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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 3 December 1968 to 2 June 1969)

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INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 3 December 1968 to 2 June 1969 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.
2. The situation during the last six months has remained calm although there have been a few incidents which have caused tension in certain areas. There continues to be a general desire to maintain peaceful conditions, and the growing co-operation in some fields between Greek and Turkish Cypriots creates a favourable atmosphere for the current inter-communal talks.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 3,533 military personnel and 175 civilian police (S/8914; para. 3). On 2 June 1969, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>			<u>Total</u>
Austria	- HQ UNFICYP	1	
	- Field Hospital	<u>54</u>	55
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	54	
	- Battalion	462	
	- Contingent HQ	<u>58</u>	574
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	17	
	- Battalion	<u>444</u>	461
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	12	
	- Battalion	<u>466</u>	478
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	12	
	- Battalion	<u>410</u>	422
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	20	
	- Battalion	<u>392</u>	412
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	139	
	- Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron	734	
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	161	
	- Helicopter support	40	
	- Contingent HQ	<u>4</u>	<u>1,078</u>
	Total military personnel		<u>3,480</u>

Civilian police

Australia	50
Austria	45
Denmark	40
Sweden	<u>40</u>

Total civilian police 175

TOTAL UNFICYP 3,655

4. The following changes took place during the period covered by this report:

Rotations

(a) Austria: A partial rotation of troops was carried out.

(b) Canada: The 2nd Battalion, the Royal 22e Regiment replaced the 3rd Battalion, the Royal 22e Regiment.

(c) Denmark: The 10th Battalion was relieved by the 11th Danish Battalion.

(d) Finland: A partial rotation took place. The incoming troops form part of the 11th Finnish Battalion.

(e) Ireland: A rotation was carried out in which the 11th Infantry Group was relieved by the 12th Infantry Group.

(f) Sweden: The 42nd Swedish Battalion relieved the 41st Swedish Battalion.

(g) United Kingdom: A rotation took place in which the 1st Battalion, the Royal Hampshire Regiment, was relieved by the 1st Battalion, the Royal Worcestershire Regiment, and 42 Squadron, Royal Corps of Transport, was relieved by 7 Squadron, Royal Corps of Transport.

5. During the period covered by this report, a reduction of thirty-one officers and men was made in the establishment of HQ UNFICYP. This is reflected in the slightly lower total strengths of contingents.

6. The Force is now deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNCIVPOL

Combined staff

Nicosia West District

Danish Contingent

Danish Civilian Police

/...

Nicosia East District

Finnish Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta Zone

Swedish Contingent
Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent
Australian Civilian Police

Lefka District

Irish Contingent
Danish Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Canadian Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

Redeployment

7. Some changes have been made in the number of observation posts (OPs), thirteen of which were removed, mainly in the Nicosia area, leaving a total of seventy-two fully manned posts. Additional mobile and foot patrols have been set up to carry out the tasks of the withdrawn OPs. One OP was re-established in the Lefka District.
8. Marshalling and dispersal of the Kyrenia Road convoy continues to be carried out by the civilian police element of the Force (UNCIVPOL) but route security and escorts are now provided by the military, thus freeing UNCIVPOL personnel for other tasks.
9. During the period covered, UNCIVPOL was redeployed and the areas of operation of its elements were realigned to follow those of the Force's military zones and districts. UNCIVPOL deployment is now as follows:

- (i) HQ UNCIVPOL Nicosia, Wolseley Barracks
- (ii) Australian element, Limassol
 - (a) HQ Limassol
 - (b) Substations: Polis
Ktima
Ayios Theodhazos
- (iii) Austrian element, Nicosia East and Kyrenia
 - (a) HQ Nicosia
 - (b) Substation: Kyrenia
- (iv) Danish element, Nicosia West and Lefka
 - (a) HQ Nicosia
 - (b) Substation: Xeros
- (v) Swedish element, Famagusta
 - (a) HQ Famagusta
 - (b) Substations: Chatos
Arsos
Larnaca
Yialousha

10. The Force remains under the command of Lieutenant-General A.E. Martola. My Special Representative in Cyprus continues to be Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall.

B. Function and guiding principles

11. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

12. That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964; 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965; 16 March, 16 June and 15 December 1966; 19 June and 22 December 1967; and 18 March, 18 June and 10 December 1968.

13. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties of UNCIVPOL are outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4).

14. The Political Liaison Committee continues to meet regularly to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relationships between the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot community. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, the Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the Force Economics Officer meet with Liaison Officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership separately. Between 3 December 1968 and 2 June 1969 the Committee held twenty-three meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and twenty-three with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

Casualties

15. During its current mandate, UNFICYP suffered no casualties in connexion with inter-communal incidents. One warrant officer died from natural causes and one soldier as a result of a vehicle accident.

Discipline

16. Once again, I wish to pay tribute to the over-all discipline, understanding and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force which have continued to be of a high order, and reflect credit on the Contingent Commanders, their staffs and the armed forces of the contributing countries.

C. Relations with the Government and with the Turkish Cypriot leadership

17. UNFICYP has continued to maintain close liaison with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and good working relations with both Government and Turkish Cypriot security forces.

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

18. Since my last report, there have been five instances in which UNFICYP has been denied freedom of movement by the National Guard and three by Turkish Cypriot fighters. These have been due to ignorance or misunderstanding of orders rather than deliberate attempts to obstruct UNFICYP from carrying out its task.

19. The number of restricted areas remains unchanged and is as outlined in my report of 11 June 1968 (S/8622, para. 15). Discussions aimed at reducing these areas, in line with present conditions, are continuing between UNFICYP and the Government.

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING
AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

20. The most significant change in the organization of the National Guard has been the apparent run-down of a number of units, which may be connected with a government announcement allowing certain exemptions from the recent call-up of the 1951 age-group. Some of these units have been amalgamated with others and the new units thus created have been given larger areas of responsibility. Training continues to be carried out at much the same level as before and, where necessary, due warning has been given to UNFICYP; no incidents have occurred which could be directly attributed to this activity.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

21. Since my last report it would appear that some reorganization of the Turkish Cypriot fighter units has taken place. There are indications that the chain of command has been remodelled along more orthodox military lines, and that other changes have led to uniformed and armed fighters appearing in some places more frequently than in the past.

22. Early in the year, a considerable increase in training was noticed; it is believed that a number of young Turkish Cypriot men were conscripted for military service and that some reservists were recalled for training which was carried out openly in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas and villages. On several occasions, the Government complained that this action was most provocative.

23. In denouncing the failure of the Turkish Cypriots to respond to the normalization measures of March 1968 (S/8446, paras. 71-75), the Government has alleged that the Turkish Cypriot leadership has taken every opportunity created by the lifting of road-blocks and other restrictions to supply arms throughout Cyprus and to train Turkish Cypriots in their use. The Government has also claimed that technicians have been brought in and that an arms factory has been set up in the

Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia to manufacture bazookas, mortars and small arms of all types together with ammunition. This has been denied by the leadership, which contends that repair shops where weapons are put in working order have existed all along. UNFICYP had previously noticed new weapons of the small arms type, believed to be of local manufacture (S/8286, para. 38), but it has no knowledge whether any other weapons are made on the island as it has not been given the opportunity to visit the shops in question.

(c) The Greek and Turkish National Contingents

24. The two National Contingents have remained in the locations occupied by them since December 1963 (S/5950, para. 26) and at the same strength.

25. Half of the Turkish National Contingent rotated on 31 March 1969. The amount of ammunition and stores brought in by the arriving troops was negotiated with the Government of Cyprus through UNFICYP's good offices. As in previous rotations, UNFICYP provided escorts, observers and road transport facilities.

26. A partial rotation of the Greek National Contingent took place on 13 January 1969.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

27. The six months under review have been calm. There have been no major breaches of the cease-fire although certain incidents have, at times, created tension. These are dealt with in paragraphs 30-38 below.

28. The National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters have continued to adopt a defensive posture, which is an encouraging indication that neither side wishes to solve its problems by military force, but in spite of this, UNFICYP's persistent efforts to achieve military disengagement, particularly in areas of close confrontation (S/8914, para. 25), have regrettably been unsuccessful. It is to be hoped that the situation will soon be such that it will be possible to make some significant progress in this respect, since disengagement is a prerequisite for an atmosphere of greater trust and confidence.

B. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP

Observance of the cease-fire

29. Shooting incidents during the period under review are summarized below. Figures for previous periods are shown for purposes of comparison.

Summary of shooting incidents

	3 Dec 68 to 2 Jun 69	8 Jun 68 to 2 Dec 68	8 Mar 68 to 7 Jun 68	7 Dec 67 to 7 Mar 68	7 Jun 67 to 6 Dec 67
Nicosia West District	4	7	2	1	26
Nicosia East District	1	9	4	7	11
Famagusta Zone	1	1	3	5	25
Limassol Zone	7	4	1	6	41
Lefka District	7	11	8	23	100
Kyrenia District	5	33	21	25	81
TOTAL	25	65	39	67	284

The reduction in the numbers of shooting incidents is gratifying and also reflects the creditable efforts made by both sides to eliminate unauthorized or negligent discharge of weapons.

Activity by the Cyprus police on the Green Line

30. Some tension was caused by the increased movement by members of the Cyprus police on the Green Line both inside Nicosia walled city and on Ayios Demetrios Street immediately outside the walls. On 14 March 1969, an incident occurred on this street when a member of the Cyprus police who had been halted by an UNFICYP sentry checking vehicles on the Green Line drew his pistol and threatened the sentry with it. A strong protest was immediately lodged with the Government. UNFICYP also protested about an incident on the Green Line on 25 March 1969 when an UNFICYP sentry was apparently deliberately knocked to the ground by a car driven by a member of the Cyprus police in uniform.

31. Following discussions with the Government, the situation on the Green Line has improved. As far as Ayios Demetrios Street is concerned, a number of the Cyprus police use the street in private cars to get to and from work.

Meladhia incident

32. On 16 January 1969, an UNFICYP corporal, at the request of the Cyprus police, proceeded together with members of the Cyprus police to the Turkish Cypriot village of Meladhia to investigate a shooting incident. There was still firing when they arrived and, again at the request of the Cyprus police, the UNFICYP corporal disarmed the man responsible for it. It was soon discovered that this man, a Turkish Cypriot, had killed a woman and two men, all Turkish Cypriots. At this point, an argument developed between the Cyprus police and Turkish Cypriot villagers as to who should have custody of the suspect. Despite UNFICYP's efforts, the dispute became heated and weapons were displayed by both sides. It became apparent to the UNFICYP members on the spot that all restraint would probably be lost with the onset of darkness and that quick action had to be taken should a serious incident be avoided. With the agreement of the local Cyprus police commander and the local Turkish Cypriot leaders, the suspect was removed from the village in an UNCIVPOL vehicle and kept overnight in UNFICYP protective custody.

33. During the night, the Government authorities insisted that the suspect be handed over to them; for its part, the Turkish Cypriot leadership requested that he be delivered to them, either in the main enclave of Nicosia or in the Turkish sector of Ktima (Paphos). In the light of the prevailing situation, UNFICYP felt that the suspect ought to be returned to the village and handed over to the headman of the village (mukhtar). This was done the following day. The Government, while expressing appreciation for the help and assistance which are given by UNFICYP for the maintenance of peace in the country, took exception to UNFICYP's action as being an infringement of the Government's authority and responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

Omorphita

34. On 10 February a foot patrol of the Cyprus police, moving along Naousis Street (so-called "Red Line") in the Nicosia suburb of Omorphita, was halted by an armed

Turkish Cypriot sentry. By the time this action was repeated on 11 and 12 February, the Turkish Cypriot fighters had strengthened their forces in the area immediately south of this street, which separates the area under government control from the Turkish Cypriot part of Omorphita. Also on 12 February a house in the government-controlled part of Omorphita was set on fire and destroyed shortly after its Turkish Cypriot owner who wished to occupy it had completed repairing and furnishing it. The identity of the offender was not established.

The Government maintained that it had the right to patrol Naousis Street. This contention was denied by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which claimed that in the past, a Cyprus police vehicle had used the street only once every two or three months. UNFICYP, which had had this street under observation since 1964, informed both parties that its records showed that there had always been some Cyprus police patrols in Naousis Street. These had been carried out at an average of about one per week during the last six or seven months, but the Cyprus police did not always patrol the whole length of the street, either starting their patrols at one end and finishing them by way of one of the side streets. Although tension was high at times, particularly when Cyprus police patrols were stopped by the Turkish Cypriot fighters, UNFICYP efforts and a review of the problem by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash at one of their regular meetings have brought about some improvement in the situation, which is closely linked with the return of Turkish Cypriot families to Omorphita. On 19 March, 22 April and 24 May, Cyprus police patrolled the whole length of Naousis Street without incident.

The Government subsequently asked UNFICYP to take steps to ensure the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot armed elements from the area between the Green Line and Naousis Street into which they had advanced at the time of the November 1967 crisis (S/8248, Add.1-9). The Turkish leadership claims that the fighters took up positions in this area in May-June 1964 in extreme secrecy at a time when Greek Cypriot armed elements were engaged in daily attacks against the Turkish Cypriots all around the Green Line and when the ring around this Line was being tightened illegally by these elements. The leadership says that these positions came to light because of the very serious situation in 1967. It is, however, not prepared to withdraw the fighters from this area unless, in accordance with its interpretation of the Green Line agreement, first, the Omorphita and

Neapolis areas are placed under the supervision of UNFICYP and the National Guard and the Cyprus police are withdrawn from these areas; secondly, National Guard positions in advance of the Green Line near the Ledra Palace Hotel, north of the Omorphita by-pass between this by-pass and Hamid Mandres, and in Ermon Street are withdrawn, and thirdly, patrolling by the Cyprus police of streets on or within one hundred metres of the Green Line is stopped.

37. UNFICYP is holding discussions with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership on this matter both in the Political Liaison Committee and at higher level. It is to be hoped that while these discussions are pursued, continued restraint will be shown.

38. In this connexion, UNFICYP has also drawn attention to the provocation resulting from the increased number of slogans appearing in streets and on houses in sensitive areas of the Green Line, some of which are on or near military positions.

C. Developments relating to the maintenance of law and order

39. The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) has continued to contribute to the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus. Its duties include investigation of matters of a criminal and inter-communal nature, the manning of posts in sensitive areas and joint patrols with the Cyprus police in Nicosia and Ktima. It also assists in inquiries concerning missing persons.

40. UNCIVPOL detachments work in close co-operation with UNFICYP military personnel and maintain constant liaison with the Cyprus police and Turkish Cypriot police elements. Their recent redeployment (see para. 9 above) has enabled UNCIVPOL to respond more quickly to local needs and to increase its patrolling of villages in sensitive areas. The recognition of its role by most Greek and Turkish Cypriots has continued to help UNCIVPOL to achieve a prompt and satisfactory settlement of many incidents which might otherwise have reached more serious proportions.

41. During the period under review there has been a decrease in the number of serious criminal cases investigated by UNCIVPOL. On the other hand, there has been a marked increase in investigations carried out into offences such as larceny, damage to crops or property and those involving death or serious injury in traffic accidents.

42. Some hunting incidents have been investigated. In the most recent case on 24 January 1969, a Turkish Cypriot poacher was shot and wounded by a member of a Cyprus police anti-poaching patrol in Paphos district. In this instance UNFICYP drew the Government's attention to the excessive use of force to arrest persons for what appeared to be a comparatively minor offence. At the same time, UNFICYP urged the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take steps to control the activities of poachers.

43. In the June and December 1968 reports (S/8622, para. 43, and S/8914, para. 33), reference was made to the killing on 26 May 1968 of a Turkish Cypriot by an anti-poaching patrol of the Cyprus police in the vicinity of the village of Vretcha. In the light of the findings of the coroner and on instructions of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the two members of the patrol were charged with homicide. In January 1969, the case was, however, dismissed by the Assize Court, as no prima facie case had been made out against the two accused. This summary dismissal by the Court gave rise to a strong feeling among Turkish Cypriots that a miscarriage of justice had been committed. In protesting against this decision, the Turkish Cypriot leadership drew UNFICYP's attention to the fact that the Court, exclusively composed of Greek Cypriot judges, was not properly constituted. It asserted that the 1960 Constitution expressly provided that in criminal matters, whenever the accused and the person injured belonged to different communities, the Court trying the case must be composed of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot judges. The Government, in rejecting these charges, reaffirmed its earlier position that, owing to the events which occurred after 21 December 1963 and the subsequent collective refusal of the Turkish Cypriot judges to participate in the administration of justice, the functioning of the Courts as provided by the 1960 Constitution was rendered impossible (S/7611, paras. 166-171). It was, however, imperative that justice should continue to be administered; the "law of necessity" imposed an obligation on the State to make new arrangements in this respect. In rebuttal, the Turkish Cypriot leadership reiterated that it could not accept the "doctrine of necessity" as a justification for taking unlawful measures in contravention of basic articles of the Constitution.

44. In the case of the killing of a Turkish Cypriot near Kalyvakia on 6 June 1968 (S/8914, para. 34, and S/8622, para. 44), a coroner's inquest was

opened on 13 March 1969 at the Nicosia District Court and was continued on 28 March 1969 and 8 May 1969. The inquest was then adjourned until 6 June 1969 to allow the coroner to hear the testimony of recently demobilized National Guardsmen.

45. UNCIVPOL continues to help in efforts to prevent the illegal excavation of antiquities, which still causes concern. Several offenders have been detained by the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police element. It is felt that it should be possible to curb this unlawful digging now that co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for the preservation of ancient monuments has improved; thus, it has been possible to have major repair work on the Roccas Bastion, situated on the Green Line of Nicosia, carried out by a team of Greek and Turkish Cypriot foremen and labourers (S/6228, paras. 77-80).

III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

46. Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have continued to show some improvements; in particular, there has been a marked increase in the number of contacts between members of both communities. An atmosphere more conducive to normalization is thus being created. As stated in my last report (S/8914, para. 43), it is UNFICYP's view that it should be possible for the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take a number of steps in response to the Government's pacification measures of 1968 which would neither jeopardize political and security requirements nor prejudice the terms of a general settlement. This is all the more so because of the reassuring signs of a better understanding at the village level, as shown by the return of a number of displaced persons, by the growing co-operation in public services and agriculture and by the increased employment of Turkish Cypriots in Government-controlled areas.

47. In my last report (S/8914, para. 56), reference was made to the improvement in the living conditions of displaced persons and to the return of some of them to their former villages. In this connexion, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has indicated that it has taken steps to encourage the return of displaced persons to a number of villages in the Paphos, Limassol and Famagusta Districts. This question has been discussed by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash; the Government is reported to be in favour of the return of Turkish Cypriots to their former homes and to be prepared to assist in their rehabilitation on the understanding that the villages to which the Turkish Cypriots return remain under Government administrative control and policing. During the last few months, Turkish Cypriot families have returned to mixed villages in the Nicosia and Limassol Districts (Peristerona, Ayios Sozomenos, Mallia, Yerovasa and Anoyira). For Mallia, the Government has made the sum of £5,750 available to the villagers for repair work to damaged houses.

48. UNFICYP considers that the return of an increasing number of Turkish Cypriots to their villages is a gratifying development and a significant step towards a return to normal conditions, which should contribute to a further détente among Cypriots. If requested, UNFICYP is ready to do all it can in order to facilitate the implementation of any resettlement scheme. It is presumed that this would provide for a gradual return of displaced persons, so as to facilitate their readaptation.

49. A problem, however, has arisen in connexion with the return of Turkish Cypriots to their former homes in the Nicosia suburb of Omorphita. As previously reported (S/8622, paras. 76-79), Omorphita was the scene of bitter fighting in December 1963 and most of its inhabitants, who were Turkish Cypriots, took refuge in what later became the main Turkish Cypriot enclave. Ever since, this suburb has remained a highly sensitive area. Nevertheless, since June 1968 some fifty Turkish Cypriot families returned to the government-controlled area of Omorphita and a score of others started to repair their houses.

50. Towards the end of January 1969, the Government reacted to this resettlement and Mr. Clerides informed Mr. Denktash that so long as Greek Cypriots were prevented by the Turkish Cypriot leadership from having free access to their homes and properties, situated in those parts of Omorphita and the adjacent suburb of Neapolis under Turkish Cypriot control, the Government could not permit Turkish Cypriots to return to their houses in the government-controlled part of Omorphita. At about the same time, the Cyprus police increased the number of its patrols in the area. The Government explained this had become necessary to maintain law and order following the influx of Turkish Cypriot families. After some incidents involving members of the Cyprus police and Turkish Cypriot fighters along Naousis Street (paras. 34-37 above), two new Cyprus police posts were established in Omorphita.

51. The Turkish Cypriot leadership expressed its deep disappointment over the decision to prevent Turkish Cypriots from returning to their homes in the Nicosia suburbs. In particular, it complained that the Government had raised no objection and issued no warning until the end of January 1969, although the Government had known that for the past nine months or so Turkish Cypriots had been returning to Omorphita of their own volition after repairing their houses with their own money. The Turkish Cypriot leadership also charged that the incidents on Naousis Street, which, it said, were due to a provocative increase of Cyprus police patrolling, had served as a pretext for reimposing the Government's ban.

52. In addition, Dr. Kuchuk protested against a Government decision to construct thirty low-cost houses in Omorphita for homeless Greek Cypriot families. He asserted that this move on the part of the Government was aimed at "infiltrating into the Turkish Cypriot suburb of Omorphita with a view to creating a Greek Cypriot

majority in the area and thus preventing the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants from returning to their houses forever". The Government denied these charges, pointing out that the houses would not be erected on Turkish Cypriot-owned land.

53. Since mid-February, no further Turkish Cypriot families have returned to Omorphita and the repairs to damaged houses have been halted. However, those Turkish Cypriots who had returned to their homes before the incidents have remained.

54. Thirty pre-fabricated houses, on which the Government did not levy the usual import duty, arrived from Turkey in March 1969 and are being set up in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia; more are reported on their way. It has been stated, in this connexion, that, when warranted by circumstances, these houses may be moved from their present locations and re-erected in villages to which displaced persons return. It should also be mentioned here that a shipment of Turkish Red Crescent relief supplies arrived in May 1969. It consisted of 430 tons of food and some 20,000 items of clothing, which were also imported free of duty.

55. As already indicated, it is to be hoped that, in addition to the promising moves to resettle displaced persons in their former villages, other normalization measures, especially in the matter of freedom of movement of the whole population, will now be considered by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Whereas Turkish Cypriots may move freely throughout the Island except in a few militarily restricted areas, access to Turkish Cypriot enclaves, a number of Turkish Cypriot villages and certain roads continues to be denied to Greek Cypriots. Of particular concern is the lack of free access to the following public trunk roads:

- (i) Nicosia - Kyrenia
- (ii) Famagusta - Chatos - Nicosia
- (iii) Trypimeni - Knodhara - Nicosia/Famagusta
- (iv) Xeros - Limnitis - Pyrgos - Kokkina - Polis
- (v) Ktima - Stavrokonnou - Kelokedhara

This abnormal situation, if not remedied, could mar the present favourable atmosphere as there is growing impatience and discontent among Greek Cypriots, now that the Turkish Cypriots have enjoyed full freedom of movement over the whole Island for some time, whilst the Greek Cypriots are still prevented from using some of the Republic's main roads.

56. In the field of public services, there has been some welcome co-operation with respect to the development of water supplies. A water reservoir was repaired and a new water pump installed by a team of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot technicians in the Turkish Cypriot village of Ayios Khariton (Famagusta District); a new pipe was laid to another Turkish Cypriot village, Ayia Kebir (Nicosia District), and a survey by Water Department engineers was undertaken in Kophinou (Turkish Cypriot village, Larnaca District) for a pipeline to increase the supply of drinking water for the town of Famagusta. Discussions are also being held with a view to improving the supply of drinking and irrigation water to a number of other Turkish Cypriot villages which may apply for inclusion in government water development projects and for public credit facilities for this purpose (S/3914, para. 61).

57. At the request of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, UNFICYP has explored with the Government the possibility of allocating public funds for the installation of electricity in certain villages and for road repairs. The Government has now included eight Turkish Cypriot villages in its 1969 electrification plan and is prepared to repair roads provided that these are also made accessible to Greek Cypriots.

58. A welcome development in agriculture is the substantial interest of Turkish Cypriot farmers in soil conservation work financed by the Government and the World Food Programme. So far, over 1,000 Turkish Cypriot farmers have submitted their applications. Similarly, farmers of both communities who live in certain defined areas may participate in a second World Food Programme project which aims at promoting mixed farming in dry land areas. In this context, the Government is prepared to issue loans to Turkish Cypriot farmers on the same terms as those provided for Greek Cypriot farmers.

59. The Turkish Cypriot leadership took, however, strong exception to the enactment on 31 March 1969 of a Law providing for the consolidation and redistribution of agricultural holdings. It asserted, inter alia, that the Law contained provisions which flagrantly violated the 1960 Constitution and adversely affected the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community in matters of land ownership. Furthermore, the leadership made it known that it considered the Law, which had been unilaterally passed by the Greek Cypriot members of the House of

Representatives, as null and void, and that any expropriation of Turkish Cypriot-owned property without the owner's consent would be unlawful and unconstitutional. In answer to these Turkish Cypriot protests, the Government explained that the Bill, in question, which had first been tabled before the House of Representatives in May 1967 and whose enactment had at the time been postponed pursuant to Turkish Cypriot objections, could no longer be delayed both for substantive and procedural reasons. The Government was on the one hand building dams for irrigation purposes, while on the other, owing to the absence of legislation for the consolidation of agricultural plots, the use of the water from these dams, built at considerable expense, was found to be economically unsound. In order to allay Turkish Cypriot suspicions the Council of Ministers authorized Mr. Clerides to address a letter to Mr. Denktash in which he gave a categorical undertaking on behalf of the Government that the provisions of the law would not be applied to Turkish Cypriot properties, except at the request and after written consent of Turkish Cypriot landowners. Subsequently, the Government informed UNFICYP that it would be willing to appoint a Turkish Cypriot farmer as a member of the Central Land Consolidation Authority established under the new law. The terms of reference of this Authority are to co-ordinate, administer and execute consolidation measures.

60. In the economic field, there has been no significant rapprochement. It would appear that it is still the aim of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with the financial assistance of Turkey, to improve the economic conditions in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas to a level which would enable its community to play a more substantial part of its own in the economic development of the Island (S/8914, para. 51). This conclusion may also be drawn from the decision to create a Turkish Cypriot Economic Planning Bureau, which is to prepare projects for the modernization of existing industries as well as plans for the establishment of processing and manufacturing industries. For its part, the Cyprus Government is not prepared to allocate funds for projects in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas unless it has the over-all supervision and financial control over the implementation of such projects. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has so far not been prepared to accept this for political reasons. It is to be hoped that the present trend towards separate economic development may be reversed soon so that the human and other resources of the whole Island may be fully utilized for the benefit of all Cypriots.

IV. INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS

61. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have continued to meet regularly in private. As in the past, they have from time to time made formal and informal statements to the Press. At a press conference held on 3 February, they issued the following joint statement:

"The first and second phases of the talks have been completed and we are now beginning the third phase.

"During the first phase of the talks we followed the procedure of exchanging views on all the constitutional aspects of the Cyprus problem without submitting concrete proposals on any issue.

"The object, therefore, of the first phase of the talks was to establish whether there existed sufficient identity of views to justify us to proceed to the second phase with more concrete proposals.

"As we have stated in our communiqué of the 25 July 1968, it transpired from the first round of talks that identity of views had been established on a number of points, while on others it was felt that it would not be difficult to establish common ground. We emphasized then that there still remain certain issues, the importance of which could not be minimized, which required patient negotiations if the existing gaps were to be narrowed.

"In the light of our experience gained during the first round of talks we felt that we ought to continue our efforts towards finding a just and workable solution of the Cyprus problem. Thus we were led to the second phase.

"During the second phase of the talks we endeavoured to narrow the gaps, on the issues on which we have been unable to establish common ground, and at the same time we exchanged written proposals on all constitutional issues in the following order:

- (a) Judiciary
- (b) Police
- (c) Legislative
- (d) Local Government
- (e) Executive

"While the process of exchanging written proposals was going on, Mr. Denktash and I made preliminary observations on the documents exchanged and asked for clarification on certain points. We then agreed to adjourn the talks between the second and third phase in order to give us time to reassess the situation in the light of the papers exchanged, the preliminary observations made and the clarifications given.

"At this stage all we can say is that some progress has been made on some issues while on others differences still exist requiring patient negotiations.

"During the second phase of the talks we have also considered the question of setting up sub-committees to examine certain issues on which sufficient common ground on the general principles has been established, but where it is necessary to consider certain technical aspects of the principles which both sides have given an indication that they could be finally accepted, subject of course to an over-all agreement on other constitutional issues.

"We feel that some sub-committees can now be appointed. An announcement will be made on this subject shortly.

"It is not our intention by this statement to create either the impression of optimism or pessimism. What we can say at this stage is that we continue to maintain reserved optimism. We have not come to the conclusion that we have exhausted all procedures or margins of negotiation.

"We believe that if the present calm atmosphere continues, with patience, understanding and goodwill a just and workable solution can be found. We are aware that there has been a demand from certain quarters that these exploratory talks, which it was agreed to be held in camera, should be now made public by releasing the written proposals or by disclosing the positions taken by each side.

"We have considered this matter carefully and we have come to the conclusion that it is premature to take such a step. This may become necessary if, having exhausted all negotiation procedures and margins, we are convinced that the talks will fail or if we feel the exploratory talks have established common ground on all issues and, therefore, it will be necessary to inform the public of the result of our efforts before committing ourselves. To announce, however, the proposals now would unavoidably cause a hardening of the positions taken by each side and would destroy all margins of negotiation."

62. On 4 March, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash formally announced their decision to set up two sub-committees, one to deal with matters appertaining to the Legislature and the other with the Independent Authorities such as the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA), the Electricity Authority, Grain Commission and Water Boards. It was specified that the initial terms of reference of the Sub-Committee on the Legislature would be "to examine and make recommendations on an electoral system acceptable to both sides", whereas the Sub-Committee on the Independent Authorities would "have as its initial terms of reference to examine and make recommendations on Turkish Cypriot participation in the aforementioned corporations". Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash emphasized that no time limits had

been set for the work of the Sub-Committees and that additional terms of reference would be given to them once they had completed their initial task. It was also stressed that any agreement reached by these Sub-Committees would be subject to an over-all settlement and could not be separately implemented, since "one issue is connected with the other". The possibility that additional sub-committees would be established to work on other constitutional questions was not ruled out, but this, it was stated, would come by stages and in the light of the experience gained by the work of the first two groups.

63. The two sub-committees began their meetings in Nicosia on 6 May. Each group consists of three Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, comprising Ministers, the Attorney-General of the Republic and leading members of the Turkish Cypriot community. At the first meeting, which was also attended by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, the programme of work and other procedural issues, including staff requirements, were discussed and it was decided that the Sub-Committee on Legislature would meet every Monday, while that on Independent Authorities would hold meetings every Friday.

64. Both Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, in reply to critical remarks made by the Press that their eleven-month old talks did not appear to have yielded concrete results so far, have repeatedly pointed out that the talks were being conducted with goodwill and determination, but that quick progress was not possible. In view of the delicacy of the problem they were dealing with, it was better for them to go slowly and carefully than to lead themselves into a difficult position by undue haste. In this connexion, the interlocutors have not concealed that "local government" was a crucial issue with decisive bearing on other constitutional problems. In view of its complexity it would require close and patient study. On 24 April, Mr. Clerides submitted proposals on this issue, which Mr. Denktash undertook to study and on which he subsequently sought clarification.

65. When questioned by the Press on 5 May prior to one of their meetings, both Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash emphatically denied newspaper reports that the talks had reached a deadlock over the problem of local government. They stressed that the margins for negotiation had not been exhausted and that they were continuing the search for a solution to the various issues on which differences

existed. They also reiterated that their current talks were informal and that the Press was conveying a wrong impression and creating an undesirable climate of anxiety when it wrote about "deadlock", "failure", "rejection" or "acceptance" of proposals. In this connexion, the two interlocutors, while acknowledging that some press reports were probably inaccurate and misleading because of the secrecy in which the talks were conducted, underlined again the need for such secrecy since talks held in public would make their work extremely difficult.

66. President Makarios, speaking at a festive gathering in Paphos District on 18 May, underlined that almost one year had elapsed since the start of the inter-communal talks and that it could "not be said that considerable progress" towards a solution of the Cyprus problem had been made during this period; in the proposals and views exchanged in writing on the various aspects of the problem, there were points on which differences were not great but there were others on which the existing divergence of views today was considerable. "We have displayed," the President stated, "a spirit of goodwill and we shall continue the talks in the same spirit. We have submitted constructive proposals in the hope of finding a peaceful and applicable solution. We have even made several concessions. But there are limits and a line beyond which we cannot retreat. We have stated and reiterate that in no case will the Greek Cypriots accept a solution creating a kind of state within a state and generally a solution running counter to the concept of a unitary state."

67. Dr. Kuchuk, in reply to the Archbishop's speech, issued a statement on 20 May, in which he agreed that "no considerable progress" had been made towards a final solution. However, the reasons for this could not at all be attributed to any lack of goodwill on the part of the Turkish side. The assertion that the Turkish Cypriots were aiming at creating a state within a state was unfounded. What the Turkish Cypriots were aiming at was "securing respect for their rights to live in peace and security as a partner community within a unitary state, i.e. the Republic of Cyprus." It was humanly impossible for the Turkish community to agree to a system of government in which its life, security and its very existence as a community would entirely depend on the benevolence of the other side.

68. In a further speech on 25 May, President Makarios emphasized that the difficulties encountered in the inter-communal talks should lead to a further

intensification of efforts towards a democratic solution which would safeguard the interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole and guarantee permanent peace. To be permanent and stable, His Beatitude said, peace must be based on democratic principles which were internationally known and accepted and it was within the framework of these principles that a solution to the Cyprus problem must be sought. The Archbishop also stressed that the Greek Cypriots wished to live in peace with their Turkish Cypriot fellow countrymen. They did not wish to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of political or other rights; on the contrary, it was their intention to cede certain privileges to the Turkish Cypriot community, but not to an extent exceeding the "security zone necessary for the unity of the State and the future of the Island".

V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

69. As in the past, the good offices exercised on my behalf by my Special Representative in Cyprus have, during the period covered by this report, continued to be available to the parties directly concerned. He has maintained close contact with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and has, as heretofore, been informed by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, whom he has met regularly, of the substance of their discussions.

70. Acting in the context of his broadened responsibilities (S/7180), my Special Representative visited Ankara and Athens during the period 21 April to 2 May 1969 for the purpose of renewing contacts with Government officials in the two capitals and exchanging views on UNFICYP's activities. This was the first visit undertaken by Mr. Osorio-Tafall to Turkey and Greece since the one he made in July 1967 (S/8286, paras. 143-146). My Special Representative, who was received by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries, had a frank and constructive exchange of views in a friendly atmosphere with both Governments, who paid a most sincere tribute to UNFICYP for its significant contribution to peace. On returning to Nicosia, my Special Representative conveyed to President Makarios and Vice-President Kuchuk the gist of the conversations he had in the two capitals.

VI. MEDIATION EFFORT

71. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

72. The costs to be borne by the Organization for the operation of UNFICYP for the sixty-three-month period from its inception on 27 March 1964 to 15 June 1969 are now estimated at \$102,865,000. This total does not include an estimate of \$590,000 which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs.

73. As at 2 June 1969 payments and pledges of voluntary contributions received from forty-seven Member States and four non-member Governments to cover these costs total the equivalent of \$94,265,385. To the above amount may be added \$540,351 which had been received as at 31 May 1969 from interest earned on investment of temporarily surplus funds, public contributions, gains on exchange and other miscellaneous income.

74. Accordingly, unless additional pledges are received, there will be a deficit on 15 June 1969 in the amount of approximately \$8,060,000.

75. If the Security Council should decide to extend beyond 15 June 1969 for a period of six months the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, including the amount of \$590,000 as the cost of final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs, assuming continuance of reimbursement commitments, would be as follows:

UNFICYP cost estimates by major categories of expense
(in thousands of US dollars)

I. <u>Operation costs incurred by the United Nations</u>	
Movement of contingents	640
Operational expenses	575
Rental of premises	72
Rations	444
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	649
Miscellaneous and contingencies	105
	<hr/>
Total, Part I	2,485

II. Reimbursement of extra costs to Governments providing contingents

Pay and allowances	4,850
Contingent-owned equipment	500
Death and disability awards	100
	<hr/>
Total, Part II	5,450
Grand Total: Parts I and II	<u>7,935</u>

76. The above estimates do not reflect the full cost of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which the Governments would absorb at their own expense in respect of an extended period in the event the mandate of UNFICYP were extended and the Governments concerned agreed to continue the present arrangements are as follows:

	\$
Australia	186,150
Austria	110,337
Canada ^{1/}	660,632
Denmark	260,000
Ireland	382,000
Sweden	520,000

The United Kingdom has agreed to absorb at its own expense the sum of \$576,000 for a six-month period. Finland is also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense.

77. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 June 1969 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive pledges totalling \$15,995,000.

1/ Exclusive of the cost of mornal pay and allowances.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

78. The improvement of the situation in Cyprus, to which I referred in my last report, has been maintained during the period under review. The Island has remained generally quiet; there have been no major breaches of the cease-fire and there has been a substantial decrease in the number of shooting incidents. At the same time, tension persists, especially in the areas of direct confrontation between the Government forces and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, requiring constant watchfulness and, as necessary, intervention by UNFICYP to maintain calm.

79. Similarly, a great deal remains to be done to bring about real progress toward a return to normal conditions in civilian life. There have, nevertheless, been some improvements in the social and economic fields. With the assistance of UNFICYP, members of the two communities have been brought closer together, especially by participation in joint projects such as soil conservation and water development. I note with satisfaction the increased participation of Turkish Cypriots in such joint activities, as well as the marked increase in other contacts between members of the two communities. On the other hand, some major anomalies persist, including the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership - instituted at a time of the disturbances of 1963-1964 - of denying to Greek Cypriot civilians access to a number of public roads. I express again the hope that this policy may now be reconsidered, particularly in view of the fact that Turkish Cypriots have for more than a year enjoyed full freedom of movement over the whole Island except in a few militarily restricted areas.

80. Hopes for a lasting settlement, as distinct from the present arrangement, are centred on the intercommunal talks in Nicosia between two prominent leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Limited agreement has been reached in these talks on certain important but secondary points, including the establishment of two sub-committees. These should significantly contribute to the widening of contacts between leading Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot personalities and thus help to narrow the communications gap which has plagued Cyprus for many years. For the time being however, no substantive results on the basic issues which separate the two sides have as yet emerged.

81. In this connexion, I should mention that on 26 and 28 March 1969 I conveyed to the parties directly involved in Cyprus, as well as to the Governments of Turkey and Greece, my deep concern at the slow rate of progress in the intercommunal talks, and my earnest hope that a determined effort would be made by the parties to expedite those talks (see annex). While fully aware of the difficulties involved and of the fact that time and caution were needed, I pointed out that the passage of too much time might hamper rather than facilitate a settlement, and, moreover, might make it increasingly difficult to maintain the United Nations Force in the Island. The replies received from the parties made it clear that they shared my concern, although their analyses of the causes of the present situation differed widely.

82. I strongly hope that the parties will not allow a deadlock to develop over such admittedly difficult issues as local government. With goodwill and statesmanship, it should be possible to find common ground that would safeguard the fundamental interests of both communities.

83. I am convinced that in the present circumstances the peace-keeping work of the United Nations Force represents an indispensable element in maintaining and further improving the calm atmosphere in the Island and in promoting the steps toward normalization, which constitute as before the two major prerequisites for substantive progress in the intercommunal talks. Therefore, I consider a further extension of the stationing of the United Nations Force to be imperative. All the parties concerned, moreover, have made it clear to me that they support the continued presence of the Force in Cyprus.

84. Taking account of all the circumstances and in the light of the positions of the parties and of the situation relating to the intercommunal talks, I recommend a six-month extension of the mandate, for a period ending 15 December 1969. In this connexion, I might mention that the Governments contributing contingents to UNFICYP have indicated their readiness to maintain their contingents for such a period.

85. The substantial deficit in the UNFICYP budget continues to be a cause for serious concern. Constant attention has been given to the possibility of reducing the operating expenditures of UNFICYP without impairing its effectiveness but it

should be borne in mind that the United Nations as such has only limited control over the amounts of these expenditures, since approximately 90 per cent of them are certified by contributing Governments as extra costs incurred by them in providing contingents and/or logistic support for UNFICYP. The main cause of the deficit, of course, is the insufficiency of voluntary contributions to meet current expenditures and to reimburse Governments contributing contingents for their extra costs. In this connexion I must repeat the misgivings I have expressed on previous occasions concerning the method of financing UNFICYP by voluntary contributions, which continue to come from a disappointingly limited number of Governments.

87. I wish once again to place on record my deep appreciation to the Governments providing contingents to UNFICYP, several of which have absorbed some or all of their extra costs at their own expense, and to those Governments which have generously made voluntary contributions for the maintenance of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. I wish also to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, the Commander of the Force and its officers and men, as well as the civilian staff, for the exemplary manner in which they have carried out their important and difficult tasks.

ANNEX

Aide-memoire by the Secretary-General dated 26 March 1969

1. The Secretary-General wishes to express his deep concern at the slow rate of progress in the present intercommunal talks on Cyprus.
2. While he is fully aware of the difficulties involved and is also mindful of the fact that time and caution are required in order to find a durable settlement, he earnestly hopes that, in the interest of peace in Cyprus and the welfare of its population as a whole, a determined effort will be made by the parties concerned to expedite these talks.
3. The Secretary-General feels that the time factor is of importance in the present case. He is concerned that the passage of too much time may hamper rather than facilitate the settlement of the Cyprus problem. He fears that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain the United Nations Force in Cyprus as the Governments now making the necessary contributions to this effect - both those contributing contingents to the Force and those making voluntary financial contributions - are becoming more and more reluctant to do so for a variety of reasons, including the slow progress in the talks.

