

**Security Council**

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Letter dated 6 June 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a document of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, presenting its position on the recommendations contained in the twenty-first report ([S/2018/14/Rev.1](#)) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution [1526 \(2004\)](#), which was submitted to the Committee in accordance with paragraph (a) of annex I to resolution [2368 \(2017\)](#).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the position paper could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Kairat **Umarov**
Chair

Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#),
[1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals,
groups, undertakings and entities



Recommendations of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team contained in its twenty-first report

1. On 29 December 2017, the twenty-first report (S/2018/14/Rev.1) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team was submitted to the Committee pursuant to paragraph (a) of annex I to Security Council resolution 2368 (2017). A table of recommendations based on the report was also circulated to the Committee on 4 January 2018; the Committee deliberated on the recommendations in informal consultations on 12 January 2018. The Committee expresses its gratitude to the Monitoring Team for the exemplary work undertaken in the fulfilment of its mandate.

2. Since December 2005, when it established the practice, the Committee has responded to each of the reports submitted to it by the Monitoring Team and brought to the attention of the Security Council and the public the Committee's position on the recommendations contained in those reports.

Position of the Committee on the recommendations contained in the twenty-first report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

Recommendation to the Committee

Position of the Committee

Overview of the threat

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| <p>1. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the risk that ISIL-related individuals may attempt to get involved in legitimate businesses within their jurisdiction and encourage them, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness concerning this risk among relevant private sector stakeholders, encouraging them also to exercise increased vigilance and appropriate due diligence procedures to mitigate this risk.</p> | <p>The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States highlighting the risk that ISIL-related individuals may attempt to get involved in legitimate businesses within their jurisdiction and encourage Member States, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness concerning this risk among relevant private sector stakeholders, encouraging them also to exercise increased vigilance and appropriate due diligence procedures to mitigate this risk.</p> |
| <p>2. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the risk of the misuse of aid and reconstruction funds and encouraging them, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness of this risk among the relevant organizations and companies involved in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in the conflict zones, promoting heightened vigilance and partner vetting during the implementation phase of their projects.</p> | <p>The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States highlighting the risk of the misuse of aid and reconstruction funds and encouraging them, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness of this risk among the relevant organizations and companies involved in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in the conflict zones, promoting heightened vigilance and partner vetting during the implementation phase of their projects.</p> |

Impact assessment

3. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as other Member States which are at risk of their cultural heritage being looted by terrorist organizations, highlighting the usefulness of catalogue registration numbers for the identification of stolen and looted items, encouraging them to compile lists of numbers from museum catalogues and exchange the relevant numbers of items that are known or suspected to have been looted and stolen with Member States bordering the conflict zones, as well as potential destination countries for stolen or looted antiquities and with relevant international organizations.
4. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the importance of controlling the international travel of returnees, relocators, foreign terrorist fighters and listed individuals, emphasizing the importance of biometric information for the identification of individuals, in particular individuals likely to travel with stolen, forged or altered travel documents, highlighting the urgency of the matter; and, in the light of resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#), encourage again² those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to submit biometric data, in particular high-quality pictures and fingerprints of listed individuals, to the Committee and similar biometric data concerning foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).
5. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the risk that porous land and maritime borders present for the travel of listed individuals, foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators and encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to put in place appropriate border control management measures, such as bilateral or regional border control information sharing mechanisms, to address this issue.

The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as other Member States¹ which are at risk of their cultural heritage being looted by terrorist organizations, highlighting the usefulness of catalogue registration numbers for the identification of stolen and looted items, encouraging them to compile lists of numbers from museum catalogues and exchange the relevant numbers of items that are known or suspected to have been looted and stolen with Member States bordering the conflict zones, as well as potential destination countries for stolen or looted antiquities and with relevant international organizations.

The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States highlighting the importance of controlling the international travel of returnees, relocators, foreign terrorist fighters and listed individuals, emphasizing the importance of biometric information for the identification of individuals, in particular individuals likely to travel with stolen, forged or altered travel documents, highlighting the urgency of the matter; and, in the light of resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#), encourage those Member States that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to submit biometric data, in particular high-quality pictures and fingerprints of listed individuals, to the Committee and similar biometric data concerning foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators to INTERPOL.

The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States highlighting the risk that porous land and maritime borders present for the travel of listed individuals, foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators and encourage those Member States that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to put in place appropriate border control management measures, such as bilateral or regional border control information sharing mechanisms, to address this issue.

¹ The Monitoring Team specified these Member States, to which a note verbale was dispatched following the approval by the Committee.

² [S/2017/573](#), para. 91.

6. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to explore measures, such as creating a joint permanent team of financial intelligence unit and customs experts, to enhance the sharing of information and joint analyses, including on financial flows linked to international trade of goods, between customs agencies and financial intelligence units.

The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to explore measures, such as creating a joint permanent team of financial intelligence unit and customs experts, to enhance the sharing of information and joint analyses, including on financial flows linked to international trade of goods, between customs agencies and financial intelligence units.

7. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness among relevant weapon manufacturers of the risk of diversion of delivered arms and ammunitions to terrorist organizations and the implementation of detailed and in-depth know-your-customer procedures as a tool to mitigate this risk.

The Committee agreed that the Chair would write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to raise awareness among relevant weapon manufacturers of the risk of diversion of delivered arms and ammunitions to terrorist organizations and the implementation of detailed and in-depth know-your-customer procedures as a tool to mitigate this risk.

8. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to share information on materials used by terrorists with Programme Global Shield³ in order to ensure that the global monitoring efforts of these materials can be updated accordingly. In addition, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so to participate in the programme.

The Chair agreed, on behalf of the Committee, to write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to share information on materials used by terrorists with Programme Global Shield in order to ensure that the global monitoring efforts of these materials can be updated accordingly, and encourage those Member States that have not yet done so to participate in the programme.

Sanctions measures (addressed to the Secretariat)

9. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee instruct the Secretariat, to explore, in cooperation with the Monitoring Team, technical possibilities as to how biometric data, in particular pictures of listed individuals, could be made available via the sanctions list, specifically for implementers using a printed copy of the list to undertake screening.

The Committee agreed that the Chair would instruct the Secretariat to continue to explore, in cooperation with the Monitoring Team, technical possibilities as to how biometric data, in particular pictures of listed individuals, could be made available via the sanctions list, specifically for implementers using a printed copy of the list to undertake screening.

³ Programme Global Shield was started in 2010 by the World Customs Organization, with the support of INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.