
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Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

In April 2018, at a high-level meeting of the General Assembly and in a briefing 1. to the Security Council, I renewed the commitment of the United Nations to building and sustaining peace. In the twin resolutions adopted in 2016 on the review of the peacebuilding architecture (Assembly resolution 70/262 and Council resolution 2282 (2016)), Member States stressed that, while Governments have primary responsibility for peacebuilding and sustaining peace, the international community, including the United Nations system, can do more to build peaceful and resilient societies. In my report of 2018 on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (A/72/707-S/2018/43), I provided an update on the progress made in the implementation of the resolutions and presented specific recommendations for addressing existing gaps. The present interim report, submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of the twin resolutions on the follow-up to the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (Assembly resolution 72/276 and Council resolution 2413 (2018)), provides an update on the implementation of the recommendations and options of the previous report, including those on the financing of United Nations peacebuilding activities. Of the 42 recommendations outlined in my 2018 report, 38 are currently being implemented. There has been limited progress with respect to four recommendations relating to financing, which is the prerogative of Member States. While the present report indicates that progress is being made overall, it is too early to measure the substantial benefit of many of those recommendations. As requested by the Assembly in its resolution 72/276, I will submit a detailed report, during its seventy-fourth session, on the continued implementation of resolution 70/262 and on progress on the implementation of the recommendations and options contained in my 2018 report.





II. Operational and policy coherence to strengthen support for peacebuilding and sustaining peace

2. The central message of my 2018 report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace was that it is necessary to enhance the coherence of international efforts in support of national Governments and their peoples. The number of outcome documents of United Nations intergovernmental bodies, including the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council, that integrate the notion of "sustaining peace" has continued to increase since 2016, reaching more than 80 documents annually in both 2017 and 2018. Most importantly, many Member States have embedded a sustaining peace approach in their national policies.

3. As a flexible and dedicated intergovernmental platform, the Peacebuilding Commission has continued to promote policy coherence in support of conflictaffected countries by convening partners from within and outside the United Nations, through country-specific, regional and thematic discussions. Meetings on the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and the Sahel, among other countries and regions, provided regular venues for discussion of political, socioeconomic, development and security challenges and risks at the national and regional levels. The advisory role of the Commission to the Security Council has also continued to advance, especially as the Council is considering the review and drawdown of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, in accordance with its presidential statements, S/PRST/2017/27 and S/PRST/2018/20. By those statements, the Council reaffirmed its intention to regularly request, deliberate and draw upon the specific, strategic and targeted advice of the Peacebuilding Commission and articulated the Commission's role in ensuring a strong focus on national peacebuilding and development priorities, supporting integrated approaches, promoting accountability, sharing good practices and facilitating broader partnerships.

4. To inform the mandate renewal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, for example, the Peacebuilding Commission provided written advice to the Security Council on the peacebuilding components of the mandate. For the prospective reconfiguration of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, to be implemented after the completion of the electoral cycle in 2019 (Council resolution 2458 (2019)), the Commission convened meetings ahead of Council deliberations to provide the Council with perspectives on Guinea-Bissau from different stakeholders. An informal interactive dialogue between the Council and the Commission was held prior to the Council's visit to Burkina Faso and Mali in March 2019, in order to update the Council on the engagement of the Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund in those two countries and in the broader Sahel region.

5. In implementing the Peacebuilding Commission's gender strategy, the Commission held dedicated discussions on the gender aspects of transitions and financing for gender in peacebuilding. It also convened a meeting on the margins of the sixty-third session of the Commission on the Status of Women, to discuss the interlinkages between gender, social protection, peace and development.

6. In terms of the Peacebuilding Commission's bridging role with regard to other intergovernmental bodies, the first informal interactive dialogue between the General Assembly and the Commission, held on 26 March 2019, provided an opportunity to enhance cooperation between the two bodies and discuss priorities on sustaining peace and peacebuilding, leading to a joint summary issued by the President of the Assembly and the Chair of the Commission. The joint dialogue between the

Commission and the Economic and Social Council, held in 2018, was focused on the linkages between climate change and challenges to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel region. I encourage the Commission to build on those experiences and explore ways to further utilize its advisory and bridging roles, thereby contributing to stronger coherence among the principal organs of the United Nations.

7. My Action for Peacekeeping initiative led to the endorsement by 151 Member States of a Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, to strengthen peacekeeping activities. Those commitments highlight the role of the Peacebuilding Commission, the importance of coherent and forwardlooking support for United Nations mission transitions, the use of inclusive and participatory approaches by peacekeeping operations and the importance of partnerships to achieve sustainable outcomes.

8. Preventing crises has remained at the very heart of efforts to sustain peace. As I have previously emphasized, crisis prevention saves lives and money and preserves development gains. The effective prevention of conflict alone saves up to \$70 billion per year for the affected country and the international community combined. The prevention of climate-related crises is also a cardinal challenge of the times. Those reasons explain why I have made prevention a priority across the work of the Organization, at the country, regional and global levels and as a common thread running through the three reform streams. I have described my prevention platform as an internal organizational, cultural and management tool to enable the United Nations system to make maximum use of existing resources and capacities in support of Member States. Using improved risk and resilience methodologies to inform regular regional prevention discussions that integrate the three pillars, namely development, human rights and peace and security, the United Nations system is coming together more effectively to ensure that its support to Member States is timely and focused on building national and regional resilience to a broad array of risks that could undermine efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

9. Coherence in United Nations operational engagement across the three pillars and with all relevant partners continues to be a priority. Central to greater coherence is my set of mutually reinforcing reforms to restructure the peace and security pillar, reposition the development system and reform management processes and practices. Cutting across those reforms is the prioritization on gender parity, as laid out in my strategy released in 2017. Similarly, efforts are underway to advance equitable geographical representation and ensure that the Secretariat better reflects the international character of the Organization. Since January 2019, new structures have taken hold. Coherence across the peace and security pillar has been enhanced by the creation of the single regional political-operational structure that has the responsibility to support a more holistic approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace. It has been further enhanced by the integration of the Peacebuilding Support Office and the former Department of Political Affairs into the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and by the revitalization of the Support Office through the redeployment of a number of posts.

10. Those reforms have created opportunities to improve the Organization's integrated support in the field. For example, under the peace and security pillar, the alignment of regional strategies and peace operations in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions is being assessed, strengthening integrated peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts on the basis of comparative advantages in the Central African Republic and Mali and encouraging greater coordination of efforts and joined-up approaches in the Middle East, the Sahel and the Western Balkans.

11. The planning and management of United Nations mission transition processes are also a priority. Mission transitions may include the drawdown or withdrawal of a

multidimensional peace operation or a transition from a multidimensional peacekeeping operation to a smaller peacekeeping mission, special political mission or United Nations country team presence. The joint project of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on United Nations transitions in mission settings continues to provide transition-related support to the following six priority countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Mali and Sudan. Such support includes the deployment of guidance materials and lessons-learned studies. In February 2019, I issued a planning directive on transitions in the context of mission drawdown or withdrawal and on integrated assessment and planning, to support early joint planning based on human rights and gender-responsive analysis and to ensure financing, operational assistance and adequate staffing.

12. In Darfur, as the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) draws down and prepares to exit by June 2020, the mission and the United Nations country team are working with government counterparts in four Darfur states on four transition priorities: rule of law (police, justice and corrections); durable solutions for the displaced populations and host communities; human rights capacity-building; and immediate service delivery to the internally displaced. In support of the transition, the country team has access to \$15 million in programmatic funding from the mission's assessed budget for 2018/19. Additional resources, including from the Peacebuilding Fund, will be critical to enable the country team to increase its activities and expand its presence in support of the Government across Darfur when UNAMID exits.

13. In Haiti, integrated transition planning has been ongoing since the preparation of the benchmarked exit strategy for the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) in early 2018. The transition strategy is anchored in the country's United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the period 2017–2021, which reflects the longer-term vision for Haiti in accordance with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including elements from the MINUJUSTH benchmarks. My proposal for the follow-on United Nations presence in the country, including a special political mission and a strengthened country team, stresses the strong nexus between peace and security, humanitarian assistance, human rights and development, with gender equality cutting across all four areas, and the relevance of an integrated longer-term vision that guarantees the most efficient and effective delivery of continued United Nations support.

14. Transitions and drawdowns should also be consistently gender-responsive, through the inclusion of relevant expertise and analysis and due attention to gender equality and the empowerment of women in transition contexts. In that respect, and in response to the recommendations set out in Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) and in my 2017 report on women and peace and security (S/2017/861), the Department of Peace Operations and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), together with UNDP, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Peacebuilding Support Office, are piloting a joint initiative. In 2018, the initiative supported gender-responsive conflict analysis workshops in Liberia and Darfur that included the participation of representatives of women's civil society organizations; it also informed United Nations transition planning in Darfur and a review of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Liberia.

15. As part of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Peacebuilding Support Office is increasingly aligning its work with the new single

regional political-operational structure, working closely with the regional divisions on country and regional priorities. The Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund are also both strengthened by and contributing to the entire peace and security pillar, as political engagement is better connected with analysis, planning, programming and resources. In February 2019, the Assistant Secretaries-General for Africa and for Peacebuilding Support, together with the Director of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, conducted a joint mission to the Sudan to review preparations for the drawdown of UNAMID and the transfer of responsibilities to the Government. Likewise, as a demonstration of closer coordination between peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts in peace processes, the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission was joined by the same Assistant Secretaries-General in a visit to Bangui to explore joint Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund support to the country, following the signing, on 6 February 2019, of a peace agreement between armed groups and the Government. The two Assistant Secretaries-General also travelled to Mali to work closely with my Special Representative for Mali to ensure adequate support for the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and discuss the development of an integrated strategic framework with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the country team, with accompanying Peacebuilding Fund support.

16. The UNDP-Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention began a new five-year phase in December 2018. The Programme builds on the strengths of the reformed peace and security pillar to ensure that joined-up support is provided to the new resident coordinator system. Currently, the Programme supports 49 peace and development adviser positions in resident coordinator offices, promoting national efforts to prevent conflict, advance sustainable development and sustain peace while assisting the United Nations system in identifying entry points for engagement. In Ethiopia, for example, the peace and development adviser set up a joint analysis cell that brings together the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Safety and Security, UNDP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to conduct cross-disciplinary analysis and ensure the complementarity of programming among agencies. Peace and development advisers also help to empower national stakeholders to strengthen mechanisms and capacities for inclusive dialogue, social cohesion and reconciliation. In Sri Lanka, the peace and development adviser, working together with OHCHR and national institutions, is supporting the establishment and operationalization of the country's transitional justice mechanism.

17. The Global Focal Point for the Rule of Law continues to leverage comparative expertise and resources from across the United Nations system. In the Central African Republic, the Special Criminal Court, supported by the Global Focal Point as part of a larger joint justice initiative to bring perpetrators of gross human rights violations and international humanitarian law to justice, held its inaugural session in October 2018. In South Sudan, working together with the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Global Focal Point is supporting the implementation of a Government-owned action plan to combat conflict-related sexual violence and promote accountability. Based on the recommendation of the independent review of the Global Focal Point in 2018, security sector reform will be included as one of its main areas of work.

18. The inter-agency working group on statelessness is another example of a United Nations system-wide approach to joined-up analysis and programming. Its work has resulted in updated guidance, the establishment of a mechanism to improve the collection and analysis of data and action to address gender-discriminatory nationality

laws. The inter-agency climate security mechanism of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, UNDP and the United Nations Environment Programme, established in October 2018, is developing an integrated risk assessment framework to enhance understanding of the relationships between climate change, peace and security, governance and sustainable development.

19. The United Nations development system plays an important role in mitigating drivers of crises, in line with its mandate. Enhancing collaboration with humanitarian assistance, disaster risk reduction and peacebuilding efforts at the national level is fundamental to helping Governments and their peoples achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. An increasing number of United Nations entities have integrated peacebuilding and sustaining peace into their strategic plans, and 80 per cent of United Nations entities offer staff technical guidance and training on conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity, sustaining peace and/or peacebuilding. Some United Nations entities, such as the World Food Programme, are working with peace and security experts to define their contributions to peace. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has developed a multi-risk approach that is focused on prevention and links peacebuilding to disaster risk reduction and climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.

20. One objective of the development system reform is a more cohesive, responsive and accountable country team, with a stronger focus on providing collective and integrated support and generating common results towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. As from 1 January 2019, all resident coordinators have a direct reporting line to me, through a system managed by the newly established Development Coordination Office. Each impartial and independent resident coordinator is responsible for the coordination of the United Nations country team and for providing strategic leadership on Sustainable Development Goal achievement, including by enabling better risk management and conflict prevention, as required by each specific country context. There is no one-size-fits-all solution and the United Nations system must ensure that it is more responsive, collectively, to the specific needs of each country. More broadly, my expectations with regard to improved integrated analysis, risk monitoring and prevention and regional strategies require close collaboration across the United Nations system, including to safeguard achievements with regard to human rights and ensure youth- and gender-responsive conflict analysis.

21. The United Nations Sustainable Development Group, under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General, has maintained a task team dedicated to transitions and recovery, co-chaired by UNDP, UN-Women and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration is focusing on providing field support to seven priority countries, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, the Niger, Nigeria and Somalia, to foster synergies in humanitarian and development action and enhance links to peacebuilding work for more integrated approaches to crises and in support of the 2030 Agenda.

22. I reiterate my commitment to the creation of a United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework that is results-oriented and more responsive to specific national priorities. That will include ensuring that new Cooperation Frameworks are informed by multidimensional risk analysis and that documents are more agile and adaptive to evolving country contexts.

23. A new dedicated UNDP facility the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in fragile settings has supported Goal achievement, national development planning and donor coordination in the Central African Republic, the Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Sudan. Pursuant to the recommendation set out in my 2018 report, 23 multidisciplinary missions relating to

the mainstreaming, acceleration and policy support strategy have been conducted and have provided support for strategic foresight, data tools and voluntary national reviews in conflict-affected settings, thereby ensuring that support for national planning to implement the 2030 Agenda was conflict-sensitive and integrated.

24. In order to increase policy and operational coherence among all three pillars in support of Member States, I continue to encourage better use of human rights mechanisms, such as the universal periodic review, special procedures and treaty bodies, and their recommendations, by the peace and security and development pillars. In that regard, I welcome the continued efforts of the Human Rights Council to work effectively and efficiently with all pillars of the United Nations system, in support of Member States. Such efforts strengthen United Nations system-wide support for the implementation of the recommendations of the universal periodic review and other mechanisms and their integration into collective efforts to advance both Sustainable Development Goal achievement and crisis prevention, thus contributing to the strengthening of the promotion, protection and prevention mandates of the Council.

III. Leadership, accountability and capacity in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace

25. My determination to improve leadership, accountability and capacity for sustaining peace across the United Nations system is first and foremost a commitment to supporting national actors in developing resilient national capacities. That commitment includes addressing inequalities, discrimination and exclusion, promoting human rights, making institutions more inclusive and addressing other conflict drivers that undermine social cohesion and that may lead to violent conflict. In the Philippines, with support from the Peacebuilding Fund, UNDP, UNICEF and UN-Women helped national actors work together to pass legislation that created the new Bangsamoro autonomous region, thereby resolving a four-decades-long conflict. That commitment also applies to all senior leadership in the field, including my special representatives and deputy special representatives. For example, in the planning directive on transitions I issued in February 2019, I clearly set out the strong expectations placed on my special representatives and deputy special representatives in leading transition planning, including the importance of requesting a focal point from the Government of the host State.

26. I am working to ensure that resident coordinator offices, drawing upon the full range of expertise of resident and non-resident United Nations entities, are equipped to serve as hubs for collective analysis and planning. The capacities of the peace and security and human rights pillars can also support analysis, planning and programming discussions at the country level in responding to specific national contexts. Peace and development advisers play a key role in ensuring that United Nations country team programmes are conflict-sensitive and informed by high-quality analysis. Human rights and gender advisers continue to be deployed, as available and as requested by host countries. The Development Coordination Office will work with partners to ensure support for, inter alia, mission transition planning, peacebuilding and enhancing collaboration among humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities in specific countries, as well as for enhancing capacity in regional offices to provide analytical and programmatic support.


27. The toolbox of integrated support from development, humanitarian and peacebuilding entities to field leadership continues to expand. That support includes regional dialogues between resident coordinators, the Development Coordination Office and the peace and security pillar and leadership workshops for the peace and

security pillar addressing evolving functions and responsibilities, including for peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Entities are increasingly offering training courses that include conflict analysis and sustaining peace.

28. The system continues to strengthen surge capacity in the field. At Headquarters, secondments such as those provided by the International Labour Organization, OHCHR and UN-Women to the Peacebuilding Support Office enhance the system-wide knowledge of those individuals working on peacebuilding. A "people pipeline" initiative is currently in process, aimed at developing and nurturing a cadre of professionals across United Nations system entities and partner institutions with the necessary knowledge and experience across the humanitarian and development nexus and its links to peace.

IV. Financing for peacebuilding

29. In 2018, I alerted you to both the urgent need for investments in prevention and for ensuring that financial resources are available for countries that are already experiencing violent conflict. Although overall official development assistance (ODA) declined slightly in 2018, ODA to conflict-affected countries as a percentage share of total ODA had stopped decreasing in 2017, potentially reversing a decadelong trend of declining support. ODA related to peacebuilding, however, continued to decline as a percentage of total ODA. In absolute terms, more investment is allocated to peacebuilding-related ODA, driven by increased investments in inclusive political processes and core government functions, but investment in basic safety and security and the rule of law and human rights remains worryingly stagnant. Total bilateral aid allocated to programmes targeting gender equality and the empowerment of women as their primary objective in conflict-affected countries remains low, at 5 per cent, despite evidence that gender equality is directly correlated with greater stability. The central concern identified in the twin resolutions adopted in 2016 remains, namely that peacebuilding and sustaining peace require adequate, predictable and sustained financing. Financing committed for peacebuilding activities at present is unpredictable, ad hoc in nature and insufficient to ensure that the root causes of conflict are addressed. Moreover, the United Nations faces a troubling financial situation with deepening liquidity problems in its regular budget, a trend that must be urgently halted and reversed. Peacekeeping operations also face frequent cash constraints that force the Organization to postpone the settlement of its obligations to troop- and police-contributing countries. I have submitted a set of measures to the General Assembly to address both the liquidity and broader structural problems that constrain budget management.



Percentage shares of official development assistance for peacebuilding and in support of conflict-affected countries, 2007–2017

Source: Peacebuilding Support Office, based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System, OECD.Stat.

30. In my 2018 report, as requested by Member States, I provided options on increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions. My options included the allocation of the remaining balance of any Headquarters-level trust fund inactive for two years or more to the Peacebuilding Fund; the voluntary commitment of the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final full-year budget of a closing peacekeeping mission each year for two years following the end of the mission's mandate to existing peacebuilding projects or to a country-level pooled fund; the voluntary commitment of unspent assessed contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund; and the provision of assessed funding representing \$100 million or an approximate and symbolic 1 per cent of the value of the total United Nations budgets for peace operations to the Peacebuilding Fund. In the period 2018/19, my recommendation for the assessment of 15 per cent of the total variance in overall financial requirements for peacekeeping operations to finance the Peacebuilding Fund, based on a variance of \$110 million, from \$6.80 billion in 2017/18 to \$6.69 billion in 2018/19, would have equated to a contribution of \$16.5 million. Any of those options, if advanced by Member States, would narrow the gap in resources and capacities to fund United Nations peacebuilding activities and help to meet national peacebuilding needs.

31. Member States have discussed financing for peacebuilding in various forums, including in the Peacebuilding Commission. A small number of Member States have

responded to my calls for voluntary contributions of assessed funds, including the creative use of unspent committed peacekeeping budgets. I look forward to continuing to explore those options with all who are interested and I continue to encourage Member States to provide financial support to United Nations peacebuilding activities. There has been limited progress on four of the financing options I outlined in 2018.

32. I have moved ahead with those recommendations on financing that are my prerogative, to ensure that important financing needs are addressed. In the United Nations development system, I have taken steps to scale up capacities in the resident coordinator offices to support Member States in planning and financing their national implementation plans for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. That has included the assignment of economists and of development coordination officers for partnerships and development finance. Resident coordinators will have three principal funding mechanisms to draw upon in support of the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding work of the United Nations country teams: the Central Emergency Response Fund, the Sustainable Development Goals Fund and the Peacebuilding Fund, respectively. Under the terms of the funding compact, I have worked with Member States to ensure a greater focus on inter-agency pooled funds and singleagency thematic funds, which will, in turn, incentivize the use of quality non-core resources. The contribution of the Peacebuilding Fund to the Goals is also notable; analysis indicates that, during the 2015-2018 period, the Fund directed 83 per cent of its investments to achieving the Goals, including Goal 10 on reducing inequalities, Goal 5 on gender equality, Goal 4 on quality education and Goal 16 on peace, justice and inclusive institutions.

33. I remain committed to ensuring greater transparency and clarity on how the United Nations manages the resources with which it has been entrusted, and on what is achieved with those resources. In peacebuilding, the United Nations system continues to push for reduced fragmentation, greater coherence and improved coordination among funding instruments. I am in the process of establishing the funding dashboard for peacebuilding, for that very purpose.

34. The allocation of resources from assessed budgets of peacekeeping missions for mandated programmatic activities in support of peacebuilding continues to be a critical tool to undertaking activities in mandated peacebuilding areas, such as mine action; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; support for rule of law and security institutions; and community stabilization. Proposed resource requirements for programmatic activities for the 2018/19 period amounted to \$190 million, of which approximately \$120 million is for mine action programmes. Programmatic funding is used for peacebuilding interventions conducted by missions alone or in partnership with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes or other partners, to enhance their capacities to address joint peacebuilding priorities. Programmatic funding has proven to be especially useful during United Nations mission transitions, to prevent gaps after the mission's withdrawal. The revised budget for UNAMID for the 2018/2019 period (A/73/488) broke new ground by including \$15 million to be used for the transfer of activities to the United Nations country team. I encourage Member States to continue to support such innovative approaches, which contribute to the consolidation of the peace and security gains made by countries during the presence of a peacekeeping operation.

35. The Peacebuilding Fund is ensuring that it works as a complement to assessed programmatic funding. Examples include the strategic sequencing of Peacebuilding Fund support to complement programmatic funding for a cross-border peacebuilding project between Côte d'Ivoire, where the peacekeeping mission was drawn down in 2017, and Liberia, where the mission closed in 2018. In 2018, the Peacebuilding Fund established a transitions window, which contributes to the implementation of my new

planning directive on transition processes, alleviating the impact of the "financial cliff" by covering two years before and five years after mission drawdown. Given the exponential growth in demand, the aim of next strategic plan is for the Fund to invest at least 40 per cent of its funding in transition settings.

36. I reiterate the imperative of ensuring that mission transition funding reflects the peacebuilding needs identified through joined-up risk analysis. Country-level pooled funds have been successfully initiated, supported catalytically by the Peacebuilding Fund and capitalized in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Papua New Guinea and Somalia. In cases such as Liberia, where the Peacebuilding Fund remains the sole contributor to the Liberia multi-partner trust fund, I stress the necessity of donor support in order for those funds to have the intended impact. In Liberia, the voluntary commitment of unspent assessed contributions from the peacekeeping budget to the Peacebuilding Fund could have provided an additional \$11.6 million of support for the transition. A voluntary commitment of the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final full-year budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (\$116.95 million), each year, for two years following the end of the mission's mandate, directed to existing peacebuilding projects or a country-level pooled fund, in accordance with my recommendation from 2018, would mean \$17.5 million a year for two years for Liberia. In support of the transition in Darfur especially, I encourage Member States to consider the option to voluntarily commit the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final full-year budget of the closing peacekeeping mission, for each of the first two years following the end of the mission's mandate, to existing peacebuilding projects or a country-level pooled fund.

37. In 2018, the Peacebuilding Fund approved over \$183 million in projects for 40 countries. The Fund was engaged in countries where it had not previously been active but where political developments opened up new opportunities, including the Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia and Zimbabwe, and the following three new countries were declared eligible for funding: Burkina Faso, El Salvador and the Gambia. The Sahel region has remained a priority for the Fund; its investments in support of the United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel have increased to \$65.7 million, from \$58 million in 2017. Since coming into office, I have called for a "quantum leap" in financial support – ideally unearmarked and multi-year – for the Peacebuilding Fund, which I consider central to prioritizing prevention through cross-pillar strategies. Member States have responded to my call, with 85 per cent growth in the capitalization of the Fund over the last two years and a number of multi-year contributions. Notwithstanding those encouraging trends, funding remains short of a quantum leap.

38. The Peacebuilding Fund will continue to surpass my target of 15 per cent of investments in gender equality and the empowerment of women as a principal objective in peacebuilding, reaching 40 per cent in 2018 – a first for any United Nations fund. An important portion of the growing Peacebuilding Fund portfolio supports innovative approaches to the empowerment of women and youth through its annual competitive special call, the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative, in partnership with UN-Women and the United Nations Population Fund. The Peacebuilding Fund continues to be the pooled fund with the greatest diversity of recipient entities (now more than 40) and one of the few pooled funds to provide direct transfers to civil society organizations and Governments. New guidelines on gender-based budgeting, as well as on youth and peacebuilding programming, are being developed for fund applicants and recipients. The Fund will soon introduce a new reporting and knowledge management system, to continue to enhance transparency, accountability and effectiveness.

39. I continue to explore innovative financing solutions for peacebuilding by looking beyond traditional partnerships, including through contributions by

individuals, foundations and faith-based organizations, bonds, levies and tax-based revenue generation, corporate partnerships and blended finance. Promising initiatives include a blended-finance approach used in Colombia to support small to mediumsized business in conflict-affected areas. I continue to encourage Member States to explore innovative means of financing peacebuilding activities.

40. At the second High-level Conference on South-South Cooperation, held in March 2019, I noticed that South-South cooperation made a valuable contribution to peacebuilding and sustaining peace, as outlined in the publication entitled *South-South in Action: South-South and Triangular Cooperation on Peace and Development*, produced by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation. Knowledge exchange among self-identified fragile countries has been supported by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building and New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

V. Partnerships for peacebuilding and sustaining peace

41. Strategic partnerships with regional and subregional partners remain a priority for the Organization. In June 2018, I convened a high-level interactive dialogue with regional and other organizations active in international peace and security. Participants had a productive exchange of views on global challenges relating to peace and security, including peacebuilding and sustaining peace. As a result, concrete actions were identified to reinforce cooperation and coordination, in particular in the field.

42. In that regard, regional special political missions in Central Africa, West Africa and Central Asia continue to hold regular thematic intergovernmental dialogues with regional and subregional organizations and strengthen joint analysis, planning and activities in support of sustaining peace. The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa have supported the Economic Community of Central African States in enhancing the operational capacity of the early warning mechanism for Central Africa, by mapping institutional capacities in conflict prevention mechanisms. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has developed mechanisms for strengthened information-sharing, coordination and joint approaches with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

43. The United Nations' partnership with the African Union, building on the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, continues to deepen, for example through a workshop, held in October 2018, on operationalizing the African Union Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in the Sahel. The African Union initiative on "silencing the guns" to promote the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa is another critical effort. Regional approaches have also enabled the Peacebuilding Fund to partner with regional organizations such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States.

44. The Peacebuilding Commission is strengthening its partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, including by convening an annual dialogue with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. I encourage the Commission to further explore ways to partner with international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank and the African Development Bank, as well as civil society organizations and the private sector.

45. As indicated in my 2018 report, my Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding to accelerate progress on the participation of women in peacebuilding is being revised, in view of the reforms initiated and the Organization's commitment to sustaining peace. The revised action plan will be aligned with the new accountability framework on women and peace and security to improve reporting on gender-responsive peacebuilding.

46. In 2018, I welcomed the report on youth and peace and security, entitled "The missing peace: independent progress study on youth and peace and security" (A/72/761-S/2018/86), and the second Security Council resolution on youth and peace and security (resolution 2419 (2018)), in which the Council requested that I submit a report on the implementation of both that resolution and resolution 2250 (2015). In September 2018, I launched Youth 2030: The United Nations Youth Strategy, which includes, as one of its priority areas, a focus on peacebuilding and resilience-building. Youth 2030 has firmly embedded commitments to advance the youth and peace and security agenda, and I look forward to advancing recommendations from both resolutions, together with Member States. Four new projects in the Western Balkans, for example, facilitate opportunities for youth perspectives to be heard by decision makers on policies shaping the future of the region. I call on Member States to prioritize the set-up of national coalitions with youth-led peacebuilding organizations and adopt road maps to ensure the operational implementation of the resolutions and the meaningful engagement of young peacebuilders and their organizations in national-level peace and security processes and programmes.

47. I continue to pursue the operationalization of the 2017 United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations. In September 2018, the United Nations and the World Bank established a joint United Nations-World Bank Steering Committee for Crisis-Affected Situations to set annual priorities and monitor implementation, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support and the Senior Director for Fragility, Conflict and Violence of the World Bank. The Peacebuilding Support Office has revitalized its capacity to manage partnerships with the World Bank Group and, following a pilot initiative launched in 2017 in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen, has established a Humanitarian, Development, Peacebuilding and Partnership Facility as a part of the Peacebuilding Fund, to support United Nations country teams.

48. As part of the operationalization of the United Nations-World Bank Group flagship study, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, the United Nations and the World Bank have collaborated in Guinea, Nepal, the Niger and Tajikistan on the roll-out of the Risk Mitigation Facility sub-window of the International Development Association. Peacebuilding Fund projects based on the findings of the study have been launched in Tunisia and Zimbabwe. In February 2019, the World Bank Group and United Nations brought together country directors, managers and resident coordinators for the first-ever senior leadership dialogue on prevention and sustaining peace in Dakar.

49. A central component of that work has been a shift in focus led by the High-level Advisory Group for Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments, established in 2016 by the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank to support a standardized and internationally-recognized approach to identifying the underlying causes and impacts of conflict and crisis and to help Governments to develop a strategy for prioritizing recovery and peacebuilding activities. In 2018, joint recovery and peacebuilding assessments were completed in Cameroon, at the request of the Government; in Zimbabwe, the United Nations and World Bank conducted a joint assessment in support of the country's political transition. Reacting to growing challenges to a system-wide sustaining peace initiative, the United Nations dispatched an integrated mission, led by my Special Representative for West Africa and the

Sahel, to review options for optimizing United Nations support for the initiative in Burkina Faso.

50. The United Nations and the World Bank continue to work within their respective institutional mandates on the security sector. In 2018, two public expenditure reviews were undertaken for the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and joint support for public financial management reform in the security sector was provided in Somalia. The United Nations and the World Bank have scaled up coordination on support to core government functions in crisis-affected situations, under the auspices of the United Nations Inter-Agency Platform on Core Government Functions in Countries Impacted by Fragility and Conflict and, in 2018, finalized a joint diagnostic tool, providing guidance on the assessment of centre-of-government, civil service, local governance, public financial management, aid coordination and security sector institutions.

51. Other international financial institutions also have an important role to play in helping to reduce multidimensional risks. The African Development Bank strategy on addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa for the period 2014–2019 and its initiative to deliver on the Bank's five corporate priorities in 10,000 communities in fragile situations in 1,000 days, in partnership with actors such as UNDP, demonstrate important opportunities for the United Nations to scale up those partnerships. The Islamic Development Bank is also scaling up its work in that area, collaborating with UNDP on developing the Bank's policy on fragility and resilience and implementing it in a number of countries.

52. In my 2018 report, I called for guidelines for community-level engagement in peacebuilding and sustaining peace. A joint United Nations-civil society working group is developing system-wide community engagement guidelines for United Nations peace operations and United Nations country teams. The United Nations will be encouraged to use the guidelines to develop or enhance existing country-specific community engagement strategies, in consultation with national and local stakeholders, in particular youth and women's groups. Such strategies could be focused on building capacity, enhancing funding support and sharing good practices.

VI. Conclusion

53. In 2018, I presented a set of 42 recommendations, many of them bold and ambitious, to support the joint commitment of Member States and the United Nations system to build and sustain peace. The present interim report offers an early indication of progress: headway is being made on the vast majority of my recommendations, except for the important ones on securing adequate financing for peacebuilding. I urge the membership to ensure that progress is also made in those areas, in order to support collective efforts to advance the sustaining peace paradigm overall.

54. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/276 and Security Council resolution 2413 (2018), I will submit a detailed report to the Assembly at its seventy-fourth session, in connection with the next comprehensive review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture, focusing on the continued implementation of the twin resolutions adopted in 2016 (Assembly resolution 70/262 and Council resolution 2282 (2016)) and the implementation of subsequent recommendations and options. In my 2020 report, I will detail impacts and achievements, in particular at the field level, as a result of the joint efforts of the international community. I will also critically address areas of limited or no progress, both to identify any additional commitments necessary on my part and on the part of the Member States and to inform the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.