

United Nations

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UNRESTRICTED

**SECURITY
COUNCIL**

**CONSEIL
DE SECURITE**

S/360
27 May 1947.

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT

by the

COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING

GREEK FRONTIER INCIDENTS

to the

SECURITY COUNCIL

VOLUME II

/ANNEX I

Report by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier
Incidents to the Security Council

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ANNEX I

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION

(a) Delegations To The Commission

AUSTRALIA

Representative - Mr. J.D.L. HOOD
Major-General John A. CHAPMAN
Mr. S.L. ATYEO
Mr. T. GLASHEEN
Captain D.W. JOHNSTONE
Miss K. WHITE

BELGIUM

Representative - Lt. Gen. Maurice DELVOIE
Mr. Andre WENDELEN
Commandant EOUSSA
Mr. C. BOWLER

BRAZIL

Representative - Mr. Antonio NEVES VIANNA
Mr. Luis ALMEIDA NOGUEIRA PORTO

CHINA

Representative - H.E. Dr. Wunsz KING
Hon. Dr. SH Kwan-Tsien
Air Major WANG Ting-Feng
Mr. WANG Kechin
Mr. Henry KING

COLOMBIA

Representative - Mr. Francisco URRUTIA
Dr. Abraham FERNANDEZ DE SOTO
Mr. Pedro LOPEZ (from 5 Apr.)

FRANCE

Representative - Mr. Georges DAUX
Mr. H. De LIMAIAC
Mr. Andre LALANDE
Mr. Philippe GUERLET

POLAND

Representative - Mr. Jerzy FUTRAMENT
Mr. Zbigniew GAWRAK-CZECZOT
Mr. Piotr SOBOLEWSKI
Miss W. CHODAKOWSKA

SYRIA

Representative - H.E. Ihsan EL-SHERIF
Mr. Issam INGLIZI

/UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED KINGDOM

Representative - Mr. R.T. WINDLE
Mr. E.H. PECK
Mr. C.N. HALKIAS
Mr. J. ADAMS
Mrs. I. FOTHERGILL
Lt. Col. H.W.L. COWAN (until 4 March)
Maj. A.F. STALLARD (4 March - 2 April)
Mr. G. GLUTTON (2 April on)
Cmdr. C.J. GORDON
Miss A.F. WOODWARD
Miss B. BAILEY

UNITED STATES

Representative - Mr. Mark Foster ETHEIDGE
Mr. Norbert L. ANSCHUTZ
Mr. Harding BANCROFT
Mr. Cyril E. BLACK
Mr. Harry N. HOWARD
Lt. Col. A.C. MILLER
Mr. A. PARSONS
Lt. Col. G. YATSEVITCH (20 March, 5 April)

Mr. E. Donald BELL
Mr. G. IRMINGER

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Representative - Mr. A.A. LAVRISCHEV
Mr. S.M. KUDRIAVTSEV
Mr. F.A. BELIAEV
Mr. A.G. GRAUR
Mr. G.P. KASPAROV
Mr. I.P. SHAPOLOV
Mr. S.M. TSIBIZOV
Mr. N.F. PAISOV

(b) Liaison Representatives

ALBANIA

Col. Nesti Krenzhi
Mr. Theodor Eeba
Mr. Myftar Fare
Mr. Vango Mitrojorgji
Maj. Kadri Azbi
Mr. Nuri Huta
Mr. Aleks Caci
Mr. Angjo Faber
Mr. Vangjel Pecani

BULGARIA

Mr. Georges Koulishev
Mr. Dimitar Ganev
Mr. Georges Andrejitchine
Dr. Nissim Mevozah
Mr. Vladimir Topencharov

/Gen. Yonko Panev

BULGARIA (continued)

Gen. Yonko Panev
Mr. Chudomir Petrov
Col. Georges Georgiev
Maj. Cyril Triphcnov
Mr. Constantin Constantinov
Mr. Marin Ivanov
Mr. Ivan Nikolov
Miss Stephanka Stephanova

GREECE

Mr. Alexandre Kyrou
Mr. Constantine Tranos
Mr. Nicolaos Gambalouris
Mr. George Phylactopoulos
Mr. Leon Marcantonatos
Mr. Byron Theodoropoulos
Mr. John Coliacopoulos
Mr. Eustache Calamidas
Mr. George Cavounidis
Col. Constantine Iatrou
Lt. Col. Michael Calligheris
2nd Lt. Milto Galvocoressis
2nd Lt. Constantine Ioannou

YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. J. Djerdja
Mr. Vrlsta Krulj
Col. Ratko Vujovic
Maj. Marijan Barisic
Maj. Zvonko Grkalic
Capt. Branko Licen
Mr. Srenko Freundlich
Miss Zorka Djakonovic
Mr. Milan Pogacnik
Mr. Peter Mihailovski
Mr. Stévo Dediđer
Mr. Anton Smolej
Mr. Lale Ivanovic
Mr. Oskar Davico
Mr. Ilija Topalovski
Mr. Mihailo Petrovic
Mr. Nikola Kapetanovic

(c) Secretariat of The Commission

Col. A. Roscher Lund
Principal Secretary of the Commission
Mr. Gustav Gottesman
Deputy Principal Secretary of the Commission
Mr. William Shearer
Asst. Secretary of the Commission
Mr. Konstantine Volokhov
Asst. Secretary of the Commission
Mr. Philippe Poullain
Asst. Secretary of the Commission

/Mr. Stanley Ryan

Mr. Stanley Ryan
 Press Officer
 Mr. Lovat Cave-Chinn
 Motion Picture Operator
 Mr. M. Chamudes
 Photographer

Mr. T.R. Bond)
 Mr. J. Muckell)
 Mr. W. Redzinski)

Administrative Officers

Miss J. Torney
 Executive Assistant

Mr. N. Teslenko)
 Mr. S. Soubotnik)
 Mr. A. Blokh)
 Mr. R. Pignolet)

Interpreters

Miss M. Charlebois)
 Miss M. A. La Fond)
 Miss J. Theriault)
 Mrs. E. Vinet)
 Miss C. Faure)

Secretaries

Mr. Jerome Collin)
 Mr. David Rose)
 Mr. T. Mossu)
 Mr. M. Pesch)
 Miss Mildred Smith)
 Miss Winifred Gosline)

Verbatim Reporters
and Stenotypists

ANNEX II
TEAMS OF THE COMMISSION

TEAM I was composed of:

Chairman:	Mr. W. G. Shearer	Secretariat
Delegates:	Mr. S. L. Atyeo	Australia
	Maj. T. P. Wang	China
	Lt. Col. A. Lalande	France
	Mr. P. Sobolewski	Poland
	Mrs. I. P. Fothergill-Payne	United Kingdom
	Mr. N. C. Anschuetz	United States of America
	Mr. A. Graur	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Liaison		
Representatives:	Mr. B. Theodoropoulos	Greece
	Mr. T. Eba	Albania
	Mr. T. Petroff	Bulgaria
	Mr. V. Krulj	Yugoslavia
Secretariat:	Mr. D. Rose	Verbatim Reporter
	Mr. A. Blokh	Interpreter
	Mr. N. Zafirides	Interpreter
	Miss M. Charlebois	Stenographer
	Miss C. Contakos	Stenographer

The Team held its First Meeting in Athens, on 16 February 1947
(Private).

The Team held its Second Meeting in Piraeus, on 17 February 1947.

Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Nikolas Petrovitch
- (b) Abas Ermini
- (c) Mirkovitch Vioslav
- (d) Figri Dina
- (e) Mouhareem Baraktaris
- (f) Mrs. Caldi

The Team held its Third Meeting in Athens, on 17 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Fourth Meeting in Athens, on 18 February 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Vsni Deme
- (b) Alouch Leshanake
- (c) Gen. Perviz

The Team held its Fifth Meeting in Athens on 18 February 1947.

/Witnesses heard:

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Stoiko Stoikoff
- (b) Kassamor Achmet Regeb
- (c) Maximovitch Milan
- (d) Philovitch Mihailo
- (e) Nedelkof

The Team held its Sixth Meeting in Ermoupolis, Syros, on
19 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Seventh Meeting in Ermoupolis, Syros, on
20 February 1947. Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Tzenko Baref
- (b) Ivan Baref
- (c) Redjeb Ramadan
- (d) Kosta Tassich
- (e) Tscoufis

The Team held its Eighth Meeting in Ermoupolis, Syros, on
20 February 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Manyo Popoff
- (b) Tzenko Baref
- (c) Nikola Moutaftchuleff
- (d) Ali Nivitza
- (e) Haki Ruchiti
- (f) Lijian Gach
- (g) Kosta Tassich

The Team held its Ninth Meeting in Ermoupolis, Syros, on
20 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Tenth Meeting in Ermoupolis, Syros, on
21 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Eleventh Meeting in Ermoupolis, Syros, on
21 February 1947. Witness heard:

Thomas Kcamilias .

The Team held its Twelfth Meeting in Ermoupolis, Syros, on
21 February 1947. Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Petor Tschoibasitch
- (b) Panos Caturados
- (c) Nikitas Theolopitis
- (d) Nicolas Triandis
- (e) Tharos Karageorgios
- (f) Thanasios Kiritnas
- (g) Lousevitch

/The Team held

The Team held its Thirteenth Meeting at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 22 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Fourteenth Meeting at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 22 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Fifteenth Meeting at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 22 February 1947. Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Loulis
- (b) George Ringas
- (c) Andreos Tzimas
- (d) Nikolas Terjopolos
- (e) Panayotis
- (f) Tzevelekis

The Team held its Sixteenth Meeting at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 22 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Seventeenth Meeting at Kirikos, Ikaria, on 23 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Eighteenth Meeting at Kirikos, Ikaria, on 23 February 1947. Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Aspirides Kissilou
- (b) George Manopoulos
- (c) George Doxopoulos
- (d) Takis Ademos
- (e) Dimitri Balis
- (f) Margaries
- (g) Tsanakas Athanastos
- (h) Bambaris
- (i) Ginalas
- (j) Gen. Bakirdjis

The Team held its Nineteenth Meeting in Evdilos, Ikaria, on 23 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Twentieth Meeting in Evdilos, Ikaria, on 23 February 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Aristides Koutsouflakis
- (b) Vitaniatis Apoltolos
- (c) Christo Papachristodoulos

The Team held its Twenty-First Meeting in Athens, on 25 February 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Twenty-Second Meeting in Athens on 26 February 1947. (Private).

/The Team held

The Team held its Twenty-Third Meeting in Athens on 27 February 1947.
(Private).

The Team held its Twenty-Fourth Meeting in Agorani on 2 March 1947.
(Private).

The Team held its Twenty-Fifth Meeting in Agorani, on 2 March 1947.

Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Dimitri Toleopolis
- (b) Nestoras Zogas
- (c) Terzoglou
- (d) George Skembis
- (e) Maria Falaima
- (f) Paraskevi Papodopolou
- (g) Theodore Ikonoinu
- (h) Georgia Mandalova
- (i) Costanida Theodoropoulos
- (j) Vaïos Dzoraz
- (k) Ioulia Makri
- (l) Elias Makris
- (m) Elias Vissariou
- (n) Nicholas Tzouloupoulos

TEAM 1A was composed of:

Chairman:	Mr. J. D. L. Hood	Australia
Delegates:	Mr. A. Wendelen	Belgium
	Mr. Wang Kechin)	China
	Mr. H. King)	
	Mr. H. de Limairac	France
	Commander C. J. Gordon	United Kingdom
	Mr. N. L. Anschuetz	United States
	Mr. G. P. Kasparov)	Union of Soviet
	Mr. S. Tsibizov)	Socialist Republ
Liaison		
Representatives:	Mr. T. Eba)	Albania
	Mr. K. Asbi)	
	Mr. M. Tere)	
	Lt. Col. G. Georgiev	Bulgaria
	Mr. L. Ivanovic)	Yugoslavia
	Capt. B. Lican	
	Mr. B. Theodoropoulos)	Greece
	Lt. Col. M. Calligheris)	
	Maj. A. Vlachos)	
	Mr. D. Krentiris)	
Secretariat:	Mr. W. G. Shearer	Secretary
	Mr. P. Poullain	Assistant-Secretar
	Mr. S. Soubotnik	Interpreter
	Miss E. Psalti	Interpreter
	Miss K. White	Secretary to Mr. E
	Miss M. Charlebois	Stenographer
	Miss C. Contakos	Stenographer

/The Team

The Team held its First Meeting in Salonika on 8 March 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Second Meeting in Florina, on 10 March 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Third Meeting in Florina, on 11 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Pantelis, Papailias
- (b) Filippou, Vassilios
- (c) Tsoklaropoulos, Ioannis

The Team held its Fourth Meeting in Florina on 11 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Tsoklaropoulos, Ioannis
- (b) Vassiliou, Theodoros
- (c) Staminos, Dimitrios

The Team held its Fifth Meeting in Florina on 11 March 1947. Witness heard:

Dr. Gymnopoulos

The Team held its Sixth Meeting in Florina on 12 March 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Seventh Meeting in Florina on 12 March 1947. Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Lt. Dimitrios Stefanidis
- (b) Pvt. Spiridon Tsirigos
- (c) Ioannides, Efthimios
- (d) Capt. Dimopoulos, Vassilios
- (e) Fourkiotis, Georgios
- (f) Vitaniotou, Agni
- (g) Vilianou, Bozinos
- (h) Kalantzis Stefanos
- (i) Lt. Gatcha Mboria

The Team held its Eighth Meeting in Korche on 13 March 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Ninth Meeting in Korche on 14 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Sherif Tefik
- (b) Ramadan Irfan
- (c) Hajdin Qerin
- (d) Nexhib Rustem
- (e) Gantsos, Georgios
- (f) Damopoulos, Georgios

The Team held its Tenth Meeting in Yannina on 15 March 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Eleventh Meeting in Yannina on 16 March 1947.

/Witnesses

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Kentros, Stavros
- (b) Tsipis, Nikolaos
- (c) Thomas Zachos

The Team held its Twelfth Meeting in Yannina on 16 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Thomas Zachos
- (b) Christoforos Zervos

The Team held its Thirteenth Meeting in Filiates on 17 March 1947.

Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Col. Athanasios Stamopoulos
- (b) Sourino, Philippos
- (c) Katsaris, Ioannis
- (d) Sakas, Ioannis
- (e) Lenis Ilias

The Team held its Fourteenth Meeting in Filiates on 18 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Stefanos, Thomas
- (b) Cheritos, Ioannis
- (c) Frontios, Konstantinos

The Team held its Fifteenth Meeting in Filiates on 18 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Efstratios, Athanasios
- (b) Ali Nostred
- (c) Tsouyopoulos, Georgios
- (d) Mersen Hedgi

The Team held its Sixteenth Meeting in Konispol on 19 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Demi Kassam
- (b) Habli Ismail
- (c) Babura Mustafa
- (d) Bino Helmi
- (e) Pronjo Fatima

The Team held its Seventeenth Meeting in Konispol on 19 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Grabocka Stefo
- (b) Megemeja Muhamet
- (c) Achmed Vesel
- (d) Kosta Ilo
- (e) Peristeri Pilo
- (f) Balani Madan
- (g) Lamohi Faik
- (h) Koro Hadji

The Team held its Eighteenth Meeting in Yannina on 20 March 1947.

Witness heard:

Pericles Kainourgios

The Team held its Nineteenth Meeting in Yannina on 20 March 1947.

(Private).

The Team held its Twentieth Meeting in Yannina on 20 March 1947.

Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Lt. Col. Athanasios Stamopoulos
- (b) Sgt. Montogeorgos, Evangelos
- (c) Sgt. Demageorgos, Alex
- (d) Michael Tsanos

The Team held its Twenty-First Meeting in Yannina on 20 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Mestan Ramadan
- (b) Christos Zois

TEAM B was composed of:

Chairman:	General M. Delvois	Belgium
Delegates:	Mr. K. Wang	China
	Mr. Z. Gawrak-Czeczot	Poland
	Mr. I. Inglizi	Syria
	Mr. G. P. Kasparov)	Union of Soviet
	Mr. A. G. Graur)	Socialist Republics
	Mr. C. W. Halkias	United Kingdom
	Dr. A. Parsons	United States
Liaison		
Representatives:	Mr. V. Mitrogorjli)	Albania
	Mr. N. Huta)	
	Col. G. Gheorghiev)	Bulgaria
	Mr. C. Petrov)	
	Mr. N. Cambalouris	Greece
	Major M. Barisic	Yugoslavia
Secretariat:	Mr. P. Poullain	Secretary
	Mr. W. Rodzinski	Secretary
	Mr. T. R. Bond	Secretary
	Mr. G. Soubotnik	Interpreter
	Mr. A. Blach	Interpreter
	Misc H. A. LaFond	Stenographer

The Team held its First Meeting in the Pavlos Mellas Prison, Salonika,
on 1 March 1947. Witness heard:

K. Siriniotis

The Team held its Second Meeting in the Pavlos Mellas Prison on

/1 March 1947

1 March 1947. Witness heard:

K. Siriniotis

The Team held its Third Meeting in Salonika on 2 March 1947. (Private)

The Team held its Fourth Meeting in the Queen Olga Street Prison, Salonika, on 3 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) G. Bobtsis
- (b) I. Tsingas
- (c) G. Koulousis
- (d) A. Morphidis
- (e) I. Stokas
- (f) G. Sidiropoulos
- (g) A. Hadjilambrou

The Team held its Fifth Meeting in Salonika, on 3 March 1947. (Private)

The Team held its Sixth Meeting in the New Prison, Salonika, on 3 March 1947. Witness heard:

D. Papayanis

The Team held its Seventh Meeting at Polyghiros, on 4 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) A. Kalivakis
- (b) I. Nicolaidis

The Team held its Eighth Meeting in Salonika, on 5 March 1947.

Witness heard:

Z. Mladenovic.

The Team held its Ninth Meeting in Salonika on 5 March 1947. (Private)

The Team held its Tenth Meeting in Salonika on 5 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Z. Mladenovic
- (b) K. I. Chuparikov

The Team held its Eleventh Meeting in the Pavlos Mellas Prison, Salonika, on 5 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) M. Siganos
- (b) Y. Samoladis

The Team held its Twelfth Meeting in Katerini, on 6 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Dr. V. Dambasis
- (b) C. Pandeliadis

/The Team

The Team held its Thirteenth Meeting in Katerini, on 6 March 1947.
(Private).

The Team held its Fourteenth Meeting at Katerini, on 7 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Mrs. E. Mansidou
- (b) N. Droungas

The Team held its Fifteenth Meeting in Salonika on 8 March 1947. (Private)

The Team held its Sixteenth Meeting in Salonika on 10 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) L. Babalikis
- (b) A. Agapithos

The Team held its Seventeenth Meeting in Salonika on 10 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) M. Hadjis
- (b) M. Doko

The Team held its Eighteenth Meeting in Salonika on 11 March 1947.

(Private).

The Team held its Nineteenth Meeting in Xerovriesi, on 19 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) J. Paganie
- (b) E. Panagoudides
- (c) E. Melisanides
- (d) J. Tsandamas

The Team held its Twentieth Meeting in Kilkis, on 19 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Olga Marantidou
- (b) P. Vambakidis

TEAM B (C) was composed of:

Chairman:	General M. Delvoie	Belgium
Delegates:	Capt. D. W. Johnstone	Australia
	Mr. L. Porto	Brazil
	Col. A. Ialande	France
	Mr. Z. Gawrak-Czeczot	Poland
	Mr. I. Inglizi	Syria
	Mrs. I. Fothergill	United Kingdom
	Mr. A. Graur	Union of Soviet
	Mr. I. P. Shapovalov	Socialist Republic
	Col. A. C. Miller	United States

/Liaison

Liaison

Representatives:	Mr. N. Huta	Albania
	Mr. C. Petrov	Bulgaria
	Mr. V. Krulj	Yugoslavia

Secretariat:

Col. A. Roscher Lund	Secretary
Mr. S. Ryan	Press Officer
Mr. N. Teslenko	Interpreter
Mr. N. Zafiridis	Interpreter
Mr. T. R. Bond	Administrative Officer
Mr. J. Collin	Verbatim Reporter
Mr. L. Cave-Chinn	Motion Picture Operator
Mr. M. Chamudos	Photographer

The Team held its First Meeting in Salonika on 11 March 1947 to discuss the Markos trip.

The Team left Salonika on 12 March 1947.

The Team held its Second Meeting on 15 March 1947. No witnesses were heard.

The Team returned to Salonika on 16 March 1947.

TEAM C was composed of:

Chairman:	H. E. Ihsan El-Sherif	Syria
Delegates:	Mr. S. L. Atyeo	Australia
	Mr. L. A. V. Porto	Brazil
	Major T. P. Wang	China
	Lt. Col. A. Lalande	France
	Mr. F. A. Belisev	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
	Mr. H. Howard	United States
	Mr. C. N. Halkias	United Kingdom

Liaison

Representatives:	Mr. V. Mitrojordji	Albania
	Mr. C. Koulichev	Bulgaria
	Mr. Philactopoulos	Greece
	Col. R. Vujovich	Yugoslavia

Secretariat:

Mr. K. Volokhov	Secretary
Mr. Pesch	Verbatim Reporter
Mr. J. Collin	Verbatim Reporter
Mr. A. Blokh	Interpreter
Mr. Romanos	Interpreter
Mr. Siphneos	Interpreter

The Team held its First Meeting in Salonika on 18 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Eleftherios Savvinidis
- (b) Sophia Alexandridou

/The Team

The Team held its Second Meeting in Salonika on 18 March 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Sophia Alexandridou
- (b) Angyroula Stavridou

The Team held its Third Meeting in Salonika on 19 March 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Fourth Meeting in Salonika on 19 March 1947.

Witness heard:

C. Dinos

The Team held its Fifth Meeting in Salonika on 20 March 1947. Witness heard:

Jean Patis

The Team held its Sixth Meeting in Salonika on 22 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Aikaterinaria Kyrkos (Kapetan Lambros)
- (b) Vitamiotis Apostolos
- (c) Papachristodoulos Christos

SUB-COMMITTEE of Team C:

The Sub-Committee held its First Meeting in Salonika on 19 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) A. Frangos
- (b) D. Merkos
- (c) C. Dinos

The Sub-Committee held its Second Meeting in Salonika on 20 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Jean Patis
- (b) Athanese Zografos
- (c) E. Liakos
- (d) D. Liakos
- (e) Georgios Krinakis

TEAM D was composed of:

Chairman:	Mr. F. Urrutia	Colombia
Delegates:	Mr. S. L. Atyeo	Australia
	Commandant Eoussa	Belgium
	Mr. Bonnier	
	Mr. L. Porto	Brazil
	Mr. Sih	China
	Col. A. Lalande	France
	Major Stallard	United Kingdom
	Mr. J. Adams	
	Mr. E. Howard	United States
	Dr. A. Parsons	

Mr. Shapovalov)
Mr. S. Tzibizov)

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

Liaison

Representatives: Mr. Mitrojdordji
Mr. Konstantinov)
Mr. Ivanikov)
Gen. Panov)
Mr. Petrov)
Col. Ghiorgiev)
Mr. Tranos)
Mr. Keliacopoulos)
Mr. Kaligaris)
Mr. Theodoropoulos)
Colonel Vujovic)
Mr. Smolej)

Albania
Bulgaria

Greece

Yugoslavia

Secretariat:

Mr. W. G. Shearer
Mr. C. Volokhov
Mr. T. Bond
Mr. D. Rose
Mr. Pesch
Mr. Pignolet
Mr. A. Blokh
Mr. Romanos
Mr. M. Chamudes
Miss M. Charlebois
Miss C. Contakos
Miss C. Faure
Mrs. Vinet
Mrs. E. Wiseman

Secretary
Assistant Secretary
Adm. Officer
Verbatim Reporter
Verbatim Reporter
Translator
Interpreter
Interpreter
Photographer
Stenographer
Stenographer
Stenographer
Stenographer
Stenographer

The Team held its First Meeting on the train between Drama and Komotini
on 23 March 1947. Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) 2nd Lt. Morsalos Thrusyvouslos
- (b) Kelleoglu Nicolaos
- (c) Constantinidis Nicolaos
- (d) General Assinacopoulos
- (e) Captain George Elinteradis

The Team held its Second Meeting at Alexandroupolis on 24 March 1947.

Witnesses and statements heard:

- (a) Brig. Andreadis Constantinos
- (b) Alimoudes Dimitrios
- (c) Balios Voitsis

The Team held its Third Meeting at Alexandroupolis on 24 March 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Alipoudis George
- (b) Zalatinoudis Constantinos
- (c) Mahmoud Hassan Tschakar
- (d) Masnovo Achmet

The Team held its Fourth Meeting in Lubimets on 25 March 1947.

/Witnesses heard

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Captain Ivan Boyeff
- (b) Dimitroff Vladim. Kisltoff
- (c) Pentcho Todoroff Ioneff
- (d) Ilcho Tallinskoif Valcheff
- (e) Jordan Georgieff
- (f) Zampfir Marinov Lukarov
- (g) Alexander Petroff Sambovov
- (h) Peter Dimitroff
- (i) Christo Medulkoff Padeff
- (j) Dimitar Dimitrov Maleff

TEAM E was composed of:

Chairman:	Mr. Gwusalt-Ozeetot	Poland
Delegates:	Major Wang	China
	Lt. Col. A. Lalonde	France
	Mr. C. N. Malkins	United Kingdom
	Major A. F. Stallard	
	Mr. C. Black	United States
	Lt. Col. G. Vatssevitch	
	Dr. A. Parsons	
	Mr. A. C. Graun	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Liaison		
Representatives:	Mr. N. Euta	Albania
	Mr. C. Petrov	Bulgaria
	Mr. Tranos	Greece
	Lt. Col. Calligheris	
	Mr. Coliaccopoulos	
	Major Borisic	Yugoslavia
	Major Grahic	
Secretariat:	Mr. P. Poullain	Secretary
	Mr. A. Bloch	Interpreter
	Mr. J. Mosso	Verbatim Reporter
	Miss J. Thariolt	Stenographer
	Mrs. E. Wiseman	Stenographer
	Mr. M. Chumides	Photographer

The Team held its First Meeting at Skoplje on 1 April 1947. (Private)

The Team held its Second Meeting at Skoplje on 1 April 1947.

Witnesses heard:

- (a) Maria Slaby
- (b) Tisi Tocupolos
- (c) Sidiropula Eugenia Anosti
- (d) Jono Kajcevali

The Team held its Third Meeting at Skoplje on 2 April 1947. Witness heard:

Ilia Konstantinidi

/The Team held

The Team held its Fourth Meeting at Skoplje on 2 April 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Mihailo M. Teskov
- (b) Kemal Iskenderi

The Team held its Fifth Meeting at Skoplje on 2 April 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Sixth Meeting at Skoplje on 3 April 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Methodios Voyadjis
- (b) Gueorgi Todorov Diavedski

The Team held its Seventh Meeting at Skoplje on 3 April 1947. (Private).

The Team held its Eighth Meeting at Skoplje on 3 April 1947. Witnesses heard:

- (a) Miltiades Papanicolaou
- (b) Alekho Papanicolaou
- (c) Dimitrios Karantzias (Karanjowski)

TEAM F was composed of:

Chairman:	Mr. A. Mendes-Vianna	Brazil
Delegates:	General J. A. Chapman	Australia
	Mr. A. Wendelen	Belgium
	Mr. K. Wang	China
	Mr. G. Daux	France
	Mr. S. Stoberski	Poland
	Mr. I. Inglizi	Syria
	Commander C. J. Gordon	United Kingdom
	Col. A. C. Miller	United States
	Mr. G. P. Kasparov	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Liaison		
Representatives:	Mr. T. Heba	Albania
	Mr. G. Andreytchine	Bulgaria
	Mr. A. Kyrou	Greece
	Mr. V. Krulj	Yugoslavia
Secretariat:	Mr. S. Ryan	Secretary
	Mr. S. Soubotnik	Interpreter
	Miss M. A. Lafond	Verbatim Reporter

The Team held its First Meeting at Bulkes on 2 April 1947. Witness heard:

Mihail Terzis

ANNEX III

LIST OF WITNESSES HEARD BY THE COMMISSION AND ITS TEAMS

<u>No</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
APITOS Ang.	10/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/16
KATERIDAKIS, Kyrios (Captain LINEROS)	22/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/3
ERCOUDIS, George	24/3/47, Alexandrou- polis	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/3
MIANDRIDOU, Sophia	18/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/1(1)
LEMOUPIS, Dimitrios	24/3/47, Alexandrou- polis	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/2
NIREADIS, K., Brig.	24/3/47, Alexandrou- polis	Team D	S/AC.4/214/Annex 2 S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/2
POSTOLOV, Rista	18/3/47, Gevgeli	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/47-I
SSEMACOPOULOS, Gen.	23/3/47, Train	Team D	
TANASOV, Djordje	2/4/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/71
THESSALAKIS, E.	18/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/15
THEANASTOS	23/2/47, Ikaria	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/18
IZEMI, Nazmi Emeni	2/4/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/71A
3			
BABALIKIS, L.	10/3/47, Salonica	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.3/16
BABAYANIS, Stergios	10/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/50
BABURA, Mustafa	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/16
BORAKITARI, Bajram	31/3/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/68
BORAKITARI, Mouharrem	17/2/47, Piraeus	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/2
BORAKITARI, General	23/2/47, Ikaria	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/13
BATIAN, Madan	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
BALIOS, Veitsis	24/3/47, Alexandrou- polis	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/2

/BALIS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
<u>B (Continued)</u>			
BALIS, Sotirios	15/3/47, Mouries	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/57-B
BAMBALIS	23/2/47, Ikaria	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/18
BAREFF, Ivan	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/7
BAREFF, Tzenko	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/7
BATALO, Chrysanthé	2/4/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/71
BEROVALIS, Lt. V.	15/3/47, Mouries	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/57-B
BINO, Hilmi	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/16
BOBTSIS, George	3/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.2/4
BOBTSIS, George	3/3/47) Salonica 12/3/47)	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/54-II
BOYADJIEV, Metodi (alias Boyadjis)	3/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/6
BOYEFF or BOSBOI Capt. Evangelios	25/3/47, Train	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/4
BOZINIS, Velliao	12/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/7
<u>C</u>			
CAKIR, Mahmut Hassan	24/3/47, Alexandrou- polis	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/3
CAIDI (Mrs.)	17/2/47, Piraeus	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/2
CANGAROV(IC), Vassili	12/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/54
CELO, M.	13/3/47, Trestenik	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/43/Rev.1
CHAPARIKOV, K. I.	5/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/10
CHARITOS, Icannis	18/3/47, Filiares	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/1
COBASIC, Petar	21/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/12
<u>D</u>			
DABOVSKI (DJAVELSKY) Georgi Todorov	3/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/6
DAMBASIS, Dr. V.	6/3/47, Katerini	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/12 /DEMAGEORGIOS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
<u>(Continued)</u>			
EMAGEORGIOU, Alexis	20/3/47, Yarnina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2/SR/20
EMA, Eucnu	18/2/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/4
EMI, Kassem	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/16
EMITROFF, Peter	25/3/47, Liutemetz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/4
EMPOULOS, Geo.	14/3/47, Korche	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9
EMPOULOS, Gheorgis	1/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/40
EMPOULOS, Capt. V.	12/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/7
ENNA, Filkri	17/2/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/2
ENOS, Constantine	19/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/5
ENJANDARAS, Ioannis	19/3/47, Herovrissi	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/19
ENIKAS, John	3/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/4
ENIMAS, Andrea) EZIMAS, Andrea) (Samariniotis)	22/2/47, Ikaria	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/Y
ENKO, M.	10/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/17
ENOUNGAS, N.	7/3/47, Katerini	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/14
ENUPMOV, Aliosman Ali	28/3/47, Sofia	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/66
ENZORAS, Vaicos	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25

E

ENLEVTHERIADES, Capt. G.	23/3/47, Train	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/1
ENMENI, Abas	17/2/47, Piraeus	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/2

F

ENALAIMA, Maria	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25
ENLOVIO, Mihailo	18/2/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/5
ENFOUKIOTIS, Georgios	12/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/7
ENFRANCOS, A.	19/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/5
ENFRONTZAS, Const.	18/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/10

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
<u>G</u>			
GACI, Lijian	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/8
GANTZOS, Georgis	14/3/47, Korche	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9
GATSIOS, Georgios	26/2/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/34
GEDLI, Divitaris Y.	28/3/47, Sofia	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/65
GEORGANTAS, George	11/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/52-II
GEORGIEV, Kosta Hadj	31/3/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/68
GEORGIEFF, Jordan	25/3/47, Liubometz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/4
GHIKCUDIS, Fotios	18/3/47, Idhomeni	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/57-H
GIOUMOURTAZOGLOU, I.	18/3/47, Idhomeni	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/57-H
GOLEMI, Hajdar	14/3/47, Korche	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9
GRABOCKA, Stefo	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
GYMNOPOULOS, Dr.	11/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/5

H

HADJI LAMBROU, A.	12/3/47, Salonica	Comm. Team B	S/AC.4/PV/55-II S/AC.4/SC.3/4
HADJIS, Methodios	10/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/17
HADJOPOULOS, Georgios	15/3/47, Mouries	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/57-B
HAJRI, Koro	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
HABIL, Ismail	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/16
HARISMIDES, Gregorios	11/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/51

I

IKONOIMU, Theodore	2/3/47, Agcriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25
IRONOMOV, Dimitri	26/3/47, Sofia	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/62
IOANNIDES, Erthimios	12/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/7
IOANNIOU, Brig.	15/3/47, Yugoslav Frontier	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/57-E S/AC.4/PV/57-H

/ISYENDERI

<u>NO</u>	<u>Date and Place</u> <u>of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
<u>(Continued)</u>			
KINDERI, Koral	2/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/4
KNOV, Kroun	11/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/52-II
KINOURIOS, Pericles	20/3/47, Yannina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/18
KLINTZIS, Stefanos	12/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/7
KLINAKIS, Athanasios	4/3/47, Polyghros	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/7
KNOBROV, A.B.	25/3/47, Liubemetz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/4
KAMLIAS, Thomas	21/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/11
KASSIMOV, Achmet	18/3/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/5
KARANJAS, Mitko (alias KARANJOWSKI)	3/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/8
KISARI, Ioannis	17/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/13
KLEGGIOU, Nikolas	23/3/47, Train	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/1
KIEROS, Stravos	16/3/47, Yannina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/11
KIKIVSKI, Yoni (or KIKIVSKI) alias KOIDES	1/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/2
KOLOUSSIE, George	3/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/4
KONSTANTINIDIS, Ilias	2/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/3
KONSTANTINIDES, N.	23/3/47, Train	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/1
KONTODORGIOS, E.	20/3/47, Yannina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/20
KONTOMANOS, Fotios (Anastas)	26/2/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/34
KOSTA, Ilo	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
KOSTADINOS, T. S.	25/3/47, Sofia	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/62
KOSTUDIS, Evangelos	31/3/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/67
KOTSIMAKO, Mehmed	12/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/54-II
KRISTOFF, Vladimir D.	25/3/47, Liubemetz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/4

/KRIMMIS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
<u>K (Continued)</u>			
KRIMARIS, G.	20/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/FV/6
KRONSEMY, Kosmos K.	2/4/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/71
<u>L</u>			
LAMBROS, Kap. (see AKATERINARIS)			
LANCE, Faik	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
LENIS, Ilias	17/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/13
LESHANAKE, Aluch	18/2/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/4
LIAKOS, D.	20/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/FV/6
LIAKOS, E.	20/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/FV/6
LOUKANOFF ZAFER, M.	25/3/47, Liubemetz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/FV/4
LOULIS	22/2/47, Ikaria	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/Y S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/15
<u>M</u>			
MANDALOVA, Georgia	2/3/47, Agorioni	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/25
MANZOUERAKIS, C.	28/2/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/38
MANLIDOU, Mrs. E.	7/3/47, Katerini	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/14
MARA NITIDOU, Olga	19/3/47, Kilkis	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/20
MARGARIS Dr.	23/2/47, Ikaria	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/18
MATEFF, Dimitroff	25/3/47, Liubemetz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/FV/4
MAXSIMOVIC, Mila	18/2/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/5
MAZNIKOV, Christo A.	28/4/47, Sofia	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/66
MAZNOVO, Ahmet	24/3/47, Alexandrou- polis	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/FV/3
MAZRI, Ioulia	2/3/47, Agorioni	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/25
MAKRIS, Elias	2/3/47, Agorioni	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/25

/MBORIA

<u>me</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
<u>(Continued)</u>			
ORIA, G.	13/3/47, Trestenik	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/43/Rev.1
LISANIDES, E.	19/3/47, Xerovrissi	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/19
THODIOS, H.	10/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/17
RKOS, O.	10/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/FV/5
RKOVIC, Vojslav	17/2/47, Piraeus	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/2
ADENOVIC, Zivko	5/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/8
QIMEJA, Moamet	20/2/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
RPHIDES, Athansios	3/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/4
RSALOS, Thrasylvoulos	23/3/47, Train	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/FV/1
UTAFITCHIEFF, Nic.	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/8
ISTAROV, Nedjim M.	28/3/47, Sofia	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/66
DELKOV	18/2/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/5
COLIADIS, Ioannis	4/3/47, Polighoros	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/7
KITAS, Capt. G.	15/3/47, Mouries	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/57-B
VITSA, Ali	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/8
STRET, Ali	18/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/15
GANIS, Ioannis	19/3/47, Xerovrissi	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/19
HAGOUTIDIS, E.	19/3/47, Xerovrissi	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/19
HELLADIS, C.	6/3/47, Katerini	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/12
PACHRISTODOLOU, C.	22/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/FV/3
PAILLAS, Pantelis	11/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/2
PAYANIS, Dim.	3/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/6
PODOPOLOU, P.	2/3/47, Agcriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/25

/PARTOULAS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
<u>P (Continued)</u>			
PARTOULAS, A.	4/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/42
PATATOUEAS, Georgios	4/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/44
PATIS, John A.	20/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/FV/4
PERISTERE, Pilo	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
PETROVIC, Nicolas	17/2/47, Piraeus	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/2
PETSAS, Ioanis	5/3/47, Salonica	Sub-com.	S/AC.4/W/3
POPOFF, Manyo	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/8
POPNIKOLSKI (alias Papanikolaou Popnikolov Aleko)	3/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/FV/8
POPNIKOLOWSKI (alias Papanikolaou Miltiades)	3/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/FV/8
PREVIZI, Gen.	18/2/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/4
PRONJO, Fatima	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/16

Q

QERIN, Hajdin	14/3/47, Korche	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9
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R

RADEFF, Christo	25/3/47, Liubemetz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/FV/4
RAMADAN, Redjeb	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/7
RAMADAN, Irfan	14/3/47, Korche	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9
RAMADAN, Mcstan	20/3/47, Yarnina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/FV/21
RUCHITI, Haki	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/8
RUSTEM, Nexhip	14/3/47, Korche	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9

S

SAKAS, Ioannis	17/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/13
SAMOLADAS, I.	5/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/11

/SAVALAKIS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
<u>(Continued)</u>			
AVALAKIS, E.	11/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/51
AVVINIDIS, E.	18/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/1
GEBAKOV, Boris P.	26/3/47, Sofia	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/62-II
SEANKOV, Athanase	18/3/47, Gevgeli	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/57-I
SHERIF, Tefik	14/3/47, Korce	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9
SIDIROPOULOU, E. A.	1/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/2
SIDIROPOULOS, George	3/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/4
SIGANOS, N.	5/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/11
SIRINIOTIS, C.	1/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/1-2
SKEMBIS, George	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25
SLAVI, Maria	1/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/2
SOURVINOS, Phillipos	17/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/13
STAMENIS, Dimitrios	11/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/4
STANOPOULOS, Lt. Col. Athanateos	17/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/13
STAVRIDOU, A.	18/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/2
STEFANOS, Thomas	18/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/18
STOIKOF, F. Stoiko	18/2/47, Athens	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/5
STOKAS, John	3/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/4

T

TASIC, Kosta	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/8
TASKOV, Mihailo	2/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/PV/4
TERSOPOULIS	22/2/47, Ikaria	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/Y
TERZIS, Mihail	2/4/47, Bulkes	Team F	S/AC.4/SC.9/PV/1/Corr.1
TERZOGLU	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25
THEODOROU, Vassillios	18/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/4
THEODOROPULOS, C.	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25

/TOCPOULOS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
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TOCOPOULOS, Zissi	1/4/47, Skoplje	Team E	S/AC.4/SC.8/FV/2
TOLFOLOPOLIS, Dim.	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/25
TOLIOS, Kleon	6/3/47, Salonica 7/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/47-I
TOMEFF, Tontcho T.	25/3/47, Liubemetz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/FV/4
TRAIKOVIC, Simo	12/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/55-II
TRENCHIFF, Kosto N.	2/4/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/71
TSAKIROPOULOS, C.	18/3/47, Idhomeni	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/57-H
TSAMIS, Nikolaos	20/3/47, Yannina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/20
TSADARMAS, Ioannis	19/3/47, Xerovrissi	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/19
TSACOUSSIS, Lazaros	7/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/48
TSAPI, Mrs. S. P.	18/3/47, Gevgeli	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/57-I
TSCHOIBASICH, Peter	21/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/12
TSEMBIS, Athanasios	18/3/47, Axioupolis	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/57-G
TSETEROKLIS, Trayanos	5/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/45-I & II
TSIGAS, Ioannis	3/3/47, Salonica	Team B	S/AC.4/SC.3/4
TSIPAS, Nik.	16/3/47, Yannina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/11
TSOKLAROPOULOS, I.	11/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/4
TSOUFIS, W/O.	20/2/47, Syros	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/7
TSOVYOPOULOS, Geo.	18/3/47, Filiates	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/15
TZOULOPOULOS, N.	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/25

U

URUCHEV, Hasan I.	28/3/47, Sofia	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/66
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V

VALCHEFF, Ilcho T.	25/3/47, Liubemetz	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/FV/4
VALTADOROS, E.	26/2/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/FV/35

/VAMBAKIDIS

<u>NO</u>	<u>Date and Place of Hearing</u>	<u>Heard by</u>	<u>Reference</u>
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MEAKIDIS, Persene	12/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
SSILIOU, Filipos	18/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/2
LIANIDIS, Christos (Paschalidis)	1/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/40
SEL, Achmed	19/3/47, Konispol	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
ETANIOTOV, Agni	12/3/47, Florina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17
ETANIOTIS, A.	22/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/3 S/AC.4/SC.2/X
ISSARIOU, Elias	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25
ACHOS, Thomas	16/3/47, Yannina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV/12
AFIRIS, Georgios	1/3/47, Salonica	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/39
ALATINOUDIS, C.	24/3/47, Alexandrou- polis	Team D	S/AC.4/SC.4/PV/3
EGA, Prose	2/4/47, Belgrade	Comm.	S/AC.4/PV/71
ERVAS, Iordanis	5/3/47, Salonica	Sub-comm.	S/AC.4/W/3
ERVOS, Christoforos	16/3/47, Yannina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV/12
OGAS, Nestor	2/3/47, Agoriani	Team 1	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25
OGRAFOS, A.	20/3/47, Salonica	Team C	S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/6
OIS, Christos	20/3/47, Yannina	Team 1A	S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV/21

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SALONICA

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/ALBANIAN

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/BULGARIAN

BULGARIAN DOCUMENTS

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	S/AC.4/67 Rev.3	E		
29/2/47	S/AC.4/71	E and F	Letter	
28/2/47	S/AC.4/76	E and F	Letter	26/2/47
28/2/47	S/AC.4/77	E and F	Letter and Memo.	26/2/47
28/2/47	S/AC.4/78	E and F	Letter	27/2/47
1/3/47	S/AC.4/85	E and F	Letter	28/2/47
5/3/47	S/AC.4/93	E and F	Letter	3/3/47
7/3/47	S/AC.4/102	E and F	Letter	6/3/47
7/3/47	S/AC.4/103	E and F	Letter	6/3/47
7/3/47	S/AC.4/104	E and F	Letter	5/3/47
7/3/47	S/AC.4/105	E and F	Letter	5/3/47
7/3/47	S/AC.4/108	E and F	Letter	6/3/47
8/3/47	S/AC.4/109	E and F	Letter	6/3/47
8/3/47	S/AC.4/110	E and F	Letter	6/3/47
8/3/47	S/AC.4/111	E and F	Letter	7/3/47
10/3/47	S/AC.4/116	E and F	Letter	7/3/47
11/3/47	S/AC.4/118	E and F	Letter	9/3/47
11/3/47	S/AC.4/119	E and F	Letter	7/3/47
11/3/47	S/AC.4/120	E and F	Letter	10/3/47
11/3/47	S/AC.4/122	E and F	Letter	10/3/47
12/3/47	S/AC.4/125	E and F	Letter	11/3/47
12/3/47	S/AC.4/128	E and F	Letter	11/3/47
12/3/47	S/AC.4/130	E and F	Letter	12/3/47
13/3/47	S/AC.4/132	E and F	Letter	12/3/47
13/3/47	S/AC.4/133	E and F	Letter	12/3/47
14/3/47	S/AC.4/134	E and F	Letter	13/3/47
14/3/47	S/AC.4/135	E and F	Letter	13/3/47
14/3/47	S/AC.4/136	E and F	Letter	14/3/47
14/3/47	S/AC.4/137	E and F	Letter	14/3/47
14/3/47	S/AC.4/138	E and F	Letter	14/3/47
14/3/47	S/AC.4/139	E and F	Letter	13/3/47
14/3/47	S/AC.4/140	E and F	Letter	14/3/47
14/3/47	S/AC.4/141	E and F	Letter	13/3/47
15/3/47	S/AC.4/142	E and F	Letter	15/3/47

/15/3/47

GREEK DOCUMENTS (continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Document</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date of Letters</u>
15/3/47	S/AC.4/143	E and F	Letter	15/3/47
19/3/47	S/AC.4/150	E and F	Letter	17/3/47
21/3/47	S/AC.4/158	E and F	Letter	20/3/47
21/3/47	S/AC.4/159	E and F	Letter	21/3/47
21/3/47	S/AC.4/160	E and F	Letter	21/3/47
22/3/47	S/AC.4/161	E and F	Letter	21/3/47
26/3/47	S/AC.4/168	E and F	Letter	22/3/47
26/3/47	S/AC.4/169	E and F	Letter	25/3/47
26/3/47	S/AC.4/170	E and F	Letter	25/3/47
27/3/47	S/AC.4/174	E and F	Letter	27/3/47
28/3/47	S/AC.4/181	E and F	Letter	28/3/47
30/3/47	S/AC.4/185	E and F	Letter	30/3/47
30/3/47	S/AC.4/186	E and F	Letter	30/3/47
31/3/47	S/AC.4/188	E and F	Letter	30/3/47
1/4/47	S/AC.4/195	E and F	Letter	31/3/47
1/4/47	S/AC.4/196	E and F	Letter	31/3/47
9/4/47	S/AC.4/203	E and F	Letter	7/4/47
9/4/47	S/AC.4/204	E and F	Letter	8/4/47
9/4/47	S/AC.4/205	E and F	Letter	9/4/47
10/4/47	S/AC.4/206	E and F	Letter	9/4/47
19/4/47	S/AC.4/221	E and F	Letter	15/4/47
21/4/47	S/AC.4/225	E	Letter	20/4/47
21/4/47	S/AC.4/226	F	Letter	19/4/47
21/4/47	S/AC.4/227	F	Letter	19/4/47
21/4/47	S/AC.4/228	F	Letter	19/4/47
25/4/47	S/AC.4/233	E and F	Letter	23/4/47
28/4/47	S/AC.4/235	E	Letter	26/4/47
28/4/47	S/AC.4/236	E	Letter	26/4/47
28/4/47	S/AC.4/237	E	Letter	26/4/47
28/4/47	S/AC.4/238	E	Letter	26/4/47
1/5/47	S/AC.4/246	E and F	Letter	30/4/47
1/5/47	S/AC.4/247	E	Letter	30/4/47
1/5/47	S/AC.4/248	E	Letter	30/4/47
2/5/47	S/AC.4/250	E	Letter	28/4/47
2/5/47	S/AC.4/251	E and F	Letter	1/5/47
8/5/47	S/AC.4/258	E	Letter	7/5/47

YUGOSLAV DOCUMENTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Document</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date of Letters</u>
30/1/47	S/AC.4/6	E and F	Note from the Legation of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Greece.	30/1/47
31/3/47	S/AC.4/9	F	Communication	31/3/47
31/3/47	S/AC.4/9	E	Communication	31/3/47
15/2/47	S/AC.4/45	E and F	Annexes	
	S/AC.4/45 Annex 5	E		
	S/AC.4/45 Annex 9			
15/2/47	S/AC.4/46	E	Annexes	
15/2/47	S/AC.4/47	E and F	Annexes	
15/2/47	S/AC.4/48	E	Annexes	
25/2/47	S/AC.4/65	E and F	Letter	
26/2/47	S/AC.4/70	E and F	Memoranda	26/2/47
27/2/47	S/AC.4/73	E and F	Letter	27/2/47
28/2/47	S/AC.4/79	E and F	Letter	26/2/47
3/3/47	S/AC.4/89	E and F	Letter and Annex I	27/2/47
5/3/47	S/AC.4/94	E	Letter	5/3/47
6/3/47	S/AC.4/100	E and F	Declaration	6/3/47
7/3/47	S/AC.4/107	E and F	Letter	7/3/47
10/3/47	S/AC.4/115	E and F	Letter	10/3/47
30/3/47	S/AC.4/183	E and F	Letter	
1/4/47	S/AC.4/198	E and F	Letter	1/4/47
2/4/47	S/AC.4/200	E and F	Letter	2/4/47
12/4/47	S/AC.4/210	E and F	Letter	
17/4/47	S/AC.4/216	F	Letter	16/4/47
17/4/47	S/AC.4/218	E and F	Letter	16/4/47
18/4/47	S/AC.4/220	F and E	Letter	17/4/47
21/4/47	S/AC.4/229	F	Letter	18/4/47
3/5/47	S/AC.4/253	E and F	Letter	2/5/47
12/5/47	S/AC.4/260	E	Letter	
12/5/47	S/AC.4/261	F	Letter	

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Document</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date of Letters</u>
29/1/47	S/AC.4/1 Corr.2	E	Corrigenda to Document S/AC.4/1	
30/1/47	S/AC.4/5	E	Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier incidents	
30/1/47	S/AC.4/5	F	Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek frontier incidents	
17/2/47	S/AC.4/52	F	EAM Annexes	
17/2/47	S/AC.4/55	F	Statement of EAM	
17/2/47	S/AC.4/56		Memorandum of EAM	
17/2/47	S/AC.4/60	E	Statement of Greek Conference of Labour.	
25/2/47	S/AC.4/62	F	Memo. submitted by Greek Conference of Labour	
2/3/47	S/AC.4/86	E	Pan-Hellenic Youth Organization	
11/3/47	S/AC.4/123	E and F	Letter from U.K. delegate	10/3/47
	S/AC.4/123 Corr.1	E		
17/3/47	S/AC.4/146	E and F	Letter from U.S.A. delegation	16/3/47
27/3/47	S/AC.4/177	E, F and R	Letter from USSR delegate	29/3/47
	S/AC.4/177 Annex 1(a)	E		
	S/AC.4/177 Annex 1(b)	E		
	S/AC.4/177 Annex 3	E		
	S/AC.4/177 Annex 6	E		
28/3/47	S/AC.4/180	E and F	Cable from Sobolev	1/4/47
31/3/47	S/AC.4/192	E and F	Letter from U.S. delegate	31/3/47
1/4/47	S/AC.4/197	E and F	Letter from U.S. delegate	1/4/47
17/4/47	S/AC.4/214	E and F	Report by Team D to the Commission	
	S/AC.4/214 Corr.1	E		
	S/AC.4/214 Annex 5	E and F		
	S/AC.4/214 Annex 7	E		
	S/AC.4/214 Annex 8	E		
17/4/47	S/AC.4/219	E and F	Report of Chairman of Team B	
	S/AC.4/219 Rev.1	F		
21/4/47	S/AC.4/223	E and F	Resolution of 18 April, 1947.	

/21/4/47

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Document</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date of Letters</u>
21/4/47	S/AC.4/224	F	Index of Documents arranged according to plan for Draft of 2nd part of Report	
24/4/47	S/AC.4/231	E and F	Report by Team 1	
	S/AC.4/231 Add.1	E		
	S/AC.4/231 Annex 8			
	Add.1	E		
	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/15			
	Add.1	E		
	S/AC.4/231 Annex 10			
	Add. 1	E		
	S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/20			
	Add.1	E		
25/4/47	S/AC.4/234	E and F	Report by Team 1A	
	S/AC.4/234 Annex 19	F		
	S/AC.4/234 Annex 32	E		
29/4/47	S/AC.4/241	E	Commission work on Yugoslav-Greek frontier	
29/4/47	S/AC.4/242	E	Letter from Mr. Hood (Australia)	28/4/47
29/4/47	S/AC.4/243	E	Memos. submitted on Yugoslav-Greek frontier	
3/5/47	S/AC.4/255	E	Directive to Subsidiary Group	
12/5/47	S/AC.4/262	F	Letter from Team B	10/5/47

SUMMARY RECORDS AND VERBATIM REPORTS

Date	Meeting No.	Kind	Hour	Symbol No.	Language
30 Jan.	1	Private	3:00	S/AC.4/SR/1	E.F.
31	2	"	11:00	SR/2	E.F.
31	3	"	4:00	SR/3	E.F.
1 Feb.	3	"		SR/3	E.
1	4	"	11:00	SR/4	E.F.
3	5	"	10:00	SR/5	E.F.
3	6	Public	11:30	PV/6	E.F.
3	7	Private	1:00	SR/7	E.F.
4	8	"	11:00	SR/8	E.F.
5	9	"	11:00	SR/9	E.F.
6	10	Public	10:30	PV/10	E.F.
6	11	Private	4:00	SR/11	E.F.
7	12	Public	10:30	PV/12	E.F.
7	13	"	3:30	PV/13	E.F.
13	13	"		PV/13	E.F.
7	14	Private	6:00	SR/14	E.F.
8	15	Public	10:30	PV/15	E.F.
10	16	"	10:30	PV/16	E.F.
10	17	Private	3:30	SR/17	E.F.
11	18	Public	10:30	PV/18	E.F.
11	19	Private	3:30	SR/19	E.F.
12	20	Public	10:30	PV/20	E.F.
13	21	"	10:30	PV/21	E.F.
13	22	"	4:00	PV/22	E.F.
14	23	"	10:30	PV/23	E.F.
14	24	"	3:30	PV/24	E.F.
15	25	Private	10:30	SR/25	E.F.
16	26	"	10:30	SR/26	E.F.
17	27	Public	10:30	PV/27	E.F.
18	27	"		PV/27	E.F.
17	27	"		Annex I	E.F.
17	28	"	3:30	PV/28	E.
17	28	"		Annex I	E.
17	28	"	1:50	PV/28	F.
17	29	Private	6:30	SR/29	E.F.
18	30	Public	10:30	PV/30	E.F.
18	31	"	3:30	PV/31	E.F.
18	31	"		PV/31	F.
18	31	"		Annex 1-E	E.
18	32	Private	4:45	SR/32	E.F.
25	33	"	10:30	SR/33	E.F.
25	33A	"	10:30	SR/33A	E.F.
26	34	Public	4:00	PV/34	E.F.
27	35	"	10:30	PV/35	E.F.
27	36	"	4:00	PV/36	E.F.
28	37	Private	10:30	SR/37	E.F.
28	38	Public	3:30	PV/38	E.F.
1 March	39	"	10:00	PV/39	E.F.
1	40	"	3:30	PV/40	E.F.
3	41	"	10:00	PV/41	E.F.
3	42	"	3:30	PV/42	E.F.
4	43	Private	10:30	SR/43	E.F.
4	44	Public	11:00	PV/44	E.F.

/5 March

Date	Meeting No.	Find	Hour	Symbol No.	Language
5 March	45	Public	10:30 Part I	S/AC.4/PV/45	E.F.
5	45	"	5:00 " II	SR/45	E.F.
5	46	Private	3:30	SR/46	E.F.
6	46	"	Corr.1	SR/46	E.F.
6	47-1	Public	10:30	PV/47-1	E.F.
11	47-1	"	Annex 1	PV/47-1	E.
6	47-2	"	4:00	PV/47-2	E.
7	48	"	10:00	PV/48-1	E.
7	48	"	6:00	PV/48-2	E.F.
10	48	"	Corr.1	PV/48	E.
7	49	Private	3:50	SR/49	E.F.
10	50	Public	10:30	PV/50	E.F.
11	50	"	10:50 Annex I-E	PV/50	E.F.
11	51	Public	10:00	PV/51	E.F.
11	52-2	"	3:30	PV/52-2	E.F.
11	52-2	"	Corr.1	PV/52-2	E.
11	53	Private	3:00	SR/53	E.F.
12	54	Public	10:00	PV/54	E.F.
12	54	"	Corr.1	PV/54	E.F.
12	55	Private	3:00	SR/55	E.F.
12	55-2	Public		PV/55-2	E.
12	56	"	8:20	PV/56	E.F.
20	56A	Private	7:00	SR/56A	E.F.
12	56	Public	4:00	PV/56	E.
13	57	"	10:00	PV/57	E.
15	57A	"	10:30	PV/57A	E.
15	57B	"	3:00	PV/57B	E.
15	57C	"	10:30	PV/57C	E.F.
15	57D	"	7:00	PV/57D	E.F.
18	57E	"	12:30	PV/57E	E.
18	57F	"	2:30	PV/57F	E.
18	57G	"	6:30	PV/57G	E.F.
19	57H	"	10:00	PV/57H	E.
19	57I	"	10:00 Corr.1	PV/57I	E.
19	57I	"	2:30	PV/57I	E.F.
21	58	Private	10:30	SR/58	E.F.
21	59	Public	4:00	PV/59	E.F.
23	60	Private	6:10	SR/60	E.
23	60	"	6:10 Corr.1	SR/60	E.
26	61	"	10:00	SR/61	E.F.
26	62-II	Public	3:30	PV/62-II	E.F.
26	62-II	"	3:30 Corr.1	PV/62-II	E.F.
27	63	"	10:30	PV/63	E.
27	64	"	3:00	PV/64	E.F.
28	65	"	10:00	PV/65	E.
28	65	"	10:00 Corr.1	PV/65	E.
28	66	"	3:30	PV/66	E.
29	66	"	3:30 Corr.1	PV/66	E.
30	67	Private	6:00	SR/67	E.F.
30	67	Public	10:30	PV/67	E.
31	68	"	3:30	PV/68	E.
31	68	"	3:30 Corr.1	PV/68	E.
1 April	69	"	10:00 Corr.1	PV/69	E.
1	70	"	3:30	PV/70	E.
2	71	"	3:30	PV/71	E.

Date	Meeting No.	Kind	Hour	Symbol No.	Languages
2 April	71 A	Public	10:00	S/AC.4/PV/71A	E.
7	72	Private	11:15	SR/72	E.F.
9	73	"	10:30	SR/73	E.
12	74	"	10:30	SR/74	E.
14	75	"	10:30	SR/75	E.
14	75	"	10:30 Corr.1	SR/75	E.
14	75-2	"	10:30 Corr.2	SR/75	E.
18	76	"	10:30	SR/76	E.
18	76A	"	5:30	SR/76A	E.
21	77	"	10:30	SR/77	E.
25	78	"	10:30	SR/78	E.
29	79	"	10:00	SR/79	E.
29	80	"	3:30	SR/80	E.
30	81	"	10:30	SR/81	E.
30	82	"	3:30	SR/82	E.
2 May	83	Public	3:30	PV/83	F.
3	84	"	11:00 Annex 1	PV/84	E.
5	84-I	"	10:30	PV/84-I	E.F.
5	84-II	"	4:00	PV/84-II	E.F.

DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY TEAM I

(S/AC.4/SC.2/-)

- 1 - Decisions of the First meeting held in Athens on 16 February 1947.
- 2 - Recommendations concerning procedure for inquiries at Piraeus on Monday, 17 February 1947.
- 3 - Agenda of third meeting held at Athens, on 17 February 1947.
- 4 - Decisions of third meeting held at Athens on 17 February 1947.
- 5 - Agenda of sixth meeting held at Syros, on 19 February 1947.
- 6 - Agenda of ninth meeting held at Syros on 20 February 1947.
- 7 - Agenda of tenth meeting held at Syros on 21 February 1947.
- 8 - Agenda of thirteenth meeting held at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 21 February 1947.
- 9 - Agenda of twenty-first meeting held in Athens on 25 February 1947.
- 10 - Agenda of twenty-second meeting held at Athens on 26 February 1947.
- 11 - Telegram from Chairman of Team I to Chairman of Commission, dated 25 February 1947.
- 12 - Telegram from Principal Secretary to Chairman of Team I, dated 25 February 1947.
- 13 - Decisions of sixth meeting held at Syros on 19 February 1947.
- 14 - Decisions of ninth meeting held at Syros on 20 February 1947.
- 15 - Decisions of tenth meeting held at Syros on 21 February 1947.
- 16 - Decisions of thirteenth meeting held at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 22 February 1947.
- 17 - Decisions of fourteenth meeting held at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 22 February 1947.
- 18 - Decisions of sixteenth meeting held at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 22 February 1947.
- 19 - Decisions of seventeenth meeting held at Kirikos, Ikaria, on 23 February 1947.
- 20 - Agenda of twenty-third meeting held in Athens on 27 February 1947.
- 21 - Decisions of nineteenth meeting held at Evdilos, Ikaria, on 23 February 1947.
- 22 - Decisions of twenty-first meeting held at Athens on 25 February 1947.
- 23 - Decisions of twenty-second meeting held at Athens on 26 February 1947.
- 24 - Numbering of meetings of Team I up to and including twenty-third meeting held on 27 February 1947.
- 25 - Decisions of twenty-third meeting held at Athens on 27 February 1947.
- 26 - Documents of Investigation Team I.
- 27 - Agenda of twenty-fourth meeting held at Agoriani on 2 March 1947.
- 28 - Agenda of twenty-fifth meeting held at Salonika on 5 March 1947.
- 29 - Decisions of twenty-fourth meeting held at Agoriani on 2 March 1947.
- 30 - Index of memoranda submitted to Team I on visits to Islands of Syros and Ikaria and village of Agoriani.
- 31 - Decisions of twenty-sixth meeting held at Salonika on 5 March 1947.
- 32 - Letter submitted to Team I by Greek Liaison Representative attached to the Team, at Salonika on 5 March 1947.
- 33 - Persons comprising Team I.
- 34 - Letter from Mr. W. Shearer, Chairman of Team I, to members of Team.
- 35 - Letter submitted by Greek Liaison Representative to Commission, dated 7 March 1947.
- 36 - Chairman's draft of report by Team I to the Commission.
- 36/corr.1 - Corrigendum to the Chairman's draft of report.
- 37 - Agenda of twenty-seventh meeting held in Geneva on 23 April 1947.
- 38 - Decisions of twenty-seventh meeting held in Geneva on 23 April 1947.

/(S/AC.4/SC.2/P/-)

(S/AC.4/SC.2/EV/-)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>
2	Piraeus, Greece	17/2/47	11:30 a.m.
4	Athens, Greece	18/2/47	11:00 a.m.
5	Athens, Greece	18/2/47	3:00 p.m.
7	Syros, Greece	20/2/47	10:20 a.m.
8	Syros, Greece	20/2/47	3:00 p.m.
11	Syros, Greece	21/2/47	12:30 p.m.
12	Syros, Greece	21/2/47	3:30 p.m.
15	Evdilos, Ikaria, Greece	22/2/47	7:00 p.m.
15/Add.1	" " "	" "	" "
18	Kirikos, Ikaria, Greece	23/2/47	12:30 p.m.
20	Evdilos, Ikaria, Greece	23/2/47	8:30 p.m.
20/Add.1	" " "	" "	" "
25	Agorianni, Greece	2/3/47	4:40 p.m.

DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY TEAM IA

(S/AC.4/SC.2A/-)

- 1 - Persons comprising Team IA.
- 1/Rev.1 - Persons comprising Team IA.
- 2 - Agenda of first meeting held in Salonica on 8 March 1947.
- 3 - Programme for Team visiting Florina, Albanian Frontier and Yennina, 9-20 March 1947.
- 4 - Agenda of second meeting held in Florina on 10 March 1947.
- 5 - Letter from Greek Liaison Representative to Chairman of Team IA dated 9 March 1947.
- 6 - Witnesses proposed by Greek Liaison Representative at third meeting, 11 March 1947.
- 7 - Decisions of first meeting held in Salonica on 8 March 1947.
- 8 - Decisions of second meeting held in Florina on 10 March 1947.
- 9 - Certificate of demobilization issued by the Yugoslav Government submitted by Greek Liaison Representative.
- 10 - Preliminary list of witnesses submitted by the Yugoslav Liaison Representative at fourth meeting on 11 March 1947.
- 11 - Agenda of sixth meeting held in Florina, on 12 March 1947.
- 12 - Decisions of sixth meeting held at Florina on 12 March 1947.
- 13 - List of refugees detained at Florina Refugee Centre.
- 14 - List of Albanian witnesses for Trestenik incidents.
- 14/Rev.1 - List of witnesses presented by Albanian Liaison Representative on Trestenik incident.
- 15 - Agenda of eighth meeting held at Korce, Albania, on 13 March 1947.
- 16 - Letter received by Chairman of Team IA from Greek Liaison Representative at Florina, dated 13 March 1947.
- 17 - Letter from Greek Liaison Representative to Chairman of Team IA, dated 13 March 1947.
- 18 - Letter received by Chairman of Team IA from Greek Liaison Representative at Florina, dated 13 March 1947.
- 19 - Letter from Greek Liaison Representative to Chairman of Team IA, dated 13 March 1947.
- 20 - List of incidents which occurred at Trestenik, submitted by Albanian Liaison Representative.
- 21 - Report submitted by Albanian Liaison Representative concerning the Rubik camp.

/22 - Letter

- 22 - Letter submitted to Chairman of Team IA by Albanian Liaison Representative, dated 14 March 1947.
- 23 - Letter from Greek Liaison Representative to Chairman of Team IA, dated 14 March 1947.
- 24 - List of witnesses submitted by Greek Liaison Representative.
- 25 - Documents submitted by Greek Liaison Representative to Team IA, at eleventh meeting held in Yannina on 16 March 1947.
- 26 - Document submitted by Albanian Liaison Representative to Team IA at eleventh meeting held in Yannina on 16 March 1947.
- 27 - Telegram received by Chairman of Team IA from Commission in Salonica, on 16 March 1947.
- 28 - List of witnesses presented by Greek Liaison Representative at Filiates on 17 March 1947.
- 29 - Summary of Likojan incidents presented to Team IA by Albanian Liaison Representative on 18 March 1947.
- 29/Add.1 - Annexes to document S/AC.4/SC.2A/29.
- 30 - Telegram received in Yannina from Commission in Salonica, on 17 March 1947.
- 31 - Decisions of eighth meeting held at Korce on 13 March 1947.
- 32 - Decisions of tenth meeting held in Yannina on 15 March 1947.
- 33 - Decisions of thirteenth meeting held in Yannina on 16 March 1947.
- 34 - Telegram received from Commission in Salonica to Chairman of Team IA at Konispol, on 19 March 1947.
- 35 - Witnesses to be heard at Konispol by Team IA at request of Commission at Salonica, on 19 March 1947.
- 36 - Proposal by Chairman concerning report by Team IA to Commission.
- 37 - Index of memoranda submitted to Team IA.
- 38 - Meetings of Team IA.
- 39 - Decisions of nineteenth meeting held in Yannina on 20 March 1947, at 5:30 p.m. and resumed on 21 March 1947 at 12:15 a.m.
- 40 - Telegram sent to Commission at Salonica by Chairman of Team IA regarding testimony of witness Thomas Zachos.
- 41 - Introduction to report by Team IA to the Commission.
- 42 - Decisions of twenty-second meeting held in Geneva on 21 April 1947.
- 42 - Visit to Aghia Paraskevi by Team IA on 12 March 1947.
- 43 - Visit to Trestenik on 13 March 1947.
- 43/Rev.1 - Visit to Trestenik on 13 March 1947.

(S/AC.4/SC.2A/-)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>
SR/2	Florina, Greece	11/3/47	10:30 a.m.
SR/4	Florina, Greece	11/3/47	2:30 p.m.
FV/4/Add.1	" "	"	"
SR/5	Florina, Greece	11/3/47	9:30 p.m.
SR/5/Add.1	" "	"	"
SR/7	Florina, Greece	12/3/47	3:00 p.m.
SR/9	Korce, Albania	14/3/47	9:00 a.m.
SR/11	Yannina, Greece	16/3/47	9:30 a.m.
SR/11/Add.1	" "	"	"
SR/12	Yannina, Greece	16/3/47	3:00 p.m.
FV/12	Yannina, Greece (See also W/5)	16/3/47	3:00 p.m.
SR/13	Filiates, Greece	17/3/47	5:00 p.m.
SR/14	Filiates, Greece	18/3/47	9:15 a.m.
SR/15	Filiates, Greece	18/3/47	3:30 p.m.
SR/16	Konispol, Albania	19/3/47	10:30 a.m.
SR/17	Konispol, Albania	19/3/47	3:30 p.m.
SR/18	Yannina, Greece	20/3/47	4:00 p.m.
SR/20	Yannina, Greece	20/3/47	6:30 p.m.
FV/21	Yannina, Greece	20/3/47	11:30 p.m.

DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY TEAM B

(S/AC.4/SC.3/-)

- 1 - Summary record of first meeting held on 1 March 1947.
- 2 - Summary record of second meeting held on 1 March 1947.
- 3 - Summary record of third meeting held on 2 March 1947.
- 4 - Summary record of fourth meeting held on 3 March 1947.
- 5 - Summary record of fifth meeting held on 3 March 1947.
- 6 - Summary record of sixth meeting held on 3 March 1947.
- 7 - Summary record of seventh meeting held on 4 March 1947.
- 8 - Summary record of eighth meeting held on 5 March 1947.
- 9 - Summary record of ninth meeting held on 5 March 1947.
- 10 - Summary record of tenth meeting held on 5 March 1947.
- 11 - Summary record of eleventh meeting held on 5 March 1947.
- 12 - Summary record of twelfth meeting held on 6 March 1947.
- 13 - Summary record of thirteenth meeting held on 6 March 1947.
- 14 - Summary record of fourteenth meeting held on 7 March 1947.
- 15 - Summary record of fifteenth meeting held on 9 March 1947.
- 16 - Summary record of sixteenth meeting held on 10 March 1947.
- 17 - Summary record of seventeenth meeting held on 10 March 1947.
- 18 - Summary record of eighteenth meeting held on 11 March 1947.
- 19 - Summary record of nineteenth meeting held on 19 March 1947.
- 20 - Summary record of twentieth meeting held on 19 March 1947.
- 21 - Introduction to report of Team B.
- 22 - Index of memoranda submitted to Team B.
- 23 - List of delegates and secretariat of Team B.
- 25 - Corrigendum to documents of Team B.
- 26 - Summary record of twenty-first meeting held on 21 May 1947.

DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY TEAM C

(S/AC.4/SC.7/-)

- INF.1 - Composition of Team C.
INF.2 - Corrigendum of Team C documents.

- 1 - Agenda of first meeting.
- 2 - Agenda of second meeting.
- 3 - Agenda of third meeting.
- 4 - Introduction to draft report.

- FV/1(1) Verbatim record of first meeting held in Salonica on 18 March 1947 at 10:30 a.m.
FV/1(2) Verbatim record of second meeting held in Salonica on 18 March 1947 at 3:30 p.m.
FV/2 - Verbatim record of fourth meeting held in Salonica on 19 March 1947 at 4:00 p.m.
SR/3 - Summary record of third meeting held in Salonica on 19 March 1947 at 10:30 a.m.
FV/4 - Verbatim record of fifth meeting held in Salonica on 20 March 1947 at 11:45 a.m.
FV/3 - Verbatim record of sixth meeting held in Salonica on 22 March 1947 at 10:00 a.m.
FV/5 - Verbatim record of first meeting of sub-team of Team C held in Salonica on 19 March 1947 at 4:00 p.m.
FV/6 - Verbatim record of second meeting of sub-team of Team C held in Salonica on 20 March 1947 at 10:00 a.m.
SR/7 - Summary record of seventh meeting held in Geneva, on 24 April 1947 at 6:00 p.m.

DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY TEAM D

(S/AC.4/SC.4/-)

- 1 - Provisional itinerary of Team D.
- 2 - Persons comprising Team D.
- 3 - Letter from Bulgarian Liaison Representative dated 22 March 1947.
- 4 - Circular from Bulgarian Liaison Representative.
- 5 - Letter from Greek Liaison Representative.
- 6 - Letter from Greek Liaison Representative dated 24 March 1947.
- 7 - Proposal by Chairman concerning report to Commission.
- 8 - Index of memoranda submitted to Team D.
- 9 - Introduction to Report.
- 9/Corr.1 - Corrigendum to introduction to report.
- 10 - Decisions of fifth meeting held on 16 April 1947 at 5:00 p.m., in Geneva.
- 11 - Letter from Greek Liaison Representative dated 19 April 1947.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>
FV/1	Train Salonica - Komotini	23/3/47	2:00 p.m.
FV/2	Alexandropolis, Greece	24/3/47	9:30 a.m.
FV/3	Alexandropolis, Greece	24/3/47	3:00 p.m.
FV/4	Lubimets, Bulgaria	25/3/47	3:00 p.m.

DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY TEAM E

(S/AC.4/SC.8/-)

INF/1 - Composition of Team E.

- 1 - Letter from Yugoslav Liaison Representative.
- 2 - Letter from Yugoslav Liaison Representative.
- 3 - Agenda of first meeting, 1/4/47.
- 4 - Agenda of second meeting, 1/4/47.
- 5 - Decisions of first meeting, 1/4/47.
- 6 - Agenda of third meeting, 2/4/47.
- 7 - Agenda of fourth meeting, 2/4/47.
- 8 - Agenda of fifth meeting, 2/4/47.
- 9 - Agenda of sixth meeting, 3/4/47.
- 10 - Decisions of fifth meeting, 2/4/47.
- 11 - Agenda of seventh meeting, 3/4/47.
- 12 - Decisions of seventh meeting, 3/4/47.
- 13 - Agenda of eighth meeting, 3/4/47.
- 14 - Index of documents.
- 15 - Programme of work.
- 15/Rev.1 - Revision of programme of work.

- FV/2 - Verbatim record of second meeting, 1/4/47.
- FV/3 - Verbatim record of third meeting, 2/4/47.
- FV/4 - Verbatim record of fourth meeting, 2/4/47.
- FV/6 - Verbatim record of sixth meeting, 3/4/47.
- FV/8 - Verbatim record of eighth meeting, 3/4/47.

DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY TEAM F

(S/AC.4/SC.9/-)

- 1 - Introduction to Report of Team F to Commission.
- 1/Rev.1 - Revision to introduction to report to Commission.
- 1/Annex 4 - Annex to introduction to report of Team F to Commission.
- FV/1 - Verbatim record of meeting held in Bulkes on 2/4/47, at noon.
- FV/1/Corr.1 - Corrigendum to verbatim record of meeting 2/4/47.

INFORMATION CIRCULARS

Date

18 Jan.	S/AC.4/INF/1/Rev.1	- E	Delegations to the Commission
14 Feb.	"	Rev.2 - E	" "
18 "	"	2 E	Passenger list to Salonica
3 March	"	4 E,F	Passports
5 "	"	5 E	Change in U.K. Delegation
11 "	"	6 E,F	Corrigenda to Summary Records
13 "	"	7 E	Re Annexes
15 "	"	8 E	Movement of Commission to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Geneva, Salonica
17 "	"	9 E	Expenses of Team
18 "	"	10 E	Hotel accommodation in Geneva
18 "	"	11 E	Movement of Commission from Salonica to Geneva
21 "	"	12 E,F	" "
27 "	"	13 E	Passports
31 "	"	15 E	Visas for Trieste
1 April	"	16 E	Personnel going to Bulkes
2 "	"	17 E	Personnel going from Belgrade to Geneva
7 "	"	18 E	Directory
10 "	"	19 E	Report on backlog of work
15 "	"	20 E	Transportation arrangements
18 "	"	20 E	Visas

NON-GOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS

2 Feb.	S/AC.4/NC/1	- E,F	Communications from private individuals and non-governmental bodies
3 "	"	2 - E,F	" "
5 "	"	3 - E,F	" "
6 "	"	4 - E,F	Corrigendum to "
7 "	"	5 - E,F	Communications from private individuals and non-governmental bodies
12 "	"	6 - E,F	" "
9 "	"	7 - E,F	" "
10 "	"	8 - E,F	" "
16 "	"	9 - E,F	" "
23 "	"	10 - E,F	" "
24 "	"	11 - E,F	" "
28 "	"	12 - E,F	" "
28 "	"	13 - E,F	" "
10 March	"	14 - E,F	" "
10 "	"	15 - E,F	" "
11 "	"	16 - E,F	" "
5 "	"	17 - E,F	" "
6 "	"	18 - E,F	" "
7 "	"	19 - E,F	" "
8 "	"	20 - E,F	Communications from private individuals and non-governmental bodies
11 "	"	21 - E,F	" "
12 "	"	22 - E,F	" "
13 "	"	23 - E	" "
14 "	"	24 - E	" "
15 "	"	25 - E	" "
19 "	"	26 - E	" "
16 "	"	27 - E	" "
13 May	"	28 - E	" "
13 "	"	29 - E	" "
10 "	"	30 - E	" "

PRESS RELEASES

<u>Date</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>
1947		
30 Jan.	S/AC.4/Press/1 - E	1st Meeting of the Commission of Investigation
31 "	" 2 - E	2nd "
31 "	" 3 - E	3rd "
1 Feb.	" 4 - E	4th "
3 "	" 5 - E	5th "
4 "	" 6 - E	6th "
5 "	" 7 - E	7th "
6 "	" 8 - E	8th "
7 "	" 9 - E	12th "
10 "	" 11 - E	15th "
11 "	" 12 - E	17th "
15 "	" 13 - E	23rd "
15 "	" 14 - E	23rd "
25 "	" 15 - E	31st "
28 "	" 16 - E	35th "
7 March	" 17 - E	Travel Program of Team I - Albanian Frontier Area
12 "	" 18 - E	Program of work of the Commission of Investigation
17 April	" 19 - E, F	Balkan Commission agrees on Framework of Report
19 "	" 20 - E	Balkan Commission Approves Part I of its Report
25 "	" 21 - E	Balkan Commission considers Security Council Resolution Appointment of Subsidiary Group
30 May	" 22 - E, F	Commission adopts directives for Subsidiary Group created pursuant to Security Council Resolution of 18 April 1947
1 "	" 23 - E, F	Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents

SECRETARIAT

29 Jan.	S/AC.4/SEC/1 - E	Document Service
8 Feb.	" 2 - E	Division of duties of Administrative Officer
12 "	" 3 - E	Secretarial duties

Working Papers (Restricted)

8 Feb. 1947	S/AC.4/W.1	Telegram from the Secretary-General of the U.N. to the Principal Secretary
5 March "	S/AC.4/W.2	Report on the Examination of the Witness in Kastoria 12 November 1946 and supplementary report
13 March "	S/AC.4/W.3/ and Add.1E	Report on Evidence by Zervas etc.
15 March "	S/AC.4/W.4	Additional Report on Evidence by Zervas etc.
	S/AC.4/W.5	Report for Mr. Hood, Chairman Team 1A

Drafts of Committees 1 and 2

	S/AC.4/W.6	Report (Pre Draft) of Report
21 Apr. 1947	S/AC.4/W.7	Draft of Second Part of Report
"	S/AC.4/W.8	Greek Charges
"	S/AC.4/W.9	Summary of Yugoslav Refutations
"	S/AC.4/W.10	Greek charges alleging northern neighbours etc.
"	S/AC.4/W.11	Accusations grecques (Chap. III)
"	S/AC.4/W.11A	Chapter 3
"	S/AC.4/W.12	Albanian, Bulgarian, Yugoslav Contention etc.
"	S/AC.4/W.13	Summary of Greek Evidence etc. (1C)
22 Apr. "	S/AC.4/W.14	Miscellaneous Greek Charges
23 Apr. "	S/AC.4/W.15	Greek Accusations about help given by northern neighbours to guerillas
"	S/AC.4/W.16	Affirmations by A, B and Y etc.
13 May 1947	S/AC.4/W.18	Albanian Comments on Draft Report
15 " "	S/AC.4/W.18/ Add.1	Albanian Comments on Draft Report
" "	S/AC.4/W.13/ Add.2	Albanian Comments on Draft Report
" "	S/AC.4/W.18/ Add.3	Albanian Comments on Draft Report
" "	S/AC.4/W.18/ Add.4	Albanian Comments on Draft Report
13 May "	S/AC.4/W.19	Bulgarian Comments on Draft Report
16 May "	S/AC.4/W.19 Add.1	Bulgarian Comments on Draft Report
" "	S/AC.4/W.20	Greek Comments on Draft Report
13 May "	S/AC.4/W.21	Yugoslav Comments on Draft Report
" "	S/AC.4/W.21 Add.1	Yugoslav Comments on Draft Report 13 May
15 May "	S/AC.4/W.21 Add.2	Yugoslav Comments on Draft Report 13 May
14 May "	S/AC.4/W.21 Add.3	Yugoslav Comments on Draft Report 13 May
14 May "	S/AC.4/W.21 Add.4	Yugoslav Comments on Draft Report 14 May
14 May "	S/AC.4/W.21 Add.5	Yugoslav Comments on Draft Report 9 May
15 May "	S/AC.4/W.21 Add.6	Yugoslav Comments on Draft Report 14 May
7 Mar. 1947	S/AC.4/SC.1/ 1	Sub-Committee of Experts Deposition of Zervas and Petsas on Voltodoros

ANNEX V

FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF
THE COMMISSION AND ITS TEAMS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place*</u>	<u>Object of Visit</u>	<u>Visit</u>	
			<u>Carried Out By</u>	<u>Requested by**</u>
7-18/2/47	Internment camp at the Piraeus (Madjikyrion) and Athens (G)	Interrogation of Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav refugees	Team 1	Y.
9-21/2/47	Internment camp of Ermaupolie (Island of Syros) (G)	Interrogation of Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav refugees	Team 1	Y.
12-23/2/47	Evdilos and Ayios Kilikos (Island of Ikaria) (G)	Interrogation of Greek political deportees	Team 1	Representative of USSR.
1/3/47	Prison of Pavlos Malas in Salonica (G)	Interrogation of Greek political prisoners, Slavo-Macedonian Problem	Team B	Y.
2/3/47	Agoriani (G)	1) Terrorist acts committed by rightist bands; 2) Interrogation of Andartes.	Team 1	Representative of USSR.
3/3/47	Salonica - Queen Olga Prison (G)	Interrogation of Greek political prisoners	Team B	B.
3/3/47	Salonica - New Prison (G)	Visit to internment camp for Greek political prisoners	Team B	B. Y.

* Country indicated by letter:

- (A).... Albania
- (B).... Bulgaria
- (G).... Greece
- (Y).... Yugoslavia

** Letters A, B, G, Y and C indicate visit requested by Liaison Representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia or by Commission.

1/4/3/47

FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
AND ITS TEAMS (Continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Object of Visit</u>	<u>Visit</u>	
			<u>Carried Out By</u>	<u>Requested by</u>
4/3/47	Polyghiros	(G) Visit to internment camp for Greek political prisoners. Slavo-Macedonian Problem	Team B	Y.
5/3/47	Prison of Gladstone Street, Salonica	(G) Interrogation of Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav "quislings"	Team B	A. B. Y.
5/3/47	Prison of Pavlos Melas in Salonica	(G) Interrogation of Greek political prisoners. Slavo-Macedonian Problem.	Team B.	Y.
6-7/3/47	Katerini	(G) Depositions on the "terroristic regime" in Greece.	Team B.	Y.
10-12/3/47	Florina	(G) Interrogation of witnesses on frontier incidents and Macedonian question.	Team 1A	G. Y.
12/3/47	Aghia Paraskevi	(G) Frontier incident of Paraskevi	Team 1A	G.
12/3/47	Florina	(G) Slavo-Macedonian question.	Team 1A	Y.
12-16/3/47	Kastanofiton	(G) Visit to Markos, Chief of Andartes.	Team B	*
13-14/3/47	Trestenik and Korce	(A) Frontier incident of Trestenik	Team 1A	A.
15/3/47	Mouries	(G) Sourmena incident	Commission	G.
15-16/3/47	Yannina	(G) Help given by Albania to bands operating in Greece.	Team 1A	G.

* At request of witness; Team unable to meet Markos.

/16/3/47

FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
AND ITS TEAMS (Continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Object of Visit</u>	<u>Visit</u>	
			<u>Carried Out By</u>	<u>Requested by</u>
16/3/47	Strumitsa	(Y) Sourmena incident	Commission	G.
	Petrich	(B) Provisioning by Bulgaria or bands operating in Greece.		
17-18/3/47	Filiates	(G) Frontier incidents of Sayada and Likojan; Cham question.	Team 1A	G. A.
18/3/47	Skra	(G) Skra incident	Commission	G.
	Axioupolis	(G)		
19/3/47	Konispol	(A) Cham question; Likojan frontier incident	Team 1A	A.
19/3/47	Xerovrissi and Kilkis	(G) Terroristic regime due to alleged rightist partisan bands.	Team B	Y.
19/3/47	Idhomeni	(G) Idhomeni incident;	Commission	G.
	Gevgeli	(Y) Interrogation of refugees on atrocities allegedly committed by Greek authorities against Slavo-Macedonians; Skra incident; Passage of frontier by Greek officers.		
20/3/47	Yannina	(G) Interrogation of a condemned person; Skipis-Radat frontier incident.	Team 1A	C. A. G.
23/3/47	Thrace	(G) Prosotsani incident*	Team D	G.
24/3/47	Alexandroupolis	(G) Korinvos-Kiriski incident	Team D	G.

* Interrogation on train between Drama and Komotini.

/25/3/47

FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
AND ITS TEAMS (Continued)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Object of Visit</u>	<u>Visit</u>	
			<u>Carried Out By</u>	<u>Requested by</u>
25/3/47	Lubimets	(B) Incidents at posts 10 and 11, near Gornoliorovski, Orieta and Korimvos.	Team D	G.
1-3/4/47	Skoplje	(Y) Refugees from "Aegean Macedonia"; Passage of frontier; Condemned persons (Skoplje); Greek refugee organization.	Team E	E. G. and
2/4/47	Bulkes	(Y) Visit to refugee camp; Interrogation of witnesses presented by Greek and Yugoslav representatives.	Team F.	G. and

ANNEX VI

COMMENTS AND ORAL STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
LIAISON REPRESENTATIVE OF ALBANIA ON
PARTS II AND III OF THE REPORT

A. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER I, SECTION A*

1. On page 1 it is said that Tsoklaropoulos (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR4) has identified some of the agents of K.K.E. as Greek nationals. The same is said about the witness Stamenis (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR4) but for him no quotations are given. This is what he said before Team I/A in reply to a question asking him to name a liaison agent:

"I did not know the man's name. He was a Greek from Macedonia and he was dressed in civilian clothing."

Thus neither of them give any name. We must also mention that Tsoklaropoulos and Stamenis are speaking of liaison agents who guided them from Albania into Greece in 1946, whereas the passage of the report where they are mentioned deals with K.K.E. liaison agents, who are said to have co-operated with the Albanian authorities when the Greek refugees crossed the Greco-Albanian frontier to go to the camp at Rubig after the agreement of Varkisa. It seems clear that it is not appropriate to mention the witnesses Tsoklaropoulos and Stamenis in this passage of the report.

2. On page 1 is the following statement:

"According to Kentros (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 11, page 5) the guerilla commander Leonidas Raptis was in Albania at the beginning of June 1946 when he was recruiting young men in Tirana and other places to form a band".

But before mentioning that, the source of this information should be given. In the preceding sentence Kentros says:

"Dringos told them that he came from Raptis who was in Albania.

Raptis had collected some young men from Tirana and other places to form

* Document S/AC.4/W.18/Add.1 (original French) - References made to draft (S/AC.4/W.18/Rev.2)

a band".

Therefore Kentros did not see Raptis recruiting but only heard of it at second hand.

3. On page 3 Zafiridis is quoted concerning the visit made by an Albanian official at Rubig etc. It would be more appropriate to quote what Gatsios said as well:

"The second visit was made by the Director of the Tirana Security Service. He visited the camp on the occasion of the anniversary of the liberation of Tirana. He made us a speech, etc." Further on he says that this Director was a man called Stefos (S/AC.4/PV 34, page 27).

4. On page 2, the part concerned with the number of Greek refugees in the camp of Rubig. According to Gatsios there were at Rubig about 200 refugees (Greek White Book), according to Kontopanos there were about 300 (Greek White Book), while before the Commission he said that there were 350. According to Zafiridis there were 350 (Greek White Book) but before the Commission it is said that, according to a calculation based on the numbers given by the witness, there were more than 600 refugees. (See S/AC.4/PV/38, page 39).

Also in this passage of the report appears the following statement:

"there were from 200 - 400 Greek refugees most of whom were transferred to Bulkes in October 1945".

But none of these three witnesses nor any other witness has declared that most of the refugees were transferred to Bulkes. In the White Book Gatsios says:

"a few days later about 14 or 15 lorries arrived from Tirana and took us directly to Skoplje".

In the Greek White Book on page 62 Kontopanos says:

"During the period of my detention the Elasitas, gathered together at Rubig, all left for Bulkes"

and, on page 114 of the Greek Book, Zafiridis says:

/"Towards

"Towards the end of October 1945 it was decided to transfer the camp of Rubig from Albania into Yugoslav territory. The Elasitas were transported by 15 Albanian cars....."

Before the Commission none of these witnesses said that most of the Greek refugees left for Yugoslavia.

Concerning the Albanian denial page 3.

5. In the text of the draft for the report we read:

"According to the Albanian representative, about 23,000 Greeks took refuge in Albania....." (S/AC.4/PV.16).

But we must emphasize that the above mentioned document does not say 23,000 Greeks but 23,000 Tchamouriets (Albanian minority in Greece).

Concerning the Greek (political) refugees in Albania who were gathered together at the Camp of Rubig see the document S/AC.4/PV.16 page 16 which reads:

"We have nothing to hide, the Albanian Government has given refuge to a limited number of Greek democrats who fled into Albanian territory to escape the persecution and the terror. The Albanian people could not take up any other attitude towards these men because that would have been contrary to the principles of its war of liberation, contrary to its statute (Chapter 3, article 36) and contrary to the principles of the Greek people's war against the occupier. At the end of 1945 all these refugees left for Yugoslavia. Is it this fact that the Greek Government is trying to class as interference in Greek internal affairs?"

6. On page 4 is the following statement:

"Gatsios, giving the source of his information about the manual of Rubig, said once:

"I know these details because I lived with another employee whose pseudonym was Spartacos. I do not know his real name. He used to go himself to Tirana to receive the paper and he took part in the publication; he told me so himself".

/Now,

Now, in the document S/AC.4/PV/34 Gatsios says:

"I lived with another political refugee whose pseudonym was Spartacos and whose true identity I do not know. It was Spartacos who bound the book and who took part in the printing. It is from him that I heard the information that I have just given".

Here we do not find that Gatsios is supposed to have said:

"He went himself to Tirana to receive the paper..."

7. On page 5 - Proofs presented by Greece - is the following statement.

Velianidis said:

"We were in the habit of going into Yugoslavia and then into Albania to the post of Vitsi, where there was a large provision store and we got our clothes there".

But in the document S/AC.4/PV 40 page 8 (French text) something different is said:

Velianidis: "At that time I was in the mountains. I used to go into Yugoslavia....."

The Interpreter: Here the witness corrects himself and says "into Albania"

Velianidis (contd): "There were some people coming from Vernik where there were stores of goods, clothing etc. and we left....."

Thus there are differences, also Vitsi is not in Albania but in Greece, while it is said above:

".....into Albania to the post of Vitsi where there was a large provision store....."

8. Concerning the Albanian denial the following statement appears on page 8:

"The Albanian liaison representative drew attention to some alleged contradictions in the testimony of Velianidis:

(a) In his deposition (G.W.B., page 100)

(b) The Albanian Liaison Officer....."

/If these

If these contradictions are formulated like that they may well be called alleged contradictions, but if, on the other hand, we consult the written statements in the Greek Book, the translation of the complete text of these statements made before the Commission and the Greek Authorities, if we also consult the statements made by this witness before the Commission and the Greek memorandum of December 3rd 1946 to the Security Council, then it could not be said that these are alleged contradictions but it would be agreed that they are, on the contrary, flagrant contradictions. By comparing these various contradictions this is the natural conclusion.

The witness Velianidis had a doubtful character and the Commission decided to make investigations about him. Team 1/A was charged to do this. Thus Team 1/A interrogated the Greek witness Tsoklaropoulos who knew Velianidis well; in reply to questions Tsoklaropoulos declared that:

"Velianidis was 20 years old".

While in the book his age had been given as 24. He continued:

"Velianidis had just left Florina to return to his village.

Before going to Florina he had been at home in the village".

Also,

"He (the witness) had been in the village all the time and Velianidis had remained there". This proves that Velianidis could not have been at Salonica when the statement was made". See Tsoklaropoulos S/AC.4/SC 2A/SR 4).

While this is what Velianidis says (S/AC.4/FV39 page 21):

"No, the police of my village handed me over to authorities at Florina who sent me to Salonica".

In his statements it becomes very evident that we are confronted with inventions, see S/AC.4/FV39, especially page 29 of the French text and also page 31, where it becomes evident that he was not a liaison agent as he pretends because neither in the white book, nor in the complete text of his statements made before the Greek authorities is mention made of such a thing.

9. On page 7 we read:

"The Albanian representative points out that this was impossible because the bridge at Petrani had been destroyed by the Germans".

Here we must add that there is no road for cars at Vlahopsilotera (See S/AC.4/FV -27 page 9).

10. On page 8 we read:

"the Albanian liaison representative pointed out a contradiction between the testimony of Velianidis and the Greek document, 'Incidents on the Greek frontier'. But this contradiction is also seen in the Greek memorandum of December 3rd 1946 to the Security Council where it says:

"On November 7th 1946 forces of the Army and the police attacked a large gang in the neighbourhood of Sfika, 7 km.

North West of Antartiko. Some members of this gang retreated into Albanian territory".

11. On page 9, Albanian denial of the hospitalization of wounded guerillas, this should be added:

It has been proved that Velianidis was not a liaison agent and so he could not have transported the wounded into Albania (See S/AC.4/FV/39 pages 30 and 31, and S/AC.4/FV 40 page 17).

12. What Tseteroklis said about the wounded in the Greek White Book is given but what he said before the Commission should also be given as this constitutes a denial of the Greek accusation (See S/AC.4/FV 45 page 15) the witness says:

"I myself did not go to hospital at all"

Second question:

"Here, when we were on the mountains, if anyone was wounded he was taken to hospital"

And lower down he says about the wounded:

"Yes, they crossed the frontier and went into Serbian territory".

On page 32 concerning the wounded coming from inside Greece and who are supposed to have been taken to the frontier, he says:

/"No,

"No, I did not hear of that".

On page 11 of S/AC.4/PV 46 the same witness says:

"I stayed about 30 days on the mountain of Vouma. I did not take part in any attack. The men of the party, who went through the villages, obtained food and we lived all the time on the mountain".

Now let us compare that with what was said above:

"If anyone was wounded he was taken to hospital",
but if there were no attacks there can have been no wounded. This proves that his declaration is false and entirely without value. Also on page 17 he says:

"in my party there were no wounded. But when I was at Manastir I saw that the men who fought in Greece and were wounded were taken into Albanian territory by way of Manastir".

B. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER I, SECTION A*

On the Albanian refutations

1. Training of Refugees

In the Albanian denial of this accusation, the Albanian delegation insisted that note be taken of the following facts, and that they be included in the report.

a) The actual person of the witness Fotios Kontopanos, called to give evidence in support of the aforesaid accusation.

He had not yet been tried when he appeared before the Commission. This would have influenced the witness to give evidence acceptable to the Greek Government.

The fact that Annivas gave evidence to the Greek authorities in February 1947 (see S/AC.4/PV/34 of 26 February 1947, page 2) when he said: "I was continually asked for explanations, and I gave a certain number up to February."

Annivas stated the following on page 6 of the same document:

"After the arrival of the Commission of Investigation, that is during the month of February, I was asked to explain certain points". This proves that the witness made fresh depositions some time before his appearance before the Commission, of course on the advice of other people and not in accordance with the facts.

At the beginning of his testimony, and at the time when he gave his first answers, Annivas did not say that he was a member of the editorial staff, but only much later at Rubig, for the book.

The witness Cheorgios Gatsios, called to give evidence in support of the above-mentioned accusation, was a very dubious character and therefore his testimony cannot be considered as reliable.

* S/AC.4/W.18/Add.3 (Original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.10/Rev.2).

Georgios Gatsios made further depositions in February 1947. This confirms the fact that he altered his statements to suit the wishes of the interested parties.

There are certain discrepancies between the depositions contained in the Greek White Book and those made to the Commission. The witness failed to state his motive in modifying his deposition for the Greek White Book. He said that as he was appearing before the United Nations he was bound to speak the truth. However, as he had previously made his deposition under oath he was also bound to speak the truth.

He said in his statement for the Greek White Book that the majority of the men at Rubig were unemployed, with the exception of those employed as cooks, bakers, etc....but before the Commission he spoke of a large amount of military training.

He stated in the Greek White Book that they were forbidden to go more than two kilometers from the camp, whereas he told the Commission he climbed hills.

According to Gatsios the Greek refugees left Rubig for Yugoslavia in mid-October, military training at Bulkes started in April, and ceased at least five months ago. This is a very significant fact. If it is borne in mind that the purpose of military training at Rubig and Bulkes, according to the witness, was to train troops for fighting in Greece, then why should five months be allowed to pass without any such activity. This point is not at all clear but the evidence of Thomas Zahos throws some light on it. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV.12).

Pages 30 and 31 of document S/AC.4/PV/34, as well as the White Book, reported Gatsios as having stated that he left Rubig for Yugoslavia in mid-October. At the same time he says that he heard the speech of the director of the Criminal police of Tirana on the occasion of the anniversary of Tirana's liberation. But Tirana was liberated on 17 November 1944, and the celebration of this liberation always takes place on 17 November.

c) The Greek witness Zafiridis is a dubious character. This witness stated that he was free when, in actual fact, he was accompanied by gendarmes, a circumstance which might have some bearing on his statement.

This witness stated that he went from Rubig to Yugoslavia via Elbasan and Ohrida, but there was a contradiction in the statement about the motor trip from Elbasan to the Yugoslav frontier. To do this trip by motor car without any mechanical defect or other incident, the witness said he took a whole day although, even going slowly this trip should not take more than three hours.

d) Regarding the military training and the Greek Military Manual which is reputed to have been compiled at Rubig. The publication and application of the Manual of Military Regulations at Rubig are in flagrant contradiction with the position of the camp, the technical possibilities and the military training of the Albanian National Army.

Among other things, this manual contains instructions on:

- the weapons of the modern army
- strategy and tactics
- chemical warfare
- elementary technical knowledge of motor transport
- aviation
- motorized units
- parachutists
- gunnery
- topography
- Morse code

Three Greek witnesses asserted that all this training was carried out during July and August 1945. However, no such training could have taken place in the Albanian Army in the absence of the necessary equipment.

All this was supposed to happen at Rubig at a time when the economic situation of the camp left much to be desired.

/(see the report

(see the report mentioned above in the Albanian refutation, as well as the testimony of the Greek witness, Thomas Zahos, at Janina, on Rubig).

Gatsios also stated that the school was open to all, and Annivas said that all the refugees were at liberty to read the manual. Now the introduction to the manual says that it is for the use of the Communists only. Thus, on the one hand it appears to be a work available to the public, while on the other it is secret.

Further, the witness Gatsios could not explain why the Albanian Government should have maintained a school open to all at which men were trained prior to being sent to fight in Greece.

It was also stated that the manual was used at Rubig, but that there were only about ten weapons in the camp, most of which were pistols. It is ridiculous to suggest that the military manual could be applied where only these weapons were available.

The witness Zafiriz mentioned to the Commission that there was a military school at Rubig, while in his statement in the Greek White Book he made no mention of this fact.

The witness tried to justify this contradiction by saying that he failed to mention this fact in his written depositions, though he referred to the military training at Bulkes. He could, therefore, have mentioned Rubig equally well. The reasons he gives for doing this are ridiculous (see page 35 of document S/AC.4/FV/38).

In his evidence to Team 1A, at Janina, Zahos categorically denied his statements in the Greek White Book, saying that they had been made under pressure and were therefore false.

As soon as he entered Albania in 1945, he was disarmed, with his companions.

According to him, all the refugees were deported to northern Albania.

/They

They remained in those camps until October 1945 under trying conditions.

"The refugees left Rubig for Yugoslavia because they had heard that the Greek refugees were allowed to work for their living at Bulkes, where living conditions were better."

According to Zahos, the refugees at Rubig possessed no weapons.

"There was no military training at Rubig or even political training."

2. Providing Guerillas with Weapons and Supplies

Albanian Refutation

a) In order to prove that the accusation contained in the book, "Incidents on the Greek Frontier" is without foundation see Reports "A" and "B" of the two commissions appointed by the Albanian Government to investigate the frontier incidents and the crossing of the frontier by groups of Greek partisans. These Reports were submitted to the Commission by letter dated 16.IV.47, (S/AC.4/215; see also the 88 statements circulated by the Commission of the Secretariat (S/AC.4/230).

b) The witness Tseteroklis Trayannos.

This witness refers to this accusation in his statements. He should therefore be quoted in the report. Tseteroklis stated on page 12 of document S/AC.4/PV.46: "Those who gave us weapons were our own people, Greeks."

Further on, still speaking on the same subject he said:

"They were liaison officers who used to go to and from Yugoslavia."

There is no word about the Albanian authorities.

On page 13 the witness said that the weapons were hidden in a pit on Albanian territory.

There is no point in arms being hidden in pits on Albanian territory. There was no reason to fear that these arms might be

/discovered

discovered by anybody since, according to the accusation, the Albanian authorities themselves were supplying the Greek partisans. It is more reasonable to assume that these weapons were not on Albanian territory at all but in pits in Greek territory. This assumption is further corroborated by the fact that those distributing the weapons were Greeks.

The same witness indulges in suppositions in his evidence as quoted in the Greek White Book, but he was unable to explain this before the Commission (see page 13).

According to the witness, we come down to this alternative: either the weapons were hidden in Greece, or else they were supplied by the Albanian authorities.

The witness repeatedly declared that the arms were hidden in pits, and it may therefore be deduced that the Albanian authorities did not supply arms.

c) The witness Vélianidis gave some information furnishing a good reply to this charge. On page 19 of document S/AC.4/PV/40, he said:

"The chief Siapkias had been hiding arms and ammunition in the mountains since 1945. When we arrived, we sought them out and used them".

Vélianidis, speaking of the arms of his partisan group, clearly states that he found them hidden on Greek territory where they had been since 1945. This is a very important fact towards proving that the band received no armaments from northern neighbours of Greece. This fact further corroborates the statements of Trayanis Tseteroklis that the arms mentioned by him as having been hidden in pits were not on Albanian but on Greek territory.

The same witness Vélianidis also spoke of the armaments of other partisan groups. He related that arms were coming from Yugoslavia to Albania and thence to Greece. But when the witness was asked why this should be the procedure followed for sending arms to partisans, he replied: "in order not to reveal that the arms came from Yugoslavia".

/Such a

Such a demonstration is valueless. The way in which this witness refers to the question of partisans being provided with arms by Albania, clearly shows that Albania is doing nothing of the kind.

d) The witness Mehmet Karafili Kotsinako:

In the last few days before his appearance before the Commission he had been briefed to testify as he did. This is brought out clearly by a comparison of his written deposition in the Greek White Book with his oral statement before the Commission.

The difference between the two statements is very great and shows provocation.

In the Greek White Book the witness speaks only of things he has heard, not of things he has seen himself.

The witness also lied when stating the reasons for his escape from prison and entry into Greece. See page 2 of the statement of the Head of the Albanian Delegation (S/AC.4/FV/54-2).

See also documents submitted by letters S/AC.4/167 of 26 March 1947 and S/AC.4/212 of 14 April 1947, which prove clearly what type of persons Mehmet Karafili Kotsinako and the other Albanian witnesses of the Greek White Book, really were.

From this it may be deduced that the meeting referred to by the witness at the Ministry of Home Affairs is a lie and a provocation.

He gives a curious and incomprehensible explanation of the Albanian Government's methods but offers no proof of the veracity of his evidence.

Unqualified persons took part in the meeting (Kotsinako himself was in charge of the Minister's Department for the Prevention of Crime).

He said that he had noticed that he had been suspected since December 1945; he was in disagreement with the Government but later held a more important appointment, and as chief of the police became responsible for the prevention of crime. In these circumstances he took part in a meeting to give arms to Greek partisans. This is very curious. But he explains it all by saying that: "I was a member of the Communist Party".

He was dissatisfied and suspected, and yet he was given a more important appointment. This is very strange.

The witness lied when he told the Commission that he did not speak

English. After some discussions, the Chairman said: "I notice that the witness understands at least part of what has been said in languages other than Albanian".

This is also proved at the end where the witness says: "This concerns the telegram about Pilo Peristere. This person is a Communist and will not give any answer likely to assist your Commission."

How is it that the witness, without knowing any language spoken in the Commission except Albanian, understood that there was talk of a telegram concerning Pilo Peristere? He had not been told about the telegram in Albanian. This proves, as I have said, that the witness speaks English. It also proves that the witness is a liar. He evidently wanted to conceal the fact that he spoke English in order to hear what was being discussed in the Commission so that he could more easily understand and reply to questions.

There is also some discrepancy between the statement on the meeting to decide the supply of arms to Greek partisans and the statement that such arms were already being supplied.

Another proof that this witness was not telling the Commission the truth, was the testimony of the Albanian witnesses before Team 1/A in Albania, according to the Commission's telegram to that Team.

e) The witness Zahos, called by the Greek Government, said that the partisans received no arms from Albania. (See document S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 11). On pages 2 and 3 of document S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 12 Zahos also states:

"At that time we were told that a company of andartes had attacked and disarmed a formation": hence this company possessed arms. "They had been given to us to be taken to our Freveza area".

f) The witness Christos Zois, called by the Greek Government to testify before Team 1/A, stated:

"We met Greek andartes who had arms hidden away, of which they gave us some." (See document S/AC.4/SC.2A/FV 21).

g) To prove that arms are hidden on Greek territory, see the

/statements

statements by the Greek witness Stefanos Kalantsis; he says he was arrested because some arms had been found hidden in his vineyards. Before the Court 43 such hidden weapons were mentioned. (See document S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 7).

h) The witness Ferikles Kanourghios said that he had been sentenced to death for having hidden arms. (See document S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 18)

i) The spokesman of E.A.M. states on page 46:

"It was quite natural that there should be a certain quantity of arms of German and particularly of Italian origin in Greece. Some of these made up the partisans' first equipment. The remainder came from booty captured in the course of clashes with the Gendarmerie and the Army or from the capture of whole military depots, as at Descati, and the disarming of armed monarchists. They (the Government) should know exactly what the partisans possess. All they have to do is to make a list of their own armed equipment and they know it. That is why the foreign journalists who went to the partisans and remained with them all agree that their armed equipment is new English material."

j) Dossier No. 24 of the documents submitted by E A M. "Dossier No. 24: the andartes (partisans) Table of Contents" quotes 74 cases which clearly show the true source of partisans' armaments. Paragraph 2 of this document quotes some (74) of the countless documents which reveal the sources of supplies of arms to the andartes.

It is clear that the partisans obtain their supplies by attacking Government Forces.

k) The witnesses Kostas Sirinjotis (1 March 47 Pavlos Melas) Papayannis Dimitrios (the new prison 1 March) Chairman of the Labour Council at Salonika, Colonel Tsinganos Nikolaos (Pavlos Melas 3 March) Joannis Nikolayevi (Polighiro 4 March) Agapitos Anastasios (8 March Chamber of Commerce) all stated that all the armaments of Greek partisans originate from within the country.

1) The witness Andrea Djimas (S/AC.4/SC.2Y) told Team I at Icaria, in connection with the Greek charges that Greece's northern neighbours were arming people and sending them to Greece: "I know of none who came back armed and I consider the whole story as a myth, a fairy tale."

4. Despatching Guerilla Detachments Across the
Frontier into Greece

In support of the Albanian refutation the following may be mentioned. To prove that this accusation is without foundation, see also:

a) The "A" and "B" reports of the two Commissions appointed by the Albanian Government to investigate the frontier incidents and the crossings of the frontier by Greek partisans (according to charges brought by the Greek Government). These two reports were submitted with my letter of 16.4.1947 (document S/AC.4/215). See also the eighty-eight statements circulated by the Secretariat of the Commission (S/AC.4/230).

b) Regarding Velianidis, he did not say either in his statement mentioned in the Greek Book (GWB) or in his testimony before the Commission (S/AC.4/PV/39) that Siapkias crossed into Greece from Albania in September 1946. In the White Book, he mentions mid-April 1946. Before the Commission, he changed his mind several times and in the end fixed the date of August 1946, without, however, maintaining that it was Albanian territory.

c) So far as Tsipis and Kentros are concerned it should be stressed here that Leonidas Raptis, political chief of the same band as Kentros and Tsipis (according to Kentros), denied all accusations of having been in Albania and having returned to Greece. (See S/AC.4/PV.27, pages 7, 8, 9). A similar denial was made by 7 other partisans of the same band. (See S/AC.4/PV.27, page 8). Leonidas Raptis, however, was sentenced to death and executed, and the other seven were also tried and sentenced to imprisonment, whilst Kentros was free although he had been a member of the same band as Raptis and the others. (See the beginning of the testimony of Kentros, S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 11).

/ d) The witness

d) The witness Zahos denies he passed through Albania (S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV.12).

e) Replying to the question if he was sure that he crossed through Albania, Zois Christos (S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV.21) stated before Team 1A:

"We travelled by train as far as Skoplje, then we took a car and crossed the frontier during the night. I cannot tell for sure whether it was the Albanian, Bulgarian or Yugoslav frontier."

5. Hospitalizing Wounded Guerrillas

The following is quoted amongst the proofs submitted by Greece:

"A medical discharge certificate of a Tirana hospital was found on Kontopanos when he surrendered to the Greek authorities."

If this document, which we have never seen, is thus quoted, it might be thought that Kontopanos was wounded in Greece in an engagement and then taken to Albania; similarly, one could presume a good many other things.

First of all, evidence must be furnished that this document exists in the Secretariat's archives, then the date of the document must be mentioned and the circumstances in which Kontopanos was in an Albanian hospital must be given. In the White Book, Kontopanos says: "In October 1945, as a result of an accidental shot from the revolver of a man named Lefteris of Arta, I was wounded in the left leg and admitted to the Tirana hospital."

It is thus clear that this document is of no importance in the Greek accusation against Albania, because:

1. Kontopanos was not wounded in Greece as a partisan and then taken to Albania for treatment.

2. The Albanian Government has agreed that it sheltered a limited number of Greek democrats who had taken refuge in Albania in order to escape from persecution and terrorism. The Albanian Government has also agreed that all these refugees left for Yugoslavia in October 1945 (see page 16 of document S/AC.4/PV.16).

/If we acce

If we accept all this, it will be quite logical also to admit that if one of these refugees was ill, we would not have him left to die, but would have done our best to cure him. Let us now return to the specific case of Kontopanos; according to him he was wounded at Rubig in October 1945. He was admitted to hospital in Tirana after which he left for Yugoslavia. But none of the Greek accusations say that Greek partisans wounded on Greek territory in 1945 were taken to Albania. These accusations deal with the second half of 1946. These explanations prove that Kontopanos' document is worthless and has nothing to do with the Greek accusation that Greek guerillas were admitted to hospitals in Albania. According to Kontopanos, he was wounded at Rubig in October 1945; therefore at that time he was not a guerilla but was simply a political refugee.

6. Crossing of Guerillas from Greece into Albanian Territory

The following should be added to the Albanian refutation:

a) As proof that this refutation is false, see reports "A" and "B" of the two Commissions appointed by the Albanian Government to investigate the frontier incidents and crossings over the frontier by Greek partisans, etc...according to the accusations of the Greek Government. These two reports were submitted to the Commission by my letter of 16 April 1947 (S/AC.4/215). See also the 38 statements circulated by the Secretariat of the Commission (S/AC.4/230).

C. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER III, SECTION A*

I wish to inform you that after studying the Greek Book "Incidents on the Greek Frontier", we have classified the incidents as follows:

- (a) There are 39 incidents which concern shooting on the frontier;
- (b) 28 incidents caused by Albanian soldiers crossing the Greek frontier
- (c) 16 incidents concerning attacks on the Greek frontier posts;
- (d) 11 incidents concerning the crossing of the Greek frontier by partisans coming from Greece and passing into Albania. Two of these incidents refer to partisans having proceeded in the direction of Albania;
- (e) 4 incidents concerning Greek partisans crossing the Albanian frontier into Greece. Of these two incidents one refers to an attempt to facilitate the entry of partisans into Greece and the other an encounter with 3 persons coming from Albania;
- (f) 1 incident concerning thefts;
- (g) 10 separate incidents concerning encounters between Greek soldiers and Greek partisans who had nothing to do with Albania, injuries done to Greek soldiers by Albanian soldiers, Albanian subjects wishing to effect an illegal entry into Greece, killed at the frontier, and finally a Greek subject killed in Greek territory by Greek soldiers.

In Appendix No. 1 the dates are given and the referring to the incidents numbers are classified as above.

On the second page of this chapter the deaths of 6 people are quoted and their names given. Now it should be noted that:

1. In regard to the two killed, Nastikas Spiridon and Jean Spiridon, the Greek Government itself admits in the book "Frontier Incidents", that these men entered Albanian territory, where they were killed. (See: white paper, French text, page 5, incidents of 15th March, 1946.)

* Document S/AC.4/W.18 (original French) - References made to draft
(S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.1) 2. In regard

2. In regard to the two women killed, Athina Prasso and Eftimia Natzi, they were Albanian subjects. The Greek white paper states that they were killed at the moment when they were endeavouring to enter Greek territory, fleeing from the Albanian tyranny. ("Frontier Incidents" French text, page 6, incident of 23rd March.) For the facts of this case see the documents presented by the Albanian delegation on 16th April, 1947, registered at the Secretariat. (S/AC.4/215 and Declaration No. 16.)

It is to be noted also that in the part of Chapter III dealing with the arguments brought forward by the Albanian Government spokesman, one reads in Point 6: "More incidents have been invented than have in fact occurred. . ." Now, the Albanian delegation has never followed this line of argument. On the contrary, we have accused Greece of having provoked incidents in excess of the 109 incidents quoted against us in the book. We have accused Greece of being responsible for 172 incidents since the end of 1944 up to the end of 1946, as well as for 19 incidents since the commencement of 1947 up till 4th April 1947. (See S/AC.4/172, S/AC.4/190, S/AC.4/191, S/AC.4/217). There were also 10 other incidents. (See S/AC.4/257.)

In the seventh argument one reads: "General Hodgson, head of the British Military Mission in Albania, is said to have declared in a report that. . ." Now, on February 17th, at the 27th Meeting of the Commission at Athens, I declared: "This is what Brigadier General Hodgson, head of the British Military Mission in Albania, writes in his periodic political report no. 10, dated July 29th, 1945. . ." (See S/AC.4/FV27). Here we do not find the words used in the seventh argument: "is said to have declared in a report. . ." In this case it would be preferable to give what was said and also to give the number of General Hodgson's report.

In the part of the IIIrd Chapter, concerning the arguments presented by the Albanian representative, the observations made by the Albanian representative about the contradictions and falsifications contained in the Greek book "Incidents on the Frontier" are not mentioned.

/Below

Below are some of our remarks concerning this book:

There are many things about the book "Frontier Incidents" which lead us to conclude that it is nothing other than a clumsy falsification.

A) We would make the following remarks concerning the French and English texts of the Greek White Book:

a) There are divergent dates given for the same incident. There are 12 incidents for which different dates are given in the two texts. There are also 11 incidents of the month of July (English text) that are given in the month of June in the French text. (See Appendix No.2).

b) There are divergent numbers indicating the same spot. There are 22 cases of this. For example, in the incident of April 14th 1946, page 4 of the French text reads:..."Greek post No.16 (Vassilia R.830963)" while in the English text the number is given as (Vassilia 817962) (See Appendix No.3)

c) There are divergencies in the indications of directions. In one text a place is said to be in the North while in the other the same place is said to be in the south. There are 8 cases of this. For example, in the incident of February 17th 1946, page 4 of the French text says that the Greek post No.8 is to the North of Kastani while in the English text it is said to be in the south of Kastanani (See Appendix 4).

d) There are divergencies in the numbers indicating the time of the same incident, or the number of the same frontier post, or the same distances (See Appendix No.5).

4) In the description of the incident of August 10th, 1946; p. 19 of the French text reads: "reinforcements arrived and the pursued band took flight towards the interior of Greece."

In the English text p. 23 it is said that the band took flight towards the interior of Albania.

f) In the description of the incident of September 18th, 1946, p.23 of the French text reads: "when pursued, the bandits fled in the direction of Yugoslav territory".

In the description of the same incident on p.27 of the English text

/the band

the band is said to have fled into Albanian territory.

B. The following divergencies are noted between the Greek book "Incidents on the Greek frontier" and the Greek Memorandum of December 3rd, 1946:

2) In the description of the incident of October 15th, 1946, presented to the Security Council, the French text of the Greek Book mentions two shepherds who were seized and liberated the following evening October 16th. In the Memorandum's description of the same incident they are said to have been liberated on the same day, October 15th.

b) In the incident of November 5th; (French text, p.25), it is stated that the gang pursued made for the Albanian frontier. The Memorandum refers to November 3rd, and to a similar incident, stating that the gang entered Albanian territory.

c) In the incident of November 7th, 1946, (French text, p.26), it is stated that after the engagement the bandits openly entered Albanian territory and that 23 of them were killed on the spot, that is in Greek territory. In the Memorandum dealing with the same incident there is no reference to casualties; it is simply stated that a few members of the gang entered Albania.

d) In the incident of November 14th (French text, p.26), it is stated that the Albanians, lying in ambush in Albanian territory, fired on a Greek patrol. The memorandum refers to Albanians lying in ambush in Greek territory, etc. ...

It is interesting to note here that 13 incidents are quoted in the Memorandum. Even among those few, we find no fewer than four contradictions to the versions given in the Greek White Paper.

C. The Contents of the Greek White Paper 'Incidents on the Greek Frontier'

The Greeks have produced no evidence in support of their White Paper dealing with the incidents.

They have brought before the Commission no evidence of any importance

/to support

to support in any way the contention that the incidents were provoked by the Albanians. In the Greek White Paper, we find under the heading 'Evidence in Support of the Greek Petition' (French text, p.142), a summary of the statement made by an Albanian deserter named Tzene Nizat, and which reads as follows: According to Nizat, all the incidents on the Greco-Albanian frontier were provoked by order of the Albanian military authorities who were anxious to improve the morale of the Albanian soldiers. This is the ridiculous argument produced by the Greeks in support of their theories.

b) The Greeks did not submit any document in support of their White Paper on the incidents.

c) The incidents of October 6th and November 19th, 1946, do not in any way concern Albania.

d) The incident of March 23rd, 1946 could not possibly be considered as a frontier incident.

e) The incident of May 16th, 1946 could not possibly be considered as a frontier incident.

There are ten such incidents, as I have stated elsewhere.

APPENDIX NO. 1

FRENCH TEXT

There are 39 frontier incidents in which there is reference to firing:

1	Night of	6-7/1/46	Post No. 6	Leontokanaki
2	No. 4	13-1-46	" " 8	Leloudas
3	" 8	17-2-46	" " 8	"
4	" 10	12-3-46	" " -	Kastanani
5	" 11	12-3-46	" " 3	Mavilis
6	" 13	7-3-46	" " 13	Skipis
7	" 16 bis	26-3-46	" " 8	Leloudas
8	" 19	14-4-46	" " 16	Vassilia
9	" 20	24-4-46	" " "	Mavromatis
10	" 21	30-4-46	" " ---	Examilia
11	" 24	6-5-46	" " 2	Ierotheos
12	" 28	20-5-46	" " 45	-----
13	" 29	29-5-46	" " 3	Mavilis
14	" 30	29-5-46	" " 9	Kalaris
15	" 32	29-5-46	" " 9	"
16	" 33	31-5-46	" " 4	Tsolakis
17	" 35	2-6-46	" " 2	Ierotheos
18	" 36	3-6-46	" " 12	Zoidis
19	" 37	4-6-46	" " 15	Kotsikolitis
20	" 45	26-6-46	" " 45	-----
21	" 47	26-6-46	" " 28	-----
22	" 51	3-7-46	" " 12	Zoidis
23	" 52	3-7-46	" " --	(M 9206)
24	" 53	5-7-46	" " --	(R 6385)
25	" 55	11-7-46	" " 3	-----
26	" 58	14-7-46	" " 33	-----
27	" 60	14-7-46	" " 36	-----
28	" 63	17-7-46	" " 23	Plikates
29	" 65	23-7-46	" " 15	Vassilia
30	" 67	2-8-46	" " 17	Pantazi
31	" 70	7-8-46	" " --	Gefstova
32	" 1	1-9-46	" " 1	Mavromatis
33	" 2	8-9-46	" " 3	Mavilis
34	" 13	September /46	" " 19	Skordilis
35	" 18	19-10-46	" " 36	-----
36	" 20	26-10-46	" " 2	Ierotheos
37	" 21	26-10-46	" " 5	Chourmoulis
38	" 27	14-11-46	" " 2	Ierotheos
39	" 41	17-6-46	" " "	Pour la Borne No. 34

28 incidents caused by Albanian soldiers crossing the Greek frontier:

1	No. 1	6-1-46	Post No.10	Poutetsi
2	" 3	8-1-46	" " 12	Zoidis
3	" 5	6-2-46	" " 14	Alevizatos
4	" 6	12-2-46	" " 4	Tsolaki
5	" 7	15-2-46	" " -	Sagiades
6	" 9	20-2-46	" " 9	Kanavis
7	" 18	7-4-46	" " 2	Ierotheos
8	" 22	5-5-46	" " 1	Mavromatis
9	" 23	6-5-46	" " 1	"
10	" 25	10-5-46	" " 32-33	

	No.			Post No.	
11	30	29-5-46		9	Kalaris
12	34	1-6-46	" "		Kastanani
13	43	25-6-46	" "	14	Alivezato
14	44	25-6-46	" "	13	Skipis
15	46	26-6-46	" "	27	-----
16	48	28-6-46	" "	27	-----
17	56	12-7-46	" "	--	Ptelia
18	59	1-7-46	" "		(R 5861)
19	62	17-7-46	" "		(N 0122)
20	68	5-8-46	" "		Orimo
21	69	7-8-46	" "		-----
22	71	8-8-46	" "		Plikati
23	77	27-8-46	" "	4	Tsolakis
24	78	28-8-46	" "	1	Mavromatis
25	22	1-11-46	" "		Ierotheos
26	26	13-11-46	" "	1	Mavromatis
27	1	19-11-46	" "	5	Chourmoulis
28	3	21-11-46	" "	12	Zoidis

(c) 16 incidents mentioning attacks on Greek frontier posts

	No.			Post No.	
1	17	31-3-46		13	Skipi
2	27	19-5-46	" "	12-13-14	Skipi
3	49	28-6-46	" "	28	-----
4	50	29-6-46	" "	31	-----
5	54	7-7-46	" "	13	Skipis
6	61	15-7-46	" "	36	-----
7	75	26-8-46	" "	8	Leloudas
8	76	27-8-46	" "	8	"
9	3	9-9-46	" "	8	"
10	6	13-9-46	" "	12	Zoidis
11	11	23-9-46	" "	21	Panagiotakis
12	12	25-9-46	" "	6	Leontokenaki
13	15	8-10-46	" "	12	Zoidis
14	16	9-10-46	" "	12	Zoidis
15	19	21-10-46	" "		Tsolakis
16	25	13-11-46	" "	12	Zoidis

(d) 11 incidents mentioning Greek partisans crossing from Albania into Greece;

in two incidents it is stated that the partisans headed for Albania.

	No.		
1	42	20- 6-46	(Monopaulo)
2	64	23- 7-46	(Kalyvia Papadima)
3	72	10- 8-46	(Monopilo)
4	73	10- 8-46	(Grande Prespa)
5	74	26- 8-46	(Mali Madi)
6	4	9- 0-46	(Skala)
7	5	12- 9-46	(Voidomati)
8	8	18- 9-46	(Ieropigi)
9	10	-----	(Konitsa)
10	24	7-11-46	(Stika)
11	23	5-11-46	(Trigonos vers l'Albanie)

/(e) 4 incidents

(e) 4 incidents mention the crossing by Greek partisans from Albania into Greece. One of them mentions an attempt to cover the entry of partisans into Greece, and the other an engagement with three persons from Albania.

1	No.	39	11/6/46	(R 7493)
2	"	7	16/9/46	(Pyrsojani)
3	"	15	25/3/46	(Post No.8 Leloudas. Attempt to cover the entry of gangs)
4	"	38	10/6/46	(Engagement with three persons from Albania)

(f) 1. incident mentioning thefts.

1	No.	17	15/10/46	(No.18)
---	-----	----	----------	---------

(g) 10 incidents of various kinds mentioning engagements between Greek soldiers and Greek partisans, which do not concern Albania: Albanian soldiers insulting Greek ones, Albanian citizens being killed at the frontier while attempting to enter Greece illegally; and also a Greek citizen being killed in Greece by Greek soldiers.

1	No.	26	16/5/46	No concern of Albania
2	"	40	14/6/46	Insults
3	"	57	11/7/46	Fisherman kidnapped
4	"	66	31/6/46	Greek shepherd (Pontikates) kidnapped, freed later.
5	"	9	21/9/46	Fight with bandits
6	"	14	6/10/46	" " "
7	"	2	19/11/46	" " "
8	"	16	23/3/46	Albanian citizens attempting to cross the frontier and killed.
9	"	12	15/3/46	Civilians killed or wounded for having attempted to cross frontier (16 Mavroniat. (No.5 Chourmouli)
10	"	14	22/3/46	(582602)

APPENDIX NO. 2

Identical incidents but different dates given.

<u>FRENCH TEXT</u>				<u>ENGLISH TEXT</u>			
1)	6/1/46					1/1/46	
2)	No. 16	Incident of	23/3/46	No. 16	Incident of	25/3/46	
3)	" 66	" "	4/8/46	" 66	" "	8/8/46	
4)	" 74	" "	20/8/46	" 76	" "	10/8/46	
5)	" 7	" "	16/9/46	" 7	" "	9/9/46	
6)	" 3	" "	22/9/46	" 3	" "	21/9/46	
7)	" 21	" "	30/4/46	" 21	" "	4/4/46	
8)	" 25	" "	10/5/46	" 25	" "	16/5/46	
9)	" 29	" "	29/5/46	" 29	" "	28/5/46	
10)	" 45	" "	26/6/46	" 45	" "	20/6/46	
11)	" 13	" "	Sept. 46	" 13	" "	27/9/46	
12)	" 54	" "	7/7/46	" 54	" "	7/6/46	

Incidents which took place in July, referred to in English Text as having occurred in June.

<u>FRENCH TEXT</u>				<u>ENGLISH TEXT</u>			
1)	11/7/46	No. 55				11/6/46	
2)	12/7/46	" 56				12/6/46	
3)	14/7/46	" 58				14/6/46	
4)	1/7/46	" 59				1/6/46	
5)	15/7/46	" 61				15/6/46	
6)	17/7/46	" 62				17/6/46	
7)	17/7/46	" 63				17/6/46	
8)	23/7/46	" 64				23/6/46	
9)	11/7/46	" 57				11/6/46	
10)	14/7/46	" 60				14/6/46	
11)	23/7/46	" 65				23/6/46	

APPENDIX NO. 3

Different figures indicating same place.

				<u>French Text</u>	<u>English Text</u>
1)	January 1946	No. 2	(R 60655)	(R 600655)
2)	February	" " 8	(R 690723)	(R 680723)
3)	March	" " 10	(R 678824)	(R 678724)
4)	"	" " 11	(R 486553)	(R 496553)
5)	"	" " 14	(R 485685)	(R 585585)
6)	April	" " 19	(R 830903)	(R 617962)
7)	page 8	" 23	(R 3455)	page 12	(R 34531)
8)	" 9	" 25	(R 483523)	" 13	(R 483524)
9)	" 9	" 25	(R 231451)	" 13	(R 230430)
0)	" 9	" 26	(R 926961)	" 13	(R 826961)
1)	" 9	" 27	(R 619882)	" 14	(R 618882)
2)	" 10	" 27	(R 65587)	" 14	(R 655873)
3)	" 13	" 44	(R 617863)	" 17	(R 617813)
4)	" 14	" 47	(R 119380)	" 18	(109380)
5)	" 18	" 66	(R 665895)	" 22	(R 655673)
6)	" 19	" 72	(105360)	" 23	(106360)
7)	" 20	" 78	(R 435531)	" 24	(R 435541)
8)	" 21	" 2	(R 555462)	" 25	(R 555461)
9)	" 23	" 11	(R 971059)	" 27	(R 9710059)
0)	" 23	" 13	(R 918990)	" 27	(R 958990)
1)	" 27	" 2	(N 123528)	" 31	(N 123258)
2)	" 27	" 2	(N 51500)	" 31	(N 05500)

APPENDIX NO. 4

Difference in direction: one text refers to the North, another to the South

FRENCH TEXT

- 1) February 1946 No.8 says:
North of Kastanani.
- 2) March 1946 No.14-2.km.500
to the south-west
- 3) Page 7 No.17-4 KM. to the
north-west of the village
of Pontikates
- 4) Page 9 No.26 - 500 mtr. to the
north-west of the village
- 5) Page 17 No.61 - 2 Kms. north of
Kominades
- 6) Page 19 No.72 into Greece.
- 7) Page 20 No.78 3 Km. 500 mtr.
to the south-west of Sayades
- 8) Page 25 No.20 4 km. 500 mtr.
to the south-east of
Konispoli

ENGLISH TEXT

- February 1946 No.8 says:
South of Kastanani.
- March 1946 No.14 -2.500 Km.
to the north-west.
- Page 11 No.18 says 4 Km. to
the south-west of Pontikates.
- Page 17 No.26 - 500 mtr. to
the north-east of the village.
- Page 21 No.61 - 2 Kms. north-east
of Kominades.
- Page 23 No.72 into Albania
- Page 24 No.78 3 km.500 mtr.
to the north-west of Sayades.
- Page 29 No.20 4 km. 500 mtr.
to the north-east of
Konispoli.

APPENDIX NO. 5

A few examples

<u>FRENCH TEXT</u>			<u>ENGLISH TEXT</u>		
Page 5	No. 12	Post No. 16	Page 9	No. 12	Post No. 1
Page 6	" 14	- 100 mtr. beyond the frontier	" 10	" 14	- 1,000 mtr. beyond the frontier
Page 7	No. 18	7/4/46 at 00.15 hours	Page 11	No. 18	- 7/4/46 at 00.45 hours.
Page 8	No. 25	- 24.20 h. a patrol	Page 13	No. 24	- 23.20 h. a patrol.
Page 9	No. 25	Post No. 35	Page 13	No. 25	Post No. 33
Page 10	No. 28	- is at 3-1/2 Kms.	Page 14	No. 28	- is at 31 Kms.
Page 11	No. 35	- about 5 men strong	Page 16	No. 35	- about 6 men strong
Page 12	No. 39	- 11/6/46 at 04.30 hours	Page 16	No. 39	- 11/6/46 at 05.30 hours.
Page 13	No. 44	- at about 100 metres	Page 17	No. 43	- at about 700 metres
Page 14	No. 46	- at 5 Kms.	Page 18	No. 46	- at 6 Kms.
Page 15	No. 54	- after 45 minutes	Page 20	No. 54	- after 25 minutes
Page 17	No. 63	- at 12.00 hours a patrol	Page 22	No. 62	- at 11.00 hours, a patrol.
Page 18	No. 64	- at 10.00 hours, a gang	Page 22	No. 64	- at 18.00 hours, a gang.
Page 18	No. 67	- at 07.50 hours, a soldier, etc.	Page 22	No. 67	- at 07.30 hours, a soldier, etc.

D. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II CHAPTER III SECTION A*

1. On page 3 is written: "11 Albania denial of Greek accusations.
a) Counter accusations formulated by Albania.

In a series of documents presented as much before the Security Council as before the Commission of Enquiry, the Albanian Government complains of 172 frontier incidents provoked by Greece (2)"

Now the Albanian Government does not only complain of 172 incidents but of 201 incidents provoked by Greece as well as 23 other incidents of less importance. To verify that one need only consult the following documents presented to the Commission of Enquiry:

1. S/AC.4/44A
2. S/AC.4/44B
3. S/AC.4/172
4. S/AC.4/190
5. S/AC.4/191
6. S/AC.4/217
7. S/AC.4/257

At the bottom of the 3rd page of chapter 111 under the number (2) the Albanian documents in connection with the 172 incidents are mentioned. But only the documents S/AC.4/44A and S/AC.4/44B concern the 172 incidents while the other documents mentioned under the number (2) are concerned with the incidents which have taken place in 1947.

2. In connection with the arguments presented by the Albanian Representative pages 3, 4, 5 S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.2, I note that two of the arguments given in S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.1 have been cut out: that is:

a) The first argument where it is emphasized that the frontier incidents are logically bound up with the Greek imperialist policy directed against Albania etc.

6) The seventh argument which speaks of the report of General Hodgson Head of the British Military Mission in Albania. In the letter that I sent you the day before yesterday I made a remark to correct what had been

* Document S/AC.4/11.18/Add.2 (original French) - References made to draft (S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.2).

written in S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.1. I now see that the whole of argument No. 7 has been cut out. The Albanian Government attaches great importance to this document, which proves clearly that Greece provokes the incidents on the Albanian frontier, and it expects the Commission also to give it the importance it deserves. I send you with this letter a facsimile of the report "FROM THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION IN ALBANIA, (B.M.M./101/12 - SECRET) PERIODIC POLITICAL REPORT NO. 10 DATED JULY 29th 1945 - REPORT OF THE VISIT TO SOUTHERN ALBANIA BY BRIGADIER D.E.P. HODGSON, O.B.E. AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL C.A.S. PALMER."

The passages which concern the Commission have already been given at the 27th meeting of the Commission at Athens. See document S/AC.4/PV27 pages 13, 14 and 15. The facsimile is in the form of 4 photographs showing the 5 pages of the report and the distribution of the report in the various British offices. We trust that this time the Commission will give this report the importance due to it.

3. Concerning argument No. 5 (S/AC.4/W11 Rev.2) I made a remark in my letter of the day before yesterday and I emphatically refer you to what I wrote then.

4. On page 4 of S/AC.4/W11/Rev.2, in the sixth argument appears the following:

"The two Albanian members of the Commission of Enquiry and the Albanian liaison officer declared etc.."

There is a mistake here, which I think is a printer's error, for it was the Soviet Delegate, the Polish Delegate and the Albanian liaison officer who declared before the Commission etc...

5. On page 6 of S/AC.4/W11/Rev.2, appears the following statement: "The Greek soldier Georgios Christojanis was wounded and captured during the incident and detained in a camp in Albania. The Albanian Representative had not had the soldier brought before the team because he said that he did not know that they would proceed to an investigation of the incident of

/Palamba."

Palamba." In connection with this I note that the reasons given here for the Albanian Representative's failure to have the soldier brought are not complete. In the document S/AC.4/SC2A/5R 13 all the reasons are given.

This document reads as follows:

"M. VENDELEN remarked that he agreed with the representative of the USSR that eye-witnesses should be produced. That is why he would like to hear the Greek soldier who had been made prisoner by the Albanians.

"M. HEBB said that he did not know that the incident of Palamba was going to be examined by the team. The Greek soldier was in a camp in Albanian territory; however his testimony had been written down and submitted to the main body of the Commission.

"M. THEODOROPoulos asked the Albanian Representative if the soldier Mitsis had been killed while Christojanis was still alive.

"M. HEBB replied in the affirmative.

"M. THEODOROPoulos considered that the Albanian Representative should not only produce the soldier as a witness but also offer his repatriation.

"Would it not be desirable to consider taking steps or making recommendations to the main body of the Commission, so that the prisoner, captured on Greek territory and now detained in Albania, might be liberated.

"The Chairman wanted to know whether there was any official correspondence on this subject either at Athens or Tirana.

"M. THEODOROPoulos said that since there were no diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania there was no dossier on this subject.

"Mr. VENDELEN emphasized the fact that the absence of the chief witness was extremely regrettable.

"The Chairman remarked that the Commission naturally had the right

/to take

to take an interest in individual cases. He himself thought that the Albanian Representative would furnish some information on the subject and that the man could well be heard as a witness.

"M. HESA said that he did not know in which camp the soldier was at present detained, but he would bring him before the team, if possible, the following day or at Kakavia."

This decision was taken at Filiates (in Greece). The Albanian representative had no means of communicating with Tirana to have the soldier brought before the team the following day. The next day the team went to Konispoli and from there the Albanian Representative telephoned to have the soldier brought to Kakavia where the other Greek soldier Jorgo Jotakis was also waiting. He had been made prisoner on July 17th 1946 at Radat-Kakavia and his interrogation was demanded by the Albanian Delegation at the Commission at Salonica on February 26th 1947 and registered in the document S/AC.4/69.

At Konispoli the team had to hear more than twenty witnesses called by the Albanian Representative for the question of the Tchamouriotes and the incidents of Lilojani, and two other witnesses whom the team had decided at Korca to hear at Konispoli, as well as the five witnesses asked for by the Commission in relation with the statements made before the Commission by Mehmet Kotsinako. Of all these witnesses the team only heard 12. On the same day the team left Konispoli and went towards Janina. Thus the team did not hear all the Albanian witnesses and, instead of going to Kakavia-Radat to examine the incidents in that sector and to hear the Greek soldiers who had been made prisoner, it went to Janina where it examined these incidents on the sand-table. In these conditions of work it was clearly impossible to send for the Greek soldiers who had been made prisoner, to come to Janina, seeing that the team had taken the decision to hear two witnesses for each party. After these explanations I insist that the

passage giving the Albanian Representative's reasons concerning the hearing of the Greek soldier Christoyannis should be completed.

6. On page 8 of S/AC.4/W 11 Rev.2 appears the following statement:

"The incidents of October 11th and November 7th 1945 are said to be connected with thefts of cattle, following which an Albanian farmer was found dead in his field." Now, the Albanian officer, Faik Lance, declared: "On October 11th 1945, 20 Greek soldiers penetrated into Albanian territory between pillboxes 55 and 56; they seized an Albanian farmer and his two horses, two cows and two donkeys. Three months later the man's body was found in his field." Thus it would be more correct to say in the report that the Albanian farmer was kidnapped and that three months later he was found killed in his field.

7. On page 11 is written:

"The soldier Georgios Jotakis having been made prisoner in the course of the incident and detained in Albania was not brought before the team."

It is necessary to give the reasons why he was not brought before the Commission, and those reasons I have already enumerated above.

In connection with the 3rd part of chapter III "on the frontier incidents that have been investigated by the Commission" I would like to make the following additions:

On February 26th 1947 at Salonica the Albanian Delegation presented its concrete demands concerning the investigation of incidents to the Committee of Experts (S /AC.469). Among other things the Albanian Delegation made the following demands:

1) That it should be verified who was to gain by violating the frontiers.

2) That the sailors Papanikolaou and Thomas Voucis should be brought before the Commission.

/3) That the

3) That the Greek prisoners, captured by our troops in the frontier incidents caused by the Greeks, should be asked to declare the truth before the Commission.

4) That the points of the frontier enumerated below should be visited to find out, according to the lie of the land, who could have provoked the numerous incidents that have taken place there.

- a) Likojan (6 incidents)
- b) Janjar (6 incidents)
- c) Radat de Gjinokastra (17 incidents)
- d) Koshcvica-Kakavija (6 incidents)
- e) Radat de Leshoviku (3 incidents)
- f) Vidova (5 incidents)
- g) Ponciara (3 incidents)
- h) Trestenik (6 incidents)

Therefore there was an opportunity for investigating 52 incidents which took place on 8 points of the frontier. We also asked for the hearing of 5 witnesses, 2 by the Commission and 2 by the team which would visit the frontier. When the team arrived at the places the Albanian Delegation would present lists of other witnesses to be heard, as has been done.

On March 7th 1947, the Commission adopted the itinerary of team No.1/A.

According to the proposal of the Albanian Delegation it was decided to investigate the incidents of:

- 1) Trestenik
- 2) Radat de Leskovik
- 3) Radat de Gjinokastra
- 4) Likojan

According to the proposal of the Greek Delegation it was decided to investigate the incidents of:

- 1) Sajada
- 2) Kakavija

Thus the Albanian Delegation proposed the investigation of 8 points and only 4 were decided upon, but in a meeting at Korca Team 1A decided to give up the investigation of the incidents of Radat de Leskovika. Thus out of 8 requests only 3 points were investigated. The Greeks asked for the investigation of 2 points and that was done.

/It was,

It was, however, emphasized that the request of the Albanian Delegation was for an investigation on the spot to see the lie of the land. But, of the 5 points that were to be visited on the spot, the team only visited Trestenik where it saw the positions and then went back to Korca to hear the witnesses.

The lie of the land is presented by the Albanian Delegation as an argument in favour of its theory. But there was no investigation on this point under the pretext that the team had not enough time.

(1) The Incidents of Trestenik

Concerning these incidents the Albanian Delegation asked for 19 witnesses to be heard (S/AC.4/SC.2A/14) and afterwards at the request of the team the number was reduced to 8 (see S/AC.4/SC.2A/14 Rev.1). Of these 8 witnesses the team only heard 4.

The visit to Trestenik permitted the team to hear Gago Mborja, Lieutenant of the Albanian National Army. This officer spoke of what had happened in that sector of the frontier. He drew the attention of the team to the very strategic position occupied by the Greeks. It has been attempted to dispose of the incidents of Trestenik because of the absence of verbatim reports which, according to international frontier regulations, should be drafted in case of incidents. Now, it is impossible to draw up verbatim reports when one of the parties concerned in an incident considers itself to be in a state of war with the other. The incidents were not occasional but continual on the part of the Greeks, who considered themselves to be in a state of war with Albania. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/43).

(2) The Albanian Witnesses Heard at Korca.

1. Tefik Sherifi.

The witness clearly showed that the Greeks, firing from the Greek frontier, on the Albanian peasants in the fields, killed his brother Moustafa Sherif (Incident of July 12th, 1946). The witness was at his brother's side when the latter was hit and killed. He states that his field

/where

where his brother was killed, is at 1000 metres from the frontier. He further states that the firing came from three directions (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.9).

2. Irfan Ramadani.

He confirms the circumstances of Moustafa Sherif's death. He was an eye-witness. He states that at first the firing came from two directions, and later from three. He emphasizes that the firing came from above them and that the Greeks occupied positions well above them. He was an eye-witness in certain incidents provoked by the Greeks in the Trestenik sector. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.9)

3. Querim Hajdar.

He confirms the incident in which Moustafa Sherif was killed by the Greeks, and also the incident of August 10th. The Greeks are responsible. The witness complains that numerous villagers suffer from the Greek provocations because they cannot cultivate their fields freely, nor can they cut wood in the forest close to the frontier (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.9).

4. Rustem Nexhip.

He was an eye-witness in several incidents, especially the one of July 12th, when Moustafa Sherif was killed. When questioned, he replied that the villagers did not carry weapons when they went to the fields.

(3) Greek Witnesses in the Trestenik Incident.

1. Gheorgios Gantsos.

He was not heard, but sent away because he knew nothing of the Trestenik incidents. But this proves that he had been primed, but badly, to give evidence in such a way as to cast doubt upon the Albanian publications dealing with the Trestenik incidents. This he failed to do (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.9).

2. Georghe Domopoulos.

There is a flagrant contradiction between the facts mentioned in the Greek book "Incidents on the Greek Frontier" and the evidence given by this

/witness,

witness, who states that there was only one Albanian soldier firing on the Greeks; in the book it is stated that "two Albanian partisans who fled after the engagement". The witness states that he could not tell how many Albanian soldiers were firing because they were in trenches and out of sight. In the Greek book we read: "Nevertheless, a gang of about 18 Albanian partisans opened fire on the soldiers, and prevented them from removing the wounded man." The witness is that wounded man, but he does not mention any of this. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 9).

(4) The Kakavia-Radat Incidents.

The witnesses were heard at Janina, on the sand-table. It was decided that two witnesses on either side should be heard.

The Albanian witnesses:

1. Tsami Nikolao.

He stressed that the Greeks made preparations for the incidents in the Radat sector (from June 25th onwards). He also emphasized that the Greeks entered Albania. A Greek soldier who was killed was buried in Albania. Another man was taken prisoner (Jorgo Jotaquis). (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 20).

2. Mestan Radadam.

He was an eye-witness. He spoke of diverse incidents, which took place at Radat on July 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 7th. He stressed that the Greeks entered Albania several times throughout these incidents.

During the hearing, the Greek Delegation presented a uniform cap which they alleged belonged to the Albanian soldier who was killed. But it was a clumsy fake. The cap had a six-pointed star on it, whereas the Albanian National Army wears five-pointed star badges. Moreover, the Albanian soldier should have been buried in Greece, as also the Greek soldier who was killed. But the bodies of these two men (Albanian and Greek) are buried in Albania. This proves that they were killed in Albania (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 9).

The Greek Witnesses:

1. Kontogeorgis Evangelos.

There is a contradiction between the statement of the witness and the Greek book as to the moment when the incident took place. In the book it is stated that in this incident the Albanians used Russian rifles, while the witness says nothing of the sort. Cartridges were produced, alleged to have been found on the spot, but it has been observed that cartridges of this type are frequently found and are used by several countries for various types of guns (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.20).

2. Dalagheorgios Alexis.

The witness refers to the incident of September 13th. He says that he was told that the men who attempted to enter Greece were Albanians, partisans, etc. He does not give the exact time of the incident. The Greek book also mentions 25 Albanian bandits who entered Greece. But the witness knows nothing of these at all. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.20).

(5) The Likojan Incidents.

The Commission did not visit this place. The Team was handed by the Albanian Delegation a list of 8 witnesses. But only two of these were heard at Konispoli, as well as an officer of the Aknoian Army, Faik Lamce, who before the Team, gave a detailed statement of the various incidents at Likojan.

1. Faik Lamce, an Albanian officer.

The witness stated that the attacks were carried out by the Greeks on October 11th, November 1st, November 7th, November 24th 1945 and on June 2nd and October 16th, 1946. He stressed the favourable position occupied by the Greeks. (See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.17).

2. Nadan Ballani.

He confirms that the Greeks carried out attacks on October 11th and November 17th 1945. Eye-witness. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 17).

3. Hajro Koro.

Shepherd, eye-witness in the incident of November 7th, 1945, when four Greek soldiers entered Albania, came up to him and spoke to him while he was grazing his goats. It was evening. He fired on the Greeks.
(See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.17).

The Greek Witnesses:

1. Thomas Stefanos.

There are discrepancies between his declarations and the incident of November 1st mentioned in the Greek book "Incidents on the Greek Frontier." The witness states that the incident began at 08.00 hours. The book says that it began at 14.30 hours. The witness refers to Pillbox 67, and the book to Pillbox 66. The witness and the Greek Liaison Officer with Team No.1A refer to the Albanian soldier Seferi taken prisoner during the incident, whereas the book does not mention him. The version in the book is entirely different. This is because the Greeks primed their witness in accordance with the evidence submitted by the Albanian Delegation to the Commission concerning this incident, without further reference to their (the Greek) book.

The witness became confused before the Team. At one moment he said: "The three Albanian soldiers advanced on the Greek frontier post", and another time he says that the Albanian soldiers were on the frontier line
(See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.14).

2. Joannis Charitos.

In his evidence before the Team, he states: "When they (the soldiers) heard the firing they all left the trenches. They saw 3 Albanian soldiers in a pillbox opposite them firing on them. One of the Albanians could not get back and was taken prisoner." But there is nothing in this to show that the Albanians entered Greece.

Like the witness before him, he mentions the incident of November 3rd

/in that

in that sector. But the Greek book makes no mention of an incident on that date in that sector. The book refers to an incident which took place on June 2nd. The witness says that eight Albanians advanced upon the frontier; the book says there were six Albanians; then, later on, the same witness said that there were seven (See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.14).

(6) The Sayada Incidents.

A Greek officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stanopoulos Athanassios, gave a detailed account of the incident of October 21st. This is when we learned that the incident was the Palamba one.

The Greek witnesses:

1. Sourvinos Philipos.

Soldier. Eye-witness. He states that on the morning of October 21st, they sent a patrol towards a small observation post to see what "the enemy" were doing. So it was a war patrol. It is quite understandable that this patrol, like any other war patrol, should have entered "enemy", or Albanian, territory. This is borne out by our statements. The witness was not present when the incident began, so he could not tell exactly what happened. (See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.13).

2. Jannis Katseri.

He is the old man who was sent into Albania to fetch the prisoner. He heard that the Greek soldiers did not enter Albania (See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.13).

3. Joannis Sakas.

He states that immediately he heard firing, he turned towards the frontier and saw the whole thing: he saw the Albanians enter some 6 - 8 metres into Greece even though he was about 600 metres away, which would appear most unlikely. He himself confirms this by saying that prior to this one there had been no incidents of any importance. In that case, why did he turn towards the frontier, and not any other way? There had been no previous incidents in that sector, and he did not have to look towards the /frontier.

frontier. The Team did not go to the spot to see the position and to observe for themselves how much truth there was in these trumped up declarations (See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.13).

4. Ilias Lenis.

He contradicts the previous witness. He says that 4 civilians from the village went to the spot where the incident took place, while the other man says 34 civilians went. Like the previous witness, this man, too, has observed from a distance that the Albanians entered some 5 - 6 metres into Greece. This is absurd (See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.13).

Generally, in the statements of the ten Greek witnesses on the frontier incidents we observe very grave contradictions, especially when compared with the Greek book "Incidents on the Greek Frontier"; this proves sufficiently once again that their statements are quite valueless. It is clear that the statements were specially prepared on the basis of the material which the Albanians submitted to the Commission on the subjects of the frontier incidents, and without reference to the Greek Book.

The 8 Albanian witnesses were very much in accord with the written statements submitted by the Albanian Delegation to the Commission with regard to the incidents. Our witnesses, simple peasants and soldiers, told clearly what they had seen and suffered.

The Greek witnesses in their statements mentioned facts in one manner one moment, and the next they mentioned them in quite a different way. This the Albanians never did.

The Greek Liaison Staff with the Team produced witnesses in the four incidents (Trestenik, Kakavia, Radat and Likojan-Sayada), but each time their declarations gave rise to grave doubts.

All this leads us to the conclusion that the investigations on the Greco-Albanian frontier have produced negative results for Greece. We, on the contrary, with the aid of the witnesses, among others, have proved that our contention is justified and that the Greeks are responsible for
/the incidents.

the incidents. This contention is further borne out by other arguments brought forward by the Albanian Delegation while the Greeks have adduced no such arguments in support of their own version of the incidents. Their only means of confirming their allegations - the witnesses - failed.

I have drawn up a list showing the disproportion between the requests of the Albanian Liaison Representative and the action that has been taken with regard to it. Side by side with it, there is a list of the Greek requests and the action taken with regard to that.

ALBANIA		GREECE	
Incidents to be investigated	8	Incidents to be investigated	2
Incidents investigated	3	Incidents investigated	2
Witnesses asked for	32	Witnesses asked for	22
Witnesses heard	8	Witnesses heard	10

E. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER IV*

During its work in Greece, the Commission was repeatedly struck by the importance of the British factor in the disturbed situation in Greece, as well as by British intervention in Greek domestic affairs, and by the British Army's responsibility for Greece's domestic situation.

At the Commission's twelfth meeting in Athens on 7 February, I stated the following:

"In December 1944, the Greek reactionary forces which opposed the setting up of a popular government in Greece, supported by British military forces whose presence, even today, constitutes one of the main causes of trouble, brought about a civil war in the country."
(S/AC.4/PV.12) Again on 10 February, at the Commission's sixteenth meeting in Athens, I stated:

"Thus, the British troops in Greece, an Allied country, constitute a danger not only to the Greek population, but to all the other Balkan peoples as well."

The Bulgarian representative said on the same question:

"If the presence of the British troops in Greece is motivated by the necessity to support a regime which is in conflict with the greater part of the Greek population, and to impose it on these people by force, the role of these troops could hardly be considered a role of appeasement and pacification. (See S/AC.4/PV.27)

The Yugoslav representative, after stressing specific cases of unwarranted interference on the part of the British troops in Greece, said:

"Therefore, the elimination of those factors is the key to the solution of the principal duty of the Investigation Commission. . ."
(S/AC.4/PV.20)

* Document S/AC.4/W/8/Add.4 (original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.16/Rev.3)

It should be noted that these statements were followed by many others, as well as by numerous letters and memoranda, all of which invariably proclaimed Britain's responsibility for the domestic troubles in Greece. The British influence on the present situation in Greece is thus substantiated. I therefore consider it essential to mention in Chapter V the British responsibility for the civil war in Greece.

I should like to stress that the testimonies made by the various witnesses before the Commission, as well as the letters and memoranda received by the Commission, contain such important judgments of British influence as "the fundamental cause of the present state of the civil war in Greece". There are very important indications of the part played by the British troops, who are referred to as "occupying forces" or "the second occupation". There are also concrete cases of collaboration between the British troops and the governmental forces against the Greek democrats, as well as cases of the arming of right wing bands by the British.

1. The spokesman of EAM stated:

"The fundamental cause of the present situation in Greece is British political intervention in our country, an intervention which has reached the point of completely destroying our national independence. ... British policy is primarily responsible for the present situation. It was Britain's armed intervention which, after the liberation, put the successive governments into office. She was responsible for the electoral coup of 31 March, by insisting on the elections taking place on that date. She was responsible for the plebiscite, and for the return of King George.

"The first prerequisite for bringing about a reconciliation in the country is the withdrawal from Greece of the British army of occupation".

2. The spokesman of the Socialist Party (ELD) said:

To say that the Greek political regime is responsible for the troubles in Greece does not mean that one should overlook the factor of

/foreign

foreign responsibility which is beyond doubt. The British factor. . . It is not easy to be reconciled to the presence of British troops in a country which is not an enemy country and therefore not an occupied country. . .

"The keynote of our policy is: the application of the Yalta Agreements in Greece and the withdrawal of foreign troops."

3. The spokesman of the left wing Liberal Party said:

"The treaty of Varkisa was violated under the eyes of the British and with their approval. . .

". . . We demand the cessation of bloodshed and the immediate withdrawal of the British troops and Commissions." (S/AC.4/IV/31)

4. The spokesman of the Youth Organization (EPCN) declared:

"The birth of the partisans was the only means of defending democratic citizens against Fascist power and tyranny. . . That is what is happening in our country which is under British occupation and a Fascist regime. The best solution of the question of our independence would be the withdrawal of the British Army."

5. General Markos, Officer Commanding the Greek democratic armies, stated in his Memorandum: "The British helped the monarchist-Fascists in every way to repudiate the treaty of Varkisa.

6. The witness Papayanis stated: (S/AC.4/SC-3/6)

"The British troops whose bayonets shielded the actions of the monarchist-Fascists, must leave Greece."

7. The witness Terzoglou, in explaining the situation in Greece, said: (S/AC.4/SC.2/FV.25)

"The existing situation is a result of the moral and material aid given to the State by the British."

8. The witness Zogas stated: (S/AC.4/SC.2/FV 25)

"The British are responsible for the present situation. They organized SEA, the military police, etc."

9. The witness Zahos, called by the Greek Government, told Team No. 1/ (S/AC.4/SC.2A/FV 12)

/"Another

"Another thing which we could not stand was the presence of the British Army in Greece, since to us it was a second army of occupation and we still consider it so. That is what decided us to join the Maquis." Concrete cases of collaboration of the British forces with the Greek Government against the democratic population are to be found both in the documents and in the evidence placed before the Commission.

I) The witness Siridopoulos Anesti stated: (S/AC.4/SC-8/ FV 2)

"In March 1945, the British, together with the monarcho-Fascists, entered the village of Notia where they rounded up all the male population whom they flogged, and, having driven them to Ardea, flogged them again.

II) The witness N. Geultsiknos said: (S/AC.4/PV.57C)

"On 28 April 1945, the British entered our villages of Prodomos and Neromylos in the district of Karadzone. . . the British killed Michael Chandzimitis of the village of Prodomos and flogged all whom they found in the street."

III. The spokesman of the left wing Liberals stated:

"A reign of terror began wherever the British set foot. And it was then that the right-wing bandits appeared (Sourlas, Vourlakis, Manganos, etc.)"

IV. General Markos' memorandum contains the following passage regarding the right-wing leaders and bands:

"Their bands are never dissolved, but they have systematically persecuted the people. Today they officially direct the bands which are thoroughly armed, clad in the uniforms of the Gendarmerie, and supplied with military equipment given them by the British."

V. The memorandum of the EAM Department of Florina (S/AC.4/SC.2A/37, No. 27, page 3) states:

"After Varkisa, considerable assistance was given to the government authorities in the provinces by the British troops, who helped them to disband local organizations and to persecute the democratic elements.

/"British

"British and Government troops jointly occupied the offices of the Regional Committee of the Greek Communist Party, plundered the Epon Club and set fire to the monument erected in memory of the members of the resistance movement. At Anynteen, they sacked the offices of the EAM organization, arrested the local EAM agents and killed Guesca, a pregnant woman. The British also took possession of the EAM offices at Vevi. In the summer of 1945, they shelled Valto, and undertook cleaning-up operations against the persecuted democratic citizens.

"Mr. Hill, the British Vice-Consul, rounded up all the balists and the Chetniks (Quislings) and handed them over to the State agents, who employed them as night watchmen in the towns and villages close to the frontier."

I beg you, Mr. Chairman, to instruct Drafting Committee II to consider the contents of this letter and add a passage to Chapter IV, stating the British culpability in the civil war in Greece.

F. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER V*

1. On the first page dealing with the allegations made by Albania, is written:

"... that Greece considers herself to be virtually at war with Albania and that she aims at confiscation of the north of Epirus and the destruction of Albania as a state. In my view, this passage does not correspond textually to what the Albanian Delegation expressed both verbally and in writing before the Commission. I said quite definitely that Greece considers herself to be at war with Albania and not "virtually at war" with Albania. I also stated that Greece is aiming at seizing territories belonging to Albania and not that she is aiming at seizing the north of Epirus."

2. On the first page is also written:

"He (the Albanian Liaison agent) said in this connection: "I have treated the question of frontier violations as part of a series of other Greek provocations directed against the independence and territorial integrity of Albania, because these frontier violations are to be accounted for within the framework of a series of incidents and do not constitute a separate problem. (See S/AC.4/PV.15, page 12. But in the document S/AC.4/PV.15, page 13 Original: French) I said in this connection:

"In the first part of my speech I have stressed the fact that it is in the interest of the Greeks alone to provoke incidents at our frontiers. I raised the question of frontier provocations as forming part of all the other Greek provocations against the integrity and independence of Albania; this question cannot be dealt with as a separate problem."

3. On page 2 (S/AC.4/W.12/Rev.2) it is stated:

"In the same declaration the Albanian liaison agent quoted the following words taken from the deposition of another Greek soldier, Jorge Kotajami, taken prisoner by the Albanians. "We were instructed

* Document S/AC.4/W.18/Add.5 (original French) - References made to draft (S/AC.4/W.12/Rev.2)

to be always on the look out for new pretexts for the provocation of the Albanians." (see S/AC.4/44.A page 14).

Actually the name of this Greek soldier was Jorgo Jotakis and not Jorgo Kotojami.

4. On the same page, immediately following, a Greek soldier who has been taken prisoner is referred to and he too was called Jorgo Kotojam. Actually this soldier's name is Jorgo Kristojanis.

5. Also on page 2, at the end of the sentence about the declaration of two Greek sailors, Emmanuel Papanikolau and Thomas Voucis, the documents S/AC.4/PV.27 page 10 - 14 should be added.

6. On page 3 (S/AC.4/W.12.R.2) in the second paragraph it is stated "four Albanian agricultural labourers, brought before the group by the Albanian liaison agent, gave evidence on 14 March with regard to incidents. Tefik Sherif stated that his brother had been killed by a shot fired by a Greek.

Here it should be emphasised that not only did Tefik Sherif give evidence on his brother's murder but all the four witnesses corroborated his statement.

7. On page 3, at the end, referring to the second witness, Maiden Ballani, it should be added that the man kidnapped by the Greek soldiers (Ferhat Hyso) was found dead three months later, in the very field from which he had been taken away. Also, for the third witness, it should be added that the witness declared that he was attacked by the Greeks during the night of November 7th, while he was grazing his sheep. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.17).

In connection with Point II of Chapter VI dealing with 'hospitality given to quislings in Greece and the subversive activities of these quislings against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia,' I beg to submit the following remarks:

/On the

On the evidence in support of the statements accusing Greece of having given shelter to war criminals and quislings:

1. On page 6 of Document S/AC.4/ W.12/Rev.2, there is a mention of a list of 19 Albanian war criminals said to have been photographed at Salonica. Now Annexe 7 of S/AC.4/44 gives a list of these criminals together with their photographs. This proves that they were moving about freely at Salonica.

2. On page 7 there is a list of former activities given by the Albanian Liaison agent, but it should be added that these were also confirmed by these Albanian war criminals and quislings. At the same time, Point b. should be more specifically worded, to read as follows: Alush Leshanaku, for the functions which he held during the German occupation: he was Commandant of the Elbasani gendarmerie; while in Point c. the name of the witness should read Prenk Previsis and not Bervitz; in Point d. Abaz Ermeni, with regard to whom the following specification should be inserted: Member of the Central Committee of the collaborationist organisation "Balli Kombetar" (In Document S/AC.2/PV.2, pages 27 - 29, Abaz Ermeni confirms that Balli Kombetar collaborated with the Germans).

In Chapter VI, dealing with the evidence in support of the accusation against Greece stating that she exercises favouritism towards war criminals and quislings: in connection with a quotation from the newspaper RIZOSPASTIS I observe that this quotation is not correct, while in Document S/AC.4/PV.13, page 8, we find the following passage:

"Immediately they arrived, the official authorities placed at their disposal the largest building in Syros: the house belonging to the reserve officers. They put in electric light, while the school is housed in ordinary dwelling houses, and two-thirds of the town of Syros is without electric light."

In the part of Chapter VI dealing with evidence in support of the

/accusation

accusation stating that Greece urges the war criminals and quislings to conspire against the Albanian Government, there are the following words to be added:

1. On page 9, we read: "in accordance with the allegations of the Liaison agent, Ditar Kurtezi stated during his trial that he had entered Albanian territory etc "

I do not think this is fair, for Muharem Feim Boshanki declared before the Tribunal: "Ditar Kurtezi told me that before long the British army would come to Albania, accompanied by the Albanians now in Greece and by the Greek Army, to overthrow the present Government. We must organize guerilla to prepare for this operation and to help them." (S/AC.4/PV.13, page 16).

2. On page 9, in the following paragraph, dealing with a war criminal, Dule Alarupi, it should be added that he was killed quite close to the Greco-Albanian frontier. (S/AC.4/PV.13, page 17 and Annexe no. 13)

3. On page 9, we read: "The Albanian Liaison agent similar groups were sent to Greece by Mousqitis. Here these words should be added "by Lieutenant Colonel Mousaqitis, Commander of the Corfu garrison."

G. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II, CHAPTER I AND ON PART III*

As regards Chapter I (A), on the Greek charges against Albania, there is nothing to support it beyond the statements made by witnesses either to Greek authorities or to the Commission. This fact is noteworthy in view of the far-reaching character of these charges. On the one hand there are charges which, according to the Greek Government, may furnish full explanations on the disturbed internal situation, whilst, on the other hand, the only proof offered is the statements of witnesses. From this one can realize the extremely wide gap between the Greek charges and the evidence to substantiate them; this also reveals the extremely slight value of these charges, which indeed appear increasingly flimsy as more and more forged evidence is adduced.

With a view to hiding the true reasons for the disturbed situation in Greece, the Greek Government brings charges against neighbours. The policy of bringing unfounded charges - a policy adopted by the Greek Government - is reflected both inside and outside the country. Within the country there are thousands of deportations and arrests of innocent persons and of convictions on trumped-up charges. This policy of unfounded charges also attacks the democratic organizations within the country. The same policy is reflected in foreign relations. It goes without saying that the experience gathered in inventing charges within the country is also applied in foreign cases. To this should be added the fact that such charges represent a means of pursuing a policy of aggression against the northern neighbours, and internally they are calculated to alienate the masses of the people from the Greek democratic movement, which is stigmatized as a foreign and hostile product. At home a fierce attack against any democratic manifestation is carried on by the double method of direct attack and progressive isolation; abroad

* Document S/AC.4/PV.85/ Part II (original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.10/Rev.2).

this policy takes the form of a sustained campaign against the democratic countries of the Balkans. But in order that this attack (in the form of charges against the other three Balkan countries) should have the desired effect, the Greek rulers had to fabricate supporting evidence. In this way we reach the chain of statements by Greek witnesses, which is all that exists to prove the charges. If, now that the investigation is over, the charges brought by the Greek Government and the validity of the evidence is scrutinized and if they are compared with the facts of the situation as brought out by abundant solid proof, the emptiness of the Greek allegations is easily seen.

This worthlessness of the Greek charges becomes increasingly clear if the Greek evidence, or more correctly the Greek witnesses, are examined.

Various important features characterize both the witnesses and the value of their statements:

(a) All the Greek witnesses were produced without any evidence of identification. Serious doubts arose in this connection during the hearing of witnesses. The Commission even found it necessary to order an inquiry to establish the identity of the witness Velianidis (See S/AC.4/PV/40).

(b) If the work of the Commission during the hearing of Greek witnesses is examined, it will be found that the witnesses were persons prepared in advance to state and maintain what they had been taught. They were prisoners awaiting trial or else persons under sentence of death whose lives depended on their conduct towards the Commission of Investigation. Some, by saying the right thing in their evidence, saved their lives; others regained their

liberty. If, for example, we take the case of the witness Valtadoros, we find that he said: "Four persons were sentenced to death at the same time as myself".

"They (these persons) have already been executed." And he went on to say:

"I think they wanted to keep me in order to give evidence before you today against neighbouring countries."

He went on to say:

"What month is it now? I do not exactly remember when the others were executed. Just now I thought it was in October, but I think it was more probably in November 1946." That was the very time when the Greek Government was collecting forced and forged statements in support of its complaint in December. This shows clearly the procedure followed by the Greek rulers in the choice of statements (S/AC.4/PV/36).

Those witnesses who had been tried or sentenced to death and who agreed to give false evidence were spared the death penalty, whilst those who did not consent to lying, that is to say to play the Government's game, were executed. There is also the case of the witnesses Stavros Kentros and Nikolla Tsipis. These two witnesses were members of a partisan group consisting of Nassis, Leonidas Raptis, Koculidhis, Beshos, Djofou, Djoupi, Julas, Vlahos, Caras, and others. Stavros, Kentros, Tsipis, Raptis, Koculidhis, Beshos, Djofou, Djoupi, Julas, Vlahos and Caras all fell into the hands of the Greek authorities. In August and September 1946 a court was set up in Janina to try most of these prisoners. In connection with this, at the 27th meeting at Athens, I read a passage from Leonidas Raptis' speech to the Military Court of Janina on 6 September 1946 which was published by the Janina newspaper. He stated that the indictment

/against

against him said nothing of his having been in Albania and being given arms etc. It may be well to quote the passage once again:

RAPTIS. "Mr. President, Judges and Prosecuting Counsel, the charges in my indictment are the following:

- "1. We organized an armed band;
- "2. We attacked the post of Korofilaque de Grameno;
- "3. We fought against the Korofilaque units;
- "4. We were in possession of firearms.

"Yesterday and today, throughout the whole trial the curious circumstance has arisen that the prisoner has to defend himself, not against the indictment but against other 100% hyperbolic and invented charges such as that we received arms from Albania, killed inhabitants of Korofilaque at Negradhes and so on, and also that there was a Russian in our bands."

"The President of the court said: 'Prisoner, no such thing has been said.'

"Leonidas Raptis replied: 'Yes, Mr. President, it was said by the witness M. Ficio, Captain of the Gendarmerie, who spoke of Serbs, Bulgarians and Russians.'"

The important point about the Raptis trial was that the President of the court, speaking on the charges which Raptis had described as hyperbolic, said: "Prisoner, no such thing has been said." How comes it that Kentros and Tsipis made statements accepting as true the charges which Raptis described as hyperbolic?

It is quite simple, Raptis has been executed whilst Kentros is free. In this connection Kentros said that after he had been imprisoned an amnesty was declared and for that reason he had not been tried. In document S/AC.4/FV/27 (page 9) I pointed out that

the tendentious charges against Albania were repudiated not only by Raptis but also by the other accused who were members of the same band, such as Koculidhis, Beshos, Djofou, Djoupi, Julas and the two wounded men Vlahos and Caras. In this connection also the witness Tsipis said that to his knowledge Raptis had stated he had never been to Albania and that the other seven had also not gone to Albania.

Then there is the case of the witness Boptis, who had been sentenced to death and who asked by letter, to testify before the Commission on the Government terror. But when he came before the Commission he said the contrary, surely because he had been put under pressure.

(c) Some of the witnesses offered by the Greek Government are opportunists. The business of giving false evidence on behalf of the Greek Government has earned them not only their release, but also the protection of the Greek Government.

(d) Some of the Greek witnesses working in the Greek Army Information Service were in any case ready to do a great deal more than give false evidence. Take the case of the witness Zafiriz. On being asked for an identity card, he showed a document issued by Headquarters which said: "Service Note. Zafiriz Georghios, son of Farmalis, a native of the village of Liko de Filiates, is a temporary resident here. This document is issued to him for exclusive use in his relations with the Athens Police. Dated Athens 31 December 1946. Office of the Director of Army Headquarters Information (signature) No. 33.614...."

(e) Among the witnesses there were persons prepared to do a great deal more than give false evidence. There were criminals.

It will be enough to mention the case of the witnesses Llazaros Tsacoussis and Anastassios Portoulas, who were involved in the assassination of Zevgos, a former Minister and a member of the Central E.A.M. Committee at Salonika on 20 March.

(f) Among the Greek witnesses there were some who had been physically and morally tortured, as is proved by many documents submitted to the Commission (cf. the case of the witness Valtadoros S/AC.4 - SC/1/1). The witness Thomas Zahos called by the Greek Government declared that he was compelled by threats to sign a statement prepared in advance by a third person.

(g) Among the Greek witnesses there were war criminals and common thieves.

Let us mention a few cases:

The witness Mehmet Karafili Kotsinako is an individual who had been engaged in the most shady transactions and had been arrested redhanded but managed to escape from prison. (See document S/AC.4/212 submitted to the Commission, particularly the warrant for arrest issued by the Attorney-General (facsimile) where he is described as an embezzler and charged with abuse of office. See also documents S/AC.4/167 and S/AC.4/FV/54.-2.)

2. The witness Halil Celik Doko, a deserter from the Albanian Army, known as an immoral individual and a thief and ready to commit the most heinous offences, who was arrested but managed to escape from prison. During the German occupation of Albania he was one of a band in the service of the Germans (see documents S/AC.4/FV/54 and S/AC.4/167).

In the White Book entitled "Evidence in Support of the Greek Appeal" there are statements in evidence by Kol Bib Doda, who served in the Fascist Militia under Italian occupation. Later he entered
/the service

the service of Kol Bib Mirakaj, Minister of the Fascist party during the Italian occupation. He was well known as a looter. (See document S/AC.4/157 submitted to the Commission.)

In the same White Book there are statements by Rakip Muco who served in the Fascist Militia during the Italian occupation.

It will easily be realized that such persons are capable of making any sort of statement. They are identified with the anti-Albanian cause by earlier acts against their country and are thus ready to do anything against it.

(h) The fact that several Greek witnesses furnished fresh evidence to the Greek authorities whilst the Commission of Investigation was already in Greece shows that the witnesses had been briefed at the last moment by the Greek authorities in their own interests.

1. The witness Kontopanos is reported on page 2 of document S/AC.4/PV/34 to have stated on 26 February:

"I was constantly being asked for explanations and I gave some before February."

On page 6 of the same document, Kontopanos said:

"After the arrival of the Commission of Investigation, that is to say, during February, I was asked for explanations on certain points." But it was on 26 February that Kontopanos also came to testify before the Commission. This shows that some time before his appearance before the Commission, the witness had made fresh statements, presumably on advice from others but not in accordance with the facts. The witness Zahos said that Kontopanos' statements had been prepared in the same way as his own, that is to say, by third persons.

2. Like Kontopanos, the witness Gatsios made fresh statements in February 1947 differing from those given in the Greek White Book, (S/AC.4/PV/34 and 35).

He went so far as to state openly before the Commission that the evidence in the Greek White Book was false and that he denied it. Nor could he explain to the Commission his reasons for going back on his earlier evidence. He said that he was appearing before the United Nations and felt bound to speak the truth. But previously he had given his earlier depositions under oath, hence he was also bound to speak the truth.

(i) Some documents submitted to the Commission clearly reveal the system used by the Greek rulers in falsifying evidence. On this point, see document S/AC.4/220 and its eleven annexes. In this connection the case of the priest Dimitriadis, who was to have been heard as a witness, should be mentioned. The Greek liaison officer reported that this priest had made no request and had no information to offer the Commission. The priest himself sent a letter to the Commission, dated 21 March 1947, explaining that he was unable to testify before the Commission as he was ill. This is another instance of pressure being brought to bear by the Greek authorities on witnesses who wished to be heard by the Commission.

There are other cases from which it appears clearly that the Greek authorities used physical and moral pressure to procure false evidence. (See statements by the witness Georgios Kirainakis, who had been sentenced to death, document S/AC.4/SC.7/PV.6).

In the Greek White Book entitled "Evidence in Support of the Greek Appeal," there are altogether thirty-one Greek witnesses in support of the charges; only ten of these implicate Albania.

/Moreover,

Moreover, the same book quotes ten other witnesses of Albanian nationality. To these must be added the witnesses Tsaoussi's Lazaros and Tsaklaropoulos, not included in the thirty-one Greek witnesses given in the White Book, who did, however, refer to Albania in their depositions. There are therefore altogether twenty-two Greek witnesses referring to Albania. Only thirteen of these were heard by the Commission of Investigation (eight by the Commission itself and five by Team 1/A). In the list of witnesses interrogated by the Commission which was submitted by the Greek liaison officers, there are altogether fifty-one witnesses in support of the Greek charges against the northern neighbours.

Albanian Refutation

As originally drafted, Chapter I contained six charges, including the charge against Albania concerning the recruitment of refugees for partisan units. Chapter I, as at present drafted, no longer mentions this charge because there has been no proof or evidence to substantiate it. The first part of this chapter merely gives Kentros' evidence that Leonidas Raptis had gone to Albania and was recruiting there. The fact that there is no evidence in support of this charge is very significant, showing that the charges against Albania are not based on any facts or documents and, consequently, do not hold water.

A. Training of Refugees

The refutation of this charge contains indisputable facts rebutting the Greek allegations.

1. At the 16th meeting of the Committee of Investigation at Athens, I said:

/ "We have

"We have nothing to hide. The Albanian Government gave sanctuary to a small number of Greek democrats fleeing to Albanian territory to escape persecution and terror. The Albanian people could not adopt any other attitude towards these people for that would have been contrary to the principles of its war of liberation, to its Constitution (Chapter III, Article 36), and to the principles of the war of the Greek nation against the occupying Power. All these refugees went to Yugoslavia at the end of 1945. Is that what the Greek Government calls and is trying to represent as interference in Greek domestic affairs?"

2. The report of the Commission set up by the Albanian Government to investigate the question of the Rubig camp. This report was submitted to Team 1/A (document S/AC.4/SC.2A/21). It is followed by statements of witnesses in support. That report says that the number of Greek refugees reached 300. They were all disarmed, they never received military training, they never left the camp in northern Albania. They were kept supplied with provisions and clothing by the Albanian Government, but these supplies were neither abundant nor of good quality.

3. The witness Zahos told Team 1/A that immediately upon entering Albania in 1945 he and his comrades were disarmed.

His statement contained the following passage:

"We stayed at Rubig until 18 October 1945. Each of us carried various sums which we had brought with us. We had asked for work in the Rubig factories but, although we had been promised work there, these promises never came to anything and our money gradually melted away. We later learned that in Yugoslavia there was a village where Greek refugees and persecuted people could go and work."

Zahos also stated that there was no military or political training given at Rubig.

4. There were three other Greek witnesses speaking in support of the Greek accusations on the Rubig camp. But their depositions contained contradictions with the evidence contained in the White Book and these discrepancies further strengthen the refutation.

(a) I have already commented on the witnesses above.

(b) The witness Gatsios, as reported in the Greek White Book, said that most of the men at Rubig were idle, apart from those working as cooks, bakers and so on; but when testifying before the Commission he spoke of a great deal of military training.

According to the Greek White Book, he said that they were not allowed to go more than two kilometres beyond the camp, but before the Commission he testified that he climbed the surrounding hills.

According to Gatsios, the Greek refugees left Rubig for Yugoslavia about the middle of October 1945, and he also said that the military courses of instruction at Boulkes began in April 1946 and that there were at least five months during which there were no military courses. This is a very significant fact. If it is borne in mind that according to the witness the purpose of military training at Rubig and Boulkes was to train troops for fighting in Greece, why then should five months be allowed to pass by without any such activity? This is not clear at all, but some light is shed on the question by the evidence of Thomas Zakos who denies the contents of these statements (see S/AC.4/SC.2A/FV.12).

On pages 30 and 31 of document S/AC.4/FV.34 and in the White Book, Gatsios is reported to have said that he left Rubig for Yugoslavia in mid-October and yet, at the same time, he says that he heard the speech made by the director of the criminal police at Tirana on the anniversary of the liberation of Tirana. But the liberation of Tirana took place on 17 November 1944 and the anniversary is celebrated on that date.

/(c) The witness

(c) The witness Zefiris said that he went to Yugoslavia from Rubig via Elbasani and Chrida, but there was a contradiction in the statement about the motor trip from Elbasan to the Yugoslav frontier. To do this trip by motor car without any mechanical defect or other incident, the witness said he took a whole day, although, even going slowly, this trip should not take more than three hours.

5. The publication and application of the Manual of Military Regulations at Rubig are in flagrant contradiction with the situation of the camp. In their written depositions not a single one of these witnesses mentioned this book. And the witnesses say that this book was applied at a time when the economic situation of the Rubig camp left a great deal to be desired. Gatsios also said that the school at Rubig was open to everybody. Anniva's said that all the refugees could read the Manual, but the introduction states that it is for the use of Communists. This must be taken to mean that it was intended for Communists only. Hence, we get the position that it is asserted, on the one hand, that there was public work, a school, a book for everybody, whether Communists or not, and, on the other hand, that there was little work and that only for Communists. This does not make sense. Gatsios testified that at the Rubig camp there were only about ten weapons, most of them revolvers, whereas the application of the Manual calls for the equipment of a modern, organized army.

6. In connection with military training at Rubig, it should also be emphasized that Gatsios, in the depositions reproduced in the Greek White Book, said that most of the refugees were idle whilst the witness Zefiris, in his depositions in the Greek White Book, says nothing of military training.

As regards the internment of refugees, see also my letters of 14 and 15 May to the Chairman of the Second Drafting Committee.

B. Providing Guerillas with Weapons and Supplies

In support of the refutation, the following may be mentioned:

1. With my letter S/AC.4/230, I submitted to the Commission 38 statements by peasants, shepherds, rural policemen and frontier guards living in the neighbourhood of the frontier. These statements bring out clearly that nothing took place on our frontiers at the time of the incidents mentioned by the Greek Government and the crossings of the frontiers by Greek partisans, including the crossings referred to in the charge of supplying the Greek guerrillas.

The witness Tseteroklis Teyanos, in his statements refers to this charge. On page 12 (document S/AC.4/PV/46) Tseteroklis says that "those who gave us weapons were our own people, Greeks".

And further on, still speaking on the same subject, he said, "They were liaison officers who used to go to and from Yugoslavia".

There is no word about the Albanian authorities.

On page 13 the witness said that the weapons were hidden in a pit on Albanian territory.

There is no point in arms being hidden in pits on Albanian territory. There was no reason to fear that these arms might be discovered by anybody since, according to the accusation, the Albanian authorities themselves were supplying the Greek partisans. It is more reasonable to assume that these weapons were not on Albanian territory at all but in pits in Greek territory. This assumption is further corroborated by the fact that those distributing the weapons were Greeks.

/The same

The same witness indulges in suppositions in his evidence as quoted in the Greek White Book, but he was unable to explain this before the Commission (see page 13).

According to the witness, we come down to this alternative: either the weapons were hidden in Greece, or else they were supplied by the Albanian authorities.

The witness repeatedly declared that the arms were hidden in pits, and it may therefore be deduced that the Albanian authorities did not supply arms.

(3) The witness Vélianidis gave some information furnishing a good reply to this charge. On page 19 of document S/AC.4/FV/40, he said:

"The chief Siapkas had been hiding arms and ammunition in the mountains since 1945. When we arrived, we sought them out and used them."

Vélianidis, speaking of the arms of his partisan group, clearly states that he found them hidden on Greek territory where they had been since 1945. This is a very important fact towards proving that the band received no armaments from northern neighbours of Greece. This fact further corroborates the statements of Trayanis Tseteroklis that the arms mentioned by him as having been hidden in pits were not on Albanian but on Greek territory.

The same witness Vélianidis also spoke of the armaments of other partisan groups. He related that arms were coming from Yugoslavia to Albania and thence to Greece. But when the witness was asked why this should be the procedure followed for sending arms to partisans, he replied: "in order not to reveal that the arms came from Yugoslavia".

Such a demonstration is valueless. The way in which this witness refers to the question of partisans being provided with arms by Albania clearly shows that Albania is doing nothing of the kind.

(4) The witness Mehmet Karafili Kotsinako:

In the last few days before his appearance before the Commission he had been briefed to testify as he did. This is brought out clearly by a comparison of his written deposition in the Greek White Book with his oral statement before the Commission.

The difference between the two statements is very great and shows provocation.

In the Greek White Book the witness speaks only of things he has heard, not of things he has seen himself.

The witness also lied when stating the reasons for his escape from prison and entry into Greece. (See document S/AC.4/PV/54-2).

From this it may be deduced that the meeting referred to by the witness at the Ministry of Home Affairs is a lie and a provocation.

He gives a curious and incomprehensible explanation of the Albanian Government's methods but offers no proof of the veracity of his evidence.

Unqualified persons took part in the meeting (Kotsinako himself was in charge of the Ministry's Department for the Prevention of Crime).

He said that he had noticed that he had been suspected since December 1945; he was in disagreement with the Government but later held a more important appointment, and as chief of the police became responsible for the prevention of crime. In these circumstances he took part in a meeting to give arms to Greek partisans. This is very curious. But he explains it all by saying that: "I was a member of the Communist Party".

/He was

He was dissatisfied and suspected, and yet he was given a more important appointment. This is very strange.

The witness lied when he told the Commission that he did not speak English. After some discussions, the Chairman said: "I notice that the witness understands at least part of what has been said in languages other than Albanian".

This is also proved at the end where the witness says: "This concerns the telegram about Pilo Peristere. This person is a Communist and will not give any answer likely to assist your Commission".

How is it that the witness, without knowing any language spoken in the Commission except Albanian, understood that there was talk of a telegram concerning Pilo Peristere? He had not been told about the telegram in Albanian. This proves, as I have said, that the witness speaks English. It also proves that the witness is a liar. He evidently wanted to conceal the fact that he spoke English in order to hear what was being discussed in the Commission so that he could more easily understand and reply to questions.

There is also some discrepancy between the statement on the meeting to decide the supply of arms to Greek partisans and the statement that such arms were already being supplied.

(6) The witness Zahos, called by the Greek Government, said that the partisans received no arms from Albania. (See document S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.11). On pages 2 and 3 of document S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.12 Zahos also states:

"At that time we were told that a company of andartes had attacked and disarmed a formation": hence this company possessed arms. "They had been given to us to be taken to our Preveza area."

/(7) The witness

(7) The witness Christos Lois, called by the Greek Government to testify before Team 1/A, stated:

"We met Greek andartes who had arms hidden away, of which they gave us some." (See document S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV 21).

(8) To prove that arms are hidden on Greek territory, see the statements by the Greek witness Stefanos Kalantais; he says he was arrested because some arms had been found hidden in his vineyards. Before the court, 43 such hidden weapons were mentioned. See document S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 7).

(9) The witness Perikles Kanourghios said that he had been sentenced to death for having hidden arms. (See document S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 18).

(10) The spokesman of E.A.M. states on page 46:

"It was quite natural that there should be a certain quantity of arms of German and particularly of Italian origin in Greece. Some of these made up the partisans' first equipment. The remainder came from booty captured in the course of clashes with the Gendarmerie and the Army or from the capture of whole military depots, as at Descati, and the disarming of armed monarchists. They (the Governments) should know exactly what the partisans possess. All they have to do is to make a list of their own armed equipment and they know it. That is why the foreign journalists who went to the partisans and remained with them all agree that their armed equipment is new English material."

(11) Dossier No. 24 of the documents submitted by E.A.M. Dossier No. 24: the andartes (partisans) Table of contents" notes 74 cases which clearly show the true source of partisans' armaments. Paragraph 2 of this document quotes some (74) of the countless documents which reveal the sources of supplies of arms to the andartes.

It is clear that the partisans obtain their supplies by attacking Government Forces.

(12) The witnesses Kostas Sirinjotis (1 March 47 Pavlos Elias) Papayannis Dimitrois (the new prison 1 March) Chairman
/of the

of the Labour Council at Salonika, Colonel Tsinganos Nikolaos (Pavlos Melas 3 March) Joannis Nikolayevi (Polighiro 4 March) Agapitos Anastasios (8 March Chamber of Commerce) all informed Team D that all the armaments of Greek partisans originated from within the country.

(13) The witness Andrea Djimas (S/AC.4/SC.2A) told Team I at Icaria, in connexion with the Greek charges that Greece's northern neighbours were arming people and sending them to Greece: "I know of none who came back armed and I consider the whole story as a myth, a fairy tale."

(14) Team I made contact with a group of partisans in Thessaly. Witnesses were heard. The witness Zerzoglou, one of the partisan commanders, stated that the partisans were receiving no help from abroad, but were obtaining their weapons by disarming right wing bands and the gendarmes and soldiers of the Greek Government (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.17).

(15) Four witnesses heard by Team I/A who had been called by the Commission following statements by the witness Kotsinako, denied taking part in the so-called conference at the Ministry of Home Affairs mentioned by Kotsinako. (See document S/AC.2A/SR.17).

(16) General Grigoriadis, leader of the left wing liberal party, informed the Commission:

"It is entirely false that the partisans are armed by the neighbours of Greece. Their arms are made in England and come from soldiers whom they take prisoner and disarm."

C. Despatching Guerilla Detachments Across the Frontier into Greece.

In support of the refutation the following may be mentioned:

1. The "A" and "B" reports of the two Commissions appointed by the Albanian Government to investigate the frontier incidents and the crossings of the frontier by Greek partisans (according to charges brought by the Greek Government). These two reports were submitted with my letter (document S/AC.4/23C). There are also the eighty-eight statements circulated in document S/AC.4/230. These documents all contain rebuttals of the Greek charges and prove beyond doubt that the Greek charges are untruthful and unfounded.

2. The witness Velianides Christos. There are some flagrant contradictions in his depositions. In connection with this charge, he does not actually state either in his deposition as reported in the Greek White Book, or when testifying before the Commission (document S/AC.4/PV/39) that Siapas crossed from Albania into Greece in September 1946. In the White Book he gives the date as mid-April 1946; before the Commission he changed his mind several times and finally fixed upon the date of August 1946 but does not refer to Albanian territory.

Velianidis gives varying numbers of partisans for the same band; on one occasion he speaks of twenty and on another of thirty men. There are discrepancies between the Greek White Book entitled "Incidents on the Greek Frontier" and the Greek Memorandum of 3 December to the Security Council and the witness' depositions. The book "Incidents on the Greek frontier", speaking of the incident on the Albanian frontier on 7 November says:

"On 7 November 1946 an engagement took place near the village of Sfiha, seven kilometres to the northwest of Andartikon, between Army and Gendarmerie detachments on the one hand and a large armed band on the other. During this clash twenty-three bandits were killed. Their bodies were found on the scene of the engagement. The other bandits crossed into Albanian territory."

(4) The witness Zehos denied he passed through Albania (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 12).

(5) Zois Christos (S/AC.4/SC.2A/FV/21) told Team No. I in answer to the question whether he was sure of having passed through Albania: "We travelled by train as far as Skoplje, then we took a car and crossed the frontier during the night. I cannot tell for sure whether it was the Albanian, Bulgarian or Yugoslav frontier".

D. Hospitalizing Wounded Guerillas

On every occasion on which this charge was taken up in statements by witnesses it was proved that there was no such hospitalization and that the charge was based on ridiculous assertions which proved exactly the contrary.

1. Fotios Kontopanos.

In the Greek White Book, "Evidence in support of the Greek Appeal" page 62, it is stated that Kontopanos was wounded in the leg and sent to hospital at Tirana in October 1945. On 25 November he left hospital and departed for Yugoslavia. The important point to note here is that the Greek Book nowhere mentions the document referred to in the Greek Memorandum of 3 December to the Security Council, which was found in Kontopanos' possession. It is endeavoured to prove from this document that Albania is giving assistance to wounded Greek partisans, but it in no way substantiates the charge.

In the first place Kontopanos was not wounded in Greece but at Rubig in northern Albania.

Then the Albanian Government agreed to give asylum to a small number of Greek democrats who took refuge in Albanian

/territory

territory to escape persecution and terrorism; all these refugees went to Yugoslavia in October 1945.

If we accept all this, it will be quite logical also to admit that if one of these refugees was ill we would not have left him to die, but would have cured him. According to Kontopanos he was wounded at Rubig in October 1945. At that time he was not a guerilla fighter, but simply a political refugee. According to Kontopanos himself he did not become a guerilla fighter until about a year later when he went back to Greece.

Hence the Kontopanos document, so far from substantiating the Greek charge, in fact substantiates the refutation because it shows clearly what this charge is based on.

The witness Velianidis Christos informed the Commission that he was a liaison officer between groups of Greek partisans and Albania and that he transported casualties.

In his written deposition in the Greek White Book, this is not mentioned. Nothing like it is mentioned even in the full deposition before the Greek authorities, even though the witness himself said that he testified in these terms before them (S/AC.4/PV/39, pages 30 and 31).

(3) In Tseterollis' evidence there are discrepancies concerning the charge of hospitalizing wounded guerillas. His depositions can in no way be regarded as supporting the charge.. He informed the Commission:

"I myself did not go to the hospital at all." In reply to the second question he said: "Whenever somebody was wounded while we were in the mountains he was taken to hospital." Further on, speaking of casualties, he said: "Yes, they crossed the frontier and went to Serbian territory." On page 32, speaking of casualties from the Greek interior who are said to

/have been

have been taken to the frontier, he said "No, I have never heard of that".

On page 11 of S/AC.4/PV/46 the same witness said "I stayed on the Vouma mountain for about thirty days. I took no part in any attack. The men of the band when passing through villages would take some food and we would live in the mountains all the time".

Now compare this with what was said previously: "Whenever somebody was wounded he was taken to hospital". But if there were no attacks, there would not be any wounded. This proves that his evidence is false and worthless. Moreover, on page 17 he says: "There were no casualties in my band, but when I was at Monastir I used to see that people who had been fighting in Greece and had been wounded were taken to Albanian territory through Monastir".

E. Crossing by Greeks into Albania

The refutation is supported by:

1. Reports "A" and "B" of the two Commissions appointed by the Albanian Government to investigate the frontier incidents and crossings over the frontier by Greek partisans (according to Greek charges, document S/AC.4/215) as well as by the eighty-eight statements submitted to the Commission (see document S/AC.4/230). All these reject this charge as false.

2. One Albanian witness, Halil Doko, about whom I have already spoken earlier on, testified in favour of the Greek contention. His depositions show that he was a member of a band in the service of the Germans. In his deposition he speaks

only of having seen two Greek officers cross into Albania, and four others in November 1946 at Jergucat; that is all.

But if the matter is considered a little more closely it will be found that he gave various dates and mentioned various facts which conflict with each other. I spoke about this witness Doko earlier on. A glance at the document (S/AC.4/167) will suffice to show, inter alia, that he escaped from the prison of Argyrokastró on 14 November 1946 and not from the Jergutsat prison on 12 December 1946. (S/AC.4/IV/54).

3. Tsacussis Ilazaros.

This was one of the thirteen Greek witnesses who spoke in support of the Greek charges against Albania. When testifying before the Commission, he mentioned the fact that on 9 November 1944 a group of combatants from Gotchev crossed from Greece into Albania on the way to Yugoslavia. It has been proved that at that time there were no frontier guards on the frontiers of Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. This evidence proves that the Greek charges (S/AC.4/IV/48-2 page 4) are ridiculous.

4. The witness Velianidis Christos.

This witness confuses both the dates on which Greek partisans are alleged to have crossed the frontier and the number of the members in his unit.

Conclusions

The Greek charges against Albania concerning the groups of partisans are supported:

(a) By the evidence given before the Greek authorities and the Commission;

(b) By the documents (the certificate of discharge from the hospital of Tirana) taken from Kontopenos in Greece.

(c) The three documents taken from Tsipis showing that he had been in Albania.

/If the

If the above material in support of the Greek charges is examined it will be found:

that the moral, political and judicial qualities of the Greek witnesses are not those of trustworthy witnesses;

that the evidence given before the Commission contains internal contradictions and conflicts with the evidence in the Greek White Book and the Greek memorandum to the Security Council dated December;

that the witnesses were predisposed in favour of the Greek Government's case and prepared to state and maintain what they had been told to say in advance;

that moral and physical pressure was brought to bear on the witnesses who appeared before the Commission;

that the Greek Government's system of falsifying evidence has been shown up;

that the evidence offered was falsified;

that the documents in support are insignificant and should be rejected as worthless (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.11 and S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.26);

that the document, (certificate of discharge from the hospital), which was not even considered by the Commission, is of no value.

Whereas the Albanian refutation is confirmed by reports "A", "B" and "C" (S/AC.4/215 and S/AC.4/SC 2A/21), of the three Commissions appointed by the Albanian Government to investigate the Rubig camp, the frontier incidents and crossing of the frontier by Greek partisans (alleged by the Greeks) as well as by the eighty-eight statements (S/AC.4/230);

Whereas the Albanian refutation is corroborated further by trustworthy statements from political organizations having the welfare, peace and democratic life of their country at heart;

/and since

and since the Albanian refutation is further corroborated by trustworthy evidence given by private persons having the peace and normal life of their country at heart;

and since the Albanian refutation is further corroborated by an abundance of authentic documents submitted to the Commission by political organizations;

Therefore the Albanian delegation to the Commission of Investigation considers that the Greek charges regarding groups of partisans are unfounded, are not substantiated, are false and represent a slander upon Albania.

H. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II, CHAPTER III AND ON PART III*

(1) Greek Charges in Respect of Provocation of Border Incidents
by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia

At the Commission's sixth meeting at Athens, the Greek Liaison Officer submitted the booklet entitled, "Incidents on the Greek Frontier". The interesting point is that the Greek Liaison Officer put the Greek cases at that meeting. Anybody would expect that when the Greek case was put, all the Greek charges would be brought forward. But I find that the charge concerning frontier incidents alleged to have been provoked by Greece's northern neighbours, hardly appears at all in the statement of the Greek case.

The form in which Mr. Kyrrou presented his charges was simply to invite the Commission to "reconstruct the incidents on the Greek-Albanian frontier". Mr. Kyrrou hardly speaks of a visit to the Yugoslav frontier and nowhere mentions the Bulgarian frontier. It would appear that the Greek Government attaches little importance to the presentation of the problem of frontier incidents and the arguments and documentation thereon. It would also appear that it is sufficient to bring up such a problem and to accuse peaceful States simply by saying:

"I further have the honour to submit two documents at this point. One of them contains a list of frontier incidents between 1 January and 31 December 1946."

Mr. Kyrrou in his statement nowhere mentions the charge that these incidents were provoked by Greece's northern neighbours.

That, in a few words, is the Greek case on the frontier incidents.

The Greek Government thus handed the Commission of Investigation the pamphlet on "Incidents on the Greek Frontier", and left it at that.

* Document S/AC.4/PV.85/Part II (original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.2)

After studying this pamphlet we were able to classify the 109 frontier incidents as follows:

- (a) 39 incidents in which firing on the frontier is reported.
- (b) 28 incidents occasioned by Albanian soldiers crossing the Greek frontier.
- (c) 16 incidents against Greek frontier posts.
- (d) 11 incidents of partisans crossing the Greek frontier on their way from Greece to Albania. Two of these incidents are cases of partisans going in the direction of Albania.
- (e) 4 incidents of Greek partisans crossing the frontier from Albania into Greece. In one of these cases, there was an attempt to assist partisans to enter Greece and in another there was a clash with three persons who had come from Albania.
- (f) One incident of theft.
- (g) 10 miscellaneous incidents of engagements between Greek soldiers and Greek partisans which do not concern Albania; damage done by Albanian soldiers killed on the frontier when wishing to enter Greece illegally; and a reference to a Greek subject killed on Greek territory by Greek soldiers.

With my letter S/AC.4/W-18 dated 12 May I submitted an annex with particulars on this classification.

1. On the contents of the book, "Incidents on the Greek Frontier".

- (a) No evidence in support of this book was submitted by the Greek Government. It is purely and simply a catalogue of 109 incidents. That is what Mr. Kyrou said when he submitted the document to the Commission.

/(b) In support

(b) In support of the charge in respect of provocation of border incidents, or rather in support of this book, there is only one summary of a statement by an Albanian deserter, Tzema Nizat, which reads as follows: "Nizat is of the opinion that all incidents on the Greek-Albanian frontier are provoked by order of the Albanian military authorities to strengthen the morale of the Albanian soldiers".

(c) In the book there are ten incidents which have nothing to do with the charge.

(d) The book mentions no incidents at sea or in the air.

(e) There are some incidents, the date and place of which coincide with incidents we have brought to the notice of the Commission. If the text of the two documents in support and the method of their treatment are compared, it will be seen clearly that our charges have been turned into counter-charges. Take, for example, the incidents of 11 and 12 July which on page 21 of the Greek book are reported as follows:

"On 11 July 1946, Albanians abducted the Greek fishermen Pritis and Theodoron while they were fishing near the coast of Ftelia-Sayades in Greek territorial waters.

"On 12 July 1946, 40 Albanian partisans entered Greek territory at the place Ftelia-Sayades and fired at 5 men of Greek nationality from Northern Epirus. The fate of three of them is not known. They were either killed or captured."

For these incidents see our statement (S/AC.4/44A, pages 11 and 12) (see also statements by Philip Pandaziu, Angjello Prifti and Aleksander Theodhoru annexed to the text). Our statement brings out clearly that these two so-called fishermen were sent to the Albanian coast by Lieutenant-Colonel Mousakitis, commandant of the Corfu garrison, to bring back

/five bandits

five bandits (Philip L. daziu etc.) who had been sent to Albania a few days previously. The incident of 11 July quoted by the Greek book represents the end of the incident between paragraphs 74 and 75 (S/AC.5 44A, pages 11 and 12). The fact that we are here dealing with a charge which has been turned into a counter-charge by the Greek authorities is also proved by the fact that the two individuals came from Corfu and according to the Greek book had come to a place off the coast of Corfu and near the coast of Sayades-Etelia to fish. The Greek argument falls to the ground because Corfu fishermen might quite well be fishing near the coast of Corfu and not near the Sayades-Etelia coast where the Greek-Albanian frontier is situated. The next thing that strikes one is that the report of the incident of 12 July does not give the names of the five Greek nationals (who are Albanian nationals, refugees in Greece) in the service of Lieutenant-Colonel Mousakitis. And what were these five Greek nationals doing in the Etelia-Sayades area which is uninhabited? Where did they come from? Nothing is said about all this.

(f) A study of the Greek incidents leads to the conclusion that most of them took place at points where the Greeks hold dominating frontier positions. Surely it is more plausible to suppose that those in a dominating position and not those in an unfavourable position caused the provocation.

(2) Discrepancies between the French and English Texts of the Book, "Incidents on the Greek Frontier"

(a) There are various dates under which the same incidents are reported. There are twelve incidents in respect of which the dates given in the two texts vary. There are also eleven incidents which are reported as having taken place in July in the English text and in June in the French text.

(b) There are different figures indicating the same place in twenty-two cases. For example, the incident of 14 April 1946 is reported in the French text (p.7) as having taken place at Greek post No. 16 (Vassilia R. 830963) whilst the English text gives the number as Vassilia R. 817962.

(c) The text diverge on the location of identical places: one says to the north, whilst the other says to the south. Eight such cases occur in connection with the incident of 17 February 1946; page 4 of the French text says that Greek post No. 8 is to the north of Kastanani, whilst the English text says to the south of Kastanani.

(d) Different figures are given for the time of the same incident, or the same frontier post or the same distance.

In my letter S/AC.4/W/18, I submitted four annexes giving the necessary explanations on what I have just said.

The French text, on p. 19, speaking of the incident of 10 August 1946 says that reinforcements arrived and the band on being pursued fled into the interior of Greece.

The English text (p. 23) says that the band fled into the interior of Albania.

The French text (p. 23), speaking of the incident of 17 September 1946, says that on being pursued the bandits fled

/in the

in the direction of Yugoslav territory. The corresponding English text describing this incident (p. 27) says that the band fled into Albanian territory.

(3) Comparison Between the Greek Book "Incidents on the Greek Frontier" and the Greek Memorandum of 3 December 1946 to the Security Council

The Greek Memorandum of 3 December, by comparison with the Greek White Book, contains a very small number of incidents with Albania. It lists seven frontier incidents and six cases of Partisan groups entering and leaving Albania. But even in this small number there are four cases differing from the corresponding incidents given in the Greek White Book, i.e. more than a third of the incidents given in the Memorandum differ from the same incidents in the White Book.

(a) The French text of the Greek White Book says that in the incident of 15 October 1946 two shepherds were taken away and released in the evening of the following day, whereas the Memorandum speaking of the same incident says they were set free on the same day.

(b) The French text (p. 26) says that in the incident of 5 November the band pursued went in the direction of the Albanian frontier. The Memorandum gives the date as 3 November for the same incident and says that the band entered Albanian territory.

(c) The French text (p. 26) reporting the incident of 7 November 1946 says that after the engagement the bandits overtly entered Albanian territory and that twenty-three of these bandits were killed and found on the spot on Greek territory. The Memorandum, speaking of the same incident,

/makes

makes no mention of anybody being killed, and adds that several bandits entered Albania.

(1) The french text (p. 26) speaking of the incident of 14 November says that some Albanians lying in ambush in Albanian territory fired on a Greek patrol. The Memorandum speaks of Albanians lying in ambush in Greek territory

(4) On the Investigation of Incidents Proposed by Greece

The Greek Liaison Officer made some proposals at Salonika concerning the investigation of the frontier incidents at two points of the frontier only: Kakavia and Sagiada. The Greek proposals were very simple, calling for an investigation on two points and no more.

(5) The Kakavia Radat Incidents

The investigation of the Radat incidents was also requested by the Albanian delegation which had already asked at Salonika for an investigation of these incidents both from the point of view of the configuration of the ground and from the point of view of Greek-held positions at these points. The Albanian delegation had also asked that the Greek soldier captured during these incidents should be heard; (I wrote at length on the two Greek prisoners in my letter of 14 May addressed to the second drafting committee, as well as on the reasons why these two soldiers were not heard and mentioned that Albania had lost important evidence on this case. At all events, the written statements of these military prisoners have been submitted to the Commission).

/(6) The Albanian Witnesses

(6) The Albanian Witnesses

The witnesses were heard before the round-table (?) at Janina. It was decided to hear two witnesses on each side.

The Albanian witnesses:

(a) Tsami Nikolao

He said that the incidents in the Radat sector had been prepared beforehand (from 25 June onwards) and that Greeks entered Albanian territory. One Greek soldier was buried in Albanian territory and another (Jorgo Jotakos) was taken prisoner. (See S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.20).

(b) Mestant Ramadan

This eye-witness spoke of a number of incidents which took place at Radat on 2, 3, 5 and 7 July. He pointed out that the Greeks entered Albanian territory repeatedly during these incidents.

During the hearing the Greek delegation produced a military cap and said that it belonged to an Albanian soldier who had been killed. But the forgery was clumsy. The cap bore a six-pointed red star whilst the National Army of Albania has only five-pointed red stars. The falsehood is further proved by the fact that the Albanian was alleged to have been buried on Greek territory whereas these two soldiers (one Albanian and one Greek) were both buried on Albanian soil which proves that they were killed on Albanian territory (see S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.9).

(7) The Greek Witnesses

(a) Kontogheorgis Evangelos

There is a discrepancy between this witness' oral evidence and the Greek book as to the time when the incident took place. The book reports that the Albanian attackers used Russian rifles, whereas the witness says nothing of the sort. Cartridges alleged

/to have been

to have been found on the spot were produced but it has been pointed out that cartridges of this type are very common and are used by several countries for various types of rifles (see S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.20).

(b) Dalagheris Alexis

He spoke of the incident of 13 September and said that he had been informed that individuals who attempted to cross into Greece were Albanians, partisans, etc. He did not state the exact hour of the incident. The book also mentions twenty-five Albanian bandits who penetrated into Greek territory but the witness had no knowledge of this (see S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.20).

A military cap alleged to have belonged to an Albanian soldier killed in Greece and buried in Albania was produced but the cap was found to have a six-pointed star whereas the Albanian National Army uses five-pointed stars exclusively.

(8) The Savada Incidents

Lieutenant-Colonel Stenopoulos Athanassios, a Greek officer, made a statement on the incident of 21 October and gave particulars. It was found that he was referring to the Palambba incident.

(9) The Greek Witnesses

(a) Gourvinos Philipos

A soldier and an eye-witness, he said that they sent a patrol towards a small observation post on the morning of 21 October 1946 in order to observe what the "enemy" were doing. In other words, it was a war patrol. Of course, like any other war patrol, this one entered Albanian "enemy" territory, and this is borne out by our statements. The witness was not present at the beginning of the incident and could not therefore have known exactly what happened (see S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR.13).

/(b) Janis Katsaris

(b) Janis Kutseris

This is the old man who was sent into the territory in order to look for the prisoner. He heard that the Greek soldiers did not enter Albanian territory (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 13).

(c) Joannis Sakas

This witness said that on hearing shots he looked towards the frontier and saw everything. He saw that the Albanians entered Greek territory to a depth of five to eight metres; and this from a distance of six hundred metres from the spot, which sounds improbable. This impression is strengthened by his statement that there had been no minor incidents previously. But in that case why did he look toward the frontier and not elsewhere? If there had been no incidents in this frontier sector before, he would not naturally have looked in the direction of the frontier. The Team did not visit the locality to look at the position and to ascertain what truth (if any) there is in these false statements (see S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR 13).

(d) Ilias Ienis

His evidence conflicts with that of the previous witness. He said that four civilians from the village went towards the spot where the incident took place whilst the other witness spoke of thirty-four civilians. Like the previous witness, he was able to observe from a long way off that Albanians were penetrating into Greek territory to a depth of five to six metres, which is ridiculous (see S/AC.4/SC.2/SR 13).

The Greeks called six witnesses and one Lieutenant-Colonel (the latter spoke on the Sayada incidents) in respect of the incidents referred to by the two witnesses.

/Discrepancies

Discrepancies between the depositions of the Greek witnesses were observed:

The Greek witnesses mentioned certain facts at one time and represented them quite differently on another occasion. Some of the witnesses gave hearsay evidence or else claimed to have observed things which no human being could have observed. Some witnesses claimed for example that from a distance of seven hundred metres they could discern such a small space as five or six metres.

There is a discrepancy between statements by witnesses and the statements in the Greek book, e.g. the statement by the Greek witness Dalagheorgios Alexis differs from that in the Greek book on the incident of 13 September.

Argument advanced by the Greek Government's spokesman.

When the Greek case was explained to the Commission, no argument was brought forward on the Greek charges on these incidents.

The Greek Liaison Officer confined himself to saying:

1. The truth of the Greek assertions or of the Albanian counter-charges could best be determined by the Commission on the spot (S/AC.4/PV/27, page 5).

2. "Constant" large-scale disturbances were taking place on the Albanian frontier. In support of his statement he referred to incidents which never took place, partisan attacks on Greek frontier posts with which Albania is not concerned (S/AC.4/128 and the statements by the Soviet and Polish delegates, and by the Albanian Liaison Officer on the alleged incidents against posts 27, 28 and 30).

/3. Rather belatedly,

3. Rather belatedly, and after he had submitted his case to the Commission, the Greek Liaison Officer came out with the statement:

".... The policy of systematic provocation adopted by the Albanian Government which does not hesitate, even while the Commission is carrying on its work, to violate through its organs the integrity of Greek territory and to kidnap peaceful citizens" (S/AC.4/128).

(10) Arguments Submitted by the Albanian Government Spokesman

The Albanian delegation repeatedly denied the Greek charges, pointing out:

1. Albania never had any intention of violating Greece's frontiers. We have never had any interest in doing so. It should always be borne in mind that Albania is not and never has been interested in violations (S/AC.4/PV.12, page 19).

2. Greece alone has any interest in provoking incidents. The question of frontier violations is part of the scheme of other Greek provocations against the integrity and independence of Albania. Greece, by provoking Albania's frontiers, is seeking to accomplish her imperialist designs (S/AC.4/15).

3. It is emphasized that any charge alleging violations of the Greek frontier on our part is not only false but represents a further link in the chain of intimidations and provocations against Albania (S/AC.4/15).

4. The incidents involved are not simple frontier incidents which might be ascribed to chance, but rather a series of successive provocations staged at the direct initiative of the Greek frontier authorities on orders from their superiors. They are actual incursions deliberately carried out and pointing to Greek intentions of aggression.

/5. The Soviet

5. The Soviet and Polish members of the Commission of Investigation and the Albanian Liaison Officer told the Commission that they had heard from the commander of the Greek guerilla forces of the Gramos region that the forces which on 31 January 1947 attacked Greek frontier posts 27, 28 and 30 and captured one officer and sixty-four other ranks, were his own units and not Albanians.

They also stated that they had seen with their own eyes some Greek soldiers who said they had been taken prisoner when the guerillas attacked posts 27, 28 and 30 and had of their own free will decided to remain with them.

6. The configuration of the ground and the dominating positions held by the Greeks on the frontier make it possible to state that Albania with her unfavourable positions cannot launch attacks, but rather, and more probably, that the Greeks, being favoured by the lie of the land, launched attacks on the Albanian frontier (S/AC.4/PV 27).

7. The two reports "A" and "B" were submitted to the Commission on Investigation (S/AC.4/215) with ample documentary material prepared by two commissions appointed by the Albanian Government to investigate the frontier incidents charged by Greece. These reports deny those charged and either show that on the dates mentioned in the Greek book for the various incidents, the frontier was quiet, or else prove that our charges have been turned into counter-charges.

(11) Conclusion

The material submitted by Greece in support of her charges that Albania is provoking incidents against her frontiers consists of:

1. The Greek book, "Incidents on the Greek Frontier".

/2. Evidence

2. Evidence by six Greek witnesses on incidents at two places on the frontier.

The Albanian reply consists of the arguments repeatedly submitted to the Commission in the two reports "A" and "B" prepared by the commissions appointed by the Albanian Government to enquire into the frontier incidents charged by Greece (S/AC.4/215).

A study of the Greek material and of the material making up the reply, makes it possible to state that:

the Greek Liaison Officer, in submitting the Greek case to the Commission, did not even mention the accusation that Greece's northern neighbours are responsible for the frontier incidents;

no evidence and no argument to substantiate the Greek charges was adduced; the only evidence in support of the Greek charges as that of an Albanian soldier's cap (he was alleged to have been killed in Greece, but was certainly buried in Albania) and turned out to be false;

as between the French and English texts of the Greek White Book there are sixty-nine discrepancies and contradictions;

the book gives about ten so-called incidents which have nothing to do with Albania;

and there are discrepancies between the Greek White Book and the Greek Memorandum of 3 December 1946 to the Security Council in respect of the same incidents;

there are inconsistencies in the evidence of Greek witnesses and contradictions between depositions by witnesses and the Greek White Book on the same incidents;

two reports submitted by the Albanian delegation (S/AC.4/215) invalidate the Greek statements on these incidents;

/The Albanian

The Albanian delegation has denied these charges in the Security Council and before the Commission with abundant arguments in support of its case.

The Albanian delegation to the Commission of Investigation considers that the Greek charge placing the responsibility for the frontier incidents on Albania is false and unfounded. The Albanian delegation further considers that the fact that this accusation has proved untrue is evidence in support of the Albanian charges blaming Greece for the provocation of frontier incidents against Albania.

I. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II, CHAPTER IV AND ON PART III*

- (1) Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Contentions that the Present Greek Regime is Responsible for a State of Civil War in Greece and for the Disturbances in the Northern Districts of that Country

A civil war is taking place throughout the whole of the territory of Greece and is not limited to the northern regions of the country.

Before the Commission in Athens the three representatives of the Balkan democratic countries stated in opposition to the Greek argument, that the civil war extended to the whole of Greece, including the islands, and that the Greek statement that the civil war existed only in the regions bordering on the northern frontiers, was false, without foundation, and in contradiction to the truth.

In this connexion I stated: "The attempt by the Athens governments to make the world believe that disorders are reported only from the northern frontier has already failed. Thus the Greek accusation that their northern neighbours organized these troubles becomes ridiculous. The struggle in self-defence has grown in numerous points in the whole of Greece and even in the islands." (S/AC.4/PV/12).

In the same document I said: "It is evident that the Greek authorities themselves are responsible for the critical situation and the civil war in Greece. It is evident, and it will become evident, that the accusation laying the blame for the Greek internal situation on Greece's northern neighbours is not only false, but it is rebounding, and will rebound, against the Greek authorities."

* Document S/AC.4/PV85/Part II (original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.16/Rev.2)

To prove this argument the three representatives of the Balkan countries requested a thorough enquiry to establish that the civil war extended throughout Greece including the islands. We asked for an enquiry into the question of the armed struggle in the Peloponnese and the islands. These statements were followed by documentary information consisting of quotations from the Greek and foreign press, speeches made by Greek and foreign politicians. The requests presented in connexion with this enquiry all expressed the firm conviction that our contention was correct. These requests came from various political organizations or individuals, of different political opinions, that found no difficulty in rejecting the provocative Greek accusations. The requests made to the Commission suggest various methods likely to result in a thorough and serious enquiry.

These requests and statements were followed by others in immense numbers, from popular political organizations, and private individuals able to give the Commission useful and relevant details. The whole of Greece was mobilized and prepared to tell the truth about the international situation. The Commission has received thousands of letters, memoranda and telegrams from the four corners of Greece which unanimously state that the civil war was of an internal, and only an internal, nature, and that the civil war was raging throughout Greek territory. The fact that these requests, stressing the internal causes, are sent by various individuals or political organizations in various regions, towns and villages throughout Greece, even from the most southern towns and villages, is a very eloquent proof of the truth that the civil war extends throughout Greece and not only to the northern regions. The contents of this immense correspondence constitute the peoples' witness and reveal the truth.

/The fact

The fact that the Commission attached great importance to this argument is confirmed by its consenting to hear the various evidence of political organizations and private individuals which brought out the real causes of the disturbed internal condition of Greece. The Commission also set up special teams to make its plan as full as possible in relation to this contention. It could be said that all the Commission's teams were concerned with examining this contention. The Commission of Investigation obviously considered this claim as having some weight and proceeded to examine it. The greater part of the Commission's verbatim records mention the existence of a civil war throughout Greece and the causes which gave rise to it.

All the time the Commission of Investigation was in Greece, the press and Government communiqués were steadily issuing news about the fighting in regions far distant from the frontiers. In this regard, it is interesting to recall the partisans' entry into the town of Sparta in the Peloponnese.

Now that the investigation is over, no impartial person can doubt that the civil war extends throughout the territory of Greece. The existence of the civil war is so clearly established by this enquiry that the Greek Government's false allegations no longer hold water. Efforts have been made to explain the spread of the civil war to other regions by the partisan so-called movement towards the south. This explanation became transparent immediately; it is the most typical (and unsuccessful) falsification of the fact that there is a civil war forced on the Greek people throughout the territory by the action of a single State, which the investigation has revealed.

/Mr. Cambalouris

Mr. Cambalouris, a member of the Greek delegation, during a meeting of Team "B" stated that the Greek partisans' first operation was launched on 31 March 1946 at Litchori, situated approximately 150 kms. from the frontier. But Litchori is in the south of Greece.

Let us take this together with the statement of Mr. Kyrrou putting the Greek Government's case before the Commission: "The third phase of the plan began on 19 December when the Security Council, acting on the Greek Government's request, decided to make an investigation into the position. This phase was marked by efforts to shift the activity of the guerillas southwards in order to prove to your Commission that the whole of Greece was in a state of civil war....." This contradiction between the members of the Greek delegation to the Commission themselves reveals to us amongst other things that even those entrusted by the Greek Government with the presentation of its case do not believe Mr. Kyrrou's assertion about "the third phase of the campaign".

On the Investigation

The various witnesses and documents put before the Commission during its work have substantiated the contention of the three democratic Balkan countries that the present situation in Greece is the direct consequence of the civil war throughout its entire territory, in every region, in every town and village. Let us glance at Map No. 1, dossier No. 24, in the statement by the representative of E.A.M. prepared on the basis of the official Ministry of Public Security communiqué as published in the Royalist newspapers, "Embros" and "Kathimerini". Map No. 1 (the period up to September 1946) shows the birth and the growth of the struggle of the Andartes throughout Greek territory. It will be seen that

/at that time

at that time the combatants were operating in the mountainous regions from southern Greece (Taygetos and Eparnon Mountains) to the north (Vitsi and Boj-Dog Mountains) and from the east (Lesbos and Rodope Mountains) to the west (Pindus and Grammos Mountains); nor did their operations decrease in the intermediate regions (Vernion, Falkon, Falokron, Groussia, Olympus, Hasia, Pilion, Ossa, Orthraes, Pindos, etc.)

The widespread nature of the struggle of the Andartes was obvious even before the Prime Minister, Mr. Tsaldaris, told a Times correspondent at Earis on 14 August 1946, that the partisan war was a purely Greek question; this statement is inconsistent with the Greek Government's position. At that time Mr. Tsaldaris did not speak of foreign intervention although according to the Ministry of Public Security publications mentioned in the E.A.M. Map No. 1, the partisens' struggle had spread to all the Greek provinces even to the islands.

Map No. 1. of the E.A.M. Documents shows the mountainous structure of Greece and the dates of the first fighting. From the communications of the Ministry of Public Order the conclusion is reached that the armed struggle in Greece started in the mountainous regions; this is quite natural because that is where the persecuted could take refuge and resist the Government's punitive measures.

The Commission, during its investigation, has had opportunities of hearing many statements on the fact that the Civil War is in full swing throughout the whole of Greece, and not only in the frontier region.

An E.A.M. spokesman stated: "People have claimed that the disorders were provoked, promoted or supported from abroad. Nothing could be more inaccurate. The disorders are due

/exclusively

exclusively to internal causes. Moreover, these disorders exist throughout continental Greece and even in the islands; they far exceed the incidents reported in the regions near the frontiers. Of course, there has been fighting in those regions also, but it did not, start there nor is it the heaviest."

Another obvious proof of the falsification of the truth by the Monarcho-Fascist Greek Government is the meeting of the representatives of USSR, Poland and the three liaison officers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania with General Markos, the Commander-in-Chief, of the Greek Democratic Army, in the heart of Greece. We walked all the way from Amadara, the first village in which the commission met the partisans, as far as the village of Krissomilia where the meeting with General Markos took place, and were in territory held by Greek partisans all the time. The distance covered is more than 200 kilometres, all in territory under partisan control. It should be noted that the village of Krissomilia is approximately 120 kilometres, as the crow flies, from the village of Kastanopiton, the Crampos Headquarters, whence the representatives who met General Markos set out.

Team No. 1 at Ivaria and later at Aghoriani (Thessaly) received abundant evidence clearly showing the existence of civil war throughout Greece. One of the most eloquent proofs of this is the contact made by the group with the partisans in the centre of Greece.

The conclusion is thus reached that the civil war is general throughout Greece and not only in the regions bordering on the frontier;

that the Greek allegation, regarding the Civil War in the regions bordering on the frontier, is unjustified and unreal;

/that the

that the Greek Government's explanation that the north to south shift of the civil war began with the Greek appeal to the Security Council, is false.

(2) Persecution of the Democratic Forces in the Country
by the Gendarmerie, Regular Troops and Rightist Bands

a. Before the Commission in Athens I emphasized (S/AC.4/PV/12)
....."The cause of all Greece's internal and external disputes is to be
sought exclusively in the internal situation.....the Verkiiza Agreement
was flouted.....the results of the compulsory and faked elections of
3 March 1946, from which half the Greek people abstained, showed
that the people had decided to resist the tyrannical regime of the
reactionary forces. The pretence of a plebiscite on 1 September 1946,
by which the Monarchist regime was imposed on Greece, is a further
stage in the process of the cruel oppression of the Greek people
and the suppression of its rights. Today Greece is in the throes
of a regime of terror.....the present Greek Government, in order
to consolidate its position, created a regular army which, with
the rightist bands, was hurled against democratic elements and
the people....."

The state machine in Greece today is in the hands of
collaborators. I have given you lists of them.

b. In support of our just argument, we have submitted 18
extracts from Greek and foreign newspapers and publications
quoting statements by eminent persons such as Mr. Wilkes, Member
of the British House of Commons, Mr. Sofulis Mercuris,
Mr. Soffianopoulous and others. We have submitted publications and
documents which prove the existence of terror and civil war in
Greece (S/AC.4/PV/12).

The value of our documentary evidence in support of our
contention:

Our documentary information is of indisputable value. During
the Commission's investigation and work, its authenticity was not
challenged. The documents were either from neutral sources,

/having the

having the necessary objectivity, or documents from Greek official sources, statements by eminent persons known in Greece, Greek publications, etc. During the Commission's work such documents were not questioned or charged as forgeries. The legal basis of the documents is very strong because their contents were not specially prepared to support our arguments during the Commission's work; they originate from various political opinions in Greece, from people who are not citizens of the three other countries interested in showing the true causes of the disordered internal situation; it is documentary information of foreign, above all, British origin.

c. We have requested the most thorough enquiry into the true causes of the civil war in Greece, and proposed to the Commission that the truth of our contention should be verified. The Commission and the various teams throughout their work, were faced with the certain revelation of the causes of the disordered state of Greece. The fact that the greater part of the work of the Commission and its Groups was clearly directed towards the exclusively internal causes of the civil war, proves the veracity of the argument of Greece's three neighbours. The allegation that an enquiry into the internal causes of the civil war would be intervention in the internal affairs of Greece was only a manoeuvre to cut the Commission off from the tragic reality of the situation, known better to the Greek people than to anyone, to cut it off from the best evidence, the popular masses, and to hide the true causes of the disorders.

d. Who were the witnesses supporting this argument? Were they from our frontier regions? Were they known to us before? Would their position in the eyes of the Greek authorities have

/benefited

benefited from their appearance before the Commission? Were they of Albanian nationality? No, Gentlemen. They were pure Greeks who came before the Commission, either voluntarily or at our request, and testified in support of our argument. They were quite unknown to us before. We had had no relations with them. There was no opportunity for us and them together to prepare arguments substantiating our accusations. But the course of events shows that our accusations before the Commission were also theirs. They had only one concern: to save the country from terror, civil war and occupation. Their desire to come before the Commission to tell the truth was hindered by the Government authorities. Instead of gaining favour with the Greek Government, they were jeopardizing their safety, and exposing themselves to greater perils and to sure persecution by monarcho-fascist circles. In spite of all this, witnesses, political organizations, private individuals either came before the Commission or sent letters, memoranda or telegrams giving factual explanations of the true causes of the situation in Greece. Among the witnesses who testified in support of the accusation dealt with in this chapter were:

(1) Spokesman from the most important political organizations in Greece (E.A.M. - ELD - Syndicat - EPON - DEMOCRATIC ASSOCIATIONS - LIBERAL LEFTISTS).

(2) Deportees, political prisoners and persons sentenced to death.

(3) Individuals and representatives from the villages.

Among these witnesses were representatives of the mass political organizations, democratic associations and intellectual clubs, and of political deportees, from every corner of Greece. There were representatives of the combatants in the democratic army. There were also women.

/It is,

It is, therefore, certain that testimony coming from such circles, from such strata of the population, is the only testimony which can reveal the truth about the causes of the internal disorders in Greece. The presence of the Commission in the country gave the Greek people the opportunity to speak out and to disclose the unbearable situation caused by the terror exercised by the present Government.

(2) On the Investigation

The testimony, letters, memoranda, telegrams show that the causes of the civil war are to be found in the attitude of the present Greek rulers towards the democratic masses and the people, in the persecutions and terror launched by the gendarmerie, the regular troops and the rightist bands.

The concrete facts of terror and persecutions are the same in all the provinces. The various evidence reveals different concrete cases, but the contents are always the same, and this shows that it is true and reliable evidence on the internal causes of the Greek civil war.

This is also borne out by the memoranda of the E.A.M., General Markos, the E.L.D., the Left Liberals, the memoranda from Ikaria, the testimony of Agoriani and Pavlo-Melas, and thousands of various letters, telegrams and memoranda.

(1) After the violation of the Varkiza Agreement, the Greek Government began the regime of terror.

The memorandum of General Markos:

"It is very difficult to write about what happened to the peoples' democratic movement and particularly to the combatants

in the resistance movement after the violation of the Varkiza Agreement." This memorandum shows that on the morrow of the Agreement the monarcho-fascist bands terrorized the Greek people, especially the democrats. The memorandum mentions the names of collaborators released after the Agreement who immediately began persecuting the people and the democratic organizations.

The spokesman of the E.L.D. stated:

"The Varkiza Agreement was violated. It was as if the Germans had returned; the Agreement was used to disarm the resistance movement. The violation served the purpose of consolidating tyranny. After Varkiza, it seemed as if the policy of the Greek Right had only one basic aim: the restoration of the monarchy by fire and sword, the extermination of the resistance and democratic forces by the imprisonment and liquidation of all democrats, the establishment of a regime with dictatorial power under a fascist monarchy."

The representative of the Left Liberal Party (S/AC/PV/31) stated that after the violation of the Varkiza Agreement no one thought persecution of democrats would have caused a civil war.

(2) Members of the resistance movement are persecuted:

The witness Evangjellos Kostoudis (S/AC.4/PV/67) stated "The arms which we surrendered after Varkiza immediately fell into the hands of collaborators who used them against us. Many persons who participated in the resistance movement were arrested. In another district five E.L.A.S. battalion commanders and captains, as well as many partisans, were thrown into prison.

The Greek witness Zehos (S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV/12), page 12:

"On 23 February 1945 we handed over all the arms we had in the 24th E.L.A.S. regiment. The same night, however, we were

/attacked

attacked by the Monarcho-Fascists who tried to kill us."

The witness Terrovglou, partisan chief of the Agrafa region (S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/25) "I was a regular officer of the Greek army and as such I was at Larissa. I was placed on list B by the authorities, that is to say, on the reserve, for no other reason than that I had taken part in the resistance movement during the occupation."

(3) Cases of terrorism and assassination of peaceful citizens without trial.

The witness Zogas (S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/25) in speaking of the rightist bandits stated:

"They simply beat the Greek people for no reason. The Sourlas bands, the gendarmes and several officers who fought in the German ranks during the occupation, are killing, pillaging, and destroying the country of Greece."

The witnesses Dambasios, Kristos Pandetiotis and Elissabeth Elianihi (S/AC.4/SC.3/2), Alexandridou (S/AC.4/SC.7/FV.1), Maria Slabi (S/AC.4/SC.8/FV/2) and many others prove the terrorism of the rightist bands and the gendarmerie against simple people, families of former E.L.A.S. combatants as well as the families of present-day partisans.

(4) The compulsory elections and plebiscite:

The different organizations which stated their cases to the Commission expressed themselves in these terms:

"Both the elections and the plebiscite were carried out under a regime of violence and falsification."

Instead of leading to peace, this fact led, on the contrary, to a progressive worsening in the general conditions.

The intensification of the civil war. The E.A.M. dossier No.

23, in support of this fact, contains twenty documents proving the illegality of the elections and of the plebiscite.

The following appears on page 28 of the E.A.M. memorandum:

"In reply to our protest against the assassination of 109 republicans during the first month after the elections the Minister of Public Order, Spyros Theotokis, said 'This is an explosion of triumph following the electoral victory; it is the intoxication of the victors and will soon pass'."

The witness Dimitrios (S/AC.4/PV.63) stated that he had been forced to vote for the monarchy. "The gendarmes tortured me during the plebiscite."

The witness Sauvinidis (S/AC.4/SC.7/PV.1) stated that the authorities "terrorized the population in order to force them to vote for the monarchists".

(5) The complicity of the governmental authorities in the crimes of the bands.

I will name three authentic documents which prove conclusively not only the complicity of the governmental authorities in the crimes of the rightist bands, but also the direct dependence of these bands on the authorities.

The three documents are attached to the memorandum of General Markos (S/AC.4/177 Annex 5 B, page 3, Annex 5 B, page 4 and Annex 5 B, page 5 respectively).

The first is signed by the well-known rightist band terrorist chief Vourlakis; it is addressed to Papa Nikolas Arogoustopoulos and is a threatening letter which reached the addressee through the Gendarmerie station of Ipatis. The Chief of the station also remembers receiving the letter.

The second, signed by the Gendarmerie Commandant Papas, told the terrorist band chiefs of Spilia to harry "the communists".

The third, the most characteristic, is the letter from the military commandant of Argitca to the rightist band chiefs,

/informing them

informing them that he (the military commandant) had been appointed their commandant.

These three letters require no comment.

(6) Concrete cases in which the rightist bands, the Gendarmerie and Government troops committed terrorist acts on a large scale:

The massacre at Hierovrisi and Stefanini in December 1946.

At the head of a band of sixty, the monarchist bandits Bandouvakis and Lazik invaded the village of Hierovrisi. They burned down the houses, violated the women and generally massacred the inhabitants, men, women and children. There were forty victims.

Referring to the reasons for the attack, the witness Marantidu stated: the village was republican, that was perhaps sufficient to provoke the attack (S/AC.4/SC.3/19).

The tragedy of Stefanini where three hundred gendarmes entered the village.

The officers ordered them to assemble forty women and young girls who were taken outside the village, where they were fired on with automatic arms. Four women were killed, ten others seriously wounded.

The massacre of Vamvakou, 15 October 1946. The rightist band of Katserea, consisting of eighty men, entered the village of Vamvakou, in Sparta. They arrested twenty-five men, five women and three children; they led them to the village square and executed them.

All these facts are from monarchist sources. (E.A.M. dossier, No. 8).

(7) The terror raged throughout Greece:

The E.A.M. memoranda.

/On the

On the very morrow of Varkiza, armed terrorist groups of royalists and bands of monarchist brigands embarked on operations with the connivance and often the co-operation of State agents. Their victims were republican citizens and former combatants in the resistance movement.

Between 12 February and 31 March 1946, 84,931 persons were arrested whilst from October 1946 to January 1947 the number of arrests reached 72,000.

The witness Loulis, the representative of the Central Committee of Political Exiles, interrogated in the concentration camp of Icaria, stated that terrorist methods were being used against democratic elements throughout Greece.

Andrea Djima stated at Icaria: "The entire Greek people, and particularly those who took part in the resistance, have been placed in an unbearable situation since the liberation; the Greek authorities' regime of terror has led to the death and imprisonment of thousands of people and to deportations to desert islands."
(S/AC.4/SC.2/Y).

(8) The campaign against democratic organizations.

The representative of the Confederation of Labour told the Commission (S/AC.4/60) that the workers, deprived of trade union liberties, are persecuted, arrested, deported or killed and that the regime in no way enjoys the confidence of the people, of the working class; that the reactionary regime is imposed on the people and remains in power thanks to intervention and aid from abroad. Finally, he stated "the efforts of this reactionary clique to crush and liquidate the national democratic forces are the cause of the civil war, unrest and disorders in Greece".

/Furthermore

Furthermore, the representative of Epon, the Greek youth organization, stated that the dissolution of their organization revealed the Greek Government's policy of erasing all trace of democracy (S/AC.4/SR.41).

(9) Persecution of intellectuals.

The memorandum of the Confederation of Democratic Associations in Table III, shows that teachers upholding the honour of Greek culture are dismissed either for being democrats or because they had participated in the national resistance to the German invader.

Teachers at the University of Athens and the Polytechnic School, members of the Confederation, have been dismissed. On the contrary, collaborators with the Germans have been appointed teachers in high schools. The documents give the names of all the Greek intellectuals killed by the bands or the gendarmerie and the names of the arrested or exiled.

The same question, with the concrete facts, was also raised before the Commission by other political organizations or parties.

(10) The persecution of the Democratic Press.

The E.A.M. spokesman stated:

"The repression of the Democratic Press and, in particular, the press of the Left, was inspired by a very special frenzy. Not a day passed without reports of the destruction of offices and printing presses, particularly in the provinces; even murders of editorial staff occur....."

As many as 55 newspapers are suspended.

On 23 February 1947 Team "B" examined the witness Costas Sirinjtis, former Director of the newspaper "Laiki Foni", in the prison of Pavlos Melas. He had been sentenced by court martial to fifteen years prison because of two publications. His paper,
/the "Laiki Foni"

the "Laiki Foni", of the Salonika Communist Party, was suspended.

In the same prison were Jani Kanakis, journalist on the "Laiki Foni", Tanassia Pandekis, Director of the newspaper "Elefteria", Bandis Zarbinis, Editor of the "Elefteria", Andonis Varvitis, Director of the newspaper "Olikis," Menelos Mossaidis, Director of the newspaper "Mahitis" (see S/AC.4/SC.3-2 and the Memorandum of the Committee of the Pavlos Melas prison).

(11) The terror and the activity of the courts.

The Confederation of Greek Democratic Associations, speaking on justice in Greece at present, says:

"The neo-fascist régime was destined to corrupt even justice. Honest judges are dismissed from their posts and replaced by unworthy judges. Justice is passing through a terrible moral crisis." Concrete cases of the partiality and the anti-democratic character of Greek justice are then quoted.

(12) The outstanding feature of modern Greece is that collaborators are in power.

Dossier No. 9 of the E.A.M. documents contains evidence showing that Greece today is dominated by people who collaborated with the Germans and Italians. The list of notorious Quislings participating in the Government who have worried their way into the State machine includes the following ministers: Gonatas, Tsatseras, Theocharidis, Theotokis (President of the Chamber); the Deputies Tourcovassilis, Vretakos; the Chief of the General Staff Spiliatopoulos, the Athens Prefect of Police Evert, and others.

The Socialist Party spokesman stated:

"Not a single collaborator has been purged. On the contrary, it can be seen that they are the all round favourites. The Greek Quisling Ralis, President of the Council during the occupation, was given

/an official

an official funeral, his coffin draped with the national flag."

The E.A.M. dossier No. 10 contains 26 documents proving that the machinery of State is in the hands of collaborators with the Germans and the Italians.

(13) In order to escape the merciless terror of the present Government, the Greek Democrats are forced to take to the mountains in self-defence and to struggle against the tyranny.

"The renewed outbreak", declares the E.A.M. representative, "the extension of the persecution, as well as the immediate danger to the lives, fortune and honour of the Democrats, forced them henceforth in increasing numbers to find shelter and protection in the mountains. Even there they are harried by the organs of the State and monarchists armed by the Government; and so they also have to find arms to protect themselves."

The E.L.D. spokesman notes that citizens have to choose between: (1) imprisonment without hope of an impartial trial; (2) deportation to a desert island without any chance of return; (3) taking refuge in places away from their homes; or (4) remaining at home under the threat of the Gendarmes, thus risking life or death or torture.

The witness Terzoglou, partisan chief of the Agrafa region (S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/25) says:

"I took to the mountains because of the unbearable situation created by Sourlas and Karagiourgios, who collected nothing but brigands and collaborators for their bands."

In his capacity of President of the Labour Council at Salonika, the witness Papaianis Dimitrios (S/AC.4/SC.3/6) stated before the Commission "that a great number of strikers had no choice but to go underground."

(3) The Greek Civil War and British Responsibility

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen, on the fifteenth of this month I addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Drafting Committee (Restricted Document S/AC.4/W.18/Add.4) placing on record that the Commission, in the course of its work in Greece, had frequently come up against the influence of the British in the disturbed condition of Greece, British intervention in Greek internal affairs, the inexplicable presence of British Military Forces, which even now constitute one of the principle causes of the Greek disorders.

In this letter I also mentioned that the responsibility of the British factor in the present Greek situation was established. For these reasons I considered, and still consider, that British responsibility in the Greek civil war must be referred to in Chapter (IV).

There is plenty of evidence of British responsibility in the Greek civil war which is an indisputable fact.

The documentary material on the part played by British forces in Greece consists of:

- (1) Official documents emanating from eminent British subjects in Greece and Greek authorities.
- (2) Memoranda submitted to the Commission by Greek political organizations.
- (3) Evidence.

The authentic document S/AC.4/177/Annex 5/A, page 6, submitted to the Commission by General Markos, proves the full facts.

This is an official Greek Government document. It does not give allusions or personal considerations, but is a concrete document. This document shows that on 20 December 1945 the

/British Government

British Government through its envoy, Mr. MacNeill, sent the Greek Government the list of armed civilians who had been discharged, but of course not until they had been armed. A list of persons with their respective arms was attached to the document. The list contains dozens and dozens of names.

Another document, attached to the memorandum of the E.A.M. Committee for Thrace and Macedonia, page 29 (E.A.M. dossier), reads:

Extract from instructions by General Melissinos Macedonian Military Command

Operational order

Confidential

No. A.P. 168

Very urgent.

To the chiefs of the 15th and 16th brigades.

In its desire to organize better security, the 7th Indian brigade has decided to make available a certain number of arms to trustworthy peasants The persons thus armed will be selected after previous agreement by the presidents of village communities, the British military authorities and chiefs of the National Guard. Prefects, after agreement with the chiefs of British military formations in the various localities, and those of the National Guard, will indicate the villages which will benefit by this distribution.

Kavalla, 15 May 1944

General: Commandant

P. Melissinos

There is another document equally authentic concerning the addresses of the different organizations and their chiefs.

The documents will also be found in the memorandum of General Markos S/AC.4/177 Annex 5/A, page 3.

/It is signed

It is signed by the British liaison officer and addressed to the Bureau of Public Security, Greek Gendarmerie Headquarters, and is dated 24 January 1946. In this letter, the British liaison officer said that British General Headquarters was making an investigation into various questions and asked for the following information: the official addressees of the various political organizations, including subsidiary or co-operating organizations, and the addressees and occupations of the chiefs of political organizations. Finally a request is made that all information on the under-mentioned subjects should be included in the monthly report.

It is clear from this letter that the British military forces are extremely and even excessively interested in Greek political life.

In order to show their value to the Commission's report and to any impartial conclusions and recommendations, I will quote several passages from the memorandum of the E.A.M. Committee in the department of Florina S/AC.4/SC.2 A/37, No. 24: "After Varkiza British troops assisted the extension of government authority to the provinces by helping the authorities to disband the organizations by attacks, pillage, and persecution of political and democratic elements generally". These documents also show that British troops in conjunction with Government troops forcibly occupied officers belonging to political organizations. The same document shows that the representatives of British forces told an E.A.M. delegation at Amyntheon: "Your E.A.M. chiefs will see in a few days what is going to happen. You will see what will happen to you." True enough, as soon as the gendarmerie arrived it occupied the offices of the organizations

/in conjunction

in conjunction with the British, killed a pregnant woman and arrested the local E.A.M. officials.

The same document shows that during the summer of 1945, the British, armed with artillery and machine guns, surrounded Valto (Rudnik) and opened fire which continued throughout the night, whilst X-ites pillaged the towns of Varygo and Klithro. The British quartered Indian military formations at Bevi, Lofous, Clandorahi, Amynth Kelli etc., and throughout the summer of 1945 cleaning-up operations were carried out, with the symbolic participation of a few gendarmes, against persecuted democratic citizens. They roused the Indians to fanaticism and made them believe that the persons persecuted were Fascists, collaborators and Germans.

A further important document appears in the annex to the memorandum of General Markos, S/AC.4/177, annex 5, page 4. This is a telegram dated 20 July 1946 from Lamia, addressed to Gendarmerie at Ipatia. This telegram says: "On the 21st of this month a British unit will leave Kifisia to make an inspection in the country regions and will return 3 August. Inform all Government services and authorities to co-operate."

Various witnesses heard by the Commission spoke of the participation of British troops in the persecution of Greek democratic organizations.

The witness Geltsinos: "on 28 April 1945 the British came to our villages of Prodormos and Meromylos, which are five minutes apart, in the district of Karatzova The British killed Michal Chadjidimitrios in the village of Prodromos and they beat up anyone found in the street." (S/AC.4/FV.570, page 18)

/The witness Zogas:

The witness Zogas: "This situation is due to the British. They organized the SEA, the military police, and together they torment the people."

The witness Siridopoulos Anastis: S/AC.4/SC.8/P7/2 "In March 1947 the British and the Monarcho-Fascists entered the villages of Notia which were encircled and threatened with artillery fire. They entered and collected all the men. They led away six or seven persons who had strayed and beat them. The women were also beaten and the men taken somewhere in Ardes where they were beaten again."

The witness Thomas Zakos: whose hearing was requested by the Greek Government stated: "Another thing which we could not bear was the presence of the British Army in Greece, because for us it was the second army of occupation and we shall always consider it as such. That is what prompted us to leave. (for the maquis)" (S.AC.4 SC2A/P7 12).

The following passage occurs in the memorandum of General Markos, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Democratic Army:

"Together with the occupational 'Security Unit' the British fought against the Greek people in December 1944 although they had guaranteed the Varkiza Agreement and undertaken to force the various governments to apply the Agreement; on the contrary they helped the Monarcho-Fascists to violate the Agreement by all possible means. The rightist bands were never dissolved but persecuted the people systematically. Today they officially direct the bands, which are fully equipped with arms, clothed in uniforms of the gendarmerie and supplied with military equipment given them by the British."

/All the

All the Commission's documentary information proves direct intervention and participation of British troops in the rightist bands' terrorist acts and in the persecution of democratic organizations in the country.

The British part in the Greek disturbances is also shown by various political organizations whose spokesmen the Commission heard.

The E.A.M. spokesman expressed himself in these terms in regard to British responsibility in the Greek Civil War:

"The fundamental cause of the present situation is the intervention of British policy in our country; it has cost the country its independence." Then the spokesman continued:

"British policy is mainly to blame for the present situation. It is through this armed intervention that the governments came to power after the liberation."

The spokesman of the Greek Socialist Party (ELD) expressed himself as follows:

"To say that the cause (of the Greek disorders) is to be found in the Greek political regime cannot mean that one should overlook foreign influence whose responsibility is beyond doubt. The British factor...."

The following is the opinion of the Epon spokesman: "Up to the present day the policy of successive governments has driven thousands of democratic citizens into the mountains. The rise of the partisan movements was the only way in which democratic citizens could defend themselves against the forces of fascism and tyranny..... This still continues today when our country is under British occupation and a fascist regime."

The spokesman of the Left Liberal Party, S/AC.4/LV/31 spoke

/in these

in these terms: "Wherever the British put their foot terror began to reign. That is how bandits of the right originate (Sourlas, Vourlakis, Manganas, Michalagas, Tscous-Andon and others)."

The foregoing show that the causes of the Greek disorders are exclusively of an internal nature. After the Rightists had violated the Varkiza Agreement, they seized power in Greece and began a policy of terror, uprooting the democratic forces and bringing civil war upon Greece.

The disorders in Greece are therefore due to the terrorist policy of the present rulers. The disturbed situation in Greece is further due to the presence of the British Army, its intervention in the internal affairs of Greece and its participation in the campaign against Greek democrats.

(4) The Persecution of the Cham Minority in Greece

The problem of the persecution of the Albanian minority in Greece deserves the most thorough enquiry because it reflects the internal policy of oppression, and a striking proof of the Greek Government's hostile attitude towards Albania and the Albanian people.

To any objective person, the Commission's documents clearly show the Greek authorities' responsibility for the massacre, for the 2,877 people killed and hanged, for the 68 villages in which 5,800 houses were set on fire, for the 23,000 poor Chams who fled from Greece to Albania in distressing conditions as a result of the incomparable terror.

In my statement in Athens I emphasized that the cruel tragedy of the Albanian minority in Greece began in June 1944. The enquiry

confirmed that the persecution and the terror continued for several months up to the exodus of March 1945. The terrible slaughter of Albanians carried out by the 10th division of the E.O.E.A. (Ethnikon Omodhon Elion Andarton) under the command of Lt. Col. Aristidi Komare of the Zerva forces, was organized in accordance with a preconceived plan for the extermination of the Albanian minority.

To substantiate the truth of this tragic reality, we have submitted fifteen objective quotations from newspapers and statements by individuals. The newspapers which reveal the facts are either of Greek or foreign origin. We have submitted sixteen authentic supporting documents such as highly valuable official memoranda and documents. The slaughter of the Chams is also confirmed by important foreign evidence. The British "News Chronicle" of 11 December 1945, reports on the evidence collected in this matter by Mr. Hutchinson, M.P. (see S/AC.4/PV/16, page 11). A member of the British military mission at Tirana, Lt. Col. Palmer submitted a report on his special trip to discover the truth about the Cham massacres (S/AC.4/PV/16, page 11 and S/AC.4/69, pp. 3-4). The report confirmed these massacres which were admitted by the Greek commander Sarandis. Mr. Palmer's report is supplemented by the remarks of the head of the British mission at Tirana, General Hodge (S/AC.4/69, p. 4). (See facsimile reproduced in the brochure "Greek monarcho-fascist government's aggressive acts against Albania." (S/AC.4/89, p.98).

This brief statement cannot be ended without mentioning the Greek press which reported on this matter. The following is from "Agonistis" of Yannina, No. 290 of 29 January 1946. "The cut-throat of Zerva, after having devastated everything that the

/hand of the

hand of the Italian and German occupiers had left standing, spread a wave of terror throughout the country. The entire wealth of the Albanians driven away by force was devastated, etc. (S/AC.4/FV/12, page 3).

The newspapers "The Voice of Epirus" in its No. 145, "Embros" of 15 August 1945, "Agonistis" of 11 July 1945 and 3 June 1945, spoke of the sufferings of the Chams (see "Greek monarcho-fascist government's aggressive acts against Albania", pages 93, 94 and 95).

The Albanian Government appealed to the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the Cham problem. (S/AC.4/FV/16, page 12).

The representative of the Greek Government, unable to deny the truth of the massacres, qualified them as "so-called massacres" and claimed that the Chams fled because they had collaborated with the occupiers. These allegations, however, were denied by the witness Frontzas, called by the Greek Government, who stated: "There was a Cham battalion in E.L.A.S." (S/AC.4/SC.2A SR page 11).

The real reason why the Chams were persecuted is that they took an active part in the struggle against the occupiers. This is confirmed by the fact that the first stage of the massacres began in June 1944 and continued to the end of the year. There was subsequently a very short period of calm because the E.L.A.S. drove the Zervists out of Chamouria. The Cham refugees in Albania who had left during the first persecutions began to return to their country. After the Varkiza agreement, however, the E.D.E.S. forces again seized Chamouria and the second stage of the slaughter thus began. (S/AC.4/FV/16).

Being unable to refute or explain the massacre of the Chams, and at a loss to defend himself for this abominable crime, the

/Greek delegate

Greek delegate at Filates tried to distract the attention of the team by denying that the Chams were of Albanian origin. Proof was given however that they are not Turks, as he claimed, but true Moslem Albanians. On the other hand, he put forward the ridiculous argument that propaganda had been at work to make these people feel Albanian instead of Turkish. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/4)

The successive Greek Governments applied a constant policy of de-nationalization to the Albanian minority which they treated as Turks. This is another reason for the persecutions.

(5) The witnesses:

We requested that four Greek witnesses, of those most responsible for the crimes, should be brought before the Commission: among others, General Napoleon Zervas, Colonel Kranja, etc. We also asked to visit the principal places where the massacres had occurred: Filat, Paramithi, Margellic, Parga, Spatar and Kocke. The Greek witnesses were not interrogated, nor were the places visited.

In Albania we requested the Commission to hear twenty Cham witnesses who had suffered during the persecutions. Team 1A heard only four. Four witnesses called by the Greek Government were also heard on this question.

In conformity with the request made in the Albanian Government representative's letter to Salonika (S/AC.4/69), the Albanian representative with Team 1A insisted on going first to Konispol in order to study the Cham problem, and on the basis of the Cham evidence collected, to return to Filat to ascertain on the spot what had happened. The Team did not adopt this

/proposal

proposal and stayed at Konispol a few hours only. (S/AC.4/S/AC.2A/15)
During these few hours at Konispol, the enquiry consisted of the hearing of some Cham witnesses, the examination of the frontier incidents at Iikojani, the hearing of five witnesses called by the Commission in connection with the statements of Mehmet Kotanlako. This was very brief indeed, whilst a day was spent at Filat hearing Greek witnesses on the Cham question alone.

The evidence of the spokesman of the Cham anti-Fascist Council shows that the terror against the Chams followed a preconceived plan. He stated: "The most bloody atrocities occurred on 22 June 1944. The Chams were unjustly terrorized throughout Chamouria. Hundreds and thousands were killed. These crimes were committed in the villages of Filati, Parga and Spatar." (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/16, p. 1)

Other witnesses mentioned concrete cases which had occurred in their villages.

The witness Iswail Halili (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/16, p. 6) stated: "I am from Spatar. The Zervas forces entered Spatar on 22 September and the crimes began on the 23rd. From the day of the arrival of the Zervas the village was cut off. The women were sent into the Mosque while the men were killed in groups." Another witness, Hilmi Bino (idem, p. 10) stated: "I am from Parga. On the arrival of the Zervas troops in Parga they separated the women from the men, the latter were sent to the Parga Castle where they were killed. The old women were sent back to their homes while the young ones were violated. Among the Commanders of the Zervas Troops there were: Commander Papanika, Basil Ballani, and Spiro Cudnidha."

The witness Fatime Paraja (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/16, p. 13) stated: "The Zervistes killed my son at Paranithia. Under the command of Jaqi Papi the Zervas troops killed the men of the village and violated the women."

According to the memorandum of the Cham Anti-Fascist Council, 673 persons were massacred in the village of Paranthia, 626 at Parga, 1,286 men, women and children at Filat, 157 killed and hanged at Spatar, 46 people killed at Gumenica (S/AC.4/234, Annex 19, page 3)

According to the same document 68 villages with 5,800 houses were pillaged, burnt and destroyed. In estimating the damage it should be noted that the destruction and looting by the Zervas Monarcho-Fascists forces in Tchamouria involved: 17,000 head of small livestock, 12,000 cattle, 21,000 cwt. of cereals, 80,000 cwt. of oil, as well as the entire 1944/45 production amounting to 11 million kilogrammes of cereals and 3 million kilogrammes of oil. During the flight 110,000 head of small livestock and 7,400 cattle were lost. The evidence shows that the Cham minority did not enjoy minority rights. Their mother-tongue was suppressed (S/AC.4/234, Annex 19). This confirms the policy of denationalization followed by the Greek authorities.

The four Albanian witnesses interrogated at Konispoli gave evidence of the atrocities suffered by the Albanian minority at Tchamouria, and gave exact dates and places. The witness Mustafa Babura showed four knife wounds on his back inflicted by Greek gendarmes when he was trying to escape the massacres with his brother. His brother was killed on the spot. The witness Madame Fatime Fronjo produced the hair of her son who was killed by Zervas soldiers before her eyes.

The four witnesses called before Team 1A by the Greek Government gave facts conflicting with the Greek Government's affirmations.

/The Greek

The Greek witness Frontzas, for example, (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/14) stated that it was possible that there had been cases of reprisals against the Cham population. The witness stated later there was a Cham battalion in ELAS. That is to say that the reprisals were not for failure to co-operate with ELAS against the occupiers, but for the contrary reasons.

The Greek witness Athanasios Sakos (S/AC.4/SC.2A/15) (it should be noted that his name is on the list of those responsible for crimes against the Chams) stated that only 400-500 Chams had been collaborators with the Italians. The Greek witness Nousret Ali stated that at present in all sixteen Cham families were left of the 26,000 (according to his information) who were there before the war. Meanwhile the Greek witness Tsonjopoulos Georgios stated that there is not a single Cham in Goumenitza, all the families who formerly lived there having left.

(5) Conclusions

The material submitted by the Albanian delegation in support of its accusations that the Albanian minority in Greece has been terrorized and massacred, consists of:

- (1) A statement on the massacres of Albanian minorities in Greece (S/AC.4/PV/16);
- (2) The memoranda addressed to international conferences by the Cham Anti-Fascist Committee (S/AC.4/PV/82);
- (3) Quotations from Greek newspapers;
- (4) Quotations from foreign newspapers;
- (5) Statements by eminent foreign politicians;

- (6) The document of Lt. Col. Palmer, Member of the British Military Mission in Albania, on his visit to Tchamouria. The committee and this report by General Hodgson, Head of the British Military Mission in Albania;
- (7) The memorandum addressed to the Commission of Investigation by the Cham Anti-Fascist Committee;
- (8) The statements of Cham witnesses before Group 1A at Konispoli.

The Greek reply relies on nothing but the evidence of the four Greek witnesses heard by Group 1A at Filat. Examination of this material makes it possible to reach the following conclusions:

WHEREAS

the Albanian material is submitted in a fully documented form, the supporting documents are of Greek origin, other supporting documents are of foreign origin (British, American),

Cham witnesses have made concrete, detailed and uncontradicted depositions on the massacre of the Albanian minority in Greece,

Greek witnesses have also made certain affirmations regarding these massacres,

there are approximately 23,000 Cham refugees in Albania,

the Greek witness Nousret Ali stated that only sixteen Cham families remain in Greece,

the Greek reply is ineffective,

THEREFORE

the Albanian delegation declares that the charges blaming Greece for the massacres of the Albanian minority by Greeks are confirmed by the investigation and correspond to the facts.

J. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II CHAPTER V*

Albanian Bulgarian and Yugoslav Contentions that the Greek Government
is Conducting a Policy of Provocation Towards Those Countries

(1) Acts of Provocation on the Frontiers of Albania, Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia

There is a logical connexion between Greece's policy towards Albania and the frontier incidents. Greece considers herself at war with Albania. The Greeks, claiming the rights of conquest, demand the annexation of territories belonging to Albania. Now, a country regarding itself as being at war with another, also wages war on it. I insisted in my previous statements on the fact that the Greeks alone have an interest in provoking incidents on our frontiers. I noted that the question of frontier violations formed part of a group of other Greek provocations against the integrity and independence of Albania. It cannot be explained as a separate problem.

When frontier incidents are studied it must be asked which side has an interest in provoking them. Now, the Greeks alone have that interest. These provocations form an integral part of all the other Greek provocations against Albania, her integrity and her independence. One does not violate the frontiers of a neighbouring country without having an interest in so doing and without linking the affair in question to other provocations

* Document S/AC.4/PV/85/Part II (original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.12/Rev.2).

of like nature, in such a way as to create a de facto situation in which one's designs may be accomplished. These designs are expansionist. Our contention is proved by the very fact that three Greek soldiers, captured during provocations on Albanian territory are held by our authorities. They have admitted the truth. It is worth while giving here the statements of these prisoners, who were captured on different dates and in different places.

The soldier Jorgo Simeon said, inter alia; "We committed that act (the provocation) not on our own free will, but because we had received orders to commit such acts."

The soldier Jorgo Jotagis said, inter alia: "Our orders were not to leave the partisans (the Albanians) in peace for a single second. We had to find new pretexts every day for provoking the Albanians."

The soldier Jorgo Kristojani said: "We then fired on the Albanian patrol, which returned the fire." (S/AC.4/44A pp. 35 and 59, S/AC.4/44B. p. 25).

Hundreds of Albanian villagers, who suffered from the Greek provocations, stressed these facts in letters to the Albanian authorities and asked, in various ways, that the necessary steps should be taken to protect their lives against the Greek provocations. (S/AC.4/44A. pp. 27, 37, 42, 44, 45, 47, 52; S/AC.4/44B, pp. 7, 8, 12, 13, 15 to 19 and 21).

However, a conclusive proof that the violations of our frontiers are caused by the Greeks, is furnished by the fact that these violations take place both by sea and by air. The Greeks, having the means at their disposal, do not confine themselves exclusively to provocations on land, but often extend their provocations to the air and the sea.

On 17 February 1947, I drew attention in Athens to the

statements of two Greek sailors, Emanuel Papanikollau and Thomas Voucias, which revealed very clearly how Greek naval units repeatedly engaged in military operations against Albania.

Following is one of the statements by Papanikollau: "..... but our anxiety reached its height when, once, during our night attacks, we had advanced until we were off the Port of Valona. On that night, an old colonel whose name and origin I was unable to ascertain had come with us I remember that, during this period, we carried out more than fifteen attacks in Albanian waters, and we were convinced without a shadow of a doubt, that the aggression against Albania by the Greek Army was prepared in every detail." (S/AC.4/PV/27).

The other sailor, Thomas Voucias, confirmed what his comrade said. He says, for instance; "We approached to within 20 metres of the Albanian coast. We cruised near the coast and the Port of Saranda. When we stopped 100 metres from Saranda, we started to fire from the two corvettes. The Albanians extinguished their lights and made no reply." (S/AC.4/PV/27).

There is an irrefutable document which proves that the entire fault lies with the Greeks. Point (b) of the report of General Hodgson, the Head of the British Military Mission in Tirana, of which I submitted a facsimile with my letter of 14 May 1947 to the Chairman of Drafting Committee II, reads: "Confirmation reached me of the incident mentioned in the Political Report of the British Military Mission No. 9 of 27 July, Appendix A, Annex I, of two Greek ships which approached Saranda and fired their heavy machine-guns at the Albanian coast"; and Point (d) reads: "The incidents would appear to have been caused either by irresponsible Greek elements, or by Albanians who had deserted to Greece from

units of the Albanian National Army." (S/AC.4/PV/27).

A study of the provocations committed on the Albanian frontier will show that the incidents occurred mainly in places where the Greeks occupy commanding positions. That fact still further strengthens the argument that the Greeks, and the Greeks alone, provoke frontier incidents; they provoke them because, in this way, they are attempting to achieve their imperialistic aims. On several occasions I brought to the notice of the Commission the incidents caused by the Greeks on the Albanian frontier in the period from September 1944 to the end of 1946, and submitted substantial documentation in support (S/AC.4/44A and B and B/Rev.1) and those from January to April 1947 (S/AC.4/190, 191, 172, 217 and 257).

Following is a classification of the 172 major and 24 minor incidents:

- a. 81 incidents involving crossing the Albanian frontier and the subsequent firing of shots;
- b. 33 incidents involving shots fired by the Greeks from their own territory to which our frontier guards did not reply;
- c. 27 incidents provoked by Greek aircraft flying over Albanian territory;
- d. 22 incidents provoked by the Greeks on our coast;
- e. 20 incidents involving exchanges of shots provoked by the Greeks from their territory;
- f. 8 incidents involving raids carried out by Greek soldiers and civilians in Albanian territory;
- g. 3 incidents following the crossing of the frontier by Greek criminals;

- h. 2 incidents involving armed attacks against Albanian frontier posts.

On 26 February 1947 at Salonika the Albanian delegation presented a specific request for an enquiry into these incidents to the Committee of Experts (S/AC.4/59); among other things, the Albanian delegation asked that the undermentioned points on the frontier, where incidents had taken place, should be visited in order to judge from the topography of the area who might have provoked them:

- a. Likojan (6 incidents)
- b. Janjar (6 incidents)
- c. Radat of Gjinokastrë (17 incidents)
- d. Koshovica Kakavijs (6 incidents)
- e. Radat of Leskoviku (3 incidents)
- f. Vidove (5 incidents)
- g. Ponciara (3 incidents)
- h. Trestenik (6 incidents)

There was thus a possibility of enquiring into 52 incidents which had occurred at eight points on the frontier.

On 7 March 1947, the Commission decided on the itinerary of Team 1A.

In accordance with the proposal of the Albanian delegation, it was decided to enquire into the incidents at:

- (1) Trestenik
- (2) Radat of Leskovik
- (3) Radat of Gjinokastrë
- (4) Likojan

The Albanian delegation had therefore proposed that an enquiry should be held at eight points; it was, however, decided that it would be held at four points only, but at a meeting at Korça, Team 1A decided not to enquire into the incidents at Radat of Leskovik. An enquiry was therefore held at only three of the eight points mentioned in the request. The Greeks had requested that an enquiry be held at two points, which was agreed.

However, it should be stressed that the Albanian request was that the enquiry should be extended to the actual places where the incidents took place, so that the topography of the area might be seen. The Team went only to Trestenik, where it looked at the positions, and then withdrew to Korça to hear witnesses.

(2) The Incidents at Trestenik

In connection with these incidents the Albanian delegation asked that nineteen witnesses be heard (S/AC.4/SC.2A/14) and, subsequently, at the Team's request, the number was reduced to eight (S/AC.4/SC.2A/14/Rev) Of those eight witnesses the Team heard only four.

The visit to Trestenik made it possible to hear Lieutenant Gaco Mborja of the Albanian National Army who spoke of events in that sector of the frontier. The attention of the Team was drawn to the excellent strategic position occupied by the Greeks. An attempt has been made to dismiss the Trestenik incidents by pointing to the absence of the reports which regulations on international frontiers require to be prepared in cases of incidents. But no such reports can be prepared when one of the parties regards itself at war with the other. These were not occasional incidents, but continually repeated acts by the

/Greeks

Greeks, inspired by the Greek view that there is a state of war between Greece and Albania (S/AC.4/SC.2A/43).

(3) Albanian Witnesses Heard at Korca

1. Tufik Sherifi

The witness showed clearly that the Greeks fired on Albanian peasants from their territory and killed his brother, MOUSTAFA SHERIFI, who was working in his field. (Incident of 12 July 1946). The witness was next to his brother when the latter was killed. He said that the field where his brother was killed was a thousand metres away from the frontiers and that the firing came from three sides. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9).

2. Irfan Ramadani

An eye-witness, he confirmed the incident in which MOUSTAFA SHERIFI was killed, and said that to start with the firing came from two sides, and, afterwards, from three sides. He emphasized that the fusillade came from the heights above them and that the Greeks occupied commanding positions. He was an eye-witness of certain incidents provoked by the Greeks in the Trestenik sector.

3. Derim Hajdar

He confirmed the incident in which MOUSTAFA SHERIFI was killed by the Greeks and the incident of 10 August. The Greeks were responsible. The witness complained that many villagers were suffering from Greek provocations because it had become impossible for them to cultivate their fields freely, except at night, or to cut wood in the forest near the frontier (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9).

4. Ractem Nekhip

He was an eye-witness of several incidents, including the incident of 12 July when MOUSTAFA SHERIFI was killed. In reply to a question, he said that peasants were not in the habit of going to the fields armed.

/Greek Witnesses

(4) Greek Witnesses for the Incidents at Trestenik

1. Georgios Ganteos

He was not interrogated but was dismissed because he had had nothing to do with the incidents of Trestenik. That proves, however, that he had been briefed, albeit inadequately, to testify in such a way as to throw doubt on the Albanian publications on the subject of the incidents of Trestenik. He did not succeed. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9).

2. Georghe Domopoulos

There is a flagrant contradiction between the facts mentioned in the Greek book "Incidents on the Greek Frontier" and this witness' evidence. He said that only a single Albanian soldier fired against the Greeks. In the book it is alleged that there were "2 Albanian partisans who fled after the encounter." The witness said that it was impossible for him to say how many soldiers had fired from the Albanian side because they were in trenches and could not be seen. In the Greek book, it is alleged that "then another band of some 18 Albanian partisans opened fire on the soldiers, preventing them from carrying away the wounded man." And that wounded man was, in point of fact, the witness, but he does not speak of those things. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9).

(5) The Incidents at Likojan

There was no inspection on the spot. A list of eight witnesses was submitted to the Team by the Albanian delegation, but only two were heard at Konispoli; they included an officer of the Albanian Army, FAIK LAMCE, who gave the Team an account of the various incidents at Likojan.

1. Faik Lamee

He confirmed the attacks carried out by the Greeks on 11 October 1945, 1 November 1945, 7 November 1945, 24 November 1945, 2 June 1946, and 16 October 1946. He especially mentioned the favourable position occupied by the Greeks (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17).

2. Medan Ballani

An eye-witness, he confirmed the attacks carried out by the Greeks on 11 October 1945 and 17 October 1945. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17).

3. Hajro Koro

Shepherd, eye-witness of incident of 17 October 1945 when four Greek soldiers entered Albanian territory, approached him, and spoke to him when he was grazing his goats. It was evening, he fired on the Greeks (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/17).

(6) Greek Witnesses:

1. Thomas Stefanos

There are contradictions between his statements and the account of the incident of 1 November given in the Greek book, "Incidents on the Greek Frontier". The witness said that the incident began at eight o'clock in the morning. The book says it was at 2:30 P.M. The witness mentioned Pyramid No. 67, whilst the book mentions Pyramid 66. The witness and the Greek liaison officer with Team 1A spoke of the Albanian soldier Avni Seferi, taken prisoner during the incident, while in the book he is not mentioned. The book reports quite differently. This shows that the Greeks briefed the witness on the basis of the Albanian statement on the subject of the incident, regardless of their book.

The witness became confused in the presence of the Team. Once he said: "The three Albanian soldiers advanced towards the Greek

/frontier posts",

frontier posts", another time he said that the Albanian soldiers were on the frontier line. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/14).

2. Joannis Charitos

In his statements to the Team, he said: "Hearing the firing, they all (the soldiers) went into the trenches. They saw three Albanian soldiers firing on them from the opposite pyramid..... one of the Albanian was unable to get away and was made prisoner." But from this it does not appear that Albanian soldiers entered Greek territory.

Like the previous witness, he mentioned the incident of 3 November. But in the Greek book, there is nothing at all for 3 November in that sector of the frontier. He spoke of the incident of 2 June. He said that eight Albanians advanced towards the frontier; in the book it only mentions six Albanians. Subsequently the same witness said that there were seven Albanians (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/14).

I have already spoken of the incidents of Radat in Chapter III.

In connection with the investigation of the incidents at Trestenik, Radat and Likojan, the Albanian delegation had asked that 23 witnesses be heard, but only 3 were heard by the Team. The Team heard 10 Greek witnesses.

The Albanian witnesses bore out the Albanian delegation's written statement to the Commission. Our witnesses, simple peasants and soldiers, related what they had seen and what they had suffered. They all confirmed the Albanian statements (S/AC.4/44A; S/AC.4/44B) regarding the incidents investigated. By means of witnesses also, we proved our case.

Three of the four Greek witnesses heard at the request of the Albanian delegation in connection with the incidents made statements inconsistent with the account in the Greek book,

/"Incidents

"Incidents on the Greek Frontier". The fourth was not heard. He was dismissed as having had nothing to do with the incidents which the Team was investigating.

(7) Conclusions

The material submitted by Albania in support of the accusation that Greece is provoking the frontier incidents consists of the following:

(1) the statement charging Greece with provoking incidents on the Albanian frontier (S/AC.4/IV/15);

(2) the list of incidents, together with correspondence from the local commanders concerning the incidents, and statements from peasants who had to suffer from the incidents. (S/AC.4/44A; S/AC.4/44B);

(3) argument in support of the accusation;

(4) the leaflet "Aggressive Acts of the Monarcho-Fascist Greek Government against Albania";

(5) a facsimile of the Report of the British Military Mission in Albania;

(6) statements regarding the incidents by the eight Albanian witnesses asked for by the Albanian delegation and examined by Team 1A.

Whereas,

the Greek reply consisted of nothing but a request for an investigation into the incidents by the Commission, and the said investigation produced negative results for Greece;

the Albanian material has been submitted in documented and reasoned form;

the Albanian witnesses have confirmed the incidents into which the Commission enquired;

the statements of the Greek witnesses contained inconsistencies with the Greek book;

/the Greek

the Greek accusation blaming Albania for provoking the incidents has been shown to be false (Chapter III);

Therefore,

the Albanian delegation accredited to the Commission of Investigation considers that the Albanian accusation regarding the provocation of the incidents on the frontier by Greece has been proven and is in accordance with the facts.

/K. ORAL STATEMENT

K. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II, CHAPTER VI*

(1) Maintenance of Quislings in Greek Territory, and subversive Activities of those Quislings against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

We brought up this important matter before the Commission of Investigation at Athens on 7 February 1947 (S/AC.4/PV/13), and I emphasized the concentration of war criminals in Greece. I submitted quotations from the Greek press which illustrate that fact. I submitted a photograph of free Albanian war criminals, photographed at Salonika on 11 April 1946. I stressed the assistance given by the Greek authorities to these criminals. The most notorious war criminals are Muharem Bajraktari, the former Fascist General Preng Previsi, the former Prime Minister under the Germans and former Minister of the Interior Figri Dine, Abaz Ermeni, the former Chief of Gendarmerie Hysni Dema, Ali Nivica, Haki Rushiti, Irfan Goskova, Isuf Baruti, the former General of the Fascist party Alush Leshanaku, and others. Documents concerning these war criminals are quoted in our book "Aggressive Acts of the Monarcho-Fascist Greek Government against Albania", including:

(a) Letter from the Ministry of the Interior to the Office of the Prime Minister, signed by the war criminal Figri Dine. This document shows that two German officers were decorated;

(b) Letter from the Chief of the Royal Gendarmerie dated 27 March 1947 addressed to the High Command of the National Forces, signed by the Chief of the Gendarmerie, the war criminal Hysni Dema. In that document, mention is made of four British airmen taken prisoner by the "Ballist" forces, one of whom was killed by the said forces and the three others handed over to the gendarmerie which, in turn, handed them over to the "German authorities".

* Document S/AC.4/EV/85/Part II (original French). References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.12/Rev.2)

Now this concentration of Albanian war criminals, the organization of other bandits of Albanian nationality in the criminal E.A.V.I. organization, and their actions, constitute another side of Greece's war against Albania. In this way, the present rulers of Greece are waging war on Albania.

In Greece, Albanian war criminals and bandits of Albanian origin are being organized and sent to Albania to commit terrorist acts. For the training of bands of Albanian subjects in Greece with a view to sending them into Albania see document S/AC.4/PV/13, dated 7 February 1945, page 10. There is also an order from the Military Headquarters of Epirus to the Commander of the gendarmerie at Yannina and subsequently sent to all sectors of the town of Yannina for "rapid execution". The document bears the numbers a.p. 2214, 2109, and is dated 20 September 1945. From that document it appears that the Greek authorities have contacts with the E.A.V.I. organization, and that the Greek authorities are arming refugees of Albanian origin (see facsimile of this order in "Aggressive Acts of the Monarcho-Fascist Greek Government Against Albania", page 42, fig. 5).

The same book, on page 36, fig. 2, gives a facsimile of the letter from Jani Diamandi. This letter appears in document S/AC.4/PV/13, page 11 with the necessary explanations which show the connection existing between the two above-mentioned documents. From these it appears that the Greeks are trying to encourage able-bodied Albanian men to leave Albania. See on page 38 of the same book, the facsimile of a letter from a Greek senior officer to members of the organization of "Northern Epirotes". These two documents are connected with the communiqué of the Committee of Northern Epirus at Yannina, published in the newspaper "VORIOS EPIROS" of 24 November 1946, which reads:

"The Northern Epirotes have taken the decision suggested to them by their long historical tradition. They will attempt to free their shackled hands themselves. And the only people to be in no way responsible will be they themselves".

In this connection, see also the statement by Kristo Papa (Document S/AC.4/PV/13, pp. 13 and 14, Annex X); see Annex XII of the same document, where there is a description of a meeting at Yannina and a report of the decisions taken to penetrate into Albanian territory in armed bands to organize unrest.

See also Periodical Report No. X of the Head of the British Military Mission in Albania, quoted in document S/AC.4/PV/27 of 17 February 1947. On page 14, it says: "(d) The incidents would appear to have been caused either by Albanians who have deserted to Greece...." and further down on the same page at point 2: "What I wished to draw attention to here was the case of deserters who may be employed for purposes of provocation on the frontier". That, however, supports our accusation that the Greeks are employing Albanian war criminals and deserters to stir up unrest inside our country. (Annex 1a, S/AC.4/PV/13, p. 4 and the facsimiles submitted to the Commission with my letter of 14 May 1947)

See also the tracts published at Yannina and distributed in Albania by Greek agents who entered our territory illegally (Annexes 2, 3 and 4 of the above-mentioned document).

Those documents are supported by articles in the Greek press, mentioned in the same document.

Let us now turn to the acts committed by these organizations of war criminals and by Albanian bandits.

Document S/AC.4/PV/13 contains the following:

(1) an account of the trial of the band of war criminal Ditar Kurtesi who was sent to Albania from Greece (p.16). This fact is also mentioned

/in the book

in the book "Aggressive Acts of the Monarcho-Fascist Greek Government Against Albania", page 52;

(2) a report on the activities of the Albanian war criminal Dule Alarupi (quoted in document S/AC.4/PV/13, on page 17 and on page 54 of the above-mentioned book);

(3) an account of the acts committed by the bands organized by Lieutenant Colonel Miltiadhi Mousakitis (idem);

(4) the report on the Skoplje case, submitted to the Commission of Investigation by the Yugoslav delegation;

(5) statements by Majram Bajraktari, a Yugoslav witness before the Commission of Investigation in Belgrade;

(6) statements by the Yugoslav witness Emin Azemi before the Commission of Investigation at Belgrade;

(7) an account of the sabotage of the elections in Albania on 2 December 1945 (S/AC.4/PV/13);

(8) statements by Vasil Lazari, quoted in the same document, page 5;

(9) statements by Stavro Jovanllari in the same document, page 5;

(10) statements by Sokrat Nini as given in the book "Aggressive Acts of the Monarcho-Fascist Greek Government Against Albania", page 42-43;

(11) statements by Dhimo Dhimojani in the same book, page 43.

The four last-named were all agents in the service of the Greeks. They were arrested and tried in Albania.

(12) a report on the Korca trial (S/AC.4/166 of 26 March 1947).

This document clearly shows the subversive activities of the E.A.V.I. organization of Yannina which, through the agents it sent into Albania, organizes criminal groups to stir up unrest in the area of Leskoviku (Alba

Various statements by Greek witnesses confirm that Albanian and Yugoslav war criminals are being used by the Greek authorities against the democratic population, in clashes with the Greek partisans, and also to commit provocative acts on the frontier.

(1) The witness ISKENDERI at Skoplje stated that Hysni Dema, head of the gendarmerie during the German occupation, was Mouharem Bajraktari's link with Greece, whence he brought instructions for extending subversive activity.

(2) The witness Hajdar Golemi at Korca stated that on 13 November 1945 he fled from Albania to Greece, where he found refuge, and that on 21 August 1946 he crossed the frontier in the Bilisht sector with six others, and that they all received arms before leaving Greece for Albania. He also stated that on Albanian territory they were surrounded and obliged to surrender. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/9).

(3) The witness Papajanis (Team B) said that 4 kilometres from the frontier near Florina, Ousoulas, of the village of Katoklini, provided the Ballists with arms, torturing the civilian population and committing acts of provocation against the frontier posts. (S/AC.4/SC.3/6, page 7).

(4) The witness Vitamiotis said that Albanian and Yugoslav Quislings (Ballists and Chetniks) were threatening democratic Greek prisoners in the presence of the Greek authorities; that they, together with the Greek gendarmes used to arrest democrats; and that they were now being kept on service along the frontier. (S/AC.4/SC.7/PV/3 page 9)

(5) The witness Efthimis Joanidis said that he saw armed Ballists and Chetniks passing under his window, and that they were living at Parori, Katoklini and Karterori. He gave the names of

/people

people beaten up by the Ballists. (S/AC.4/SC.2A/SR/7, page 4).

(6) Luan Gashi, a war criminal, stated at Syros that when they arrived at Florina they received clothes and shoes, and then remained at Valos for three months and had the right of walking about freely even at night (S/AC.4/SC.2A/PV/8).

The Albanian delegation with Team I asked for six witnesses to be heard.

(1) Figuri Dine

He was Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister during the Italian and German occupation of Albania. He was declared to be a war criminal by the Albanian Government. (S/AC.4/189, pp. 62-64 and S/AC.4/SC.2/PV.2). He crossed into Greece on 1 September 1946. He said he had been in the camp at Piraeus for two months. The entry in the camp register showed that he had arrived there on 15 January 1947, that is to say just when the Commission of Investigation was preparing to go to Greece, i.e., the Greek authorities had then started to transfer war criminals who had been at liberty in the North of Greece to camps in the South of Greece.

He stated himself in the presence of the Team that during the years 1942 to 1943 he had been Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister a month before the Germans' retreat.

(2) Hrani Dema

The above was head of the gendarmerie during the German occupation. He commanded the forces which took part in the great cleaning-up operation of the Germans against the National Army of Liberation in June, 1944 (S/AC.4/189, pp. 63-64). He said himself, "I was in command of the gendarmerie"; he further stated: "I accepted command of the gendarmerie at the request of the great patriot Mehdi Frasheri. I did so to establish order in the country where disturbances were taking place which resulted in chaos."

/Now Mehdi

Now Mehdi Frasheri is himself a war criminal who has fled to Italy. He was Regent during the German occupation.

He said he entered the Piraeus camp on 1 September. Subsequently he said he did not remember exactly but thought it was the 20 of September, 1945. According to the camp register he arrived on the 15 January, 1947. There is every reason to believe that from the date of his entering Greece until 15 December 1946 he was walking about freely in Greece. According to information and evidence at the disposal of the Albanian Government, Hysni Dema entered Greece once, then returned to Albania again, then left for Greece once more (December 1945 and January 1946). The witness stated that he had never gone from Greece to Albania and had never returned. But this does not in any way correspond with the facts. The witness' behaviour, in the presence of the Team proves it. He became confused on several occasions before the Commission, which was noted by everybody. That proves that he found himself in a difficult and unexpected position and that consequently all he did was to conceal the truth (S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/4).

(3) Alush Leshanaku

The above was Secretary of the Fascist party of the Prefecture of Elbasani during the Italian occupation. He was also a member of the Fascist Assembly of Tirana. During the German occupation, he commanded the gendarmerie of Elbasani; he committed robbery and murder (S/AC.4/189, page 66). The witness himself acknowledged before the Team that five months after the occupation of Albania by the Italians he held the post of Commander of the Fascist organization of Elbasani; then he said "as Secretary of the Fascist party I was also a member of this federation." (Fascist Assembly). When Italy declared war on Greece, Alush Leshanaku made a speech to the Fascist Assembly, asking to enroll as a volunteer against Greece. This was denied by the witness, but the

/truth

truth is proved by the Albanian people who all affirm the contrary.

As regards his collaboration with the Germans, the witness said: "After the German occupation, the German forces put me in command of the gendarmerie." He denied that he was in command of the band of Bicaku which, during the German cleaning-up operations against the partisans (January, 1944), captured General Davis, Head of the British Military Mission to the National Army of Liberation, and handed him over to the Germans. But that denial is untrue. He is afraid of being arrested in Greece itself, and he lies. The fact however, is known to the whole Albanian people. (S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/4).

(4) Prenek Previzi

He became a general during the Italian occupation of Albania. During the German occupation, he was in charge of national defence. He was one of the collaborators most responsible for military operations against the National Army of Liberation. He said: "I gave no orders because it was agreed that all orders would be given direct in the military areas and all action would be initiated on the spot." Now it is clear that such orders must have come from a higher authority, namely, from National Defence Headquarters.

He claimed to have crossed the frontier in June 1946 and to have arrived at the Piraeus camp on 3 August 1946 (S/AC.4/SC.2/FV/4).

(5) Ali Nivitsa

After the Albanian representative had described some characteristic features of the witness as a war criminal and as an organizer of disturbances in Albania with Greek help, the Greek liaison officer gave some additional information saying that the Greek police, in agreement with the Greek department dealing with war criminals, decided that the above individual would be brought before a special war criminals court; all this took place on 29 May 1946.

The witness said he entered Greece on 8 October 1944, and remained at Jannina. He sent a letter to General Zervas and to

/Major Tom

Major Tom to ask for permission to remain there, which was granted. He said he wrote that letter on the advice of nationalist circles at Jannina. Thus, a war criminal, recognized as such even by the Greeks, received advice, corresponded with General Zervas, and received permission to live in Greece which proves that he was protected.

He added "General Zervas invited me, and others, to come into his office." This fact proves how closely Ali Nivitsa was connected with the then Greek authorities. He arrived at the Syros Camp on 4 January 1947. He said he came from Syros and from Crete. But why was he taken to Syros? He could well have remained in Crete, as did so many others. Here again Ali Nivitsa was useful to the Greek authorities in organizing acts against Albania. On being asked whether he knew Abdullah Alarupi (See Dule Alarupi, page 17, S/AC.4/PV/13), the witness said that he had merely heard his name and that he came from Korça and that he had been killed. On 27 November 1945 Abdullah Alarupi was near the frontier on Albanian territory, having come there from Greece. The witness alleged that on that period he was in the South of Greece or in the island (he said that he arrived at the camp in October 1945 - Syros or Crete). In that case how did he know that Abdullah Alarupi had been killed? This means he was perfectly well aware of the mission of Abdullah Alarupi who had been sent from Greece to Albania to stir up trouble. He said that he had never been arrested by the Greek authorities or put on trial. This also throws doubt on the veracity of the Greek claim that he is to be regarded as a war criminal (S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/8).

(6) Haki Rushiti

See the charges against Haki Rushiti (S/AC.4/SC.2/PV/8). Although the witness attempted to deny the charges, his dossier in Albania nevertheless shows that they are true.

/He stated

He stated that he arrived in Greece on 17 October 1944 and that he was interned for the first time in a camp in May 1946. In March 1945 General Zervas and the British Military Mission arranged that he should go to Corfu. From March 1945 until May 1946 he remained on Corfu. He said that he lived for 13 months on Corfu with the assistance of UNRRA. Actually, he was concealing the truth. He is avoiding recognizing any of the charges on purpose, although he played an important part in connection with the disturbances fomented by Greece in Albania.

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From all the above, it is clear that there are concentrations of Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav war criminals and Quislings in Greece and that these were at liberty before the arrival of the Commission of Investigation. From the documentation and the testimony of other witnesses from among the war criminals it appears that the latter are well treated by the Greek authorities; it appears further, that the Greek authorities are sending them, with gendarmes and groups of the Right, on operations against the partisans or on expeditions to persecute democrats. Most important of all, it appears that these war criminals are used by the Greek Government against the three democratic countries of the Balkans.

The refutation of these charges has been proved false and is mainly based on the evidence of war criminals, disposed in advance to fight against their own countries by every means.

(2) Greece's foreign policy is expansionist

In considering this question, the two earlier points must be borne in mind, namely, that armed provocations, acts of terrorism and acts of diversion, and the concentration of war criminals are the means by which the Greek Government is waging war against Albania to achieve its imperialist aims. The Greek Government is using all the means at its disposal: the army, the navy, the air-force, war criminals, Albanian bandits, the press and the radio. It is attacking our frontiers, it is stirring up trouble in the interior of Albania with the object of annihilating or carving up Albania. In this connection see Part III of the Albanian delegation's statement at Athens on 8 February (S/AC.4/PV/15).

Articles in the Greek press and speeches by important political personalities of present-day Greece confirm the great campaign which was launched in that country during the years 1945 and 1946 to incite the people to war against Albania. At the head of the campaign is the Greek Government itself.

See the articles in the Greek press inciting to war (same document).

See the statements by Greek political personalities asking for nothing but war against Albania (same document).

See the press and radio campaign for insults to Albania (same document).

In addition to the other facts, there is Mr. Tsaldaris's proposal to Mr. Piate for the dismemberment of Albania, put forward during the Peace Conference in Paris. That was dealt with by the representative of Yugoslavia on the Commission of Investigation in his statement at Athens on 14 February 1947, which was registered with the Secretariat (S/AC.4/PV/24

See the Minutes of the Fifty-Ninth Meeting of the Commission of Investigation at Salonika (S/AC.4/PV/59).

Here again we drew attention to the question of Greek claims presumably to be satisfied by force; but not even on this occasion did we receive a reply from the Greek representative.

At that meeting, I emphasized the illegal course followed by Greece to achieve its imperialist designs. I said: "What is interesting, is the illegality of it. This is characterized by hostile propaganda against Albania by illegal means: pamphlets, manifestos and newspapers are introduced into Albania by illegal means. This campaign is linked to propaganda of the same type carried on in the press. The illegality is also characterized by the use and organization of enemies of Albania (particularly by the E.A.V.I. organization, in acts against Albania). The illegality is also characterized by the continual incidents perpetrated by the Greeks on our frontiers, by land, by sea and in the air."

My insistent request for a reply is always countered by something which is no reply, for there are no serious arguments in rebuttal. This charge linked with the others, shows the true nature of the monarcho-fascists of modern Greece.

Another important point is that the Albanian delegation on several occasions, and in good time, applied to the Commission to hear witnesses and make an enquiry to verify this charge. But no enquiry took place. (S/AC.4/65; S/AC.4/129; S/AC.4/PV/59; S/AC.4/182).

The Albanian delegation repeatedly brought up this charge, which is based on terrorist acts, on authentic documents of British and Greek origin, on statements of important Greek political personalities and on articles in the Greek press.

The Albanian delegation repeatedly requested that the accusations should be verified by the hearing of witnesses as well.

But some of the grounds of this charge (provocation of frontier incidents and the stirring up of trouble by Greece inside Albania) have already been verified.

If in addition to what has been said it is remembered that the Greek liaison officer did not answer the charge, the conclusion is that the evidence and arguments submitted by the Albanian delegation confirm the charge that Greece's foreign policy is expansionist.

(3) On the Draft Report

I have now stated the Albanian delegations' views regarding the Commission's investigation into the various problems with which it is concerned.

Further, I have sent to Drafting Committee II six letters on various observations that I felt called upon to make in connection with the draft report. Now, the draft report put forward by the Drafting Committee differs widely from the views I have just stated and those given in my six letters. I do not know what the Committee did with the observations in my letters, but if these wide differences persist in the report, the Albanian delegation, relying on the views I have just put forward, reserves the right not to accept such a report.

I consider that the report should present all the material collected during its work and relevant to the investigation.

On examining the draft report, we find:

1. In the said draft report, there are incomplete quotations, from statements made by witnesses; or else there are merely quotations, taken from the statements of witnesses in the Greek White Book, without any parallel quotations from statements made by the same witnesses before the Commission. For instance, there is the case of the witness Tseteroklis, of whom the draft report says (in connexion with the charge of hospitalization of casualties):

"Tseteroklis declared in his deposition (G.W.B.) that the medical care they received in Albania and Yugoslavia was evidence of collaboration between E.A.M., the N.O.F. and the Albanian and Yugoslav Governments". Before the Commission, however, the same witness said: "In my band, there were no casualties. But when at Monastir, I used to see people who were fighting in Greece and were wounded being taken away into Albanian territory, and passing through Monastir". He also said: "I personally did not go to hospital at all". He added: "Whenever we had any casualties, they were carried into Serbian territory". In this case, it must be emphasized that according to him, his band carried out no attack and had no wounded.

2. Facts are put forward which do not correspond to the statements of the witnesses. For instance, of the refugees at the Rubig Camp, it is said that the majority went off to Yugoslavia. I am at a loss to know where this might come from, because the three or four witnesses who spoke of Rubig said that all the refugees from Rubig went to Yugoslavia.

3. It is to be noted that some of the refutations, including the most important, are not given in full.

In one chapter, I see that the report of General Hodgson, the Head of the British Military Mission in Albania, appears. But in the same chapter as corrected a day later, I see that it has been omitted.

/4. There are

4. There are cases where the inconsistencies quoted in the refutation are not clear, while in the minutes the contrary is the case.

Other comments might be made; the six letters I sent to the Drafting Committee give several examples.

ANNEX VII

COMMENTS AND ORAL STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
LIAISON REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA ON
PARTS II AND III OF THE REPORT

A. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER II SECTION A*

The Bulgarian Delegation has examined the draft report elaborated by No. 2 Editing Committee, concerning Chapter 2, on the subject of the allegations brought by Greece against the neighbouring countries which were meddling in her affairs with the intention of confiscating certain portions of her territory. (S/AC.4/W.8/Rev.2).

Paragraph B, Chapter 2, concerns Bulgaria. The substance of this paragraph clearly demonstrates the lack of any serious evidence against Bulgaria and the absence, even, of any well-defined accusation. But the Bulgarian Delegation hopes to have the opportunity of expressing its opinion on this subject as soon as the Commission, according to its original intention, sets out to examine the grounds of complaint lodged by Greece and Bulgaria, in order to draw its conclusions.

Meanwhile I think it may serve some purpose to draw your attention to certain errors and inaccuracies which, according to the Bulgarian Delegation, have occurred in the proposed draft, and which should be corrected.

On page 6 (II. Witnesses examined by the Commission.) where it is a question of: "The support of these allegations, the Greek Government presented ... etc.", it is stated that the Greek Government "referred to six other declarations of Bulgarian officials." In brackets, the explanation is given that these declarations refer to the gentlemen: Pavlov, Kolarov, Obbov, Veltchev, Yugov and Guerorguiev. Actually the declarations of these statesmen, quoted by M. Kiron, deal only with Western Thrace, a fact alluded to on two occasions by the Greek liaison Officer himself

* Document S/AC.4/W.19 (original French) - References to draft report

(Greco-Thrace), notably in Appendix No. 1. in his speech of 17 February 1947 (S/AC.4/IV.27). These declarations, therefore, have no connection with Macedonia, nor with the allegations as formulated in the draft report - namely: - The Greek Representative accuses Bulgaria of instigating "an intensive propaganda in favour of the re-assimilation of Greek Macedonia to the Yugoslav Federal State of Macedonia." (S/AC.4/W.8/Rev.2. P.5).

It would be unsuitable, therefore, to insert in the report the declarations of these six Bulgarian statesmen, which have no concern either with Macedonia or the Macedonian question, and which moreover contain nothing more than the proclamation of Bulgaria's right of access to the Aegean Sea, through Western Thrace, a right which was claimed by Bulgaria before the Peace Conference in Paris and before the Council of Four Foreign Ministers.

The passage (P.6) beginning with: "Further evidence was brought etc." as well as the passage (same page, lower down) beginning with: "This letter also suggests etc." deal only with data concerning Piræan Macedonia and Bulgar-Yugoslav relations and have no connection with Greco-Bulgarian incidents and differences, which are solely within the sphere of the Commission of Investigation. Even if these passages were to remain in the draft report, they would be of no advantage to the Greek case which is strengthened by no proof whatsoever. However it would be more reasonable to delete them since they deal with items which are outside the framework and the study of the Commission.

Another consideration however arises which is still more important, which would make the suppression of these two passages desirable. They are worded in such a way as to give the impression that the United States Delegate is accusing the Bulgarian Government and bringing evidence against it.

/Now, it is

Now, it is well known that Mr. Ethridge, in his letters addressed on several occasions to the liaison officers of the Balkan States, has never tried to take a position in favour of one country or another, but has only endeavoured to seek information and enlightenment in regard to the questions raised by the liaison officers.

This is made still more evident in the letter addressed by Mr. Ethridge to the Greek liaison officer on 31 March 1947 (S/AC.4/192) in which the United States Delegate again asks M. Kiron if "any proof exists of an agreement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria....", in which the sentences would correspond with the allegations brought by the Greek Delegate in his declarations.

On Page 5, in the passage: "of declarations emanating from Bulgarian officials.....", a slight printer's error should be corrected, namely "of Bulgarian officials", which is no doubt the way the compilers of the draft wished to express themselves.

B. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER III, SECTION B.*

With regard to report S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.1, the Bulgarian delegation would like to make several remarks concerning inaccuracies in the draft of the text.

a. On page 12 of the said report it is stated:

"Eleven Greek soldiers are said to have been killed and thirteen wounded in the course of engagements, either with guerilla bands, or with Yugoslav patrols".

: This passage is incomprehensible.

Is it really a question of engagements with Yugoslav patrols? In this event, the passage is misplaced, since this chapter is only concerned with "Greek charges against Bulgaria."

Perhaps the author of the report had in mind engagements between the Greek army and Bulgarian patrols and the text I have quoted may only be due to a lapsus machineae. If this is indeed the case, we would ask you to rectify the error and the numbers, for, according to the White Book "Incidents on the Greek Frontier", only one Greek soldier was killed, and not by Bulgarian soldiers, but by smugglers (page 31), and one Greek soldier was wounded. If it is absolutely necessary to add the ten soldiers killed and the twelve wounded in the Corymbos incident (page 35 of the French text), it must be specified that this only refers to Greek losses sustained in conflicts between Greek guerillas and the Greek army, that these conflicts, according to the White Book itself, took place on Greek territory and that Bulgarian authorities and soldiers were in no way concerned in them.

b. We consider it absolutely indispensable to add the following passages at the end of page 12, immediately following the classification of incidents included in the White Book:

* Document S/AC.4/W.19/Add.1 (Original French) - References to Draft Report (S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.1).

1. The Greek Government only submitted proofs, and produced witnesses in respect of some of the incidents alleged in the said book (the incidents discussed in Chapter I); and it was owing to the insignificance of the facts mentioned that the Commission did not concern itself with all the cases included in the book.

2. The Bulgarian Government has always denied the material existence of the incidents included in the White Book.

c. The passage beginning "As to the incidents" (page 14) should be entirely redrafted, for we have never claimed that the incidents included in the White Book were "nearly all provoked by the Greeks". This phrase might apply to the incidents with which we have charged the Greek Government, but in no way to those mentioned by the Greeks in the White Book. It is unnecessary to do so, however, since the same idea is already formulated in the preceding paragraph.

The passage concerned should therefore be drafted as follows:

"As to the incidents brought up in the Greek White Book, the Bulgarian representative, while denying their material existence in general, considered that most of these incidents were strikingly insignificant and in any case were not of a political character."

d. On page 14, in the final line, instead of "the guerillas are in control of Greek territory in the frontier region", we should put: "certain parts of Greek territory in the frontier region".

e. We consider it indispensable to add the following new paragraph at the end of the report:

"In support of his case, the Bulgarian representative sent letters to the Commission, one dated 15 March and another dated 20 March, to which he attached, for the information of the Commission, a series of annexes containing the results of the enquiry conducted by Bulgarian authorities concerning alleged frontier incidents".

/C. WRITTEN

C. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER IV.*

The Bulgarian delegation would like to draw the attention of the Commission of Investigation to certain omissions and inaccuracies which should be noted in the draft report (S/AC.4/W.16/Rev.3).

The following passage should be inserted on page 11, before the statements of witnesses:

"The representative of Bulgaria accused the Greek Government of going so far as to deny the Slav population of Macedonia the right to exist. This population is not allowed to have its own schools, to publish books, or to form associations. It has even been forbidden to speak its own language" (S/AC.4/140, page 2).

The statements of the witness Ioanis Patis, of Livadia in Beothia, who had been condemned to death, and was interrogated by Team C at Salonika on 22 March 1947, should be included in a special passage of the report, for they are concerned with essential questions and are the testimony of a person who was aware that to reveal the truth to the Commission would cost him his life and would incite the Greek Government to hasten his execution.

It would therefore be advisable to insert in a suitable place (on page 5 or 6, for instance) a passage reading as follows:

"The witness Patis stated that on 15 December 1946 he was beaten for a whole hour by three non-commissioned officers of the Gendarmerie. He also said that some young men from his village, fleeing the terrorism of the authorities, were forced to take to the hills. 'After the Treaty of Varkiza, all members of the Resistance were persecuted'. In reply to a question from Mr. Halkias, the witness Patis said: 'I went into hiding, mainly because all members of the resistance were to be beaten by the police until they spat blood. That is a rule the police follow'". (S/AC.4/SC.7/PV.4.)

* Document S/AC.4/W.19/Add.2 (Original French) - References to Draft Report (S/AC.4/W.16/Rev.3).

On page 1 it has not been specified that the Central Committee of E.A.M. is concerned, and on page 2 it has not been specified that the witness Loulis was the leader of a Greek democratic party, namely, a member of the liberal party for twenty years, a member of the E.A.M. administration in hiding during the German occupation, the chief general of the Epirus region, a member of the Central Committee of E.A.M., Chairman of the National Solidarity Organization, and the representative of political deportees on the island of Ikaria.

D. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER I, SECTION B.*

A "summary of evidence put forward by the Greek Government against algeria concerning guerilla bands", has just been submitted to the Commission. We should like to draw attention to several errors and omissions, since we think that this might serve to improve the document concerned.

1. On page 1, the witness "Christos" is mentioned. This refers, of course, to the witness Christos Madzourakis. This omission should be rectified.

2. On page 2, paragraph 2 it is stated, with reference to the village of Metaxades that "the latter is situated in Bulgarian territory." We have not been able to ascertain that such a statement was made by the witness; in any case, it would be entirely untrue, for the map proves that this place is situated in Greek territory.

3. The statements made by the witness Velikostoyanoff, taken from the White Book, are reproduced on page 2. It must be added that this witness was not speaking of his own experiences, but quoting the words of a certain Lieutenant Radeff, and that Velikostoyanoff, therefore, testified by hearsay.

4. On page 7, in the penultimate paragraph, we have the phrase "the mayor of Manurissa". This should be altered to read "Mandritza".

5. The title "Crossing of the Bulgarian frontier by Greek guerilla bands", on page 4, is ambiguous. It is concerned with crossing from Greek territory into Bulgarian territory and not with crossing in the other direction. We would suggest that the title be changed to "Crossing by Greek guerillas into Bulgaria".

6. The testimony of a certain "Medelkoff" is reported on page 3. We insist that it should be recorded in parentheses that this is a case of anonymity and that the person heard by the Commission did not wish to disclose his real name, despite the insistence of certain delegates.

(S/AC.4/SC.2/PV-18. II. 1947)

* Document S/AC.4/W.19/Add.3 (Original French) - References to Draft Report (S/AC.4/W.15/Prov.1)

7. On page 4, the paragraph beginning "A number of witnesses gave evidence in support of the Greek charges" should be deleted, for in making this statement the author of the report is taking sides. This report should only include statements, and not conclusions.

8. On page 5, the whole passage beginning "the Greek liaison Representative submitted, etc....." is misplaced, for we are merely concerned here with a list of proofs, whereas the passage in question is in the form of an accusation. This passage might possibly be inserted immediately after the title, as a statement of the Greek case.

9. The Greek representative's statement regarding certain camps, which, according to him, existed on Bulgarian territory, is reproduced on page 1. We think it absolutely indispensable that it should be recorded after the statement of the Greek case that the Greek representative provided the Commission with no proof in support of his assertion.

10. Throughout the report, witnesses are quoted whose testimonies are included in the White Book, but who did not testify before the Commission itself. One gets the impression that the author of the report felt that this group of witnesses should be regarded in the same way as the witnesses heard by the Commission. For us, these witnesses are quoted in the White Book merely as a point of departure, to facilitate the hearing of witnesses by the Commission. The depositions reported in the White Book might have been useful to us as a basis of comparison with the statements of the various witnesses heard by the Commission. All this, however, could only have been so if the witnesses concerned had indeed been brought before the Commission and heard by it. In the contrary case, that is to say, when the witnesses included in the White Book have not been heard by the Commission, the statements made by them are of no importance.

We therefore most urgently request that the names and statements of Messrs. Papadoulis, Velikostoyanoff, Gologanoff and Plevnalieff, which are all included in the White Book, but were not brought before the Commission or heard by it, be struck from the report.

/E. WRITTEN

E. WRITTEN COMMENTS ON PART II, CHAPTER VI.*

The Bulgarian delegation would be extremely grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements for a copy of this communication to be sent to the Drafting Committee. We would ask you to take into account the following remarks and to have them inserted in the report of the Commission, Chapter VI (S/AC.4/W.12, Rev.2).

We think it necessary to add the following paragraph to the passage on page 5 dealing with the two bandits who were members of the Parcho Group and were killed on Bulgarian territory on 25 February 1947:

"In his statement dated 17 February 1947, the Bulgarian Liaison Representative drew the attention of the Commission to the constant and brutal hostility which the official Greek press had never ceased to show for two years towards Bulgaria and towards the Bulgarian people as a whole".

The Bulgarian Liaison Representative referred in the same speech to the grave and real danger which, in his opinion, the existing regime in Greece constituted to the neighbouring countries and to peace in the Balkans. (S/AC.4/PV.27, pp. 25-26 of the English text).

* Document S/AC.4/W.19/Add.4 (Original French) - References to Draft Report (S/AC.4/W.12/Rev.2).

F. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II, CHAPTERS I AND II*

The Bulgarian delegation has done its best to study carefully the draft conclusions prepared by the Drafting Committee, or by certain members of that Committee, and also the statements on which these conclusions were based. The Commission has no doubt observed that a relatively small part of the material collected and of the conclusions concern Bulgaria directly. Nevertheless, I think it my duty to analyze the facts submitted and to explain the point of view of the Bulgarian Government clearly, so as not to leave in doubt any of the questions with which the Commission is concerned within its terms of reference.

I.

The first chapter of the report is concerned with the Greek accusations, which allege that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are assisting the guerilla movement in Greece. With regard to Bulgaria - I shall only speak of that country now -, I must admit that the Bulgarian delegation was somewhat embarrassed, not at having to refute the Greek accusations, which are obviously ill-founded, but by the difficulty of understanding exactly what these accusations were and what concrete proof was adduced in their support.

Other delegations probably share this opinion. To give a few examples: in the plan of the first chapter of the report,

* Document S/AC.4/PV.35/Part III (Original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W/15/Prov.1 and S/AC.4/W.8/Rev.2

there are some counts of indictment such as the assertions that Bulgaria was giving military training to Greek refugees or was forming them into guerilla units. But an examination of the vast amount of material collected by the Commission shows that even the most servile witnesses of the Greek Government have been able to say nothing to render these accusations more precise. The same applies to the alleged military camp and the alleged branch of the Bulkes military school, established at the village of Mandritza in Bulgaria. Although the Greek Government spoke of a military camp and a military school in this village, in solemn official documents, not a single witness has been found who could supply proof of their existence. I am pointing all this out in order to show how lightly the most serious accusations have been levelled against Bulgaria by a Government which had every reason to wish that these matters should remain in obscurity and which soon bitterly regretted the step it took in New York in December 1946.

Indeed, the Commission of Investigation had hardly been in Athens ten days before certain persons in Government circles began to write in the Greek newspapers that the Commission should be expelled because of its attitude, which they called "impudent."

The same first chapter contains accusations such as the ones that Greek partisans crossed into Bulgaria or that certain wounded Greek partisans were cared for in Bulgaria. The statements on this subject quote two declarations by the Greek liaison representative and by the Greek Government, as well as the testimony of certain witnesses. But if we study all these documents attentively, it becomes clear that it was in vain that the Greek Government took so much trouble to collect material of this kind. Not a single action has been proved which might justify Bulgaria being reproached

/for having failed

for having failed in her international obligations. Bulgaria has never constituted a base for Greek partisans and has never helped them in any way.

I shall deal separately later on with each of the cases presented. As regards the statement that Bulgaria has given refuge to Greek refugees amongst whom there are Greek partisans, fleeing from Greek Government terrorism the Bulgarian Government has never denied this. In so doing, it acted as the authorities of any country wishing to conform with the principles and practices of international law would have done. The Bulgarian delegation has submitted to the Commission complete information on the subject of Greek refugees coming to seek shelter on Bulgarian territory.

We informed the Commission that the refugees were interned in the interior of our country and that some of them were sent to a concentration camp, first at the village of Glavanitza, in the Tutrakan district, and then at the town of Berkovitz, hundreds of kilometres from the Greek frontier. We stated that we were prepared to give every facility to the Commission if it wished to visit this camp and to obtain any information it might deem necessary. Moreover, the Commission has a copy of the decree of the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, dated 3 October 1946, laying down the manner in which all Greek partisans crossing the Bulgarian frontier were to be dealt with. This decree has always been strictly applied. If there were armed men amongst the refugees, they were disarmed and interned in a concentration camp. If there were wounded or sick men among them, they were taken to a hospital and also sent to a concentration camp on their recovery.

/thus, no reproach

Thus, no reproach can be levelled at the Bulgarian Government for all these actions. On the contrary, its perfect loyalty and its correct attitude must be acknowledged.

The Bulgarian delegation read with surprise the passage in one of the draft conclusions stating that "Greek guerillas, in groups and individually, were assisted in crossing Bulgarian territory from Yugoslavia to Greece and sizeable Greek guerilla groups had on a number of occasions taken refuge on Bulgarian soil with the assistance of the Bulgarian authorities". In the same passage it is said that: "Other evidence shows that in certain instances Greek guerillas, travelling to Greece from Yugoslavia were given arms in or near Sofia; and hospital facilities were offered to Greek guerillas who were transferred for this purpose to Bulgarian territory."

It is even more surprising to find the same unfounded allegations reiterated, for no apparent reason, except the complete absence of all proof, in another passage (on page 4). The same things are repeated without any difference and, consequently, quite unnecessarily in another place (paragraph 11).

If a careful and fairminded analysis is made of the documents quoted by the Commission, it will be found that the allegations that Greek partisans entered Greece from Bulgarian territory with the help of the Bulgarian authorities and that they received arms from the Bulgarian authorities, have never been supported by serious proof.

In the same paragraph 11, it is said that: "the evidence submitted to the Commission with regard to arms and equipment for guerillas was less conclusive." This admission of lack of proof is of incontestable value to us, but it should be expressed in a still clearer and more categorical form. Indeed, there is a complete lack of proof and not "less conclusive proof."

/The Commission's

The Commission's investigations have confirmed that Bulgaria did not arm and equip Greek partisans. No proof has been submitted to show that the Bulgarian Government performed such actions.

I should now like to make a few remarks on the various sub-divisions of the first chapter. First of all, however, I should like to dwell briefly on the moral qualities of the witnesses called by the Greek Government, for the veracity of their statements may be judged, to a great extent, by these qualities. Most of these witnesses were persons deprived of their liberty, and thus absolutely dependent upon the Greek police authorities: they were persons sentenced to death or to other punishments, accused people under arrest and, in general, people to whom it would be easy to suggest that their fate depended upon their statements.

Information on the methods and procedure used by the Greek authorities in preparing these false witnesses has been brought to the knowledge of the Commission. As to certain other witnesses, there were serious grounds for thinking that they were agents in the service of the Greek police. The two brothers of the Greek delegation's first witness, Fotios Condopanis (Anivass), informed the Commission that Anivass had always shown himself to be a person without moral scruples and that he had maintained suspicious contacts with the Greek police and with certain foreign circles.

Hardly any of the Greek witnesses heard by the Commission had identity papers and in some cases it was indisputably established that they had been tortured by the Greek authorities and that their statements had been extorted from them by force.

The Commission knows, for instance, of Mr. Hood's telegram about the witness Zahros, interrogated by Mr. Hood's brigade in the town of Janina. Nearly all the witnesses called by the Greek Government were

/uneducated people

uneducated people, some of them even illiterates, a fact which is also worthy of attention, because Mr. Kyrkou has tried to obtain from such ignorant persons information on complex international problems, on the policies of certain Balkan Governments, on the Macedonian question, etc...

The people called upon to testify against Bulgaria were, mainly, persons regarded as responsible for numerous crimes, during the German occupation. For instance, Colonel Ivan Gologanov, mentioned in the White Book, formerly presided over the court martial during the German occupation; he was sentenced to death for his numerous and serious crimes against Bulgarian patriots. Others were wanted for crimes under common law, such as the witness Kroum-Zvarnov, who was responsible for several thefts committed in Bulgaria. All these persons were under the protection of the Greek authorities, who calculated that hatred for their own country would lead them to bear false witness against Bulgaria.

I do not think I need point out the contrast in this connection with the majority of the witnesses who testified against the Greek Government, and also the high moral and intellectual qualities of persons who were heard at Athens and Salonika and who explained the reasons for the chaotic situation now prevailing in Greece. The Commission has been able to realize this itself.

I should like to make another remark relating to proofs. The Greek Government has brought before the Commission:

- (a) The book entitled "Evidence."
- (b) The book entitled "Incidents"
- (c) Witnesses

The book entitled "Evidence" in fact only contains the results of legal examinations undertaken by the Greek administrative or police authorities, or rather, the testimony of various witnesses taken by the Greek authorities. In the majority of cases, these testimonies were submitted as summaries, and this was done indirectly, through texts drawn up according to the judgment of the examining official. I shall give a typical example: one of the witnesses said, while describing his itinerary, that he passed close to height number so and so. On being questioned, the witness explained that he was an ordinary soldier and did not know what the word height meant in military language. To everyone's astonishment, the Greek liaison officer explained that the witness, in describing his itinerary, probably mentioned certain villages and that the writer of the testimony, when transcribing it into literary and suitable language and following the points identified by the witness on a map, had seen fit to interpret the itinerary in his own geographical terms. This example should be noted, for it explains in a striking manner how the evidence submitted was cooked up.

It should be added that these testimonies were given by persons whom the Commission in the majority of cases, had neither seen nor heard. The Commission therefore had no opportunity of checking the identity of the witnesses nor of sorting out what was true and what was false in their testimonies. It had no opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses in order to fill in gaps or straighten out confusions. We are only speaking of the intrinsic value of the testimonies contained in the White Book, apart from their confirmation or invalidation by the testimony of witnesses made before the Commission. This means, therefore, that only the testimonies made before the Commission

/can be entertained

can be entertained, and that the White Book will only serve for purposes of comparison and as a symposium drawn up for the guidance of members of the Commission in hearing witnesses.

We could argue at length our assertion that the White Book in itself provides no proof. The Greek representative, however, makes this unnecessary by the formal statement he made on 4 March 1947, to the following effect:

"The White Book was published for your information and in order to serve as a starting point for hearing witnesses. In the last resort it will be what the witnesses say directly before the Commission that will count."

In view of what has just been said, we insist that the testimonies included in the White Book, which, for one reason or another, were not reiterated by witnesses before the Commission, should be purely and simply eliminated and considered as null and void. It would be absolutely useless to invoke the authority of the Government which submitted them in favour of the contrary argument. In the matter with which we are concerned and in this international dispute, the authority of one State has no weight since it is neutralized by the authority of the opposing States. An allegation must be substantiated by adequate proof. Thus, the testimonies of the following witnesses among others should be eliminated:

Ivan Gologanov (page 144)
Radko Pleynalieff (page 145)
Siméon Volikostoyanoff (page 145)
Papadoulis (page 88) etc

The book entitled "Incidents on the Greek frontier" must be treated in the same manner. It consists of an enumeration of incidents which, according to the Greek Government, took place on the frontiers

/throughout

throughout the year 1946, and the responsibility for which is attributed to us. It is obvious that this is only a detailed statement of the Greek case and that the affirmations it contains must consequently be proved by other methods. The fact of having noted these incidents and of having presented them in the form of a book has absolutely no value as evidence. All discussion on this point would be useless. Otherwise any enquiry would be superfluous - the Greek assertions would have been taken as "gospel" and an enquiry would have been dispensed with. Such an enquiry was, however, considered indispensable by the Security Council, simply because the Greek assertions contained in the Book in question were considered as mere allegations which had to be proved by suitable means.

In view of what has been said above, all the incidents contained in the aforementioned book which have not been confirmed by the witnesses should be eliminated. It should be added that such incidents compose the great majority of the cases in our enquiry.

We should like, however, to draw your attention once again to the insignificance of the facts submitted by the Greek Government. Read once again the incident reproduced above; add the large number of incidents relating to cases of contraband by persons who stole cattle or cut wood in a forest near the frontier; add the few sporadic cases of shots fired by soldiers at frontier posts and the rare "provocations" by anti-Greek songs and slogans; bear in mind that all this took place, not within a very short period, but over a whole year of 365 days, and not in one place, but here and there along the whole frontier of 500 km.; you will soon be convinced that we have here a repetition of the well-known story of the mountain which, after great

/efforts

efforts, gave birth to a mouse. Let us repeat that the accusation of having inspired and fomented the serious and tragic civil war which is raging throughout Greece, should be based upon a whole complex of facts, the extent and number of which would be such that they could be neither concealed nor minimized. In other words, if the accusations were well-founded, our conduct would be manifest in a number of ways, - facts would have come to light of financial aid, of large-scale supplies of arms and ammunition, of intense written and oral propaganda, of the existence of associations in Bulgaria directed against the present Greek Government - and there would be no necessity to search for facts and circumstances in order, in the end, to find only a few clashes, three in all, which took place in the vicinity of Cotymbos between Greek troops and Greek partisans and in connection with which so much time has been wasted to determine whether a few partisans pursued after their defeat across the frontier took refuge in Bulgaria.

The witnesses: According to Mr. Kyrrou, no importance need be attached to the fact that certain witnesses concealed their real identity, that others had been condemned to death or to imprisonment and that a number of others testified under duress, and were even subjected to torture. According to Mr. Kyrrou, the important thing is that the witnesses spoke the truth - and the manner in which this truth was revealed should be of no interest to us. This theory must seem ridiculous not only to lawyers but to all men of good sense. Mr. Kyrrou is committing what in good logic is called a "petitio principii", for in this case the important question is whether a given witness, who has concealed his identity, or has been condemned to death,

/or, has been

or, has been subjected to maltreatment and torture, is telling the truth when he makes certain assertions before the Commission.

Many of the witnesses could not or would not establish their identities before the Commission. I shall only quote here the case of the man "Nedelkoff", who frankly told the Chairman and the delegates that he did not wish to reveal his identity. Thus, the Commission knows nothing of this witness, and cannot be certain that he is not an impostor. Such anonymity deprives the witness's testimony of all value. No procedure in the world, civil or penal, admits anonymous witnesses and all procedures prescribe that the hearing of witnesses should be preceded by their identification.

In the second place, I should like to recall the case of the witness Valtadores, on whom the Greek courts had passed sentence of death, at the same time as a similar sentence had been passed on four of his comrades. These four men were executed. A member of the Commission wished to know why Valtadores himself had not yet been executed. The latter replied: "I do not know, probably because they wanted to keep me to testify before the Commission."

II.

A study of the paragraph concerned will show that the Greek accusations are formulated in a vague and inconsistent manner - which makes any technical precision difficult. The very title of Chapter II speaks of "Greek charges that Bulgaria is interfering in the internal affairs of Greece, aiming at detaching from Greece parts of her territories (Aegean Macedonia and Western Thrace)". And further on, on page 5, "the Greek Government accuses Bulgaria of promoting intensive propaganda for the incorporation of Aegean Macedonia in the Macedonian Federal State of Yugoslavia."

In the speech of the Greek liaison officer and in the statements of Greek officials, these inconsistencies and this vagueness in the
/formulation

formulation of the Greek accusations against Bulgaria are still more marked.

Moreover, not the least proof can be found in this document that Bulgaria is interfering in Greek internal affairs nor that she is conducting "intensive propaganda for the incorporation of Aegean Macedonia in the Macedonian Federal State."

The statements of the "six Bulgarian officials" are concerned exclusively with Western Thrace and have no connection with questions submitted to the Commission of Investigation. There is no mention of Macedonia in these statements. The speeches ascribed to Mr. G. Dimitroff and to General Terpecheff were delivered at a time when peace treaty questions were being discussed everywhere, and they contain nothing which might serve as a support for the Greek accusations. Can a few speeches and a few statements made over a period of two years be considered as proof of intense propaganda?

Mr. Kirou's dissertation on Bulgaria's foreign policy during the last fifty years, on her so-called "initial opposition to the incorporation of Aegean Macedonia in the Yugoslav Federation," on an alleged agreement whereby Bulgaria was to cease this initial opposition in exchange for the assistance which Yugoslavia had promised her in connection with Bulgarian designs on Western Thrace, - all these arguments of the Greek Liaison officer are without genuine foundation.

The article which appeared in the newspaper "Rabotnitchesko Delo" of 16 November 1946, with comments on Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations, does not refer at all to the differences which exist

between Bulgaria and Greece. The decision of the Bulgarian Great National Assembly of 18 December 1946 only refers to the Pirine part of Macedonia. There has never been any mention in the Bulgarian Parliament of that part of Macedonia which lies within the borders of the Greek State.

A further proof that the Greek accusations contained in Chapter II are absolutely unfounded is the fact that on 31 March 1947 the American delegate, Mr. Ethridge, had to ask the Greek liaison representative if he intended to submit proof of the alleged agreement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Mr. Kyrrou provided no proof, either before or after Mr. Ethridge's letter, and contented himself with repeating his personal suppositions, which he was unable to support with any proof, in his letter of 9 April 1947.

The weakness of the Greek liaison representative's case may also be observed in his long letter of 7 May 1947 (S/AC.4/258), in which he found it necessary to comment on the reply I had the honour to give to delegates of the United Nations in my letter of 8 April 1947. Although Mr. Kyrrou took a whole month to elaborate his commentary, and although he presented this commentary in the form of a veritable political dissertation, he was unable to add anything whatsoever which might serve to elucidate the questions before the Commission of Investigation, and still less anything which might support the Greek argument. Mr. Kyrrou only made a fresh attempt to create a diversion by adding still further inaccurate representations of fact. Thus, for instance, he insinuated in his letter that in the Bulgarian Parliament there had been talk of "the unification of the three parts of Macedonia" although there has been nothing of the kind either on that occasion or on any other. We repeat that only Pirine Macedonia and Bulgaro-Yugoslav

/relations

relations were dealt with, that is to say, questions outside the scope and competence of the Commission of Investigation.

In these circumstances, it is obvious that the Greek Government in formulating such accusations against Bulgaria and against her other northern neighbours was only seeking to divert attention from the real causes of the civil war in Greece and from the cruel injustices and persecutions to which the Slav population of Macedonia is subjected by the present Greek régime.

III.

Let us return to the facts quoted in Chapter I.

(a) Military Training of Refugees

This accusation is formulated in the following terms in the memorandum submitted to the Security Council:

"The Greek bandits are armed and trained in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, and are placed under the command of officers of those countries".

Mr. Kyrrou added in his speech of 17 February, on page 4 of the French text:

"The existence of branches of Bulkes has been known for some time, in particular at Mandritza in Bulgaria. There are camps on the territory of our neighbours and emplacements near the frontier which are used as field hospitals for guerillas wounded on Greek territory as ammunition dumps and as provisional barracks where guerillas seek refuge when pursued by the Greek troops".

Where is there any proof of these serious and bold allegations? Hardly anything can be found in the documents. On the contrary, the witness George Alipoudis (S/AC.4/SC.4/FW.3, meeting held on 24 March 1947 at Alexandrinopoulis) said that he never saw anything resembling a

camp or a munitions dump on Bulgarian territory, which he entered when he was pursued by the Greek Army. I do not think I need spend much time on the witness Kroum Nikoloff Ivanoff (S/AC.4/PV.52, 2/3/47) of Salonika, who told a story of a group of armed Greek guerillas in British uniforms who arrived in the Bulgarian town of Gorna-Djoumaya on the day when a Mass was being celebrated to the memory of the agrarian leader Alexander Stamboliysky, for here we have to do with a typical false witness. Many written documents certify that the date of Stamboliysky's assassination does not correspond to that mentioned by the witness and that no Mass was celebrated on the date he specified. In the second place, the witness said that he observed the presence of Greek partisans through the window of the prison where he was on that day, and added that these partisans established contact with Bulgarian officers and soldiers. It is just possible that the witness saw lorries full of Greek guerillas passing his prison window, but we may well wonder how the witness could have seen from his window that these same guerillas, after passing by in vehicles, established contact with Bulgarian officers and soldiers.

We think it unnecessary to deal at length with the evidence of Ivan Gologanoff, Radko Plevnalieff and Simeon Velikostoyanoff, since their testimonies are not included in the White Book and were not repeated by the witnesses before the Commission. We speak elsewhere of the question of principle raised by this problem.

The dossier offers no other proofs, and it should have been full of them, for the fact of maintaining training camps and munition dumps is something which by its very nature would be manifest in many different ways and this would have left its mark on men and could easily be proved by numerous witnesses.

Thus, this accusation completely falls to the ground.

(b) Recruitment of Bands on Bulgarian Territory

As regards this subdivision, even more than the preceding one, the voluminous dossier of the Commission may be searched in vain for the slightest proof to corroborate the accusation formulated in the title. Not a single witness mentioned organizations, Bulgarian instructors or organized military training in any part of Bulgaria, barracks, firing ranges, courses for political education, or even ostensibly innocent organizations which might conceal regular military training. The documents mention individual guerrillas, or even groups of guerrillas who sought refuge on our territory, but we repeat that no one has mentioned the recruitment and organization of bands. Only the witness Dimitrios Alepoudis told the Greek administrative authorities that the band which attacked the village of Metaxades was led by a Bulgarian chief and that this Bulgarian chief passed a death sentence on Sergeant Major Zakos of the gendarmerie. This testimony, however, is certainly of no value, because:

1. The witness made no precise statement regarding this alleged Bulgarian; he knew neither his name, his age, nor his politics; in fact, he knew nothing;
2. This witness' testimony is isolated; no other witness has confirmed it in any way; however, many of the witnesses had taken part in battles around Metaxades, and
3. Alepoudis said nothing to the Commission about this alleged Bulgarian chief.

(c) Provision of Arms and Ammunition to Guerrillas

The evidence on this change in the Commission's files is very meagre. We only find isolated and contradictory cases, and these are of no value. For instance, there is the witness Morzalos, who says that when a guerrilla prisoner was searched a bomb of Bulgarian origin was found on him. This fact is not, of course, conclusive, even if it is true, since another

/witness

witness stated that as a guerrilla he was armed with a French Lebel rifle, and many other witnesses have testified that the arms in the ranks of the guerrillas were of various origins and that there were as many German rifles and light machine-guns as Italian and, above all, British weapons. The guerrillas take their arms where they find them, so that there is nothing surprising in a bomb of Bulgarian origin being found in their possession.

In the second place, there is a case of the witness Konstantinos Papdoulis, who stated that he had seen seventy brand new and well-oiled light machine-guns of Bulgarian origin somewhere or other. But this is a witness who only testified before the Greek administrative authorities and whose testimony was not included in the Commission's records. Hence, this testimony is null and void. We have discussed this at length above.

Even if we added to all the testimonies mentioned those of the witnesses Mandzourakis, Babayanis and Dimetrius, it cannot be alleged that Greek guerrillas received their arms and ammunition from the Bulgarians. Mandzourakis' testimony is full of contradictions, Babayanis is a witness who was sentenced and imprisoned, and if the two testimonies are compared striking contradictions will be found concerning the day, the hour, the itinerary, the name of the leader who conducted them, etc., etc.

(d) Crossing by Guerrillas from Bulgaria to Greece.

There again we have the witnesses Mandzourakis and company. All that can be said regarding the validity of this evidence has already been said. Moreover Mandzourakis only reports one isolated case. As to the other witnesses, such as Eleuteriadis, Balios, /Zalaténoudis, etc.,

Zalatenoudis, etc., they allege crossings from Greece to Bulgaria rather than in the other direction. I have already had occasion to emphasize one of the striking contradictions in Mandzourakis' testimony; the witness stated that he passed through Haskovo. It may be seen from the map that this place is not on the itinerary indicated by the witness. (S/AC.4/PV.48).

(e) Hospitalization of Wounded Guerrillas

The Greek representative seems to have concentrated his attacks on this point. But it is a shot in the void for we have never denied that we cared for the wounded and the sick, whether civilians or soldiers, who crossed our frontiers to find shelter in Bulgaria. We have the right to give them shelter and are even obliged to do so by international law and morality.

What conclusion is to be drawn from what I have just said? It has already been stated: all these accusations and all this mass of proof is much ado about nothing--it is what we expressed earlier by the well-known proverb "the mountain gave birth to a mouse."

G. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II, CHAPTER III*

In analyzing the facts collected and classified by the Commission of Investigation with regard to this chapter, and confining ourselves to what affects Bulgaria, it may be useful first of all to make several fundamental statements:

1. The "incidents" quoted by the Greek Government are for the most part insignificant facts bearing no relation to the civil war now raging inside Greece.

2. The Greek Government has been unable to prove the material existence of the facts alleged in the memorandum sent to the Security Council, in the two White Books and in the various speeches made by Mr. Kyrrou before the Commission. From the outset, and from a superficial analysis of the White Books, it was clear to the Commission that the majority of the incidents cited by the Greek Government were either submitted in an exaggerated and distorted form or were pure invention. The work which the Commission has performed for so many months has confirmed this.

3. The Greek Government did not bring the incidents on the Bulgarian frontier, which are the subject of its complaint, to the knowledge of the Allied Control Commission at Sofia, except in three or four relatively insignificant cases. Similarly, the Greek frontier authorities in many cases did not seek to contact the Bulgarian frontier authorities when, according to them, incidents took place on the frontier.

* Document S/AC.4/PV.85/Part III (original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.11/Rev.2).

4. Some of the incidents mentioned in the White Book took place in localities abandoned by the Greek army when it retired to the interior. We may well ask, therefore, how the Greek frontier authorities were able to keep track of and ascertain the facts which, they allege, really took place.

5. In contrast to the Greek Government's exaggeration of trifling incidents devoid of political significance and its representation of these incidents as serious cases liable to disturb peace in the Balkans, the Bulgarian Government, which has much greater reason to complain of provocations committed by the Greek frontier authorities, has never sought to exaggerate the importance of these incidents. It has confined itself to bringing them to the knowledge of the Allied Control Commission, asking it to take the necessary steps in order that these incidents might not be repeated. Moreover, the Bulgarian Government has always thought and still thinks that it is capable of safeguarding order and peace on its frontiers single-handed.

6. The Bulgarian Government unhesitatingly accepted the British suggestion regarding the implementation of the Greco-Bulgarian agreement of 1931, which includes rules for frontier services; the Greek Government did not even deign to reply to this suggestion. The explanations that Mr. Kyrkou gave in this connection are not conclusive, for, although diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Greece have not yet been re-established, nothing would prevent the use of the good offices of, let us say, the Allied Control Commission or the British Mission at Sofia, to which a Greek Liaison Officer is attached; these bodies would not have refused to intervene in order to ensure the application of the aforementioned agreement.

Let me now go into the details of the incidents referred to in this chapter.

/As has been

As has been said several times, the facts contained in the book entitled "Incidents on the Greek Frontier" are remarkable for their insignificance. A number of these cases relate to cattle smuggling or woodcutting; others refer to rifle shots fired from time to time, others to allegedly anti-Greek songs sung by a group near a Bulgarian frontier post or to white rockets sent up from the Bulgarian side, etc....There is a striking disproportion between the gravity of the accusations and the futility of the alleged incidents. On the one hand, there is the alleged instigation and fomentation of a large-scale civil war, and on the other hand we are told of isolated facts and frontier incidents of no importance, which could not possibly be connected into a system. It is not enough to prove that in a struggle between partisans and the Greek army a bomb of Bulgarian origin was found on one partisan, or that on such and such a date rockets were fired somewhere on the Bulgarian frontier, to draw the conclusion that Bulgaria instigated and fomented disturbances in Greece on a large scale. In order to emphasize the disproportion mentioned above and the insignificance of the incidents quoted, I should like to single out the incident reported on page 36 of the French text, which, far from proving the alleged fomentation, only proves the good neighbourliness and good will of the Bulgarian authorities:

"On 28 December 1946, three bandits in civilian clothes coming from Bulgaria seized 56 sheep from the Greek village of K and led the sheep to the Bulgarian village of Koletsovo. When the N.C.O. in charge of the Creek post protested, the N.C.O. in charge of the Bulgarian post replied that he would examine the facts. A few days later he replied that he had found nothing whatsoever. Strangely enough on 3 January 1947 (6 days after the

/incident)

incident) he informed the Greek N.C.O. that he had just found the sheep, which would be restored to their owner and that the thieves had been arrested and imprisoned."

This incident requires no comment.

If to the aforementioned considerations we add the length of the frontier, which is 500 kilometres, the configuration of the ground and, above all, the fact that the Greek frontier area is rife with civil disturbances, it will easily be seen that the Greek complaints against us are absolutely unfounded, since "incidents" such as those quoted to you by the Greek Government are events which occur even amongst neighbours who live in perfect agreement.

Of course, incidents which have not been investigated by the Commission should be eliminated from those cited by the Greek Government, and, when this is done, we have only to examine the 3 incidents which took place in connection with the clashes at Korymvos, Metaxades and Prosotzene. That is all that remains of the large number of incidents quoted in the book concerned.

These three incidents, however, only represent clashes which took place on Greek territory between the Greek army and the Greek partisans, and all this does not concern Bulgaria. The accusation is that groups of partisans, put to flight by the Greek army, crossed into Bulgarian territory, but this refers to Chapter I, which we have already considered. We can only repeat that we have never denied that we gave shelter to Greek refugees, whether civilians or soldiers, whether armed or not, and that we have acted in accordance with rules and practices of international law and in conformity with the general instructions given by the Minister of the Interior.

We have considered the evidence collected in connection with the incidents concerned and the credibility of such witnesses as Mandzourakis, Parbayanis, Dimetrius, Eleuteriadis, etc., so that there should be no need to return to this subject.

/H. ORAL STATEMENT

H. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II, CHAPTER IV*

We now return to Chapter IV relating to the assertions of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, that the present Greek regime is responsible for the civil war in Greece and also for the disturbances in the northern regions of that country.

The numerous facts contained in this chapter leave no doubt that these assertions of Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia are absolutely well-founded and proven. The statements of Greek politicians and political organizations, the testimony of a large number of witnesses and innumerable concrete and often terrifying facts mentioned in the report, confirm irrefutably that the entire responsibility for the tragic position of the Greek people and for the tense situation in all parts of Greece rests with the existing Greek regime and may be explained by its anti-democratic methods, as well as by its inability to establish a reign of justice and law in the country.

The findings contained in this chapter show that a state of civil war exists throughout Greece and is not limited to the northern regions of that country. The objections raised by the Greek Government only confirm this reality. Greek denials are confined to Mr. Kyrrou's vain attempt to explain the disturbances and the civil war in the distant frontier regions by calling them the "tactics" of partisans, in the hope of misleading the Commission... He describes the location of clashes between the partisans and Government troops in an arbitrary manner, in order to give the impression that most of them took place in the frontier regions.

* Document S/AC.4/PV.85/Part III (original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.16/Rev.3).

The Commission has been able to satisfy itself completely that clashes have taken place and continue to take place throughout the country, including Thessaly, the Peloponnese and even the Islands.

The data contained in the report have established irrefutably and clearly that democratic elements in Greece are being persecuted by the gendarmerie, Government troops and right-wing bands. The Greek liaison officer has only been able to reply to this overwhelming evidence by attempting to deny the Commission of Investigation the right to concern itself with Greece's internal policy and political régime on the pretext that this would represent interference in the internal affairs of Greece.

It is in vain, too, that Mr. Kyrrou has tried to deny the Fascist nature of the existing régime in Greece and the fact that a large number of collaborators with the former occupiers are now in the Government, Parliament, the army, the gendarmerie, the police and Governmental bands. He was unable to deny that Greece was a country of refuge for Quislings and war criminals from the neighbouring countries, and that it was, as the liberal newspaper "Vima" has expressed it, "a paradise of collaborationists".

The persecution of national minorities in Greece (Macedonians and Chamurliots) has also been proved. The Commission has had the opportunity, in this connection, of ascertaining several moving facts, characteristic of the intolerable conditions of these national minorities, which are subjected to terrible injustices and persecution. The Greek liaison representative was unable to refute or even to soften this horrible and terrifying reality. He only attempted to raise two objections which, however, convinced no one: he recalled "the thousands of Slav-speaking emigrants who crossed into Bulgaria at the end of 1944, when the German troops were withdrawing and after the departure of these troops, with whom the refugees had been in close collaboration".

/Mr. Kyrrou

Mr. Kyrou knows, however, that if there were German collaborators amongst these refugees, they were judged in Bulgaria and that several were shot and others returned to the Greek authorities to be judged in Greece. Such was the fate of Governor-General Stefan Kletchkoff, who was condemned and shot, and of others also. The Bulgarian authorities acted in this manner towards all war criminals.

It would be absurd, however, to identify with these war criminals the thousands of emigrants mentioned by Mr. Kyrou, for these emigrants fled from the persecutions of the Greek authorities, remembering the examples of the past, when these same authorities submitted the Slav population to mass extermination. Several hundred thousand of these refugees from Western Thrace and Aegean Macedonia are now in Bulgaria and are still so anxious to return to their homes, but are prevented from doing so by the Greek Government's well-known policy with regard to national minorities. The fact, to which the Greek liaison representative referred, that there are special interpreters for Slav languages attached to the Greek courts, only proves that there are considerable numbers of Slavs in the northern part of Greece and that the Greek authorities are obliged to have such interpreters because the population does not know Greek. But the fact that these interpreters are attached to the courts does not prove that the authorities recognize the national existence of this population, that it is no longer deprived of the right to use its own language in public manifestations, or that it now has schools or churches, books or newspapers, as has been stated frequently before the Commission.

To sum up as regards Chapter IV, it may be concluded that the assertions of Bulgaria and Greece's northern neighbours contained in this chapter are absolutely proven and that the Commission has been able to establish this incontestably.

/Thus we are

Thus we are the more surprised at the attempt made in the draft report to give a completely false idea of the political situation in Greece. There are passages in this report which are indeed astounding, and from which it might be concluded that nearly all is well in Greece, except for the alleged bad faith of her northern neighbours. But we who are taking part in the investigation conducted in Greece, know perfectly well that it would be a bad joke to represent the existing Greek regime as almost a model of democracy and free government. None of us, and none of those who have observed the existing situation in Greece on the spot, could be misled by looking at the window dressing at Athens and certain other towns such as Salonika. We are perhaps witnessing attempts on the one hand to diminish the enormous responsibilities of the Greek Government and on the other hand to impose upon the democratic countries of the Balkans responsibilities which are not theirs. Such conclusions, which are unfounded and arbitrary, lead us to think that an attempt is being made to interpret the results of the investigation in a curious manner, that is to say, to dilute the responsibilities, to distribute them in all directions, part of the crushing burden of the Greek Government being shifted to the shoulders of the neighbouring countries, although they have not departed from their loyal attitude. All this is perhaps inspired by the wish to give an impression of impartiality to all the governments concerned, which, equally lightly, have themselves become involved in petty disputes.

We sincerely hope that the Commission will not act thus and that it will consider itself bound to "disclose the whole truth" as it results from all its investigations, namely, that the

/source

source of the evil lies in the existing régime in Greece and that Greece's neighbours are in no way responsible for the terrible tragedy of which the Greek people has been the victim for two years. We think that the truth should be spoken openly, not only because it is the truth, but also because just findings and conclusions must be reached in order to determine the proper procedure and methods to be followed in order to remedy the existing situation.

The fact that it was only in Greece, of the four countries visited, that the Commission heard witnesses criticizing the policy of their own Government should not be given the interpretation attempted in the aforementioned draft. It may be explained by the simple fact that, according to the Security Council's decision, the Commission was concerned with the régime in Greece, where a civil war was raging, and not with the régimes in other Balkan countries.

I. ORAL STATEMENT ON PART II, CHAPTER V*

V.

As regards Chapter V, which deals with the assertions of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia that the Greek Government is conducting a policy of provocation towards these countries, it is enough to examine even superficially the vast amount of material summarized in the draft report, in order to become convinced that these assertions have been fully proved. Many testimonies have established that the Greek authorities organized hundreds of incidents during the last three years along the frontiers of the three democratic countries. They have also established that Greece is the happy hunting-ground of all the Balkan Quislings and war criminals, who are also used for acts of terrorism and other provocations directed against Greece's northern neighbours. Furthermore, irrefutable evidence has proved that the foreign policy of the existing Greek régime is inspired by chauvinistic and expansionist principles. With regard to Bulgaria in particular, the report has convinced us that the Commission possesses a vast amount of documentation proving the fierce hatred of the Greek rulers towards the Bulgarian people. The offences and incessant threats of prominent Greeks and of the whole Greek governmental press against Bulgaria are well known. The Commission itself had the opportunity, on 7 February in Athens, of observing this state of mind of chauvinistic circles in Greece, - the circles which govern Greece today - when a group of "Hitos" made a hostile demonstration for one hour against the Bulgarian delegation and against Bulgaria

* Document S/AC.4/PV.85/Part III (original French) - References made to draft report (S/AC.4/W.12/Rev.2).

in front of the Acropolis Palace Hotel. I referred to this incident in my speech on 17 February, in order to draw the Commission's most serious attention to this state of mind in Greek official circles, which explains a number of the incidents with which the Commission is concerned. Indeed, the book entitled "Cowardly Bulgaria" was distributed to you in Athens, together with other pamphlets filled with expressions of brutal hatred and hostility towards the Bulgarian people.

I hasten to come to the last part of my statement, but before beginning this, I should like to say a few words about the speech Mr. Kyrrou made this morning.

Mr. Kyrrou spoke on a number of subjects; he told us of the Messianic role of the present Greek regime, of the salvation of modern civilization, of Greece's territorial claims and of the alleged "three invasions" of Greece by Bulgaria, but he devoted too little time to the questions which directly concern the Commission, since these questions are apparently very embarrassing for him.

Mr. Kyrrou asserted that our three democratic States threatened democracy and civilization now existing in Greece. We have been guilty of no interference in Greece's internal affairs, but if Mr. Kyrrou reproaches us with not being delighted by the civilization and democracy of Mr. Tsaldaris, that is his affair. For us, this "democracy" is a synonym for tyranny, provocations and sanguinary acts. We cannot allow General Markos and all those who are struggling against the anti-democratic Greek regime to be labelled as bandits and gangsters. Does Mr. Kyrrou not think that, at that rate, the vast majority of the Greek people, and particularly those who object to the existing regime would also have to be labelled as bandits and gangsters? In what category, then, should we place

/all those

all those sinister government agents who have had thousands of men massacred without even formally bringing them to trial?

As to territorial questions, it is in vain that Mr. Kyrrou asks you for help to annex several pieces of Bulgarian and Albanian territory, for territorial questions have already been settled by the peace treaties and are not within the Commission's competence.

Why indeed has Mr. Kyrrou avoided explaining to us the state of affairs throughout Greek territory and the extent of the civil war which rages in his country? Why has he said nothing to us of the Greek provocations against our country, for instance, those of the band of the notorious Partcho, regarding whom we have submitted so many revealing documents?

Mr. Kyrrou reproaches us for not having provided him with a complete list of all the Greek refugees who have crossed into Bulgaria. But the Commission has never shown any interest in the names of these refugees. Mr. Kyrrou does not seem to know of the vast numbers of refugees from Western Thrace and Aegean Macedonia. There are thousands and tens of thousands of these poor people who have fled from the terror of the existing Greek regime.

Mr. Kyrrou asserts that only the Communist newspapers criticize the existing regime in Greece. Is this true? We can quote three at random, the "Herald Tribune", the "Gazette de Lausanne" and the "Courrier de Genève", to which we could add many more and mention journalists such as Mr. Lippmann, Mr. Shirer and others who, although they are far from being sympathetic towards Communism, are still further from approving of what is happening in Greece.

/Gentlemen:

Gentlemen:

These are the general conclusions which can and must be drawn from the Commission's investigation. Any attempt to conceal the truth and to falsify the results of the work of the Commission of Investigation would be useless and at the same time fatal to the noble task with which it has been entrusted. The verbatim records of the Commission and its teams suffice to show us the real situation in Greece and to give us an idea of its causes. The conclusions must correspond with the facts collected by the Commission and set down in its documents.

Unfortunately, as I emphasized above, some of the conclusions submitted to the Commission are in flagrant contradiction with reality and must be corrected. If the conclusions which it draws are just and sincere, this will be the best indication of the nature of the recommendation which the Commission must submit in due course, in accordance with the Security Council's decision of 19 December 1946.

The Bulgarian delegation does not think it necessary to go into detail in this connection, nor to suggest one precept or another. It only wishes to express its conviction that a remedy, in order to be effective, must correspond to the nature of the evil. Since in the present case, the fundamental evil lies exclusively in the anti-democratic regime existing in Greece, an idea may be formed of the nature of the conclusions which should be drawn by the Commission. These conclusions can only have one purpose: that of giving the Greek people freedom to choose the government which the vast majority wishes and which would correspond to its democratic traditions. We Bulgarians, as immediate neighbours of Greece, are anxious for our part, that the disturbances and chaotic conditions in that country

/should cease,

should cease, since we also feel the repercussions; we also wish the provocations to which we are continually subjected by the present Greek Government to cease, so that conditions may be created for the establishment of normal and friendly relations between the Bulgarian and Greek peoples. The Bulgarian Government has no aggressive designs on Greece. On the contrary, our Government and our people are inspired by the most sincere wish for the establishment of firm bonds of friendship between our two neighbouring peoples. This is in the lasting interests of both peoples and also in the interests of peace in the Balkans. We are sure that that is perfectly possible, but we think that it will depend to a large extent on the manner in which the Commission finally accomplishes its mission and on the repercussions which its recommendations to the Security Council will have in Greece.

Gentlemen, a heavy responsibility lies upon us all, although in different degrees. Bulgaria is not yet a Member of the United Nations, but she wishes to become one and believes that the day is near when she can take her modest place amongst the Members of this World Organization of democratic peoples.

We have a high opinion of the work of the United Nations, and place in it our hope for the better future of humanity. The present investigation is the first case where the United Nations has undertaken inquiries of this nature. Any disappointment engendered by the work and decisions of the Commission would be extremely regrettable and detrimental. Any success, on the contrary, would be a great encouragement for the future.

Our delegation hopes serenely and confidently that the Commission's work will end with positive decisions, which can contribute to clearing the path to peace and friendship between all the democratic peoples of the Balkans, including the Greek people, with whom we repeat, we wish to maintain the best possible relations and with whom we want to live as good neighbours.