour, the hatred, and the black misery of the past, but this time he has gone too far, and the honour and the prestige of the United Nations are involved.

134. The United Nations was built on the bodies of the millions of victims who fell at the hands of the Nazis and the Fascists in the last war. Their blood cements its foundations. Seated around this table are the representatives of nations which suffered nearly mortal blows, who lost a whole generation of their people in the occupation of the Nazis and Fascists of their countries: the USSR, France, Ethiopia, Denmark, Bulgaria, Israel, the Jews—who were the only people singled out by the Nazis for complete destruction. Other nations represented here—the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, India, Nigeria—suffered grievous losses in the war of liberation against the tyrants. The Arabs were not among them. They were not numbered in this roll of honour. Some of

rise up in arms on Hitler's side. Others were held from doing so by huge allied security forces.

Yet, the representative of Jordan yesterday made an audacious attempt to link Zionism, a lofty ideal of national liberation, with the most unspeakable crimes known to the world—the Zionism which was described by the late King Faisal of Iraq, who represented the Arab liberation movement at the Versailles Conference in 1919, in the following words. I quote from a letter written by him at that time to Weizmann, the first President of Israel:

"We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement . . . We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another. The Arab movement is national and not imperialist. Our Zionist movement is national and not imperialist, and there is no conflict for us both. Indeed I think that neither can be a success without the other."

But this noble vision is what the representative of Jordan testified with the crimes of the Nazis. This is rank antisemitism and hatred. It stinks in the nostrils of humanity. I reject it with contempt.

Mr. SEYDOUX (France) (*translated from French*): I apologize for taking the floor again for a very short moment. My delegation reserves the right to express its views on the problems dealt with in the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia when that matter is discussed. However, it wishes to state today that it has the warmest sympathy for this effort to alleviate the sufferings of civil populations and to prevent the Palestine refugee problem from assuming even more serious proportions.

The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on my list is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): In this constructive approach of the Security Council, I would have liked to avoid invectives on controversial subjects. But having listened to the well-meaning but venom-ridden words of the Israel representative, I could not restrain myself.

I wish to raise a specific issue concerning paragraph 2 (c) of the Secretary-General's report [*S/7930/Add.7*] which was submitted today while the Council was meeting; paragraph speaks of "Movement of Israel forces approximately 2 km east along Kuneitra-Damascus Road at 0515 hours, Zebra, 11 June". That is after the cease-fire, after the adoption of the cease-fire that was in effect between the Israel and Syrian forces.

What did the Israel representative choose to say at that time? He criticized the representative of Jordan for being, in his own words, dragged us back. But what did he say of himself? He went back eighteen years to a question of frontiers between Israel and Syria. And then, in the clear Jewish accent that he chooses to intonate in our ears, he went on to speak about those cruelties.

141. But the representative of Israel forgot something. I am sure his memory is not lapsing concerning the massacres and killings, perpetrated in the most ugly, inhuman, Nazi-Fascist manner, in Deir Yassin, Kafr Kasseem, Qalqiliya and Gaza, where people were buried alive. It would take me very long to enumerate all these vast pages of the history of the Zionist occupation of Palestine, the fatherland. But there are enough people who saw and witnessed those atrocities, which are being committed by the Israelis up to the present time, at a time when the soft-spoken Israel representative chooses to deceive the Council and to deceive us here.

142. He talks about the Arabs not having taken part in the war, but, according to the testimony of Sir Winston Churchill himself at the end of the war, it was, thanks to the co-operation of the Arabs during the war, one of the factors that led to the success and victory of the Allies.

143. But then he alluded once again to the Arabs in a rather slanderous and derogatory manner. I do not expect anything else from a Zionist. That is in his nature. The Zionist leaders, during World War II, co-operated with the Nazi leaders, and a deal was negotiated between them in order to achieve some results. I refer you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council, and the Israel speaker, to a book called *Perfidy*<sup>5</sup> by no less a man than a great Zionist himself, Ben Hecht, who uncovered this plot between the Zionists and the Nazis during the war. But he forgot one thing. He forgot that during World War I, which led to the Balfour Declaration—and I think Lord Caradon will bear me out on that—my own country, Syria, offered 300,000 people, who died of hunger because they were fighting on the side of the Allies. And among the troops in the Second World War that liberated Europe from Nazi Germany and from Fascist occupation, there were Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian soldiers—namely, Arabs—who gave their lives for the cause of the Allies.

144. Now this person comes here, after all the aggression and invasion, in order to accuse Syria. He also has the audacity to invoke the letter addressed by King Feisal to Weizmann. But he forgot that King Feisal, like a great many of the Zionist leaders themselves at that time, was deceived by Zionism, by Weizmann and his clique.

145. Never at that time did they say that they were going to occupy Palestine and throw the Arab population out. The Arabs were good-hearted people. They thought that those people who were coming and who were being given homes among them were coming as friends, not as enemies, annihilators and invaders. But when King Feisal discovered that this was the case, his letter was repudiated. Anyhow, the letter was conditional; it assumed that the Israelis, or the Zionists, would co-operate with the Arabs. Such co-operation never existed. From the very first time that the first Israel settlers came into Palestine they ousted the Arabs, threw them out.

146. These are only diversionary tactics. I raise this specific point and I ask the Council to pronounce itself on this point, which occurs in the report of the Secretary-

<sup>5</sup> Ben Hecht, *Perfidy* (New York, Messner, 1961).

General and which is a clear-cut violation of the resolution adopted two days ago by the Council [236 (1967)], a violation that calls for condemnation and should certainly be condemned.

147. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Jordan, on whom I now call.

148. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): Mr. Kidron was apparently annoyed by the comparison between the practices of Nazism and the behaviour of Zionism. I pose the challenge to Mr. Kidron to show me the difference between them, when both movements have the concept of expansion; when both have the concept of race; when both have the concept of *lebensraum*; when both have the concept of force, of acquiring lands by invasion and the use of force; and when both have fifth-columns, whether they are called pressure groups or fifth-columns.

149. The practice of Nazism is not different from that of Zionism. They have all elements in common. Let Mr. Kidron deny the existence of one of the five elements I just cited. Let him deny one. I would then be happy to know that Zionism is starting to have a change of heart, a change of mind, a change of behaviour to something from that practised by Nazism. It would be a happy hour if Mr. Kidron were to come now and say: We no more believe in force; we no more believe in race and superiority; we no more believe in expansion; we no more believe in fifth-columns. It would be a happy day indeed.

150. Another thing was mentioned about the practice of Nazism. It is true that a certain number of Jews suffered because of Nazism. But should this give the Israelis any right to practise the same thing against the Arab people of Palestine? A crime is a crime. Murder is murder. Whether you kill one million, one hundred thousand or six million, the crime is the same.

151. Reference was made to the crimes the Nazis committed. But is the answer to the crimes of the Nazis, to deprive the Arab people of Palestine of their homeland? Were the Arabs the Nazi movement which committed the crimes? Are they to pay for the crimes committed by the Nazi movement in Europe? Should the Moslem Arabs pay the price of appeasement, the price of relieving the Christian conscience of Europe? Are we to offer Palestine because Hitler, who happened to be a Christian, committed his crimes? Was he our cousin or our brother? Was the crime an Arab crime? I cannot see the logic.

152. The statement was made that in the last war many Jews were killed but the Arabs did not suffer or participate, a charge referred to also by my colleague of Syria. But tens of thousands were fighting on the side of the Allies in North Africa. Not only this, but my people, the Arab people of Palestine, were struggling for their independence, their nationhood, their statehood, and the minute the war broke out they stopped fighting for their own cause. I think Lord Caradon will remember this. My people stopped struggling against the British for the liberation of their homeland; they stopped attacking the United Kingdom because the United Kingdom, the occupier of Palestine, was

at that time fighting the Nazis. This is something which is not difficult to establish. History is our witness.

153. My last point is this. The claim was made that the Arabs of Palestine from the western bank are going back because they do not think that the Israelis are "that bad". These are the words of Mr. Kidron. True, they want to go back. All the expellees want to go back, not because they do not think the Israelis are "that bad", but because a home is a dear thing indeed. Living in your own home is something very dear. Living in a hut or a tent or a cave, or living in the open with only your blanket to cover your children, is something no one wants. If the Arabs who were expelled by force insist on going home now, they go home because they prefer their own homes to a life in a tent, in a cave, in a hut, or in the open with nothing.

154. Mr. KIDRON (Israel): I do not wish to take up the time of the Council too much, but I have just received a cable from my Government in Jerusalem concerning the work of UNRWA, and I think it is my duty to inform the Council of the latest developments.

155. An agreement has been arrived at between Mr. Michelmore, the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, and my Government, and I wish to read it out to the Council. The letter which Ambassador Comay of the Israel Foreign Office has addressed to the Commissioner-General contains the terms of that agreement, and these are the terms:

"Dear Commissioner-General:

"I wish to refer to the conversations I have had with you and your colleagues within the last two days and to confirm our agreement that, at the request of the Israel Government, UNRWA would continue its assistance to the Palestine refugees, with the full co-operation of the Israel authorities, in the west bank and Gaza Strip areas.

"For its part, the Israel Government will facilitate the task of UNRWA to the best of its ability, subject only to regulations or arrangements which may be necessitated by considerations of military security. On this understanding, we are prepared to agree in principle:

"(a) To ensure the protection and security of the personnel, installations and property of UNRWA;

"(b) To permit the free movement of UNRWA vehicles into, within and out of Israel and the areas in question;

"(c) To permit the international staff of the Agency to move in, out and within Israel and the areas in question; they will be provided with identity documents and any other passes which might be required;

"(d) To permit the local staff of the Agency to move within the areas in question under arrangements made or to be made with the military authorities;

"(e) To provide radio, telecommunications and landing facilities;

“(f) Pending a further supplementary agreement, to maintain the previously existing financial arrangements with the governmental authorities then responsible for the areas in question, concerning:

“(i) Exemptions from customs duties, taxes and charges on importation of supplies, goods and equipment;

“(ii) Provision free of charge of warehousing, labour for offloading and handling, and transport by rail or road in the areas under our control;

“(iii) Such other costs to the Agency as were previously met by the governmental authorities concerned;

“(g) To recognize that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946, to which Israel is a party, shall govern the relations between the Government and UNRWA in all that concerns UNRWA’s functions.

“The present letter and your acceptance in writing will be considered by the Government of Israel and by UNRWA as a provisional agreement which will remain in force until replaced or cancelled.”<sup>6</sup>

The Commissioner-General gave the appropriate reply to that letter.

156. Finally, I should like to advert in a few words to the supplemental information received by the Secretary-General, to which the representative of Syria referred a few moments ago. I must, of course, express my appreciation for the kind words used by the representative of Syria with regard to my so-called eloquence and my accent—although at a later stage in his remarks he was not so complimentary about my person.

157. I would refer briefly to point (c) of sub-paragraph (vi), which the representative of Syria mentioned and which he maintained furnished proof that Israel had broken the cease-fire and the Security Council resolutions. I want to assure the Council that there has been no breach whatsoever of the cease-fire or of the Security Council resolutions. I must draw the Council’s attention to the fact that the report in question emanates from observers in Damascus who are about sixty kilometres away from the scene and who obviously get their information from local people. In saying that, it is not my intention, of course, to cast any doubt on the report. However, if there was such a movement of Israel forces, it was a movement inside the lines, and not ahead of the lines. There has been no such thing as any forward movement, any movement ahead of the previously held Israel position.

158. I want to assure the Security Council that this position has been rigorously held by the Israel authorities ever since the cease-fire came into effect a couple of days ago. There has been absolutely no change in this position. I am assured that General Bull confirms this. I would add that the report does not speak of a violation: it speaks of a

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 13*, annex III.

movement. This is a movement behind, not ahead of, the position held at the time of the cease-fire.

159. Mr. KEITA (Mali) (*translated from French*): Yesterday evening I stated my delegation’s position on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [*S/7951/Rev.2*]. Our support for that resolution has been further strengthened today by two facts: first, we continue to believe that there can be no hope of peace while Arab areas remain under the control of Israel forces; secondly, sub-paragraph 1 (vi) (c) of the Secretary-General’s report, submitted this morning in document *S/7930/Add.7*, indicates that the movement of Israel forces continues in the Damascus region, despite the adoption of relevant resolutions by the Security Council.

160. Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia have submitted a draft resolution [*S/7968/Rev.1*] dealing with one of the most humanitarian aspects of the present situation in the Middle East. We have been informed that Arabs who have been expelled from their lands are wandering in the desert, suffering from thirst and all kinds of torments. We should like to ask whether, through the good offices of General Bull, United Nations personnel could not be given greater means of helping more effectively all the people who are now suffering from thirst in the desert.

161. Reverting to the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia, if the sponsors have no objections, we should like to see this draft completed by the addition of a third operative paragraph, worded as follows:

“3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council.”

If the three sponsors would be good enough to accept this slight amendment, we think it might improve the draft resolution.

162. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

163. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I feel it my duty to draw the attention of members of the Council to the distortion engaged in by the Israel spokesman. He denied that the movement of Israel forces referred to in point (c) of sub-paragraph (vi) of the Secretary-General’s report [*S/7930/Add.7*] was forward movement. But this movement of Israel troops was reported by United Nations military observers as a movement approximately two kilometres east along the Kuneitra-Damascus road. Anyone familiar with the Kuneitra-Damascus road knows that it leads to Damascus. Anyone going from Kuneitra to Damascus is moving forward. Hence, this is undoubtedly a forward movement, and it is a clear-cut violation of the cease-fire; it happened after the cease-fire had taken effect.

164. The Israel spokesman said—although he made some reservations—that the report of the observers is based on what the local people say. Such an allegation really cannot be accepted by anyone with intelligence. Do the military observers ask the Syrian people what is happening on the

front and then send their reports to the Secretary-General? Is that the kind of evidence that we are using here?

165. It is truly amazing, to say the least, that the Israel representative should speak about respect for law, when this very Council has condemned Israel more than any other State in the United Nations. No other States, including the Arab States, have been condemned by the Security Council so many times as these invaders. One need only go to the records of the Security Council. I do suggest that it is an insult to the intelligence of members of the Council and of the United Nations to perpetrate such lies. The Israel representative knows that they are lies.

166. Mr. SETTE CAMARA (Brazil): Mr. President, with your permission I should like to put on record the position of my delegation concerning the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/7951/Rev.2]. When I first took the floor on the question before us, I made it quite plain that the Brazilian Government, in view of the very close ties of friendship which link our nation both to the Arab States and to Israel, would remain as objective as possible in the consideration of this question.

167. It is in the light of the foregoing that my delegation is going to analyse the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. In our view, this draft contains three main elements: first, it accuses Israel of having violated the cease-fire resolutions approved by this Council; secondly, it accuses Israel of continuing the occupation of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan; thirdly, it demands:

“...that Israel should immediately and unconditionally remove all its troops from the territory of those States and withdraw them behind the armistice lines and should respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreements.”

168. As far as the first point is concerned, I would say in all fairness that, having in mind all of the information available—and by all the information available I mean the reports of the Secretary-General—I would not be in a position to state categorically which of the parties involved in the conflict first violated the cease-fire resolutions. We should recall that in their acceptance of the cease-fire resolutions, both parties stated clearly that they would comply with the said resolutions only if the other party were to do the same. In view of the conflicting information in connexion with this point, it seems to my delegation extremely difficult to single out a party to the conflict and to condemn it as a violator of the important decisions taken by the Security Council.

169. With reference to the second point, I would say that the occupation by Israel of territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan has resulted from the state of war which does exist between Israel and the above-mentioned States. I would go further and recall that this Council up to now has not called upon Israel to withdraw its forces from the positions they formerly occupied. In the issue before us we must keep in mind that this occupation resulted, as I have already said, from the state of war, either *de facto* or *de jure*, existing between the contending parties,

and we have heard repeated assertions from several representatives according to which there can be no doubt as to the existence of belligerency between the parties concerned.

170. As far as the third point is concerned, my delegation takes note of the statement of the Minister of Defence of Israel in which, as quoted by Ambassador Rafael at the 1347th meeting of the Council, he categorically declared that his country has “no aim of conquest”. That stand is in accordance with the position of the Brazilian Government which has been consistently opposed to any territorial conquest by military means. In connexion with the issue before us, I should like to say that the problem of withdrawal cannot be envisaged as an isolated step. To do so would be tantamount to condemning Israel as the Power responsible for starting the fighting, as the aggressor. Yet the evidence before us—that is, the reports of the Secretary-General—offer no grounds for a clear-cut identification of the Power which struck first. We further contend that the cease-fire resolutions were but a first step which should be followed by other measures such as the withdrawal of troops, military and political disengagement aiming at the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. It is our firm conviction that in this manner only can peace in the area be restored and enforced on a lasting basis.

171. We also favour some of the suggestions which have been submitted to the Council. For instance, we favour the reinforcement of the Council’s cease-fire call through the reactivation and strengthening of the United Nations machinery in the area. Furthermore, we agree that the Secretary-General should be requested to send a special representative to the Middle East to consult with the parties concerned and to help in the reduction of tension and the restoration of peaceful conditions. In addition, the special representative could be of assistance in carrying out the measures relating to the safety and security of the populations living in the areas in which military operations have taken place, as contemplated in the joint draft resolution presented by my country together with Argentina and Ethiopia.

172. For the reasons I have mentioned, my delegation does not support the Soviet draft resolution and will abstain when it is put to the vote.

173. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I made some comments on the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union last night. Before the vote is taken, I should like to comment very briefly on the two outstanding proposals with which Canada has been associated.

174. First of all, there is the draft resolution dated 24 May [S/7905] co-sponsored by Canada and Denmark. That draft resolution, which was designed to reinforce the Secretary-General’s efforts to restore calm in the Near East when he was there on the spot and to urge all Member States to refrain from any steps which might worsen the situation, was all too tragically overtaken by events, as were subsequent efforts made before 5 June to urge restraint on the parties concerned. In the circumstances, I would suggest, Mr. President, with your permission, that the draft resolution contained in document S/7905 be withdrawn.

175. I now turn to the proposal submitted in the name of Canada alone, contained in document S/7941 dated 7 June 1967. That draft resolution embodies an idea, that is, effective implementation of the Security Council's decisions, to which my delegation attaches considerable and continuing importance. My delegation considers that a resolution along the lines we proposed on 7 June could still prove to be applicable and useful, although some revisions taking into account the constructive comments made around this table would be useful.

176. Accordingly, my delegation does not insist on priority over the Soviet draft resolution on which the representative of the Soviet Union has called for an immediate vote. Canada does, however, maintain its draft resolution of 7 June on the table for consideration, perhaps in a revised form, at the appropriate time, and we would wish to consult with other delegations on that text, as we should like to consult on the resolution, in its revised form, which the representative of the United States has just circulated.

177. The representative of the Soviet Union said that our draft resolution constitutes a breach of the Charter and apparently conceals what he called a "cat in the bag". I must say that I find it rather difficult to associate the very straightforward language in that resolution with this description. However, I agree with the Soviet representative that events may have indeed caught up, to some extent, with the resolution, to the extent that it has been in fact in the course of implementation by you, Mr. President, and the Secretary-General in a manner which I hope satisfies him as being within the terms of the Charter. But the possible revisions of our draft on which I should be glad to consult all my colleagues may, I hope, bring whatever "cat" he may believe to have been hidden to his attention for his satisfactory examination.

178. The PRESIDENT: I have no more representatives who have indicated a desire to speak before a vote is taken on the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

179. In order that the situation may be quite clear, I would say this: In addition to the draft resolutions which I mentioned in my introductory remarks this morning, the Secretariat has drawn my attention to two more draft resolutions before the Council. The first is contained in document S/7905 and has been submitted by Canada and Denmark. I agree with the Canadian representative that this draft resolution should be withdrawn since it has been overtaken by events. The second is contained in document S/7916/Rev.1 of 1 June and has been submitted by the United States.

180. An immediate vote has been requested by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. According to rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure:

"Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission."

181. I understand from the representative of Canada that he will not object to the Council's voting now on the draft

resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in document S/7951/Rev.2.

182. I should like to ask the representative of the United States whether he will insist on a vote first on the draft resolution in document S/7916/Rev.1.

183. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I shall be very glad to respond. There are, in fact, three United States proposals before the Council. One is in document S/7916/Rev.1, to which you, Mr. President, have just referred. That was our initial proposal, designed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities by endorsing the appeal of the Secretary-General. A number of members at that time were unwilling to support the Secretary-General's appeal, and the subsequent outbreak of hostilities has made that draft resolution out of date. We will not press it to the vote.

184. The second United States draft resolution is in document S/7971 dated 10 June. We introduced it last Saturday to demand scrupulous respect for the cease-fire and to call for categorical instructions to military commanders. It was denounced by the Soviet Union for reasons I found inexplicable at the time and still find inexplicable. A resolution [236 (1967)] with identical objectives was adopted the next day on your recommendation, Mr. President. The United States delegation will therefore not press draft resolution S/7971 to the vote.

185. The third United States resolution is our substantive proposal contained in document S/7952/Rev.2. We have now submitted a third revision to that draft which has just been circulated [S/7952/Rev.3] and has been referred to by our colleague from Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff. This United States proposal, whose purpose I explained in detail yesterday, is still before the Security Council. My delegation will not ask for a vote on that draft resolution today because several delegations have indicated to us that they desire more time for all members to consider carefully all the complicated ingredients which must go into a truly meaningful next step towards peace in the Middle East. Some members have indicated that they will wish to suggest certain changes in our text. The representative of Ethiopia made a particularly eloquent plea earlier today that we not press this draft resolution to a vote.

186. I want the Council to know that although we have proposed a draft resolution which expresses our sincere convictions in the matter, we are open-minded and will be glad to consider constructive suggestions for improvements in the United States text. Indeed, many constructive contributions on how best we may deal with this subject have been made in the course of our debate. We have been carefully weighing and considering the proposals which have been made.

187. What the Council has achieved so far is in conformity with our objective—that is, not to force votes, but to obtain unanimity on the best course of action that the Council can follow to bring about peace in the Middle East. Indeed, we have been able to achieve unanimity, under difficult conditions, on the cease-fire resolutions we have adopted.

188. We must remember that a cease-fire is in effect, and admittedly the process of consultation, conciliation and

accommodation of viewpoints on the next important steps takes time. We are prepared to agree that appropriate time should be granted for this purpose. We recognize the urgency of the matter. I think we have demonstrated for three weeks our willingness to deal urgently with this situation. But we think it perfectly apparent to all concerned that the Council has far from exhausted its possibilities of contributing to the construction of a stable peace in the Middle East. The fact is that we are not at the end of our work; we are only at the beginning. Despite this, we are not going to stand in the way of a request by a permanent member of the Security Council for consideration of a draft resolution which it has put before the Council. This is quite consistent with the view that the United States delegation has always taken: that if a permanent member or a non-permanent member desires an urgent meeting, an urgent meeting should take place; if a permanent member or a non-permanent member desires a proposal to be put to the vote, that is its privilege. We are prepared to vote on the draft resolution submitted to the Council by the representative of the Soviet Union.

189. The PRESIDENT: I believe, then, that the situation is clear. The draft resolution contained in document S/7905 has been withdrawn. The draft resolutions contained in documents S/7916/Rev.1, S/7952/Rev.3 and S/7971 are not being pressed to the vote. Furthermore, the Canadian representative does not insist on a vote being taken now on the draft resolution in document S/7941; he accepts that priority should be given to the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union in document S/7951/Rev.2.

190. I would therefore suggest to the members of the Council that if there is no objection we should now proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union.

191. Some representatives have asked to give an explanation of vote. When we have heard those explanations of vote, we might adjourn for a couple of hours and then proceed with our debate. If there is no objection, we shall proceed accordingly.

192. I understand that it is the wish of the representative of Nigeria that a separate vote should be taken on each of the operative paragraphs of the Soviet draft resolution [S/7951/Rev.2]. I shall therefore first put to the vote operative paragraph 1.

*A vote was taken by a show of hands.*

*In favour:* Bulgaria, India, Mali, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Nigeria, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*The result of the vote was 4 in favour, none against, with 11 abstentions.*

*Operative paragraph 1 was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of nine members.*

193. The PRESIDENT: I apologize to the representative of the Soviet Union because, contrary to the rules of procedure, I forgot to ask whether he would accept the request made by the representative of Nigeria for a separate vote on the individual paragraphs of the Soviet draft resolution. If he has no objection, I will proceed.

194. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): For all of us the rules of procedure remain the only basis for our conduct and, in this respect, the President should of course set us a good example. There is no need for me to go on developing this idea; but the fact that you have remembered the rules of procedure, although a little late, and that you are now addressing this request to the Soviet delegation does of course give us some grounds for being lenient. If we had been asked this question at the very outset, we should undoubtedly have met the wishes of members of the Council and of you, Mr. President, as we invariably do; and now we wish to state that we have no objections since this is the wish of several members of the Council. We understand that they are motivated by good will.

195. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I should like only to observe—and I think I express not only my own view, but that of the Council—that in the most trying of circumstances the President of the Council has conducted himself with complete fidelity to the rules of procedure and has attempted to the best of his ability, which has been extraordinary, to preside impartially and to carry out the wishes of the Council.

196. The PRESIDENT: Before I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, I want once again to apologize for omitting to ask the Soviet representative whether he would agree to the procedure.

197. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, we much appreciate what you have just said. This is the only possible kind of behaviour for us as members of the Council, colleagues and plenipotentiary representatives of our countries, who are all moved by the same desire to ensure that the Council's work shall be as efficient and business-like as possible. I should like to mention, however, that I did not quite understand the comments we have just heard from the United States delegation. What place do these solicitor's depositions have in our discussions? Why do we need these lawyer's opinions? You and I were having a normal, tactful dialogue based on mutual understanding, but why do other speakers act in the way they do? I am beginning to get the impression that someone becomes deaf whenever it suits him—deaf for political purposes, of course—and that the deaf react and answer quickly but not to the point.

198. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I do not think that the Soviet representative has to tell me what to say; I do not tell him what to say.

199. The PRESIDENT: I consider that this dialogue has now finished, and we shall proceed to the vote on operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution contained in document S/7951/Rev.2.

*A vote was taken by a show of hands.*

*In favour:* Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Japan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*The result of the vote was 6 in favour, none against, with 9 abstentions.*

*Operative paragraph 2 was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of nine members.*

200. The PRESIDENT: Under these circumstances, I do not know whether the Soviet representative will insist that we vote on the draft resolution as a whole, since no operative paragraph has been adopted. The Soviet representative does not insist, and therefore, the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union has not been adopted.

201. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, a vote has just been taken on the Soviet draft resolution which stated that Israel, in defiance of the Security Council's resolutions on the cessation of military activities, has seized additional territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria and is still occupying the territory of those countries, thus failing to halt its aggression and defying the United Nations and all peace-loving states.

202. The Soviet draft resolution proposed that the Security Council should vigorously condemn Israel's aggressive activities and continued occupation of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, regarding this as an act of aggression and the grossest violation of the United Nations Charter and generally recognized principles of international law. The Soviet draft resolution also proposed that the Security Council should demand that Israel should immediately and unconditionally remove all its troops from the territory of those Arab States and withdraw them behind the armistice lines, and should respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreements. These demands, Mr. President, represent the very minimum action which the Security Council should take in the present circumstances, in the face of open aggression against a number of States Members of the United Nations.

203. It is regrettable that owing to opposition by certain members of the Security Council, particularly the United States, the Council has not been able to do its duty in accordance with the United Nations Charter and to take all necessary steps against the aggressor. A heavy responsibility for this rests with those States which have not done their duty as members of the Security Council. As a result an emergency situation has arisen in which emergency measures must be taken by the United Nations and all peace-loving countries in order to stop the continuing aggression in the Near East immediately.

204. The Israel extremists are cynically violating the United Nations Charter and disregarding the elementary rules of contemporary international law and morality. As a result of the aggressive acts of the Israel military clique and ruling circles in Tel Aviv, which have launched a chauvinistic campaign of territorial claims, the situation in the Near East is deteriorating even further.

205. It is obvious, however, that at the present time further discussion of this question in the Security Council cannot produce the results which, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the existing situation requires. The Soviet delegation has already expressed its views on the United States draft resolution [S/7952/Rev.2] which is unacceptable, unsound and designed essentially to help the aggressor. And matters are not likely to be helped much by any minor changes in this draft which do not alter its essentially unacceptable character. The Soviet delegation wishes to state again that it will object to the United States draft resolution and vote against it.

206. A short time ago and, so to speak, "just before the curtain", as members of the Council must have noticed, there appeared a new United States draft resolution [S/7952/Rev.3] which, apart from its verbal embellishments, does not differ in the least from the earlier United States draft. The Soviet delegation wishes to make its position perfectly clear. We shall vote against this hastily concocted United States draft resolution, in exercise of the right accorded to us in the Council.

207. We have also expressed our views on the Canadian draft resolution [S/7941], and in this connexion we reaffirm our negative attitude towards this draft.

208. Thus, Mr. President, owing to the position taken by certain Powers, especially the United States of America, and because of the lack of agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council, some of which (and we are thinking mainly of the United States of America and the United Kingdom) are in actual fact supporting the Israel aggressor, the Security Council is unable to take the necessary decisions in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Mr. President, this is a fact, a regrettable one, and it must be faced together with all its consequences, political, legal and otherwise.

209. Because of this, Mr. President, we must seek other ways of eliminating the consequences of aggression and bringing about the immediate withdrawal of the Israel forces behind the armistice lines. In this difficult hour for the States of the Arab East the Soviet delegation expresses its confidence that all peace-loving and progressive forces, all those who support the cause of the freedom and independence of peoples and the principles of the United Nations Charter, will take all necessary steps to help the peoples of the Arab countries deliver a decisive rebuff to the forces of Israel aggression, defend their lawful rights, extinguish the hotbed of war in the Near East and restore peace in this area.

210. The Soviet delegation, Mr. President, is convinced that, in spite of the difficulties facing the Arab national

liberation movement, the just struggle of the Arab peoples will triumph.

211. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): The United States abstained on all aspects of the Soviet draft resolution for the reasons fully explained in my detailed speech to the Council yesterday [1358th meeting]. I then pointed out the essential defect in the Soviet proposal. The Soviet proposal tried in simple terms to state this, as a solution to this great problem: Condemn Israel for its aggression; Israel, withdraw your troops and let everything go back to exactly where it was before the fighting began on 5 June. I pointed out to the Council what the consequences of that proposal would be. Once again, opposing forces would stand in direct confrontation poised for combat. Once again, there would be no international machinery to keep them apart; once again, Aqaba would be blockaded against the free and innocent passage of all maritime nations; once again nothing would be done to resolve the deep-lying grievances on both sides that have fed the fires of conflict in the Near East for twenty years; and significantly, once again there would be no bar to an arms race in the area, an arms race which has so substantially contributed to tension in that region.

212. It is our sincere judgement, shared by a broad majority of the Council, that the Soviet proposal therefore does not encompass a genuine approach to the solution of the problems. It cannot lead towards peace. Rather, it would be a big step backward towards another war. What the Near East needs today imperatively are new steps towards real peace, not just a cease-fire, which is just what we have today; not just a fragile and perilous armistice, which is what we have had for eighteen years; not just withdrawal, which is necessary but insufficient. Real peace must be our aim.

213. Now, we heard nothing from the Soviet Union today that indicated a desire to move forward, in unanimity among members of this Council, to seek the way to find that real peace. Our draft resolution was put forward with that desire. We indicated flexibility and a desire to accommodate our views to that of other members of the Council in the effort to find a common approach to the solution of this grave problem.

214. I interpret the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union to mean that, rather than making such a real effort, there is an attempt to build a case for some other move which has been publicized in the press in reports about Soviet intentions. As far as the United States is concerned, we are not interested in manoeuvres. We are interested in a genuine effort to arrive at real peace in the Middle East and to work together in the Council to that end. What are needed desperately are real steps to solve our problems. What are needed are not condemnations, which are rarely effective diplomatic actions, and refusals to deal with the errors and policies which led to this situation, but an earnest attempt to find solutions. We are going to persevere in that attempt.

215. Mr. PARTHASARATHI (India): It should not be necessary, keeping in mind the statements I have made in the Council, to make a lengthy explanation of our vote

today. The Security Council adopted on 6 June its first resolution [233 (1967)] calling for a cease-fire. On 7 June the Council set a deadline for 2000 hours GMT the same day [resolution 234 (1967)]. At the Council's 1352nd meeting on 9 June, the parties concerned were given two hours to communicate their acceptance of the cease-fire and their implementation of it [resolution 235 (1967)].

216. Despite the repeated demands of the Council for an effective cease-fire, Israel annexed further territory in Syria. These actions of Israel in defiance of Council resolutions reinforced the grounds for our voting for operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. As far as paragraph 2 of that draft resolution is concerned, my delegation has consistently urged and earnestly pleaded that unless the provision of withdrawal of armed forces to the positions they occupied on 4 June 1967 is linked with the cease-fire, there can be no reduction of tension, much less a stable cease-fire, leading to durable peace. That remains the position of my delegation, and hence our support for the draft resolution.

217. In this context, I must once again draw attention to the four points I first enumerated in the Council at its 1352nd meeting, on 9 June 1967. They are relevant not only to what various delegations have said here but also to any future consideration of the problem either in this Council or elsewhere.

218. I must thank most warmly the representative of Ethiopia, my friend and colleague Mr. Makonnen, for his endorsement of the position my delegation has taken. I should also like to thank the representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom and Brazil, who have referred sympathetically to one or more of the four points.

219. It is not late, even at this stage, to clarify the fact that the basic foundation of the four points is a correlation between cease-fire and withdrawal to positions occupied by Israel's armed forces on 4 June 1967.

220. The second and third points—that is, reactivation and strengthening of the United Nations machinery in the area to enforce the cease-fire and withdrawal, and the request to the Secretary-General to designate a special representative—are also linked with the first point.

221. It is only the fourth point on which the Council would be required to take action, only after withdrawals have been completed and the aggression has been vacated.

222. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): The representative of the Soviet Union said that he was opposed to the Canadian draft resolution of 7 June [S/7941]. As I indicated in my remarks before the vote was taken on his draft resolution that I would be consulting on possible revisions of that draft resolution, I had hoped that he would not indicate in his remarks an unwillingness to consult, not only with Canada but with other members of the Council, on further constructive measures—and here I have in mind the sort of ideas to which the representative of India and others have referred.

223. My delegation, and I believe a majority of the members of the Council, are anxious that consultations in

this Council should continue, and I made this remark last night: that my Government is strongly of the view that the permanent members of the Council should continue to try to concert their actions and should not act in a way which divides the Council and diminishes the chance for any useful results to emerge from our work; that they must, on the contrary, exercise the special responsibilities which the Charter and history have given them, and co-operate in finding positive solutions.

224. I therefore hope, Mr. President, that in adjourning, we adjourn on the note that, whatever other measures the representative of the Soviet Union has in mind to have the United Nations seized with the positions and points of views to which he has referred, we should continue to consult in the Council as we are enjoined to do under the responsibilities which we have assumed here.

225. The PRESIDENT: I have no further speakers listed as wishing to explain their vote. I would therefore, with the indulgence of the members, upon instructions from my Government explain my vote in my capacity as representative of DENMARK.

226. In the opinion of my delegation, the most important purpose of the further activities of the Council in relation to the Middle East should now be to bring about lasting arrangements for a stable peace in that area. In our view, the Council will have to approach this problem in the light of the political realities. We have succeeded in re-establishing peace in the Middle East; what the world can now, with all reason, expect from us is that we endeavour to contribute to arrangements that will reflect the primary responsibility of the Council: to maintain international peace and security. We do not believe that that purpose is served by the adoption of one-sided resolutions placing all responsibility for the present situation on one party to the conflict. The recent history of the Middle East is far too complicated to allow for such judgements. Neither do we believe that that purpose is served by the presentation of demands to one party without any reciprocity.

227. If we are to achieve lasting solutions to the problems of the Middle East, if we are to hope for a stable peace in that area, comprehensive and well-balanced solutions have to be sought, solutions which are equitable and just to all concerned. We acted in unanimity to bring peace back to the Middle East. It is our conviction that only by continuing to act together will it be possible to maintain a stable and durable peace in that area.

228. For those reasons, my delegation abstained from the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/7951/Rev.2.

229. And now, speaking as PRESIDENT, I shall adjourn the meeting until 5 o'clock this afternoon, in accordance with the agreement we reached a little while ago.

230. Mr. IYALLA (Nigeria): Mr. President, I have no more wish than any other member to delay the Council, but could I have some guidance from you as to what we shall be engaged in, specifically, when we reassemble? Is it to take up the outstanding draft resolution submitted by the

delegations of Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia [S/7968/Rev.1]? What exactly are we going to do?

231. The PRESIDENT: When we resume our meeting later today, the first thing that will happen will be that the representative of Argentina will introduce a draft resolution tabled by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia. I understand that the three co-sponsors wish to have a vote today on that.

232. Further, I have a list of representatives who have expressed the wish to speak today.

233. That is what we are going to do. I cannot, unfortunately, tell you what those speakers are going to say.

234. Mr. IYALLA (Nigeria): Thank you very much for your explanation, Mr. President.

235. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of the United Arab Republic.

236. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): My delegation cannot but view with the utmost regret the outcome of the Council's deliberations. It is the belief of my delegation that the Council, by failing to take action with regard to the assessment of the aggression and the condemnation of the aggression, as well as by failing to order the prompt, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the aggressor's forces as prescribed in the draft resolution presented by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has not discharged its primary duties in the maintenance of peace and security.

237. The failure of the Security Council to act in the case before it will certainly raise genuine and grave concern among the peoples of the world. That failure may indicate that the Security Council will not be able even to erase the consequences of aggression in a case in which two imperialist Powers, like the United States of America and the United Kingdom, place all obstacles in the way of, and in fact object to, such just and imperative action.

238. May I ask: Who can fairly and objectively oppose the call for the withdrawal of an aggressor from territory belonging to the victim of that aggression?

239. The vote taken by the Security Council today will be another injustice to be added to the many injustices directed against the Arabs and their just cause.

240. The Government of the United States has been saying time and again that the Viet-Nam problem should be dealt with in the Security Council. By this hypocritical suggestion it believes that it can fool the world and cover up its sinister designs in Asia. The attitude of the United States delegation in this Council is a warning to those who still entertain the hope that the Council could act in cases not favoured by the United States Government.

241. I should like to express our sincere thanks to the delegations that voted in favour of the Soviet draft resolution. They are upholding the Charter of the United Nations and standing beside the victims of aggression.

242. I should like to tell the Council, and specifically the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, that the Arabs will not accept this injustice and that they will see to it that the injustice is undone.

243. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Soviet Union has indicated a desire to speak.

244. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, will you please state exactly when we shall be meeting again?

245. The PRESIDENT: One other representative has asked to speak before the adjournment of this meeting. I have been informed that he will speak for only about five minutes. After he has spoken, it is my intention to adjourn, with the Council's agreement, until 5 o'clock. Of course, I am in the hands of the Council, but I think the agreement was that we should adjourn for about two hours.

246. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Iraq. Since the Security Council table has been filled as a result of the invitations that have been extended to four representatives, the representative of Syria has indicated his willingness to withdraw temporarily from his place at the Council table while the representative of Iraq makes his statement. I appreciate this gesture by the representative of Syria, and I now call on the representative of Iraq to take a place at the Council table and make his statement.

247. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for allowing me to make a statement to the Security Council. As I have promised, I shall speak for only a few minutes. I would start by saying that there are two reasons why we have not been participating in these discussions during the past few days.

248. The first reason relates to the physical seating arrangements in the Council chamber. It was decided—with our agreement, of course—that the representatives of only three Arab countries would sit at the Council table throughout the discussions. Those three representatives have carried out their task with distinction. They have explained the points of view of the Arab countries as a whole. The representatives of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria, the countries most directly concerned, have been sitting with you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council for the past few days. Of course, to say that they are the countries "most directly concerned" is not to give the entire picture. For all the Arab countries are directly concerned. Indeed, it is not only the Arab countries that are directly concerned: all the peoples of the world are and should be directly concerned with this naked aggression by Israel against the peoples of the Arab countries. One proof of that has been the appearance before the Council this afternoon of the representative of Pakistan, who, in his own words and with his own emotions, explained how important this question is to all Members of the United Nations and all the peoples of the world. I repeat: this matter is the concern not only of the Arab countries, but of all peoples of the world who cherish liberty, justice and independence.

249. We are very grateful to the representative of Pakistan and to the Government and people of Pakistan for their

support for the just cause of the Arabs in this conflict. We are also grateful to the members of this Council who have been working day and night in an attempt to support the rights of the Arabs.

250. The second reason why we have not been participating in these discussions is that we have been watching from the sidelines in disbelief, disillusionment and disgust—if I may be permitted, as one of the aggrieved parties, to use that word. We have been watching meetings of the Council dragging on for hours and hours in order to allow the aggressor to occupy as much territory as possible. Those manoeuvres of some members, permanent members, of the Security Council are so clear to everyone that no explanation is needed. I would refer to what took place with regard to the Israel aggression against Syria and the cease-fire. Each time the Council was convened to be informed of continuing advances by the aggressor, some delegations would say, "We are not sure. We want further clarification. We want further information". The reason was clear to everyone. They were conniving with the Israel aggressor in order to ensure that that aggressor would achieve its designs in respect of Syrian territory. And that is exactly what happened.

251. My brothers of the Arab States at this table and the representatives of other States—the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and others—have emphasized the collusion of some Powers in the Israel aggression against the Arab world. Aircraft were sent to bomb Arab installations and positions. And I am referring to United States aircraft.

252. The United States Government has denied many times that it has used its aircraft. But suppose for argument's sake that we agree and allow this argument of the United States Government to be accepted. There are two points that could never be argued or disputed. All of us know of the close fraternal or paternal relations between Israel and the United States. All of us know of the importance of United States interests in the Middle East. All of us are aware of the concern of humanity regarding the possibility of a world war. All of us, I repeat again, know of the relations between the Israel aggressors and the United States Government. Are we going to be convinced that the United States Government did not, because of those very important reasons, give the green light to the Israelis to attack? Are we going to be convinced that the Israelis did not get the permission of the United States Government to go ahead with their attack on the Arab countries?

253. Millions of dollars of United States tax-exempt money is being collected now in this country from the people of the United States. How can those millions of dollars be allowed to go to the Israel aggressors when we know that the City of New York has been looking around for months now for a few million dollars to relieve the plight and poverty of the coloured people of the City of New York? I even heard about a fight that was reported on the radio this morning between the Mayor and others concerning the \$6 million that is going to be added or subtracted because the New York City budget cannot allow that sum of money to take care of some of the misery of the people who have been living here under conditions of

discrimination. How, for heaven's sake, can we understand the millions and hundreds of millions of dollars that are being collected with impunity to be sent to Israel? That is one thing.

254. The other is this: Are we going to be convinced that there was no mutual understanding between the United States authorities and the Israel aggressors concerning intelligence and information? We know very well that as one of the biggest Powers in the world, the United States Government must have the facilities to find out what is going on in territories in all parts of the world. One of my colleagues has already referred to the U-2 planes and the other information vessels and satellites. So we are convinced only for those two reasons—and we say there are three—that the United States Government is as responsible as the Israelis concerning the attack against our Arab world.

255. May I also mention the pressures and the *démarches* that have been made by the United States Government in the capitals of the world and here in the United Nations to try to stand in the way of the undoing of the Israel aggression. This is apparent to all concerned and to all the peoples of the world.

256. This morning Lord Caradon, the representative of the United Kingdom, spoke about the responsibilities of the members of the Security Council. I am not here to tell the members of the Council about their responsibilities. But being an aggrieved party, we again read the Charter of the United Nations.

257. Chapter V of the Charter concerns the Security Council. Article 23, paragraph 1, states with regard to election of Security Council members:

"The General Assembly shall elect six other members of the United Nations . . . due regard"—that is to complete the membership of the Security Council—"being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution."

That reference to "equitable geographical distribution" means that members of the Security Council do not represent their countries only; they represent the entire membership of the United Nations, and they have to uphold the principles and functions of the United Nations Charter.

258. Article 24, paragraph 1, states:

"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer"—we, the 122 Members of the United Nations—"on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."

The Security Council is required to act on behalf of the United Nations.

259. I do not need to say that in this case the Security Council should not act on behalf of the aggressors, as some people have been doing. Paragraph 2 of Article 24 states:

"In discharging these duties, the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."

Thus the Council acts on behalf of the Members and also for the purposes of the United Nations. I say this with reference to what has just been said by the representative of the United Kingdom whose Government is as responsible as the Government of the United States in each and every single aspect of the situation. Of course, the delegation of the United Kingdom was not as active in speaking in the Council as the United States, but it does share the responsibility with the United States.

260. The reason I refer to the responsibilities of the membership of the Security Council is because of what I heard the representative of the United States, Ambassador Goldberg, say when he spoke of his duties in the Security Council. Mr. Goldberg said:

"I do not imply that any member of the Council in appearing here represents anybody other than his country." [1356th meeting, para. 71.]

I thought that the members of the Council represented the United Nations. Then he continued:

"We speak for our countries, we state their policies"—the policy is to condone, encourage and protect Israel aggression in the area—"and we attempt to the best of our abilities to present the point of view of our countries to this Council." [Ibid.]

I do not need to go further into that. I think I have made my point. If I need to add to it, it is simply to say that all that the United States Government has done here is to protect Israel aggression.

261. If I may, I should like to take two or three minutes more. Since the crisis started, all of us recall that famous United States commitment to safeguard the territorial integrity of all the countries in the area. A week or so before the outbreak of hostilities, we heard the representative of the United States very eloquently and repeatedly mention that the commitment of the United States is the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of all. And those of us who were here remember very well the emphasis that Ambassador Goldberg used to put, before the outbreak of hostilities, on "all"; indeed, he used to say: "all parties". Then the outbreak of hostilities took place. The Israel invaders went into our homeland. It was mentioned just once in the beginning, but the "all" was not as loud. Since that time, I think we heard it only once because, in effect—and this can be verified by the dispatches from Washington concerning the position of the State Department—whenever representatives of the United States Government were asked, "What do you mean by 'all'?", they said that there was no comment. But the "all" before the Israel invasion meant one thing, which everybody knows.

262. Mention was made here—it was started by the United States delegation and repeated by some members of the Council—about negotiations between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. If you believe that the victim of aggression can negotiate with an aggressor, then, Mr. President, the history of your own country would tell you the truth. The Danish people did not negotiate with the Nazi aggressors. The French people did not negotiate with the Nazis. The Russian people, who fought heroically up to the gates of Moscow, did not negotiate with the aggressors. The Ethiopian people did not negotiate with the Fascist Italians. How do you want us to negotiate with the aggressors? To give the fruits of aggression to the aggressor? To negotiate under blackmail, international or otherwise?

263. Already in *The New York Times* this morning—as was said by one of my colleagues, *The New York Times* now has a monopoly on the news—there was a story about the Israel Government starting to build an atom bomb. I am sure you have all read that. This is part and parcel of the manoeuvres. This is part and parcel of the blackmail. As if we did not know the Israelis have been doing this for some time now. What do they want to tell us? “Unless you accept, you will be annihilated by an atom bomb.” And with whose technical assistance and advice is this atom bomb being made?

264. Mr. President, I think I have taken enough of your time. One thing that I should like to say is that even though we have had setbacks, even though we have had defeats, we are right, we will attain our rights, and we will repulse the invader. We will—and this is addressed not only to the invader, it is addressed to others—not forget, we will not forgive.

265. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of the United States in exercise of his right of reply.

266. Mr. BUFFUM (United States of America): I am truly sorry to have to detain the Council further before its well-deserved recess, but I find it completely impossible to let this meeting adjourn without commenting on the monstrous allegations which we have just heard from the representative of Iraq. I shall try to confine my remarks to something less than five minutes, which he promised that his presentation would take, but I think there are two or three points which must be made in this connexion.

267. First of all, we heard a repetition of the allegation that United States planes were involved in the recent conflict. My delegation has denied that allegation so often that it hardly seems necessary to do so again. But lest the old technique of repeating a lie frequently make it true and bear any fruit here, I find it necessary once more to state categorically that that is an absolute falsehood. We have repeatedly offered to accept impartial United Nations investigations of these charges, an offer which I may say has not yet been taken up. I can only hope that the remark

which the representative of Iraq made that “perhaps we can pass over this one” means that he and his colleagues have now at last come to recognize the falsity of that particular charge.

268. With regard to his perhaps more fundamental and even more egregious complaint that the United States gave a “green light to Israel aggression”, as he put it, I should just like to remind the members that, as frequent statements here have proven, the United States, both inside and outside the Council, exerted its very best efforts to prevent a conflict from breaking out. Those of you who were engaged in the discussions and efforts to get a resolution ensuring that the Council would take pre-emptive action to avoid a conflict, and the efforts to get a cease-fire the moment the conflict broke out, will know where the truth lies.

269. Finally, in order not to detain the members too long, I should like to clarify only one point of policy on the part of the United States Government about which the representative of Iraq appears to be confused. I take it from his comments about that newspaper that he is an avid reader of *The New York Times*. But I think he did not read this morning's *New York Times* carefully enough. If he had, he would have seen that as recently as yesterday United States policy with regard to the territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the Middle East was reaffirmed personally by President Johnson.

270. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Iraq has asked for the floor in exercise of his right of reply.

271. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq): Just to set the record straight, I did not say, concerning the participation of United States planes in the aggressive action against our homeland, that we can pass over this one. I only said that, suppose for argument's sake, we would pass over this one.

272. With regard to reading *The New York Times*, what can we do? Practically the only newspaper that is available when we open our eyes in the morning is *The New York Times*, and that is what we read.

273. As to the commitment of the United States Government, in *The New York Times* this morning it is said that the President did not offer any explanation, and that State Department officials would not want to go into details as to what they meant by this commitment.

274. The PRESIDENT: I have no further speakers on my list. Since it is now about 3.20 p.m., I would propose that we adjourn the meeting until 5.30 p.m., if this is agreeable to the Council. There being no objection, the meeting is adjourned until 5.30 p.m.

*The meeting rose at 3.25 p.m.*

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