



# Security Council

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## Letter dated 29 September 2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab, and in accordance with paragraph 47 (c) (iii) of Security Council resolution 2662 (2022), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia.

The Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Kimihiro **Ishikane**  
Chair

Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)  
concerning Al-Shabaab



**Letter dated 25 August 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Somalia  
addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee  
pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab**

In accordance with paragraph 47 of Security Council resolution 2662 (2022), we have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia to be submitted to the Council by 1 October 2023.

*(Signed)* Ahmed **Himmiche**  
Coordinator/maritime/regional expert

*(Signed)* Matthew **Rosbottom**  
Armed groups expert

*(Signed)* John Peter **Hazenberg**  
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*(Signed)* Nikhil **Acharya**  
Arms expert

*(Signed)* Stella **Attakpah**  
Finance expert

## *Summary*

Al-Shabaab remains the most immediate threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia. Despite ongoing efforts by Somali and international forces to curb Al-Shabaab's operational capacity, the group's ability to carry out complex, asymmetric attacks in Somalia remains undiminished. Nevertheless, the Panel noted encouraging signs throughout the course of the mandate that suggest that the offensive has dented Al-Shabaab's ability to govern and exert influence over newly liberated territory. The pressure will remain, however, on the Federal Government of Somalia to coordinate the next phase of the offensive while managing several precarious "hold" operations in Hirshabelle and Galmudug.

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Somalia continues to function and carry out attacks with the group's operations largely confined to Bari Region in north-east Puntland. The death in January 2023 of Bilal al-Sudani, the leader of the Al-Karrar office of ISIL-Somalia and chief financial facilitator, is a setback for the group. The Panel also noted continued armed conflict between the group and Al-Shabaab during the mandate.

The prolonged fighting in Las Anod is having a destabilizing effect on the peace, security and stability of Somalia and a profound effect on civilians in the town and surrounding areas. The ongoing conflict also may provide opportunities for Al-Shabaab and ISIL-Somalia to take advantage of the fragilities created.

The Federal Government of Somalia and regional governments continue to face other challenges to the State-building process, which are having a negative impact on the State's ability to provide security and public services to the Somali people. Federalism and governance continue to suffer from election delays and attempts by regional presidents to extend their mandate beyond their terms. The lack of effective cooperation between Mogadishu and regional states has allowed profiteers and political entrepreneurs to exploit weaknesses in governance for their own self-interest. The diversion of public revenues from the fisheries by intermediaries is an example of the misappropriation, corruption and unjust enrichment that is threatening the peace and security of Somalia.

Coordinated efforts to fight Al-Shabaab inside Somalia and along its border are lacking effective cooperation at the national and the international levels. After initial success in fighting Al-Shabaab, there have been setbacks in achieving the vision of a coordinated force generation and force preparation for the next phase of the offensive, owing to delays in mobilizing forces from frontline states. Additional challenges will likely mount because of the ongoing drawdown of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

An analysis of improvised explosive devices, weapons and ammunition captured from Al-Shabaab indicates that the group continues to have access to an uninterrupted illicit supply, as some of the ammunition captured was manufactured as recently as 2020. The systematic analysis and tracing of captured weapons remains essential for identifying cases of diversion and disrupting illicit smuggling networks.

The Federal Government of Somalia continued to make significant progress in developing its weapons and ammunition management architecture and processes, although operational challenges at the level of the federal member states endure. Weapons marking and recordkeeping have increased at the Federal Government level, but difficulties remain in expanding these capacities from Mogadishu to the federal member states. Accountability and oversight challenges persist, particularly with respect to heavily armed clan militia and civilian possession of light and heavy weapons in the federal member states. The safe and secure management of

ammunition and explosive weapons in Somalia continues to remain challenging owing to the complex operational environment, the lack of trained personnel and limited resources.

The strategy of the Federal Government of Somalia to disrupt the financing of Al-Shabaab, which is in its initial stages, has mainly focused on dismantling illegal money collection checkpoints of Al-Shabaab, as well as raising awareness of the relevant actors in the strategy. In order to effectively implement its strategy, the Federal Government will require the involvement of relevant actors from ministries, departments and agencies, as well as private sector stakeholders, all of whom play a crucial role in mitigating Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue.

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\* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

## **I. Introduction**

### **A. Background**

1. The present report contains the findings of the Panel covering the period from 16 December 2022 to 15 August 2023.<sup>1</sup> An overview of the Somalia sanctions regime, mandate, appointment of the Panel and countries visited during the reporting period can be found in annex 1.

### **B. Methodology**

2. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (see [S/2006/997](#)) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling ([ST/SGB/2007/6](#)). The evidentiary standards and verification processes include:

- (a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where possible;
- (b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events, where possible;
- (c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
- (d) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary evidence in support of the information collected;
- (e) Analysing satellite imagery, where applicable;
- (f) Analysis of databases of remote tracking information relating to vessels.

3. In addition, the Panel, in accordance with paragraph 28 of the above-mentioned report of the Informal Working Group, provided the opportunity to all parties to review, comment and respond during the report drafting process, where and when necessary and feasible.

4. The Panel has committed itself to maintaining and fostering its relationship with the authorities of the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states and Somaliland, so as to ensure cooperation and transparency in fulfilling its investigative mandate, within the framework of applicable methodological standards.

## **II. Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia: threats to peace, security and stability of Somalia**

### **A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab)**

#### **Overview**

5. Al-Shabaab remains the most immediate threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia. During the reporting period there has been no significant degradation of the group's ability to carry out asymmetric attacks in Somalia. While the group has faced new pressure from the offensive led by the Federal Government

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<sup>1</sup> The Panel continued to pursue all pending investigations introduced in [S/2022/754](#).

of Somalia, particularly in Hirshabelle and Galmudug States, the Panel has not been able to corroborate claims made by the Ministry of Information of Somalia, on 25 March 2023, that Al-Shabaab had sustained more than 6,000 casualties, including the deaths of 3,000 fighters.<sup>2</sup> As the offensive continues to focus on clearing eastern Galmudug, specifically Ceel Buur, the Panel has noted recent operations linked to the offensive in Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba regions. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab's ability to exploit geographical seams found across the Somali National Army's disposition, assimilate into local communities during tactical retreats and conduct probing counter-attacks against government forces, pro-government militia and forward operating bases suggests that Al-Shabaab remains resilient, adaptable and deadly. Despite being pushed from large areas of central Somalia, the group has managed to increase its pace of operations, including complex attacks such as the large-scale attack in May 2023 against the forward operating base, operated by Uganda, of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in Bulo Mareer, Lower Shabelle.

### Update on Al-Shabaab membership and structure

6. The Panel continues to update information on the structure of Al-Shabaab (SOe.001) to identify potential leadership changes and to develop its understanding of the group. Ahmed Diriye, also known as Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah (SOi.014), continues to serve as Al-Shabaab's emir, and made a rare video appearance<sup>3</sup> at the group's "consultative forum on issues of jihad in East Africa", in which he was flanked by the group's spokesperson, Ali Mohamed Rage, aka Ali Dheere (SOi.021); Sheikh Hassan Yaqub Ali, possibly a Shura Council member and leader of the group's religious affairs; Suldan Mohamed Suldan, a Shura Council member and former leader of the Hisbah; and approximately 100 other delegates. The Panel believe this conference was held in Yedi, Lower Juba, in early May 2023.<sup>4</sup>

7. In late June 2023, the group released footage of a graduation ceremony at the Rabi' ibn 'Amr Military Training Camp. The footage showed Ali Dheere, Suldan Mohamed Suldan, and possibly senior training official Muktar Usman, aka Abu Muslim, addressing hundreds of new Al-Shabaab members, all of whom were armed, as they joined the "Martyrdom-seekers Battalion" (Katibat al-Istishhadiyyin).<sup>5</sup> The graduates were later seen parading in captured Somali National Army vehicles (see annex 3).

8. During Eid al-Adha, the group released videos showing celebrations in nine different regions across Somalia purportedly under the group's control to highlight that, in the face of the offensive, the group still controls significant areas of central and southern Somalia.<sup>6</sup> However, despite the group's outward portrayal of continued strength, the Panel noted a significant increase in the targeting of mid-level and senior leadership during the reporting period. Unfortunately, and as previously reported by the Panel, Al-Shabaab retains the ability to supplant deceased leaders with trained

<sup>2</sup> See <https://sonna.so/en/over-3000-al-shabab-terrorists-killed-by-the-somali-government-in-the-last-6-months/>. In 2022, ATMIS estimated that Al-Shabaab numbers were between 7,000 and 9,000, meaning that, according to the Federal Government of Somalia, over a third of its fighting power has been eliminated.

<sup>3</sup> In the video his face was pixelated, see annex 2.

<sup>4</sup> Confidential security reports seen in June 2023.

<sup>5</sup> See <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/shabaab-spokesman-says-its-attacks-increased-by-70-in-speech-to-graduating-class-of-suicide-attackers-rallies-fighters-and-civilians.html> (subscription needed).

<sup>6</sup> These were Bula Fulay, in Bay; El Adde, in Gedo; El Ansar and Tiye glow, in Bakool; Buqaqable and Shaw, in Hiraan; Fidow, in Middle Shabelle; Galhareeri, in Galguduud; Cammaara, in Mudug; Qunyo Barrow, in Lower Shabelle; and Bu'ale, Jilib, and Salagle, in Middle Juba.

alternates.<sup>7</sup> Below, the Panel outlines some of the key individuals whom the group lost during the reporting period:<sup>8</sup>

(a) On 16 June 2023, two senior commanders – Aden Abdirahman Aden and Idris Abdirahim Nur – were killed in an air strike near Jamame, Lower Juba;

(b) In early June 2023, Ali Raaho, an Al-Shabaab extortion collector responsible for collection in Mogadishu and Afgoye, was killed by the National Intelligence and Security Agency near Afgoye;

(c) On 3 March 2023, Aruriyow Mohamed Omar, also known as Ahmed Salah, was reportedly killed by Somali National Army Danab forces in Turdho village, Lower Juba, for his alleged attack coordination activities in Lower Juba;<sup>9</sup>

(d) On 15 December 2022, Yusuf Mohamed Jingab, the head of the local radicalization office, was reportedly killed during operations in Juhay village, Middle Shabelle;<sup>10</sup>

(e) In October 2022, Mohamed Hasan Omar, also known as Abu Abdul Rahman or Abu Abdirahman, was injured in a battle between Middle and Lower Shabelle, he later succumbed to his wounds in Jilib in November 2022. He reportedly served as the head of training for new recruits;

(f) The former head of “Dawa” or religious affairs and member of the Shura Council, Abdullahi Nadir, also known as Abdullahi Yare, was reportedly killed in a United States air strike near Jilib on 1 October 2022.<sup>11</sup>

9. While Al-Shabaab did not comment on the death of Abdullahi Nadir, who was reportedly touted as a potential successor to the emir, Abu Ubaidah, the group did eulogise Mohamed Hasan Omar on 24 November 2022 and called for attacks to avenge his death.<sup>12</sup> Separately, in May 2023, the group’s head of external operations in Kenya and Ethiopia (see paras. 29–36 below) and key recruiter of foreign nationals, Moalim Osman, a field commander in charge of operations in Ethiopia, was reportedly seriously injured in an air strike in Jilib. A regional head of finance was also reportedly killed in an air strike near Afmadow, Lower Juba, along with other fighters in early July 2023.<sup>13</sup> The Panel will continue to monitor the possible impact the deaths of these key individuals may have on the group’s operational capacity.

10. The Panel also noted reports of two Al-Shabaab commanders – Mohamed Ali Hassan, also known as Moalim Hudeifa, and Abdi Hassan Hulbale – surrendering to the Somali National Army in December 2022 in Hirshabelle and March 2023 in Lower Shabelle, respectively. The Panel sent a letter to the Federal Government of Somalia requesting access to interview these individuals, but the Panel is still awaiting a reply.

### **Use of improvised explosive devices**

11. The Panel noted no significant or sustainable change in improvised explosive device activity in 2023, compared with 2022. Specifically, improvised explosive device threats in Somalia have not substantially decreased over the past year and the

<sup>7</sup> See S/2020/949, para. 42.

<sup>8</sup> These are reported fatalities; the Panel has been unable to conclusively confirm their deaths.

<sup>9</sup> See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/special-forces-kill-senior-al-shabaab-commander-in-somalia>.

<sup>10</sup> See <https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1604208395250180097?lang=en>.

<sup>11</sup> Abdullahi Yare had a \$3 million reward on his head; see <https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/abdullahi-yare/>.

<sup>12</sup> See eulogy <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/shabaab-announces-death-of-its-former-governor-for-banaadir-region-official-in-mujahideen-development-office.html>.

<sup>13</sup> See <https://sonna.so/en/over-50-al-shabaab-militants-killed-in-lower-jubba-operation/>.

number of casualties caused by the use of such devices has increased year-on-year since 2020. In the first six months of 2023, the Panel has already recorded at least 950 casualties from approximately 282 incidents caused by the use of improvised explosive devices. In 2022, the Panel recorded over 2,000 casualties from approximately 462 incidents relating to such devices. In 2021, the Panel recorded 1,428 such casualties.<sup>14</sup>

12. During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab continued to use person-borne improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices as its main weapons, targeting security forces and government infrastructure. The Panel recorded 11 person-borne improvised explosive device attacks and 29 vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks in 2023 thus far, which constitutes a significant increase when compared to the same period last year. The Panel also noted the continued use of under-vehicle improvised explosive devices to target government or security personnel, with 11 such incidents recorded in 2023 thus far.

13. The start of the Government's offensive in August 2022 saw an initial increase in overall improvised explosive device attacks by the group up to the end of 2022, in apparent retaliation to their early losses. As the offensive has stalled recently, however, there has been a decrease closer to normal trends regarding the use of improvised explosive devices in the first half of 2023. The Panel noted an increase in the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in the first quarter of 2023, especially in Hirshabelle and Galmudug States since the offensive against the group began in August 2022.

#### *Technical evolution*

14. The Panel identified an evolution in the tactics, techniques and procedures of improvised explosive devices manufactured by Al-Shabaab, including the use of multi-switch devices and movement sensors derived from motorcycle alarm systems. Further examination of remote-controlled improvised explosive devices have been found to incorporate both long-range remote switches initiated by a mobile phone, as well as short-range keyless alarm systems such as motorcycle alarm-based initiators. The use of these sensitive movement sensors has resulted in the death or injury of at least three explosive ordnance disposal specialists from international forces supporting ATMIS in Somalia.<sup>15</sup> The counter-improvised explosive device units of the international forces reported that these motorcycle alarm-based movement sensors can be initiated by the magnetic field of active impulse F3-type metal detectors, which are issued as part of the standard improvised explosive device search kits to explosive ordnance disposal specialists of international forces operating in Somalia.<sup>16</sup>

15. The Panel also noted reports of a development in long-range remote switches or learning code receivers to trigger improvised explosive devices. The learning code receivers manufactured in China under the brand Honest remain the most commonly found devices in Somalia.<sup>17</sup> A shipment of new learning code receivers was intercepted by the National Intelligence and Security Agency at Aden Adde International Airport on 22 December 2022, destined for an unidentified consignee. The Agency called the phone number associated with the consignee, but the latter

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<sup>14</sup> The highest figures previously recorded were in 2019, with 527 incidents, and in 2017, with 2,294 casualties.

<sup>15</sup> Confidential interview with multiple sources working as explosive ordnance disposal specialists within the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) international forces in Somalia.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> The Panel reported on these learning code receivers in its final report for 2022 ([S/2022/754](#), annex 16).

then blocked any further calls and never arrived at the airport to claim the shipment (see annex 4 for additional information).

16. International forces also identified the use of increasingly innovative tactics by Al-Shabaab operators to conceal improvised explosive devices. For example, the Panel documented evidence of Al-Shabaab operators fitting cattle hooves on the soles of their shoes to cover their tracks once the improvised explosive devices had been placed by hand and then arming them remotely.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Home-made and military-grade high explosives*

17. The Panel continues to monitor methods used by Al-Shabaab to produce home-made explosives using nitric acid and sulfuric acid as the main precursors and charcoal as a combustible. These products remain widely available in Somalia given their legitimate use. The Panel has not yet seen an indication of mitigation measures by the Federal Government of Somalia and the FMS to monitor and report on their diversion for potential manufacture of improvised explosive devices. In addition to the use of home-made explosives, the Panel also noted the continued threat posed by Al-Shabaab's use of military-grade high explosive harvested from unexploded ordnance or diverted larger calibre ammunition such as mortar rounds or rocket artillery, as the main charge in several improvised explosive devices manufactured by the group.<sup>19</sup>

18. Additional military equipment allegedly captured by Al-Shabaab from the forward operating base at Bulo Mareer on 26 May 2023 included 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, 120 mm mortar launchers and ammunition, 107 mm rockets and launchers, QLZ-87 automatic grenade launchers, two T55 tanks, as well as radios, personal protection equipment and uniforms.<sup>20</sup> Most of the heavy weapons and equipment captured by Al-Shabaab from Bulo Mareer were reportedly destroyed by a drone attack conducted by international partners led by United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) later on the same day.<sup>21</sup>

#### **Al-Shabaab attacks targeting government premises**

19. On 24 July 2023, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber wearing a Somali military uniform infiltrated the Jaalle Siyaad Military Academy in Mogadishu and detonated himself as soldiers from the Somali National Army 14 October Brigade lined up for breakfast. Early reports stated that more than 25 soldiers had been killed and over 60 injured.<sup>22</sup> Following the attack, the speaker of the Lower House of Somalia called for an investigation into the traitors who had reportedly facilitated the attack. On 29 July 2023, the Deputy Minister of Defence reported that Somali security services had arrested 14 security officers for their alleged role in the plot. The attack highlights the group's continued ability to infiltrate Somalia's security forces and penetrate highly secure locations, as previously reported by the Panel.<sup>23</sup>

20. The Panel noted efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia to mitigate Al-Shabaab's ability to access sensitive areas. In January 2023, the Prime Minister announced ongoing investigations into the role security personnel played in

<sup>18</sup> Confidential interview with multiple sources working as explosive ordnance disposal specialists within ATMIS international forces in Somalia.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> See <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/35213/us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia>.

<sup>22</sup> See <https://www.dw.com/en/somalia-al-shabab-islamist-kills-dozens-in-attack-on-army/a-66333884>.

<sup>23</sup> See S/2019/858, para 11.

facilitating Al-Shabaab access to attack the Villa Rays hotel on 28 November 2022.<sup>24</sup> This is in addition to the convictions, in late December 2022 and early January 2023, of two former soldiers of the Somali National Army – Mohamed Abdulle Nur Abkow and Sharif Mohamed Barkhadle – for their role in facilitating the transportation of Al-Shabaab vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices through checkpoints in Mogadishu.<sup>25</sup> The Panel wrote to the Federal Government regarding the involvement of security forces in facilitating attacks and awaits a reply.

### Complex attacks

21. During the reporting period, the Panel noted 14 complex attacks. Complex attacks usually involved Al-Shabaab detonating a vehicle- or person-borne improvised explosive device at the start of the attack to breach access to a facility or building, which is then followed by a ground assault, and occasionally included the use of a secondary vehicle- or person-borne improvised explosive device to target fleeing individuals, reinforcement units or medical first responders.

22. This is a significant increase from the four complex attacks reported in the final report for 2022, suggesting an increased operational tempo on the part of Al-Shabaab. The ongoing government offensive against Al-Shabaab could result in more complex attacks in the near to midterm as the group attempts to demonstrate its resilience and adaptability.

#### *Attack on African Union Transition Mission in Somalia forward operating base, Bulu Mareer*

23. On 26 May 2023, Al-Shabaab launched a pre-dawn complex attack against the Uganda-operated forward operating base in Bulu Mareer. The attack by many fighters was initiated by the use of two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. The Government of Uganda confirmed that 57 soldiers had been killed in the attack. Following the attack, the Panel noted reports of shelling by Ugandan forces on local villages surrounding Bulu Mareer, resulting in civilian casualties.<sup>26</sup> The Panel is investigating Al-Shabaab's capture of large calibre 120 mm mortar rounds and 107 mm rockets from Bulu Mareer.<sup>27</sup>

#### *Attack on Somali National Army forces in Gal Cad*

24. In late January 2023, Al-Shabaab attacked a Somali National Army base in Gal Cad, Galmudug, approximately 375 km north-west of Mogadishu, killing at least seven Somali National Army troops, including Deputy Commander of the Danab forces, Major Hassan Mohamed Osman, also known as Hasan Tuure.<sup>28</sup> Al-Shabaab employed two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices to target the base before conducting the assault.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>24</sup> See <https://www.caasimada.net/soldiers-investigated-for-role-in-somalia-hotel-attack-says-pm/>.

<sup>25</sup> See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-ex-soldier-sentenced-to-death-for-facilitating-al-shabaab-attacks>.

<sup>26</sup> See <https://twitter.com/MIGX999/status/1667219670779215895?t=6koRMLHEJ-wWhfUoY7pc3Q&s=09>.

<sup>27</sup> Confidential and public security reports. Interviews with ATMIS and international troops, Uganda People's Defence Forces sources, ATMIS internal assessments and media sources (including Al-Shabaab-affiliated Al Kata'ib media).

<sup>28</sup> See <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-01-20/somalias-al-shabaab-attacks-base-in-town-it-had-lost-kills-seven>.

<sup>29</sup> See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-targets-army-base-in-newly-liberated-town-in-somalia>.

*Attack on Villa Rays hotel*

25. On 27 November 2022, in Bondhere district, Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab conducted a complex attack by detonating a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in the vicinity of the Villa Rays hotel. The device breached the hotel compound, allowing access to the assault team. The siege lasted 21 hours and resulted in 13 casualties, including eight deaths. The hotel was targeted as several government officials reside there and hold meetings in the complex.

26. Other complex attacks of note include the attack on 30 May 2023 on Somali National Army forces in Masagaway, Galmudug, during which Al-Shabaab employed six person-borne improvised explosive devices and also booby-trapped the bodies of three deceased Somali National Army soldiers to cause additional casualties to first responders post-attack; the person-borne improvised explosive device attack on 22 January 2023 on the Banaadir Regional Administration Headquarters in Mogadishu, killing five individuals; and the person-borne improvised explosive device attack on 23 October 2022 on the Tawakal hotel in Kismayo, killing 58 individuals.

**Indirect fire attacks***Mortar attacks*

27. Al-Shabaab continues to use mortars to target mainly ATMIS and Somali National Army forward operating bases in central and southern Somalia. On 24 January 2023, mortars aimed at the presidential palace hit the Warta Nabada and Hamarwayne districts of the capital, wounding at least five civilians. On 1 February 2023, two 81/82 mm mortar rounds landed inside the Halane base, injuring six security guards.<sup>30</sup> Somali security forces were able to identify the site from where the mortars were launched at the United Nations Guard Unit. The elevated launch site and area surrounding the attack's point of origin have since been under regular surveillance by Somali security forces in order to prevent further attacks.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, on 9 April 2023, two days before the Secretary-General visited Somalia, Al-Shabaab fired five 81/82 mm mortar rounds towards the vicinity of Villa Somalia, killing two individuals on the premises of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.<sup>32</sup>

*107 mm rocket attacks*

28. In its final report for 2022, the Panel reported on seven 107 mm rockets that had been launched by Al-Shabaab against Villa Somalia on 9 June 2022.<sup>33</sup> During the reporting period, the Panel noted with concern Al-Shabaab's continued use of 107 mm rocket variants to conduct two significant attacks in Mogadishu against the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) camp in the Aden Adde International Airport protected area and Villa Somalia on 25 June 2023 and 4 July 2023, respectively. 107 mm rockets recovered from the attacks bore the markings "Lot 1100, NW 19.85 KG" and characteristics similar to 107 mm Fadjr-1 variants known to be manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran (see annex 5). The Panel noted that weapons and ammunition captured on 26 May 2023 from the ATMIS forward operating base in Bulo Mareer included 107 mm rockets. The Panel also learned that

<sup>30</sup> Reports received from confidential United Nations security sources indicate that Somali security forces were able to identify the mortar launch site. The elevated launch site and surrounding area is reported to have since been under constant surveillance with National Intelligence and Security Agency armed forces being permanently posted there to prevent further attacks.

<sup>31</sup> Reports received from confidential United Nations security source.

<sup>32</sup> Somali security reports.

<sup>33</sup> S/2022/754, para. 84.

international forces reportedly destroyed vehicles carrying these weapons into Al-Shabaab-held territory on the same day.<sup>34</sup>

### **Al-Shabaab regional capabilities**

#### *Operations in Ethiopia*

29. During the reporting period, various sources informed the Panel that Al-Shabaab continues to prioritize the establishment of a new bedding down location in the Bale Mountains. As part of this strategic goal, the group's emir, Abu Ubaidah, initiated an Ethiopian Jabhat contingent in 2020, illustrating the group's long-held intent to target and infiltrate Ethiopia. At that time, Moalim Osman, a senior Al-Shabaab commander, was installed as the leader of the unit.<sup>35</sup>

30. In its final report for 2022, the Panel noted Al-Shabaab's large scale incursion into the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia, taking over the border towns of Ato and Yeed.<sup>36</sup> In July 2023, the group released a two-part video documenting the attacks in Ethiopia in July 2022, showing large numbers of Al-Shabaab fighters being briefed by senior leader Fuad Mohamed Khalaf, also known as Shongole (SOi.005), before the attack on Ato (see annex 6). The video also documents the Ethiopian Liyu Police retreating in the face of Al-Shabaab advances, as well as a large collection of captured military equipment.<sup>37</sup> The group continues to push its anti-Ethiopia propaganda narrative.<sup>38</sup>

31. In May 2023, Al-Shabaab held the "Consultative forum on issues of jihad in East Africa" in Lower Juba (see annex 2). At the forum, Abu Ubaidah ordered his fighters to ready themselves for a war with Ethiopia and talked about the group's successes against outside forces in its territories. Al-Shabaab's continued offensive cross-border capabilities underscores the group's long-standing interest in expanding its territory and regional attack capabilities and regional ambitions.<sup>39</sup>

32. On 7 June 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia released information with respect to the Ethiopian National Defence Forces thwarting an Al-Shabaab attack near Doolow on the Somali border with Ethiopia.<sup>40</sup>

#### *Operations in Kenya*

33. Al-Shabaab has increased its frequency of attacks along the Kenyan border with Somalia during the reporting period, targeting the counties of Garissa, Lamu,

<sup>34</sup> See <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/35213/us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia>.

<sup>35</sup> Moalim Osman was injured in an air strike on 22 May 2023 in Jilib (see para. 9 above).

<sup>36</sup> S/2022/754, para. 22.

<sup>37</sup> Available at <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Multimedia/two-part-shabaab-documentary-presents-dark-history-of-ethiopians-in-somalia-major-operations-on-liyu-police-in-border-towns.html>. The two-part video is the fourth chapter in the series "They are not Welcome – They Shall Burn in the Fire", a series aimed at highlighting historical grievances with Ethiopia.

<sup>38</sup> The Panel has previously highlighted alleged human rights violations by Ethiopian Liyu Police in the Somali Regional State. See S/2022/754, para. 24.

<sup>39</sup> See <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/shabaab-convenes-2nd-consultative-forum-on-jihad-in-east-africa-warns-somalis-of-foreign-plots-by-america-ethiopia-and-uae.html>.

<sup>40</sup> See [https://twitter.com/mfaethiopia/status/1666434600309080067?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1666434600309080067%7Ctwgr%5Ead6c6f0399d31192289b252a709a9eb94eb7547b%7Ctwcon%5Esl\\_&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aljazeera.com%2Fnews%2F2023%2F6%2F7%2Fethiopia-says-it-foiled-al-shabab-attack-near-border-with-somalia](https://twitter.com/mfaethiopia/status/1666434600309080067?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1666434600309080067%7Ctwgr%5Ead6c6f0399d31192289b252a709a9eb94eb7547b%7Ctwcon%5Esl_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aljazeera.com%2Fnews%2F2023%2F6%2F7%2Fethiopia-says-it-foiled-al-shabab-attack-near-border-with-somalia).

Mandera, and Wajir. The group's intent to continue to target and attack areas of Kenya that share a border with Somalia is accompanied by a series of propaganda releases.<sup>41</sup>

34. The Panel noted at least 30 attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya in June and July 2023, and another 10 attacks in the two months before that. Although attacks generally increase at that time of year owing to the long rains providing extra cover for the group, the number of attacks in June was significantly higher than usual.<sup>42</sup> In July, Al-Shabaab took control of Gebiley forward operating base in Gedo Region, Somalia, approximately 10 km from the Kenya-Somalia border. The Kenya Defence Forces had vacated the forward operating base on 30 June 2023 as part of the broader ATMIS drawdown.<sup>43</sup> The attacks in June 2023 included: (a) an attack in Lamu County on 24 June that killed five people; (b) the explosion of an improvised explosive device in Mandera County on 21 June 2023 that killed three people; and (c) two attacks on 13 June 2023, one in Garissa County in which the explosion of an improvised explosive device killed eight police officers, and the other in Wajir County when a passenger bus was fired at. In late May 2023, Kenyan security forces raided a reported Al-Shabaab camp in Garissa County and seized several rocket-propelled grenade launchers and rounds, 7.62x39 mm AK pattern assault rifles and a 7.62x54 mm PKM light machine gun.<sup>44</sup>

35. In response to the recent increase in the number of attacks on Kenya, the new Director General of the National Intelligence Service of Kenya visited Somalia in July 2023 to discuss the security situation. Security officials relayed to the Panel their concern that the continued offensive against Al-Shabaab in Somalia will possibly squeeze Al-Shabaab fighters towards Kenya and may prompt some Kenyan fighters within Al-Shabaab to return home.

36. In May 2023, Kenya and Somalia announced that a phased reopening of official border points between the countries would occur within 90 days. On 6 July 2023, however, the Cabinet Secretary of the Interior and National Administration of Kenya, Kithure Kindiki, announced the reopening would be delayed, citing the recent increase in Al-Shabaab attacks along the border as the primary reason.<sup>45</sup> The official border points were closed in 2011 owing to Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya. Since that time Al-Shabaab has generated significant revenue by extorting the unofficial cross-border trade; the reopening of official formalized border points could have an impact on the group's revenue generation. A potential projected loss of revenue could be the impetus behind the group's increase in border attacks since April 2023. Opening official border crossing points would have no significant impact on the infiltration of Al-Shabaab fighters inside Kenya, owing to the long, porous nature of the border.

### **Al-Shabaab finances**

37. The Panel noted the ability of Al-Shabaab to continue to raise funds through various extortion mechanisms and illicit or parallel taxation systems, including extortion of businesses and the illicit taxation of livestock and agricultural products. The group also continues to operate a network of checkpoints whereby vehicles, depending on type or size, pay negotiated rates of between \$300 and \$1,200, as

<sup>41</sup> See <https://www.voanews.com/a/6719911.html>; see also <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/shabaab-threatens-revenge-against-kenya-s-cowardly-attacks-on-somali-civilians.html>.

<sup>42</sup> See S/2022/754, para. 25. The Panel recorded significantly fewer attacks during the last mandate.

<sup>43</sup> See <https://twitter.com/MPMursalKhaliiif/status/1679464412061605888>.

<sup>44</sup> The Panel wrote to Kenya in January and July 2023 for further information on Al-Shabaab operations, including weapons and ammunition used and details of individuals captured and killed, but has yet not received a reply.

<sup>45</sup> See <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/govt-to-delay-reopening-of-kenya-somalia-border-cs-kithure-kindiki-announces-4293880>.

mentioned in the Panel's final report for 2022 (S/2022/754). Checkpoints continue to be a major revenue generator for the group and cash is the predominant mode of payment. During the reporting period, the Somali National Army continued to attack Al-Shabaab-operated checkpoints, resulting in the seizure of Al-Shabaab payment receipts.<sup>46</sup> The Panel noted the issuance of receipts at checkpoint locations to ensure safe passage for the vehicle and for audit purposes for the group's finance department.<sup>47</sup>

38. Attacks on Al-Shabaab checkpoints provide an opportunity to gather evidence on the group's financial systems through the seizure of receipts, ledgers and mobile phones.<sup>48</sup> The Panel also noted other examples of Somali security services discovering Al-Shabaab-associated infrastructure, such as an Al-Shabaab "villa" in Adan Yabal, Middle Shabelle, in mid-December 2022, and another structure used for radio broadcasting in Harardhere, Galmudug, in mid-January 2023.<sup>49</sup> The Panel wrote to the Federal Government of Somalia in January 2023 for more information on Al-Shabaab paraphernalia and documents found at these two locations but has yet to receive a reply.

39. As an illustration of effective Al-Shabaab financial practices outside areas it controls, the group imposed a weeklong blockade on Baidoa, South-West State, in July 2023, cutting off all supplies into or out of the town. Al-Shabaab lifted the blockade after it reached an agreement with the local business community.<sup>50</sup>

40. Separately, the Panel noted reports in March 2023 by the Ministry of Information who claimed that Al-Shabaab's income had been reduced by half<sup>51</sup> following the Government's initial financial disruption measures. These measures included the freezing of 250 bank accounts and 70 mobile money accounts.<sup>52</sup> The Panel sent a letter to the Federal Government of Somalia requesting information on the balance in the frozen accounts but has yet to receive a reply.

## B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia

### Overview

41. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia (ISIL-Somalia) remains intent on conducting operations in Somalia, where it is primarily confined to Puntland, and has carried out at least three separate attacks against Puntland Security Forces during the reporting period. The group's scope of attacks in central and southern Somalia remains limited; the Panel noted that the group only claimed one attack in April 2023 against an ATMIS truck in Mogadishu.<sup>53</sup> ISIL-Somalia may, however, seek to exploit the ongoing conflict in Las Anod and the recent fighting

<sup>46</sup> The most recent operation was on 20 July 2023, see [https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1681955143061848064?t=3prp22X8ZqWBXV\\_mxvABgA&s=09](https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1681955143061848064?t=3prp22X8ZqWBXV_mxvABgA&s=09).

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> As documented in the Panel's report for 2018 (S/2018/1002, annex 2.4).

<sup>49</sup> See <https://twitter.com/FaadumoAli1/status/1603302421198884864?cxt=HHwWgMCqsdbDicAsAAAA>.

<sup>50</sup> See <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-imposes-blockade-on-baidoa-town-in-somalia-/7185165.html>.

<sup>51</sup> See <https://allafrica.com/stories/202304010112.html>.

<sup>52</sup> Questionnaire response from the Director of the Financial Reporting Centre.

<sup>53</sup> See <https://twitter.com/IbnSiqilli/status/1643462391844286468?t=-tPaQNrqnUUAQsUAeezZg&s=09>. The Panel cannot substantiate whether ISIL-Somalia was behind this attack.

between Puntland Security Forces and local militia, due to political tension surrounding local elections, to increase its sphere of influence.<sup>54</sup>

### Update on ISIL-Somalia membership and structure

42. Puntland Security Forces, with support from international partners, reported some success in targeting ISIL-Somalia during the reporting period. On 12 January 2023, Puntland State television announced that security forces had killed the group's head of operations, an Ethiopian national named Abu Albara Al Amani, in Balidhidhin district, Bari Region.<sup>55</sup> This was followed on 25 January 2023 by the killing of Bilal al-Sudani, a Sudanese national and one of the leaders of ISIL-Somalia, along with 10 other ISIL-Somalia operatives, by United States special operations forces in the Golis Mountains in northern Puntland, representing a significant setback for the group;<sup>56</sup> al-Sudani was the leader of the ISIL-Somalia Al-Karrar office and acted as the chief financial facilitator for the group.<sup>57</sup> After his death, the United States Secretary of Defence said that al-Sudani was responsible for fostering the growing presence of ISIL in Africa and for funding the group's operations worldwide, including in Afghanistan.<sup>58</sup> Separately, on 26 June 2023, again in Balidhidhin, Bari Region, security forces reportedly arrested several ISIL-Somalia foreign fighters from the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic, including Sudanese national and senior commander Mohamed Ibrahim Daha.<sup>59</sup>

43. The Panel also received reports that 12 ISIL-Somalia members, including four Ethiopian and two Sudanese foreign fighters, surrendered to security forces based in Balidhidhin village on 2 July 2023. Security forces then transferred these individuals to Bosaso Central Prison. Three senior leaders – Sudanese national Muhamad Abdalla Abdiraahim, also known as Abu Salam; Ali Yusuf Ali, also known as Ikrama; and Mohamud Macalin Maxamed, also known as Garshall – were among the defectors.<sup>60</sup>

44. In early July 2023, the Panel received reports of an ISIL-Somalia training camp near Bandarbeyla in Puntland. According to sources, three senior ISIL-Somalia commanders – Moalim Osman, Abu Yahya and Abdi Sharif – trained up to 45 new operatives at the camp.

45. The Panel also noted the arrests of Ayub Omar Bwanaadi, Mohamed Omar Bwanaadi and Kassim Ahmed Ali on 7 April 2023 in Isiolo County, Kenya. The three were reportedly travelling from the United Republic of Tanzania to Ethiopia, through Kenya, with the goal of crossing into Somalia to join ISIL-Somalia. The three reportedly possess historical links to Al-Shabaab and were charged with committing terror-related offences in Lamu, Kenya, in 2019.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>54</sup> In May 2023 Garowe Airport was forced to close owing to fighting between Puntland Security Forces and local militia, and on 20 June 2023, 26 people were reportedly killed in further clashes in Garowe.

<sup>55</sup> See <https://www.facebook.com/Puntlandstatetv/posts/pfbid025t3aUESyBEZ8tBqdL8Lu63TePqTb1YZJPmWNDMFygcia6QKeYfnUwFFBkRfimULml>.

<sup>56</sup> See <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/01/26/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-a-successful-counterterrorism-operation-in-somalia/>.

<sup>57</sup> The Al-Karrar office acts as a financial hub to transfer funds to other ISIL affiliates.

<sup>58</sup> See <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/03/bilal-sudani-somalia-islamic-state/>.

<sup>59</sup> See <https://www.police.pl.so/faah-faahin-hawl-gal-lagu-qabtay-horjoogayaal-ka-tirsan-kooxda-isis-daacish-xog/>.

<sup>60</sup> The Panel wrote to Puntland Authorities in July 2023 for more information and an opportunity to interview them, and is awaiting a response.

<sup>61</sup> Interviews with security sources, Kenya, July 2023.

## Operations

46. The Panel noted reports of armed conflict between Al-Shabaab and ISIL-Somalia during the reporting period. Prolonged clashes over territory and control of smuggling routes reportedly occurred in central Bari, Puntland, in March 2023. Further clashes were reported on 9 July 2023 in Ameyra, a village in the Golis Mountains. Armed conflict between the groups is not new; the Panel reported on similar clashes in 2016 and 2018.<sup>62</sup> As both groups are likely seeking to capitalize on current regional conflicts, as well as exploiting the offensive and ongoing clashes in Las Anod, the potential for further inter-group tension will likely remain high.

## Improvised explosive devices: design techniques

47. International explosive ordnance disposal experts and specialized agencies have noted an evolution of the tactics, techniques and procedures related to improvised explosive devices in and around Puntland. Propaganda videos disseminated by ISIL-Somalia in July 2021 and early 2023 showed improvised explosive devices design techniques, including those previously documented in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, such as O-loop trigger devices and crush-wire, victim-operated switches. Additional information on these tactics, techniques and procedures can be found in confidential annex 7.

## Finance

48. The Panel received information that ISIL-Somalia extortion threats forced several businesses to close in Bosaso, Puntland, in June 2023. In one case, ISIL-Somalia reportedly threw a grenade at a shop for not complying with the threat.<sup>63</sup>

# III. Other challenges to peace, security and stability of Somalia

## A. Las Anod conflict

49. The conflict in Las Anod, which started in early 2023, between Somaliland security forces and local, mainly Dhulbahante militia, continues to threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia. During the reporting period, the Panel travelled to Hargeisa, Somaliland, and to Garowe, Puntland, to meet political actors, activists, security officials, clan elders, victims and displaced persons so as to gather information on the current conflict.<sup>64</sup>

50. Various attempts to mediate an end to the conflict, including by neighbouring Ethiopia, have so far failed. In early April 2023, the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, appointed Abdikarim Hussein Guled as the envoy of the Federal Government of Somalia for Somaliland affairs.<sup>65</sup> In June 2023, the Security Council released a press statement calling for the immediate withdrawal of Somaliland security forces from Las Anod and called upon all parties to exercise restraint and refrain from provocative actions, incitement to violence and inflammatory rhetoric.<sup>66</sup> Somaliland's response to the communiqué was swift, announcing its concern at the Council's failure to acknowledge the presence of Al-Shabaab in the conflict and the

<sup>62</sup> See S/2019/858, para. 59.

<sup>63</sup> See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/isis-extortion-threats-force-business-closures-in-bosaso-somalia?s=09>.

<sup>64</sup> The Panel submitted a thematic report to the Committee regarding the conflict, in April 2023.

<sup>65</sup> See <https://twitter.com/ahguled/status/1642561076767207426?s=61&t=DasMZkR7xik6YYQmsucCw>.

<sup>66</sup> Statement available at <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15313.doc.htm>.

wider implications that the group's presence has for peace and security in the region.<sup>67</sup> The President of Puntland State, Said Abdullahi Deni, also responded, vowing that his government would openly support the people of Khatumo State if the Somaliland administration ignored the Council's calls to withdraw troops and restore peace.<sup>68</sup>

51. Competing narratives about the origins and impetus behind the conflict endure. Somaliland's established stance remains in place and namely is focused on the involvement of various actors and armed groups in the Las Anod conflict, including Puntland,<sup>69</sup> Al-Shabaab<sup>70</sup> and anti-peace entities. In the Panel's conversations with Somaliland officials, they remained steadfast in their narrative that Al-Shabaab is exploiting the conflict to enable the group's expansion into northern Somalia and is attempting to build a land bridge that extends from the Galgala Mountains in Puntland to Jijiga, Ethiopia, through Las Anod and Buuhoodle. This would offer the group new avenues from which to conduct external attacks into Djibouti and Ethiopia, while facilitating greater access to the Gulf of Aden. Somaliland views itself as a bulwark against Al-Shabaab's regional expansion. While the Panel did receive information from Somaliland about the involvement of Al-Shabaab in the December 2022 assassination of a vocal activist and politician, which triggered the ongoing conflict, it has not yet uncovered any credible threats from Al-Shabaab's reported expansion in the north.<sup>71</sup> Overall, Somaliland maintains it has consistently taken a defensive approach and has refrained from initiating any offensive actions inside Las Anod, while restating its commitment to finding a peaceful resolution and encouraging future international and regional efforts to put a stop to the fighting.<sup>72</sup>

52. On the other side of the conflict sits the Dhulbahante clan. Its clan elders returned to Las Anod in January 2023, and they subsequently released a declaration in February 2023 that rejected Somaliland's claim to independence and announced their intention to be part of Somalia.<sup>73</sup> On 6 July 2023, the Dhulbahante elders appointed a 45-member committee as the executive body of Khatumo State, which elected Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw-Ali as its president on 5 August 2023.<sup>74</sup>

53. For its part, on 9 February 2023, Al-Shabaab, through its al-Kata'ib media foundation, issued a Somali-language press release categorically denying any involvement in the conflict in Las Anod caused by the "apostate" Somaliland government.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Statement available at <https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/hargeisa-somaliland-june-8th-2023-press-release-un-security>.

<sup>68</sup> See <https://twitter.com/GaroweOnline/status/1669263261789745156?t=hU08faE1zSBa1y7tr25m4w&s=09>.

<sup>69</sup> On 5 July 2023, the Somaliland Ministry of Defence released a statement claiming the involvement of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) and other Puntland state soldiers trained by the United States and the United Arab Emirates. See <https://twitter.com/SLNTV/status/1676579473213333504>.

<sup>70</sup> In a television interview on 10 July 2023, the Minister of the Ministry of Interior for Somaliland, Mohamed Kahin, stated that the Al-Shabaab flag had been painted in the city of Las Anod. See <https://twitter.com/MMSomalitv/status/1678426831207243777>. This is possibly a reference to a fake picture of the Al-Shabaab flag painted on a post in Las Anod, which circulated on social media; see <https://twitter.com/IbnSiqilli/status/1678546315532173314>.

<sup>71</sup> The Panel was unable to verify these claims provided by authorities.

<sup>72</sup> Announcement made on 25 June 2023, when the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a meeting for members of the international community.

<sup>73</sup> See <https://www.somalidispach.com/latest-news/breaking-news-ssc-clan-leaders-summit-release-a-13-point-declaration/>.

<sup>74</sup> See <https://horseedmedia.net/somalia-ssc-council-elects-chairman-of-executive-council-in-lasanod-381212>.

<sup>75</sup> See: <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/shabaab-denies-connection-to-clashes-in-somaliland-says-allegations-otherwise-intended-to-gain-foreign-support.html>. The Al-Shabaab statement reads: "The Shabaab al-Mujahideen movement does not accept that its name is used as an excuse to violate the lives, money, and honour of the people of Las Anod city. This administration wishes to use these bogus allegations to obtain support from global disbelief to help them in the vicious massacres this regime is committing against the people of Las Anod city".

### Arms involved in the conflict

54. The Panel investigated the type, calibre and origin of weapons, ammunition and related materiel through the analysis of explosive remnants of war of ammunition used by parties to the conflict in Las Anod. The Panel also included its initial analysis of weapons, ammunition and related materiel in a thematic report to the Committee, key elements of which are included in annex 8. From the materiel documented in Las Anod, the Panel proceeded to trace several types of weapons and ammunition, including 12.7x108 mm and 7.62x54 mm small arms ammunition, 107 mm Type 63, RPG7 and SPG9 rockets, as well as 90 mm M79 anti-tank weapons, sending official requests for information to four Member States. The Panel's tracing requests were not conclusive because none of the Member States contacted keep records on items produced more than 10 years ago.

## B. Misappropriation of public funds

### Fisheries revenue

55. Paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011) considers that the sanctions listing criteria may include, but are not limited to, the misappropriation of financial resources that undermines the Transitional Federal Institutions' [the now Federal Government of Somalia] ability to fulfil their obligations in delivering services within the framework of the Djibouti Agreement. The Panel submitted a thematic report on the misappropriation of Somali fisheries revenue in June 2023.

56. In November 2021, the Auditor General of the Federal Government of Somalia issued a special audit report on the management of fisheries from 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2020. The report found that Somalia had collected \$3,269,564 in fees for fishing licences to foreign vessels.<sup>76</sup> The report estimated that Somalia should have collected \$59,760,000 from foreign vessels if the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources<sup>77</sup> had applied the rate of \$60,000 to \$90,000 per licence, per quarter, for foreign longliner vessels, as stipulated in the Somali Fisheries Act (Law No. 29 of 2014).<sup>78</sup> The Panel assesses that Somalia receives by far the lowest revenues from foreign fishing vessels compared with other African countries with comparable economic exclusive zone (EEZ) size and geographic location.<sup>79</sup>

57. The Panel indicated in its thematic report that, from 1 January 2022 to 15 June 2023, it recorded approximately 200 automatic identification system (AIS) tracks with patterns consistent with industrial fishing-related activities inside the economic exclusive zone of Somalia. Of the approximately 200 AIS tracks, 134 were associated with Iranian-flagged fishing vessels, 51 with Chinese-flagged fishing vessels, and a limited number associated with India, Pakistan, Spain, and unknown countries. The thematic report highlighted four ways in which the misappropriation of revenue linked to the Somali fisheries sector violates the fisheries law. They include:

<sup>76</sup> The total comprises \$1,045,000 in 2018 for 31 vessels at a unit price of \$33,710 per year and \$2,090,000 in 2020 for 52 vessels at a unit price of \$49,761 for 2020 [31 in 2019 and 21 in 2020, as only 21 vessels were reported in the website of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resource since then].

<sup>77</sup> The Federal Government of Somalia changed the name to the Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy in late 2022.

<sup>78</sup> Office of the Auditor General, Special Audit Report on the Management of Fisheries (November 2021), page 14.

<sup>79</sup> See, for instance, sustainable fisheries partnership agreements of the European Union with some African countries. Available at [https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-fisheries-partnership-agreements-sfpas\\_en#list-of-fisheries-agreements](https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/international-agreements/sustainable-fisheries-partnership-agreements-sfpas_en#list-of-fisheries-agreements).

- (a) The issuance of licences by federal member states to foreign vessels;
- (b) The issuance of illegal licences by corrupt public officials;
- (c) The issuance of fake licences by criminal networks;
- (d) Illegal fishing by foreign vessels.

*Issuance of licences by federal member states to foreign vessels*

58. Regarding the issuance of licenses by FMS to foreign vessels, the Federal Government of Somalia indicated to the Panel, throughout the first half of 2023, that it had issued 27 licences to Chinese vessels in 2022 and none in 2023. The Panel received confirmation from Galmudug and Puntland that they had issued 14 and 25 licences, respectively, to Chinese vessels, valid from May 2022 to May 2023. In July 2023, the Federal Government of Somalia sent a letter to the Panel confirming that Somalia and the China have long cooperated bilaterally on matters of mutual interest, including fisheries cooperation, and that there was a misunderstanding and lack of direct communication. The letter also confirmed that both countries had resolved all their differences, agreed to further enhance fisheries cooperation and increase fishing outputs sustainably, and that Somalia had renewed its bilateral fisheries cooperation with China. On 6 August 2023, the Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy announced the renewal of its memorandum of understanding with the Chinese Overseas Fisheries Association.<sup>80</sup>

*Issuance of illegal licences by corrupt public officials and fake licences by criminal networks*

59. The second and third categories of misappropriation involve the issuance of illegal or fake fishing licences to Iranian fishing vessels for a fee ranging from \$6,000 to \$11,000 per licence (see annex 9 for additional information). The Panel sent letters to the Islamic Republic of Iran and China requesting that they share copies of fishing licences issued in Somalia to the vessels registered in their countries, as well as information on Somalia-based intermediaries that are possibly facilitating this process. The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Panel that their authorities needed more time to gather the information requested.

**Diversion of public funds**

60. In early July 2023, the Auditor General presented his office's annual audit report, which was aimed at improving the accountability and transparency of public resource management in Somalia. The report also included information about possible widespread embezzlement by government officials dating back to 2018, and that as at June 2023, approximately \$21 million was missing from government coffers. According to the report, the Auditor General's office had conducted a forensic audit of government accounts and noted that the money was withdrawn from government accounts between March 2018 and April 2023.<sup>81</sup>

61. As a result of the report, the Attorney General, on 4 July, released a list of 18 government officials accused of financial crimes and corruption. Of the 18 individuals mentioned, nine officials had reportedly departed Somalia.<sup>82</sup> The announcement by the Attorney General is part of a broader effort by the Federal Government of Somalia

<sup>80</sup> See <https://twitter.com/SONNALIVE/status/1688186435524771840?t=crADY64g61XhX41EUVAj3Q&s=09>; and <https://twitter.com/ChineseSomalia/status/1688490248819425280>.

<sup>81</sup> See <https://mustaqbalmedia.net/en/somalia-the-auditor-general-presents-annual-audit-reports-to-the-parliament/>.

<sup>82</sup> See <https://somalimagazine.so/somalias-attorney-general-exposes-corrupt-higher-government-officials/>.

to eliminate corruption and increase transparency in the country. The Panel will continue to monitor the investigations.

## C. Challenges to State-building

### Challenges to federalism

62. Somalia continues to face political challenges to its State-building process. Election and inter-clan conflicts continue to be an additional challenge, threatening peace and security in Somalia. During the reporting period, incumbent presidents at the regional level continued to seek ways to remain in office beyond their terms by postponing elections. On 17 July 2022, Somaliland postponed its presidential election planned for November 2022 to November 2024.<sup>83</sup> In December 2022, clashes started in Baidoa, South-West State, when a group called “Salvation of South West” allegedly with elements from the SNA took up arms to prevent the local parliament from extending the term of office of the President of South-West State, Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed “Laftagaren”.<sup>84</sup> In addition, fierce clashes erupted in Garowe, Puntland, on 6 February 2023 and 20 June 2023 to prevent plans, to be executed through the regional parliament, aimed at extending the term of the President of Puntland State, Said Abdullahi Deni, which will expire in January 2024.<sup>85</sup> Following the endorsement of the constitution by the Parliament of Puntland on 15 July 2023, Mr. Deni denied on 1 August that he was trying to delay the election.<sup>86</sup>

63. Within this context, the National Consultative Council,<sup>87</sup> a forum intended to synchronize the development of institutions at the federal and regional levels, continues to face challenges. During the reporting period, the Council convened in late December 2022 in Mogadishu, in mid-March 2023 in Baidoa and in late May 2023 in Mogadishu. At the meeting held in December, the Council agreed to form a technical committee to review the national security architecture agreed upon in April 2017. At the second meeting, it agreed on fiscal federalism and called for the establishment of a national revenue agency and a commission for allocation and acceleration of income.<sup>88</sup>

64. The third meeting of the National Consultative Council during the reporting period, in May, was more controversial, as it dealt with a de facto extension of presidential term limits in the federal member states, seeking to extend the current terms to 2024 in order to synchronize the election timeline with the election at the Federal Government level and have enough time to adopt a one-person, one-vote electoral system. In addition, the National Consultative Council explored options to remove the post of the Prime Minister and instead create a single ticket for electing a

<sup>83</sup> See <https://twitter.com/SLNTV/status/1680946803158425600>.

<sup>84</sup> Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed “Laftagaren” came to office on 19 December 2018 for a term of office ending on 19 December 2022. In 2020, the parliament extended the term of the president to 2024, to be aligned with the legislature. See <https://somaliguadian.com/news/somalia-news/somalias-president-orders-troops-aligned-with-southwest-opposition-to-return-to-barracks/>.

<sup>85</sup> See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/un-report-somalia-s-puntland-electoral-conflict-escalating-to-dangerous-levels>; see also <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/fighting-erupts-somalias-puntland-regional-parliament-debates-voting-changes-2023-06-20/>.

<sup>86</sup> See <https://www.radiodalsan.com/puntland-leader-deni-dismisses-claims-of-extending-term-in-office/>.

<sup>87</sup> The National Consultative Council is a bi-monthly meeting, attended by the President and the Prime Minister of the Federal Government of Somalia as well as the presidents of regional governments (Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubbaland, Puntland and South-West State) and the Governor of Banaadir.

<sup>88</sup> See <https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1636786842803503116>.

President and Vice-President.<sup>89</sup> Apart from the former President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo, who welcomed the idea, most political actors criticized the move and declared it unconstitutional. No steps have so far been taken in the Parliament to discuss these options.

65. The meeting of the National Consultative Council held in May, unfortunately, diverted attention away from coordination between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states on the next phase of the offensive against Al-Shabaab. The President of Puntland State boycotted the last two meetings, accusing the Federal Government of undermining federalism in favour of a centralized government structure. Mr. Deni was criticized by international donors for failing to engage constructively in the State-building process.<sup>90</sup>

### **Challenges to federal member states**

66. Internal politics and clan dynamics continue to fragment the federal system at the level of federal member states, thereby undermining State-building efforts. All federal member states and Somaliland continue to witness crises that create vulnerabilities and community fragmentation, creating conditions that Al-Shabaab seeks to exploit. Galmudug continued to witness tensions between Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a and Galmudug forces supported by the Federal Government of Somalia around Dhusamareb which occurred in late 2021. In Jubbaland, Gedo continues to resist any compromise with the government in Kismayo. Hirshabelle has been fractured as the Hawadle clan are seeking more autonomy in Hiraan. Puntland continues to face both tension with Somaliland around Las Anod, as well as in Garowe in relation to the election calendar.

67. Fragmentation among the federal member states is also occurring because of a growing political entitlement culture in which politicians who are forced out may seek to use force to make their agendas heard. The clash in Garowe of 20 June 2023 followed the dismissal on 17 June 2023, by the President of Puntland State, of Security Minister Abdisamad Mohamed Gallan.<sup>91</sup> Mr. Gallan, of the Ali Saliban clan, had previously launched an insurgency against the Puntland administration in 2016, following his sacking as Governor of Bari.<sup>92</sup> Similarly, the dismissal of Ali Jeyte Osman as Governor of Hiraan on 16 June 2023 by the President of Hirshabelle, Ali Abdullahi Gudlawe, led the former to proclaim himself as president of Hiraan.<sup>93</sup>

### **Challenge to Somaliland**

68. In mid-July 2023, the Panel noted the emergence of the Dulmi Diid armed militia, which is primarily operating from the Gan Libah Mountains in the Sahil Region of Somaliland. Initially, the group claimed to be fighting against Somaliland's National Electoral Commission announcement regarding the national election schedule.<sup>94</sup> Since July 2023, the Panel has noted reports that the group engaged in armed clashes with Somaliland security forces using heavy weapons. On 11 August, clashes between the Somaliland Police Force and Dulmi Diid in Goda-Weyn, Berbera district, resulted in the death of nine police officers. In addition, an unknown number

<sup>89</sup> See [https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2023/Jun/191705/somali\\_council\\_of\\_ministers\\_approves\\_ncc\\_s\\_election\\_agreement\\_amidst\\_opposition.aspx](https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2023/Jun/191705/somali_council_of_ministers_approves_ncc_s_election_agreement_amidst_opposition.aspx).

<sup>90</sup> See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-donors-point-finger-at-outgoing-puntland-president-s-state-building-engagement>.

<sup>91</sup> See [https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2023/Jun/191845/puntland\\_president\\_sacks\\_two\\_senior\\_ministers\\_amid\\_rising\\_political\\_tensions.aspx](https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2023/Jun/191845/puntland_president_sacks_two_senior_ministers_amid_rising_political_tensions.aspx).

<sup>92</sup> See the report Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (S/2016/919, annex 8.10).

<sup>93</sup> See <https://hornobserver.com/articles/2270/Hiiraan-Governor-fired-amid-revenue-dispute-impact-on-al-Shabaab-war-uncertain>.

<sup>94</sup> Confidential United Nations reports, July and August 2023.

of Somaliland security forces from the Garhajis clan reportedly defected to Dulmi Diid.<sup>95</sup>

69. In early August 2023, the Panel noted the spread of local demonstrations in support of Dulmi Diid towards Burao, Togdheer Region, and Erigavo district, Sanaag Region. On 12 August, the Chief of the Somaliland Police Force issued a public statement accusing Dulmi Diid of attempting to compromise the nation's security by attacking government security forces.<sup>96</sup> The Panel currently has no information as to who is funding the armed group and what their goals are.

### **Responses and measures taken to combat threats to peace, security and stability of Somalia**

#### *International partners*

70. As the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, continues to consolidate his authority in his second year, the positioning of international actors inside Somalia continues to evolve. Somalia has eased bilateral tensions, such as those with Kenya and with the United Arab Emirates, which had been inherited from the former President, Mr. Farmaajo, as a result of political alignments. Nevertheless, competition between several actors in zero-sum engagement has affected ambitions in terms of force generation and equipment supply. During the reporting period, international engagement in Somalia has been shifting from being motivated by humanitarian solidarity and combating global terrorism to being more focused on national interest. Officials from one major troop-contributing country to ATMIS expressed to the Panel their worries that donor fatigue in Western countries might be faced by national pressure in the troop-contributing countries owing to continuous troop casualties in Somalia.

71. At the multilateral level, the coordination of security efforts continues to be fragmented, owing to the absence of the United Nations in a coordinating role in the two new security forums that emerged in 2023. On 1 February 2023, the Presidents of Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya convened in Mogadishu for a discussion on regional security and agreed on a joint initiative known as "Frontline States" to fight Al-Shabaab. One month later, Somalia joined a quintet comprising the five major security partners Qatar, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America for a meeting in Washington, D.C., on 8 March 2023.<sup>97</sup> These two initiatives have yet to fully materialize.

72. At the bilateral level, the preeminent role of Türkiye and Qatar as security partners became less visible with the departure of the former President, Mr. Farmaajo. During the reporting period, the role of Türkiye in force generation of Somali troops decreased, with more focus on officers, non-commissioned officers and specialized training, as well as on replenishment to replace troops lost in combat.<sup>98</sup> The United Arab Emirates became a major security partner, with whom the Federal Government of Somalia signed an agreement on military and security cooperation and fighting

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> See <https://www.zawya.com/en/world/middle-east/uae-qatar-somalia-turkiye-uk-us-issue-joint-statement-on-somalia-wzf2bw0o>; see also the communiqué of the third meeting held in Doha, on 5 June 2023, at [https://twitter.com/MofaQatar\\_EN/status/1666067632846454784](https://twitter.com/MofaQatar_EN/status/1666067632846454784).

<sup>98</sup> Statement by Turkish officials to the Panel; see also [https://twitter.com/TC\\_Mogadishu/status/1634197846990757889](https://twitter.com/TC_Mogadishu/status/1634197846990757889) and [https://twitter.com/TC\\_Mogadishu/status/1553864679516262402](https://twitter.com/TC_Mogadishu/status/1553864679516262402); and information regarding the most recent graduation, available at <https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1686359540088934400>.

terrorism, on 5 January 2023.<sup>99</sup> That agreement has allowed the financing of force generation and the equipment for up to 3,000 soldiers trained in Uganda, and was made public during the graduation ceremony, which was attended by the President of Somalia and the President of Uganda.<sup>100</sup> In addition, Egypt emerged as an actor with a potential interest in Somalia, following the visit by the President of Somalia to Cairo in July 2022.<sup>101</sup> Nevertheless, the conflict in the Sudan and potential easing of tension between Ethiopia and Egypt since the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, met with the President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, on 13 July 2023 might create a new dynamic in relation to regional security.<sup>102</sup>

#### D. Rule of law

73. The Panel has noted from its conversations with United Nations system entities and non-governmental organizations that as the offensive against Al-Shabaab continues, there is a growing likelihood that the Federal Government of Somalia may be forced to deal with a growing number of captured Al-Shabaab fighters. If this does occur, most captured members will likely be processed through the existing military court system, which has remained standard practice since the group was pushed out of the capital in 2011. Moreover, the Government recently reinforced this practice when it adopted the Anti-Terrorism Act, in March 2023. Article 35 of the new legislation continues to give the power to prosecute the crimes of terrorism to the Courts of the Armed Forces. Article 36 gives the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces responsibility for prosecuting and investigating terrorism cases.

74. Human rights groups have continued to advocate that these trials are not fair and should be handled by civilian courts.<sup>103</sup> The Office of the Attorney General office in Somalia, however, is currently not equipped to prosecute these types of cases in criminal or civil court. Specifically, terrorism financing-related cases are extremely complex in nature and require specialist skills. Other barriers to trying Al-Shabaab members in criminal court include: the safety and security of criminal or civil judges and prosecutors; specialist knowledge of terrorism prosecutions; and the rather slow nature of proceedings found outside military courts.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>99</sup> See <https://sonna.so/en/uae-minister-of-state-for-defence-receives-somali-defence-minister-2/>; an alleged draft of the agreement can be downloaded from the following web page: <https://web.archive.org/web/20230915072022/https://www.banooda.com/index.php/news/item/2480-final-agreement-between-somalia-government-and-united-arab-emirates>.

<sup>100</sup> See [https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2023/Mar/190404/somali\\_and\\_ugandan\\_presidents\\_attend\\_graduation\\_ceremony\\_for\\_newly\\_trained\\_somali\\_soldiers\\_in\\_kampala.aspx](https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2023/Mar/190404/somali_and_ugandan_presidents_attend_graduation_ceremony_for_newly_trained_somali_soldiers_in_kampala.aspx); see also the message from the Minister of Defence of the Federal Government of Somalia on 30 June 2023 thanking the United Arab Emirates and Uganda for their role in supporting Somalia's efforts in force generation, available at <https://twitter.com/Amohamednur/status/1674836613409525760>.

<sup>101</sup> See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/how-egypt-is-slowly-winning-somalia-s-confidence>.

<sup>102</sup> See <https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-egypt-dam-dispute-nile-0f71472e426d9399c273d09aedc04e62>.

<sup>103</sup> See the report of Human Rights Watch, available at <https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=8584&file=EnglishTranslation>, paras. 39–44.

<sup>104</sup> Information provided by the Federal Government of Somalia.

## IV. Response of and measures taken by the Federal Government of Somalia and international actors

### A. Federal Government of Somalia offensive against Al-Shabaab

75. Over the past year, the Federal Government of Somalia offensive against Al-Shabaab has made significant territorial gains in Hirshabelle and Galmudug States. During the offensive, the Federal Government has relied upon and leveraged sub-clan militias, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and support for the offensive, across the two states. The territorial gains, namely the liberation of Hiraan and Middle Shabelle Regions as well as two districts in Galmudug State, creates a window of opportunity to establish governance and security within the newly liberated districts. With that said, the Federal Government faces numerous potential regional and local challenges, including clan conflicts, divisive federal member state politics and the challenge of ensuring long term security, especially given questions around the formalization of community militias. Given these concerns, there is a significant risk of Al-Shabaab reasserting influence and power within the region once the focus of the Federal Government and its forces is shifted elsewhere.

#### Galmudug

76. The offensive in eastern Galmudug is ongoing and after initial gains in the state, the Federal Government of Somalia and aligned forces are attempting to capture Ceel Buur, Al-Shabaab's last major stronghold in central Somalia. The towns of Harardhee<sup>105</sup> and Ceel Dheere<sup>106</sup> were cleared in January 2023, but remain only partially cleared. Federal Government forces have expanded their control over the surrounding areas and some main supply routes connecting the district capitals to Hobyo and Adan Yabal districts. Al-Shabaab forces have been pushed westwards from Harardhere and northwards from Ceel Dheere into an area around Ceel Buur town, but the rural and remote areas of both Ceel Dheere and Harardhere district remain contested, and in some cases under the control of Al-Shabaab. At the time of writing, Al-Shabaab controls most of central and eastern Ceel Buur district and, despite having lost territory in the neighbouring districts, still exerts influence into Harardhere and Ceel Dheere, where its fighters have attacked Federal Government forces and continue to threaten communities. Most recently, the fighting has occurred in these contested areas, which lie between villages that are firmly under the control of either Al-Shabaab or the Federal Government.<sup>107</sup>

77. In order to ensure long-term stability, take advantage of successful military operations and meaningfully prevent Al-Shabaab's return to eastern Galmudug, liberated areas need permanent and supported hold forces providing security. The current degree of security and stability within Ceel Dheere and Harardhere towns, provides the base level conditions for critical interventions in reconciliation, political inclusivity and supporting livelihoods. These interventions can then support the provision of a viable and legitimate long-term alternative to Al-Shabaab. Such a scenario is dependent, however, on stability being provided and ensured by post-offensive hold forces. As the Federal Government of Somalia plans for the next phase of the offensive, there is a risk that necessary forces and resources will be diverted from the liberated areas of eastern Galmudug, as well as Hiraan and Middle Shabelle. Without continued support for the liberated areas after the offensive, it will be

<sup>105</sup> See <https://gorfayn.org/harardheere-six-months-on-how-freedom-transformed-a-hopeless-city/>.

<sup>106</sup> See <https://twitter.com/rr0162/status/1635750999792173056?s=61&t=8pPpG9T2ILEUGIz0Q35vSw>.

<sup>107</sup> Confidential interviews with Federal Government of Somalia security officials.

challenging for the Federal Government to consolidate the gains made in Hirshabelle and Galmudug States.

*Questions linger surrounding the “hold”*

78. Hold forces are in place in the liberated areas of Harardhere and Ceel Dheere, but there is uncertainty around the long-term plans for permanent hold forces.<sup>108</sup> The current expectations, within the liberated areas as well as Mogadishu and Dhusamareb, is that the Ma’awisley will be the hold force after the offensive, potentially with the backing of troops of federal member states or those of the Federal Government of Somalia. There is also a widespread expectation that these forces will be formalized and integrated into Federal Government security forces, but it remains unclear if the necessary conversations and discussions are ongoing to implement this. Given the scope of forces involved, significant financial, logistical and accountability planning and support will be necessary to undertake any formalization of the informal forces. There is also a lack of clarity regarding the role of the Somali National Army in Galmudug post-offensive.<sup>109</sup> Moreover, the possibility of a second phase of the offensive into southern Somalia risks shifting forces from Galmudug and leaving the liberated areas unsecured and without necessary force deployments.

*Al-Shabaab*

79. Despite recent territorial losses, Al-Shabaab is an adaptable and resilient organization that is highly capable of changing its strategy and tactics to reassert influence. Al-Shabaab’s ability to exploit clan conflicts will enable them to capitalize on any onset of inter- or intra-clan conflict as an entry point to reinfiltate liberated areas. Al-Shabaab’s military forces have also demonstrated a continued capacity to confront and defeat Federal Government of Somalia forces on the battlefield, including as seen in the attack on 30 May against the Somali National Army at Masagaway in Ceel Dheere district, as well as the attack on 26 May against the ATMIS base in Bulo Mareer, Lower Shabelle. Territorial losses are unlikely to indicate a loss in military or organizational capability. Despite some territorial losses, the group remains in a strong financial position and retains the ability to exert its influence over Galmudug-based sub-clans.

*Resist temptation to rush the offensive*

80. The Federal Government of Somalia has publicly signalled that it intends to carry out a second phase of the offensive, shifting forces towards southern Somalia, following the completion of offensive operations in Galmudug. With that said, a rushed second phase of the offensive likely puts the success achieved thus far at risk. The deployment of Somali National Army forces from eastern Galmudug to southern Somalia would likely leave eastern Galmudug vulnerable and without sufficient protection from Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab forces in Galmudug remain a significant obstacle, evidenced by the stalled offensive operations towards Ceel Buur. For example, despite tactical defeats in Middle Shabelle earlier in the campaign, the Panel has received credible reports that Al-Shabaab is already becoming increasingly active in recently liberated areas along the Adan Yabal coastal strip. Within the medium term, Al-Shabaab will likely attempt to reassert influence, particularly if potential clan conflicts become active and provide an opportunity for the group to insert itself back into the region.

**Operation Black Lion**

81. The immediate neighbouring countries to Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, have indefinitely suspended their initial commitment to provide non-ATMIS-

<sup>108</sup> Confidential interviews with United Nations officials and donor officials.


<sup>109</sup> Confidential interviews with United Nations officials and donor officials.

hatted troops for the second phase of offensive operations planned by the Federal Government of Somalia against Al-Shabaab, commonly known as “Operation Black Lion”.<sup>110</sup> The absence of those troops from these frontline states may result in a setback for the Federal Government, which had touted Black Lion as a possible final nail in Al-Shabaab’s coffin. Now, however, the Government will face questions over how it can effectively execute the second phase of operation absent the estimated 18,000 additional troops that these frontline States had reportedly pledged. This news, coupled with the ongoing drawdown and withdrawal of ATMIS troops, will challenge the ability of the Federal Government to execute the second phase of operations.

82. Ethiopian security officials informed the Panel that the country’s decision to bow out from “Black Lion” is a result of the ongoing ATMIS drawdown and a lack of domestic support. Instead, Ethiopia will focus its redeployed forces along the Ethiopia-Somalia border. Overall, it appears that “Black Lion” was too ambitious and not properly coordinated or planned. Importantly, issues over command-and-control and financing were never properly agreed upon, according to sources with placement and access to early Black Lion discussions.

### Drawdown of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

83. In line with resolutions 2628 (2022), 2670 (2022), and 2687 (2023), which set out the operational timelines associated with the ATMIS drawdown, ATMIS successfully redeployed 2,000 personnel by 30 June 2023 and is in the process of planning for the next redeployment of 3,000 personnel by 30 September 2023.<sup>111</sup>



<sup>110</sup> See <https://www.hornexaminer.com/somalias-allies-withdraw-troop-support-for-black-lion-offensive-reasons-and-implications/>.

<sup>111</sup> Since January 2023, ATMIS has closed or handed over eight forward operating bases. The forward operating base at Maslah was shuttered in January and the forward operating base at Marka Ayub was closed in mid-June 2023. The remaining six forward operating bases – Xaaji Cali, Miriqtuqo, Cadaale, Albao, Gherille, Aljazeera 1 – were all closed between 20 and 28 June 2023.

## **B. Financial disruption strategy of the Federal Government of Somalia**

### **Overview**

84. In line with paragraph 32 of resolution 2662 (2022), the Panel continues to exchange information with the Federal Government of Somalia and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) regarding the steps the Federal Government is taking to disrupt Al-Shabaab finances, as requested by the Security Council.

85. During the reporting period, the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee, a body composed of eight ministries, organized nine coordination meetings in 2023 and directed the Financial Reporting Centre and the Central Bank of Somalia to provide guidance and directives to the reporting entities in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism Act of 2016.

86. Meetings of the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee occurred with more frequency in 2023. In addition, the Federal Government of Somalia established a task force that reports to the Committee at the operational level and deals with the implementation of policies on anti-money-laundering efforts and on countering the financing of terrorism, expanding the number of entities associated with the Federal Government of Somalia from eight to 18 members from ministries, departments and agencies, thereby strengthening the ability of the Federal Government to manage progress made against stated benchmarks in that regard through assigning roles to each member institution.

87. In March 2023, the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee held a follow-up meeting with the Notaries and Lawyers Association to discuss the implementation of orders issued by the Committee at previous meetings. Specifically, the Committee requested the Notaries and Lawyers Association to participate in combating the financing of terrorism and noted that notaries play a vital role in monitoring the purchase and/or sale of properties across the country. At the same meeting, the Director of the Financial Reporting Centre stated that her organization had conducted capacity-building training for the Notaries and Lawyers Association to raise the awareness of the Association of the need for greater collaboration with the Financial Reporting Centre.

88. In December 2022, the Financial Reporting Centre issued guidelines to financial institutions on external account freezing procedures. The Panel is investigating how many institutions have, on the basis of suspicions, proceeded to freeze external accounts. The Director of the Centre informed the Panel that from January to May 2023, the Centre had received zero suspicious transaction reports and 150 large cash transaction reports from four financial institutions.

### **Protection of individuals and businesses from Al-Shabaab and ISIL-Somalia extortion practices**

89. As mentioned in paragraphs 8, 37 and 38 above, Federal Government of Somalia security forces conducted several kinetic operations targeting Al-Shabaab-associated financiers and checkpoints throughout central and southern Somalia during the mandate. These actions will have a short-term impact on the group's ability to re-establish these checkpoints, likely resulting in a small loss of revenue. Increased awareness and knowledge of non-kinetic financial disruption methods, such as how to report suspicious banking activity, is needed among the financial and non-financial institutions in Mogadishu and wider Somalia.

90. The successes registered by the Federal Government of Somalia in fighting Al-Shabaab militarily in late 2022 were coupled with plans to wage a strategic messaging campaign to discredit the group and uncover Al-Shabaab's illegal extortion practices. The campaign had some initial success in building public confidence to defy Al-Shabaab. Delays with the next phase of operations against Al-Shabaab, however, allowed the group to threaten Somali officials and business community members, showing weaknesses in the ability of the Federal Government to protect civilians, notably financial reporting actors and the broader business community. The case of the Baidoa blockade, mentioned above in paragraph 39, is an illustration of such reversals.

## **V. Implementation of the arms embargo**

### **A. Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargo**

#### **Weapons and ammunition management**

91. Of all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council with respect to Somalia since 1992, resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#) places the heaviest emphasis on the role of effective weapons and ammunition management in targeting and disrupting the ability of Al-Shabaab and other non-State actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region to obtain weapons, ammunition and lethal military equipment. Equally, the Council urges authorities of the Federal Government of Somalia to identify and hold accountable those involved in illicit smuggling and trafficking networks of weapons, military equipment and ammunition.

#### *Progress of the Federal Government of Somalia on the coordination and strategic planning of weapons and ammunition management*

92. While progress has been made in establishing the architecture of a functional weapons and ammunition management system, significant work remains to be done on the implementation front. In paragraph 8 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council encourages partners to coordinate their efforts to support Somalia in implementing the weapons and ammunition management requirements set out in the resolution. From 21 to 22 March 2023, the Panel attended an annual coordination meeting on weapons and ammunition management in Mogadishu convened by the Office of National Security. The meeting brought together representatives from the Federal Government of Somalia and regional security organizations of the federal member states, as well as ATMIS and specialized agencies, embassies and international partners in order to improve the coordination of weapons and ammunition management programming in Somalia.<sup>112</sup>

93. At that coordination meeting, the representatives of the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states reported on progress made towards achieving the benchmarks proposed following the technical assessment in 2022 of the country's weapons and ammunition management capabilities ([S/2022/698](#)). Progress was also reported on the evolution and implementation of a national strategy on weapons and ammunition management, in line with the request by the Council in paragraph 5 (a) of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#). The Federal Government of Somalia presented a forward-

<sup>112</sup> Aligned with benchmark 3 on improving coordination among weapons and ammunition management stakeholders proposed following the 2022 technical assessment of weapons and ammunition management capabilities of Somalia ([S/2022/698](#)), as outlined in paragraph 6 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#). The coordination meetings on weapons and ammunition management were organized by the Federal Government of Somalia with technical support from HALO Trust.

looking 12-month implementation plan delineated into lines of effort that correspond to the benchmarks laid out in [S/2022/698](#) and the six pillars of the national weapons and ammunition management strategy. Each line of effort is subdivided into tasks that have been assigned to a national lead agency or international implementer.

*Operational difficulties and limited progress at the level of federal member states*

94. At the level of federal member states, a workshop on weapons and ammunition management in support of the weapons and ammunition management goals of the Federal Government of Somalia was held on 13 March 2023 in Dhusamareb with the Regional Security Officer and security forces of Galmudug State.<sup>113</sup> Despite notable gains at the level of the Federal Government, progress in this area at the regional level remains limited. The significant proliferation of non-government-owned weapons, held by private militia and clans, exacerbates armed clashes and clan-related violence. A legacy of conflict and regional instability, black markets, illicit cross-border arms trafficking and the theft of contingent-owned equipment owing to raids on peacekeeping missions, have facilitated access to weapons and ammunition in Somalia. The Panel notes evidence of clans, militia and designated non-State armed groups possessing a wide range of armaments, including pistols, assault rifles, light machine guns, grenades and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as heavier, larger calibre weapon systems.<sup>114</sup>

*Update on digital record-keeping and marking*

95. Progress has been made in the digitalization of a tailored Somali security forces governance system for weapons and ammunition management, with the development of a bespoke, Somali-owned national weapons and ammunition management database nearing completion. Lessons learned from the deployment of this database with the Somali Police Force in Banaadir will be incorporated into the planned implementation of the database with the Somali National Army. While the new, tailored national database is undergoing final development, both the Somali Police Force and the Somali National Army continue to register weapons through the Fulcrum mobile data collection system, which was implemented by the joint verification team mandated by the Council to support the end-user verification of imported weapons and now doubles as a temporary weapons and ammunition management database.<sup>115</sup> Using Fulcrum, the Somali Police Force has registered over 7,500 weapons across Banaadir, and in Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South-West States since November 2020, while the Somali National Army has registered over 8,400 weapons, primarily in Banaadir and South-West State since March 2023.<sup>116</sup>

96. All weapons delivered to the Federal Government of Somalia under the partial lifting of the arms embargo are meant to be appropriately marked before being deployed within Somalia. Both the Somali Police Force and the Somali National Army have received mobile weapon-marking machines and marking training from specialized agencies, thereby enabling them to mark weapons with government end-user markings prior to digitally registering them. While the ability to systematically mark and register weapons at the level of the Federal Government has increased significantly, there is still minimal marking capacity in the federal member states, with marking equipment being deployed from Mogadishu when required.

<sup>113</sup> The meetings were organized by the Galmudug authorities with technical support from HALO Trust.

<sup>114</sup> Confidential interviews and review of evidence from international and Somali security forces, specialized agencies, weapons intelligence sources and community elders.

<sup>115</sup> See the statement by the President of the Security Council of 22 May 2014 ([S/PRST/2014/9](#)).

<sup>116</sup> Office of National Security, Federal Government of Somalia and the Joint Verification Team.

### Cooperation on recovered, captured or seized weapons and ammunition

97. Ensuring the traceability of recovered weapons through access to recovered weapons and ammunition, including those seized or those captured on the battlefield, remain priorities for the Panel, serving as invaluable sources of evidence for tracing, targeting and disrupting illicit supplies to Al-Shabaab and ISIL-Somalia.<sup>117</sup>

98. In line with paragraph 9 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#),<sup>118</sup> the Panel has requested the Federal Government of Somalia to allow the Panel to have access to information as well as to be able document, analyse and trace weapons captured on the battlefield and ammunition or related materiel seized from areas recently liberated by the renewed campaign against Al-Shabaab by Somali security forces, clan militias and ATMIS. The Panel has also requested access to inspect weapons, ammunition and military materiel captured or seized through raids in all major cities and ports of entry, including Mogadishu, in order to identify and trace illicit supply networks.

99. The Federal Government of Somalia facilitated access for the Panel to conduct four inspections in Kismayo and Mogadishu of weapons, ammunition and related materiel captured from Al-Shabaab. These items were captured by the Somali National Army, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali Police Force and federal member state security forces from Jubbaland and Galmudug. On the basis of the markings identified and the technical characteristics of the weapons, the Panel documented and proceeded to trace several weapons, as detailed in paragraph 108 below.

100. Following cross-border attacks conducted by Al-Shabaab in the neighbouring states of Ethiopia and Kenya,<sup>119</sup> the Panel has also conducted several meetings and written to Ethiopian and Kenyan authorities requesting cooperation with relevant government authorities to access, document, analyse and trace weapons, ammunition or related materiel captured by their security forces, particularly in border locations. The identification of operational-level focal points and the conducting of technical-level discussions or border visits within the frontline States have yet to happen.

#### *Update on the national captured weapons database*

101. The Federal Government of Somalia continues to update the national captured weapons database for the recording of seized and recovered weapons. Conflict Armament Research provided the Federal Government with technical and operational support, including the provision of equipment and training in weapon identification and documentation to approximately 15 Somali Police Force, Somali National Army and National Intelligence and Security Agency personnel, all aimed at improving the accuracy of documentation and regular uploads of images and contextual data regarding materiel seized or captured on the battlefield. The database, which was established in 2022, currently contains records of 78 weapons.

<sup>117</sup> Aligned with benchmarks 6 and 7 proposed following the technical assessment in 2022 of weapons and ammunition management capabilities in Somalia (see [S/2022/698](#)), as outlined in paragraph 6 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#).

<sup>118</sup> The Federal Government of Somalia, in cooperation with ATMIS, is required, as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), to document and register all weapons and military equipment captured as part of offensive operations and to facilitate inspections by the Panel of all military items before their redistribution or destruction.

<sup>119</sup> The Panel previously reported on cross-border attacks in Mandera and Lamu Counties, as well as the Al-Shabaab incursions into Ethiopia in July 2022 ([S/2022/754](#), para. 26).

*Cooperation between ATMIS and the Federal Government of Somalia on recovered, captured or seized weapons and ammunition*

102. A harmonized standard operating procedure on the management of recovered small arms and light weapons in Somalia between ATMIS and the Office of National Security of the Federal Government of Somalia was agreed to on 29 June 2021 but remains to be implemented, owing to the lack of dedicated resources, specialized skills and field-level cooperation. The standard operating procedure was updated and signed by the Federal Government on 5 July 2023 and by the Head of Mission of ATMIS on 8 July 2023. The revised procedure stipulates that, where possible, a specially trained team of the Somali National Army must deploy to document seized and recovered weapons. Where this is impractical owing to operational limitations, then ATMIS troops may document the materiel by following the guidelines that are now included in the revised standard operating procedure.

103. In order to improve cooperation between the Federal Government of Somalia and ATMIS with regard to enabling the systematic documentation and tracing of captured weapons, focal points within ATMIS and the Federal Government were established in March 2023 at the federal member state level. The effective implementation of the standard operating procedure within the federal member states, particularly where the ongoing offensive against Al-Shabaab is playing out, requires the immediate identification of dedicated operational-level focal points at ATMIS headquarters and within each ATMIS sector, to cooperate closely with the Somali National Army and the specially trained documentation team of the Federal Government.

**Notification and deliveries of consignments of weapons and ammunition**

104. Since the submission of the Panel's final report for 2022 ([S/2022/754](#)) on 1 September 2022, 21 consignments of weapons and ammunition have been notified to the Federal Government of Somalia. The details of consignments, notifications and deliveries are summarized in confidential annex 10 to the present report.

105. The Panel and the joint verification team continue to update a comprehensive registry pertaining to weapons and ammunition officially imported by the Federal Government of Somalia since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013. According to the registry, the Federal Government has officially received approximately 44,000 weapons and 101 million rounds of ammunition, including around 71,000 RPG-7 rounds, since 2013.

**B. Future of the arms embargo**

106. In its resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council indicated that it would be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in the resolution, including any modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed, in light of the progress achieved and compliance with the resolution. The Federal Government of Somalia, through its National Security Adviser, has indicated to the Panel that Somalia has two objectives:

(a) The removal by the Security Council of all limitations on Somalia's ability to import weapons, ammunition and military equipment in order for its forces to be able to successfully fight Al-Shabaab, without the burden of notifications and requests for approval;

(b) The maintenance of mechanisms to curb the illicit flow of weapons to Al-Shabaab, ISIL-Somalia and other spoilers, until Somalia can manage and control its coast and borders more effectively.

107. In July 2023, the Panel participated in the Secretariat's technical assessment mission, requested in paragraph 47 (b) of resolution 2662 (2022), to provide an update on progress against each indicator set out in the benchmarks contained in the technical assessment report (S/2022/698). The Panel indicated to the Office of the National Security Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia that any effort made by the Council to revise the arms embargo should take into consideration the need to maintain effective mechanisms for the documentation and analysis of weapons and ammunition captured from Al-Shabaab and ISIL-Somalia for the purpose of tracing their origin, as well as efforts to curb the proliferation and use of arms by militia absent appropriate weapons and ammunition management provisions.

## C. Tracing of weapons and ammunition used by Al-Shabaab

### Inspection by the Panel of weapons captured from Al-Shabaab

108. As stated in paragraph 99 above, the Office of National Security of the Federal Government of Somalia facilitated four inspections by the Panel, during the current mandate, of weapons captured from Al-Shabaab in Halane armoury in the Aden Adde International Airport protected area. The weapons were captured in 2020 in Wisil, Galmudug; Maxaas, Hirshabelle; Janale, Lower Shabelle; and Kismayo, Jubbaland. The inspected weapons included 73 assault rifles (AK, AKM, Type 56, Type 56-1, Type 56-2, MPi-KM-72), 7.62x54 mm calibre PKMs, M86 light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers and rounds. On the basis of the markings identified and the technical characteristics of the weapons, the Panel documented and proceeded to trace several weapons, including 36 weapons for which details are provided below and which have characteristics similar to weapons originating from the following manufacturing States, with details provided in annex 11:

#### (a) Bulgaria

- Two types of ammunition boxes for 7.62x39 mm and 7.62x54 mm, lot number A 10-18 and T 02-18. The Panel identified that these boxes were part of ammunition delivered to Somalia in February 2022 for Danab special forces

#### (b) China

- 36 assault rifles Type 56, Type 56-1 and Type 56-2 with markings indicating manufacture in five factories (26, 56, 66, 313, 386 and 9336), with nine produced between 2015 and 2020
- One Type 67-2 PKM pattern light machine gun with marking indicating manufacture in factory 36
- Two RPG launchers Type 69-40 火 with marking indicating manufacture in factory 4702
- Three Type 69-3 RPG and one Type 69-40-III round produced between 2002 and 2016
- Four cartridge types with markings indicating manufacture in factories 811, 945 and 9611, the most recent produced in 2015, 2016 and 2017
- Four types of ammunition boxes for 12.7 mm API TYPE 54 with lot numbers (011-17-11, 012-17-11, 111-17-41, 112-17-41)

#### (c) Former German Democratic Republic

- Two MPi-KM 72 assault rifles

## (d) Hungary

- One AK63D assault rifle

## (e) Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

- Five AK pattern assault rifles with markings indicating manufacture in two factories (Izhmash and Tula), produced between 1953 and 1974. One type of ammunition box for 7.62x39 mm ammunition with lot number 28 from 1989 with marking: 7.62 АПС рЖ ф28-89-188 BT 110/89 C 440 шТ

## (f) Unknown origin

- Two AK pattern assault rifles
- Five assault rifles Type AK103 with markings similar to Izhmash (likely imitation)
- One PKM pattern light machine gun with marking indicating manufacture in factory 86

109. The Panel continues to document the markings of recovered items or items captured on the battlefield in order to conduct tracing that could allow for the identification of supply networks. In this regard, the Panel sent letters to Member States, including Bulgaria, China, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Russian Federation and Serbia, requesting their assistance.

110. Bulgaria, the Russian Federation and Serbia replied that their competent authorities confirmed that the M86 pattern machine gun was not manufactured in their respective countries. China informed the Panel that after verification by the Chinese competent authorities, the firearms mentioned in the letter are conventional firearms that are easy to imitate and are used and manufactured in most countries around the world and that it is difficult to determine the source solely based on the markings and gun numbers.

111. The Russian Federation shared the response from its competent authorities stating that the “7.62 mm ПКМ №ПЖ228 machine gun and 7.62 mm АКМ №СН8492, №ЛВ11 assault rifles are not registered among stolen or lost weapons, nor in a database of serial numbers. Assault rifle АКМ №СН8492 could have been manufactured at plants of the Izhmash Group before year 1975 if the marking on the body contains the following: emblem of a manufacturing plant, year of manufacturing (four digits) and 6 sign serial number of the product (two letters of the Russian alphabet and four digits)”. The Russian Federation also informed the Panel that the company “Kalashnikov Concern” which oversees production of Kalashnikov products “does not confirm that the products were manufactured at its plants” and that “Russian competent structures possess no data related to military grade weapons shipped before 2020”. The Panel is still awaiting a reply from Germany.

#### **Continuing lack of access to data on weapons, ammunition and related materiel captured on the battlefield**

112. While the Panel appreciates the access granted to the 75 weapons captured between 2022 and 2023, the Federal Government of Somalia has yet to share information on a significantly higher number of weapons reportedly captured during Somali National Army operations conducted under the first phase of the current Federal Government offensive against Al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle and Galmudug. Based on the Panel’s internal assessment of casualty figures reported by the Federal Government from the first phase of the ongoing offensive, the Federal Government may have in excess of 5,000 weapons and related ammunition formerly belonging to Al-Shabaab members who are now deceased, have been captured or have defected. The Panel therefore reiterates the

importance of receiving access to a significantly higher proportion of recovered weapons and ammunition so as to trace and disrupt illicit supply networks, in cooperation with Somali national authorities. Limited data on captured ammunition was received by the Panel during the current reporting period from Somali security forces or ATMIS.

## D. Illicit flow of weapons and ammunition into Somalia

### Seizure at sea, the case of *Marwan 1*

113. The Panel gathered information indicating that a fishing vessel under the name of *Marwan 1* was intercepted by the USS *Lewis B. Puller*, on 1 December 2022 in the Gulf of Oman. *Marwan 1* was found to be carrying 50 tonnes of ammunition comprising 1,080,000 NATO standard 7.62x54 mm cartridges for light machine guns, 25,000 12.7x99 mm cartridges for sniper rifles, 6,960 M122-K proximity fuses for 122 mm rockets and 870 boxes of strip propellant for rocket-propelled grenades type PG 7.

114. The Panel investigated the case of the interdiction of *Marwan 1* on 1 December 2022 because the dhow was owned and operated by Somali individuals and registered in Somalia. The Panel also investigated the case after receiving excerpts from interviews of the crew that were conducted following the seizure, which indicated that, in August 2022, *Marwan 1* had carried 10 tons of large calibre ammunition and 10 tons of gun powder to the port of Berbera, Somaliland. According to the interview excerpts, the source was told that the ammunition and explosives were delivered to Yemen. *Marwan 1* was initially registered in Thailand as Chaichanachoke 8 in 2013 and then in Djibouti as Alwesam 4. The dhow, with the three successive names has been listed since May 2018 as engaging in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities within the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission area.<sup>120</sup>

115. Together with the Panel of Experts on Yemen, the Panel conducted an inspection of materiel seized from *Marwan 1*, facilitated by the United States Naval Forces. Both Panels requested high-resolution images of seized ammunition, fuses and strip propellant showing the markings and lot numbers on boxes, packing material and cartridge headstamps. High-resolution images of seized weapons were also requested, including close-ups of serial numbers and additional markings, details of fire selectors, grip stocks, front and rear sights, paint and construction material, as well as information on whether internal and external component numbers matched. This information is critical for tracing the origin and year of manufacture of weapons, ammunition and lethal materiel to distil patterns and enable comparisons with armament used by relevant armed groups, including Al-Shabaab and ISIL-Somalia. A reply is still pending.

116. The Panel gathered the following information regarding the crew and the seized weapons (further details are provided in annex 12):

(a) Following the interdiction of *Marwan 1*, the dhow proceeded to Berbera, Somaliland, and has remained there to date;

(b) Mohamed Abdulkadir Mohamoud was arrested and detained in Hargeisa on 25 January 2023 following allegations that his boat was transporting weapons when it was seized by United States forces. He was freed on 6 February 2023 owing to a lack of evidence;

<sup>120</sup> Vessel under serial number 99 of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission list of vessels engaging in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, available at [https://web.archive.org/web/20230707141029/https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/compliance/vessel\\_lists/IUU%20lists/IOTC%20IUU%20Vessels%20List\\_20230525EF.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20230707141029/https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/compliance/vessel_lists/IUU%20lists/IOTC%20IUU%20Vessels%20List_20230525EF.pdf).

(c) Mr. Abdulkadir Mohamoud confirmed to the Panel that the *Marwan I* had made two voyages to Bandar Abbas in the Islamic Republic of Iran to import food commodities to Puntland and that Iranian operatives had taken control of the dhow and loaded the alleged ammunition without his knowledge;

(d) The Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed to the Panel that *Marwan I*, registered in Somalia as a cargo vessel (International Maritime Organization (IMO) No. 196 and Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) No. 1412377),<sup>121</sup> had called twice at the Shahid Bahonar Port of Bandar Abbas and taken cargo containing food products destined for Somalia;

(e) The letter from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Panel “reiterated that the statements made by the detained crew [of the *Marwan I*] lack credibility and have no legal merit”. The letter also stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot verify the claims made by the United States regarding the interdiction of vessels and the authenticity of items seized, it is worth noting that replacing cargo in high seas is well-known modus operandi for smuggling networks, and is a plausible scenario in this case.”

117. The Panel included this case in the present report as the alleged transfer of ammunition in the anchorage area of Berbera, Somaliland which is within the territorial waters of Somalia, is a violation of the arms embargo and *Marwan I* would therefore meet the designation criteria set out in paragraph 43 (b) of resolution 2093 (2013) as having acted in violation of the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and recently confirmed by paragraph 10 of resolution 2662 (2022).

#### **Seizure of military equipment inside Somalia**

118. The Panel recorded two seizures of military equipment in Somalia: (a) the seizure on 25 April 2023 of 60 tactical scopes with mounting rails for AK pattern assault rifles destined for unknown recipients in Egal International Airport, Hargeisa, Somaliland; and (b) the seizure on 18 May 2023 in the port of Mogadishu of a container laden with military equipment allegedly destined for Al-Shabaab.

119. The Panel inspected the two boxes seized in Hargeisa airport from a Norwegian national and found that they contained night-vision goggles, tactical scopes of type Spina Optics f/2.8, with 10x40 magnification, and their associated mounting rails specifically designed for Kalashnikov pattern assault rifles. These items were manufactured in and shipped from China on 8 April 2023 and transited through Dubai, United Arab Emirates on 22 April 2023. Additional details can be found in annexes 13 and 14.

120. The Panel noted from reports by the National Intelligence and Security Agency that the container seized in the port of Mogadishu on 18 May 2023 included tactical scopes, as well as helmets, military uniforms, drones and communication equipment.<sup>122</sup> The container has markings indicating tracking number MSMU8261141 of the Mediterranean Shipping Company. The company’s tracking

<sup>121</sup> The Panel notes that the digits are not accurate, as International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers should have seven digits and Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers should have nine digits, with the three first digits representing a country. See <https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/IHS/Documents/IMO%20Ship%20Number%20&%20Extension%20FAQs.pdf>; and <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/terrestrial/fmd/Pages/mid.aspx>.

<sup>122</sup> National Intelligence and Security Agency Twitter report on seizures 18 May 2023, [https://twitter.com/HSNQ\\_NISA/status/1659210036726607872?s=20](https://twitter.com/HSNQ_NISA/status/1659210036726607872?s=20) and <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/somalia-seizes-military-shipments-bound-for-al-shabaab-4240266>.

website indicates that the container was loaded in Ningbo, China, on 31 March 2023 and delivered to Mogadishu on 11 May 2023. On 27 June 2023, Kenyan media reported that Zakariya Kamal Sufi Abashiekh was charged in Kenya with buying military equipment on behalf of Al-Shabaab from China and shipping the consignment in three containers to Mogadishu with the same description as items included in the above-mentioned container number.<sup>123</sup> The Panel received information that the consignee of the above-mentioned container and five additional ones was Samadon General Trading Company (Ilyaa Ali Mohamud) in Bakara market, Mogadishu.

121. The Panel wrote to China and the United Arab Emirates requesting assistance in tracing the chain of custody of the smuggled military material. China replied to the Panel on 10 July 2023 stating that the tactical scopes and their associated mounting rails and the night-vision goggles are not military aid or military trade equipment, making it difficult to verify transaction information. China also stated that the customs export declaration form of the relevant container does not include weaponry, and that no further information was found.

122. In the Panel's assessment, the scopes with their associated mounting rails specifically designed for AK pattern assault rifles have no other use than to be mounted on those weapons for military use as opposed to commercial or hunting purposes. Weapon sights with night-vision capability were listed in annex A to resolution 2607 (2021), requiring an advance request to the Committee before their supply to Somali security forces, and helmets were listed in annex B to resolution 2607 (2021), requiring an advance notification to the Committee. Annex A to resolution 2662 (2022), which eased the procedural requirement related to the supply of weapons to Somali security forces, no longer includes helmets and refers to weapon sights with a night-vision capability greater than generation 2. The Panel believes that the importation of tactical scopes and helmets for recipients other than Somali security forces is a violation of the arms embargo by the smugglers involved.

## **VI. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance and violations of international humanitarian and human rights law**

123. On 7 August 2023, the Committee approved a new humanitarian expert, who was appointed by the Secretary-General on 17 August (S/2023/613). With this appointment, the Panel will be better positioned in future to provide the Committee with valuable insights on potential obstructions of humanitarian assistance and violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

## **VII. Natural resources**

### **A. Implementation of the charcoal ban**

124. The Panel currently does not have any active investigations into possible violations of the charcoal ban. The Panel has not recorded any illicit export of charcoal from Somalia since January 2022.<sup>124</sup> While the export trade in Somali charcoal is paused, the charcoal stockpiles in Kismayo total approximately 500,000 bags or 12,000 tons of charcoal.

<sup>123</sup> See <https://web.archive.org/web/20230629170702/https://citizen.digital/news/mystery-of-kenyan-man-accused-of-importing-weapons-on-behalf-of-al-shabaab-n322523>.

<sup>124</sup> See S/2019/858, para. 169.

### **Federal Government of Somalia intent to sell remaining, Kismayo-based charcoal stockpile**

125. In resolution 2662 (2022), the Committee noted the need to reduce the size of the charcoal stockpile in and around Kismayo and requested the Federal Government of Somalia to consider submitting a proposal for the one-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles, including a clear plan for ensuring transparency and fiscal accountability during the disposal process, to prevent Al-Shabaab from profiting from the sale.

126. In mid-February 2023, the Federal Government of Somalia started the process of seeking approval from the Committee to sell the remaining charcoal stockpile in Kismayo, citing growing health hazards and recurring community conflict. After the Committee requested additional details from the Federal Government about its disposal plan, the National Security Adviser informed the Committee in early June 2023 that the Federal Government had vetted India-based buyers and transporters for the charcoal. The Panel will remain available to assist the Federal Government throughout this process.

### **B. Confiscation of charcoal by the Sultanate of Oman from MV *Fox***

127. In paragraph 139 of its report for 2022 (S/2022/754), the Panel indicated that it had sent a letter to the Government of the Sultanate of Oman in late July 2022 conveying its readiness to cooperate with Oman regarding Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1 in relation to the seizure of charcoal originating from Somalia aboard the MV *Fox*.<sup>125</sup> In a reply to the Panel, the Government of the Sultanate of Oman confirmed the confiscation of the charcoal and its sale by public auction in the local market, which went to an Omani bidder. The letter indicated that the proceeds from the sale of that charcoal was the property of the Sultanate of Oman.

128. The Panel received information from the owners of the MV *Fox* and the consignee of the charcoal shipment to the effect that neither were aware of the Omani-coordinated public auction. In addition, they informed the Panel that they had paid all expenses related to the MV *Fox*'s time in port. Ultimately, the charcoal was sold to an undisclosed buyer for approximately \$2.6 million dollars, which is less than a third of its market value, which was estimated at \$8.85 million (see annex 15).<sup>126</sup> The Panel shared the alleged receipt of payment for that charcoal with the Government of the Sultanate of Oman and requested clarification regarding the sale process. The Panel also reminded the Government of the Sultanate of Oman of the provisions of Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1, in which the Committee requests that Member States consult with the Committee with respect to the ultimate distribution of the proceeds of such a resale, with a view to ensuring that they are distributing said proceeds in a manner consistent with the objectives of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Federal Government of Somalia, through an official communication of the National Security Adviser to the Government of the Sultanate of Oman, has requested the recovery of the proceeds from the sale of the charcoal.

129. The Panel is of the view that there is no legal basis for the claim that the proceeds of the charcoal are the property of the Sultanate of Oman and that its sale was not conducted with the necessary transparency required within the parameters of Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1. The Panel believes that, as the charcoal

<sup>125</sup> An updated version of Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1 is available at [https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/implementation\\_assistance\\_notice\\_no.1.pdf](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/implementation_assistance_notice_no.1.pdf).

<sup>126</sup> The Panel received information from the Federal Government of Somalia that the price of a bag of charcoal is \$50. MV *Fox* was carrying 177,000 bags (see S/2022/754, annex 21, figure 2).

originated from Somalia, its proceeds should benefit the Somali people. The Panel stands ready to cooperate with the Government of the Sultanate of Oman to support a potential investigation into the matter with a view to taking the necessary steps in coordination with the Committee for the ultimate distribution of the proceeds. Such steps will mitigate the perception of Somalia that the sanctions are having a negative impact on the country, rather than hurting Al-Shabaab.

## VIII. Recommendations

130. The Panel recommends that, in its upcoming resolution on the Somalia sanctions regime, the Security Council:

(a) Include, in its potential renewed sanctions against Al-Shabaab, provisions to the effect that exploiting the Somali coast to smuggle weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive device components through Somalia is a threat to the country's peace and security, and that individuals, entities and vessels involved in such activity may be designated by the Committee and made subject to the targeted measures established in resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#);

(b) Recalling the concern over reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the exclusive economic zone of Somalia, expressed in its resolutions [2607 \(2021\)](#) and [2608 \(2021\)](#), consider fishing by foreign vessels without licences issued by the Federal Government of Somalia as a threat to peace and security and task the Panel to report on this activity with the support of the European Union Naval Force, the Combined Maritime Forces, Somalia and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC);

(c) Include, in its potential renewed sanctions measures against Al-Shabaab, a provision that potential revisions to the arms embargo by the Council should:

(i) Take into consideration the need to maintain effective mechanisms for the documentation and analysis of weapons and ammunition captured from Al-Shabaab and ISIL-Somalia;

(ii) Include notification measures for weapons and ammunition supplied to forces not under the control of the Federal Government of Somalia to curb the proliferation of weapons to non-State actors until a weapons and ammunition management mechanism and security architecture are effectively established at the regional level;

(d) Include language to encourage strategic partners to provide specialized long-term trainings and capacity-building on weapons and ammunition management, including on the tracing and analysis of captured weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive device components.

131. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Send a letter to Ethiopia and Kenya requesting that they facilitate inspections by the Panel of weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive device components captured from Al-Shabaab, so as to trace their origins;

(b) Send a letter to the Federal Government of Somalia recalling paragraph 32 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#) and encouraging Somalia to work with the Panel to identify the steps needed to establish a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab financing;

(c) Send a letter to the Federal Government of Somalia encouraging that it continue to enhance its anti-corruption mechanisms to effectively monitor the misappropriation of public funds, as well as other corruption-related issues, and to

share information with the Panel for the purposes of potential future designations by the Committee;

(d) Encourage Member States and international security partners supplying weapons and ammunition to Somalia to ensure that all details of their shipments, including serial numbers, types and models, year of manufacture, lot/batch numbers, quantities in crate, mode of transport, destined end user and place of storage, are shared with the Committee in line with the requirements of Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2;

(e) Send a letter to the Sultanate of Oman reminding the Government of its obligation under Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1 to consult with the Committee with respect to the ultimate distribution of the proceeds from the auction of the charcoal.

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15	Receipts related to the sale of charcoal confiscated from MV FOX in Salalah, Sultanate of Oman 106

## **Annex 1: Mandate and appointment of the Panel**

The mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (“the Panel”) is contained in paragraph 44 of Security Council resolution 2662 (2022). The Panel’s mandate includes the tasks as set out in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018), which referred to tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012), paragraph 29 of resolution 2444 (2018), and paragraphs 32 and 35 of resolution 2662 (2022) as they relate to Somalia.

In accordance with paragraph 47 of resolution 2662 (2022), the Panel provided the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab with a midterm update on 8 May 2023. The Panel also submitted two thematic reports to the Committee on 5 April and 30 June 2023. The third and fourth thematic reports will be submitted after submission of this report.

Five members of the Panel, which is based in Nairobi, Kenya, were appointed by the Secretary-General in his letter S/2022/981, dated 19 December 2022. The Humanitarian Expert was appointed by the Secretary-General in his letter S/2023/613, dated 17 August 2023, after the completion of this report. During the mandate, the Panel travelled to Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Somalia, Spain, Qatar, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States to conduct meetings with officials and confidential sources. Within Somalia, the Panel travelled to Bossaso, Garowe, Hargeisa, Kismayo, and Mogadishu. The Panel sent 64 official letters to Member States, international organizations, entities, and individuals in relation to its investigations.

Lastly, General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/254 regarding the 16-day advance booking of tickets, has resulted in a Secretariat policy requiring prior notice of 25 calendar days for any Panel travel, with waivers to the rule granted only under exceptional circumstances. Due to the unique nature of the Panel’s work within the UN system, which requires significant flexibility in meeting with existing sources, as well as identifying new ones, satisfying this travel requirement is often challenging.

## Annex 2: Picture of Al-Shabaab Emir Ahmed Diriye from May 2023

Figure 1: Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Diriye (face blurred), aka Abu Ubaidah (SOi.014), with spokesperson Ali Mohamud Rage, aka Ali Dheere (SOi.021), on the far left and senior leader Hassan Yaqub Ali (orange beard) and Suldan Mohamed Suldan (far right) at the consultative forum on issues of jihad in East Africa in May 2023.



الدورة الثانية للاجتماع التشاوري حول قضايا الجهاد في شرق أفريقيا | قاعة أحمد جري للمؤتمرات | [18 - 25] - شوال - 1444هـ

IKA WADATASHIGA ZAAD EE LOOGA ARRINSANAYO JIHAADKA KA SOCDA BARIGA AFRIKA | HOOLKA SHIRARKA EE AXMED GUREY | [08 - 15] - MAY -

Source: <https://web.archive.org/web/20230808165227/https://heemaalnews.com/shirka-al-shabaab-ee-xoraynta-bariga-africa-oo-bayaan-xasaasi-ah-laga-soo-saaraysawirro/>

### Annex 3: Pictures from Al-Shabaab graduation ceremony at Rabi' ibn 'Amr Military Training Camp

Figure 1: Al-Shabaab spokesman Ali Mohamud Rage aka Ali Dheere addressing graduating Al-Shabaab fighters June 2023




Figures 2 and 3: On the left, Suldan Mohamed Suldan, a senior Al-Shabaab and Shura council member, addressing graduating fighters June 2023. On the right, senior religious cleric Mukhtar Mohamed Usman, aka Abu Muslim, addresses graduating fighters June 2023



Figure 4: Picture of Al-Shabaab fighters at graduation ceremony June 2023.



Figure 5: Image of Al-Shabaab “Suicide Fighters Battalion” at the groups Rabi' ibn 'Amr Military Training Camp using captured vehicles.



Source: All pictures available at <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/shabaab-gives-extensive-photo-documentation-for-hundreds-of-graduate-fighters-suicide-attackers.html>

## Annex 4: New Learning Code receivers used for improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab

In annex 16 of the Panel's 2022 final report (S/2022/754), the Panel reported that Al-Shabaab frequently used learning code receivers (LCRs) manufactured by Henan Honest IOT Technology Co. Ltd for its improvised explosive devices. During this reporting period, the Panel inspected three boxes, each containing 120 LCRs, after NISA seized the items at Aden Adde International Airport in late 2022, see figure 1. The boxes were shipped from Guangzhou, China, to Mogadishu, Somalia, on 22 October 2022, see tracking label at figure 2.

Zhejiang Guoshi Electric Company Limited (浙江国始电气有限公司) manufactured these LCRs.<sup>127</sup> NISA informed the Panel that it identified Daacad Electric<sup>128</sup> as the consignee, however, the company never claimed the consignment. The consignment also included handheld radios, see figure 4. The Panel sent a letter to the People's Republic of China requesting support in identifying individuals and entities who financed the purchase and the shipment.

Figure 1: 120 LCRs from one box



Source: Panel

<sup>127</sup> Zhejiang Guoshi Electric Company Limited is registered in Huangyu village, Liushi Town, Yueqing, Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, see figure 3.

<sup>128</sup> The phone number +252 610368125 is associated with Daacad Electric.

Figure 2: Shipping label MGQ0004041, CN No 1166589 of boxes 2 and 3 dated 22 October 2022



Source: Panel

Figure 3: LCR and its remote control and quality control sticker.



Source: Panel

Figure 4: Model of seized handheld radios along with their shipping label



Source: Panel


## Annex 5: Use of 107 mm rockets by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu

In paragraph 84 of its final report (S/2022/754), the Panel reported that Al-Shabaab launched seven 107 mm rockets in Mogadishu on 9 June 2022. During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab used 107 mm rockets twice, targeting Aden Adde International Airport (AAIA) on 25 June 2023 and Villa Somalia on 4 July 2023. In the first attack, the rockets landed in open area along the AAIA beach. The second attack resulted in the rockets impacting a residential house in Mogadishu, killing three and injuring two civilians.

### 107mm used and recovered on 25 June 2023

During the 25 June attack, two additional rockets which were not initiated were recovered by security forces and later destroyed by an explosive ordnance disposal team. The distance between the firing point and the points of impact was 6 kilometres, see figure 1. Al-Shabaab launched the rockets from an open space in a residential area using sandbags to aim the rockets rather than bulkier factory-produced launch tubes, see figure 2. While enabling attackers to better conceal the rockets during transfer and preparation, this launch technique reduces both range and precision. The two recovered rockets had markings and technical characteristics similar to 107mm Fadjr1 incendiary rocket variants manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran, see figure 3. The Panel noted that Al-Shabaab captured 107 mm rockets from the Uganda-operated ATMIS forwarding operating base (FOB) at Bulu Mareer. The Ugandan contingent informed the Panel that their 107 mm rockets are cream coloured with no obliterated markings. The Ugandan contingent confirmed to the Panel that the trucks carrying the 107mm launcher and some of the ammunition captured by Al-Shabaab from Bulu Mareer were subsequently destroyed by international forces, see figure 4. The Panel continues to monitor and investigate the use of 107 mm rockets by Al Shabaab.

Figure 1: Location of firing and impact point on 25 June 2023



Source: Panel based on information provided by ATMIS

Figure 2: 107 mm rockets being fired without launch tubes, using cell phones to electronically initiate the primer in the rocket motor base and sandbags to adjust elevation and direction.



Source: ATMIS

Figure 3: Markings indicating LOT 1100, net weight 19.85kg (consistent with Fajr1 107 mm incendiary rockets) and deliberately obliterated R No (probably rocket number)



Source: ATMIS

Figure 4: Screenshot from the prestrike video of two vehicles transporting illicitly captured weapons from Al-Shabaab's raid on the ATMIS FOB in Bulo Mareer on 26 May 2023. At the request of the FGS, international forces carried out the aerial strike later on the same day to deny Al-Shabaab access to ATMIS military equipment.



Source: ATMIS

## Annex 6: Picture of Fuad Shongole addressing the public during Eid celebrations in June 2023

Figure 1: Fuad Mohamed Khalaf aka Shongole (SOi.005) addressing the public during Eid celebrations in Saakow, Middle Juba, Somalia, in June 2023.



Source: Al-Kataib Media

**Annex 7: Evolution of ISIL-Somalia IED tactics, techniques, and procedures**

**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

**For the Committee only**

## Annex 8: Ammunition used in Las Anod conflict



107 mm rocket with characteristics similar to Chinese manufactured Type 63



Fin stabilized rocket with retractable blade fins with characteristics similar to those of ammunition for 73 mm recoilless SPG 9



Stabilizer for strip propellant in 40 mm PG7 fin stabilized rocket propelled grenade, ammunition code 11-66-76 K indicating manufacture in Bulgaria in 1976



Ammunition boxes marked: 12.7x108 mm and 7.62x54 mm DEFENCE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY CORPORATION, ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA<sup>129</sup>

<sup>129</sup> Ammunition captured by militia from Somaliland base, see [https://twitter.com/THE\\_GEELLE/status/1630296693647261696](https://twitter.com/THE_GEELLE/status/1630296693647261696); 27 February 2023.

## Annex 9: Foreign vessels fishing without, or with suspicious, fishing licenses

### Case of interdiction of Iranian fishing dhows ARSALAN and BALOCHISTAN 20 in Somali waters

On 10 April 2023, Somali military patrol boats interdicted two Iranian dhows – ARSALAN (MMSI 422170425) and BALOCHISTAN 20 (MMSI 422341830) – off the coast of Hobyo, Galmudug, Somalia, and then escorted them to Mogadishu Port. On 16 April, At the port, the Somali Coast Guard detained both crews, including 33 Iranian nationals and three Pakistani nationals, on allegations of illegal fishing.<sup>130</sup> The Panel inspected the two dhows with the cooperation of Somali authorities on 19 April 2023, see appendix 1. The Panel confirmed that the dhows were carrying tuna fish and other species in their holds and gathered the following information:

(a) ARSALAN held a fishing license issued in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as a registration certificate of the dhow and a fishing license issued by the Ministry of Ports and Transport and the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Galmudug, Somalia (see appendix 2).

(b) BALOCHISTAN 20 held a fishing license issued in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as a registration certificate of the dhow and a fishing license issued respectively by the Ministry of Ports and Transport and the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Galmudug, Somalia (see appendix 3).

Both crews maintained that their respective dhows were fishing with licenses issued in Hobyo, Galmudug, Somalia, and that each owner paid a fee of \$11,000, which they transferred via hawala to a Somali individual. The Panel shared the above documents allegedly issued in Somalia with Galmudug authorities who confirmed they were counterfeit.

### Case of suspicious fishing licenses gathered during flag verification

The Panel received additional copies of counterfeit licenses found on board Iranian flagged dhows during flag verification operations conducted by international forces. These licenses appeared valid for 45 days and were reportedly received following payment of \$6,111 (see appendix 4). The Panel shared these documents with Puntland authorities who have yet to confirm if they were issued by their services to Iranian fishing dhows.

The Panel identified two individuals in Somalia and one in a third country who are allegedly involved in facilitating the payment and issuance of the counterfeit documents. The Panel intends to gather more evidence and give them an opportunity of reply before presenting their personal information to the Committee. These individuals could meet the designation criteria.

The Panel sent letters to the Islamic Republic of Iran and requested copies of fishing licenses issued in Somalia to the vessels registered in their countries, as well as information on intermediaries in Somalia facilitating the process. The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Panel that their authorities need more time to gather the information requested.

If each of the 134 Iranian flagged dhows paid \$11,000 to obtain a license, then a total \$1,650,000 would have been paid to unknown networks.

### Case of foreign vessels fishing in Somalia's waters without a license

The Puntland Maritime and Police Forces (PMPF) interdicted two Iranian and nine Yemeni fishing vessels between 14 October 2022 and 25 March 2023, see appendix 5. None of these dhows had a fishing license.

Vessels fishing without licenses usually operate without disclosing their location either by operating with AIS switched off, by using fake AIS codes, or by spoofing their AIS codes. The presence of these vessels usually deploying long fishing nets or longlines over several kilometres could still be identified via their fishing net locators (FNL) using stand-alone AIS.<sup>131</sup> The Panel found several occurrences of transmission of FNL AIS associated with known fishing vessels present Somalia's EEZ, as well as others without known association to vessels. While most of the FNL AIS have the first three digits of their

<sup>130</sup> The regional court of Banadir delivered its ruling on 5 June 2023 and ordered each fisherman to pay a penalty of \$11,000 for illegal fishing in Somali waters (a total of \$396,000), see <https://sonna.so/en/iranian-and-pakistani-fishermen-found-guilty-of-illegal-fishing-in-somali-waters/>. The court had earlier ordered the seizure and sale by auction of 30 tons of fish found on board the dhow. The Banadir Court of Appeal upheld the ruling on 30 July 2023, and increased the penalty to \$12,000 for each fisherman; see <https://twitter.com/SONNALIVE/status/1685944746244542464>.

<sup>131</sup> An analysis of the FNL AIS issue can be found in a dissertation "Influences on navigational safety and environment of the application of new technologies onboard fishing vessels in China: AIS fishing net locator and smart terminal of class B AIS by Yang Zhengni, World Maritime University, Dalian, China; available at [https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1295&context=msem\\_dissertations](https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1295&context=msem_dissertations).

MMSI not associated to any country, eight have an MMSI starting with 208, which is known to be associated with the Vatican State. The Vatican State confirmed to the Panel that those MMSI were not registered by its services and therefore used illegally. The Panel continues to investigate, in cooperation with other stakeholders, to gather information on the identity of the vessels using illegal MMSI to disguise their fishing activity in Somali waters.

**Appendix 1: Case of interdiction of Iranian flagged dhows arrested by FGS**

*Figure 1.1 pictures of ARSALAN fishing boat, NASSER LENG BUILDING, CO SA*



**Source:** Panel

*Figure 1.2: Pictures of BALOCHISTAN fishing boat, ALMANSOOR, CO SA, KUNARAK, IRAN*



**Source:** Panel

*Figure 1.3: Pictures of frozen tuna fish in the hold of ARSALAN*



**Source:** Panel

Appendix 2: Documents gathered from to ARSALAN (MMSI 422170425)

Figure 2.1: Fishing license issued to the dhow as 4/3739 in the Islamic Republic of Iran

زمان پرینت : ۲۰ ۱۲۵ ۱۴۰۱۵ ۱۳:۱۵:۳۸

وزارت جهاد کشاورزی  
سازمان شیلات ایران

از زوجه به آقای مسلمان کشورمان انبار  
دوره تا قضاة ۲۰۰۰ ساعت شوره داری انبار

۱۴۰۱/۱۲/۰۳ تاریخ : ۱۴۴۲۷۱۱۲۸۵  
شماره : ۱۱:۳۴:۴۶ اداره کل شیلات استان

کد شناور	۴/۳۷۳۹
ظرفیت شناور	۱۷۰
شماره پروانه صید	لنج
IOTC No.	لنج <input type="checkbox"/> قایق <input type="checkbox"/>
نوع شناور	در بای عمان <input type="checkbox"/> ۴۲۵
کد صیدگاه	۱۵ گوشگیر سطلج
کد روش صید	روش صید هوور مستقیمی

کد ناخدا	۴۰۱۰۰۱۰۰۳۳۲۹
نام ناخدا	ابراهیم شباب
بیکر	بکر محمد تیناب
عنوان	۳۶۵۱۷۸۰۰۷۴
عنوان	۳۶۵۱۲۹۰۱۰۷
عنوان	۳۶۵۱۱۸۵۶۸۰
عنوان	۳۶۴۰۲۱۶۴۲۳
عنوان	۳۶۴۱۰۱۸۳۴۱
عنوان	عنوان
عنوان	۶۶۹۰۰۲۲۰۹۹

Source: Somali coast guard

Figure 2.2: Certificate of registry issued, on 23 March 2023, to ARSALAN by the Ministry of Ports and Transport of Galmudug, Somalia

Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya  
 Dowlad Goboleedka Galmudug  
 Wasaaradda Dakadaha Iyo  
 Gaadiidka Badda

جمهورية الصومال الفيدرالية  
 حكومة اقليم جلمدج  
 إدارة الموانئ والنقل البحري

Federal Republic of Somalia  
 Galmudug State  
 Ministry of Ports and Marine Transportation

NO :042

CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

This certificate is used by the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transportation

Registry particular      Name of vessel: Arsalaan

Building material : fiber glass

Length	20.00	M
Breadth	04.00	M
Depth	02.50	M
Gross Tonnage	25.00	Tons
Net Tonnage	10.00	Tons
Engine, Towzen	230.00	HP

Nam of owner:

THIS certificate is to kept on boat in original or copy and returned to the HOBYO port harbor master when requested

This certificate is valid for 6 Months

Type of vessel fishing bot

Issued by department of marine Transport

Issued Date: 23/03/2023

Expire Date: 23/09/2023



Ministry of Ports and Marine Transportation, Galmudug State of Somalia      Tell: +252(0)25243011 (1/W)

Source: Dhow's owner

Figure 2.3: Fishing license issued, on 23 March 2023, to ARSALAN by the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Resources of Galmudug, Somalia

**GALMUDUG STATE OF SOMALIA**  
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources

Date of issue: 23/03/2023  
This license is issued under the provisions of the Galmudug State Fisheries Law NO 005 of 30th June, 2021 to fishing Vessel whose details specified herein below to carry out fishing activities within the EEZ

DURATION OF VALIDITY: 45 days starting from the issued date

**VESSEL DETAILS**

Vessel Name: Arsalan	Flag State: Iran
Vessel T: Fishing Dhow	Fish hold capacity: 35T
Country of Registry: Iran	LOA/width/Draft:
Port of Re istr: Chabahar	Official No:
GRT/NRT: 120/35T	
Engine type and Power: Yanmar 6696.456KW	
Other craft on board:	

**LICENCE DETAILS**

Owner's Name: Moslem shabaab	Address: Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran
Head Office:	Telephone:
	E-mail:
Agent in Somalia: Ahmed Afrah Ali	Address: Hoby, Galmudug state
Telephone: +252615273803	Receipt No: 1041
Mail:	

**FISHING AREAS & TARGET SPECIES**

Species permitted: Tuna and like	Designated fishing areas: beyond 24 NM of Galmudug fishin water
Quantities Permitted: 35T	Fishin methods and gear:

**Conditions:**

1. This license is Not Transferable.
2. The owner is required to strictly abide the above mentioned Galmudug fisheries law

Approved and Signed by the Director General

*(Signature)*

*(Stamp: GOROLEED, GALMUDUG STATE, MARINE TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT)*

Source: Dhow's owner

## Appendix 3 Documents found on BALOCHISTAN 20 (MMSI 422341830)

Figure 3.1: Certificate of registry issued to the dhow as 4/3894 in Chabahar in the Islamic Republic of Iran

جمهوری اسلامی ایران  
وزارت راه و شهرسازی  
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN  
MINISTRY OF ROADS & URBAN DEVELOPMENT

سازمان بنادر و دریانوردی  
PORTS & MARITIME ORGANIZATION

ALLOWED NAVIGATION AREA:  
INDIAN OCEAN TUNA COMMISSION

گواهی نامه ثبت  
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

طبقه ریهجاز دریانوردی :  
لنگه کمسیون تون ماهیان الهانوس هند

علامت خطاب Call Sign	شماره ایلو Imo No.	شماره و تاریخ ثبت No. & Date Of Registry	بنادر ثبت Port Of Registry	نام کشتی Name Of Vessel
NIL	NIL	ندارد 4/3894 - 06/02/2008	چابهار CHABAHAR	۲۳۸ 4/3894
تحت کلاس Classed by	محل ساخت Place Of Built	سال ساخت Year Of Built	نوع کشتی Type Of Vessel	
موسسه رده بندی ایرانیان IRANIAN CLASSIFICATION SOCIETY (ICS)	ایران IRAN	۱۳۸۶ 2007	FISHING DHOW	
شماره و تاریخ و بندر ثبت قبلی (در صورت وجود) Previous No., Date & Port Of Registry			نام و آدرس سازنده Name & Address Of Manufacturer	
ندارد NIL			ساری منور - ایران - سیستان و بلوچستان MANSOUR CO. - Sistan and Baluchestan - IRAN	
مشخصات بدنه و ظرفیت ثبت شده				
Registered Dimension , Tonnage & Hull Particulars				
تعداد دکل و جرثقیل No. of Mast(s) & Crane(s)	تعداد عرشه No. of Decks	نوع سینه Type of Bow	نوع پاشنه Type of Stern	جنس بدنه Hull Material
ندارد NIL	۱	ندارد NIL	ندارد NIL	فایبرگلاس FIBERGLASS
ظرفیت ناخالص GT	ظرفیت خالص NT	طول سراسری (متر) Lenght Overall (m)	عرض میانی (متر) Moulded Breadth (m)	مق (متر) Moulded Depth (m)
۱۰۲	۳۱	۲۹.۴۰ متر 29.40 m	۷.۲۰ متر 7.20 m	۳.۵۰ متر 3.50 m
مشخصات موتورهای اصلی				
Particulars of main Engines				
حداکثر سرعت Max. Speed	قدرت موتورها BHP (KW)	تعداد موتورها و سیلندرها No. of Eng & Cyl	نوع موتورهای اصلی Type of Main Engines	
۰ کت 0 KNOT	۴۷۸.۷۴۰ کیلو وات 478.740 KW	۱ موتور و ۶ سیلندر 1 ENG(s) & 6 CYL(s)	میتسوبشی MITSUBISHI	
نام و نشانی سازنده Name & Address Of Manufacturer		محل ساخت Place Of Built	سال ساخت Year Of Built	تعداد پروانه No. of Propeller(s)
میتسوبشی - ژاپن MITSUBISHI - JAPAN		ژاپن JAPAN	ندارد NIL	۱
مشخصات مالک (مالکین)				
Particulars of owner(s)				
میزان سهام Rate of Shares	نشانی و آقامتگاه Address & Domicile		تابعیت Nationally	نام مالک (مالکین) Name of Owner(s)
۱۰۰ درصد 100 %	ایران - کنارک - خیابان ساحلی - منزل شخصی - KONARAK - IRAN		ایرانی IRANIAN	محمدحسین افروز MOHAMMADHANIF AFROUZ
محل صدور Place Of Issue	تاریخ صدور Date Of Issue	نام و سمت مقام مسئول Name & Position of Authority		
چابهار - ایران CHABAHAR - IRAN	۰۳/۱۲/۲۰۱۸ 03/12/2018	بهروز آقایی مدیر کل بنادر و دریانوردی استان سیستان و بلوچستان BEHROUZ AGHAEI General Port Director Of Chabahar		

Source: Somali coast guard

Figure 3.2: Fishing license issued to the dhow as 4/3894 in the Islamic Republic of Iran



وزارت جهاد کشاورزی  
سازمان شیلات ایران

تاریخ: ۵۱۴۲۴۲۱۲۵۲۰  
شماره: ۱۲:۵۷:۵۹

اداره کل شیلات استان

<p>کد شناور: ۴/۳۸۹۴ ۱۰۳</p> <p>ظرفیت شناور: ... شماره بهای صید: ... IOTC No. ... نوع شناور: ۴۲۵ <input type="checkbox"/> لنج <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> قایق دریای عمان</p> <p>کد صیدگاه: ۱۵ کد روش صید: ... کد نوع صید: ... مقدار ادوات مصرفی: ... مدت اعتبار از تاریخ لغایت: ... بندر صیادی: ...</p> <p>تلاش صید: ... روز</p>	<p>کد شناور: ۴۱۶۰۴۰۰۱۴۷۱ نام ناخدا: محمد شهسواری</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>نام ناخدا</td> <td>محمد شهسواری</td> </tr> <tr> <td>فارقیت شناور</td> <td>۳۴۴۰۱۶۶۵۶۶ ملوان</td> </tr> <tr> <td>امین شهسواری</td> <td>۳۴۴۰۵۳۸۵۴۴ ملوان</td> </tr> <tr> <td>سلیمان بازار خاک</td> <td>۳۴۴۰۸۸۸۳۴۰ ملوان</td> </tr> <tr> <td>جاسم شهسواری</td> <td>۳۴۴۰۸۲۹۲۵۵ ملوان</td> </tr> <tr> <td>فرهاد بلوچ</td> <td>۳۴۴۰۸۳۴۴۶۱ ملوان</td> </tr> <tr> <td>حسین در زاده</td> <td>۵۲۵۰۲۵۲۷۴۵ ملوان</td> </tr> <tr> <td>نویید شهسواری</td> <td>۳۴۴۰۳۴۳۳۳۶ ملوان</td> </tr> <tr> <td>رشتول بخش بلوچی</td> <td>۵۲۵۹۸۹۸۳۵۴ ملوان</td> </tr> </table> <p>۹- ناصر توپانزی ۱۰- عین و مراد ۱۱- ... ۱۲- ... ۱۳- ... ۱۴- ... ۱۵- ... ۱۶- ... ۱۷- ... ۱۸- ... ۱۹- ۹ ۲۰- ... ۲۱- ... ۲۲- ... ۲۳- ... ۲۴- ... ۲۵- ...</p>	نام ناخدا	محمد شهسواری	فارقیت شناور	۳۴۴۰۱۶۶۵۶۶ ملوان	امین شهسواری	۳۴۴۰۵۳۸۵۴۴ ملوان	سلیمان بازار خاک	۳۴۴۰۸۸۸۳۴۰ ملوان	جاسم شهسواری	۳۴۴۰۸۲۹۲۵۵ ملوان	فرهاد بلوچ	۳۴۴۰۸۳۴۴۶۱ ملوان	حسین در زاده	۵۲۵۰۲۵۲۷۴۵ ملوان	نویید شهسواری	۳۴۴۰۳۴۳۳۳۶ ملوان	رشتول بخش بلوچی	۵۲۵۹۸۹۸۳۵۴ ملوان
نام ناخدا	محمد شهسواری																		
فارقیت شناور	۳۴۴۰۱۶۶۵۶۶ ملوان																		
امین شهسواری	۳۴۴۰۵۳۸۵۴۴ ملوان																		
سلیمان بازار خاک	۳۴۴۰۸۸۸۳۴۰ ملوان																		
جاسم شهسواری	۳۴۴۰۸۲۹۲۵۵ ملوان																		
فرهاد بلوچ	۳۴۴۰۸۳۴۴۶۱ ملوان																		
حسین در زاده	۵۲۵۰۲۵۲۷۴۵ ملوان																		
نویید شهسواری	۳۴۴۰۳۴۳۳۳۶ ملوان																		
رشتول بخش بلوچی	۵۲۵۹۸۹۸۳۵۴ ملوان																		

**توضیحات**

- تجاوز از محدوده فوق تخطی از قوانین صید و دستورات بهتر شیلات محسوب گردیده و موجب تعقیب متخلف طبق قانون خواهد بود.
- از کلیه مامورین انتظامی خواششمند است همکاری های لازم را مبذول فرمایند.

هفتاد و پنج روز تلاش صید دارد

Source: Somali coast guard

Figure 3.3: Certificate of registry issued, on 23 March 2023, to BULUSHITAAN by the Ministry of Ports and Transport of Galmudug, Somalia

Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya  
Dowlad Goboleedka Galmudug  
Wasaaradda Dakadaha iyo  
Gaadiidka Badda

جمهورية الصومال الفيدرالية  
حكومة اقليم جلمدج  
وزارة الموانئ والنقل البحري

Federal Republic of Somalia  
Galmudug State  
Ministry of Ports and Marine Transportation

B:NO :043

CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

This certificate is used by the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transportation

Registry particular      Name of vessel: Bulushitaan

Building material : fiber glass

Length	20.00	M
Breadth	04.00	M
Depth	02.50	M
Gross Tonnage	25.00	Tons
Net Tonnage	10.00	Tons
Engine, Towzen	230.00	HP

Nam of owner:

THIS certificate is to kept on boat in original or copy and returned to the HOBYO port harbor master when requested

This certificate is valid for 6 Months

Type of vessel fishing bot

Issued by department of marine Transport

Issued Date: 23/03/2023

Expire Date: 23/09/2023

Ministry of Ports and Marine Transportation, Galmudug State of Somalia      Tell: +252615885011/WhatsApp



Source: Dhow's owner

Figure 3.4: Fishing license issued, on 23 March 2023, to BULUSHITAAN by the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Resources of Galmudug, Somalia




License No:  
23/3MAR23

Receipt No:  
1042



## GALMUDUG STATE OF SOMALIA

Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources

### FISHING LICENCE

Date of Issue: 23/03/2023

This license is issued under the provisions of the Galmudug State Fisheries Law NO.005 of 30th June, 2021 to fishing Vessel whose details specified herein below to carry out fishing activities within the EEZ

DURATION OF VALIDITY	45 days starting from the issued date
----------------------	---------------------------------------

### VESSEL DETAILS

Vessel Name: <b>Bulushitaan</b>	
Vessel T: <b>Fishing Dhow</b>	
Country of Registry: <b>Iran</b>	Flag State: <b>Iran</b>
Port of Register: <b>Chabahar</b>	Fish hold capacity: <b>31T</b>
GRT/NRT: <b>103/31T</b>	LOA/width/Draft:
Engine type and Power: <b>Mitsubishi 478.740KW</b>	Official No:
Other craft on board:	

### LICENCE DETAILS

Owner's Name: <b>Moslem shabaab</b>	Address: <b>Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran</b>
Head Office:	Telephone:
Fax:	E-mail:
Agent in Somalia: <b>Ahmed Afrah Ali</b>	Address: <b>Hobyu, Galmudug state</b>
Telephone: <b>+252615273803</b>	Receipt No: <b>1042</b>
E-mail:	

### FISHING AREAS & TARGET SPECIES

Species permitted: <b>Tuna and like species</b>	Designated fishing areas: <b>beyond 24 NM of Galmudug fishin water</b>
Quantities Permitted: <b>31T</b>	Fishin methods and gear:

**Special Conditions:**

- This license is Not Transferable.
- The owner is required to strictly abide the above mentioned Galmudug fisheries law

.Approved and Signed by the Director General: *Abdirahman Ali*




OT ON MI NOTE 10

Source: Dhow's owner

**Appendix 4: Suspicious fishing licenses gathered during flag verification**

Figure 4.1: Fishing license allegedly issued by Puntland to Iranian dhow Al Sudais (MMSI 422348151), 1 November 2022




Source: Flag verification by a Member State.



**Appendix 5: Fishing dhow interdicted by PMPF between 14 October 2022 and 25 March 2023**

*Figure 4.1: Location of interdiction*



*Figure 4.2: Iranian fishing dhows arrested by PMPF*

<p>Date of arrest: 14 March 2023  <b>AL HASHIMI</b>                  Crew: 13 Iranian</p>	
<p>Date of arrest: 19 March 2023  <b>AL AZIIZ</b>                  Crew: 21 Iranian</p>	

Figure 4.3: Yemeni fishing dhows arrested by PMPF

<p>Date of arrest: 14 October 2022  <b>SALIM</b>  Crew: 8 Yemeni, 3 Somali</p>	
<p>Date of arrest: 17 November 2022  <b>DURA</b>  Crew: 13 Yemeni, 2 Somali</p>	
<p>Date of arrest: 6 March 2023  <b>ALHAKIM</b>  Crew: 22 Yemeni</p>	
<p>Date of arrest: 14 March 2023  <b>AL-MABRUUK</b>  Crew: 8 Yemeni and four Somali  <b>IBNU JAWAS</b>  Crew: 16 Yemeni and one Somali  <b>AL AZHAR</b>  Crew: 16 Yemeni and one Somali</p>	
<p>Date of arrest: 19 March 2023  <b>AL AWAD</b>  Crew: 35 Yemeni and five Somali</p>	
<p>Date of arrest: 25 March 2023  <b>AL MURAD</b>  Crew: 18 Yemeni 7 Somali</p>	
<p>Date of arrest: 25 March 2023  <b>SUNDUS</b>  Crew: 14 Yemeni</p>	

Source: PMPF

**Annex 10: Weapons and ammunition delivered to Somalia during the reporting period**

**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

**For the Committee only**

## **Annex 11: Identification of weapons and ammunition captured from Al-Shabaab**

During the reporting period, the Office of the National Security Advisor facilitated three inspections by the Panel of weapons captured from Al-Shabaab. In April 2023, the Panel inspected weapons captured by the Somali National Army during their operations in Jubaland and Galmudug. In August 2023, the Panel inspected weapons and ammunition captured by the Somali National Army and Jubaland forces, as well as weapons and ammunition captured by National Intelligence and Security Agency and the Somali Police Force. The Panel includes in table 1 the list of weapons captured during the previous and the current reporting period, which constitutes a database showing the weapons used by Al-Shabaab. Table 2, 3 and 4 include pictures of markings and identified manufacturers and countries of origin. Appendix 1 includes markings on ammunition boxes captured from Al-Shabaab

**Table 1. List of markings of captured weapons identified during the previous and the current reporting periods<sup>132</sup> (current reporting period in bold font)**

<b>Ser</b>	<b>Date capture</b>	<b>number</b>	<b>Marking</b>	<b>Serial number</b>	<b>Variation</b>	<b>Closest serial number</b>	<b>FGS marking</b>	<b>Total donated</b>	<b>Beneficiary units</b>	<b>Year of donation</b>	<b>Donor country</b>
1	Apr 22	1		6884	0	6884	SO-XDS-2017	1600	SNA	2017	Djibouti
2	Jan 22	1		58201808	0	58201808	SO-XDS 2015		SNA		
3	2019	1		18110	0	18110		3000	SNA	2014	UAE
4	Oct 21	1	56-2	404803	0	404803			SNA	2013	Ethiopia
5	2022	1		12967	1	12966		6000	SNA	2017	China
6	Mar 21	1		69549	4	69545		6000	SNA	2017	China
7	Sep 19	1		411212	5	411207			SNA	2013	Ethiopia
8	2019	1		2865	6	2859		200	PSF	2013	Yemen
9	2019	1		48014325	7	48014332		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
10	Nov 21	1		60013158	36	60013194	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
11	Sep 19	1		60006094	76	60006170	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
12	2019	1	AB	3054	170	AB 3224		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
13	Oct 21	1		60012023	247	60012270	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
14	Feb 21	1	56-1	17104861	4500	17109361		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
15	Mar 22	1		61129414	312	61129726					
16	2019	1	UPDF 56	5403264							
17	2019	1		167553							
18	2019	1	ry	2522							
19	2019	1	BP	2916							
20	2019	1	IC	12052							
21	2019	1	EB	4093							
22	2019	1	V	2299							
23	2019	1		502							
24	2019	1	AX	2546							
25	2019	1	83LC	7406							
26	2019	1	00	2299							
27	2019	1	00	5372							



<sup>132</sup> See annex 7 of (S/2022/754).

Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
28	2019	1	FMP	133650							
29	2019	1		36038858							
30	2019	9		No marking							
31	Sep 19	1	PM	1451							
32	Sep 19	1	S-AY	1512							
33	Sep-19	1	TFG AMG	4384							
34	Sep 19	1		No marking							
35	May 20	1	G3 C	56421							
36	May 20	1		372624							
37	May 20	1		636093							
38	May 20	1	G3 A3	6050185							
39	May 20	1	G3-	ry-rryns D							
40	Mar 21	1	D	17403							
41	May 21	1	56-2	722634							
42	Jun 21	1		7260306							
43	Oct 21	1	56-1	62779							
44	Nov 21	1		15005828							
45	Nov 21	1	386 56	3526021							
46	Dec 21	1		3463							
47	Mar 22	1		63071650							
48	Apr 22	1	M70B1	1984							
49	Apr 22	1		110992							
50	Apr 22	1		384801							
51	Apr 22	1		431596							
52	Apr 22	1	M70B1	431712							
53	Apr 22	1	56	626685							
54	Apr 22	1	EM	1701146							
55	Apr 22	1		66769998							
56	Apr 22	1	1955								
<b>57</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>2717018</b>							


Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
58	2023	1	26	30005215							
59	2023	1	26	60000469							
60	2023	1	26	60003785							
61	2023	1	26	60009383							
62	2023	1	26	60014293							
63	2023	1	26	60014768							
64	2023	1	26	60053925							
65	2023	1	26	62103507							
66	2023	1	26	62131917							
67	2023	1	26	62143358							
68	2023	1	26	62163358							
69	2023	1	26	63025371							
70	2023	1	26	63041894							
71	2023	1	26	63061631							
72	2023	1	26	64030876							
73	2023	1	26	65009915							
74	2023	1	56	36008966			XSH 30642 240697047				
75	2023	1	66	12094597							
76	2023	1	66	17189034							
77	2023	1	66	18120250							
78	2023	1	66	20039297							
79	2023	1	66	4107466			SO XDS 2017				
80	2023	1	66	4110326			SO XDS - 2017				
81	2023	1	66	4139867			SO XDS 2017				
82	2023	1	66	4040914			SO-XDS-2017				
83	2023	1	66	5029729			SO-XDS-2017				
84	2023	1	313	5217326							
85	2023	1	313	5548397							
86	2023	1	313	3503591							

Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
87	2023	1	386	2853526							
88	2023	1	386	3501479							
89	2023	1	386	3503037							
90	2023	1	386	3510009							
91	2023	1	9336	409017			240697048				
92	2023	1	9336	412912							
93	2023	1	36	243149							
94	2023	1	73 BM	2790							
95	2023	1	БР	43102			240697069				
96	2023	1	1953п ХГ	4193							
97	2023	1	46 ИС	3523							
98	2023	1	1963 EB	4950							
99	2023	1	1964 CH	8492							
100	2023	1	1970	LB11							
101	2023	1	1974 BP	6355							
102	2023	1	AK 103	15005618			SHQK 197034				
103	2023	1	AK 103	15007264			SHQK 197023				
104	2023	1	AK 103	15007649			SHQK 197025				
105	2023	1	AK 103	15008420			SHQK 197033				
106	2023	1	AK 103	15008846			SHQK 197027				
107	2023	1	78 GC	5190							
108	2023	1		744340							
109	2023	1	CF M86	272929							

**Table 2: Markings of small arms captured from Al-Shabaab during the reporting period**


Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
1	Type 56 26 2717018	26/China		
2	Type 56-1 26 30005215	26/China		
3	Type 56-1 26 CN 60000469	26/China		
4	Type 56-1 26 CN 60003785	26/China		
5	Type 56-1 26 CN 60009383	26/China		
6	Type 56-1 26 CN 60014293	26/China		
7	Type 56-1 26 CN 60014768	26/China		

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
8	Type 56-1 26 15 CN 60053925	26/China (2015)	2015	
9	Type 56-1 26 17 CN 62103507	26/China (2017)		
10	Type 56-1 26 17 CN 62131917	26/China (2017)		
11	Type 56-1 26 17 CN 62143358	26/China (2017)		
12	Type 56-1 26 17 CN 62163358	26/China (2017)		
13	Type 56-1 26 18 CN 63025371	26/China (2018)		
14	Type 56-1 26 18 CN 63041894	26/China (2018)		

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
15	Type 56-1 26 18 CN 63061631	26/China (2018)		
16	Type 56-1 26 19 CN 64030876	26/China (2019)		
17	Type 56-1 26 20 CN 65009915	26/China (2020)		
18	Type 56-1 56 36008966	56/China	XSH 30642  240697047	
19	56-1 式 66 12094597	66/China		

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
20	56-1 式 66 17189034	66/China		
21	56-1 式 66 18120250	66/China		
22	Type 56-1 66 20039297	66/China		
23	Type 56-2 66 4107466	66/China	SO XDS 2017	
24	Type 56-2 66 4110326	66/China	SO XDS - 2017	

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
25	Type 56-2 66 4139867	66/China	2017	
26	Type 56-2 66 4040914	66/China	SO-XDS-2017	
27	Type 56-2 66 5029729	66/China	SO-XDS-2017	
28	Type 56-1 313 5217326	313/China		
29	Type 56-1 313 5548397	313/China		

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
30	Type 56-2 313 3503591	313/China		
31	Type 56 386 2853526	386/China		
32	Type 56 386 3501479	386/China		
33	Type 56 386 3503037	386/China		
34	Type 56 386 3510009	386/China		
35	Type 56-2 9336 409017	9336/China	240697048	
36	Type 56-2 9336 412912	9336/China		
37	Type 67-2 36 243149	36/China		

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
				
38	MPi-KM-72 73 BM 2790	VEB/ German Democratic Republic (1973)		
39	MPi-KM-72 78 GC 5190	VEB/ German Democratic Republic (1978)		
40	AK63D BR 43102	Hungary	240697069	
41	1953и XГ4193	Izhmash/ USSR (1953)		
42	1960 AP6746 ИС3523	Izhmash/ USSR (1960)		

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
43	1963 EB4950	Tula/ USSR (1963)		
44	1964 CH8492	Izhmash/ USSR (1964)		
45	1970 LB11	Tula/ USSR (1970)		
46	1974 BP6355	Tula/ USSR (1974)		
47	AK 103 ↑ 7.62x39 15005618	Likely imitation Izhmash	SHQK 197034	
48	AK 103 ↑ 7.62x39 15007264	Likely imitation Izhmash	SHQK 197023	

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
				
49	AK 103 ↑ 7.62x39 15007649	Likely imitation Izhmash	SHQK 197025	
50	AK 103 ↑ 7.62x39 15008420	Likely imitation Izhmash	SHQK 197033	
51	AK 103 ↑ 7.62x39 15008846	Likely imitation Izhmash	SHQK 197027	
52	MPi-KM-72 78 GC 5190	VEB/ German Democratic Republic (1978)		
53	744340	Unknown		

Serial	Markings	Factory /Country (year)	SNA markings	Picture showing the markings
54	M86 CF M86 272929	Unknown		

Source: Panel

Table 3: RPG launcher and RPG rounds captured from Al-Shabaab

Ser.	Markings	Items
1	<b>RPG lancer</b>  69-40 火 50246 4702	
2	<b>RPG lancer</b>  69-40 火 720346 4702	
3	<b>RPG round</b> <b>69-3</b> <b>HEAT</b> <b>1F-08-9373</b>	
4	<b>RPG round</b> <b>69-3</b> <b>HEAT</b> <b>3F-02-9373</b>	
5	<b>RPG round</b> <b>69-3</b> <b>HEAT</b> <b>3F-07-9373</b>	
6	<b>RPG round</b> <b>69-40-III</b> <b>HEAT</b> <b>JH-2</b>	

Source: Panel

Table 4: Headstamps of 7.62×54mm ammunition captured from Al-Shabaab

 A circular brass ammunition headstamp with a central primer. The numbers "9611" are stamped at the top and "78" at the bottom. The surface shows some greenish corrosion.	 A circular brass ammunition headstamp with a central primer. The numbers "811" are stamped at the top and "15" at the bottom. The surface is heavily corroded with blue-green patina.
9611 78 (year 1978)	811 15 (year 2015)
 A circular brass ammunition headstamp with a central primer. The numbers "945" are stamped at the top and "16" at the bottom. The surface is heavily corroded with blue-green patina.	 A circular brass ammunition headstamp with a central primer. The numbers "945" are stamped at the top and "17" at the bottom. The surface is heavily corroded with blue-green patina.
945 16 (year 2016)	945 16 (year 2017)

Source: Panel

**Appendix 1: Ammunition boxes captured from Al-Shabaab**

Figure 1: 12.7x108mm Armoured Piercing Incendiary (API) with marking: 12.7 API TYPE54 85 ROUNDS 4/7 32/16-25 111-17-41 (with characteristics similar to ammunition produced in China for Type54 weapons)



Figure 2: 12.7x108mm Armoured Piercing Incendiary (API) with marking: 12.7 API TYPE54 88 ROUNDS 4/7 32/16-25 112-17-41 (with characteristics similar to ammunition produced in China for Type54 weapons)



Figure 3: 12.7x108mm Armoured Piercing Incendiary (API) with marking: 12.7 API TYPE54 85ROUNDS 4/7 26-17-25 011-17-11 (with characteristics similar to ammunition produced in China for Type54 weapons)



Figure 4: 12.7x108mm Armoured Piercing Incendiary (API) with marking: 12.7 API TYPE54 85ROUNDS 4/7 26-17-25 012-17-11 (with characteristics similar to ammunition produced in China for Type54 weapons)



Figure 5: 7.62x54mm Full Metal Jacket rounds with characteristics similar to ammunition produced in Bulgaria from 2018 with marking: 7.62x54mm FMJ/LC LOT#T 02-18 SSN F-55 05/18 440 PCS ((10))



Figure 6: 7.62x39mm Full Metal Jacket rounds with characteristics similar to ammunition produced in Bulgaria from 2018 with marking: 7.62x39mm FMJ/SC LOT#A 10-18 SSN F-50 26/17 700 PCS ((10))




Figure 7: 7.62x39mm 'mild steel bullet, steel case, Lot number 28, 1989 year of manufacture, 188 manufacturer code with characteristics similar to ammunition produced in former USSR from 1989, 440 pieces with marking: 7,62 АПС гЖ ф28-89-188 BT 110/89 C 440 шт.



Source: Panel

## Annex 12: Smuggling of weapons and ammunition by the fishing dhow MARWAN 1 registered in Somalia


### Facts on the seizure of ammunition from MARWAN 1

The Panel noted reports by the United States 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet that on 1 December 2022, the USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3) interdicted a dhow, MARWAN 1, with a Somali flag (see picture at figure 1).<sup>133</sup> The Panel found that the MARWAN 1 had a suspicious route from an unidentified origin during that period, see figure 2.

Figure 1: Pictures of MARWAN 1 (left by US Fleet and right for registering the dhow by the FGS Ministry of ports and transport



Figure 2: Unknown origin and route of the MARWAN 1 with AIS off before 30 November 2022




Source: Panel using <https://maritime.ihs.com>

The United States confirmed to the Panel that their forces seized 50.5 tons of ammunition and related items from the MARWAN 1. The cargo seized includes 6960 M122-K proximity fuses; 870 boxes of PG 7 strip propellant; 25,000 rounds of 12.7x99 mm sniper ammunition; and 1,080,000 cartridges of 7.62x54 mm ammunition, see figure 3.

<sup>133</sup> <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3235314/us-seizes-11-million-rounds-of-ammunition-other-illegal-weapons-in-gulf-of-oman/>.

<sup>134</sup> <https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Photo-Gallery/igphoto/2003125091/>.

Figure 3: Ammunition and related items seized from MARWAN 1 on 1 December 2022



Source: USA

The Panel received excerpts from interviews of the crew stating that the MARWAN 1 had cargo consisting of 10 tons of large calibre ammunition and 10 tons of gun powder which were delivered in August 2022, in the anchorage area of the port of Berbera, Somaliland to a fast boat for transport to an undisclosed destination.

The Panel contacted the Mr. Mohamed Abdulkadir Mohamoud, the operator of MARWAN 1, for an opportunity of review. He stated in his reply that the Captain of the MARWAN 1 informed him that an unknown Iranian team took control of the loading process in Bandar Abbas and that the intended destination of the ammunition was not Somalia.

The Panel shared information with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the two alleged smuggling cases by the MARWAN 1, as well as the claim that the Iranian Government officials took control of the dhow during the loading of the ammunition. The Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed to the Panel that MARWAN 1, registered in Somalia as a cargo vessel (IMO 196 and MMSI 1412377)<sup>135</sup> called twice at the Shahid Bahonar Port of Bandar Abbas and took cargo containing food products destined for Somalia, in the second half of 2022. The dhow departed the port on 28 July and 22 November 2022 respectively. The letter from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Panel “reiterated that the statements made by the detained crew [of the MARWAN 1] lack credibility and have no legal merit” It also stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot verify the claims made by the United States regarding the interdiction of vessels and the authenticity of items seized, it is worth noting that replacing cargo in high seas is well-known modus operandi for smuggling networks, and is a plausible scenario in this case.”

### Information on MARWAN 1

MARWAN 1 was initially registered in Thailand as CHAICHANACHOKE 8 in 2013 and then in Djibouti as ALWESAM 4. This dhow, which has been registered under three different names, has been listed since May 2018 as engaging in Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) area.<sup>136</sup> The Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport of the FGS issued a certificate of registry to MARWAN 1 valid from 11 January 2021 to 10 January 2022 with the owner as SOMLINK Fisheries Investment Company, which has an address in Bossaso, see appendices 4 to 6.

<sup>135</sup> The Panel notes that digits are not accurate as the IMO has seven digits and MMSI has nine digits with the three first digits representing a country see <https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/IHS/Documents/IMO%20Ship%20Number%20&%20Extension%20FAQs.pdf>; and <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/terrestrial/fmd/Pages/mid.aspx>.

<sup>136</sup> Vessel under serial 99 of IOTC IUU list which may be downloaded at [https://web.archive.org/web/20230707141029/https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/compliance/vessel\\_lists/IUU%20lists/IOTC%20IUU%20Vessels%20List\\_20230525EF.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20230707141029/https://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/compliance/vessel_lists/IUU%20lists/IOTC%20IUU%20Vessels%20List_20230525EF.pdf)

During the voyage in August 2022, the crew of MARWAN 1 was composed of one Captain from Pakistan, one engineer from Kenya and five Somalis. The same crew was on the voyage in November 2022 in addition to six other individuals, see appendix 7. Confidential appendix 8 includes pictures of the 13 crewmembers on board MARWAN 1 during the interdiction on 1 December 2022. The Panel sent a letter to Pakistan and to the operator requesting them to facilitate an interaction with the captain, to offer him an opportunity of review. Pakistan has yet to reply to the Panel's letter on the subject.

**Analysis of the violation**

The Panel included this case in this report as the alleged transfer in August 2022 of ammunition in the anchorage area of Berbera, Somaliland within the territorial waters of Somalia is a violation of the arms embargo and MARWAN 1 would meet the designation criteria elaborated recently confirmed by paragraph 11 of resolution 2262(2022) as “having acted in violation of the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), further elaborated upon by paragraph 26 of resolution 2044 (2002) and paragraph 34 (b) of resolution 2093 (2013).”

## Appendix 1: List of 13 crewmembers MARWAN 1 dated 23 November 2022 (1/9/1401 of the Persian calendar)

فهرست خدمه  
IMO CREW LIST

Page no. شماره صفحه  
1

Arrival ورود  Departure خروج

1-1. Name of ship نام کشتی 1-2. IMO Number شماره ایمر 1-3. Call of sign علامت خطی

2-Port of arrival/departure بندر ورود/خروج بندر عباس - سومالی

3-Date of arrival/departure تاریخ ورود/خروج ۱۴۰۱/۹/۱

4-Flag state of ship کشور صاحب پرچم سومالی

5-Last port of Call آخرین بندر سومالی

6-Nature and no. of Identity document (seamens passport) نوع و شماره مدرک شناسایی (گذرنامه دریایی)

7.No ردیف	8.Family name, given names اسلام خانوادگی و نام	9.Rank or rating رتبه یا رتبه	10.Nationality ملیت	11-Date and place of birth تاریخ و محل تولد	6-گذرنامه دریایی
1-	طارق محمود محمد بشیر	ناخدا	پاکستان	۱۹۷۲ پاکستان	۸۶۵
2-	دایب بورال عمر	ملوان	سومالی	۱۹۹۷ سومالی	۴۹۲۲۲
3-	عبدالسلام محمد	"	"	۱۹۸۸ "	۱۹۷۳۴۶۸
4-	نجروج جفری	"	کنیا	۱۹۷۸ کنیا	۰۰۱۶۶۰
5-	یوسف جامع حسن	"	سومالی	۱۹۸۸ سومالی	۹۶۵۷۶
6-	محمدجادی مومن	"	"	۱۹۹۰ "	۸۱۵۴۳
7-	عیدی جعفر اکار اسماعیل	"	"	۱۹۹۹ "	۸۷۵۳۲/۰۱۹
8-	یوسف عبدالقدیر	"	"	۱۹۸۴ "	۱۵۴۲۲
9-	ابشیر محمد احمد	"	"	۱۹۹۰ "	۱۴۴۱۱
10-	محمد داکار محمد	"	"	۱۹۶۷ "	۸۶۴۲
11-	جاما حسن هبی	"	"	۱۹۸۵ "	۵۰۰۷۱
12-	سالیبان محمود ابابری	"	"	۱۹۹۲ "	۱۷۲۸
13-	محمد جاماسید	"	"	۱۹۹۷ "	۱۷۷۹۰

12- Date and signature by master, authorized agent of officer ۱۴۰۱/۹/۱

IMO FAL Form 5

تاریخ امضاء و امضاء مجاز

25

Source: Confidential

Appendix 2. List of seven crewmembers, dated 28 August 2022 (6/5/1401 of the Persian calendar)<sup>137</sup>

**فهرست خدمه**  
**IMO CREW LIST**

PMO

Arrival ورود  Departure خروج

Page no. شماره صفحه ۱

1-1. Name of ship نام کشتی ۱-۱-۱۹۹ لنج		2-Port of arrival/departure بندر ورود/خروج بندر عباس - سومالی		3-Date of arrival/departure تاریخ ورود/خروج ۱۴۰۱/۵/۶	
1-2. IMO Number شماره ايمو ۱-۲-۱-۱		5-Last port of Call آخرین بندر يمن		6-Nature and no. of Identity document (seamens passport) نوع و شماره مدرک شناسایی (گذرنامه دریایی)	
1-3. Call of sign علامت خطب ۱-۳-۱		3-Flag state of ship کشور صاحب پرچم سومالی		7-No ۷-ردیف	
8-Family name, given names نام خانوادگی و نام		9-Rank or rating رتبه یا رتبه		10-Nationality ملیت	
11-Date and place of birth تاریخ و محل تولد		12- Date and signature by master, authorized agent of officer		۱۲- تاریخ و امضاء فرمانده کشتی یا نماینده مجاز او	
1- طارق محمود	ناخدا	پاکستان	۱۹۷۲	پاکستان	۸۶۵
2- طیب بوعلی	ملوان	سومالی	۱۹۹۷	سومالی	۴۹۲۲۲
3- عبدالسلام محمد	"	"	۱۹۸۸	"	۱۹۷۳۴۶۸
4- جفری نگان گا	"	کنیا	۱۹۷۸	کنیا	۰۰۱۶۶۰
5- یوسف جامع	"	سومالی	۱۹۸۸	سومالی	۹۶۰۷۶
6- محمودگدی	"	"	۱۹۹۰	"	۸۱۵۴۳
7- عبدالغفار داکاداکا	"	"	۱۹۹۹	"	۸۷۰۳۲

۱۴۰۱/۵/۶

12- Date and signature by master, authorized agent of officer

IMO FAL  
Form 5

Source: Operators MARWAN 1

<sup>137</sup> [https://www.iranchamber.com/calendar/converter/iranian\\_calendar\\_converter.php](https://www.iranchamber.com/calendar/converter/iranian_calendar_converter.php).

## Appendix 3: Bill of lading with departure from Bandar Abbas on 28 August 2022

PORT(S) & MARITIME GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF HORMOZGAN PROVINCE		اداره گل بندر و دریانوردی استان هرمزگان	
Islamic Rep. of IRAN Ministry of Roads & Urban Development		دولت جمهوری اسلامی ایران وزارت راه و شهرسازی سازمان بندر و دریانوردی	
Marine affairs NO. BAHO140101485		شماره امور دریایی: BAHO140101485	
SERIAL NO.	202233400144/0	شماره سریال	۲۰۲۲۳۳۴۰۰۱۴۴/۰
ISSUE DATE & TIME(PC)	7/28/2022 12:02:09 PM	تاریخ و ساعت صدور	۱۴۰۱/۰۵/۰۶ - ۱۲:۰۲
PORT CLEARANCE NO.	5595104	شماره اجازه حرکت	۵۵۹۵۱۰۴
CUSTOM LEAVE NO.	864690	شماره پروانه حرکت گمرک	۸۶۴۶۹۰
AGENT		نماینده	تعاونی لنگرداران هرمزگان
VESSEL NAME	MARWAN1	نام کشتی	مروان ۱
ARRIVED FROM	ADEN	وارد از بندر	عدن (یمن)
ON DATE	7/18/2022 3:00:00 PM	در تاریخ	۱۴۰۱/۰۴/۲۷ - ۱۵:۰۰
IMO NO/ VESSEL REG NO.	196	شماره IMO/شماره ثبت شناور	۱۹۶
SHIP'S FLAG	SOMALIA	پرچم شناور	سومالی
REGISTRY PORT	Somalia	بندر ثبت	سومالی
GROSS TONNAGE	332.00	ظرفیت ناخالص شناور	۳۳۲.۰۰
MASTER	T.M.BASHIR	فرمانده	طارق محمود بشیر
IS PERMITTED TO SAIL TO	Somalia	اجازه دارد، به طرف	سومالی خروج نماید.
Head Of Maritime Affairs	BEHZAD HATAMI	رئیس امور دریایی	بیزاد حاتمی
PORT	Shahid Bahonar Port	بندر	بندر شهید باهنر
Signature		امضاء	

## Remarks

This Pc is valid for 5 days from date of issue for one trip.

Departure is forbidden while sea and weather conditions are not favorit.

To confirm the authenticity of this document, please visit our website:

<https://verify.pmo.ir/pcinquiry>

This document has been issued electronically and does not need any signature and stamp

تاریخ نسخ انشاییه کشتی اکثریت توپیکه دریایی ۱ حداکثرت ۵ روز است دریایی

این اجازه حرکت از تاریخ صدور به مدت ۵ روز برای یک سفر اعتبار دارد.

در صورت ناساعد بودن شرایط جوی-خروج سجاد نخواهد بود.

جهت اطمینان از صحت اجازه حرکت به آدرس زیر مراجعه نمایید.

<https://verify.pmo.ir/pcinquiry>

این اجازه حرکت به صورت الکترونیکی صادر شده است و نیاز به مهر و امضا ندارد

Source: Operators MARWAN 1

## Appendix 4: Certificate of Registry of MARWAN 1

JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA  
SOOMAALIYA  
Wasaaradda Dekadaha & Gaadiidka Badda



جمهورية الصومال الفيدرالية  
وزارة الموانئ والنقل البحري

SOMALI FEDERAL REPUBLIC  
Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport  
Office of the Somali Maritime Administration Department

## CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

Issued by Federal Republic of Somalia

Certificate No: **105-03203**

VESSEL SPECIFICATION			
NAME OF VESSEL/IMO NUMBER	CALL SIGN	GROSS TONNAGE	NET TONNAGE
MARWAN 1	SM023	332 MT	226 MT
TYPE OF VESSEL	PLACE OF BUILT	YEAR BUILT	NAME OF BUILDERS
FISHING VESSEL	THAILAND	2013	THAILAND SHIP BUILDER
LENGTH	BREADTH	DEPTH	HULL MATERIAL
39.50 M	9.00 M	4.80 M	WOOD
ENGINE TYPE	NUMBER OF ENGINES	HORSE POWER	PROPELLER TYPE AND NOS
CATERPILLAR 3516, DIESEL ENGINE	THREE	1350 KW	ONE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER	
OWNER	OWNER ADDRESS
SOMLINK FISHERIES INVESTMENT COMPANY	AIRPORT ROAD, BOSASO, PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA TEL: +252907791112

<p>Issued at: Mogadishu, Somalia</p> <p>Captain Hassan M. Afrah Director</p> <p>ISSUE DATE: 11/01/2021</p>	 <p>Signature: </p> <p>EXPIRY DATE: 10/01/2022</p>
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**Appendix 5: Application for registration of MARWAN 1 showing that Mr. Mohamed Abdulkadir Mohamoud is the operator of the vessel**

JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA  
SOOMAALIYA  
Wasaaradda Dekadaha & Gaadiidka Badda



جمهورية الصومال  
ألفيدرالية

**SOMALI FEDERAL REPUBLIC**  
**Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport**  
**Office of the Somali Maritime Administration Department**

**APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION**

1. Name of the Vessel: MARWAN 1

2. IMO NO.: N/A

3. Previous Name: ALWESAM 4

4. Previous Flag of the vessel, if any: SOMALIA

5. Name of the owners SOMLINK FISHERIES INVESTMENT COMPANY  
**\*MUST\*** Include: BOSASO, PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA  
 - Complete Address 00252907791112  
 - Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
 - Email \_\_\_\_\_  
 - Owner Identification No. \_\_\_\_\_

6. Name of the Operators/ Managers MR. MOHAMED ABDULKADIR MOHAMOUD  
BOSASO, PUNTLAND STATE OF SOMALIA  
**\*MUST\*** Include: 00252907791112  
 - Complete Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 - Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
 - Email \_\_\_\_\_  
 - Company Identification No. \_\_\_\_\_

7. Accounting Authority for Radio Station: \_\_\_\_\_

8. Material of Hull: WOOD

9. Length: 39.50 m Breadth: 9.00 m Depth: 4.80 m

10. Gross Tonnage: 332 MT Net Tonnage: 226 MT Deadweight: ---

11. Type of Service: FISHING VESSEL

12. Construction Place: THAILAND Date Keel Laying: 2013 Delivery Date: \_\_\_\_\_

13. Name of the builders: THAILAND

Mobile: +252-61-9504892, +252-61-093912 E-mail: [hassan.afrah@sma.gov.so](mailto:hassan.afrah@sma.gov.so) URL: <http://www.sma.gov.so> Page 1 of 2

Source: Confidential

Appendix 6: Photograph of Mohamed Abdiqadir Mohamed as the chairman of Precision Shipping and Logistic Service with address in Berbera, Somaliland



Source: Confidential

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**Appendix 7: List of MARWAN's crewmembers during the voyages of August and November/December 2022**

Serial	Crewmembers August 2022	Crewmembers November/December 2022
1	<i>Tariq Mahmood Mohammed Basheer (Captain), Pakistan</i>	<i>Tariq Mahmood Mohammed Basheer (Captain), Pakistan</i>
2	<i>Tayeb Boral Omar, Somali</i>	<i>Tayeb Boral Omar, Somali</i>
3	<i>Abdul Al Salm Mohammed, Somali</i>	<i>Abdul Al Salm Mohammed, Somali</i>
4	<i>Njoroge Geffrey, Kenya</i>	<i>Njoroge Geffrey, Kenya</i>
5	<i>Youssef Jama Hassam, Somali</i>	<i>Youssef Jama Hassam, Somali</i>
6	<i>Mohammed Kedi Moumen - Somali</i>	<i>Mohammed Kedi Moumen - Somali</i>
7	<i>Abdi Jaafar Dakadaka Ismail, Somali</i>	<i>Abdi Jaafar Dakadaka Ismail, Somali</i>
8		<i>Youssef Abdul Gadeer, Somali</i>
9		<i>Ibsheer Mohammed Ahmed, Somali</i>
10		<i>Mohammed Akar Mohammed, Somali</i>
11		<i>Jama Hassan Habi, Somali</i>
12		<i>Saliban Mahmood Abari, Somali</i>
13		<i>Mohammed Jama Said, Somali</i>

**Appendix 8: Pictures of the crew**

**Strictly Confidential**  
**for the Committee only**

## Annex 13: Smuggling of military equipment in Hargeisa, Somaliland

### Facts on the seizure of tactical scopes and night vision goggles in Hargeisa

The Panel investigated a case of illicit trafficking of military equipment to unknown users in Somalia following the seizure in Hargeisa airport, Somaliland, on 25 April 2023 of 60 tactical scopes and their associated mounting rails specifically designed for AK 47 pattern assault rifles, as well as a pair of night vision goggles. The Panel inspected the items in Hargeisa on 24 May 2023 and found that:

(a) The tactical scopes are of type Spina Optics (f/2.8, magnification 10x40) manufactured by Guangdong Shipin Han Technology Co., LTD located at 390 Yide Road, Yuexiu District, Guangzhou, Guangdong, the People's Republic of China, see figure 1;<sup>138</sup>

(b) The items were in three boxes with labels indicating the shipment on 8 April 2023 from No. 8, Building 2, East District, Jinsha Zhoufeng Logistics Park, Baiyun District, Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province, see figure 2;<sup>139</sup>

(c) The consignment transited Dubai before being shipped to Hargeisa on 22 April 2023 on a commercial cargo flight with false indication of the content and the receiver identified as Deeq Ahmed Ibrahim, see appendices 1 and 2.

### Findings and analysis of the investigation

During meetings in Hargeisa, Somaliland, security services informed the Panel that they believed that the equipment was destined for SSC militia and potentially to be transferred to Al-Shabaab at a later date.

The Panel sent letters to the People's Republic of China and the United Arab Emirates sharing pictures of the equipment, shipping documents from China and an airwaybill from UAE. The letter requested them to assist the Panel in identifying individuals involved in facilitating the purchase and the shipment of those military equipment for the benefit of weapons smuggling and trafficking networks in Somalia.

The People's Republic of China informed the Panel that after verification by the Chinese competent authorities, they found that the tactical scopes and their associated mounting rails and the night vision goggles are not military aid or military trade equipment, making it difficult to verify transaction information. A reply from the UAE is still pending.

The Council in paragraph 10 of resolution 2662 (2022) decides that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia by preventing Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region from obtaining weapons and ammunition, take the necessary measures to prevent all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The scope with their associated mounting rails specifically designed for AK47 assault rifles have no other use than to be mounted on those weapons. Weapon sights with a night vision capability were part of annex A of resolution 2607 (2021) requiring an advance request to the Committee before their supply to Somali security forces. Annex A of resolution 2662 (2022) which eased the procedural requirement related to the supply of weapons to Somali security forces made reference to weapon sights with a night vision capability greater than generation 2.

The scopes are weapons sights and considered military equipment. As the items were not intended for Somali security forces, their qualification within the definitions of annex A of successive resolutions on Somalia is not relevant. The Panel considers therefore that individuals and networks involved in smuggling them to Somalia are meeting the designation criteria recently confirmed by paragraph 11 of resolution 2262 (2022) as "having acted in violation of the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), further elaborated upon by paragraph 26 of resolution 2044 (2002) and paragraph 34 (b) of resolution 2093 (2013)."

<sup>138</sup> <https://spinaoptics.en.made-in-china.com/product/kxsYjaPUgLce/China-Spina-Optics-2-8-10X40-Tactical-Scope-Riflescope-Hunting-Scope-Optics-Scope.html>.

<sup>139</sup> Google translate of "广东省广州市白云区金沙洲丰物流园东区 2 栋 8 号"

Figure 1: Tactical scopes type Spina Optics ( f/2.8 magnification 10x40)



Source: Panel, inspection in Hargeisa, Somaliland, 24 May 2023

Figure 3: Shipping labels indicating the shipment on 8 April 2023 from No. 8, Building 2, East District, Jinsha Zhoufeng Logistics Park, Baiyun District, Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province



Source: Panel, inspection in Hargeisa, Somaliland, 24 May 2023

**Appendix 1: Airwaybill 485-04606350 comprising 200 pieces shipped in Deira, Dubai, UAE, for a consignee in Hargeisa, Somaliland**

Set your laboratory steps here **STAPLE DOCI** **1.5 ABOVE PERI** **ATION** ← Line-up here →

485 DW 04606350 485-04606350

Shipper's Name and Address <b>GAWLE CARGO LLC.</b> DEIRA DUBAI UAE AE, TL: 009714239475, INFO@GAWLECARGO.COM		Shipper's Account Number Not negligible <b>Air Waybill</b> Issued by ASTRAL AVIATION DUBAI AE, TL: 009714239475																								
Consignee's Name and Address <b>XASAN MAXAMED XAASHI</b> HARGEISA SOMALI LAND HARGEISA SO, TL: 00252434068288		Consignee's Account Number It is agreed that the goods described herein are accepted in apparent good order and condition (except as noted) for carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. ALL GOODS MAY BE CARRIED BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING ROAD OR ANY OTHER CARRIER UNLESS SPECIFIC CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN HEREOF BY THE SHIPPER, AND SHIPPER AGREES THAT THE SHIPMENT MAY BE CARRIED VIA INTERMEDIATE STOPPING PLACES WHICH THE CARRIER DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying supplemental charge if required.																								
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City <b>GAWLE CARGO LLC</b> DUBAI AE, TL: 0551998062		Accounting Information DCW285-CALOGI POOLED																								
Agent's IATA Code 9999999	Account No. DCW285	MODE OF PAYMENT: Prepaid																								
Airport of Departure (Addr. of first Carrier) and requested Routing DUBAI WORLD CENTRAL		Reference Number CAL0097773403																								
to HGA By first Carrier BU Routing and Destination to by to by		Optional Shipping Information FGG																								
Airport of Destination HARGEISA		Declared Value for Carriage NVD																								
Requested Flight Date 04/02/22		Declared Value for Customs NCV																								
Handling Information SHC-ELI/LITHIUM ION BATTERIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION II OF PI967. 6CAA DG CERT 287. 24HRS EMERG ENCY RESPONSE CONTACT NUMBER 00971586501263. 54PKGS ELI AND 146PKGS NON ELI MKRD AND LBLD. PLS INFRM CNSGNEE UPN ARRVL																										
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th>No. of Pieces RCP</th> <th>Gross Weight</th> <th>kg</th> <th>Rate Class</th> <th>Chargeable Weight</th> <th>Rate Charge</th> <th>Total</th> <th>Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>200</td> <td>5600.00</td> <td>0</td> <td></td> <td>5600.0</td> <td>21.30</td> <td>119280.00</td> <td>GARMENTS, SPARE PARTS, MOBILE PHONE, COMPUTER ACCESSORIES, MOBILE ACCESSORIES, FOOD STUFFS, 54PKGS LITHIUM ION BATTERIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION II OF PI967</td> </tr> <tr> <td>200</td> <td>5600.00</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>119280.00</td> <td>VOL. 21.25 CBM</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			No. of Pieces RCP	Gross Weight	kg	Rate Class	Chargeable Weight	Rate Charge	Total	Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume)	200	5600.00	0		5600.0	21.30	119280.00	GARMENTS, SPARE PARTS, MOBILE PHONE, COMPUTER ACCESSORIES, MOBILE ACCESSORIES, FOOD STUFFS, 54PKGS LITHIUM ION BATTERIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION II OF PI967	200	5600.00					119280.00	VOL. 21.25 CBM
No. of Pieces RCP	Gross Weight	kg	Rate Class	Chargeable Weight	Rate Charge	Total	Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume)																			
200	5600.00	0		5600.0	21.30	119280.00	GARMENTS, SPARE PARTS, MOBILE PHONE, COMPUTER ACCESSORIES, MOBILE ACCESSORIES, FOOD STUFFS, 54PKGS LITHIUM ION BATTERIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION II OF PI967																			
200	5600.00					119280.00	VOL. 21.25 CBM																			
Prepaid Weight Charge Collect Other Charges																										
119280.00 Valuation Charge																										
Tax																										
Total other Charges Due Agent																										
Total Charges Due Carrier																										

Shipper certifies that the particulars on the face hereof are correct and that insofar as any part of the consignment contains dangerous goods such part is properly described by name and is in proper condition for carriage by air according to the applicable Dangerous Goods Regulations.  
 GAWLE CARGO L.L.L., OFFICE NO 10 AL REAS, DEIRA, 490425  
 1973062  
 AGT:GAWLDEX MUHAMMED NUSO HOSSEIN

Another Calogi portal generated air waybill . Contact sales@calogi.com to get connected.

Appendix 2: Page 2 of cargo manifest indicating DEEQ Ahmed as the receivers of the three boxes of Airwaybill 485-04606350 (Redaction of content of the fourth column by the Panel)

26	1897	3	
27	1898	2	
28	1899	13	
29	1900	1	
30	1901	3	
31	1902	4	
32	1903	2	
33	1904	1	
34	1905	1	
35	1906	2	
36	1907	3	
37	1908	<del>28</del>	
38	1909	6	
39	16822	30	
40	16823	20	
	TOTAL	200	

XXY/02 DEEQ AHMED  
XXX/01



Source: Security services, Hargeisa, Somaliland

## Annex 14: Container seized in Mogadishu with military equipment for Al-Shabaab

The Panel investigated a case of illicit trafficking of military equipment following a report by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). On 18 May 2023, NISA seized a container containing military equipment reportedly destined for Al-Shabaab, see figure 1.

The Panel sent letters to the People's Republic of China and Switzerland where the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) is headquartered, sharing pictures of the containers, container tracking information from China to Somalia, and NISA's allegation about the container's intended recipient. The Panel noted from footage posted in social media that the container had markings as owned by Mediterranean Shipping Co (MSC) with the tracking number MSMU8261141, see figure 2. MSC's tracking website indicates that the container with number MSMU8261141 was loaded on MSC FELIXSTOWE (ZF311A) in Ningbo, People's Republic of China, on 31 March 2023 and unloaded from MSC DENISSE (JM318R) in Mogadishu on 11 May 2023, see figure 3.

Figure 1 NISA press statement on the seizure of the container comprising military equipment



Source: [https://twitter.com/HSNQ\\_NISA/status/1659210036726607872](https://twitter.com/HSNQ_NISA/status/1659210036726607872), 18 May 2023

Figure 2. Identification of the container seized by NISA



Source: [https://twitter.com/Hesham\\_Amareer/status/1659910897366626307/photo/1](https://twitter.com/Hesham_Amareer/status/1659910897366626307/photo/1)

## Annex 15: Receipts related to the sale of charcoal confiscated from MV FOX in Salalah, Sultanate of Oman

Figure 1: Alleged receipt related to the sale of the charcoal confiscated by Omani customs from the MV Fox, 29 September 2022

نظام إدارة الجمارك المتكامل

الرئيسية موقع العمل جهات الاتصال تفضير كلمة المرور تسجيل

مرحبا : عبدالله عبدالحميد ال

معرف زمني التعلية: 16641850007173003 English العربية

https://icms.customs.gov.om/icms/jet/secure/shared/auction/search

شرطة عمان السلطانية  
الإدارة العامة للجمارك

نظام إدارة الجمارك المتكامل

إدارة الشركة	تفاصيل العرض
بنان جمركي	الترسيمة الأوصاف الرسوم
إدارة المدفوعات	*تنتشر إلى حفل الإزاعي
إدارة التفتيش	تفاصيل مقدم عرض المراد
إدارة النظام	نوع الترسية:
إدارة التعريفات	رقم تسجيل العرض:
إدارة المستخدم	رقم إيصال تأمين المراد:
أدارة الاسترداد	رقم البيع بالمراد:
العالية	تاريخ الاشاء:
الإقرار الجمركي للعمليات	الحالة:
تقرير المدفوعات	موقع تقديم العرض:
إدارة المستودعات	التاجر:
إدارة البيع بالمراد	الحد الأدنى للعرض:
بحث طلبات الموافقة على البيع بالمراد	الملاحظات:
مراجعة طلبات الموافقة على البيع بالمراد	حالة ترسيمة المراد:
إشياء مراد	حالة المراجعة:
بحث المرادات	ملاحظات المراجعة:
التسجيل في مراد	
بحث التسجيل في مراد	
ترسيمة المراد بدوئا	
بحث الترسية البدوية	
بحث العروض المسجلة	
تقرير المخزن	
مراجعة الفائز بالمراد	
بحث العروض الفائرة	
أدارة المستودعات الجمركية	

بدوي  
BID20220926002701  
0  
AUC20220926001341  
12:00 2022/09/29  
نعت الموافقة  
الإدارة العامة للجمارك-OMMCT  
شركة سهول الجوهري للتجارة والمعاملات ش م م  
ع. 1  
1000000 ر.  
تم تحويل مبلغ 250 ألف ريال عماني في حساب ضمانات الضحايا الجمركية والمبلغ المتبقي 750 ألف ريال عماني تم توريده في حساب الأيراد  
هم  
مقبول

Source: Confidential

Figure 2: Alleged receipt related to the sale of the charcoal confiscated by Omani customs from the MV Fox, 29 September 2022

نظام إدارة الجمارك المتكامل

الرئيسية موقع العمل جهات الاتصال تغيير كلمة المرور تسجيل

مرحبا : عبدالله عبدالمجيد ال  
معرف زمن العملية: 16641849469003003 English العربية

https://icms.customs.gov.om/icms/jsp/secure/icms/payment/Payment...

شرطة عمان السلطانية  
الإدارة العامة للجمارك

نظام إدارة الجمارك المتكامل

إدارة الشركة  
بنان جمركي  
إدارة المدفوعات

استعراض تذكرة الدفع  
تم الدفع بنجاح

إدارة المدفوعات

رقم تذكرة الدفع: PTN2609228043970  
تاريخ الدفع: 13:35 2022/09/26  
تم الدفع: 1000000.000  
حالة الدفع: 0.000  
المبلغ المستحق: 1000000.000  
رصيد المدفوعات (ريال عماني):  
إجمالي المبلغ المدفوع (ريال عماني): 1000000.000

إشياء تذكرة الدفع  
البحث عن مستحقات الدفع  
البحث عن تذكرة الدفع  
إشياء طلب دفعات مالية أخرى  
بحث طلب دفعات مالية أخرى  
إدارة التفتيش  
إدارة النظام  
إدارة التعريفات  
إدارة المستخدم  
أدارة الاسترداد  
العالية

تفاصيل المبلغ المتوجب دفعه

نوع الحساب	المبلغ المستحق	نوع المبلغ
الضمان	0.000	BID20220926002701 - 1
الإيرادات	1000000.000	المبلغ المقتطع بعد المصاريف كضمان
الإيرادات	0.000	مصاريف أخرى - مزايدات
	1000000.000	ضريبة القيمة المضافة (الرسوم)
إجمالي المبلغ مستحق الدفع		

المدفوعات السابقة

سجل	رقم العملية	تاريخ الدفع	محل	المبلغ المنفوع (ريال عماني)	طريقة الدفع	الحالة	الإجراءات
1	PTN26092280439708921224	2022/09/26 13:35	عبدالله عبدالمجيد -12621369 البلوشي	1000000.000	شيك	نجاح	تسجيل

تقرير المدفوعات  
إدارة المستودعات  
إدارة البيع بالمراد  
إدارة المستودعات  
الجمركية

Source: Confidential