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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN  
KASHMIR WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT,  
THE CEASE-FIRE LINE AND THE FUNCTIONING OF UNMOGIP

## PART I

### Purpose of this Report

1. This report on the current situation in Kashmir, with particular reference to recent extensive disregard for the Cease-Fire Agreement and the Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir (CFL), together with the functioning of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is submitted in order to provide information for the use of the Council. In the course of my recent consultations with members of the Council, a need for a report from me was generally expressed. The report will serve to inform the Members of the grave situation that has developed in Kashmir, of my deep concern about it, and of the steps I have been taking in past weeks in seeking to avert further deterioration of that situation and to restore normal condition in the area. For this same purpose, I presented to the Council members individually on 31 August an informal and confidential paper, which was made available also to India and Pakistan.

### Gravity of the situation

2. There can be little doubt that the Kashmir problem has again become acute and is now dangerously serious. Implicit in it, in my view, is a potential threat to peace not only between India and Pakistan, but to the broader peace. As Secretary-General, my primary concern at this stage has been necessarily with the current breaches of the Cease-Fire Agreement and the CFL. There is, of course, a long and extensive background to the Kashmir problem, of which the Cease-Fire Agreement is but one aspect. No effort is made in this report to assess the political background of the problem or the possible root causes of the recent unusually large number of violations of the CFL. Thus, reference to the political

factors in the broad Kashmir issue, past and present, and political assessments or judgements are avoided here. Though fully aware of the political factors and their implications, I could not presume to act as political arbiter. It is enough to say here that, for whatever reasons, the Cease-Fire Agreement entered into by the parties at Karachi on 29 July 1949, thus realizing an objective of Security Council resolution S/726 of 21 August 1948, has collapsed, although I hope only temporarily. Each side, naturally, puts forth justifications for its actions which have led to this condition. In any case, it seems to me that the quiet which would result from mutual observance of the Cease-Fire by India and Pakistan would afford the most favourable climate in which to seek a resolution of political differences. The differences over Kashmir are sharp, great and ominous. They must be resolved if peace in that area is ever to be secure.

#### UNMOGIP

3. The United Nations maintains UNMOGIP with its forty-five Observers along the CFL of almost 500 miles, about half of which is in high mountains and is very difficult of access. UNMOGIP exercises the quite limited function of observing and reporting, investigating complaints from either party of violations of the CFL and the Cease-Fire and submitting the resultant findings on those investigations to each party and to the Secretary-General, and keeping the Secretary-General informed in general on the way in which the Cease-Fire Agreement is being kept. Because the role of UNMOGIP appears frequently to be misunderstood, it bears emphasis that the operation has no authority or function entitling it to enforce or prevent anything, or to try to ensure that the Cease-Fire is respected. Its very presence in the area, of course, has acted to some extent as a deterrent, but this is not the case at present. The Secretary-General exercises responsibility for the supervision and administrative control of the UNMOGIP operation.

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#### Increase in violations of Cease-Fire

4. There has been a disturbing increase in the number of incidents involving violations of the CFL since the beginning of 1965. In mid-June of this year, for example, General Nimmo reported that during the previous five months, a total of 2,251 complaints from both sides charging violation of the Cease-Fire had been submitted to UNMOGIP. Most of these involved firing across the CFL, although some concerned crossings of the Line by armed men. As of that date, 377 violations in all categories had been confirmed by investigations of the Observers, 218 of which were committed by Pakistan and 159 by India. Some of these violations took the form of "heavy and prolonged firing" from weapons up to the calibre of field artillery. Among the most serious of the violations was one that occurred in May of this year when Indian troops in battalion strength attacked and captured Pakistan positions in the Kargil area of Kashmir and remained in occupation of them. In the interest of preserving the CFL, I appealed to the Government of India to withdraw its troops from the Pakistan side of the Line. On assurance from me that UN Observers would henceforth be stationed on both sides of the Line in that area, which India considered strategically vital to the security of the Srinagar-Leh Road, the Government of India agreed to do so and in due course the Indian troops were withdrawn, thus closing the matter and making unnecessary any further consideration of a report on it to the Security Council. Subsequently, there were some military attacks on the road by armed elements from the Pakistan side.

#### Events since 5 August

5. The current serious trouble affecting the Cease-Fire and the CFL in Kashmir dated from 5 August 1965, and consists of a large number of violations of the CFL by crossings of the Line, by firing across it with artillery pieces, and by the occupation of positions on the wrong side of the Line. General Nimmo, the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, has been sending the United Nations Headquarters daily cables on the incidents that have been occurring as reported to him, together with as much confirmed information as possible on the basis of the investigations of specific incidents by United Nations Military Observers. The

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investigations, being conducted on the spot, require time, of course, particularly since some of the places are very difficult of access, fighting is going on and roads are sometimes closed by military order. UNMOGIP has never before been called upon to cope with such a great number of simultaneous violations of the CFL. The adequacy of the present number of Observers and of their function may well be reappraised in the light of experiences since 5 August.

6. General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This is a conclusion reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigations by the United Nations Observers, in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the CFL, even though in most cases the actual identity of those engaging in the armed attacks on the Indian side of the Line and their actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation or evidence. As regards violations by artillery, there was heavy and prolonged artillery fire across the Line from the Pakistan side in the Chamb/Bhimber area on 15-16 August, and on 19 and 26 August the town of Punch was shelled from the Pakistan side, some of the shells hitting the building occupied by UN military Observers. Pakistan artillery again shelled the town of Punch on 28 August. There was an exchange of artillery fire between the Uri sector on the Indian side and the Chakothi sector on the Pakistan side on 14 August. Also, it has been confirmed and reported on 25 August that Indian artillery shelled the village of Awan, in Pakistan, five miles from the CFL in the Bhimber sector. It is likewise confirmed that as of 24 August armed elements from Pakistan were still occupying Indian positions (pickets) north of Mandi in the Punch Sector of the CFL. On the other hand, it is confirmed by both UN Observers and official Indian sources that on 15 August, Indian Army troops reoccupied the Pakistan positions in the Kargil area and have remained there; Indian Army troops on 24 August supported by artillery occupied and retain Pakistan positions in the Tangdhar-Nauseri (Tithwal) area; while on 27/28 August, Indian artillery shelled the area north of Punch on the Pakistan side and Indian troops crossed the CFL in the Uri-Pedori area.

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It has been confirmed that Indian troops have reached the Haji Pir Pass, which is five miles on the Pakistan side of the CFL on the Uri-Punch road. Each instance of violation is protested by the UN Observers who demand that troops on the wrong side of the Line be withdrawn.

7. UNMOGIP received an Indian complaint of Pakistan shelling, on 1 September, of pickets and a battalion Headquarters in the Chamb area of the Jammu-Bhimber sector of the Cease-Fire Line. The complaint stated that at 0230 hours on that date one and a half Pakistan tank squadrons crossed the Cease-Fire Line in this area, supported by artillery. Pakistan artillery was also said to have fired on a battalion Headquarters near Punch from 1630 hours on 1 September and on an Indian battalion Headquarters in the Jangar area. The substance of these complaints was subsequently confirmed by United Nations Military Observers. A Pakistan complaint reported that Indian soldiers had crossed the CFL in strength in the Kargil, Tithval and Uri-Punch sectors, as reported above. Pakistan, in this complaint also affirmed the crossing of the CFL by Pakistan troops in the Bhimber area on 1 September, as a defensive measure to forestall Indian action, asserting also that in this sector the Indian Air Force had taken offensive action against Pakistan troops. Also on 1 September armed infiltrators ambushed an Indian convoy at Gund, north-east of Srinagar on the Leh Road and both sides sustained casualties. On 2 September the Jammu team of UNMOGIP received an Indian complaint that Pakistan aircraft had attacked the road between Chamb and Jaurian during the morning of 2 September and that Jaurian village was in flames. The air attack on Jaurian was confirmed by UN Military Observers. The complaint also alleged that Pakistan troops had crossed the border with approximately 90 tanks and were moving from Chamb sector toward the east. Pakistan artillery fired in the Punch area during the night of 1/2 September and in the afternoon of 2 September.

8. An annotated list of complaints of incidents of violation that have been investigated thus far by the Observers, as reported to me by General Nimmo, is presented in Part II of this report. Also appended is a map of Jammu and Kashmir showing the approximate CFL.

Efforts of the Secretary-General

9. On the morning of 9 August, a cable was received from General Nimmo warning that the situation was deteriorating along the CFL. On the basis of this report, I saw the Representative of Pakistan at 1230 hours on that day, and asked him to convey to his Government my very serious concern about the situation that was developing in Kashmir, involving the crossing of the CFL from the Pakistan side by numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian military positions on the Indian side of the Line, and also my strong appeal that the CFL be observed. That same afternoon I saw the Representative of India, told him of the information I had received from General Nimmo and of the démarche I had made to the Government of Pakistan, and asked him to convey to his Government my urgent appeal for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from their side. In subsequent days, I repeated these appeals orally for transmission to the two Governments, asking also that all personnel of either party still remaining on the wrong side of the Line be withdrawn to its own side. I have not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the Cease-Fire and the CFL will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that Line. I did receive assurance from the Government of India, conveyed orally by their Representative at the United Nations, that India would act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and will respect the Cease-Fire Agreement and the CFL if Pakistan does likewise. In the meantime, reports from UNMOGIP as of 30 August indicate a continuation of violations of the Cease-Fire and the CFL from both sides.

10. In view of the continuing deterioration in the situation as of 16 August, I gave consideration to a further step in the form of a draft statement about the Cease-Fire violations which was designed for public release. The draft was handed to the two Representatives to be transmitted for the information of their Governments. Both Governments reacted promptly. The Government of India had no objection to the release of the statement but at first wished certain modifications which, in part at least, I regarded as unacceptable. The Government of Pakistan was strongly negative about the statement in general on the grounds that it favoured India in that it dealt only with the current cease-fire situation without presenting the political background of the broad issue and thus was lacking in balance, since a cease-fire alone supports the status quo to India's benefit.

11. Weighing carefully all considerations, I came to the conclusion that a public statement by the Secretary-General at that time would serve no constructive purpose and might well do more harm than good. My first and primary objective had to be to see the fighting end rather than indicting or denouncing any party for starting and continuing it. I thought it might be helpful to make another quiet effort toward achieving observance of the Cease-Fire through a new approach to the two Governments. Consequently, I gave thought to the possibility of sending urgently to the area a Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the purpose of meeting and talking with appropriate authorities of the two Governments and with General Nimmo; conveying to the Governments my very serious concern about the situation; and exploring with them ways and means of preventing any further deterioration in that situation and regaining quiet along the CFL. If such a mission had materialized, I had it in mind to ask Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to undertake it. The idea was broached by me informally to the two parties on 20 August. The subsequent responses of the Governments, while not negative, involved in each case conditions which, in my view, would make the mission not feasible at that time and therefore I abandoned it.

12. As a further and immediate step, however, on 23 August I asked General Nimmo to come promptly to United Nations Headquarters for consultation with me about the situation in Kashmir, and he arrived in New York from Srinagar on the 26th. Consideration of other efforts that I might make was then undertaken in the light of the discussions with General Nimmo.

13. General Mimmo's reports on incidents continue to be received as the Military Observers carry out their investigations of specific actions. The procedure that has been followed is for General Mimmo to submit the reports of the investigations of each incident and the Observers' findings fixing blame, to each party, confidentially, and to send copies to me, without any public disclosure. This procedure, which has been found to be in the best interest of the effective functioning of UNMOGIP is being continued.

14. In view of alarming reports indicating a steady escalation of the fighting in the air and on the ground, involving regular army forces on both sides, I addressed on 1 September an appeal to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan which was circulated to the Council in document S/6647.

#### Conditions For a Restoration of the Cease-Fire

15. Restoration of the Cease-Fire and a return to normal conditions along the CFL can be achieved only under the following conditions:

(a) A willingness of both parties to respect the Agreement they have entered into.

(b) A readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the CFL from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform.

(c) Evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line, which would include the withdrawal once more of Indian troops from Pakistan positions in the Kargil area.

(d) A halt by both parties to the firing across the CFL that has been occurring from both sides in some sectors with artillery and smaller guns.

(e) Allowing full freedom of movement and access to United Nations Observers by both parties on both sides of the line.



PART II

ANNOTATED LIST OF THOSE INCIDENTS SINCE 5 AUGUST 1965 WHICH HAVE BEEN  
INVESTIGATED BY UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS PRIOR TO 3 SEPTEMBER 1965

Letter dated 30 August 1965 from the Chief Military Observer  
of UNMOGIP to the Secretary-General

..... I submit to you herewith an annotated list of recent incidents affecting the Cease-Fire and the CFL in Kashmir. This list comprises only incidents on which complaints have been submitted asserting violation of the Cease-Fire and the CFL between 5 and 30 August 1965 and which have been investigated and reported upon prior to 30 August. The list is by no means complete in the sense that in the stated period there have been many more complaints of incidents submitted by both parties which the Observers have not yet been able to investigate. The annotations on the list have been compiled from the information thus far submitted in my letters to you described as sections I through IV and in my cabled messages. The investigations of incidents continue and I shall, of course, keep you informed of their results. To my great regret, incidents are also continuing.

As you will note, the investigations, which often have to be carried out in extremely difficult circumstances and at varying lengths of time after the particular action has occurred, have in general not yet been able to verify, either through observation or direct evidence, the identity of those responsible for the action and participating in it, or whether and to what extent there had been in fact a crossing of the CFL.

(Signed)

R.H. NIMMO  
Lt-General

Chief Military Observer,

UNMOGIP

Annotated List of Incidents Annexed to the Letter of 30 August  
from General Nimmo

1. Incident of 5 August in the Galuthi sector on the Indian side of the CFL

Nature:

On 5 August, an Indian patrol was attacked by a group estimated at about seventy armed men at a point 8,000 yards from the CFL.

The attackers abandoned a quantity of arms, ammunition and equipment.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the attack had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the attackers and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although it was presumed that they did.

The casualties seen by the Observers included: three Indian soldiers and three attackers killed.

2. Incident of 5/6 August in the Baramula sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On the night of 5/6 August, a clash took place in the Gulmarg area between an Indian patrol and a group of armed men, who, after firing at the patrol, disengaged, leaving behind a quantity of arms, ammunition and equipment.

Investigation:

UN Observers saw the abandoned materials and noted that the weapons had their markings scratched off.

3. Incidents of 7/8 August in the Galuthi sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On the night of 7/8 August, attacks were carried out by armed groups on two Indian battalion headquarters and eight pickets, all located from three to six miles from the CFL.

The raiders abandoned a quantity of arms, ammunition, equipment and leaflets calling the people of Kashmir to "holy war".

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed that the attacks had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although it was presumed that they did.

The casualties seen by the Observers include: One Indian soldier wounded and four raiders killed.

4. Incidents of 7/8 August in the Baramula sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On the night of 7/8 August, attacks were carried out by armed groups on five bridges, two formation headquarters and six pickets, all located between two to seventeen miles from the CFL.

The raiders abandoned a quantity of arms and ammunition. Two raiders were captured by the Indian forces.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place.

The casualties of the attacks seen by the Observers included: thirteen Indian soldiers killed, twelve Indian soldiers wounded and one Indian policeman wounded; one raider killed and one wounded.

The Observers interviewed one of the captured raiders, who stated that he was a soldier of the 16 Azad Kashmir infantry battalion and that the raiding party was composed of about 300 soldiers of his battalion and 100 "mujahids" (armed civilians trained in guerilla tactics).

UN Observers noted that some of the materials said to have been abandoned by the raiders were manufactured in Pakistan.

5. Incidents of 7/8 August in the Jammu sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On the night of 7/8 August, attacks were carried out by armed groups on two Indian battalion headquarters, two and six miles from the CFL.

The raiders abandoned some arms and ammunition.

Investigation:

United Nations Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although this was believed to be the case.

The casualties seen by United Nations Observers included: five Indian soldiers killed and five wounded.

6. Incidents of 7/8 August in the Naushera sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On the night of 7/8 August, attacks were carried out by armed groups on one petrol oil and lubricant dump, one battalion headquarters and two pickets, all located 4,000 to 10,000 yards from the CFL.

The raiders abandoned a quantity of arms and ammunition.

Investigation:

United Nations Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although it was thought that they had.

7. Incidents in the Punch sector on the Indian side beginning on 7/8 August

Nature:

On the night of 7/8 August, a group of raiders attacked an Indian picket fourteen miles northeast of Punch. In later attacks, large groups of raiders occupied the town of Mandi and several pickets in the area.

Indian troops recaptured Mandi on 12 August and continued their drive against the raiders.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed most of the reported fighting. The number of raiders was estimated to exceed 1,000. The available evidence indicated that some of the raiders must have come from across the CFL.

As of 24 August, the raiders were still holding some Indian pickets north of Mandi. The situation was still confused and UN Observers were unable to visit some of the areas concerned because of continuing hostilities and closed roads.

8. Incidents of 10 August in the Kargil sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On 10 August, attacks were carried out by small armed groups on 2 bridges and one picket, 6-8 miles from the CFL.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place.

The casualties seen by the Observers included: 5 Indian soldiers, 2 Indian policemen and 1 raider killed; five Indian soldiers and one Indian army porter wounded.

The dress worn by the dead raider was similar to the uniforms of Pakistan frontier corps of scouts.

9. Incident of 12 August in the Kotli sector on the Pakistan side

Nature:

On 12 August, Indian troops fired 3.7" howitzer artillery at the Mendhar area, 1 mile on the Pakistan side of the CFL. A bridge was damaged.

Investigation:

This action was confirmed by UN Observers.

10. Incidents of 13 August in the Baramula sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On 13 August, the Indian picket at Naugam, 12 miles from the CFL, was attacked by a group estimated at about 40 men. Later the convoy evacuating the wounded from Naugam was ambushed.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although this was believed to be the case.

The casualties in those attacks were said to be 10 soldiers killed and 23 wounded on the Indian side. The Observers saw and interrogated 22 of the wounded soldiers.

11. Incidents of 14 August in the Baramula/Donel sectors

Nature:

On 14 August, the Uri area (7 miles on Indian side of the CFL) was shelled by Pakistan artillery from the Chakothi area (12 miles on the Pakistan side of the CFL).

Indian artillery returned the fire later.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the shelling from both sides.

12. Incidents of 14/15 August in the Skardu/Kargil sectors on the Pakistan side

Nature:

On the afternoon of 14 August, Indian troops fired with 120 mm mortars across the CFL in the Dalunang area.

On 15 August, Indian troops crossed the CFL and occupied 3 Pakistan positions near the Line, northeast of Kargil.

Investigation:

These actions were confirmed by UN Observers.

13. Incidents in the Jammu/Bhimber sectors on the Indian side beginning on 14 August

Nature:

On 14 August, armed elements from the Pakistan side allegedly crossed the CFL in the Chamb area and penetrated up to 1 mile on the Indian side of the Line. Indian positions along the CFL were subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire from the Pakistan side on 15-16 August. The attacking forces captured 9 Indian positions on 16-17 August.

As of 26 August, the Indian forces had reportedly recaptured 7 pickets and continued their counter-attack with artillery support.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the shelling of Indian positions and considerable fighting in the area.

On 15 and 17 August, the Observers saw at a hospital in Jammu 62 Indian soldiers wounded during the incidents and were told that there were more casualties.

The Observers were unable to investigate most of the alleged attacks on the spot because of continuing hostilities.

14. Incidents of 15 August in the Jammu sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On 15 August, an armed group raided the village of Rajpur, 5 miles on the Indian side of the Pakistan/Jammu border.

11 villagers were reportedly killed and 4 wounded.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the attacks, but could not determine the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although this was the presumption.

15. Incident of 16 August in the Galuthi sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On 16 August, a convoy of Indian vehicles, civilian buses and one UN jeep was fired upon with 2" mortars, rocket launchers and small arms on the main road from Punch to Galuthi.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the incident.

They saw eight Indian soldiers killed, seven wounded and three vehicles destroyed by bullet and grenades. The UN jeep was hit by bullets.

16. Incident of 18/19 August in the Kargil sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On the night of 18/19 August, an armed group attacked an Indian battalion headquarters and an adjacent road construction camp.

The attackers abandoned a quantity of equipment.

Investigation:

The attack was confirmed by UN Observers.

The casualties seen by the Observers included: 2 road construction workers killed and 2 wounded.

17. Incident of 19 August in the Punch sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On 19 August, Pakistan field artillery fired 25 pounder shells across the CFL on the airfield and the hospital at Punch.



Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the shelling.

They were told by the Pakistan command that this limited action was necessary because the airfield was being used by Indian aircraft to direct Indian artillery fire against Pakistan positions and that the hospital was hit by accident.

18. Incident of 24 August in Pakistan near the Bhimber sector

Nature:

On 24 August, Indian artillery shelled the village of Awar in Pakistan 1,000 yards south of Pakistan-Kashmir border and five miles west of the CFL in the Bhimber sector.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed the shelling.

19. Incident of 24 August in the Baramula, Domel sectors on the Pakistan side

Nature:

On 24 August, Indian troops supported by artillery, crossed the CFL and occupied Pakistan positions in the Tangdhar/Hauseri (Tithwal) area.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed this action.

The attack was admitted by the Indian local commander who claimed that Pakistan forces had attacked first.

20. Incident of 24 August in the Baramula sector on the Indian side

Nature:

It was reported on 24 August that in a clash at the Chor Panjal pass six miles on the Indian side of the CFL, Indian troops had killed twenty-one "intruders".

Investigation:

UN Observers visited the site of the clash and saw nine bodies dressed in green "selwa" shirts and "Kamiz" trousers. The clothing and general appearance of the bodies led the Observers to believe that they were those of Azad Kashmir soldiers.

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21. Incident of 26 August in the Punch sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On 26 August, Pakistan artillery shelled the area of the town of Punch.

Investigation:

The shelling was confirmed by UN Observers.

22. Incidents of 27/28 August in the Punch/Rawalakot sector on the Pakistan side

Nature:

On 27/28 August, Indian artillery in the Punch area fired 25-pounder shells at the Pakistan side across the CFL north of Punch.

Indian troops crossed the CFL from the Uri area into the Bedori area on the Pakistan side of the line.

Investigation:

UN Observers confirmed these actions.

As of 29 August, Indian troops had reportedly reached the Haji Pir Pass, five miles on the Pakistan side of the CFL on the Uri/Punch road.

23. Incident of 28 August in the Punch sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On 28 August, Pakistan artillery shelled the area of the town of Punch for half-an-hour.

Investigation:

This action was confirmed by UN Observers.

Summaries of Incidents Reported by General Nimmo  
Since his Letter of 30 August

1. Incident of 1 September in the Naushera sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On the morning of 1 September, Pakistan artillery fired at an Indian battalion headquarters in the Jangar area about 2.5 miles from the CFL.

Investigation:

The shelling was confirmed by UN Observers.

2. Incident of 1 September in the Srinagar area on the Indian side

Nature:

On 1 September, an Indian convoy was ambushed by an armed group at Gund, 24 miles on the Indian side of the CFL on the Srinagar-Leh road.

Investigation:

The attack was confirmed by UN Observers.

The Observers saw the bodies of 3 attackers, one prisoner captured during the clash and a quantity of arms and equipment left by the attackers.

The prisoner informed the Observers that he was a member of the Karakoram Scouts (based in the Skardu sector on the Pakistan side) and that he and a number of other scouts had been selected to destroy the bridge at Gund on the Srinagar-Leh road.

The Observers also noted that some of the arms and equipment abandoned by the raiders were manufactured in Pakistan.

3. Incidents of 1 and 2 September in the Punch sector on the Indian side

Nature:

On the afternoon of 1 September, on the night of 1/2 September and again on the afternoon of 2 September Pakistan artillery fired with 25 pounders at the Punch area.

Investigation:

The shelling was confirmed by UN Observers.

4. Incidents on the Indian side in the Jammu/Himber sectors beginning on 1 September

Nature:

On 1 September, the Indian command complained that early on 1 September, Pakistan artillery shelled an Indian battalion headquarters and Indian pickets in the Chamb area. One and one-half tank squadrons later crossed the CFL and attacked an Indian picket located 2 miles from the CFL.

A second complaint received on 1 September stated that 3 Indian pickets had been occupied by Pakistan troops and that the artillery and tank attack was still in progress.

On 2 September, the Indian command reported that on the morning of 2 September Pakistan aircraft attacked the road between Chamb and Jaurian, 14 miles east of the CFL and 5 miles of the Pakistan/Jammu border, with rockets and machine-gun fire. It was claimed that Pakistan troops had crossed the border with approximately 90 tanks and that by the afternoon of 2 September 16 of those tanks had been destroyed.

Investigation:

The Pakistan command informed UNICGIP on 2 September that its troops had crossed the CFL on 1 September in the Himber sector, pointing out that this was a purely defensive measure to forestall Indian action in the area. It complained that for the first time since the Cease-Fire on 1 January 1949 Indian aircraft had intervened in ground battle by taking offensive action against Pakistan troops in the Himber sector. Four Indian vampires were reportedly shot down by Pakistan aircraft.

UN Observers confirmed most of the reported actions had taken place.

Although the Observers had been unable to proceed west of the Munawarwali river since the beginning of the Pakistan thrust, the evidence available to them as of 2 September seems to indicate that the Pakistan troops have managed to occupy an area of approximately 30 square miles, roughly extending 5 miles east of the CFL up to the Munawarwali river and 6 miles north of the border up to the Chamb village area.

Unofficial Map for Sole Purpose of Showing Approximate Location of Kashmir Cease-Fire Line

