



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SECOND YEAR

**1345<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 31 MAY 1967

NEW YORK

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## NOTE

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## THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 31 May 1967, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. LIU Chieh (China).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1345)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902).
3. Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907).
4. Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910).

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

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**Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907)**

**Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)**

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Council, and with the consent of the Council, I now invite the representatives of Israel, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic

and Lebanon to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. G. Rafael (Israel), Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic), Mr. M. H. El-Farra (Jordan), Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) and Mr. G. Hakim (Lebanon) took the places reserved for them.*

2. The PRESIDENT: Letters dated 30 May 1967 have been received from the representatives of Iraq [S/7914] and Morocco [S/7915] requesting that they be invited to participate in the Council's discussion. Accordingly, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Iraq and Morocco to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber in order to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Pachachi (Iraq) and Mr. A. T. Benhima (Morocco) took the places reserved for them.*

3. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now continue its discussion of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council will have noted that a United States draft resolution has been distributed this afternoon in document S/7916.\*

4. The first speaker on my list is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

5. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq): I am grateful to the Council for giving me this opportunity to make a statement in the present debate. I have been instructed by the Government of the Republic of Iraq to appear before this important body to explain the position that my country takes in respect of the present situation in the Near East.

6. The grave crisis endangering peace and security in our area has arisen because of Israel's threat to start a war if its demands concerning navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba are not met. While the Government of the United Arab Republic has informed the Secretary-General that it "would not initiate offensive action against Israel" [S/7906, para. 9],<sup>1</sup> no such assurance—I repeat, no such assurance—has been given by the Israel Government; on the contrary, responsible Israel officials such as the Prime

\* Subsequently replaced by document S/7916/Rev.1 in English only.

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967.

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Minister, Mr. Eshkol, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban, have stated in clear and unmistakable terms that unless Israel's demands concerning navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba are fully satisfied, Israel will use force to obtain them.

7. This is the situation in all its stark simplicity: one side solemnly declaring that it will use force only if attacked, and the other side giving notice to the world that it will employ military means in order to acquire certain rights in another country's territory on the basis of arguments of doubtful validity. Never before has such a challenge been hurled at this Organization and the international community. It is therefore incumbent upon this Council, if it wishes to discharge its responsibilities, to determine first of all the real causes of the crisis and where the real threats to peace come from.

8. Israel is asking the Council to be party to an attempt to impose upon the United Arab Republic a solution that flouts that country's sovereign rights as an independent State and that would endanger its national security. In his brilliant analysis two days ago, my friend Mr. El Kony of the United Arab Republic fully covered the legal aspects of the problem, and I would like to say now that my Government fully endorses the point of view he expressed regarding the sovereign right of the United Arab Republic to control navigation through its territorial waters whenever it feels such control is necessary for its own national security. Prior to 1956 such control was not challenged by the users of the gulf. The United Arab Republic has now restored the *status quo ante*, that is, the situation as it existed before the Israel aggression against Egypt in 1956. It is evident that no rights or privileges derived by the aggressor from his aggression can have any legal or moral validity. Yet that is exactly what certain Powers are calling on the Council to state. Instead of helping to remove the last traces of that odious adventure, they wish to ensure that Israel continues to enjoy the fruits of its aggression.

9. The questions arising from the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, including the problem of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, are only symptoms of a deeper conflict, a conflict which is commonly called "The Palestine question". We fully agree with the statement of the Secretary-General in his latest report that "the underlying basis for this and other crisis situations in the Near East is the continuing Arab-Israel conflict which has been present all along" [*ibid.*, para. 2].

10. May I take this opportunity to express, on behalf of my Government, our appreciation and support for the decision of the Secretary-General to comply promptly with the request of the United Arab Republic Government to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force. In paragraphs 2 to 7 of his latest report, the Secretary-General makes what we believe to be an unanswerable case for the withdrawal.

11. Regarding the question of Palestine, I would say that rarely has a problem evoked such deep emotions or had such enduring significance. This is because there are few problems which raise as many fundamental questions. All the great issues of our time are interwoven in the fabric of

the Palestine question. But essentially it is the unique tragedy of a people who have been denied their birth-right of freedom in the land which has been theirs from time immemorial.

12. Those Powers which demand an immediate solution to the problem of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba—on which not a single resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council has ever been adopted and on which the United Nations has taken no position—do not display the same sense of urgency and concern for the fate of one and a quarter million human beings whose right to repatriation to their homeland has been solemnly proclaimed and reaffirmed in no less than eighteen resolutions of the General Assembly. Nor do they seem to be disturbed by the repeated violations of so many other resolutions adopted by the Assembly and this Council, including the cease-fire resolution adopted by the Security Council on 15 July 1948 [54 (1948)], under Chapter VII of the Charter, and the resolutions adopted pursuant to it.

13. If the Arab States today were to declare that the non-implementation of these resolutions was a *casus belli*, would they not be on far more solid ground than Israel, which claims a right which it does not possess under international law and on which the United Nations has taken no position, formally or otherwise? Are we not entitled to conclude, therefore, that according to those who now vigorously uphold Israel's illegal demand for free and unfettered passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, the *fait accompli* is the only principle to guide United Nations actions? One wonders if that is why Israel, this persistent and avid practitioner of the *fait accompli*, is permitted to defy with impunity so many resolutions of the United Nations.

14. The Armistice Agreements themselves have been violated repeatedly by Israel. The representative of the United Arab Republic has given a few examples of such violations, namely, the occupation of the demilitarized zones and the deliberate disruption of the functioning of the armistice machinery. We endorse the Secretary-General's proposal to reactivate this machinery, provided it is accompanied by the strict implementation of the Armistice Agreements and the full restoration of the conditions which prevailed at the time of the signing of these Agreements.

15. It follows from that brief account of some of Israel's more notorious activities that it would be illogical, and indeed unreasonable, to isolate and give priority to the secondary question of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, while ignoring the other, far more weighty and urgent problems with which the United Nations and the Security Council have been concerned for years. The fact that the Israelis threaten to start a war on the question of navigation does not detract from the importance of the other questions; nor does it give the question of access to the Gulf of Aqaba any special importance, unless the Council is prepared to give in whenever a Member State, irresponsibly and for reasons of prestige, decides to make a particular question a *casus belli*.

16. There are two ways of dealing with the Palestine question. First, there are those who believe that this question should be examined objectively on its own merits,

and that on the basis of that objective examination decisions that are consistent with the Charter and the principles of equity and justice should be taken. Secondly, there are those who feel that expediency should be the deciding factor; that the United Nations should attempt only what is, in their view, possible or feasible, even to the extent of condoning and perpetuating an injustice. The latter theory is based on the belief that the passage of time will make the victims of any crime or injustice, however grave it may be, accept their fate. But this in effect grants licence to any State to take the law into its own hands, defy and ignore resolutions with impunity, and dictate its own terms for the solution of problems. How can the United Nations survive if it surrenders to expediency and allows itself to become an instrument for the consolidation of aggression? Yet this is precisely what the effort to ensure Israel navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba amounts to.

17. In this present crisis, brought about by Israel, the Arab States have repeatedly stated that they will not initiate military operations or take the first step on the road to war. But if Israel uses force, then the conflict will not be localized, but will spread to all the other theatres, and it will not end until Israel aggression has been totally defeated and the Israel menace to the peace and security of the area removed. Those who think that the issue will be settled by a quick, lightning thrust are indulging in dangerous delusions.

18. My friend and colleague, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, yesterday gave the Council [1344th meeting] an eloquent and moving account of the feelings of our people and their unshakable determination to put an end to twenty years of humiliation at the hands of the aggressor in our midst. We shall defend ourselves whatever the cost and however long and difficult the struggle may be. We are prepared to use every tool at our disposal. The conflict will be total and uncompromising.

19. The day before I left Baghdad my Government decided to deny our oil resources to any State which takes part in or supports the Israel aggression against the Arab States. We have invited all the other Arab oil-producing and exporting countries to meet with us to co-ordinate our positions. This must prove that our people are prepared to bear any hardship and accept any sacrifice. But there will be no retreat. Make no mistake about that; make no miscalculations.

20. For fifty years we witnessed the Zionist peril steadily advancing. From a mere promise given by a colonial Power in time of war, Israel was able to carve for itself a precious part of our homeland, continually threatening and trying to intimidate our people with murderous attacks across the armistice lines, which as the Foreign Minister of Lebanon said, the Arab countries have not once crossed since 1949 but which the Israelis have crossed with their armies twelve times. And now they are not hesitating to threaten to unleash a war on us, and maybe on the world, in order to keep their ill-gotten gains.

21. The problem before the Council is to prevent Israel, which alone is threatening war, from carrying out its threat. But this should not be done by giving in to its demands.

The Council should take up the real issues which underlie the crisis and without the solution of which there can be no peace in the area—the issues relating to the people of Palestine and their rights and relating to the necessity to reactivate the elaborate machinery which the Security Council itself established to keep the peace in the area. Until and unless that is done no real progress can be achieved in fulfilling the Council's primary responsibility of keeping the peace—not a peace of convenience or expediency, but a peace based on the principles of the Charter, a peace based on respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, a peace based on justice, and not a peace based on allowing an aggressor, which ten years ago treacherously attacked Egypt, to maintain and keep the one remaining fruit of its aggression, in contravention of the principles of international law and equity.

22. Mr. President, I ask for your indulgence, since we have the floor and since the United States draft resolution is now before us, to say that we do not believe that the draft resolution fully conforms with the intent of the report of the Secretary-General. But, naturally, before giving our final view on this text, we shall await the explanations of the representative of the United States as to what is intended by the draft resolution, as to what conditions it intends to establish.

23. Mr. MATSUI (Japan): Last Wednesday, I had the opportunity to express [1342nd meeting] the very grave concern of my Government regarding the situation in the Middle East. Our concern has grown more acute and has deepened, particularly since we have received the Secretary-General's second report of 26 May 1967 [S/7906], in which, having just returned from visiting Cairo, he reiterated his assessment of the general situation in the area, already described in his first report of 19 May as being "more disturbing, indeed . . . more menacing, than at any time since the fall of 1956" [S/7896, para. 19].

24. The deeper our concern, however, the stronger becomes our conviction that it is incumbent upon the Security Council to face squarely the problem in all its aspects and to discharge its responsibilities promptly and effectively. My delegation notes that the second report of the Secretary-General deals with a considerable number of substantial matters of great importance affecting the maintenance of international peace and security in the Near East, at present and in the future. In the view of my delegation, the Secretary-General's assessment of the situation, and the various substantive matters referred to by him in his report, provide a very good basis for the Council to consider the present situation in the Near East, without unnecessary acrimonious interventions.

25. The Secretary-General's reiterated assessment of the situation strengthens the view of my delegation that the foremost and most important consideration is for all Governments concerned to exercise maximum restraint, scrupulously avoiding any action of any kind which might lead to further deterioration of the present grave situation. Because this is our strongly held view, we support, with other delegations, the Secretary-General when, in his report, he urges all parties concerned "to exercise special

restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions" [S/7906, para. 14].

26. My delegation believes that the Council as a whole—I would venture to hope unanimously—might very well support the Secretary-General's efforts to reduce present tensions by appealing to all the parties concerned to exercise the maximum of self-restraint.

27. The relaxation of present tensions should provide, as the Secretary-General put it, a "breathing spell". Such a "breathing spell" would offer, first of all, a better opportunity for the parties concerned to seek, as they are clearly obliged to do under Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, a solution of their disputes by negotiation or other peaceful means of their own choice.

28. We note in this connexion that the Secretary-General has mentioned, in his discussions with officials of the United Arab Republic and Israel, possible steps which could be taken by mutual consent. The Secretary-General also expressed, in paragraphs 10 and 12 of his second report, his particular concern over the dangerous consequences which could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran. I have no intention at this juncture of discussing the legal aspect of this question. My delegation, however, cannot help sharing the Secretary-General's deep concern in this regard. We therefore strongly urge the parties concerned to rely on peaceful means, as specified in the Charter, for a solution of this problem.

29. To conclude my remarks, my delegation is fully aware of the innumerable difficulties and complexities involved in seeking a peaceful solution of the prolonged conflict between the Arab States and Israel. We do not foresee that such a solution will come easily or quickly, but the stakes of peace or war in the Near East are altogether too high to permit even the slightest degree of cynicism, defeatism or despair. The conflicting parties have the most solemn obligation to make every effort to find peaceful solutions of their basic conflict acceptable to all of them.

30. Meanwhile, almost two weeks have passed since the present tense situation in the Near East was brought to our attention. Now is the time for the United Nations as a whole, and particularly the Security Council, in close co-operation with the Secretary-General, to seek the positive, specific and objective measures that may be necessary to bring that basic conflict to a just and peaceful end.

31. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I have asked to speak briefly in order to submit a draft resolution for the consideration of the Council. This draft resolution is simple and reads as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General in document S/7906,*

*"Having heard the statements of the parties,*

*"Concerned at the gravity of the situation in the Middle East,*

*"Noting that the Secretary-General has in his report expressed the view that 'a peaceful outcome to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing spell which will allow tension to subside from its present explosive level', and that he therefore urged 'all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions',*

*"1. Calls on all the parties concerned as a first step to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal,*

*"2. Encourages the immediate pursuit of international diplomacy in the interests of pacifying the situation and seeking reasonable, peaceful and just solutions,*

*"3. Decides to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council may determine what further steps it might take in the exercise of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security."* [S/7916/Rev.1.]

32. It is obvious that this is an interim draft resolution. It simply endorses the Secretary-General's appeal for a breathing spell in order, in his words, to "allow tension to subside from its present explosive level" [S/7906, para. 14] and to gain time in which "to seek, and eventually to find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions" [ibid., para. 19]. To this end the draft resolution urges all parties to exercise the restraint necessary to allow both the Council and international diplomacy to pursue the further steps required to defuse the situation and move towards peace.

33. In offering the draft resolution at this time, my delegation is conscious of the fact that it is now one week since the Council first met in the present crisis. Our meeting today is the fourth in this series of meetings, during which all of us—the members of the Council and the parties to the dispute—have had the opportunity to state our respective positions. Five days ago the Secretary-General returned from his arduous mission to Cairo. Four days ago he submitted his report to the Council, in which he said that his major concern at this critical juncture was to "gain time in order to lay the basis for a *détente*" [ibid., para. 12].

34. The events since then have certainly underscored the urgency which the Secretary-General expressed to us last Friday in his report. To be sure, in my statement to the Council on Monday [1343rd meeting], I was able to refer to a brief and welcome respite which had been obtained by diplomatic efforts in which my country actively participated. Nevertheless I was obliged to emphasize that the crisis has not substantially eased, tension remains great, and the time-span in which to avert a clash is short. Those remarks, regrettably, still hold true today.

35. The Security Council, in a world body of 122 Members, is a relatively small and compact body; it was so designed under the Charter. It is charged, in Article 24 of



the Charter, with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". Let us not forget the reason, which is made expressly clear in the same Article. It is, to quote the Charter: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations . . .".

36. To that end the United States believes that the Council ought to take, step by step, the necessary decisions in this extremely grave and important matter. The draft resolution which we now submit reflects the first step which, in our view, the Council should take. The measures which we propose in this interim resolution are designed, in the spirit of the Secretary-General's report, to ensure a cooling-off period in the Near East without prejudice to the ultimate rights or claims of any party. This will afford the necessary time for more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues.

37. It is not our intention in offering this interim resolution to attempt in any way to evade or delay the exercise by the Council of its responsibility to seek solutions to the underlying causes of the present crisis. On the contrary, our aim is to gain time and to create a climate in which such solutions can be sought under more favourable conditions.

38. Indeed, our draft resolution takes into account the fact that the Council has two types of responsibilities. In addition to its responsibility to avert an imminent clash, it has also the responsibility conferred by Chapter VI of the Charter, and described in the Secretary-General's words: "to seek, and eventually to find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions" [*S/7906, para. 19*].

39. And corresponding responsibilities lie also, under the Charter, on every Member State in the international community to support our common effort in the United Nations to achieve peace and security in the Near East.

40. There is one great issue in the balance here today: the issue of keeping the peace in the Near East, with all that that implies for world security. But we in this Council must also recognize that we face another issue as well: the issue of the potency and efficacy of the United Nations.

41. The twenty-one-year record of the Security Council contains numerous instances of historic decisions, decisions by which we, the members, were able to "harmonize our actions", as the Charter says, sufficiently to save the world from the scourge of war. We have proved that we have the capacity to serve the purpose assigned to us by the Charter. The issue now is whether we have the courage, the resolution and the vision to exercise that capacity.

42. It must be candidly acknowledged that we have many conflicting interests represented at this table. But we have one overriding common interest, which is peace. I suspect that a detached observer following these proceedings, as they are being followed all over the world, will be watching above all to see whether partisan concerns and narrow national interests will be subordinated to our common overriding interest in peace.

43. I earnestly commend this draft resolution to the attention of the Council.

44. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of Jordan to take a place at the Council table and make a statement.

45. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I deeply regret that the Israelis' persistent violations of the General Armistice Agreement, which brought about the present tension in the area, has compelled my Government to address the Council with a sense of deep urgency. Little has been heard about the chain of Israel violations, murders and plunder which created the present situation endangering international peace and security.

46. We have time and time again reminded the Council of the determination on the part of the Israel authorities to create a situation convenient for their expansionist designs in the area. We have recorded events, serious incidents and acts of aggression committed against our area and people. However, in spite of the seriousness of the situation, no effective and deterrent remedy has been taken by the Council.

47. I need not dwell at length on a description of the attacks by Israel troops and regular armed forces against Jordan. We have described them earlier, either through formal complaints or in official documents presented to the United Nations. Let us, however, very briefly consider the behaviour of the Israel authorities after the decision taken on As Samu by the Council in which Israel was censured and in which the Council emphasized to Israel that military actions could not be tolerated and that if they were repeated the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps, as envisaged in the Charter—that is, in Chapter VII—to ensure against the repetition of such acts.

48. Only last month Israel forces, in spite of the decision of the Security Council, again crossed the armistice demarcation line into Jordan, south of Hebron, and Israel helicopters transporting Israel forces also crossed the armistice demarcation line and landed in Jordan. The intruding Israel forces, while inside Jordan, engaged in a serious clash with Jordanian civilians, causing the death of one Jordanian and the wounding and kidnapping of another who was later murdered inside Israel.

49. We had filed a complaint with the United Nations machinery in the area, and the Mixed Armistice Commission found that the Israelis' action constituted complete disregard by Israel of its obligations under the Armistice Agreement. The Commission also determined that this hostile and warlike act was the most serious and flagrant violation of article III, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Jordan-Israel General Armistice Agreement.

50. The Mixed Armistice Commission took a most serious view of the Israel authorities, who openly admitted the act of aggression, in utter disregard of their obligations. The Commission finally used what has become a routine formula and called on the Israel authorities in the strongest terms to desist from a most serious threat to peace and security.

51. This act committed last month was the Israel reaction to the Security Council decision on As Samu of 25 November 1966 [*resolution 228 (1966)*].

52. Furthermore, a month later, on 15 May 1967, the Israel authorities conducted a military parade in the occupied part of the Holy City of Jerusalem. Not a single Ambassador of any member Government of the Security Council attended that parade, which not only violated the Armistice Agreement, but also amounted to an act of well-planned provocation as part of the Israelis' expansionist designs.

53. No words could better describe that flagrant provocation than the statement of Mr. Ysrael Galili, an Israel Cabinet member, which was reported in the Israel *Jerusalem Post* of 7 May 1967 as follows:

“‘We’”—meaning the Government of Israel—“‘shall judge the Independence Day parade in Jerusalem not by the number of ambassadors present, but by our attitude towards the Defence Forces and the capital. No country would be relieved of its obligation to send a representative to the parade.’ Israel had not asked permission”—I want to underline this—“to declare Jerusalem its capital or to transfer the Knesset there, he said. The day would come when all the world’s statesmen would realize that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel by ‘virtue of the political fact we shall create’.”

54. The Israelis, as can be seen, in all arrogance and defiance declared Jerusalem their capital and transferred the Knesset there, and they are now confronting the world with a *fait accompli*. Mr. Galili’s Government is challenging the will of the Security Council and indeed the world at large when he states that the day would come when the world’s statesmen would realize that Jerusalem was the capital of Israel by virtue of “the political fact we shall create”.

55. I need not take much of the Council’s time at this stage to present evidence of more violations, more condemnations and more defiance. It will be sufficient to refer at this stage to the diversion of the Jordan River. Through this diversion the Israelis would not only deprive the helpless refugee families of their only means of livelihood, but would also gain serious military advantages. It is a fact that this Israel act is in violation of international law and of the Armistice Agreement in the area, which expressly states that no party should effect any change whatsoever which would give it any military advantage. But now, as a result of this diversion, Israel troops in the northern part of Jordan cross the river easily by foot to come into Jordan and commit their crimes. The attack on Tel El Arba’in and Jisr Sheikh Hussein committed on 29/30 April 1966 offers a glaring example. In that attack the Israelis crossed the river in the dark by foot and razed buildings to the ground, killed and murdered innocent civilians and then crossed back on foot into the Israel-occupied area.

56. There has been no fighting which the Israel authorities did not initiate. Not once did Jordan start the fighting, except in self-defence and after having suffered heavy losses and much destruction. We were hoping that the Security Council decision on As Samu would have its effects on the Israelis, but apparently they are still in no mood to abandon their aggressive campaign. I doubt whether they are in a mood to do so at present, now that they are

celebrating the nineteenth year of their usurpation of Palestine, now that the bells of danger are ringing everywhere so that the United Jewish Appeal can collect more American tax-deductible donations, now that many politicians, mayors, governors, senators and congressmen are joining in a campaign to “give to Israel”—I mean now that pressure groups are working at full speed, now that Israel is exploiting an Israel-created situation—to meet its internal economic difficulties.

57. Only last Sunday we witnessed a parade by supposedly American citizens, who carried an Israel flag in one hand and an American flag in the other. I just heard references to conflicting interests. I was wondering, in case of a conflict of interest between the United States of America and Israel, where their loyalty would be, with the Israel flag or the American flag. The behaviour of citizens of a country is an internal matter and comes squarely within the domestic jurisdiction of a Member State. I am aware of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. But I submit that when that behaviour affects the interests of other Member States, thirteen or seventeen Member States, I am entitled in sitting here to discuss the behaviour of pressure groups which are working against the interests of the Americans, a peace-loving people. The parade called for war against the Arabs. I saw in the parade many of the same faces that were in an earlier parade on Fifth Avenue to champion peace.

58. I shall not continue on this subject. This may be very embarrassing to a big Power, because it is not only a privilege to be a big Power, but it is also a responsibility. The responsibility is to fulfil the tasks of a big Power in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Charter and with human rights.

59. We do not think, Mr. President, that Israel is now in a mood to abandon its aggressive designs, despite your appeals and genuine desire. These events which I have described in brief before you indicate beyond a shadow of doubt that, firstly, there has been a continuing violation of the armistice demarcation line; secondly, there has been a violation of the no man’s land; thirdly, the acts committed by Israel regular forces constitute both a violation of the Armistice Agreement and acts of aggression within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter. This whole campaign is part of an expansionist plan aimed at acquiring more Arab lands and displacing more Arab people.

60. We find, therefore, that the Security Council cannot but react to these grave developments. It should compel the Israel authorities to desist from committing such deliberate acts of aggression. It should order the Israelis to retire from the demilitarized zone and the no man’s land and stop trespassing on the armistice demarcation line.

61. The worsening of the situation is caused by the lack of adequate action by the Security Council on every one of these violations. The Secretary-General, in his able report, reminded us that the underlying cause for this and other crisis situations in the Near East is the continuing Arab-Israel conflict which has been present all along. This was explained very clearly in the complaint and in the interventions made by Mr. El Kony, representative of the United Arab Republic.

62. Now that the situation has reached a grave dimension, it is incumbent upon the Security Council to prevent the recurrence of such acts of aggression, thus preventing the case of peace from being threatened. This is the more so since the Israelis are now boycotting two out of the four United Nations machineries in the area, despite repeated requests by the Security Council, which call on Israel to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commissions.

63. I have just come from the Arab East. I visited most of the places in Jordan that were the scenes of Israel brutality and crimes. I visited As Samu and talked to the people there, to the widows of the victims, to the orphans, to the injured, to those who suffered for no reason other than the fact that they happened to be on the demarcation line next to a foreign substance injected into our area against our will, against United Nations principles and the Charter, with the criminal intention to kill and to murder in order to create a vacuum for further expansion.

64. I visited a school of little children, adjacent to the armistice demarcation line in the village of Bidross. Some of the children, young boys of nine to ten years of age, were hit by the bullets of Israel soldiers who were shooting at them across the armistice line, while the children were playing in the school yard. I met some of those boys. They showed me their wounds. Most of them refuse now to leave their classes for the playground, afraid of more Israel bullets. Those children are now the victims of fear. They were treated by the Israel troops as though they were birds in a hunting game. These children will grow up, and I put this question to you, Mr. President, and through you to every member round this table: would it be surprising if many of these boys become members of El-Fatah, El-Assefa, or Abtal Al Awdah organizations? I visited a farmer who left his village and home in the Israel occupied area in order to live on, and cultivate, his land on the Jordanian side of the demarcation line. Recently, Israel attempted to annex this farmer's land as part of its expansionist plan and for strategic purposes. Had Israel succeeded, this farmer would be away from his land and home. Would this helpless and aged man be blamed if he, at this unfortunate old age, turned out to be an El-Fatah or El-Assefa member? In all honesty and sincerity, I pose this question to all of you: how would you feel if you found yourself in the shoes of this aged man or in the place of any expellee from Palestine?

65. Some of you speak about sabotage and terrorism. I beg you to examine this matter carefully. The lands of all those people were annexed to Israel-occupied areas by various vicious and illegal means, either by conquest or forgery or armistice violations, or other evil Zionist means. The legitimate owners, the Arabs of Palestine, look and find foreigners coming from South Africa or Germany or other places to pick fruit from trees they had never planted, in lands they never lawfully possessed, owned or cultivated.

66. A Palestinian looks to the Council and hears some members speak about forgetting the past and looking to the future. Out of bitterness and despair, such legitimate owners may sometimes cross the armistice demarcation line into his land. He may put a little hand-made mine in a road, but the question arises: can this legitimate owner be called

a trespasser in his own land, or a burglar in his own home, or a foreigner in his own country?

67. As I said, the lands worked now by Israelis were taken by them through occupation, forgery, acts of aggression, or violation of United Nations resolutions. Such deeds and violations created the crisis. The Secretary-General very ably referred to the crux of the problem in paragraphs 2 and 14 of his report [S/7906]. These paragraphs should be read together. No interpretation is needed; the words are clear. The Secretary-General is with us, and the meaning and intention behind these paragraphs is very clear to all of us.

68. Mr. Rafael spent some time speaking about El-Fatah. But can the Israel representative cite one single incident that took place in any place outside the Arab area, even by United Nations resolutions? Can he cite one single case where El-Fatah worked in an area not an Arab area according to your resolutions, or in an area not taken by conquest in violation of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?

69. And if those foreign Zionist Irgunists—criminals—who committed the massacre of Deir Yassin were called by the leaders of Israel “freedom fighters” is it not ridiculous to call the Arab people of Palestine “terrorists”? Terrorism is not a part of our values, nor is it a part of our tradition. It was first imported into the Holy Land by the Zionist movement and by those who immigrated from Germany to carry on their Nazi-like terrorist activities in the Holy Land. In this connexion we may mention Mr. Rafael himself, the representative of Israel. Mr. Rafael is German, born in Berlin, and he came to Palestine to be among the leading figures of an underground movement. Mr. Rafael happens to be a member of Haganah—which may be news to many of you here. So when he speaks about terrorism, I do not think he is qualified to sit in judgement. He introduced terrorism to our area, to the Holy Land, to the land of peace.

70. The people of Palestine are becoming most impatient. They have waited for a just United Nations solution for nineteen years. Their present action is the result of the Security Council's inaction. They are the victims of injustice and they are determined to regain their beloved homeland. They are human. They have become a forgotten people. But they have not forgotten and cannot forget their homeland.

71. I have not heard the name “Palestine” mentioned by those of you around this table who lead the opposition. This, we believe, is wrong. The problem is there and Palestine is there, and it is to regain their homeland that the people of Palestine will sacrifice their own blood. Any human being who does not sacrifice himself for a just cause does not deserve to live. A homeland is a precious thing, and by deleting the name “Palestine” from their speeches those representatives do not make a contribution to peace and security. This is a contribution to war; this is an invitation to every Palestinian to rise, to struggle, to fight, to die so that others may live.

72. War is a tragedy. No one wants war. But when injustice is permitted in the Council to continue because of

power politics, because of political expediency in order to secure a so-called peace, no peace is secured. There can be no peace with injustice; there can be peace only with justice. They go together. They are—quoting a great man, ex-President Eisenhower—two sides of the same coin.

73. Having said this, I must express at this stage my astonishment at finding that, for the first time in the history of the question of Palestine, the right title was not incorporated in the agenda of the Security Council. For the first time in the history of this problem, not only have some members deliberately refused to acknowledge the presence of a problem called “The Palestine question”, but the correct title has not been placed on the agenda. The title “The Palestine question” was used in every single agenda in the past: the last one involved As Samu; the one before that was the Syrian complaint; the one before that was the Israel complaint against Syria. I have them here, and in every single one the correct title was used.

74. Now of course, I have no right to speak here on questions of procedure; I am not a member of the Council. But this is substance, this is a substantive matter. We are discussing here the matter of Palestine. The complaint of the United Arab Republic involves many phases of the problem of Palestine. You cannot discuss it in a vacuum.

75. Having said this, I must state that it is a waste of time to look at any of the items in isolation. We should go deeper. Let us look at the problem as a whole, understand it and be aware of all its phases. Let us know the whole truth, because only half the truth is a lie.

76. Those who objected to the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force should be reminded that it was never intended to stay in the area for ever. The Emergency Force was not a cure but a step to facilitate one. It was a bandage, not a cure. After eleven years of its presence with no attempt on its part to put an end to Israel's arrogance and defiance, why should it surprise some quarters that a request was made for the withdrawal of the Emergency Force from the area? The Israel authorities have been exploiting and taking advantage of the presence of the Force in the south of Palestine and the presence of the United States Sixth Fleet to the west of Palestine in order to turn north against Syria and strike east against Jordan with safety. Thus, secure in the south and the west, Israel could attack, murder and destroy.

77. And if those who now champion the campaign against the United Arab Republic were indifferent to all such Israel defiances, are they in a position to criticize the exercise of a sovereign right by a sovereign State? And if Israel refused, after its Sinai aggression, to permit one single soldier of the Emergency Force to stand on the Israel-occupied part of the armistice demarcation line, can they come, are they entitled to come, and lecture us about the legality of the presence of the Force in the area?

78. Much has been said about the so-called right of Israel to passage through Aqaba. Let us not forget that the Israel presence on the Red Sea is a military presence resulting from an act of occupation in violation of a Security Council cease-fire resolution. I have a map here which will give the

members an idea where the Israel forces were at the time of the cease-fire resolution, showing exactly the place where they were situated when the Jordanian delegation left for Rhodes to sign the Armistice Agreement. It shows the violation committed by Israel in violation of the Security Council's will. Are they not estopped from even claiming a shadow of a right—the right acquired by conquest in violation of Security Council resolutions? I am having these maps distributed to you, Mr. President, so that members may have an opportunity to look at this map. This map appears in a book called *A Soldier with the Arabs*<sup>2</sup> written by an Englishman, Mr. John Bagot Glubb

79. My delegation has said in the Council that illegal occupation does not give a right. It imposes a duty, a duty to get rid of the usurper and occupier. What is more, the Security Council is duty bound to restore the condition which existed before the aggression, because aggression never conveys a right. The Emergency Force was never intended as an instrument to validate what is illegal otherwise, one would be using the Force to defy the law of nations.

80. The Gulf of Aqaba is an Arab Gulf. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom is entitled to perform the task of a self-appointed jurist, to pass judgement on the status of Arab waters in the Gulf of Aqaba. The issue before the Council is whether the United Arab Republic is applying in the Gulf now the same rules that were in force prior to the Israel aggression. This being the case, there is nothing new in the declaration of the United Arab Republic. It contained nothing but a return to the conditions existing prior to the 1956 campaign.

81. The other day the Security Council heard a lecture by the Israel representative on international reality. I believe that friends of Israel should advise him to give some thought to international morality, to the rule of law, to respect for fundamental human rights and strict adherence to the provisions of the Charter.

82. Mr. El Kony very ably illustrated to the Council what the Israel representative meant by “international reality”. Mr. El Kony presented to the Council the run-down of the events that led to the conquest of Naqab. He showed what was the aggressor, the conqueror and the perpetual instigator of all the troubles in the area. I therefore need not dwell on this issue.

83. Finally, I should like to emphasize that it is the illegal acts of forcible occupation which form the background for the so-called international reality. Let me repeat to Israel, and let its friends know, too, that anything but peace on force is unreal and could not receive the support of the international community, nor could it be in conformity with international law or morality, let alone the Armistice Agreement and the Charter. Might, conquest and aggression cannot sustain a right and they are ultimately doomed to disintegration and failure.

84. I heard the representative of the United States, Mr. Goldberg, referring to the policy of the United States vis-à-vis the area. He referred to the territorial integrity

<sup>2</sup> London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1957.

all countries of the Middle East. To my knowledge the question of Palestine is still before the Security Council. The problem is not solved. There is an Armistice Agreement. The Agreement did not fix boundaries; it fixed a demarcation line. The Agreement did not pass judgement on rights—political, military or otherwise. Thus I know of no territory; I know of no boundary; I know of a situation frozen by an Armistice Agreement. And I should like clarification on this. Does this mean that the United States is also endorsing the conquest of Israel, of almost one third of what is now occupied by Israel? This is very important. It should reflect the policy of the United States.

85. Our problem is that we are always victims of vague terms. And we are also victims of lack of communication with the great nation of the United States, because of a curtain put between us and the people of the United States. We can hardly reach them because of the influence of pressure groups in big cities. I hope the time will come soon when this curtain will be lifted, when justice will prevail, when knowledge and understanding will be the means of communication, because with understanding comes awareness, with awareness problems can be solved on the basis of justice and truth.

86. The determination of our people is stronger than all Israel fabrications and distortions. We have the means, the resources and the will which will enable us to put an end to any aggression, to regain our homeland and protect our liberty despite the efforts of those who want to destroy our liberty.

87. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of the United Arab Republic to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

88. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): Mr. President, as you may recall, at the end of my submission to the Council on 29 May [1343rd meeting], I, on behalf of my Government, put before the Council certain suggestions which we deem essential for the partial alleviation of the present tension in the Middle East. The Secretary-General, in his report, stated—and I shall read, with your permission, Mr. President, the relevant part of the report:

“There are other possible courses of action which might contribute substantially to the reduction of tension in the area. In paragraph 16 of my report to the Security Council on 19 May [S/7896] I referred to the possibility of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission providing a limited form of United Nations presence in the area. In that report I stated that ‘it would most certainly be helpful in the present situation if the Government of Israel were to reconsider its position and resume its participation in the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. I suggest that the Council consider this possible approach also during its search for ways out of the present crisis. This form of United Nations presence could to some extent fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Force.’ [S/7906, para. 15.]

89. Therefore, consonant with my previous suggestions and in support of the ideas contained in the Secretary-General’s report, my Government is presenting to the

Council, in accordance with rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following draft resolution:

*“The Security Council,*

*“Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Article 21, paragraph 1, of the Charter;*

*“Conscious of the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East resulting from the inability of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to function in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and in conformity with the obligations of the parties to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement;*

*“Noting with grave concern that in accordance with the various reports of the Secretary-General and, in particular, his latest report [S/7906], the aforementioned United Nations machinery became particularly inoperative due to the attitude of Israel authorities regarding the General Armistice Agreement;*

*“Considering that the unilateral denunciation by Israel of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement cannot be accepted or tolerated by the Security Council, and does not absolve Israel of its obligations and responsibilities under that Agreement;*

*“Fully convinced that such unilateral denunciation by Israel and its flagrant violation of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is responsible for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, threatening international peace and security in the area*

*“1. Decides that the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is still valid and reiterates that the United Nations machinery emanating therefrom should be fully operative;*

*“2. Calls upon the Israel Government to respect and abide by its obligations and responsibilities as stipulated in the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement and to act accordingly;*

*“3. Instructs the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to proceed promptly and reinstitute within two weeks the headquarters of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission in El Auja from where it discharged its duties prior to the Israel unilateral action forcing its expulsion from that zone;*

*“4. Decides to bolster additional measures necessary for the full implementation of this resolution in case of the non-compliance by the Israel Government with the terms of this resolution;*

*“5. Requests the Secretary-General to contact the parties to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement for the immediate implementation of this decision and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days for its approval with regard to additional measures;*

"6. *Decides* to reconvene to discuss the report of the Secretary-General immediately upon its submission." [S/7919.]

90. I am confident that this draft resolution will receive the thorough attention it deserves, and that the reaction to it by the members of the Council will be favourable.

91. May I now be permitted to make a comment on the statement made yesterday [1344th meeting] by Mr. Goldberg, the representative of the United States. In that intervention, Mr. Goldberg opted not to argue the merits of the non-applicability of article 16, paragraph 4, of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, although he was the one who invoked this article in his statement on 29 May [1343rd meeting]. I wish to express my gratification that Mr. Goldberg, to satisfy his professional pride, at least ventured to discuss legal arguments. He, however, chose only one aspect. He referred to Security Council resolution 95 (1951) of 1 September 1951.

92. It is true that that resolution was adopted by the Council, but two highly important factors affected the resolution. First, four of the nine States that voted for the adoption of the resolution were parties to the dispute, and according to Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter, "a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting". It follows that, according to the provisions of the Charter, the resolution should not have been adopted.

93. That there was a dispute was clear from the fact that Israel and other countries, some of which have tried in vain to hide behind Israel, were disputing our rights to impose restrictions on the passage of some war *matériel* to Israel through the canal.

94. The representative of Egypt quoted and placed in the records of the Security Council meetings at that time the very clear and unequivocal views expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States at earlier meetings of the Council. He showed how much they supported the opinion that a party to a dispute should abstain from voting. He expressed his belief that an elementary principle of justice required that a party to a dispute should not be a judge of it, and that it was this great principle which inspired the provision in Article 27 of the Charter that a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

95. Yet, when there was a case which would not uphold their own interests, the same members whom he had quoted challenged the relevance of their previous views. However, apparently political expediency was the aim and method of those members of the Council at that time. Need I say that they still maintain that attitude?

96. Secondly, the resolution was based on the assumption that for two and a half years no fighting had occurred between Egypt and the Israel authorities. Again, for political aims, those members of the Council at that time flagrantly disregarded the numerous aggressive acts committed by the Israelis during those two and a half years, in spite of the fact that they were presented to the Council in

detail by the representative of Egypt. However, even the assumption on which the resolution was based must have been completely invalidated by the treacherous Israeli attack on Sinai in 1956.

97. Mr. Goldberg went further: he denied us the state belligerency, basing himself on the fact that we signed the Armistice Agreement. In his view, that should terminate the state of war.

98. This, we contest. In addition to the argument which we have already put before the Council, I shall limit myself to a reference to the following opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Ludecke versus Watkins*, which it was declared in 1948 that "War does not cease with a cease-fire . . .".<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the late Justice Frankfurter in the same case indicated that "The state of war may be terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential proclamation".<sup>4</sup> Therefore, according to United States practice, an armistice does not end the state of war.

99. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation would like to make some comments on the question under discussion in the Council.

100. At today's meeting of the Council the representative of Jordan, Mr. El-Farra, has drawn the Council's attention to the fact that the question we are discussing should appear in the Council's agenda under the general heading "The Palestine question", as has always been the practice in the past. In this connexion we should like to state that we consider that the point made by Mr. El-Farra is a valid one and we believe that the Security Council should make the necessary correction in the wording of the item under discussion.

101. In his statements here in the Council, the representative of the United States of America has on a number of occasions delivered himself of some very extensive judgements on subjects including, *inter alia*, international navigation, the principles governing international relations in that field, and so forth. At this meeting too, when the representative of the United States spoke again to make some comments on his draft resolution, we heard once more for the umpteenth time the all-too-familiar collection of terms such as "peace-loving", "justice", "legality", and so on.

102. In our view at least, these statements, which so like wearisome sermons, create a strange impression. It is not indeed ironical that the official representatives of the United States of America should here be trying to present Washington as a champion of "peace", an observer of "legality" and "justice", and on a world-wide scale at the

103. As one listens to statements of this kind, one can help wondering how the United States representative discourses about exalted principles of international law supposed to tally with the deeds and practical actions

<sup>3</sup> *United States Reports: Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court*, vol. 335, p. 167.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.

Washington. How are the statements of the United States representative, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, a professional lawyer, to be reconciled with the fact that the United States has grossly violated the most elementary principles of international law in the very field to which the United States representative is referring—in particular, how are they to be reconciled with the naval blockade of States with which the United States is not at war and which are States Members of the United Nations?

104. We venture to ask what international principles can be invoked, for instance, to justify the unlawful acts of the United States of America against Cuba. One is forced inevitably to conclude that people in Washington begin to think about international law only when it suits the purposes of the White House. When it does, the statements of United States representatives are liberally strewn, as if from some cornucopia, with references to “international agreements”, “justice”, “rules of law” and “legal practice”. But when it does not suit Washington’s interests, all signs of attachment to international laws—and particularly observance of these laws—disappear without a trace.

105. I think, gentlemen, that it might be interesting for us to hear a reply to this particular question from the representative of the United States of America in the Security Council.

106. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of Israel to take a place at the Security Council table and to make a statement.

107. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel): In the course of two meetings of the Security Council held yesterday and today, representatives of five Arab States have launched an assault of unprecedented ferocity against my country. They have threatened Israel and the world with total war. They have tried with the threat of sanctions to intimidate countries which uphold international morality and legality. They have threatened to destroy the independence of my country and to extinguish the existence of my people. That is the message which the representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt have brought to this Council.

108. They have taken off the make-up of diplomatic niceties and shown to us and to the world the contorted face of brutal reality. They have employed the worn-out and transparent technique of portraying the victim of aggression as the aggressor. In shining innocence and with flowing eloquence they come to the Council and pretend to have no offensive intentions towards Israel. What a mockery. They enumerate Israel’s alleged violations of United Nations resolutions and proclaim their faithful compliance with resolutions of the United Nations and the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements.

109. Did the Arab States take up arms against the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 [181 (II)], providing for the establishment of Israel, or did they not? Did the Security Council on 1 September 1951 adopt a resolution [95 (1951)] outlawing blockade practices against Israel, or did it not? Did that resolution state in clear terms that such belligerent actions as blockades are incompatible with the armistice régime, or did it not?

110. The Armistice Agreements prohibited all hostile acts, all acts of incursions and all crossings of borders, whether by regular or irregular forces. Under the cover of those Agreements, the Arab countries have carried on their warfare against my country by means of their choice. Their terrorists, *fedayeen*, saboteurs, marauders—irregular or regular—have crossed our borders not twelve times: over the years they have crossed them and invaded our territory thousands of times. Their Governments have openly declared their support for this war by stealth, a war that has cost Israel many hundreds of casualties.

111. The representative of Egypt has openly declared here that his country is in a state of war with Israel and that it is therefore permitted to carry out acts of war and belligerence against it. That is his justification for the blockade instituted in the Gulf of Aqaba, and maintained in the Suez Canal.

112. It is the ruling of this Council that the Armistice Agreements terminate belligerence, but it is the policy of the Arab States to practise this outlawed belligerence. That is the crux of the matter, that is the fundamental controversy. The Armistice Agreements envisaged the restoration of total peace, while the Arab States are engaged in preparations for total war.

113. Belligerence is not a one-way street. It cannot be travelled with safety and impunity. The representatives of the Arab States who have spoken here wish to assure the Council that they do not intend to take offensive action against Israel. Yet they practise, yet they proclaim, a people’s war. They organize armed incursions into my country, they plan and execute sabotage and terrorism in Israel. Their leaders openly threaten to destroy Israel. They mass large offensive forces on the borders of my country and proclaim a blockade. They proclaim a blockade in an international waterway which is vital for my country.

114. I ask the members of this Council to judge for themselves: is this offensive action, or is it not? Is this compliance with the Charter obligations of peaceful co-existence, or is it not?

115. My country has faced that kind of unrelenting warfare with supreme restraint. I wonder whether any other State represented here or in the United Nations as a whole would have exercised such patience under similar circumstances and provocations. My people have manifested that patience, but it should not be mistaken for a lack of determination to defend its liberty and to fight for its existence.

116. Mr. PARTHASARATHI (India): We have before us the United States draft resolution [S/7916/Rev.1]. My delegation has already endorsed the idea of an appeal for restraint to the parties concerned—in fact, to all Member States. But it seems to me that the terms of the appeal would have to be so carefully drafted as to command the approval of the overwhelming majority of the Security Council. I would therefore defer any further comments on this question until our next meeting.

117. Speaking this afternoon, the representative of the United Arab Republic read out the text of a draft



resolution, which the Security Council should consider very carefully. The draft resolution lists certain practical steps which, if taken by the Council, would help to maintain peace in West Asia. Further, the draft should be viewed in the light of the latest report of the Secretary-General, which it follows closely in certain respects. It is the intention of my delegation at the appropriate time, after due consideration has been given to it by the Council, to ask for a vote on the draft resolution under rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

118. We reserve the right to speak again on this matter.

119. Mr. MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): I shall not comment on the draft resolutions that have been submitted today, except to say that we shall, of course, study all suggestions with care and attention. My brief remarks will deal only with the possible methods of approach that the Council may see fit to consider with a view to making its efforts both realistic and expeditious.

120. It will be recalled that in my last statement at the 1343rd meeting of the Council on 29 May with regard to the present crisis in the Middle East, I indicated the readiness of my delegation to join in any effort directed at addressing an appeal to the principal parties concerned in the crisis to refrain from engaging in any act that might aggravate the situation, and thus to allow the Council to gain time for its efforts to preserve peace in the area. I can only reiterate today that this readiness on the part of my delegation continues and that the need to gain time is as imperative as ever. As I also said in my last statement, I should hasten to add that such an appeal, if its great value is not to be lost, should enjoy the unanimous support of all members of the Security Council.

121. My delegation believes that this limited but highly important initial objective that we have set for ourselves, as it emerged from the first round of the debate in the Council, is within our reach, provided we diagnose the situation realistically and avoid at this stage all elements and arguments that would tend to create division and discord in our present deliberations in the Security Council.

122. It is well-nigh impossible to prescribe a solution for this long-present crisis in the Middle East, the present "crisis situation" as the Secretary-General has put it, is but the latest expression of "the continuing Arab-Israel conflict which has been present all along" [*S/7906, para. 2*].

123. It is thus well-nigh impossible to prescribe a solution for this long-standing problem at one stroke, as it were. Even as we consider this latest expression of a long-standing conflict, we should have a two-phased and double-pronged approach to the problem. The first phase of that approach, which I shall call the "appeal phase", if it is to be useful should, in our opinion, aim at restraining the principal parties and all other countries from taking action that could only aggravate the situation. This can only be done in the form of an appropriate appeal formulated in language that will not be susceptible to interpretation by any party as prejudicing some of its claims of long-standing sovereign rights with regard to a number of issues with which members of the Council are only too familiar.

124. If we, on the other hand, in an attempt to formulate an appeal at this stage introduce elements and controversial concepts which either party will interpret as affecting or prejudicing any legal claim emanating from its sovereignty, then I submit we shall not be advancing our work, nor shall we be advancing the cause of peace.

125. It is needless to point out that absolute caution is necessary if we are to obtain the kind of unanimous resolution that we have in mind. What we should aim for at this first phase is to gain time, time badly needed to carry out intensive consultations and to allow passions to subside, thereby creating an atmosphere in which some issues of long standing can be tackled.

126. Such an appeal should thus set the stage for the next phase, for the second approach, to deal with the fundamental issues and other issues arising therefrom. This second phase, which, by mutual accord, can be a phase of a defined period of time, can be the phase of intensive effort by the Council to resolve the problem by peaceful means. There is, in our opinion, much to be said for the need for quiet diplomacy and intensive negotiation under the auspices of the Security Council. A public debate such as the one we have had in the last few days, while useful in clarifying matters and issues, also has the disadvantage of hardening positions. We thus feel that the Secretary-General should continue to undertake further contacts with the parties principally concerned in the crisis. Given his unique position and personality, the confidence of the parties that he personally enjoys and the prestige and authority of his high office, we believe that U Thant has a definite and constructive role to play in preventing this dangerous situation from deteriorating further.

127. I know that calling for more time is easier said than done. I know that for some members of the Security Council this may seem to be a long-drawn-out process. This might also be interpreted by the parties concerned as a passive attitude, an evasion of one's responsibility in the face of what they consider to be, from their point of view, a clear case for immediate rectification. But, on the other hand, what is the alternative to a further and persistent search for a solution?

128. I respectfully submit that the alternative could only be one fraught with great danger. Is it too much, then, to ask for restraint and for limited time to enable the Council to proceed with its urgent and serious task of preserving peace in that troubled area? My delegation submits, in all humility, that it is not too much to ask for that.

129. It is in that spirit and in the spirit of this statement that my delegation approaches the challenging task that the Security Council is called upon to face in the vital area of the Middle East.

130. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): The representative of the Soviet Union, my friend and colleague Mr. Fedorenko, has given the Council a disquisition on international law—not only on this situation, but on other situations—and he has asked me to answer his legal commentary. I am glad to oblige, and this is my answer.



131. On legal questions, the Soviet representative speaks like the great authority on Chinese literature that indeed he is. I shall leave it to him to rely on Chinese proverbs, and I shall continue to rely on international law, including treaties to which his Government is a party.

132. Ambassador Fedorenko also complains that I have repeatedly used words such as "peace-loving", "justice" and "legality". I should not imagine that it would be necessary in this Council to apologize for using these words, and I regret that I have to serve notice on him that I shall use them again and again and again until they are heeded. I shall also say to Ambassador Fedorenko, with all friendship and respect, that I do not purport to tell him how to phrase the views of his Government, and I also say to him that I would thank him not to tell me how to phrase the views of my Government.

133. I am not surprised, however, that the words "peace-loving", "justice" and "legality" have a strange sound to Ambassador Fedorenko. I am just surprised that he admits this so frankly and so publicly.

134. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We have just heard an *exposé*, as one might call it, by the representative of the United States, who—as was to be expected—continued his exercises in legal terminology and eloquence and, experienced lawyer that he is, refrained from replying to the substance of the question.

135. We have tried to draw a comparison between Washington's statements and its acts. We have confined ourselves to asking one single question relating to the statements made by the official representative of the United States of America in this exalted body during the discussion of the situation in the Near East.

136. We have indeed heard many insistent reaffirmations of Washington's attachment to the lofty principles of "justice", "lawfulness", "legality", "morality", and so on and so forth.

137. In our earlier statements we had already drawn attention to what the White House is saying, and what the armed forces of the United States of America are doing—invading foreign territories, violating every rule of law, and carrying out reprisals against entire peoples.

138. The question we are asking today has one very specific purpose. We should like the United States Ambassador, who is often addressed as "Judge", to tell us how he judges the statements made by official circles in the United States of America, and the practical acts which completely contradict these statements.

139. The peoples of the world base their judgements on deeds, and not on eloquent statements. And we ask the United States Ambassador: "How do you explain not the

statements but the acts of the United States Government, particularly those relating to the blockade of one of the Members of the United Nations which enjoys equal rights with us all? What principles were the competent authorities in the United States of America taking for their guidance when they indulged in acts of this kind—particularly, the blockade of Cuba?

140. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I said the other day, and I repeat it now, that at any time when the representative of the Soviet Union is prepared, with respect to an item properly on the agenda, to talk about the matter and to vote on it, I am ready to do so, whether it concerns Viet-Nam, Cuba or anything else. The chips are down not only when you make speeches but when you vote: I have found that when we try to inscribe items so that we can discuss these important issues, there are objections. Let the objections be withdrawn and we shall proceed to discuss these subjects at the proper time. We are discussing the item on our agenda now.

141. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We are convinced once again that the United States representative is evading a direct answer to our question; and it is not, of course, without reason that he is evading it. In other words, he does not have any explanations to offer.

142. Mr. SEYDOUX (France) (*translated from French*): It was, naturally, with keen interest that my delegation, which had expected to make its contribution to this debate today, learned of the draft resolution circulated by the United States delegation at the beginning of this meeting. Although this text is a statement of views which have already been set forth in the Council, I am sure that all will agree with me that it requires on the part of our Governments very careful study, befitting the gravity of the present crisis. The same is true of the text which has been read out to us by the representative of the United Arab Republic and on which the representative of India has requested a vote by the Council.

143. My delegation would, in any case, like to have more time to study these two draft resolutions and any other proposals which may be made by members of the Council. I therefore consider it advisable to propose that we adjourn until the day after tomorrow, until Friday morning, for example, to give us time for reflection and the usual consultations among members of the Council.

144. The PRESIDENT: The representative of France has suggested that the Council be adjourned until Friday morning. If this is agreeable to the incoming President and if there is no objection, the meeting will be adjourned until Friday morning at 10.30. The representative of Denmark, who will be the next President of the Security Council, has signified to me that this is agreeable to him.

*The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.*

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