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1343rd MEETING: 29 MAY 1967

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NOTE

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THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 29 May 1967, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. LIU Chieh (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1343)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902).
3. Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907).
4. Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910).

Adoption of the agenda

1. The PRESIDENT: In addition to item 2 of the provisional agenda [S/Agenda/1343], on which discussion was adjourned at our last meeting, members will note that a third and a fourth item have been included as the result of, first, a letter dated 27 May 1967 [S/7907] from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic requesting the inclusion of one item in the present agenda of the Security Council and, secondly, a letter dated 29 May 1967 [S/7910] from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom requesting that the Secretary-General's report of 26 May 1967 [S/7906] be included in the provisional agenda of today's meeting.
2. If there is no objection, I shall consider the agenda adopted.

The agenda was adopted.

3. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I take it that, following on the adoption of the agenda, the report of the

Secretary-General of 26 May is before us amongst the documents for discussion in the Council.

4. The PRESIDENT: It is so understood.

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Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907)

Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)

5. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 1341st meeting, I shall now, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic to take places at the Council table in order to participate without vote in the discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. G. Rafael (Israel) and Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic) took places at the Council table.

6. The PRESIDENT: Since our last meeting letters dated 27 and 29 May have been received from the representatives of Jordan [S/7909] and the Syrian Arab Republic [S/7912] requesting that they be invited to participate in the Council's discussion. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic to take places at the Council table in order to participate without vote in the Council's discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Farra (Jordan) and Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) took places at the Council table.

7. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have received copies of the report submitted by the Secretary-General [S/7906] following his recent visit to Cairo, which was circulated on Saturday, 27 May. May I, on behalf of the Council, thank the Secretary-General for his quest for

peace in the Middle East. I believe that all of us in the United Nations are indebted to him for the energy and the sense of urgency with which he has met his heavy and trying responsibilities. He has now set forth in the report before us his observations, his hopes and his fears. Members of the Council will, I am sure, agree with me that this is an extremely important document on the basis of which the Council must now act urgently and constructively to avert a course of disaster not only for the Middle East but for the whole world.

8. The Council will now proceed to discuss the items on its agenda. Normally items are discussed in the order in which they are listed in the agenda. Since the three items on our adopted agenda appear to be more or less interrelated, I invite the views of members as to how they may wish to proceed with the discussion.

9. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I think that it might satisfy all the members of the Council if all the items were considered together. As the President has said, they all relate to the same subject.

10. The PRESIDENT: As there is no objection to that suggestion, we shall proceed in that manner.

11. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): We are met here today to consider what means the United Nations—and specifically the Security Council—should adopt to deal with the present crisis in the Near East. The Secretary-General has correctly assessed this crisis. He has described it as more serious, indeed more menacing, than at any time since 1956.

12. In dealing with this problem we should at all costs avoid wasteful recriminations over the response of the United Nations to recent events. The Organization has played a crucial role for many years in maintaining peace, however fragile, in the Near East. The General Armistice Agreements, the Truce Supervision Organization, the admirable ten-year service of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the many important actions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, the successive Secretaries-General and other United Nations officials—these are a great and memorable chapter in United Nations history. In the Near East, more than in any other region, the world has looked to the United Nations to keep the door closed on the spectre of war.

13. Now the door has come unhinged. That fact is not a reason to question the motives of the United Nations handling of the matter. Nor is it a reason for despair or handwringing. Our duty is rather to find new ways by which the United Nations can reassert itself for peace, to the end that war may be averted and the area may achieve the “reasonable, peaceful and just solutions” [S/7906, para. 19] of which the Secretary-General has spoken in the concluding passage of his report. We have seen one chapter of the United Nations role in the Near East come to an end. It is now our task to open a new chapter in this long search for peace.

14. In addressing ourselves to this task, we have before us, notably, the report of the Secretary-General—and,

Mr. President, I am sure you had the unanimous support of the Council when you expressed your appreciation to the Secretary-General for his excellent report. I wish to read to the Council a section of the report to which the Secretary-General clearly attaches particular importance:

“The decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to restrict shipping in the Strait of Tiran, of which I learned while en route to Cairo, has created a new situation. Free passage through the Strait is one of the questions which the Government of Israel considers most vital to her interests. The position of the Government of the United Arab Republic is that the Strait is territorial waters in which it has a right to control shipping. The Government of Israel contests this position and asserts the right of innocent passage through the Strait. The Government of Israel has further declared that Israel will regard the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israel flagships and any restriction on cargoes of ships of other flags proceeding to Israel as a *casus belli*. While in Cairo, I called to the attention of the Government of the United Arab Republic the dangerous consequences which could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran. I expressed my deep concern in this regard and my hope that no precipitate action would be taken.” [Ibid., para. 10.]

15. The Secretary-General further pointed out:

“The freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran is not, however, the only immediate issue which is endangering peace in the Near East. Other problems, such as sabotage and terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria, will, unless controlled, almost surely lead to further serious fighting.” [Ibid., para. 13.]

16. And it is, of course, quite clear from other references in this and in the Secretary-General's previous report of 19 May 1967 [S/7896] that the tensions which arise from substantial military confrontation in the Gaza Strip following the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the area are also sensitive and serious.

17. Soberly appraising the situation and taking into account his conversations in Cairo with leaders of the United Arab Republic, the Secretary-General, in a key paragraph of his report, said:

“In my view, a peaceful outcome to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing spell which will allow tension to subside from its present explosive level. I therefore urge all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions.” [S/7906, para. 14.]

I cannot conceive that any member of the Security Council will not support this appeal.

18. This grave appeal from the Secretary-General has lost none of its relevance since his report was issued. A blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba has been announced. Armies star

within sight of each other on the armistice lines between Israel, Syria and Egypt, including the Gaza Strip. Incidents have occurred resulting in casualties, some of which have been reported this very day. Thus, the dangers in these three areas, which the Secretary-General has rightly identified as the most sensitive of all, remain at their height. Passions, regrettably, are still high and the need for utmost restraint on all sides has in no way abated.

19. But we can take note today not only of the continuing dangers, to which I have referred, but also, I am glad to say, of a favourable development.

20. Yesterday the Prime Minister of Israel stated that his Government had decided to rely on "the continuation of political action in the world arena" to stimulate "international factors to take effective measures to ensure free international passage" in the Strait of Tiran. That statement is very much to be welcomed. It is clearly in the spirit of the Secretary-General's appeal for a "breathing spell" and his urgent request that to this end the parties "exercise special restraint" and "forgo belligerence". It has followed also upon strenuous diplomatic efforts by the Governments of Member States, including my own, in support of the Secretary-General's appeal. Last week, indeed, while he was still in Cairo, I made, in this very Council, on behalf of my Government, a parallel appeal "to avoid any action which might exacerbate the already tense situation which prevailed when the Secretary-General departed on his mission" [1342nd meeting, para. 8].

21. Prime Minister Eshkol's statement will be all the more effective if it is now matched in the same spirit by other parties and by all the Governments principally concerned.

22. We note in this connexion the Secretary-General's account, in his report of his conversations in Cairo, in which he tells us that: "President Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad assured me that the United Arab Republic would not initiate offensive action against Israel" [S/7906, para. 9]. But, regrettably, since then President Nasser has reiterated that the restrictions on shipping through the Strait which he imposed while the Secretary-General was en route to Cairo remain in effect. Therefore, it would be a sad mistake to suppose that the crisis has now substantially eased.

23. Diplomacy is still operating within very narrow limits and on a short time schedule. We in the Security Council, therefore, must intensify our efforts, both collectively and in our separate capacities, to promote a *modus vivendi*, particularly at the points of greatest danger. Surely all will agree that means must be found to liquidate this conflict as a military one and, in particular, to defuse the most sensitive area, the Gulf of Aqaba.

24. It is necessary for me, in the circumstances, to make explicit the basic attitude of the United States as we approach this task. Our attitude is rooted in the Charter, in opposition to aggression from any side and in full support of international law and the role of the United Nations. Ours is not an attitude of partisanship. I repeat—ours is not an attitude of partisanship. The foundation of our policy remains, as President Johnson stated last week:

"To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East I wish to say what three Presidents have said before—that

the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area.

"The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area in any form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy of the United States led by four Presidents—President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and myself—as well as the policy of both of our political parties. The record of the actions of the United States over the past twenty years, within and outside the United Nations, is very clear on this point.

"The United States has consistently sought to have good relations with all States of the Near East. Regrettably this has not always been possible, but we are convinced that our differences with individual States in the area and their differences with each other must be worked out peacefully and in accordance with accepted international practice."

25. These general observations have direct application to the concrete case before us. In the view of my Government, the first step—the very first step—which the Council must take is to put its great authority behind the appeal of the Secretary-General. This first step is urgently required; for, however welcome yesterday's statements of restraint may be, tension remains great and the time span in which to avert a clash is short. We need a breathing spell for diplomatic activity and for this Council's more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues.

26. Therefore, the United States believes that the Council, as an interim measure and without extended debate, should endorse the Secretary-General's appeal and call upon all parties concerned, in his words, "to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions" [*ibid.*, para. 14]. The full authority of the Council would thus be placed behind this righteous appeal.

27. We believe, from the context of the situation, that with respect to the particularly sensitive area of Aqaba, forgoing belligerence must mean forgoing any blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba during the breathing spell requested by the Secretary-General, and permitting free and innocent passage of all nations and all flags through the Strait of Tiran to continue as it has during the last ten years. This would enable the Council to deal with the situation deliberately and free of the threat of—and again I quote the Secretary-General—"dangerous consequences" which, as the Secretary-General says in his report, "could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran" [*ibid.*, para. 10].

28. But such an expression of support for the Secretary-General's appeal would be only the beginning of our task. If the momentum for peace thus generated is to endure, the Council must address itself in longer-range terms to all three of the points of tension which the Secretary-General has identified in his report: the Gulf of Aqaba situation, the confrontation in the Gaza area and on the Syrian-Israeli frontier, and the problem of terrorism. Let me comment on each of these three matters in turn.

29. Concerning the Gulf of Aqaba problem, the basic view of the United States was stated on 23 May by our President in these words:

"The United States considers the Gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israel shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterways is a vital interest of the international community."

30. With respect to innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran, it must be said with all gravity that the issue of international rights in the Gulf and in the Strait cannot be solved by unilateral steps to change the *status quo* which has existed for more than ten years and has made peace possible in the area throughout that period, and which is in accordance with international law. Not only are the rights of the immediate parties at stake, but also the rights of all trading nations under international law. Such law, indeed, has been expressed in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, to which many nations are parties. Article 16, paragraph 4, of that Convention states:

"There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State."¹

I should like to observe that both the United States and the Soviet Union, among others, are parties to this Convention and joined in the declaration of article 16, paragraph 4, thereof.

31. We are all aware, of course, that the United Arab Republic is a coastal State and possesses territorial sea along the shores of the Strait of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. However, it is also necessary to be aware that it is only one of four such coastal States possessing territorial seas bordering on these waters.

32. We are aware of the claim of the United Arab Republic to control shipping through its territorial sea in the Strait. But surely it is not in keeping with the spirit and obligations of the United Nations Charter for such a coastal State to embark unilaterally upon measures of force or threats of force to press its claim. For over ten years the settlement made by the United Nations in 1957 has been the basis of a peaceful régime for the Strait and the Gulf. If any State wishes to alter the *status quo*, it has a clear obligation under the Charter to proceed by peaceful means. Article 33 of the Charter is unmistakable in the obligation that it lays upon all Members, and I quote it:

"1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or

arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

"2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means."

33. It is particularly important, in the light of what the Secretary-General has told us in his report, that the long-established practice in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran not be disturbed during the period in which efforts are being made under Article 33 to deal with claims that have been raised. This, I repeat, is our specific understanding of the meaning, in the context of the Aqaba problem, of the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties to "exercise special restraint" and to "forgo belligerence". Surely, stopping, searching and preventing the passage of ships through the Strait would clearly fall within the category of acts against which this appeal is directed.

34. I turn now to the second highly sensitive problem mentioned by the Secretary-General: the military confrontation in the Gaza Strip and on the Syrian-Israel frontier. This confrontation is obviously highly dangerous, particularly in the heavily populated area of the Gaza Strip. The next step for the Security Council in both areas should be to find practical means, through whatever United Nations machinery is readily available, to minimize the danger of a military clash along this line, and to help the opposing forces to disengage. We have only to read the news bulletins which are even now coming in, with their reports of firing going on in Gaza, to realize how urgent action is on this problem.

35. Third, it is necessary to face other problems, such as, in the Secretary-General's words, "sabotage and terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria" [*ibid.*, para. 13].

36. The Security Council has many times called upon the parties to observe scrupulously the General Armistice Agreements with their strict prohibition of all hostile acts from the territory of any of the parties, and to return to the normal operations of the armistice machinery.

37. Fourth, there is a final step we must take under our responsibility if we are to achieve a more lasting reduction of tension in the Near East. Effective steps must be taken to reaffirm the General Armistice Agreements and revitalize the armistice machinery.

38. This critical hour is no time for selling the United Nations short. Its resources are far greater than some suppose. The diplomatic arsenal is not confined to debate or the adoption of resolutions. It encompasses quiet diplomacy by the Secretary-General and the Members, the good offices of Member States, the use of intermediaries, and all the devices comprehended in Article 33 of the Charter.

39. Therefore, the United States looks beyond today's debate towards further effective steps by all concerned, in the highest tradition of this Organization and the spirit of

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477, p. 216.

the Charter, to save the peace in the Near East. What we do here today and in the days to come will affect not only the peace of the Near East but the good name and standing of this great Organization. The eyes of the world are, quite literally, upon us in this debate. Now, more than ever, world opinion expects the United Nations to live up to its promise of peace. But the United Nations is not and cannot be an abstract entity in the clouds. Its life and vigour depend totally on certain very concrete entities here on earth, namely, the Governments of Member States. The issue of war or peace lies "not in our stars, but in ourselves". It lies in whether or not we, the Members, are sufficiently alive to our common humanity and our manifold common interests, including the vital interests each one of us has in the maintenance of peace in accordance with the Charter.

40. If we are alive to those interests, then surely we shall find ways to transcend today's conflicts and to "harmonize the actions of nations", as the Charter bids us to do, and thus to win together the only true victories, the only victories truly worth having, which are victories for peace.

41. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United Arab Republic.

42. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): It is no secret that my country has been, during the last week or more, subjected to a fierce and persistent campaign aimed at misrepresenting and distorting the true facts of the situation. My Government has no doubt that that campaign represents, and indeed is designed to be, a deliberate attempt to force the partial discussion of a problem in total and utter disregard of the true nature of the problem. I dare say that, in its awareness of this attempt, my Government is not alone; its assessment of the situation is indeed shared by others. The Secretary-General himself, in his report to the Council, made this worthy reference:

"It has been alleged in some quarters that the prompt compliance with the request for the withdrawal of the Force is a primary cause of the present crisis in the Near East. This ignores the fact that the underlying basis for this and other crisis situations in the Near East is the continuing Arab-Israel conflict which has been present all along" [S/7906, para. 2.]

43. It is therefore necessary to keep in mind that the few aspects which some of the Members seek to dramatize—for their own purposes—are only symptoms of the basic problem, that is to say, "The Palestine question".

44. The Palestine question has been a perennial item on the agenda of the Council. This important body has hardly spent a month since the illegal dismemberment of Palestine without either discussing or being seized of one aspect or another of this problem.

45. We are advised, or shall I say we are told, not to look into the past; that we should, rather, confine ourselves to the situation that has been so dramatically presented to this Council—even disregarding the absence of the Secretary-General who was performing an important mission for the sake of that same situation.

46. I submit that we cannot, in all fairness and in all honesty, just forget the happenings of the last twenty years. Indeed that cannot be done if the Council wants to discharge faithfully its responsibilities. It has to look boldly at the events—the tragic events—which have been perpetrated in our part of the world in utter disregard of the values of human life and international law. The Council should, furthermore, examine most thoroughly its own records and decisions. And, indeed, it should have the courage to take the necessary measures to bring the situation back to where it should be.

47. I shall not tax the patience of members by recounting in detail the tragedy of Palestine. The way that tragedy was planned and implemented made it surpass all previous tragedies, and unfortunately it took place on our part of this planet.

48. It suffices to remind the Council that a people who had lived in peace for more than thirteen centuries in their land found themselves within a short period of time arbitrarily and illegally driven out of their homes and lands. Families were broken up as a result of the most inhuman acts of brutality and were forced to flee here and there. Those innocent people—more than a million of them—have been living for the past eighteen years in misery on an UNRWA ration of seven cents a day. And even that is not guaranteed any more. Many of those people were well-to-do, but since the implantation by colonialism of that alien body in their land, they have been living in miserable camps overlooking their own lands and witnessing their harvests being collected by the aggressors.

49. That is why my Government decided to request the Security Council to include on its agenda the item entitled "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security".

50. That is the root of the present situation in the Middle East, and I would certainly be neither honest nor coherent in speaking about the problem if I did not refer in detail to the origins of the tension and trouble in the area.

51. Since its imposition on the area, Israel has had a long history of violations of international law and various agreements concluded under the auspices of the United Nations. It has also had a heavy record of intimidations against its neighbours and an insatiable appetite for expansion.

52. For instance, not even a fortnight had elapsed when Israel armed forces advanced in the Negev and annexed the village of Umm Reshresh, now being referred to as the Israel port of Eilat. Thus they presented the world with a *fait accompli* in flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement. I shall explain in detail, at a later stage of my submission, the gravity and importance of that violation.

53. We have always believed, and we still do, that Israel was planted in the Middle East by colonialism to serve colonial interests. In order to serve those interests, the Israelis cannot help but view expansion as a corner-stone of their policy. This has been declared by many Israel leaders

on various occasions, both before and after that year of disgrace: 1948.

54. As I have just stated, they had hardly signed the Armistice Agreement before they advanced and occupied further territory. As further evidence of this policy of expansion, we cite the case of the demilitarized zone of El Auja. Beginning in 1948 Israel authorities embarked on a series of acts which culminated in 1955 in complete and total occupation of El Auja and its annexation to the territory of Israel.

55. Israel has a twofold approach toward expansion; namely, territorial expansion and the elimination of the indigenous population. I offer the following cases to illustrate the insidiousness of its policy.

56. The expulsion by Israel in September 1950 of about 7,000 Bedouin residing in the area of the Azazma tribe into Egyptian territory. This was followed by the expulsion of the whole tribe, totalling about 15,000.

57. The non-compliance of the Israel authorities with decisions of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission of 30 May 1950, which demanded the return of the Azazma Bedouin to their lands. This case was examined by the Security Council in the autumn of 1950.

58. The expedition in 1953 of its armed forces to the El Auja region under the guise of police forces—an act condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission on 2 October 1953 on the grounds that the continuous presence of Israel police forces constituted a violation of articles IV and VIII of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement.

59. The establishment of settlements within the demilitarized zone, against which, once again, the Egyptian Government addressed a complaint to the Security Council in February 1954.² This complaint has been dormant before the Security Council since that time.

60. The occupation of the whole of the El Auja region, the expelling of the United Nations observer and the lowering of the United Nations flag.

61. May I remind the Council of the present plight of the Azazma tribe, which, because its expulsion post-dated the Armistice Agreement, does not enjoy the relief provided by UNRWA.

62. Need I also remind the Council that the Armistice Agreement had stipulated that the Mixed Armistice Commission would maintain its headquarters at El Auja, which was established by the same agreement as a demilitarized zone.

63. I shall not dwell on the fate of the other demilitarized zones, for the Secretary-General in his report of 2 November 1966 [S/7573] to the Council has objectively stated the case.

64. The aggressive policy perpetrated by the Israel authorities is not only expansionist in nature but also destructive in purpose. I refer in particular to the Gaza raid on 28 February 1955, during the course of which Gaza was subjected to heavy firing from Israel field artillery. Do I need to remind the Council also that during this one attack thirty people were killed in cold blood and thirty-three were severely injured?

65. I cannot fail to refer to the repeated raids carried out against the refugee camps at Deir El Balah, El Bureij, and Rafah, the establishment of which has been financed by UNRWA. The attack on Khan Yunis, however, surpassed any other because it was conducted by armoured cars which attacked even the police station within the city itself.

66. This persistent campaign of provocation, murder and plunder culminated, as we all know, in the treacherous attack against my country in the autumn of 1956. That was an act which shook the conscience of the entire world and was thoroughly condemned by the world community.

67. Attacks of a more recent date by Israelis against the Arab nations have been intensified, escalated and carried out with perfidy and viciousness. These attacks are neither new nor unknown to the members of the Council.

68. It was less than a year ago that the Israel authorities arrogantly announced that they had undertaken a limited retaliatory "expedition", using their Air Force against the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 July 1966. It is tragic but true that the Security Council, when seized of this shameful and avowed attack, failed to condemn the aggressor in spite of Israel's admission of its guilt.

69. Israel, feeling strong because of the complicity of its allies in the Western camp, struck again on 13 November 1966. This time it was against the peaceful village of As Samu, a village of some 4,000 people, and innocent men, women and children were killed and the town was reduced to rubble.

70. The policy of the Israel authorities, as there has been occasion to state, is neither incidental nor occasional. It merely reflects a policy of direct provocation, and the role, that of lackey for imperialism, given to Israel to play within the context of a larger conspiracy.

71. On 7 April 1967, a considerable number of Israel jet fighters crossed the armistice demarcation line and penetrated deeply into Syrian territory, as far as the Damascus area. They were intercepted by Syrian fighters, which led to full-scale aerial combat. This latest Israel provocation was executed with the sole determination of provoking Syria into a full-scale war and thus inflicting destruction and catastrophes upon Syria, where water projects on the Jordan River were in process for the sake of reclaiming land. In fact, beginning with the first day of 1967, Israel started preparing the ground for a large-scale attack on Syria. Proof of this was furnished by the declaration of Mr. Levi Eshkol, who stated on the 13th of this month that: "Israel is prepared to risk all-out war in a military offensive to topple Syria's army régime". He went on to say: "We may have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of 7 April".

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Ninth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1954*, document S/3172.

72. This was no empty threat and my Government had every reason to believe that on 17 May 1967 the Israel authorities seriously contemplated an attack against Syria. On 13 May, we received accurate information that Israel was concentrating huge armed forces on the Syrian border. These forces were divided into two fronts, one south of Lake Tiberias and the other north of the lake. The decision made by Israel at this time was to carry out an aggression against Syria as of 17 May. On 14 May, my Government examined the situation, took measures, and contacted our Syrian brothers, who apparently already had this information.

73. In the discharge of our responsibilities towards the security of our people and our Arab brothers, in both Palestine and the other Arab countries, and in fulfilment of our sovereign rights, we have decided, in co-operation with our Arab brethren, to defend the Arab nation by all measures. Since the presence of UNEF would have conflicted with this decision, and also for the sake of UNEF's safety, in the exercise of our sovereign rights we requested the Secretary-General to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force. Thus, we have peacefully brought the situation back to what it was before the 1956 aggression against my country.

74. We have attempted to outline very briefly the realities of the situation. We have endeavoured to depict the true picture and, to the best of our ability, we have tried to diagnose the real causes of the tension in the area.

75. Against this background, of which I believe every responsible statesman is aware, it is indeed surprising that certain Powers are seeking, for their selfish interests, to divert the attention of the world from the true culprit. Instead of candidly recognizing where the responsibility lies and honestly facing up to their duty in this regard, those Powers are presently casting doubts on the legitimacy of the measures taken by my Government within the framework of its sovereignty, and in particular with respect to the Gulf of Aqaba.

76. I am firmly convinced that no one can argue or contest our basic rights. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity and in order to put it on record, may I be allowed to state my country's case.

77. As members of the Council are well aware, the Gulf of Aqaba is a long narrow gulf on the eastern side of the Sinai Peninsula. The length of the Gulf is about ninety-six miles and the widest breadth less than fifteen miles. The entrance to the Gulf is situated in the joint territorial waters of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. Due to navigational hazards the only navigable route to the Gulf runs less than one mile from the Sinai Peninsula. Hence, it crosses our undisputed territorial waters.

78. The Israelis claim that they have the right to navigate in the Gulf. This we proclaim is without foundation. A cogent reply which refutes the allegation of the Israelis rests on the following facts.

79. Historically, the Gulf has been under continued and uninterrupted Arab domination for over one thousand

years. It always has been a national inland waterway subject to absolute Arab sovereignty. Its geographical location is conclusive proof of its national character. By its configuration it has a nature of a *mare clausum* which does not belong to the class of international waterways. An accepted norm of international law is that some bays with more than one littoral State are not considered open sea due to geographical and historical conditions. An international tribunal adjudicating a similar gulf case in Central America reached that conclusion—a conclusion which was recognized by several countries, including the United States. In 1917, the International Court of the Central American Republics ruled that the Gulf of Fonseca, which is surrounded by three countries—Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua—is “an historic bay possessed of the characteristics of a closed sea”³ and that it therefore was part of the territories of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

80. Hence, it was decided that the three littoral countries are entitled to exclude the vessels of other countries when at war. Therefore, as I have already said, since the Gulf of Aqaba has only three legitimate littoral States, namely, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, all of which are in a state of war with Israel, the three legitimate littoral States on the Gulf of Aqaba have a right recognized by public international law to ban the vessels of an enemy.

81. It certainly will be argued that the Israelis have a port on the Gulf. But even that presence lacks legitimate foundation.

82. The Israel armed forces on 10 March 1949 usurped and occupied the village of Umm Reshresh, along with a stretch of about five miles overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba. This, as I have already stated, occurred four months after the Security Council decision calling on all parties concerned to desist from further military actions and territorial accretion. This illegal act was perpetrated two weeks after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement on 24 February 1949. This action completely and drastically violated the letter and spirit of the Agreement, article IV, paragraph 1, of which stipulates explicitly that:

“The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.”

It is also relevant to read out paragraph 2 of article IV of the Armistice Agreement:

“It is also recognized that the basic purposes and spirit of the Armistice would not be served by the restoration of previously held military positions, changes from those now held other than as specifically provided for in this Agreement, or by the advance of the military forces of either side beyond positions held at the time this Armistice Agreement is signed.”⁴

³ See “Central American Court of Justice, 9 March 1917, The Republic of El Salvador v. the Republic of Nicaragua”, in *American Journal of International Law* (New York), vol. 11, p. 693.

⁴ *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3.*

83. Furthermore, this illegal occupation of that port in Palestine and the advance of the Israel armed forces was put before the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, whose Special Committee decided on the matter on 20 March 1950. This was further examined by the Security Council, which, in its resolution 89 (1950) of 17 November 1950, stated that the Council:

“Takes note of the statement of the Government of Israel that Israel armed forces will evacuate Bir Qattar pursuant to the 20 March 1950 decision of the Special Committee provided for in article X, paragraph 4, of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement, and that the Israel armed forces will withdraw to positions authorized by the Armistice Agreement.”

84. In this respect, I would like to clarify that the reference to Bir Qattar includes the vicinity of Umm Reshresh which the Israelis called “Eilat” after their illegal occupation of the territory. This Israel occupation violated also Security Council resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948 ordering the parties “pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to desist from further military action”. It also violated resolution 56 (1948), adopted by the Council on 19 August 1948, in which it was stated that “no party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce”. In fact, this Israel action violated decisions of the Security Council, including that of 15 July 1948, which invoked Article 40 and therefore, according to the Charter, should have entailed the application against Israel of the enforcement action provided for in Chapter VII.

85. In view of these specific orders, Israel’s possession of the coastal strip does not entitle it to any legal claim to sovereignty. This is in conformity with the well-established doctrine in international law that belligerent occupation cannot legally be converted into sovereignty over the occupied territory. An occupant, according to international law, and I quote Oppenheim, “in no wise acquires sovereignty over such territory through the mere fact of having occupied it”.⁵ Annexing a territory occupied by military force can have legal effect only if the state of war ends by the conclusion of a peace treaty. This view was held by the United States, as portrayed in 1931 by the United States Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who declared that the United States “cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*”. Therefore it would be natural for the United States Government to abide by this doctrine in its international relations. This doctrine was also incorporated in several international multilateral treaties such as the treaty signed in Rio de Janeiro on 10 October 1933⁶ and that at the Ninth International Conference of American States on 30 April 1948.

86. Thus the Arabs’ consistent refusal to accept Israel’s claim to authority over the coastal strip is in strict conformity with the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition. It is ironic that the United States position in the matter under consideration is contrary to that doctrine.

⁵ L. Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise*, vol. II, *Disputes, War and Neutrality*, 7th ed. (ed. H. Lauterpacht), London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1952, p. 433.

⁶ Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation.

87. In the light of these facts, it is quite obvious that the Israel authorities have no legitimate right to be present on the shores of Aqaba since no legal right or claim, in either municipal or international law, could be based on illegal actions. Moreover, I wish to state that, according to international law, a state of war confers certain rights upon the belligerents. Also, it is a general, incontestable rule of international law that the conclusion of a partial or general armistice agreement does not end the state of war. It only terminates the hostilities.

88. Oppenheim states that armistices and truces are

“all agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities. They are in no wise . . . to be called temporary peace, because the condition of war remains between the belligerents themselves, and between the belligerents and neutrals, on all points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities. In spite of such cessation the right of visit and search over neutral merchantmen therefore remains intact, as does likewise the right to capture neutral vessels attempting to break a blockade, and the right to seize contraband of war.”⁷

89. Basing ourselves on either legal facts, as we shall read them from the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, or the facts of life in our part of the world, as we have been witnessing them through the years, there is not a shadow of doubt as to the continued existence of the state of war between the Israelis and both the Arabs of Palestine and their brethren in the Arab countries.

90. The Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement of 1949 stipulates in article I, paragraph 3, that:

“The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear . . . shall be fully respected”.

The existence of a state of war between the parties is distinctly and explicitly stated in article IV, paragraph 3, where it is stated that:

“The provisions of this Agreement are dictated exclusively by military considerations . . .”.

91. The continued violations and the numerous premeditated acts of aggression, in all dimensions, against the Arabs, which culminated in the cowardly attack on Sinai in 1956, clearly mean that a state of overt war has been existing. Hence my Government has the legitimate right, in accordance with international law, to impose restrictions on navigation in the Strait of Tiran with respect to shipping to an enemy.

92. After this rather lengthy elaboration, it is quite evident and unequivocal that according to international law a state of belligerency exists between the Arab States, whose territories circumscribe the entirety of the Gulf of Aqaba, and Israel. The Armistice Agreement does not vitiate our rights to impose restrictions on navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

⁷ L. Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 546 and 547.

93. The 1956 aggression did not change the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba and consequently did not affect the United Arab Republic's rights over its territorial waters. In this respect the Secretary-General, in his report of 6 November 1956 to the General Assembly, stated that:

"It follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict."⁸

94. This fact was re-emphasized by the Secretary-General when in his report to the General Assembly on 24 January 1957 he referred to the invasion of Egypt and stated that:

"The United Nations cannot condone a change of the *status juris* resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the *status juris* existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action."⁹

That the invasion of Egypt should not affect the *status quo ante* was also pointed out by the Secretary-General of the United Nations when he stressed that:

"It follows from principles guiding the United Nations that the Israel military action and its consequences should not be elements influencing the solution."¹⁰

95. Also, the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force was not envisaged as the implementation of any policy affecting this issue. The Secretary-General further stated that:

"In accordance with the general legal principles recognized as decisive for the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force, the Force should not be used so as to prejudice the solution of the controversial questions involved. The Force, thus, is not to be deployed in such a way as to protect any special position on these questions..."¹¹

The Secretary-General also reiterated that the Force "must ... be impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial."¹²

96. My Government's position on that point was amply and clearly stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic when he declared before the General Assembly, at the end of the debates on 1 March 1957, that:

"The Assembly has heard the statement made by the representative of Israel and the other statements made

relating to Israel's withdrawal. We take it that the Assembly is unanimous in expecting full and honest implementation of its resolutions calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal by Israel. This position, which is the only position the Assembly could possibly take, remains intact and entire. Nothing said by anyone here or elsewhere could shake this fact or detract from its reality and its validity."¹³

97. I wish to bring to your attention the fact that, according to *The New York Times*, President Eisenhower, who was President of the United States of America during that period, declared as recently as Thursday last, 25 May, with reference to the Israel claim concerning the Gulf of Aqaba that: "I cannot recall that Egypt itself ever agreed to this."

98. It is quite clear that Israel tried to derive a legal right by committing an illegal act and that the Secretary-General did not allow himself to be drawn into supporting its unlawful assertions. Nothing said in the General Assembly by Israel and some other delegations could affect the lawful rights of the United Arab Republic or legally obligate its Government to endorse an unaccepted premise.

99. The obviousness of this fact renders any controversy about it mere sophistry, with no relevance whatsoever to the legal realities of the situation.

100. The attitude of the United Arab Republic Government regarding navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba is not new. In 1950, the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Governments decided that since the entrance to the Gulf was in their joint territorial waters, it was incumbent upon both Governments to preclude enemy vessels from ingress into and egress from the Gulf. Egyptian troops established military installations to exclude all Israel naval traffic and bar strategic material from reinforcing its war effort.

101. This practice has been scrupulously maintained since 1950. The Egyptian Government sent two memoranda to the United States and United Kingdom Embassies in Cairo, on 30 January and 28 February 1950 respectively, informing them of the decision to occupy the islands of Tiran and Sinafir and to protect the two islands and the entrance of the Gulf.

102. Furthermore, the Government of Egypt declared its intention to guarantee "free and innocent passage according to international law". This obviously could never be construed to guarantee "free and innocent passage" to an enemy during a state of war. The United Kingdom recognized our rights by an exchange of letters between the British Ambassador in Cairo and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I shall, with your permission, Mr. President, read the texts of the two letters; the first, dated 29 July 1951, read:

"I am authorized to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are ready to agree to the following arrangement in regard to British vessels other than naval or military craft sailing direct

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Emergency Special Session, Annexes*, agenda item 5, document A/3302, para. 8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 66, document A/3512, para. 5 (a).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 23.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 29.

¹² *Ibid.*, para. 5 (b).

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, vol. II, 666th meeting, para. 87.

from Suez or Adabia to Aqaba. The Egyptian customs authorities at Suez or Adabia, after searching and issuing clearance for such vessels, will immediately inform the Egyptian naval authorities at Tiran Island so as to preclude any necessity for the latter to make a further visit and search of the vessels in question. On the other hand all British vessels will of course comply with normal practice when passing through Egyptian territorial waters. I would be grateful if Your Excellency would be good enough to confirm the acceptance by the Egyptian Government of the above-mentioned arrangement."

The reply, dated 30 July 1951, from the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs was as follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 29 July 1951, the text of which follows:

"...

"I am authorized to communicate to Your Excellency the Royal Egyptian Government's agreement to the arrangements and measures set forth in the above letter since they are in conformity with Egypt's rights as to her ports and territorial waters."

103. Vessels flying American as well as various other flags accepted the Egyptian regulation until 1956. On 10 March 1953, the Danish vessel *Andrias Bay* entered into the Gulf and it was hailed, inspected and then released. Again, on 3 December 1953, the Egyptian Government authorized the American vessel *Ali Bon* to enter the Gulf when it was sure that this vessel carried grains as a gift of the United States of America to Jordan and not equipment.

104. In this respect I should also bring to the attention of the Council the fact that in 1953 the Egyptian vessel *Samir* was forced by bad weather to enter Israel territorial waters. Subsequently, in July 1953, the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission resolved that merchant ships belonging to either party were not permitted to pass in the territorial waters of the other. Thus was established a legal precedent that no innocent passage could be attributed to combatant parties.

105. Could there be a clearer recognition of my Government's rights of visit and search? Could there be a more formal acceptance of the correctness of the United Arab Republic attitude?

106. Nowhere in the Charter can a provision be found modifying or altering these accepted norms of international law. The Charter clearly acknowledges the inherent right of self-defence which United Nations Members are entitled to exercise. Since the inception of the United Nations, international practice has gone a long way towards confirming these rules. I hardly need enumerate the several cases in which certain members of this Council deemed it fit to initiate various types of restrictions even when their security and territorial integrity were not seriously threatened.

107. I shall limit myself at this stage to referring to two pertinent examples, namely, the restrictions imposed by the

Government of the United States of America against Cuba and the People's Republic of China, respectively.

108. The United States, while denying us today the inherent right to take the necessary measures in self-defence in the face of Israel acts of aggression, itself saw fit in 1962 to take what it alleged to be necessary measures of self-defence, namely, detaining, inspecting and diverting commercial ships bound for Cuba on the high seas. While there is no state of war between the United States and Cuba, the United States allowed itself this illegal course of action.

109. Today, although our case with Israel is of a different nature—that is to say, there is a state of war and we are exercising defensive measures within the limits of our territorial waters—the United States continues to stand against international law in supporting the Israel claims.

110. I cannot but wonder whether it is permissible for those States to embark on such actions while admonishing other States and threatening them when they perform their rightful and, most certainly, their legal prerogatives. Such a double standard obviously violates the principle of sovereign equality on which our Organization is based.

111. The world is witnessing nowadays in the policies of certain great Western Powers a trend toward the total disregard of principles and ideals. Their acts not only have become devoid of those two elements; they also lack logic and rationality.

112. Only a few days ago they washed their hands completely of the question of South West Africa and justified such conduct as the only practical and realistic way of dealing with the problem, thus ignoring the Charter of the United Nations and sacrificing the very existence of the people of South West Africa, in their own land since the beginning of history. This they do unabashedly, stating that they have vast economic interests in South Africa and that the Government of that country is so powerful militarily that it would be unwise to challenge it.

113. Also, not long ago they shrank from their responsibilities vis-à-vis Southern Rhodesia, thus selling its people to a white minority of adventurers. This, too, was attributed to economic interests and the ties of kith and kin with that minority. Their conscience then was not aroused, and their usually loud voices were kept mute.

114. These represent only two cases out of the lengthy list of their actions in Africa and Asia. There are plenty of other wrong-doings; to mention only a few: *apartheid*, colonialism, and so on.

115. Yet now wild cries of alarm are raised, not because a country is committing a crime against humanity, not because a country has violated or is violating the inherent rights of peoples to their homes and lands, but because a small country—an Afro-Asian country—is exercising its inherent right of sovereignty. Why this sudden outburst? Is it because we are not kith and kin, or is it because we refuse to act as tools of the interests of imperialism? That role will certainly never be ours.

116. Having demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt the soundness of both our basic political and legal positions, I wish to add for the information of the members of the Council that we have declared over and over again at various levels of my Government that, having acted within the limits of our sovereign rights, we do not contemplate any offensive action. But we hasten to add that we would not hesitate a moment, in the exercise of our inherent right of self-defence, to repel any aggression committed against us.

117. The truth of the matter is that the primary responsibility for the relief of tension in our area lies at the door of those who foment trouble and threaten peace in words and deeds, and most certainly not on those who in all good faith exercise their sovereign rights. No one in all objectivity can contest or even intimate that we cannot exercise our sovereignty over our territorial waters.

118. The search for a solution or the restoration of tranquillity in the Middle East should first and foremost take as a stepping stone the full and total respect of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people. My Government firmly stands by this principle and is equally committed to the cause of justice. It shall continue to do so consistently in the discharge of its obligations to the people of Palestine, in particular, and to the Arab nations as a whole.

119. It should therefore be incumbent upon the Security Council to take appropriate action in the fulfilment of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and in view of the grave situation resulting from the inability of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to function in accordance with the resolutions of the Council and in conformity with the obligations of the parties to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement—an inability due to the attitude of the Israel authorities, as indicated by the Secretary-General in his report [S/7906] when he refers to the General Armistice Agreement.

120. We believe that the Security Council should take into consideration in its approach to the problem the fact that the unilateral denunciation by Israel of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is legally invalid and unacceptable, and does not absolve Israel of its obligations and responsibilities under that Agreement, and that such a unilateral denunciation by Israel, as well as its flagrant violation of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement, is responsible for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, threatening peace and security.

121. It is our considered opinion that the Security Council should, in its endeavour to deal with the present situation, recognize the continuing validity of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement, and that the United Nations machinery emanating therefrom should be fully operative.

122. Accordingly, the Council should deem it appropriate to call upon the Israel Government to respect and abide by its obligations and responsibilities as stipulated by the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement, and simultaneously instruct the Chief of Staff of the United Nations

Truce Supervision Organization to proceed promptly to reinstate within two weeks the headquarters of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission in El Auja, from which it discharged its duties prior to the Israel unilateral action forcing its expulsion from that zone.

123. We believe that the Secretary-General should be requested to report to the Security Council within fifteen days, and that it should reconvene immediately upon the submission of that report.

124. Mr. RUDA (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): The Security Council met on 24 May, at the request of the delegations of Canada and Denmark, to consider "the extremely grave situation in the Middle East which is threatening international peace and security". Generally speaking, we agree, Mr. President, with the opinion of these two delegations, which is shared by others in this Council, and we agree, in particular, with the Secretary-General's statement in his report of 19 May [S/7896], when he described the situation as "extremely menacing". However, we abstained from speaking at the last meeting, because we felt that, although the Council should act with all promptness to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in the troubled area, it should await the outcome of the Secretary-General's visit to Cairo, so that it could consider the problem with all the facts before it and, more particularly, in the light of the authoritative opinion of someone returning with direct information about the conflict. This latest report [S/7906] is now before the Council, and we must express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for submitting it in such a short time.

125. Before entering upon consideration of the Middle East question as it appears today in the light of the Secretary-General's report, I should like to make some comments on the context in which my delegation views the recent developments, in other words, how we interpret the responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter.

126. This principal organ of the United Nations has been entrusted, as is so often stated here, with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In discharging that responsibility, many lines of action are open to the Council, depending upon the gravity of the situation. In dealing with a question like the present one, its main objective must be, first and foremost, to avert a military confrontation and, to that end, it must seek, by means of effective decisions, to check the aggression or disturbance of the peace and to prevent threats from being translated into action. If faced by a dispute or a situation which is liable to lead to a disturbance of the peace, the United Nations should seek a settlement by peaceful means, in accordance with justice and international law.

127. Events so far indicate that, although there is no fighting at present, we are faced by an acute crisis which threatens the maintenance of peace. The Secretary-General repeated, in the first paragraph of his latest report, his view that the general situation in the Near East at present is more disturbing, indeed, more menacing, than at any time since the fall of 1956. The statements made by both parties

to the conflict in the Council last Wednesday [1342nd meeting] and today and the speeches made by political leaders in the Middle East and elsewhere show clearly the gravity of the situation.

128. In the opinion of my delegation, the Council has an immediate task to perform before the conflict develops further. In view of the urgency of the situation, we believe that this is no time to aim at general decisions or seek solutions to complex problems which have burdened Middle East politics for many years.

129. My delegation believes that our work now, today, is basically to use every means at our disposal to keep the peace. We should not look for final judgements or miraculous solutions, which we have not managed to find over the years. Let us resolutely determine now to prevent the conflict from becoming more acute. We have the advantage that all parties have adopted an attitude of caution and that there has been no armed conflict. Let us do nothing to provoke one, for the consequences of such a conflict are impossible to foresee.

130. For these reasons, both particular and general, my delegation considers that its responsibility in this hour of crisis is to give full support to the Secretary-General when, in his latest report, he urges the parties concerned to exercise restraint and avoid an armed confrontation and any action which might increase the tension, so that the Council may deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and seek solutions.

131. We should like to think that none of the parties would consider its rights or claims affected by a course of action designed to prevent an aggravation of the conflict. We feel sure that the Council will be able to find solutions which take into account the vital interests at stake and which will re-establish the precarious peace that has existed for ten years in the Middle East. These words are prompted only by a genuine desire to protect the peace; in order to achieve this aim, we shall exert every effort in the search for solutions. Our geographical position, our ties of friendship with both parties and our peace-loving tradition are the best guarantee of our impartiality.

132. As I said earlier, we do not want, at this time, to embark on an analysis of the substance of the issues involved. However, we should like to reserve the right to do so at the proper time, in order to reiterate, if necessary, the various positions taken by our Government in similar circumstances in favour of peace and the application of the principles of international law.

133. Before concluding, I should like to place on record my Government's opinion on the role played by the United Nations Emergency Force during its presence in the Middle East. There can be no doubt in anyone's mind that its presence was a fundamental factor in maintaining stability and peace in the area assigned to it. It carried out its work with propriety and dignity and achieved the objectives set for it while it was in the area. Furthermore, its experiences will be important for the future of United Nations peace-keeping operations. My delegation shares the Secretary-General's regret that circumstances should have forced

him to order the withdrawal of the Force and feels confident that the presence of the United Nations through its participation in the Mixed Armistice Commissions can come to constitute as solid a guarantee for the maintenance of peace as that provided by the Force.

134. Mr. SETTE CAMARA (Brazil): On behalf of my Government and on my own behalf, as this is the first time I am speaking I should like to express our deep appreciation to you, Mr. President, for your kind remarks regarding Brazil's return to the Security Council. Brazil has served on this Council for a total of eight years, and is now discharging the duties of its fifth term as a member of this body. The fact that the Members of our Organization have once again chosen to elect Brazil to this organ is highly gratifying to us. My country is honoured to succeed Uruguay on the Council, for Uruguay is a country to which Brazil is linked by very special ties of friendship.

135. Turning to the matter at hand, the Brazilian Government has been following closely—and with the greatest concern—the mounting crisis in the Middle East. The Brazilian people are linked to Israel and to all the Arab nations by very close ties of friendship. Both Arabs and Jews played an important part in Brazilian history and not only contributed to our social and economic development but also helped to shape the cultural and spiritual features of Brazilian civilization. As a member of the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, Brazil has a special duty to perform in discharging the responsibility entrusted to it by the United Nations Charter.

136. For the last eleven years Brazil has been supplying one of the contingents which make up the United Nations Emergency Force. The role of the Force as an element of stabilization of the political situation in the Middle East has been a source of gratification to my Government. I might add that the presence of our soldiers under the flag of the United Nations on the territory of the United Arab Republic has strengthened the friendship between Brazil and the United Arab Republic.

137. Because of those considerations, my Government cannot but approach this issue in an entirely objective and impartial manner. In connexion with the crisis in the Middle East, the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a recent statement, reiterated our purposes to co-operate, within the United Nations or elsewhere, in the efforts of the international community to avoid any further deterioration of the situation and to restore stability. It is not our intention to pass judgement on any action, but rather to seek ways and means of easing the present tensions and paving the way for the restoration of peace and security in the area.

138. The Brazilian Government wishes to put on record the fact that it fully endorses the principle that the consent of the host country is the basis of any peace-keeping operation. My Government fully agrees with the statement of the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council on developments in the Middle East, that:

"The decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to terminate its consent for the continued

presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on United Arab Republic territory in Sinai and on United Arab Republic controlled territory in Gaza came suddenly and was unexpected. The reasons for this decision have not been officially stated, but they were clearly regarded as overriding by the Government of the United Arab Republic. It is certain that they had nothing to do with the conduct of the Force itself or the way in which it was carrying out the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly and accepted by the Government of the United Arab Republic when it gave its consent for the deployment of the Force within its jurisdiction. There can be no doubt, in fact, that the Force has discharged its responsibilities with remarkable effectiveness and great distinction. No United Nations peace-keeping operation can be envisaged as permanent or semi-permanent On the other hand, it can be said that the timing of the withdrawal of the Force leaves much to be desired because of the prevailing tensions and dangers throughout the area. It also adds one more frontier on which there is a direct confrontation between the military forces of Israel and those of her Arab neighbours." [S/7896, para. 10.]

139. The whole world has been enriched and enlightened by the contributions of Arab and Jewish culture, thought and civilization. Let us fervently hope that the Jewish and Arab nations will live up to the traditions of their wisdom and lucidity. In our view, the first duty of the Council is to prevent the escalation of the present tensions in the Middle East into an armed conflict whose far-reaching repercussions would surely affect the whole world. To achieve this objective, the Council needs the full co-operation of all parties directly involved in the crisis and their utmost caution and restraint.

140. If anything can be done by the Council at this moment, it is to initiate or support all efforts—without taking sides in the confrontation—to prevent further aggravation of the crisis. What is at stake in the Middle East is of vital concern to nations all over the world. We reaffirm our confidence in the efforts and the ability of the Secretary-General. We reiterate our support of the role to be played by the United Nations in bringing the parties concerned together for a fruitful discussion of their problems. As the Secretary-General himself has pointed out, within the framework of the United Nations there still exist operating organs that can be helpful in this emergency in trying new approaches for a settlement of the crisis.

141. In the light of those remarks the Brazilian delegation gives its whole-hearted support to the appeal contained in paragraph 14 of the most recent report of the Secretary-General [S/7906]. Without "special restraint" and a strong decision on the part of the Powers directly involved in the crisis—to avoid any further act which might lead to the increase of the tension—it will be extremely difficult for the Council to find an immediate solution to the problem before us.

142. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): When we met briefly and inconclusively last week I stated [1342nd meeting] that we had four questions to tackle together: First, how can tension be relieved and immediate dangers of

conflict removed? Second, how can the rights of free and unimpeded passage through the Strait of Tiran be guaranteed and assured? Third, how can effective United Nations measures and machinery to keep the peace and prevent violence and conflict through the whole area best be worked out for the future? Fourth, what new measures and additional action can be taken to prevent such dangers to the peace from recurring in future years?

143. I said that no one could doubt the danger, and no one could doubt the urgency, and I spoke of the challenge and the opportunity which faced the United Nations. There were those who sought to belittle the danger and to doubt the urgency. We were told that we were artificially dramatizing the situation, that there was no need for the Council to meet. We were even told that no serious incidents had been reported.

144. We have pressed from the start that the Council should meet and act. Our first purpose was to support the Secretary-General in his mission to Cairo. But there were those who maintained—and their arguments prevailed—that we should await the Secretary-General's report. Now we have that report. We have had ample time to study it. The report more than confirms both the danger and the urgency. In fearless language, all the more forceful by reason of its simplicity and restraint, the report both shows the immediate dangers and points the way to the action we must take.

145. We have very good reason, as we expected, to be grateful to the Secretary-General for his decision to go to Cairo and for the dispatch with which he completed his mission. We are grateful, too, for the service he has done in giving us so soon after his return from that exacting and critical and lonely expedition a report so compelling in its statement of the dangers and so constructive in its indications of the action required.

146. The report in clear and direct words tells us how the Secretary-General called attention to "the dangerous consequences which could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran" and expressed his deep concern in this regard that "no precipitate action would be taken" [S/7906, para. 10], and went on to state the fear that a clash between the United Arab Republic and Israel over this issue would inevitably set off, to use his words, "general conflict in the Near East" [*ibid.*, para. 12].

147. We cannot fail, in the light of that warning, to concentrate first and foremost on the vital need for finding a solution of the critical problem of the Gulf of Aqaba. And, as I made clear when I spoke last week, we consider that this must take into account not only the normal requirements of the States bordering the Gulf, but also the interests of all maritime Powers.

148. From the first, my Government has made its position on that main issue of the Gulf of Aqaba absolutely clear. It was stated by a representative of my country ten years ago in the General Assembly. It has been consistently maintained and repeatedly and positively confirmed. It is on this main issue that we should first ensure that belligerence is avoided and special restraint exercised.

149. But, as the Secretary-General also emphasized in his report, the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran is not the only immediate issue which is endangering peace in the Near East. He points to the possible courses of action which could contribute to the reduction of tension.

150. Having urged all concerned "to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension" [*ibid.*, para. 14], the Secretary-General turns to practical proposals, proposals to reduce immediate tension and to keep the peace in the whole area in the future. Now we must surely engage on an urgent study of ways and means by which the United Nations can assist in achieving those purposes. As the Secretary-General says, we must fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. He has proposed full recourse to the United Nations peace machinery still present and available, so that there can be a continuing and effective United Nations presence in the area. We must persuade those directly concerned to co-operate to the full. We must be ready to consider new and original methods, with special reference to the possible steps which could be taken by mutual consent to which the Secretary-General has referred in his report. Without the positive and constructive contribution of the United Nations we should be left with the fuses still lit which at any moment could lead to a series of explosions doing irreparable damage. We are ready and eager to work with the Secretary-General and all members of the Council and with the parties concerned to find urgent means to restore the effectiveness of the international effort.

151. I trust that today we all realize the extent of our obligation and our opportunity.

152. For ten years the United Nations has successfully performed a most valuable task. All who have contributed to that success have earned the gratitude of the world in preventing bloodshed and enabling the pursuit of peace to go forward.

153. A supreme effort is now required of us to save the situation. Surely all of us, permanent and non-permanent members of the Council, must join in that effort. I might say in passing that I trust that my friend, the representative of the United Arab Republic, will also co-operate in the search for a solution. We listened with close and respectful attention to the speech which he made today, and I determined that I shall say no word which shall increase tension or animosity. When we have studied his speech, it may well be that we shall wish to make some comment on his detailed statements. I would only say now, with respect, that I trust that the somewhat more moderate tone of his speech today, as compared with his speech last week, may indicate some improvement in the general situation.

154. This is no time for any of us to hold back. It is a time for international understanding and international good faith, and international co-operation. For we must all surely recognize that what is at stake, as was pointed out by the representative of Brazil just now, is not only the peace of the Near East and the saving of the peoples of the Near East from the scourge of war: the effectiveness of the world Organization which we are all pledged to support is at

stake. We seek a solution compatible with the sovereign rights of all nations since we are all pledged, to use the words of the Charter, to defend "the equal rights . . . of nations large and small". We are pledged too, and again I use the words of the Charter, "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained". We must be ready to work with the Secretary-General and with each other, in mutual respect, to save the peace and achieve a just settlement and restore the authority of the United Nations.

155. Those must be our purposes, and for my country I say now that from the first we have sought to work for a solution within the framework of the United Nations. And that is our purpose now. We trust that all will join in that international endeavour. If they do, we could even at this late hour turn the dangers of untold bloodshed and disastrous conflict which we face today into a triumph for the rule of reason and law. We could take together a long step forward towards the creation of a stable world order.

156. The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.

157. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel): On Saturday, 13 May—just two weeks ago—the streets of Cairo reverberated with the sound of tanks and the cries of agitated crowds whipped up by cheerleaders chanting: "We want war with Israel".

158. We in Israel looked on this spectacle with detachment, thinking that this was just one more outburst of chauvinistic frenzy which is such a common feature of the Arab military dictatorship régimes. But the tanks and the marching columns did not return to barracks. They moved forward into Sinai as the spearhead of a massive military concentration along the southern borders of Israel.

159. While the military machine was moving with ever increasing momentum, the Egyptian propaganda machine poured out a torrent of threats against Israel and charges that we had massed large forces on our northern border in preparation for an attack on Syria.

160. Although the trumped-up nature of these propaganda allegations was obvious, my Government nevertheless instructed me to inform the Secretary-General of their complete unfoundedness. As the Secretary-General confirms in his first report to the Security Council [*S/7896*], I conveyed to him on 15 May the assurances of my Government that Israel had not concentrated any troops anywhere and harboured no aggressive intentions against any of its Arab neighbours. I requested the Secretary-General to convey these assurances to the Arab Governments concerned.

161. He acted without delay on our request and added that the independent inquiries which he had conducted through his own United Nations representatives in the area confirmed the facts conveyed to him by Israel. At the 1342nd meeting of the Council on 24 May, I drew the Council's attention to the relevant paragraph—paragraph 9—of the Secretary-General's report. This notwithstanding, the representative of the United Arab Re-

public, in his letter of 27 May to the President of the Security Council [S/7907], not only brazenly repeats this fabrication, but in doing so he distorts the Secretary-General's report. I understand his predicament, but I cannot admire his audacity.

162. The unfounded charge of alleged Israel troop concentrations is the keystone of the Egyptian case for moving its forces against Israel. If it is pulled away, the whole flimsy edifice of Egyptian propaganda will collapse like a house of cards. By the alchemy of a process of constant repetition, the Egyptian propaganda machine tries to transmute the big lie into golden truth. This technique has been tried before, and not so long ago, with initial success and final disaster for its practitioners.

163. To return to the narration of the events: on 16 May, one day after my Government had conveyed these assurances to the Secretary-General, President Nasser moved against the United Nations Emergency Force and deployed heavy Egyptian forces right along the Israel border. In his report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, with his accustomed restraint and courtesy, has painted a vivid picture of the attitudes and actions of the Egyptian authorities. An ultimatum was issued, and while it was being delivered Egyptian military forces took over positions held by the Emergency Force, and shells were even fired to speed up the evacuation. With the Emergency Force safely out of the way, more Egyptian forces were poured into Sinai. At this point the situation became critical.

164. Israel's Defence Forces were still on their normal peace footing. But in the light of these sudden and threatening moves, my Government was compelled to take limited precautionary measures.

165. On 22 May, the Secretary-General, alarmed at the rapidity with which the situation was deteriorating, left on his journey to Cairo. While he was en route, President Nasser, in a fiery speech, proclaimed the blockade of the international waterway of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

166. When the Secretary-General arrived in Cairo, not only did he find himself confronted with the *fait accompli* of the blockade, but also with the same whipped-up crowds greeting him with cries of: "We want war with Israel". Next came announcements that operational blockade measures were being put into effect, and that mines were being laid in the international waterway.

167. The Secretary-General returned to New York earlier than expected and his report is now before the Security Council; in that report he stated:

"The decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to restrict shipping in the Strait of Tiran, of which I learned while en route to Cairo, has created a new situation. Free passage through the Strait is one of the questions which the Government of Israel considers most vital to her interests While in Cairo, I called to the attention of the Government of the United Arab Republic the dangerous consequences which could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of

Tiran. I expressed my deep concern in this regard and my hope that no precipitate action would be taken." [S/7906, para. 10.]

168. This is President Nasser's reply to the representations made to him by the Secretary-General; on 26 May he said: "Sharm El Sheikh means real confrontation with Israel. Taking such a step means that we should be ready to enter full-scale war with Israel. It is not an isolated operation." This speaks for itself.

169. As the Secretary-General himself has stated, the important immediate fact is that the situation in the Strait of Tiran represents a very serious potential threat to peace.

170. The position of my Government was stated in unambiguous terms by the then Foreign Minister of Israel at the 666th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 1 March 1957, and I repeated that statement when I spoke at the 1342nd meeting of the Security Council on 24 May last. I wish to confirm today again in the most solemn terms that this is the position of the Government of Israel. Every interference with the freedom of navigation in these waters is an offensive action and an act of aggression against Israel, the infringement of the sovereign rights of all nations to the unimpeded use of this international waterway and a gross violation of international law.

171. There is today no controversy whatsoever over the international character of the waterway in question. For ten years now it has been used uninterruptedly; hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping with all their different cargoes and under many different flags, including Israel's, have freely passed to and fro.

172. I wish to recall that statements recognizing the international character of the Strait of Tiran and acknowledging that freedom of navigation for all countries is the rule there were made at the 666th, 667th and 668th plenary meetings of the General Assembly in March 1957 by many countries, particularly those with important maritime interests, notably the United States of America, Argentina, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland and Denmark, and others.

173. In response to the recent unilateral and arbitrary action of the Egyptian Government, many more unambiguous and emphatic statements by these and other Governments have been issued, not only in support of Israel's vital rights and interests in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, but also to uphold their own rights and interests and to safeguard the integrity of the law of the sea.

174. In the face of the proclaimed lawlessness of the Egyptian Government, the assertion of these rights and the protection of the established law is a matter of supreme and urgent concern to each member of the international community.

175. In the light of this situation, the eviction of the United Nations Emergency Force from its position at

Sharm El Sheikh at the entrance to the Strait was not only an act of defiance of the will of the United Nations and a violation of Egypt's pledged word, but was the signal for the revival of belligerence after ten years of tranquillity in the Gulf of Aqaba.

176. What was the real role of the Force? Its main tasks were in Sharm El Sheikh and in Gaza to see to it that Egypt did not interfere with the freedom of navigation, and to deter terrorists and marauders from crossing the borders of Israel. The Force acquitted itself of these two tasks with distinction. Israel, along with all peace-loving nations, pays tribute to the officers and men of the Force who have so faithfully carried out their strenuous mission for peace.

177. From what I have said it becomes obvious that a United Nations Force has no tasks to fulfil in Israel. The entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba is not in Israel, and the marauders and infiltrators do not operate from Israel territory.

178. The proclaimed and practised policy of belligerence so brazenly pursued by the Government of the United Arab Republic is the crux of the matter. This is the underlying cause for the present and other crisis situations in the Middle East.

179. This belligerence made an empty shell of the Armistice Agreement. The two central violations of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement are the denial of free passage in the Suez Canal and the denial of free passage in Aqaba. In September 1951, the Security Council ruled that such belligerent practices and blockades cannot coexist with the armistice régime.

180. While the United Nations ruled that belligerence is incompatible with the armistice régime, Egypt wants to use the Armistice Agreements and United Nations machinery as a cover for the continuation of that very belligerency which the Armistice Agreement was intended to end. This is the meaning of the innocent-looking sentence where the Secretary-General reports President Nasser's assurances that all that he wanted was a "return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956". What were these conditions? Illegal blockade of the Suez Canal; armed incursions by organized gangs of *fedayeen*; and illicit interference with the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. The Government of Israel will not permit a return to these conditions.

181. This is the real issue, and not the mixture of stale allegations and fictitious charges put forward by the representative of the United Arab Republic.

182. The representative of the United Arab Republic has presented to the Council, at length and in detail, his version of the historical developments of the last twenty years. It was a fascinating exercise in fiction and diversion. Unfortunately, he forgot to mention one basic fact which determined the course of events to follow. On 15 May 1948, the Egyptian Army and those of other Arab States invaded the State of Israel with the avowed aim, conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to occupy the territory of Israel and to destroy its independence. This aggression, which was committed in flagrant violation of

the United Nations Charter and of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, was resisted and defeated by the people of Israel. It is this unsuccessful attempt to wipe out Israel which is the basic cause of the future developments. This Arab invasion of Israel was called at that time by the principle members of the Security Council by its true name, "aggression", and all that followed can be directly traced back to that aggression, and to that alone.

183. If there is still any doubt over Egypt's present-day objectives, Colonel Nasser himself has dissipated the last vestiges of it and thrown off all pretence. In his speech before the Central Council of Arab Trade Unions on 26 May 1967 he revealed his true intentions—not new to Israel or to those who knew the realities of the Middle East, but shocking to those who believed that they were dealing with a responsible leader. This was his message:

"The Arab people want to fight.

"We have been waiting for the suitable day when we shall be completely ready, since if we enter a battle with Israel we should be confident of victory and should take strong measures. We do not speak idly.

"We have lately felt that our strength is sufficient and that if we enter the battle with Israel we shall, with God's help, be victorious. Therefore we have now decided to take real steps.

"The United Nations Emergency Force stays as long as we wish and until we are ready. I have said at one time that within half an hour we can say to UNEF: 'Go'. And this is what has really happened.

"The battle will be a full-scale one and our basic aim will be to destroy Israel."

184. These threats do not need any interpretation. This is not the first time in our generation that we have seen to what lengths of folly dictators can go unless checked in time and what disasters they can inflict on mankind, including their own people. Is it too late to hope that this Organization, born out of the shambles of a dictator's madness, will rally in defence of its own principles and restrain President Nasser from the course on which he is set? The people of Israel, steeled in hardship and oppression, stand firm, resolute and united and will not shrink from defending their liberty and independence.

185. It is not too late for reason to prevail. The Government of Israel believes that five immediate steps should be taken in the present crisis: all inflammatory statements and threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State should cease; the Charter obligation of non-belligerence must be strictly complied with; the armed forces should be withdrawn from their positions as at the beginning of the month; all forms of armed incursion, acts of sabotage and terrorism should cease and the Governments concerned should take all steps to prevent their territory from being used for these hostile acts; in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba there should be no interference with any shipping.

186. If these steps are taken promptly, the deep anxieties of the hour will be lifted and the present dangerous tensions will subside.

187. The PRESIDENT: There are three more speakers on my list. Before we continue, however, I would suggest to the Council a recess of ten minutes.

188. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Today we have heard statements by a number of delegations which have explained their positions, their approach and their understanding of the problem under discussion. The list of speakers contains the names of only three delegations wishing to explain their point of view. The Soviet delegation is one of those three.

189. We would ask you, members of the Security Council, to give us an opportunity of expressing our views today before we adjourn this meeting of the Security Council. We believe it is most important for us to do this now and not at some other time or on some other day.

190. The PRESIDENT: It is the Chair's intention that the meeting continue until the speakers' list is exhausted. In view of the hour, however, I believe it would be convenient to have a very short recess. In fact, it has been suggested to me that we have a short recess of ten minutes; I am sure that the members of the Council will find that that will not interfere with our proceedings, which will continue after the recess. If there are very insistent objections, I will not press for it, but I propose that we recess and resume promptly at 6 o'clock. I make this proposal because it has been suggested to me that this short recess will enable us to pay closer attention to the speeches that will follow.

191. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): I should merely like to know what reasons prompted some delegations to suggest such an important decision at this time and which delegations felt unable to hear a few more speakers and allow the Council to continue its work. Those reasons must be very weighty ones, for if we were to break off our work at this point, that would mean that we did not attach any great importance to the task before us. So far we have not been informed of those reasons, and I should therefore like to know what they are.

192. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I am the guilty man. If a reason is asked for, I can only say I do not think it delicate to state it.

193. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Sometimes, as we sit in this most important body, we have an impression that efforts are being made to engage us in conversation with some kind of world beyond the grave, and that some voice is therefore asking us to accept the obscure ideas of nameless people.

194. We have already had occasion to point out that we here are living people and want to talk to living people, and we cannot understand why living people—whatever seat they may occupy, even the President's—should wish to reach out to the dead. We find it even more difficult to

understand the explanation given by the United States representative who referred to some kind of mysterious delicacy of the reasons why we should interrupt the Security Council's work.

195. There is obviously no place here for dramatic effects, and it would be reasonable for the members of the Security Council to continue their businesslike discussion without delays of any kind.

196. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I find my friend Mr. Fedorenko singularly obtuse. I withdraw my request.

197. The PRESIDENT: I should like to say that the Chair would in normal circumstances give equal consideration to a similar request on the part of any member. But, as I said, the Chair will not insist on this recess. Now that the request has been withdrawn, I call on the next speaker, the representative of Ethiopia.

198. Mr. MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): My delegation feels that the Council is in duty bound to thank and commend the Secretary-General for his worthy and sincere efforts that have resulted in the wise and balanced report which he has presented to us and which is under consideration in accordance with the item listed last on our agenda.

199. In our earlier intervention on this matter in the Council we suggested that it would be justified for the Secretary-General's report to be presented to us before we embarked on substantive discussion. We are happy to note that the report has not disappointed our expectations.

200. The Secretary-General is to be commended for doing his best in the difficult and complicated circumstances surrounding the Middle East crisis. The effort he has made so far and the suggestions he has presented in his report show clearly how objective and painstakingly careful he has been in his whole approach to this matter. It is our view that in this matter, as in other matters, he has shown loyalty both to the universal trust on which his high office is based and to the spirit of the Charter, which for him, as well as for us, is the guideline to all international action. This is a course of conduct we expect of the Secretary-General, and he is to be commended for living up to our expectations.

201. The job of the Secretary-General has been called the most impossible job in the world, and those who become too demanding in their impatient expectations of quick results or who are ready to voice ill-considered criticism of the Secretary-General's actions are bound to add to the inherent difficulties of his office and to create more complications for an already formidable task. In any case, if the world community really wishes to make the Secretary-General an effective servant of peace, it should give him continued support and should always be prepared to consider his suggestions and counsel seriously. That is the only way by which the Secretary-General can have the necessary authority and prestige to enable him to contribute effectively to the solution of world problems. To the extent that we help the Secretary-General in this manner, we enable the United Nations to play a more active and a

more effective role in international relations. This constant dedication to and support for the United Nations should of course be forthcoming from all Members of the Organization, be they large or small Powers.

202. It is unnecessary to emphasize that it is the support and co-operation of the major Powers, permanent members of this Council, that is of decisive importance in this respect because the larger the Power the greater the responsibility. The trouble is that the world seems to have fallen into the dangerous habit of looking upon the Secretary-General as a kind of one-man fire brigade which it allows itself to ignore in times other than those of international crises, and then, in such times of international crises—and only then—it expects him and the United Nations to resolve difficult and deep-rooted problems through some kind of miracle or magic formula.

203. So long as this inconsistent attitude toward the United Nations role persists and until such time as we—and by “we” I mean the whole membership of the United Nations—are prepared to back the United Nations all along the line and to give our full and constant co-operation to the Secretary-General, the world seems to be doomed to living in vicious and dangerous cycles of tensions, alarms and conflicts whose cumulative effect is bound, in the end, to undermine the very cause of international peace and security whose maintenance is the primary responsibility of this Council.

204. It is with those considerations and preoccupations at the back of our minds that my delegation has studied the report of the Secretary-General which is now before the Council. We would not be doing justice to the efforts of the Secretary-General nor would we be helping the cause of peace which we want to preserve if we were to make rash comments on the substance of the report.

205. My delegation, like the Security Council itself, needs time to study and consider this problem. Our comments today will therefore necessarily be preliminary and will not include any substantive examination of the report.

206. We feel, as I have had occasion to state earlier, that in the prevailing circumstances the Secretary-General has acted rightly and with the same calm dignity that we have come to associate with his character and personality. The course of action that he has outlined in his report deserves the Council's consideration and support.

207. Moreover, my Government, for its part, approves the general line and purport of the Secretary-General's approach to the problem, and we agree with his concern to gain time and to have what he himself has called “a breathing spell” which, to quote him again, “will allow tension to subside from its present explosive level” [*S/7906, para. 14*]. It is our duty in the Security Council, and indeed in the United Nations, to do our utmost, both individually and collectively, to help gain time for the Secretary-General and to create a climate in which the Council can undertake the appropriate initiatives to avert military conflict which, in the estimate of the Secretary-General, could “inevitably set off a general conflict in the Near East” [*ibid., para. 12*].

208. My delegation concurs with the Secretary-General's considered judgement that a breathing spell is required to allow the Security Council to study the underlying causes of the present crisis. The Council would therefore do well to concentrate its urgent attention on the report and the recommendations contained therein. The first and foremost objective at this stage, it seems to us, should therefore be the avoidance of conflict and of any step that is likely to lead to confrontation. With this urgent objective in view and by way of endorsing the efforts of the Secretary-General as outlined in his report, my delegation is prepared to join in an effort to work out an urgent appeal to all the parties concerned to exercise restraint and to refrain from taking any action which could give rise to confrontation and conflict. The avoidance of all such action will allow the Security Council to proceed with its urgent mission of the preservation of peace in the region.

209. I need hardly add that such an appeal should carry the unanimous support of the Council if its great value is not to be lost. This makes it all the more necessary for us to strive with one mind and with common purpose in order to achieve this end.

210. I reserve the right of my delegation to intervene later should the need arise.

211. Mr. PARTHASARATHI (India): At the 1341st meeting of the Security Council on 24 May, I expressed the view that the Council should await a report from the Secretary-General on the result of his discussions in Cairo before proceeding with the consideration of the matter on the agenda. We felt—and subsequent events bear out this conclusion—that no useful purpose would be served by a public airing of the issues while the Secretary-General was engaged in delicate diplomatic negotiations on the same issues.

212. My delegation would like to pay a most sincere tribute to U Thant on his untiring efforts in the cause of peace and the discharge of his onerous responsibilities in a fair and impartial manner. We admire his dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the statesmanship which he has displayed in the current crisis.

213. In his report of 26 May [*S/7906*], the Secretary-General has dealt with a number of issues relevant to the present situation in West Asia and has suggested a number of steps that could help reduce tension. He has also alluded to other possible steps which could be taken by mutual consent of the parties.

214. The Security Council is meeting to deliberate on vital issues affecting war and peace in West Asia. Tensions have existed in the area for many years, but now they have become critical. We are deeply concerned at this situation.

215. There are several issues in the area which can endanger peace. They are set out in the Secretary-General's report, but it is important to realize that these problems have to be viewed in the perspective of the tragic history of the area. The Council is charged under the Charter with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace. It is the view of my delegation that our immediate endeavour

should be to work for restraint and reduction of tensions in order to gain, in the words of the Secretary-General, "a breathing spell". The time thus gained can be utilized by the Council to work for a *détente* and seek ways and means to consolidate peace in the area.

216. The Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council, has given an indication of the possible courses of action which might contribute substantially to the reduction of tension. He has stated that: "it would most certainly be helpful in the present situation if the Government of Israel were to reconsider its position and resume its participation in the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission" [*ibid.*, para. 15]. Similarly, in another paragraph of the report the Secretary-General has repeated his earlier suggestion that: "it would be very helpful to the maintenance of quiet along the Israel-Syrian line if the two parties would resume their participation in the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, both in the current emergency session and in the regular sessions" [*ibid.*, para. 16].

217. My delegation lends its support to those valuable suggestions. It is a matter of record that while the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission has not been able to achieve any concrete results, the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission has not functioned at all since 1956. Both the Israel-Syrian and Egyptian-Israel, as well as other, Mixed Armistice Commissions were established under the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements signed between Israel and its Arab neighbours. We believe that the provisions of the various General Armistice Agreements should be fully observed by the parties concerned. The Council can play a particularly useful role in this connexion by strengthening the machinery of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

218. The position of my Government in regard to the basic issues is well known and was stated in Parliament on 25 May 1967 by the Minister for External Affairs of India. At this stage I do not wish to go in detail on questions of a substantive nature, but would only briefly restate my delegation's position.

219. First, in asking for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, the United Arab Republic was only exercising its sovereignty. The Secretary-General acted correctly and wisely in agreeing to that withdrawal. The Minister for External Affairs of India said in Parliament on 25 May 1967:

"India could not be a party to any procedure which would make UNEF into an occupation force nor could the Government of India agree to UNEF's continued presence in the United Arab Republic in the absence of the latter's consent and, in any case, Indian troops could not remain part of UNEF without the United Arab Republic's approval."

220. Second, we understand the reasons for certain precautionary measures of preparedness taken by the United Arab Republic and note that they are of a defensive nature. In this context it is relevant to note paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report of 26 May 1967.

221. Third, all parties should fully observe the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab States.

222. Fourth, in regard to the Gulf of Aqaba, the Minister for External Affairs for India stated in Parliament on 25 May 1967:

"So far as the Government of India are concerned, we had taken the position as far back as 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland sea and that entry into the Gulf lies within the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. We adhere to this view."

It is our view that no State or group of States should attempt to challenge by force the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic over the Strait of Tiran. A *modus vivendi* is most desirable, but any arrangement that is worked out must be within the framework of the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic.

223. Finally, it is our earnest hope that peace in the area will be preserved. It is our duty to encourage efforts by the Secretary-General and all Member States to work for a *détente* which alone can lead to the consolidation of peace in West Asia.

224. We earnestly wish to see a reduction of tension and the establishment of peace in this area as in other areas of the world. There are, no doubt, many obstacles, but we share the Secretary-General's belief that in spite of all these difficulties the United Nations can and must persevere in its endeavours to find reasonable, peaceful and just solutions to these problems. Towards this end my delegation is ready now and in the future to extend its full co-operation to all efforts to secure and maintain peace in West Asia. What is required at this stage is the exercise of the utmost restraint by all parties concerned, to enable the Secretary-General and the Security Council to take steps to maintain peace.

225. I reserve my right to intervene again in the debate, Mr. President.

226. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Security Council has before it a letter from the representative of the United Arab Republic requesting the inclusion in the Council's agenda, as a matter of extreme urgency, of an item entitled "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security".

227. As is well known, at earlier meetings of the Security Council the Soviet delegation has already given its appraisal in principle of the situation which has arisen in the Near East. We have pointed out in particular that in this part of the world a situation is developing which gives grounds for concern regarding the interests of peace and international security. Attention must be drawn to the fact that Israel appears before us once again as the real culprit responsible for the dangerous aggravation of tension, and that Israel could not of course act in the way it is acting unless it was being directly and indirectly encouraged by certain imperialist circles which are trying to restore colonial oppres-

sion in Arab lands. These circles undoubtedly regard Israel in present circumstances as their main weapon against Arab States which are pursuing an independent national policy and resisting the pressure of the forces of imperialism.

228. Today the United States representative once again engaged in histrionics of all kinds in the manner characteristic of United States propaganda, and it was quite clear from his utterances whom Washington is protecting and whom it is trying to accuse. The United States representative praised Mr. Eshkol's statement and made no attempt to conceal whom the United States regards as responsible for the present crisis. It is extremely regrettable that Washington should display such partiality in its efforts to protect the forces of aggression and extremist circles in Israel, and that it should go on giving generous assistance to them by making pious appeals to both sides.

229. The United States representative went so far in encouraging Tel-Aviv's claims that he saw fit to offer here an interpretation of certain passages in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, in terms which cannot in the least be regarded as justifiable in any way. We would like to point out in this connexion that the Secretary-General's report does not need interpreting and it certainly does not need an interpretation involving a deliberate distortion of the fundamental issue.

230. The United States representative was so carried away by his own mood that he began to quote extensively from certain articles of the United Nations Charter. But it is not for Washington of all places to raise its voice here and play the role of champion of our Organization's Charter and guardian of its integrity. Everyone knows that it is precisely Washington which is flouting the basic principles of the United Nations Charter from day to day in various regions and on various continents from Latin America to Asia.

231. The United States representative expressed his distress at the situation in the Near East, where the Government of the United Arab Republic has recently exercised its sovereign rights. It is a pity that the United States shows no humane feelings or regret at the cruel and ruthless destruction of peaceful towns and villages, or at the killing of hundreds and thousands of women, children and old men in another part of the world by interventionists from across the ocean. But is this monstrous orgy of military barbarism being enacted on planets in outer space, to which the United States speaker also referred, or on our earth? Or are the people of that country made of different stuff so that in their case barbarous treatment is permissible?

232. The Security Council is aware of the true facts which give rise to concern from the point of view of the interests of maintaining peace and security in the Near East. The situation in the Near East resulting from Israel's aggressive act against neighbouring Arab States has often been the subject of discussion in the Security Council.

233. In July and August 1966, as we all remember, the Council considered in some detail the serious situation created by Israel's aggressive acts against Syria. In November 1966 another Arab State, Jordan, fell victim to Israel's undisguised aggression. It is appropriate to recall in this

connexion that the Council condemned Israel for its aggression against Jordan and gave a warning that, if such actions were repeated, it would be compelled to take serious steps against Israel. In spite of this serious warning, however, Israel is unwilling to renounce its policy of provocation and military adventures against the Arab States. Mention must be made in this connexion of the armed incident that occurred on 7 April 1967, in the course of which the Israel side went so far as to launch overt military operations against Syria using aircraft, tanks and artillery.

234. We also know that these acts of Israel were accompanied by declarations confirming Israel's desire to settle Israel-Arab differences from a position of strength, by force of arms. It is well known for instance that the Prime Minister of Israel, and following him the Chief of the Israel General Staff, declared that the armed attack of 7 April would not be the last and that Israel itself would at its own discretion choose the forms, methods and timing of further actions of this kind. The most recent statements by ruling circles in Israel have been filled with equally blatant threats.

235. After the armed attack by Israel forces on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic on 7 April of this year, Tel Aviv continued to intensify the atmosphere of military psychosis in the country. Leading statesmen, including Foreign Minister Eban, openly called for Israel to undertake large-scale "punitive" operations against Syria and to strike it a "decisive blow".

236. The Defence and Foreign Policy Committee of the Knesset (Parliament), in a decision dated 9 May, granted the Government full powers to conduct military operations against Syria. Israel forces were moved up to the Syrian frontier and placed on a war footing. National mobilization was proclaimed.

237. And today we have further evidence that Israel has protectors who are not only giving it moral encouragement in its military adventures but are ready to provide any form of military assistance. The answers given by the Prime Minister of Israel in his interview with the *U.S. News & World Report*, which was reported in the issue of 17 April, are very significant in this respect. Asked whether Israel was expecting help from the United States if it were attacked by its neighbours, the Prime Minister replied: "We get these promises when we ask the United States for arms and are told: 'Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here'."

238. As is well known to members of the Council and particularly to the peoples of the Near East, it is precisely at times when a new act of provocation is being prepared against one of the countries of this area that the United States Fleet visits the Near Eastern ports with unambiguous intentions. The peoples of the Near Eastern countries know the real value of these "courtesy visits", as they are called, and remember their history only too well.

239. As we have said before, if Washington and London really intended to ease tension in the Near East, then they should start, for instance, by withdrawing from the Mediterranean their fleets which constitute one of the most serious sources of tension in this part of the world.

240. It is highly symptomatic that during the last few days reference has once again been made to the notorious concept of the power "vacuum" which is said to have been created in the Near East after the former colonial Powers had lost their position in most countries in this area, and which the United States thinks it ought to fill.

241. As recently as today, *The New York Times* devoted a very lengthy editorial to this blatantly neo-colonial concept, praising the police role of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and regretting that the United States does not have the same kind of cudgel to use south of Suez as well.

242. Surely everyone knows that, in the Mediterranean and in other parts of the world as well, United States naval fleets are engaged in premeditated provocative actions off the shores of foreign countries including the Soviet Union, thousands of miles from the North American continent, with the aim of aggravating international tension. Is it not time to stop these provocative adventurist escapades in the vicinity of foreign territory, which endanger peace and international security?

243. One can only be astonished at the attempts made by some members of the Council to suggest that the steps taken by the Arab countries to safeguard their security in the face of overt military threats by Israel are the cause of the aggravation of the situation in the Near East. A study of the sequence and logic of events is enough to show absolutely clearly that these steps taken by the Arab countries are a legitimate response to Israel's threats and to the dangerous concentration of Israel forces near the Syrian frontier.

244. In his statement of 25 May President Nasser said:

"On 13 May we received accurate information that Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border huge armed forces of about 11 to 13 brigades. These forces were divided into two fronts, one south of Lake Tiberias and the other north of the lake.

"The decision made by Israel at this time was to carry out an aggression against Syria as of May 17. On May 14 we took our measures . . ."

245. After Israel has so often unleashed aggressive acts against the Arab countries in violation of the Armistice Agreements, the apprehension felt by the Arab States at Israel's renewed military preparations is entirely understandable and fully justified.

246. Today, Mr. El Kony, the representative of the United Arab Republic, has fully explained the position of the Government of the United Arab Republic.

247. The Soviet Union has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Government of Israel to the fact that the hazardous policy which Israel has been pursuing for many years in regard to its neighbours is fraught with dangers for which the entire responsibility rests with Tel Aviv; and it would be a fatal mistake if military extremist circles in Israel, unrestrained by sober political considerations, were to gain the upper hand in the present tense situation.

248. The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to raise its voice of warning in the Security Council and to point out that those who are pushing Israel to the brink of the abyss do not realize that it is much easier to spark off a military conflict than to extinguish it.

249. The Soviet Union, together with all peace-loving countries, condemns the intrigues of the imperialist forces against the freedom and independence of the Arab peoples. The statements made by the Governments of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have made it clear that the peoples of our countries resolutely support the legitimate efforts of the Arab States to strengthen their security in defence of their inalienable sovereign rights.

250. In this connexion I should like to quote an extract from the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic which, like the other peace-loving countries, is concerned at the tenseness of the situation in the Near East. This statement says, *inter alia*, that:

"The German Democratic Republic most vigorously condemns the imperialist activities directed against the Arab States.

"In contrast to the anti-Arab policy of the Government of the West German Federal Republic, the Government and people of the German Democratic Republic now as in the past strongly support the Arab States and peoples in their resistance to imperialist provocations. The German Democratic Republic resolutely condemns the insidious propaganda, which has appeared in imperialist publications in the West German Federal Republic against the leaders of the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic and against U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations."

251. The Soviet Government is convinced that the peoples are not interested in kindling a military conflict in the Near East. Only a handful of colonial oil monopolies, and their myrmidons who enrich themselves by provocative and adventurist actions, can be interested in such a conflict. Only the forces of imperialism, with Tel Aviv following in the wake of their policy, can be interested in it.

252. In these circumstances the Arab countries, in defending their legitimate rights, are showing moderation in the face of Israel's latest threats. Whether the militarist and extremist circles in Tel Aviv will risk overstepping the danger line will depend largely on those who stand behind Israel.

253. The Soviet Government is watching the development of events in the Near East very closely. It bases itself on the premise that the maintenance of peace and security in this area, which is directly adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union, is in the vital interests of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

254. The Soviet Union believes that in the situation that has now arisen the Security Council, which under the United Nations Charter is the body primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace, should reso-

lutely condemn the provocative acts and threats against the Arab States.

255. At the Council's 1342nd meeting our delegation explained its attitude to the so-called initiative by Canada and Denmark in the Security Council and gave its assessment of it. We took the view then, as we do now, that the appeal by these two NATO countries to the Security Council was part of a campaign which is being artificially inflated by certain forces and whose real objectives have nothing in common with genuine concern for peace and security in the Near East.

256. The present initiative of Canada and Denmark also reflects, like a drop of water, the dissatisfaction of those imperialist circles which until comparatively recently considered themselves masters in the Near East and used to deploy their military forces there as they wished, but were then asked—by sovereign States exercising their lawful rights—to clear out of the area.

257. Even in today's speeches some Western delegates have gone on shedding tears of inconsolable grief at the fact that the military contingents of the NATO countries, for whom the bell tolled long ago, have had to abandon their cherished "strategic deployment" on foreign territories.

258. The Soviet delegation has not of course supported and will not support any initiative like this by Canada and Denmark.

259. If the Western Powers, which have been expressing their concern about the Near East so vociferously and with such prolix eloquence in the Security Council, were really interested in maintaining peace and security in this area, then all they would have to do would be to call to order their unruly accomplices in this dangerous aggravation of the situation—namely, the extremist militarist circles in Tel Aviv whose policy is the cause of the constant aggravations of the situation in the Near East.

260. In view of all this, the Soviet delegation is convinced that if the Security Council is now to consider in all seriousness the situation which is developing in the Near East, the situation must be considered in connexion with the well-founded complaint submitted to the Council by the United Arab Republic.

261. In the present case the Security Council has before it a complaint indicating the real causes of tension in the Near East; and the Soviet delegation, which firmly supports the appeal by the United Arab Republic, considers that the question submitted by the United Arab Republic for consideration by the Security Council should be given priority and should be considered by the Security Council without delay.

262. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): At this stage and at this time of the evening, I would only say this: The statements made by previous speakers have only served to underline what you, Mr. President, and a number of members of the Council have said about the need of the Council at the next stage to take heed of and to reinforce the Secretary-

General's appeal contained in his very important report [S/7906] which was submitted to us today. I have particularly in mind paragraph 14.

263. What is now surely most urgently needed is the exercise of special restraint by all concerned to allow a breathing spell in the search for a peaceful outcome to the present crisis. The Secretary-General in his report has urged that tension be allowed to subside "from its present explosive level". The Secretary-General has also outlined a number of possible suggestions which might be followed up by the Council, suggestions which might contribute to a reduction of tension which both he and, I am certain, all members of the Council warmly desire at this stage.

264. It is clear from the Secretary-General's report that the Council bears a very heavy responsibility and has a number of complex issues to examine. In these circumstances, it would appear that some interim action by the Council, as suggested by several delegations today, is most desirable as a prelude to more specific action by the United Nations later, when consultations which the Secretary-General no doubt will have—consultations among members of the Council and among the parties directly involved—might have arrived at a maximum amount of understanding as to precisely what the next step should be. But I do hope that an early agreement will be reached on the terms of an appeal, as suggested by several delegations this afternoon.

265. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I wish to make a few remarks in exercise of my right of reply to the comments made by the Soviet representative, Mr. Fedorenko. I am quite content to allow the members of the Council to judge whose statement on the agenda items displayed in tone and content the most impartiality—my statement or Mr. Fedorenko's. Indeed, the record will show that I stated in the same terms our commitment to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations in the area, Arab and Israel alike, and our fervent desire to have good relations with all States of the Near East. I failed to notice any such even-handed references in his remarks.

266. Also it is rather interesting that in attempting to deal with the agenda items I referred only once to the Soviet Union, and then only in the context of a factual statement that the Soviet Union had adhered to an international convention on the freedom of the seas.

267. On the contrary, Mr. Fedorenko's statement was studded with perjorative statements about my country, statements which I reject as being totally without foundation. That type of statement contributes nothing to the just resolution of the grave problem before us. Conspicuous in Mr. Fedorenko's statement was the virtually total absence of reference to the Secretary-General's report, which practically every other member of the Council pointed to as the best guide-line that we could use in determining where we are to go from here. Mr. Fedorenko's statement heats up the situation rather than cools it off. It diverts our attention from the problem at hand. It does not—and I say this most regrettably—advance our search for a reasonable, peaceful and honourable settlement.

268. It is also a strange phenomenon that the Soviet representative in a speech of this character always injects a totally irrelevant subject. In the introduction to his speech he sought to bring Viet-Nam into this Council for discussion although it is not on the agenda of this meeting. It is also a strange phenomenon that the Soviet Union objected to Council consideration of Viet-Nam when that subject was included in the Council's agenda at the request of the United States. If the Soviet representative would agree not only to talk but to vote on the Viet-Nam problem in this Council and if he would withdraw his objection to the Council's consideration of the subject, I should be very glad to accommodate him at any time.

269. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We have tried to listen attentively to the statement just made by the United States representative. We have endeavoured to understand the sense of this reply of his to the statement by the Soviet representative, and there is only one conclusion that we can draw both from what the United States representative said in his earlier statement and from what he has said by way of clarification. This conclusion is that it is perfectly clear that the United States delegation is attempting to divert attention from the main issue, from the crux of the problem which has arisen in connexion with the dangerous situation in the Near East, and is trying by every possible means to switch attention from the aggressive and adventurous acts committed by Tel Aviv against its Arab neighbours and to lead the discussion into the realm of quotations, references and other legal stratagems.

270. But, as we said earlier, no amount of eloquence, however casuistic it may be, can conceal the gravity of the situation which is being created with the co-operation, participation or inspiration of Washington. And, if the United States representative could look in a mirror at the monstrous war which the United States is waging on the Asian continent far from its own frontiers, then—as the saying goes—"don't blame the mirror if you are to blame yourself".

271. I could, of course, use the original expression with which the immortal genius of the fable-writer Krylov enriched our literature long ago. But I think that, as the situation is so clear, there is no need to resort to poetic quotations, since I am sure that this is well known to everyone from their primary school lessons.

272. The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.

273. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel): The representative of the Soviet Union deemed it fit to repeat his unfounded charges against my Government and country. He spoke of provocations, military concentrations and threatening statements by Israel's leaders. I have already drawn his attention at the 1342nd meeting of the Council on 24 May to the report of the Secretary-General, which in clear and undeniable terms refutes the allegation of Israel troop concentrations. The representative of the Soviet Union has spoken of mobilization by Israel, but has carefully avoided mentioning the fact that Israel took precautionary measures only after Egypt advanced several divisions in Sinai and along the borders of Israel.

274. The representative of the Soviet Union bases his evidence on President Nasser's fabrications. He prefers them to the objective report of the Secretary-General. I wonder whether this is the kind of impartiality which the representative of the Soviet Union recommends. Were he to apply only a modest measure of impartiality to the affairs of the Middle East, I am convinced that his country would make a major contribution to the establishment of peaceful conditions in that tormented region.

275. The representative of the Soviet Union referred to provocations by Israel. What are they—the mining of roads in Israel, the blowing up of houses in peaceful villages, the waylaying and assassination of farmers plowing their fields? These are the provocations, these are the acts of hostility to which the people of my country have been subjected for many, many years. These acts were the subject of the Secretary-General's press statement of 11 May 1967 when he said:

"I must say that, in the last few days, the El Fatah type of incidents have increased, unfortunately. Those incidents have occurred in the vicinity of the Lebanese and Syrian lines and are very deplorable, especially because, by their nature, they seem to indicate that the individuals who committed them have had more specialized training than has usually been evidenced in El Fatah incidents in the past. That type of activity is insidious, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreements and menaces the peace of the area. All Governments concerned have an obligation under the General Armistice Agreements, as well as under the Charter of the United Nations and in the interest of peace, to take every measure within their means to put an end to such activities."

276. The Secretary-General, in his most recent report of 26 May [S/7906] to the Security Council, again drew attention to the dangerous effects of sabotage and terrorist activities.

277. The representative of the Soviet Union referred to statements made by Israel Government leaders. I know that Mr. Fedorenko is a famous scholar in oriental literature. I am not aware if his wide erudition also includes a knowledge of Hebrew. It may be that his lack of knowledge of our Hebrew language is the reason for his misreading of statements made by Israel Government leaders. I will submit to the scrutiny of the members of the Council only one example.

278. Mr. Fedorenko referred to Foreign Minister Eban's statement which I have here. Mr. Eban said:

"The Syrian Government could not be more mistaken if it believes it has discovered a method of attacking Israel with impunity. The real or fictitious sessions of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission have not created an open season for murderous attacks and sabotage against Israel. The Government of Israel will take and carry out whatever steps it deems necessary to protect its territory and the lives of its citizens regardless of the formal state of the Mixed Armistice Commission meetings".

279. I believe that the representative of the Soviet Union has access to the statements made by Arab leaders. Therefore, I can confine myself to just one quotation from an inexhaustible stream of such threatening statements. I shall read the recent statement made by the Syrian Defence Minister, General Assad, on 20 May 1967. He said:

"The Syrian forces were prepared to initiate the liberation and the blowing up of the aggressive Zionist existence in 'our' Arab homeland. The Syrian Army, which has been waiting for a long time, is unanimous in its will to precipitate the battle. However, the Army has been waiting for a signal from the political leadership. The Minister of Defence, as a military man, is of the opinion that the time is ripe for a liberation war, and that it is necessary, at least, to undertake minimum measures to ensure a punitive blow on Israel that will return to her her wisdom and compel her to go on her knees humiliated and defeated".

280. The Syrian Minister boastfully admitted that Syrian aircraft had encroached upon Israel territory tens of times since 23 February 1967 for observation and other purposes. The last time, on 14 May 1967, Syrian aircraft penetrated Israel air space for tens of kilometres.

281. I could continue with these quotations, but the hour is late and the members of the Council are fully aware of all these statements. I thought that the time was ripe to refute the unfounded allegations that have been repeated by the representative of the Soviet Union.

282. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): My colleague and friend Mr. Fedorenko said that the meaning of our statement was not clear. I should like to clarify it for him.

283. The United States is opposed to belligerent acts and violence by anyone in the Middle East, no matter what their political ideology or alignment may be. We respect their right to their own political systems and to make their own alignments. We stand ready to endorse the Secretary-General's appeal to all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions.

284. Can the Soviet Union say the same?

285. The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Syria.

286. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I had not intended to take the floor today. In fact, I had prepared a statement which at the time I prepared it I had thought sufficient. The members of the Council will be able to judge this when they hear my statement tomorrow.

287. However, in listening to the statements made, respectively, by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. El Kony, and the representative of Israel and in comparing their tones, I was really flabbergasted, to say the least. We all have heard the two statements and we can all judge for ourselves the restraint, the rationalism and the

logic with which the representative of the United Arab Republic argued his case. I think that any professor or teacher studying the case we are discussing here would regard the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic as representing one point of view and arguing that point of view.

288. However, the Israel representative started with a freshman-like presentation, describing the masses in the streets of Cairo chanting "We want war", and things of that sort. He then proceeded to use most insulting and arrogant language, referring to President Nasser as a "dictator" and so on. All of us remember what he said.

289. I remember the appeal made during the first of these series of meetings of the Council by the representative of Ethiopia, that we should refrain from using acrimonious language. I submit that the language used by the representative of Israel was not only acrimonious but also arrogant. I have tried to discover the rather strange reason for the language and tone of the representative of Israel. I could not find one, and suddenly I remembered what had happened in the streets of New York yesterday. For there was a great parade on Riverside Drive and Mr. Rafael, my little neighbour to my right, was on the stand reviewing the 45,000 people—it was later said to be 100,000 and still later to be 150,000 people—who passed before him chanting the songs of Israel. There were also military formations in the parade. Undoubtedly, all of this must have gone to his head, especially when we take into consideration that seventy lonely Arabs also tried to march on Riverside Drive. But they were hit by tomatoes and eggs and humiliated. All that must have gone to the head of Mr. Rafael, and he must have felt himself to be, not a big dictator, but a little dictator. Certainly he must have thought that he was a Roman emperor as he sat in the Council today and dictated the five points which are the basis of the conciliation that he is asking for; he was dictating his terms. I submit that Mr. Rafael does not represent a little State. He acts like one of the three super-Powers—although even the representatives of the super-Powers do not use language like his.

290. I said that I had not intended to take the floor today, but Mr. Rafael referred time and again to the statements of Syrian representatives. I have a whole file with me here which contains the statements of Israel representatives, but I shall save the time of the Council by quoting just a few of them.

291. *The Jerusalem Post* published the following in its issue of 12 May 1967, under the heading: "Eshkol warns April 7 action may have to be repeated":

"In view of the fourteen incidents in the past month alone we may have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7."

First of all, the threat in that statement is quite clear. Secondly, I ask members to observe the words "we may have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7". That certainly means that they adopted measures on 7 April and that they have applied those measures. With respect to exactly what happened on 7 April, that will be one of the basic points with which I shall deal tomorrow.

292. I have before me a photostatic copy of an article which appeared in *The Jerusalem Post* of 7 May 1967, which refers to the situation on the Syrian border:

"Mr. Galili said ... Israel [must] take forcible measures in self-defence. He said Israel must live its life without excessive sensitivity to censure by Powers which do not understand the conditions of our existence."

293. The quotation to which the representative of the Soviet Union referred has appeared in the 17 April 1967 issue of *U.S. News & World Report*; it reads as follows:

"Answer: Surely, we expect such help—but we would rely primarily on our own Army. I wouldn't want American mothers crying about the blood of their sons being shed here. But I would surely expect such help, especially if I take into consideration all the solemn promises that have been made to Israel.

"We get these promises when we ask the United States for arms and are told: 'Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here'."

294. I shall save the time of the members of the Council by merely quoting the report of the Secretary-General, which reads as follows:

"Intemperate and bellicose utterances, by other officials and non-officials, eagerly reported by the Press and radio, are unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East."—and mark this—"In recent weeks, however, reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that State statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions." [S/7896, para. 8.]

295. An article which appeared in *The New York Times* of 13 May 1967 began in the following manner:

"Tel Aviv, May 12—Some Israel leaders have decided that the use of force against Syria may be the only way to curtail increasing terrorism.

"Any such Israel reaction to continued infiltration probably would be of considerable strength but of short duration and limited in area."

Even a description of the military operation has been given by the military leaders. In that particular week there was some sort of neurosis that swept over Israel and Israel leaders, including Abba Eban, Prime Minister Eshkol, Mrs. Golda Meir, and Mr. Galili, the Chief of Staff, who were going from one city to another clamouring for war against Syria. Surely the Secretary-General's statement which I read out here about the inflammatory statements from Israel is not unfounded and is worthy of our praise.

296. One thing that really puzzles me a great deal are statements by representatives of Israel about the rule of law, when the very existence of Israel—I repeat, its very existence—was founded on terrorism and gangsterism. The

Haganah was founded in 1936, before any Arabs attacked Israel. The Haganah and the Zionists decided that the Arabs should be thrown out of Palestine. There is considerable proof to that effect, but I shall leave it for a later stage. However, to show the roots of terrorism in which the very existence of Israel was founded, I shall quote Security Council resolution 57 (1948) of 18 September 1948 which stated:

"The Security Council,

"Deeply shocked by the tragic death of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, as the result of a cowardly act which appears to have been committed by a criminal group of terrorists in Jerusalem while the United Nations representative was fulfilling his peace-seeking mission in the Holy Land,

"Resolves:

"1. To request the Secretary-General to keep the flag of the United Nations at half-mast for a period of three days;

"2. To authorize the Secretary-General to meet from the Working Capital Fund all expenses connected with the death and burial of the United Nations Mediator."

297. One month later, no answer was received from the Government of Israel, and on 19 October 1948 the Security Council adopted resolution 59 (1948) which stated, among other things:

"The Security Council,

"...

"1. *Notes with concern* that the Provisional Government of Israel has to date submitted no report to the Security Council or to the Acting Mediator regarding the progress of the investigation into the assassinations;

"2. *Requests* that Government to submit to the Security Council at an early date an account of the progress made in the investigation and to indicate therein the measures taken with regard to negligence on the part of officials or other factors affecting the crime;

"3. *Reminds* the Governments and authorities concerned that all the obligations and responsibilities of the parties set forth in its resolutions 54 (1948) of 15 July and 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948 are to be discharged fully and in good faith."

298. Not long ago a letter was addressed by the Secretary-General to the representative of Jordan regarding the death in 1958 of a Colonel in the Mixed Armistice Commission, Colonel Flint of Canada. In his letter to the Foreign Minister of Jordan the Secretary-General quotes a Security Council resolution on that subject, and also the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan.

299. I should like to suggest that now, after twenty years, the Security Council ought to hear from the representative

of Israel about the results of its investigations concerning the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte by terrorists. To the best of my knowledge, one of them has become a member of the Israel Parliament.

300. I shall refrain from further comment at this time, and I should like to reserve my right to intervene again at a later stage.

301. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We were not in the least intending to go on commenting on the statements made by representatives at this table. If we have taken the floor again, it is only to show that we listen closely to what is said here and we hope that our colleagues are listening with the same attention to what we say here.

302. In this connexion, I have the impression that the United States representative did not listen attentively enough to our statement which set forth with the utmost clarity the position of the Soviet Union on the question under consideration. If he had done so, he could hardly have asked questions such as those he has just put to us. But since he has asked these questions, we will state our views again.

303. The positions of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America on the question under consideration are different. They are different in principle.

304. The Soviet Union has stated that, moved by a feeling of high responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the Near East, it condemns the aggressive policy pursued by Tel Aviv in regard to its Arab neighbours, while the United States—as we heard once again in the statement made today by the United States representative—sees things differently. It does not join with us in condemning the source and cause of the aggression. This is what separates us. It would seem that this was clear even without further clarifications.

305. As far as the Secretary-General's report is concerned, this has been submitted to the Security Council and it

speaks for itself. Why, then, should anyone resort to a purely arbitrary interpretation which, ultimately, will only play into the hands of those who are continuing their aggressive actions? Instead of condemning and calling to order the dangerous trends and dangerous policy pursued by Tel Aviv, they exchange courtesies and expressions of solidarity on the issue.

306. With regard to the comments made by the representative of Israel, my task has been greatly simplified by the able statement made by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, who has clarified a number of points raised by the representative of Israel. There is scarcely any need to repeat such elementary matters, including one point which was purely a question of language.

307. As we pointed out in our statement—and I was glad to note the Syrian representative's correct clarification of this point—our information came from a very specific source. We quoted from the United States publication *U.S. News & World Report*. If our colleague from Israel has any complaints regarding the wording, he should address them to the publication *U.S. News & World Report* which, we believe, obtains its information direct from first-hand sources, either from Hebrew—and they must have experts in this—or from oral statements made by the official representatives of Tel Aviv who, as everyone knows, speak American very well.

308. In conclusion, I would like to say once again that we fully confirm the statement which we made today in the Security Council.

309. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Israel has agreed, in view of the lateness of the hour, to defer the exercise of his right of reply until the next meeting of the Council.

310. I believe it is the consensus of the Council that we should meet again tomorrow afternoon at three o'clock.

The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.