



## Security Council

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### **Letter dated 8 October 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council**

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator pursuant to paragraph 34 of Security Council resolution 2385 (2017) on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Kairat Umarov

Chair

Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)  
and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea



**Letter dated 18 September 2018 from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea**

In accordance with paragraph 34 of Security Council resolution 2385 (2017), I have the honour to transmit the requested report on the implementation of paragraphs 33 and 34 and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The humanitarian community working in Somalia wishes to advise that, as with the previous 12 reports, it maintains the definition of “implementing partner” pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), which is as follows:

“Implementing partner” — a non-governmental organization (NGO) or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another NGO and that reports when requested to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:

- (a) The organization is part of the humanitarian response plan for Somalia (or the Somalia Humanitarian Fund) process; and/or
- (b) The organization is represented in a cluster’s 3W matrix (*Who* does *What* and *Where*).

I remain available should you have any questions about the content of the report or need further clarification on the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

(Signed) Mark **Lowcock**  
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs  
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

## Report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

### Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution [2385 \(2017\)](#), the resolution succeeding resolutions [1916 \(2010\)](#), [1972 \(2011\)](#), [2060 \(2012\)](#), [2111 \(2013\)](#), [2182 \(2014\)](#) and [2244 \(2015\)](#) and [2317 \(2016\)](#), in which the Council established the reporting requirement. It is the thirteenth submission pursuant to the above-mentioned resolutions. The Council, in paragraph 34 of its resolution [2385 \(2017\)](#), requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Council by 15 October 2018 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments thereto.

2. The present report covers the period from September 2017 to September 2018. It focuses primarily on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected people in areas under the control or influence of Al-Shabaab, which was included on the sanctions list pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#), by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [751 \(1992\)](#) and [1907 \(2009\)](#) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, on 12 April 2010. As in the previous 12 reports ([S/2010/372](#), [S/2010/580](#), [S/2011/125](#), [S/2011/694](#), [S/2012/546](#), [S/2012/856](#), [S/2013/415](#), [S/2014/177](#), [S/2014/655](#), [S/2015/731](#), [S/2016/827](#) and [S/2017/860](#)), the present report outlines constraints to humanitarian access and operational implications. In addition, it summarizes mitigation measures established to address the risks of politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance. The report is based on information synthesized in consultation with relevant humanitarian organizations active in Somalia and information from the Risk Management Unit in the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator for Somalia.

### Humanitarian situation

3. The food security situation has continued to improve, however, needs remain critical, with internally displaced persons among the most vulnerable people in need in Somalia. An estimated 4.6 million people are in need, down from the 5.4 million people who required assistance between February and August 2018. The improvement in food security is attributable to the sustained humanitarian response and the above-average rainfall during the *gu* rains from April to June. Somalia has consequently had the wettest season in recent years, boosting the harvest of cereals to the highest levels since 2010. The projection of above-average rainfall for the coming *deyr* season is likely to result in further food security improvements.

4. However, despite the recent improvements to the food security outlook, such gains remain fragile and humanitarian needs in Somalia are still substantially high. The number of people in need still exceeds the levels prior to the onset of the drought crisis in 2016. Vulnerable communities have not recovered from the significant losses, in particular those sustained by agriculturalists and pastoralists, as a result of the drought crisis. Consequently, emergency and crisis levels of food insecurity persist in Somalia. Humanitarian needs in Somalia are driven by the increase in internal displacement that occurred during the drought, as people in inaccessible, rural areas sought assistance in populated areas that humanitarians could reach more easily. New displacements due to conflict and other factors, including lack of food, reunification with family, health care, education opportunities, insecurity and the search for better living conditions, have continued in 2018. The total number of internally displaced Somalis is estimated to be 2.6 million people, who are currently living in dire conditions in urban and peri-urban areas and require continuous assistance with basic

services. Internally displaced persons constitute some 58 per cent of the 1.5 million people in urgent need of assistance, the majority of whom are children.

5. Notwithstanding the improvements in the food security situation, high malnutrition rates prevail across the country, especially among the highly vulnerable internally displaced population. The nutritional status of children aged under 5 years remains largely unchanged owing to prolonged conflict, overstretched services and the lasting impact of the drought crisis in 2016. An estimated 954,000 children are expected to be acutely malnourished over the year, including 173,500 who are in need of urgent life-saving treatment. The situation is predicted to worsen between August and October, especially in the north-eastern parts of the country, as well as in areas that are hosting large internally displaced populations. The risk of evictions continues to rise for internally displaced persons, who are often the most vulnerable and, so far this year, more than 204,000 people have been evicted, equal to the total number of people evicted in 2017.

### **Humanitarian response**

6. Humanitarian partners have continued to provide life-saving assistance alongside livelihood support. Each month, nearly 2 million people are receiving food assistance and over 755,000 are being assisted with temporary access to safe water. Between January and August, health services were provided to more than 2 million people, most of whom were in flood-affected areas. Over the same period, the nutrition cluster treated 154,544 children for severe acute malnutrition. While cases of acute watery diarrhoea, cholera and measles continue to be reported, their frequency is significantly lower than in 2017, owing mainly to immunization campaigns that were conducted in 2017 and 2018, in which more than 4.4 million children were vaccinated against measles. Routine vaccinations for tuberculosis, tetanus and measles are also under way.

7. Humanitarian operations in Somalia remain critically underfunded, and the international community needs to sustain assistance and financial support to enable Somalia to respond to the current and future crises. In 2018 to date, donors have generously contributed \$577 million towards the humanitarian response plan, in addition to \$179 million in funding received outside the appeal. However, the total humanitarian funding received is considerably lower than the funding received during the same period in 2017. While last year, generous and early assistance enabled humanitarian partners to save lives, sustain the humanitarian response and avert famine, this year's funding shortfall may hamper the effective delivery of vital services. Funding shortfalls present a particular risk of service disruptions for displaced communities, including with regard to the restoration of education, health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. Sustained funding is critical to enable aid agencies to boost the provision of life-saving assistance and, ultimately, to put the affected communities on the path to recovery.

### **Humanitarian access constraints and operational implications**

8. The humanitarian operational environment in Somalia remains very challenging. The safety of humanitarian operations remains a key concern owing to the volatile and unpredictable security situation. During the first eight months of 2018, over 85 violent incidents affected humanitarian organizations, resulting in the death of 7 humanitarian workers, the injury of 12, the abduction of 18 and the arrest and temporary detention of 12. Over 80 per cent of the incidents took place in southern and central Somalia, with more than half of the deaths and injuries occurring in Mogadishu. Incidents vary in nature and include directly targeted attacks, as well as incidental violence. Security incidents further range in severity, from the most severe including assassinations, kidnappings for ransom, abduction, expulsion, looting and

deliberate destruction of assets or facilities, arrest and detentions, to the least severe, such as verbal and written threats. As in previous years, the collateral impact of attacks in populated places in Mogadishu continues to account for the majority of humanitarian personnel casualties. The number of assassinations in Mogadishu is also continuing to rise. Although the targets of most of the assassinations are government officials and security personnel, there have been instances in which humanitarian workers have also been targeted, both in Mogadishu and in other regional states. For example, in March, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack on a humanitarian worker, who was killed after an improvised explosive device that had been attached to his vehicle was detonated.

9. Although the number of humanitarian workers abducted by Al-Shabaab for ransom decreased, from the 25 recorded during first eight months of 2017 to five during the same period in 2018, the overall number of abductions of humanitarian workers remains high. While ransom was demanded for 25 of the 31 humanitarian workers that were abducted in 2017, in 2018, Al-Shabaab has demanded ransom for only 5 of the 18 humanitarian workers abducted to date. After successful community-led negotiations, 17 of the 18 aid workers have been released. One international female humanitarian staff member, who was abducted on 2 May 2018, continues to be held by her captors. The impact of the abductions is felt not only by the organizations directly concerned. Abductions also affect the people in need of assistance and protection, who are often left without assistance when the affected organizations decide to scale down or suspend operations. For example, in early August 2018, following the prolonged detention of one staff member, the International Committee of the Red Cross reduced its activities in Somalia, affecting access to assistance and protection for people who depend on its programmes. In another incident, in August, five staff members of a humanitarian organization were forced to abandon a beneficiary registration exercise in Gedo region, Jubbaland State, after the community members urged them to immediately leave the village as Al-Shabaab militants closed in on them, forcing the organization to consider another location for the project.

10. Al-Shabaab continues to implement hostile policies against most humanitarian organizations, for example, by directly targeting their personnel or assets. It also continues to direct local populations not to accept assistance packages from some humanitarian organizations and to punish communities that do accept such packages. For example, on 26 May, Al-Shabaab militants abducted three beneficiaries of a cash-for-work water catchment project in Bay region, South-West State, for failing to abide by its directive banning local communities from working for the project. In January 2018, in Shabelle Hoose, South-West State, Al-Shabaab destroyed the construction site of a humanitarian agency building water, sanitation and hygiene facilities using an improvised explosive device attack, and in March, it also destroyed a water source built by a humanitarian organization in K50 in Shabelle Hoose, South-West State. The later incident left about 5,000 people and an unspecified number of livestock without access to water.

11. The number of violent incidents associated with disorder and the looting of relief supplies increased during the second quarter, following the scaling-up of humanitarian interventions to respond to the effects of the floods in April to June 2018. The same trend in the frequency of incidents was also recorded in 2017 when humanitarian organizations scaled up drought response interventions. Violence associated with aid distribution accounted for the majority of the 26 violent incidents that affected humanitarians during the *gu* rainy season. As a result, in order to address interference with aid delivery, humanitarian organizations have been urged to improve planning for distribution activities, including by ensuring community

participation, as appropriate, and transparently addressing any grievances that communities may have with regard to beneficiary selection.

12. A steady increase has been observed in the number of incidents in which armed actors attempt to use force to coerce humanitarian workers to include them or their relatives as beneficiaries of aid. During the first eight months of 2018, more than 20 such incidents were recorded. In addition to the use of violence to threaten humanitarian workers, in some instances, armed actors have looted relief supplies and/or confiscated assets. For example, in May in Hobyo, Galmudug State, a gunman shot at a humanitarian vehicle, injuring one aid worker, after the gunman had been rejected as a beneficiary for a humanitarian project for which he was not eligible. In June, armed clan militia disrupted a relief distribution exercise and looted relief supplies in Laascaanood, in Sool region in northern Somalia. One of the armed men shot and wounded two female internally displaced beneficiaries, while one of the humanitarian organization's staff sustained stab wounds. In a related incident that involved state security forces in Galmudug in August, an assortment of relief supplies were robbed at gunpoint. In cases where government-affiliated actors are involved, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs immediately follows up with the authorities concerned at both the federal and regional state levels, often receiving commitments from the authorities to work alongside humanitarian organizations to have such concerns addressed. The Office continues to make efforts to improve the timeliness of the reporting of such incidents, as well as gathering the evidence required to inform follow-up efforts with the authorities. In addition, some local community leaders have continued to address such violations, especially when clan militias are involved.

13. Despite some milestone commitments made by the Federal Government of Somalia and some regional states, including Galmudug, HirShabelle, Puntland and South-West State, humanitarian organizations and the general civilian population are continuing to experience severe challenges related to the roads in 42 districts in southern and central Somalia and in Bari, Puntland. Extortion and other violations are common occurrences at the numerous illegal checkpoints controlled by both State and non-State affiliated armed actors. Similar violations continue to be reported at the authorized checkpoints along all major access roads in southern and central Somalia, with the following access roads most affected: Mogadishu-Afgooye-Baidoa, Mogadishu-Balcad-Jawhar and Cadaado-Gaalkacyo. While several operations were conducted to remove the unauthorized checkpoints along some access roads, including Mogadishu-Afgooye-Wanlaweyn, Mogadishu-Balcad-Jawhar, Gaalkacyo-Cadaado-Dhuusamarreeb and Garoowe-Boosaaso, the armed actors have adjusted by creating non-static checkpoints. Aid organizations continue to urge the authorities to build on the milestone commitments and efforts initiated in 2017 and to prioritize the securing of the major supply routes.

14. Furthermore, the siege by Al-Shabaab of some government-held towns in HirShabelle, South-West State and Jubbaland State has continued to hinder the transport of humanitarian and commercial supplies. The siege has continued to be strictly enforced in Xuddur and Waajid in Bakool, Diinsoor in Bay, Buulobarde in Hiraan, and Marka in Shabelle Hoose. In Buulobarde, Xuddur and Waajid, Al-Shabaab militants continue to target donkey cart drivers who are driving off-road in an attempt to sneak essential supplies into towns. Al-Shabaab often confiscates or destroys the supplies, in addition to committing other violations, including killing the transporters, subjecting them to physical assault and levying fines. For example, in June, Al-Shabaab attacked 13 trucks that were returning from carrying supplies from Beledweyne to the besieged town of Xuddur, resulting in the burning of 11 trucks and at least seven deaths; and in March, Al-Shabaab burned nine donkey carts that were transporting food commodities in Gedo, Jubbaland State, but the seven men who were driving the

carts managed to escape. Such incidents are common occurrences in the affected regions.

15. Humanitarian organizations continue to access the besieged towns by air. These include areas such as Buulobarde in Hiraan, HirShabelle State, Diinsoor in Bay and Waajid and Xuddur in Bakool, South-West State, and Garbahaarey in Gedo, Jubbaland State. Humanitarian organizations have been able to access Buulobarde by air only since 2014, owing to Al-Shabaab's aggressive implementation of a blockade on the town. Al-Shabaab continues to frequently plant improvised explosive devices at the airstrip, which is not protected around the clock. Security forces conduct a security sweep only when flights are expected, and permanent security arrangements for the airport are required. In the third incident of its type over a brief period, on 15 January, an improvised explosive device exploded at the airfield, posing a real threat to travellers. Discoveries of improvised explosive devices at the airstrip continue to be frequently reported, raising safety concerns for travellers, including humanitarian personnel and civilians.

16. Al-Shabaab also continues to sustain pressure on the Jawhar-Mogadishu and Mogadishu-Afgooye-Marka access roads by staging improvised explosive device attacks and coercing vehicles using such routes to pay "taxes". Trucks using the main supply routes in Hiraan continue to be subjected to Al-Shabaab attacks, a situation that has been long-standing because of the group's enforcement of its economic blockade on government-controlled towns. Road access along the Mogadishu-Afgooye-Baidoa route continues to be severely constrained owing to the mounting demands of and extortion by "State-affiliated armed groups" (that is, groups affiliated with the national Government), clan militia, criminal groups and Al-Shabaab. According to local communities, Al-Shabaab has, in particular, continued to increase its fees along some stretches of the Mogadishu-Baidoa and Mogadishu-Jawhar routes. For example, Al-Shabaab issued an instruction that, from mid-June 2018, all Toyota Noah drivers utilizing the Balcad-Afgooye road must pay a registration fee of a \$100 per vehicle and a daily road toll of \$3. The vehicles are popular because of their fast shuttle services between towns and villages. To ensure compliance, Al-Shabaab set up a checkpoint in the Dar es Salaam area near Ratiweyne village in Dayniile district. In addition, illegal checkpoints continue to be established intermittently along access roads in Galmudug by State-affiliated armed groups, as well as clan militias and criminals.

17. Furthermore, throughout southern and central Somalia, civilians continue to face more rigorous taxation by Al-Shabaab, forcing many into displacement and causing the loss of productive assets, thus rendering those civilians more vulnerable to food insecurity. In Marka town in Shabelle Hoose, taxation has been imposed on donkey carts that are supplying or collecting commodities. In many areas, traders are now subject to double taxation, paying both to Al-Shabaab and to the Government, which has made small businesses non-lucrative and has led to price hikes for consumers. During the 2018 *gu* rains, regions with farming communities were reportedly forced by Al-Shabaab to pay "taxes" to tend to their fields after good rains, while in parts of Galmudug, including in Ceel Buur, Ceel Dheere and Xarardheere districts, Al-Shabaab also increased taxation, requiring money and livestock to be provided as *zakat* or a "voluntary *jihad*" contribution. For example, farmers in Booshol village in Diinsoor, Bay region in South-West State, were directed to pay \$30 to tend to their farms and, consequently, several families were forced to vacate their farms and move to settlements for internally displaced persons in Baidoa because they could not afford to pay. In Waajid in Bakool, also in South-West State, internally displaced persons continue to express concern over Al-Shabaab's excessive taxation and harassment whenever they attempt to tend to their farms outside town. It should be noted that some internally displaced persons were forced to abandon

farming activities because of the taxation imposed by Al-Shabaab, and those who cannot afford to pay are being coerced into surrendering their children for recruitment.

18. Aggressive forced child recruitment campaigns in areas in southern and central Somalia, and in parts of Bari region in Puntland have continued to drive civilians into displacement, increasing the humanitarian caseload. The country taskforce monitoring and reporting mechanism reported that, from January to July 2018, a total of 1,568 children (including 43 girls) were recruited and used by armed forces and groups in Somalia. Al-Shabaab accounts for at least 80 per cent of the children recruited in Somalia. During the same period, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and its partners provided protection services to 817 children (including 96 girls) who had escaped from Al-Shabaab or had been released by armed forces in various areas of Somalia.

19. Al-Shabaab continues to take control of towns after the withdrawal of the Somali national armed forces and other government-affiliated forces, resulting in the disruption of humanitarian operations and, in some cases, the complete suspension of programmes. In 2018, the seizure of control of towns and villages, at times temporarily, by Al-Shabaab was reported in areas in HirShabelle, South-West State, Jubbaland and Puntland. The reactions of the population upon the taking of the towns are often mixed. In some areas, Al-Shabaab carries out retaliatory attacks on civilians that they deem to be government supporters or collaborators; and in other towns it only talks or preaches to local populations, without harming anyone. For example, in June, in Baxdo in Galmudug, Al-Shabaab militants took control for several hours, preaching to the population, without causing harm, and subsequently in July, it temporarily took over Caad village and the surrounding areas, burning houses, destroying several shallow wells and confiscating livestock from pastoralists who were accused of retaliating. Al-Shabaab also besieged the village and continued to block the delivery of medical and commercial supplies, including food and fuel. In July, it carried out revenge attacks on Hawadle clan civilians in parts of Hiraan and Shabelle Hoose by looting all their livestock, and Al-Shabaab destroyed the main bridge in Qoryooley in Marka district, Shabelle Hoose, through an improvised explosive device attack.

20. Conflict between Somaliland and Puntland over control of parts of Sool and Sanaag regions escalated again during the first quarter of 2018, with hostilities around Tukaraq in Sool region. Tensions remain high, while efforts to resolve the stand-off are under way. To date, all mediation efforts by external actors, including the United Nations, have failed and both parties have remained firm on their positions, setting prerequisite conditions on entering into negotiations that are unacceptable to the opposing side. Politicians on both sides have been fuelling the conflict with inflammatory statements, and both Puntland and Somaliland continue to mobilize and amass troops along the frontline. The heightened tensions and the level of preparedness demonstrated by both parties has elevated the risk of a full-fledged escalation of armed hostilities.

21. Clan conflicts remain a major concern, particularly in Hiraan, Galmudug, Shabelle Hoose, Shabelle Dhexe and Sool regions, where clan violence costs lives and livelihoods and displaces families. Humanitarian programmes in the affected locations are often suspended until the conflict is resolved. Occasionally, local humanitarian staff belonging to warring clans have been victimized or caught up in the conflict. Clan-related conflicts are mainly recorded in areas where pastoralist communities reside, owing to competition for scarce resources such as water and pasture, or in areas where farmers clash with nomads or over farmland. Galguduud and Hiraan remain the most affected areas with prolonged clan conflicts, and Galguduud region is particularly notable for clan skirmishes owing to the harsh environment and competition for resources. During the second quarter of 2018,



Sanaag region saw a sharp increase in incidents of clan-related violence owing to renewed fighting in Ceel Afweyn district. Hiraan region, particularly Beledweyne district, also continues to be affected by several clan conflicts. While clan elders and the authorities continue to prioritize negotiations to address ongoing clan conflicts, the payment of blood compensation remains the key determinant to conflict resolution. Even after reconciliation efforts have been successful, conflicts have the potential to reignite quickly over small or perceived provocations. For that reason, humanitarian organizations operating in the areas must be kept abreast of all incidents that can lead to clan conflicts, including those that may have occurred months or years in the past, to avoid falling prey to the revenge cycle.

22. Parties to the conflict have had an impact on telecommunication services, by ordering service providers to terminate services or attacking, destroying and damaging telecommunication installations. Disruptions to telecommunication services have affected some humanitarian programmes, including the provision of cash assistance and remote monitoring through call centres. In July, the killing of two Hormuud Telecom staff and the destruction of the company's building and antenna in Ceel Waaq, Gedo region, cut off all telecommunication services, including Internet and telephone services, interrupting aid programmes. The incident was the third time a Hormuud Telecom branch was reportedly destroyed by the Kenyan security forces that are not part of the African Union Mission in Somalia since the beginning of the year. Previously, those forces were accused of destroying the Hormuud Telecom installations in Dhamas and Ceel Banade in Jubbaland State. Humanitarian organizations continue to urge all parties to the conflict to respect civilian installations.

23. The forced evictions of internally displaced persons from established settlements continue to rise, leading to the loss of the significant investments made by humanitarian partners to facilitate access to basic services, including the establishment of water points and other water, sanitation and hygiene facilities, maternal and children's health centres and education facilities. During the eviction in Mogadishu in December 2017, approximately 4,220 households in 25 out of 38 settlements were destroyed, along with infrastructure such as schools, water, sanitation and hygiene facilities and other community facilities. To date in 2018, over 204,000 people have been evicted, which is equal to the number of people evicted in 2017 as a whole. Evictions are often carried out with little or no notice, and at times with the complicity of uniformed armed security personnel enlisted by land owners. On average, more than 155,000 people have been evicted across Somalia every year since 2015, and over 11,000 internally displaced persons are, on average, evicted every month. Many have been subject to multiple evictions. Up to 2015, large-scale evictions mostly affected internally displaced persons inhabiting public land and buildings, but over the past three years, forced evictions have increasingly targeted internally displaced persons hosted on private land.

24. Parties to the conflict have also continued to carry out airstrikes in some areas in Jubbaland State, South-West State and Puntland. The targets of the airstrikes have mainly been the assets and personnel of Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) located outside residential areas or within isolated areas under their control. Although, to date, the airstrikes have had no direct impact on humanitarian operations, the risk to operations located in the affected regions remains, in particular for vehicles moving supplies and personnel, which might be targeted in error. The renewed call during the first and second quarters of 2018 by the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance of the United States Agency for International Development for humanitarian organizations to submit deconfliction data may portend future possible increases in airstrikes. As a secondary impact, aerial attacks have reportedly made Al-Shabaab more suspicious of humanitarian organizations, on the basis that they could be collecting information to be used for airstrikes.

25. On 2 September 2018, the Federal Government of Somalia formalized its directive to international NGOs to relocate their leadership to Somalia by the end of 2018 through an official letter, advising that failure to comply by January 2019 will result in deregistration. International NGOs have responded positively to the directive and have already moved ahead, creating a committee to facilitate the process and to address the implications of the directive. International NGOs have also reiterated their request to the Federal Government of Somalia and regional states to expedite the establishment of a centralized and enabling framework, an initiative that has been under way for the past three years. In the absence of a centralized regulatory framework, aid organizations have continued to face demands such as arbitrary taxation, the involvement of authorities in contracting suppliers and service providers, and interference in staff recruitment, including screening, interviewing, selection and vetting. These have continued to lead to disruptions, delays, intrusions on humanitarian facilities, arrests, the detention and expulsion of humanitarian workers and occasional temporary suspensions of humanitarian programmes. During the first eight months of 2018, nearly 100 such incidents were recorded, accounting for the arrest and temporary detention of 12 humanitarian workers and the expulsion of 2 for alleged infractions. In comparison, in 2017, 22 humanitarian workers were arrested and temporarily detained, while 9 humanitarian workers, including 3 international staff and 6 Somali national staff were expelled by the authorities.

#### **Risk mitigation measures**

26. The Organization and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes have continued to put in place and implement enhanced risk management and control measures to ensure full accountability for their activities and funds channelled towards humanitarian response in the challenging operational environment in Somalia.

27. The Risk Management Unit supports the United Nations system, the Government of Somalia, at both the federal and regional state levels, and other development and humanitarian actors with the following services: facilitation of the design and promotion of the adoption of the collective risk management and due diligence standards; risk management advice; risk management training (online and classroom-based); information-sharing and information management; maintenance and enhancement of the Contractor Information Management System, the provision of support to multi-partner trust funds and the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility ; use of country systems and risk assessments and analysis for potential and existing partners. All the risk mitigation measures, practices, tools in place and tailored recommendations are designed to help agencies to address or mitigate a wide range of identified risks, including fiduciary, fraud, programme, integrity and reputational risks. The Risk Management Unit continues to support the Office of Internal Oversight Services and audit and investigations offices of different United Nations agencies, as required, through its monitoring team and risk analysts. The Risk Management Unit continues to establish and strengthen partnerships within the Organization and with the Government of Somalia, the NGO community, donors, law enforcement and other humanitarian and development partners.

28. As at 31 August 2018, the Contractor Information Management System database contains information contributed by the Risk Management Unit and 15 United Nations agencies on more than 4,060 contractors and suppliers to the United Nations in Somalia. The value of contracts covered therein is around \$5.1 billion. Regular updates include the listing of entities subject to Security Council sanctions and periodic updates of the World Bank exclusion list and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) list of wanted persons for Somalia. Individuals and organizations identified in the reports on Somalia by the Monitoring Group on

Somalia and Eritrea are added to the database as and when required. The Risk Management Unit also provides risk analysis and updates to the United Nations, World Bank, and African Development Bank trust funds (Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility funds) in support of the implementation of the National Development Plan. Over the reporting period, donor funds channelled through the United Nations multi-partner trust to the national funding stream have increased from \$2 million to \$11 million.

### **Impact of paragraphs 32 and 33 of resolution 2385 (2017)**

29. In paragraph 33 of resolution 2385 (2017), the Security Council decided that, until 15 November 2018, the measures imposed on Member States in paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia. While organizations surveyed for the present report did not explicitly comment on the impact of paragraphs 32 and 33 of resolution 2385 (2017) on their ability to implement programmes, the non-renewal of the humanitarian exemption would result in delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by non-State armed groups, which would put affected communities at risk of loss of lives and livelihoods and of exposure to suffering.

### **Conclusions**

30. After nearly three decades of turmoil, Somalia is currently on a positive trajectory towards peace and stability. When renewed risk of famine became apparent in early 2017, donors and operational humanitarian agencies acted promptly to scale up the humanitarian response and to save lives. The extensive mobilization reflects unprecedented and timely international solidarity, which is in line with commitments made as part of the Grand Bargain at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. It also reflects persistent efforts by humanitarian organizations to reach those in need, including in dangerous and insecure areas, to save lives and prevent the loss of livelihoods. Although large-scale famine has been averted to date, some communities in the hardest-to-reach areas in southern and central Somalia remain at risk of famine, and further efforts are required to ensure that the most vulnerable areas do not slip into famine in the coming months.

31. Humanitarian organizations active in Somalia continue to strike a balance between security concerns and ensuring effective service delivery under the principle of staying, protecting and delivering. Humanitarian partners also continue to seek to expand access where the needs are greatest, despite significant security challenges. The aforementioned efforts require flexible and timely funding to effectively provide assistance to millions of Somalis.

32. In the light of the foregoing, the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator invites the Security Council to renew the humanitarian exemption provided for in paragraph 33 of its resolution 2385 (2017).