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**Letter dated 21 December 2015 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2196 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council**

The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2196 (2015) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 17 (c) of resolution 2196 (2015), the final report on their work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) on 6 November 2015 and was considered by the Committee on 20 November.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

*(Signed)* Aurélien **Llorca**  
Coordinator

Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended  
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2196 (2015)

*(Signed)* Mélanie **De Groof**  
Expert

*(Signed)* Paul-Simon **Handy**  
Expert

*(Signed)* Ruben **de Koning**  
Expert

*(Signed)* Carolina **Reyes Aragón**  
Expert

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\* Reissued for technical reasons on 29 December 2015.



## **Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2196 (2015)**

### *Summary*

Two years after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2127 (2013) on 5 December 2013, the prospects for peace and security in the Central African Republic remain remote. The momentum that the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation had created in May 2015 was brutally interrupted when armed groups sparked a new wave of violence in the country at the end of September.

The escalation of violence that began in Bangui on 26 September also motivated former Séléka groups to move south towards the capital, as they had done in March 2013. On this occasion, international forces were able to halt their advance at Sibut, located only 188 km north-east of Bangui. However, the free movement of former Séléka armed elements in areas in which international forces are deployed, as well as the unhindered travel of their leaders to and from the Sudan and Chad, underlines the shortcomings of the peacekeepers' presence and the inability or negligence of neighbouring States when it comes to monitoring their own borders and implementing Security Council resolutions and sanctions.

The recent violence also halted the political process that had ushered in a new draft constitution and a new electoral law. While elections were supposed to formally bring to a close the second transition period in 2015, an alliance of convenience between radical former Séléka factions of Nourredine Adam and anti-balaka groups associated with the former President, François Bozizé, is now demanding a third transition.

Calls to extend the transition period were first made early in 2015 during parallel peace talks in Nairobi, which were organized without the endorsement of the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic. They involved sanctioned individuals Nourredine Adam and François Bozizé, who travelled to Nairobi in violation of the travel ban, together with their inner circle and commanders of the main armed groups. Facilitated by the President of the Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, in his capacity as international mediator, with the support of the Presidency of Kenya, the Nairobi negotiations occupied the main parties to the conflict for four months, proposed no inclusive solutions and ultimately derailed the Bangui Forum and its disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation agreement.

In the absence of State authority in most of the country, individual members of the Chadian security and military forces have trespassed into Central African territory and committed human rights violations against Central African nationals. The lack of control over its borders on the part of the Sudan has also allowed the Lord's Resistance Army, originally from Uganda, to find a safe haven in the Kafia Kingi enclave, a disputed area between the Sudan and South Sudan, out of reach of the African Union Regional Task Force. From their hideout, Joseph Kony and his inner circle instruct the few remaining loyal military commanders to loot and poach, inside the Central African Republic and as far as the northern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and bring back ivory, gold and diamonds. Sudanese poachers are also involved in such activities, sometimes competing with the Lord's Resistance Army.

In the western Central African Republic, the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC), commanded by Martin Koumtamadji, also known as Abdoulaye Miskine, poses the main security threat. Its deadly attacks on the main supply road to Bangui from Cameroon are paralysing the national economy. Miskine was released from captivity in Yaoundé in November 2014 in exchange for hostages taken by FDPC. He now enjoys his freedom in Brazzaville, while his group continues to hold hostage 16 Cameroonian nationals captured in March 2015.

Trade in natural resources continues to finance armed groups in all parts of the country. Taxation, security arrangements and parallel administrations are commonplace in former Séléka areas. The Union pour la paix en Centrafrique of “General” Ali Darrassa Mahamat thrives on gold production around Bambari and coffee trade with the Sudan. Similarly, the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique of Nourredine Adam levies taxes on the cattle trade in Kabo and Kaga Bandoro and on the diamond sector in Ndélé, Bria and Sam-Ouandja.

Diamond buying houses have not acted to reduce the risk of financing the former Séléka. In addition to the Bureau d’achat de diamant en Centrafrique/Kardiam (Badica), the buying house added to the sanctions list on 20 August, the Société centrafricaine du diamant (Sodiam) and Sud Azur have purchased diamonds from Bria and Sam-Ouandja in breach of the sanctions regime.

Anti-balaka groups are engaged in taxation and racketeering with regard to trade in agricultural resources and general merchandise, but also attacks on humanitarian convoys, the international forces and the transitional authorities, concentrated on the main access roads to Bangui and its main entry point, PK12. Anti-balaka groups also control most of the bank of the Ubangi River on the Central African side of the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, taxing boats and fishery activities on the river.

In the south-west, anti-balaka members continue to be present at a few diamond sites and have also obtained mining licences. While their involvement is not systematic in the proposed “green zone”, which is one of the conditions for exports to resume under the Kimberley Process, potential purchases from such sites and individuals would nevertheless still represent a violation of the sanctions regime.

Recent seizures of arms indicate regional circulation, in particular from neighbouring countries. Cross-border trafficking from Cameroon continues to represent one of the main sources of supply of hunting ammunition in the Central African Republic.

In-country circulation of arms remains significant. Improper storage and failures of stockpile management in the Central African Republic are the main causes of diversion and sources of trafficking. An anti-balaka attack against a gendarmerie headquarters on 27 September and regular attacks on police and gendarmerie posts demonstrate the need for physical security of arms storage facilities.

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### Annexes\*

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\* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

## Background

1. The Panel is home-based but maintained an almost permanent presence in the Central African Republic throughout the investigation phase of its mandate (April-October 2015). It travelled by road and air to 14 of the 16 prefectures (provinces) of the country.
2. At the regional level, the Panel travelled on three occasions, including twice by road from the Central African Republic, to Cameroon (Batouri, Bertoua, Douala, Garoua Boulāï, Kenzou and Yaoundé) and undertook two visits to Angola (Luanda) and one to Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo).
3. In accordance with paragraphs 17 (c) and (d) of resolution 2196 (2015), the Panel provided to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) its programme of work on 31 March, a progress update on 19 May and its midterm update on 29 July 2015. The Committee and its Chair visited the Central African Republic in August 2015.

## Methodology

4. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997, annex).
5. While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel intends to withhold identifying information.
6. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response within a specified deadline.
7. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions on the control of documentation and word limits, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265, the Panel decided to place some case studies and findings in the annexes to the present report. For example, a section on humanitarian issues is provided in annex 7, a section on outreach and cooperation with stakeholders and organizations is provided in annex 8 and most footnotes are compiled in annex 9.

## I. Bangui region<sup>1</sup>

### A. Escalation of violence in Bangui

8. From 26 September to 16 October 2015, Bangui was the scene of the most recent escalation of violence in the Central African Republic, almost a year after similar incidents (8 to 17 October 2014).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See map in annex 1.

<sup>2</sup> See details in annex 9.1.

9. The surge of violence left 79 civilians dead and 512 injured, as well as resulting in 20 attacks against United Nations premises and staff and 19 attacks against guesthouses and offices of international and local non-governmental organizations.<sup>3</sup>

10. Furthermore, as at 16 October, the violence had left 17,090 persons displaced and caused 2,894 refugees to flee across the Ubangi River to Zongo, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

11. On 28 September, 677 detainees escaped from the Ngaragba prison in Bangui,<sup>4</sup> notwithstanding the presence of forces from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). An estimated 203 escapees were anti-balaka elements.<sup>5</sup>

12. About 80 detainees in Bouar<sup>6</sup> and Sibut were also released during attacks on unprotected detention facilities by anti-balaka elements. Senior commanders have in most cases returned to their areas of operations and not yet been recaptured. Only the anti-balaka member “General Andilo” is currently imprisoned, at Camp de Roux, Bangui.<sup>7</sup>

13. For a detailed account of the events of September and October in Bangui, see annex 1.1.

## B. Threat to the political transition

14. The Panel considers that the escalation of violence that engulfed Bangui and Sibut from 6 to 11 October was aimed at destabilizing the transition and further delaying elections.<sup>8</sup> Polls are considered to be the major threat to the plans of spoilers to seize power either by force or through a new peace settlement outside the framework established by the international community,<sup>9</sup> underlining the fact that the crisis is mostly of a political nature.<sup>10</sup>

15. Since the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation on 11 May, the political process of reconciliation had gained greater momentum. It included the launch of voter registration on 26 June<sup>11</sup> and the adoption of a new electoral law and a draft constitution establishing the baselines for general elections to be held before the end of 2015, which should formally end the transition.

<sup>3</sup> See sources in annex 9.2.

<sup>4</sup> The Panel obtained three conflicting figures: 677 according to the Central African judicial authorities (e-mail on 19 October 2015); 689 according to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and 686 according to MINUSCA, with the last-mentioned specifying that no detailed list of inmates was available.

<sup>5</sup> A list of anti-balaka elements detained at the prison, provided by Maxime Mokom, is archived with the United Nations.

<sup>6</sup> According to a confidential report dated 1 October 2015, 19 anti-balaka detainees escaped during the attack on the jail on 29 September.

<sup>7</sup> Rodrigue Ngaïbona was mentioned in the Panel’s interim and final reports for 2014 (S/2014/452 and S/2014/762).

<sup>8</sup> Meetings with political actors in Bangui, 15-26 September 2015, including those running for and those opposing elections.

<sup>9</sup> See details in annex 9.3.

<sup>10</sup> See details in annex 9.4.

<sup>11</sup> According to a MINUSCA report, 1,895,252 voters were registered, representing 90.4 per cent of the population, a historic figure for elections in the country.

16. The Panel assessed that major political choices by the transitional institutions<sup>12</sup> had aggrieved much of the Bangui-based political elite and indirectly contributed to the gradual deterioration of security that had culminated in the outbreak of violence on 26 September. Those choices included the Transitional Government's decision to isolate elements of armed groups perceived as radical; the appointment of an anti-balaka leader as a minister; and the adoption by the National Transitional Council of election-related frameworks<sup>13</sup> that de facto sidelined many political actors. Those decisions were compelled by the hesitation of the international community in general and the international forces in particular about what was the right strategy with regard to tackling armed groups.

### **Risky pick-and-choose strategy**

17. During and after the Bangui Forum, the Panel observed the Transitional Government's approach to selecting suitable representatives of armed groups for political negotiations. Its political choices led to greater consideration of the Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) of Djono Ahaba over other former Séléka factions, including the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) of Nourredine Adam and the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) of "General" Ali Darrassa Mahamat.<sup>14</sup>

18. Regarding the anti-balaka, the impact of the Transitional Government's selection strategy included the gradual rehabilitation of Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, who was reappointed as president of the national football federation, and the appointment of the leader of the anti-balaka stronghold of the Boeing neighbourhood of Bangui, Sébastien Wénézoui,<sup>15</sup> as Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development. It also led to the sidelining of their rivals, Maxime Mokom and Joachim Kokaté.<sup>16</sup>

19. Whereas the Transitional Government chose to isolate radical elements considered to be behind the crisis, the international mediator opted for a totally different approach that relegitimized them and served to inform their demand for a third transition and the postponement of the elections.<sup>17</sup> His actions, including the facilitation of travel ban violations (see annex 6), met with considerable international criticism and led the President of the Security Council to recall in a presidential statement of 18 December 2014 the importance of Member States implementing sanctions (S/PRST/2014/28).

20. The Panel notes that the lack of coordination between the international mediator and the Transitional Government has played into the hands of spoilers on both sides.

21. The inconsistency of the approaches towards dealing with radical elements of armed groups also manifested itself when representatives of MINUSCA<sup>18</sup> and a

<sup>12</sup> See details in annex 9.5.

<sup>13</sup> See details in annex 9.6.

<sup>14</sup> See details in annex 9.7.

<sup>15</sup> In its final report for 2014 (S/2014/762), the Panel concludes in its paragraph 75 that most of the religious-based attacks conducted on the Muslim area of Bangui originated from Boeing; see photograph of Wénézoui in Boeing in annex 1.2.

<sup>16</sup> See details in annex 9.8.

<sup>17</sup> It should be noted that the international mediator's initiative was not coordinated with the United Nations, the Economic Community of Central African States or the African Union. See annex 1.3.

<sup>18</sup> See details in annex 9.9.

member of the Group of Eight, Economic Community of Central African States Ambassador Adolphe Nahayo,<sup>19</sup> discreetly met Nourredine Adam in Kaga Bandoro in October.

22. Such special treatment for an individual sanctioned by the Security Council, whose forces violently clashed with international troops on 10 and 11 October, is likely to contribute to confirming his strong belief that he is a power broker.<sup>20</sup>

23. Moreover, the Panel is of the view that the appointment of leaders of armed groups as members of the Transitional Government both reinforces their sense of impunity and has no significant impact in reducing the level of violence.

#### **Rapprochement between the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique and Mokom's anti-balaka faction**

24. Consequently, the Transitional Government's strategy further radicalized FPRC and the Mokom faction of the anti-balaka that both attended the Nairobi talks. Both the Kenyan authorities and the international mediator facilitated on this occasion the travel of sanctioned individuals Adam and Bozizé to Nairobi, including by providing air assets, in violation of paragraph 30 of resolution 2134 (2014) and paragraph 4 of resolution 2196 (2015).<sup>21</sup> Since the signing of an agreement in Nairobi, both FPRC and Bozizé's party, Kwa Na Kwa (KNK), have systematically called for a third transition,<sup>22</sup> as enshrined in the declaration adopted in Nairobi.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> See details in annex 9.10.

<sup>20</sup> For the Nairobi talks, the international mediator provided Adam with special treatment by flying him, with MINUSCA support, to Brazzaville and Nairobi on special flights chartered by the Presidency of the Congo.

<sup>21</sup> See annex 6 for a photograph of all the participants at the Kenyan Presidency on 14 April 2015 and more details on violations of the travel ban and implementation of the asset freeze.

<sup>22</sup> See annex 1.4; confidential communication, 10 October 2015.

<sup>23</sup> Meetings with Barret Aboua Moussa Maouloud, Kaga Bandoro, 16 January 2015, and Moyen-Sido, 27 May 2015; report on meeting between MINUSCA and Adam, confidential e-mail, 10 October 2015; see also copy of the Nairobi agreement in annex 1.5.

**FPRC and anti-balaka representatives who attended the talks in Nairobi<sup>24</sup>**

<i>FPRC</i>	<i>Anti-balaka</i>
Michel Djotodia (president)	General François Bozizé Colonel Jean-François Bozizé François Joseph Bozizé (also known as “Jojo”) Lin Banouképa (Bozizé’s lawyer)
Nourredine Adam (vice-president)	Joachim Kokaté (Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona’s representative)
Moustapha Sabone (general coordinator)	Maxime Mokom (military coordinator)
Abel Balenguélé (deputy coordinator)	Côme Hyppolyte Azounou (Mokom’s deputy and administrator of Damara)
General Youssouf Ibrahim (regional commander, Kaga Bandoro)	Baron Clotaire Adramane (KNK liaison and Mokom’s special adviser, Dekoa)
Mahamat Nour	Sylvain Béorofei (zone commander, Gobéré)
Yousouf Idriss	Chrysostome Yapélé, also known as “Chiki Chiki” (coordinator, Berbérati)
Mahamat Saleh	Basile Dika (Azounou’s deputy and regional coordinator, Ouham-Pendé)
Kader	Arnold Geoffroy Iya (coordinator, Bouar) Clément Bama Rodrigue (Central African armed forces)

25. Interviews conducted by the Panel between May and October 2015 in Moyen-Sido, Kaga Bandoro, Ndélé, Bangui and Paris also established that the extended presence of FPRC and anti-balaka leaders in Nairobi had led to a gradual rapprochement between those groups.

26. In particular, the FPRC deputy coordinator, Moussa Maouloud, and Mokom confirmed to the Panel that they regularly telephoned each other.<sup>25</sup> During the escalation of violence in Bangui, several intelligence reports from the international forces, which were confirmed by the Panel during a meeting with the chief of staff of Nourredine Adam in Ndélé, indicated that operational meetings were held in the PK11 and Boeing neighbourhoods between representatives of Haroun Gaye and Mokom, probably Yvon Konaté, to coordinate action against the international forces and the transitional authorities.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Information provided to the Panel by a confidential source who was in Nairobi; interviews with the Panel, Bangui, 20 April and 24 June 2015. See also annex 6 for a photograph of the delegations and annex 9.11 for additional details.

<sup>25</sup> Meeting with Moussa Maouloud, Moyen-Sido, 26 May; meeting with Mokom, Bangui, 27 June 2015.

### **Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique armed militia in Bangui**

27. The main armed militia based in the Texas block of the Jamaïque sector of the PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui is composed of around 60 elements and controlled by Haroun Gaye.<sup>26</sup> A founding member of FPRC and officially appointed by Nourredine Adam on 2 November 2014 as rapporteur of the FPRC coordination structure, Gaye is considered by Adam's chief of staff to be in charge of the FPRC armed elements in Bangui.<sup>27</sup>

28. Other armed groups are active in the neighbourhood, in particular that commanded by a former Séléka general, Achafi Daoud. Smaller groups, such as that commanded by a former general, Ousmane Mahamat Ousmane, "Rue poussière" and the Coordination des organisations des musulmans centrafricains of Ali Ousmane, reportedly reinforce Gaye's militia.<sup>28</sup>

29. The group commanded by Gaye and his deputy, Hamit Tidjani,<sup>29</sup> is perceived, however, as the most extremist by the local community and civil society representatives. In particular, Gaye's group has been preventing the movement of people outside the neighbourhood in order to reinforce the communal identity of the Muslim population and avoid reconciliation.<sup>30</sup>

30. Gaye's militia is reportedly funded by a United States-Chadian national, Mahamat Nour Binyamine,<sup>31</sup> who is reportedly in charge of collecting rent for buildings and houses owned by the former President, Michel Djotodia, and paying travel expenses for Nourredine Adam.<sup>32</sup>

31. The Panel is of the opinion that the failure of MINUSCA to arrest Gaye on 2 August, in an operation during which a peacekeeper was killed and eight others were injured, represents a negative milestone in combating impunity and restoring State authority. It also affected the perception of the balance of power between MINUSCA and armed groups. Most of the individuals identified in the Panel's 2014 interim and final reports as armed group leaders and members are still active,<sup>33</sup> and Haroun Gaye and his militia operate freely in the third district of Bangui.<sup>34</sup>

### **Operational coordination between Kwa Na Kwa and Mokom's anti-balaka faction**

32. Information obtained by the Panel reveals that, in anticipation of the Bangui Forum, an operational rapprochement was coordinated in Bangui between KNK and Mokom's faction, following instructions from Bozizé's entourage in Nairobi.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>26</sup> See details in annex 9.12.

<sup>27</sup> Meeting with Lambert, Ndélé, 3 October.

<sup>28</sup> The main military commanders in the PK5 neighbourhood were identified as former Séléka members: Colonel Mahamat Seïd, Hassan Marega and Mahamat Fadoul.

<sup>29</sup> See details in annex 9.13.

<sup>30</sup> Confidential report, 20 August 2015; meeting with PK5 civil society activist, Bangui, 28 August 2015; see details in annex 9.14.

<sup>31</sup> See details in annex 9.15.

<sup>32</sup> Meetings with former Séléka member, Bangui, 29 June and 2 July 2015; meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 25 June, and Paris, 4 September 2015.

<sup>33</sup> See details in annex 9.16.

<sup>34</sup> Haroun Gaye was personally involved in an incident against a MINUSCA-protected delegation led by Dieudonné Nzapalaïnga to the Bangui central mosque on 26 October 2015; moreover, armed men patrolling PK5 were observed on 27 October 2015; confidential report, 28 October 2015.

<sup>35</sup> Meetings with three confidential sources with excellent knowledge of KNK and anti-balaka activities, Bangui, 27 April and 26 and 29 June 2015.

33. Several meetings were held in April and May at the house of Bernard Mokom, father of Maxime and stepbrother of Bozizé, in the Boy-Rabe neighbourhood of Bangui, with Didacien Blaise Kossimatchi<sup>36</sup> and Baron Clotaire Adramane<sup>37</sup> playing a central role in the coordination between anti-balaka military commanders of Mokom's faction (including Olivier Koudémon, Guy Mazimbélet and Guy Gervais Mokpem) and the KNK leaders, including Bertin Béa. The financial support of Nadia Béa, Bertin's wife and manager of an import company called Agence de communication routière et de transit, was also mentioned in those reports.<sup>38</sup>

34. On the basis of that information, the Central African authorities arrested Bertin Béa on 15 August at Bangui International Airport as he boarded a Royal Air Maroc aircraft. On 20 August, a crowd invaded the Bangui court and forcibly freed him, during an interview before his provisional detention. The crowd was composed of KNK supporters and anti-balaka elements, among whom the judicial authorities identified a senior anti-balaka military commander.<sup>39</sup> On 6 October, the Panel witnessed Béa again being prevented from travelling to Paris.

### **Elections: the red rag of spoilers**

35. Other decisions that aggrieved many political actors beyond the Nairobi group are related to the elections. The first pertains to the decision to allow refugees to vote and the second to the eligibility of members or former members of the Transitional Government.

36. In a seminal decision published on 20 July (see annex 1.7), the Transitional Constitutional Court nullified a decision of 30 June by the Transitional National Council that prevented refugees from taking part in the elections. Muslim organizations and leaders of former Séléka factions had considered the earlier decision to be another example of Muslim marginalization. The combined pressure of the Court and international partners was the driving force that compelled the Council to review its position on 20 August.<sup>40</sup>

37. On 28 August, the Transitional Constitutional Court clarified the provisions of the Transitional Constitutional Charter about the eligibility of members of the transition to stand for election.<sup>41</sup> The Court's decision prevented significant numbers of political actors from running in the presidential and legislative elections.<sup>42</sup> They subsequently joined forces to request a third transition. Politics in the Central African Republic remains the easiest way to accumulate wealth and capital.

38. The unlikely coalition of political actors and armed groups requesting a third transition comprises:

<sup>36</sup> See details in annex 9.17.

<sup>37</sup> See details in annex 9.18.

<sup>38</sup> Confidential reports, 27 March, 10 April and 8 May 2015, confirmed during meetings with confidential sources, with excellent knowledge of KNK and anti-balaka activities; see also annex 1.6 for a photograph of Bertin and Nadia Béa.

<sup>39</sup> The information provided to the Panel identified him as a Central African soldier registered under number 2005-2-1028, Wilfred Ndoutingai; meeting with judicial official, Bangui, 29 August 2015.

<sup>40</sup> See details in annex 9.19.

<sup>41</sup> See annex 1.8 for the court decision and annex 9.20 for more details.

<sup>42</sup> See details in annex 9.21.

(a) The Nairobi group, including FPRC and anti-balaka elements linked to Mokom and Bozizé;

(b) A group of political platforms, parties and independent prominent persons<sup>43</sup> numerically representing 90 per cent of the country's political parties and associations.

39. The Panel considers that some of the organizers of the recent violence in Bangui are among the second above-mentioned group, which includes members of the current Transitional National Council.<sup>44</sup> On 27 September, a Council member and civil society activist, Gervais Lakosso, organized a demonstration calling for the international forces to leave the Central African Republic. He also aired a message on Radio Ndeke Luka in which he called for civil disobedience and, the next day, organized a demonstration, led by Koudémon, calling for the departure of the international forces.<sup>45</sup>

40. Lakosso's involvement was considered sufficiently serious for the former Minister of Justice, Aristide Sokambi, to issue a communiqué on 28 September in which he pointed out the responsibility of Lakosso, Mokom, Koudémon and Ngaïkosset for the recent escalation of violence (see annex 1.10).

41. The President of the Transitional National Council, Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet, has also often displayed the behaviour of a spoiler from within. To illustrate this, the Panel notes his dubious stance on various Council decisions, which casts doubt on his full adherence to the transitional process and elections. In addition, his role during the recent upsurge of violence in Bangui, in particular his declaration that some high-ranking officers in the military had requested him to take power, also displayed his personal ambitions.<sup>46</sup>

### C. Issues relating to the arms embargo

42. A section on incidents of non-compliance is included in annex 1.11. In annex 1.12, the Panel analyses the mixed outcome of the voluntary disarmament operation initiated in March by the Central African authorities.

#### Arms inspections, trends and violations

43. Since 7 April, the Panel has conducted 30 inspections of stocks of arms and ammunition seized or collected by international and national forces, belonging to the national security or armed forces or inspected while still under the control of armed groups.

44. The inspections were conducted in the west (Bouar, Baoro, Berbérati), the north (Kaga Bandoro, Mbrès, Ndélé), the east (Bria, Obo), the centre (Mbaïki, Bossangoa, Bambari) and Bangui. Annex 1.13 provides details of all the inspections of weapons and ammunition conducted by the Panel.

45. In line with the Panel's final (S/2014/762) and interim (S/2014/452) reports for 2014, and on the basis of the vast geographical scope of the inspections and the significant amount of materiel analysed during its mandate, the Panel considers:

<sup>43</sup> See details in annex 9.22.

<sup>44</sup> See details in annex 9.23.

<sup>45</sup> See photographs of Koudémon and Lakosso in annex 1.1, Lakosso's flyers in annex 1.9 and more details on Lakosso in annex 9.24.

<sup>46</sup> See details in annex 9.25.

(a) That the circulation of arms in the Central African Republic remains significant and contributes to fuelling the conflict;

(b) That similar types of conventional small arms, light weapons and ammunition, some of which feature the same serial numbers,<sup>47</sup> are in the possession of all armed groups, including the anti-balaka, the former Séléka, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC), Sudanese poachers, criminals and the national security and armed forces (see also annex 1.13);

(c) That the vast majority of the 415 weapons inspected are assault rifles of various categories: type 56 (81), type 56-2 (65), type 56-1 (7), Galil-type (9), MPI-KM-type (11), Vektor R4-type (7), KBK-AKMS-type (4) and AKM-type (23). The Panel also inspected 44 MAS-36 rifles and 31 MAT-49 submachine guns. Artisanal hunting rifles are circulating in the country, especially in anti-balaka areas (see annex 5.6 and [S/2014/452](#), annexes 14 and 15);

(d) That hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades are available to armed groups;

(e) That significant quantities of 7.62x39 mm ammunition from several countries of origin have been seized from all armed elements in all prefectures. To a lesser extent, 14.5x114 mm, 12.7x108 mm, 7.62x54 mm, 7.5x54 mm, 7.62x51 mm, 5.56x45 mm, 9x19 mm and 9x25 mm ammunition has recently been seized and collected. Hunting ammunition is found primarily in anti-balaka areas (see *ibid.*);

(f) That most of the weapons and ammunition in circulation originate from State stockpiles and there is no evidence that significant quantities of weapons and ammunition have been brought into the Central African Republic since the imposition of the arms embargo;

(g) That cross-border trafficking from Cameroon in violation of the arms embargo continues to represent one of the main sources of supply of hunting ammunition, which is sold freely on the open market, even in the vicinity of MINUSCA bases (see annex 5.3);

(h) That some 7.62x39 mm ammunition seized from armed groups was manufactured recently (up to 2013).<sup>48</sup>

### **Stockpile management**

46. The storage and security of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons belonging to the Central African security and armed forces remain a major challenge.

47. To date, the Panel has inspected only one armoury that complies with minimum safety requirements.<sup>49</sup> At other sites, arms and explosives were stored without proper security measures, as observed at the offices of the research and investigation section in Bangui (see annex 1.14).

<sup>47</sup> See details in annex 9.26.

<sup>48</sup> In Obo, rounds inspected were produced in 2012 in China and in 2013 in the Sudan.

<sup>49</sup> This assessment is based on seven inspections from 12 April to 6 July of the armoury of the gendarmerie headquarters located at Camp Izamo (see annex 1.15).

48. Similarly, several units of the national security and armed forces did not have proper arms registries<sup>50</sup> and, in one case, a significant quantity of hunting ammunition appeared to have disappeared in transit from the gendarmerie in Bria to Bangui.<sup>51</sup>

49. The storage and security of arms and ammunition seized by MINUSCA in the prefectures also remain of concern. The Panel inspected several MINUSCA bases where arms, ammunition, explosives, narcotics and soft drugs were stored in disregard of safety standards.<sup>52</sup> The Panel also came across a weapon kept outside the storage facility, in the private room of a peacekeeper, allegedly for security reasons.

50. Improper storage of arms and ammunition and poor stockpile management raise several issues:

(a) Unsafe storage generates physical security risks and can lead to serious accidents;

(b) The recent escalation of violence demonstrated that armouries and weapons stores are the first targets of attackers, and such successful attacks fuel violence;

(c) Inadequately managed stockpiles, whether controlled by the national authorities or international forces, are a major source of diversion, illegal trafficking and circulation of small arms and light weapons.<sup>53</sup>

51. Correct storage and security of stockpiles are thus crucial for enhancing security and reduce armed violence.<sup>54</sup>

## II. Central region and border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo<sup>55</sup>

52. The Panel considers that former Séléka factions and anti-balaka groups are engaged in a tactical struggle over the control of territory in the central region, characterized by low-intensity skirmishes and ambushes since August 2014.

53. The most recent main battle between anti-balaka and former Séléka elements was fought in Batangafo in July 2014. As a result of the mobilization of local young people, groups associated with the anti-balaka are now active in most of the region, as far as Bria.

54. In this context, local people continue to be targeted by armed groups, villages looted and burned and civilians killed.<sup>56</sup> There have been numerous reported cases of sexual violence and cattle rustling.

55. While the level of tension has fallen considerably in the Ben Zambé-Bouca-Batangafo triangle, the situation remains extremely tense in the Bambari-Grimari-

<sup>50</sup> Some units are consistently logging weapons in and out of their armoury. For example, a copy of the registry of the military national training centre in Bouar is provided in annex 1.16.

<sup>51</sup> See details in annex 9.27.

<sup>52</sup> Inspection in Bossangoa and Mbaïki, 26 April and 30 August 2015 (see annex 1.17).

<sup>53</sup> This assessment is shared by other institutions, as detailed in annex 9.28.

<sup>54</sup> See references in annex 9.29.

<sup>55</sup> See map in annex 2.

<sup>56</sup> MINUSCA reported on 7 July 2015 having found a mass grave in Kanga, between Kouango and Ngakobo; confidential report, 9 July 2015. See details in annex 9.30.

Kouango area, in particular between the anti-balaka and the UPC faction of the former Séléka but also between rival anti-balaka groups.

56. The attack perpetrated by the anti-balaka in the Combattants neighbourhood of Bangui against the senior leaders of UPC on 26 October triggered a new wave of violence in the area.

57. The structures of UPC and anti-balaka groups in the central region are outlined in annex 2.

58. Armed groups also use the Democratic Republic of the Congo for smuggling activities. Anti-balaka groups control most of the Central African bank of the Ubangi River and most of the islands, whence they tax the movements of boats. In the area of Satema (Basse-Kotto prefecture) and Béma (Mbomou prefecture), UPC controls the main crossing points with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including between Béma and the town of Yakoma, on the Congolese side of the river (Equateur Province). From Bangassou to the border with South Sudan, the area is mostly under the influence of LRA groups active in the northern Democratic Republic of the Congo (see sect. III.D).

#### **A. Control of the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo by armed groups**

59. Almost all the crossing points for the Ubangi River, which serves as the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, are controlled by armed groups or under their influence.

60. From the border to Basse-Kotto prefecture, anti-balaka groups have established several dozen checkpoints on the river, taxing fishers and traditional boats transporting goods and passengers. This taxation is having an impact on the price of basic goods and fishery activities.

61. From Mongoumba (Lobaye prefecture) to the port of Kolongo, south of Bangui, the area remains under the influence of the anti-balaka group of Alfred Yékatom, also known as “Colonel Rombhot”.<sup>57</sup> The Panel also received information that his group uses Kolongo to smuggle ammunition, including hunting ammunition, from the Congo.<sup>58</sup>

62. From Port Sao, north of Bangui, to Kouango, anti-balaka groups based in their stronghold of the sub-prefecture of Ndjoukou (Kémo-Gribingui prefecture) maintain a dozen checkpoints, from either villages on the riverbank or camps on islands. Several “naval” checkpoints manned by local anti-balaka young people from Kouango are located between Kouango and Mobaye.<sup>59</sup> Activity at Port Sao was paralysed for a week in June following the hijacking of a boat by anti-balaka elements demanding

<sup>57</sup> Listed by the Committee on 20 August 2015; see details in annex 9.31.

<sup>58</sup> Meetings with a confidential source with good knowledge of armed trafficking networks, Bangui, 15 January 2015; meeting with traders at Ouango port, Bangui, 22 January 2015.

<sup>59</sup> Meeting with local fishers and authorities, Kouango, 16 April 2015. It was mentioned in a confidential report of 30 May 2015 that between seven and eight checkpoints were located on the Ubangi River between Port Sao and Kouango.

ransoms. The cargo and passengers, including Congolese nationals, were released after a week.<sup>60</sup>

63. In Kouango, the Panel was informed that cattle and goods looted by anti-balaka elements were mostly sold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, more specifically in the villages of Bangi, Buda and Dula, in the Bosobolo district of Equateur Province, where the anti-balaka are reportedly purchasing hunting ammunition.<sup>61</sup>

64. The strategic post of Béma has been coveted by anti-balaka groups<sup>62</sup> and at least two factions of the former Séléka (UPC and RPRC), which reportedly even clashed for its control.<sup>63</sup> During a telephone interview on 16 April, a former FPRC zone commander, Colonel Adoum Kamis, admitted that he and his deputy, Ismael Ayero (UPC), were levying an illegal tax of FCFA 700 (\$1.30) per passenger to cross the river. For commercial goods, the taxation varied by quantity and value, from FCFA 1,000 to FCFA 2,000 (\$2-\$4).

65. The former Séléka elements also use Béma for smuggling activities to and from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where they reportedly source weapons, ammunition and military uniforms. Members of the Congolese battalion of MINUSCA confirmed that several UPC members wore uniforms of the Congolese military.<sup>64</sup> In addition, the Panel traced back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo eight Galil assault rifles seized from armed groups, including the former Séléka and LRA.<sup>65</sup>

66. Smuggling of natural resources from the Central African Republic to the Democratic Republic of the Congo reportedly benefits former Séléka forces. The mainly UPC-controlled area between Bangassou and Alindao, including the sub-prefectures of Kembé (Basse-Kotto prefecture) and Gambo (Mbomou prefecture), is rich in diamonds and gold.<sup>66</sup>

## **B. Bambari-Grimari-Kouango hotspot**

67. The main parties in this area are UPC and two opposed anti-balaka groups. Bambari remains subject to a potential upsurge of violence, as observed from 20 to 24 August when seven civilians were killed as a result of intercommunal violence.<sup>67</sup>

68. RPRC, led by the military chief of staff, General Joseph Zoundeko, as well as General “Tarzan” and Lieutenant Younouss, has a residual role in the area. General Zoundeko has denounced Fulani and also said that the UPC leadership was composed of “foreigners”, using the same rhetoric as the anti-balaka and the local Muslim youth

<sup>60</sup> Confidential report, 22 June 2015.

<sup>61</sup> Meeting with local population, Kouango, 16 April 2015.

<sup>62</sup> During a meeting with a UPC deputy zone commander in Kouango on 16 April 2015, he indicated that two former Séléka elements and 14 civilians had been killed during the attack, which had occurred on an unknown date at the end of 2014.

<sup>63</sup> Meeting with MINUSCA, Bangassou, 16 April 2015; see more details in annex 9.32.

<sup>64</sup> Confidential report, 22 October 2015; meeting with MINUSCA, Bangassou, 16 April 2015.

<sup>65</sup> See details in annex 9.33.

<sup>66</sup> Meeting with local authorities and businesspeople, Bangassou, 16 April 2015.

<sup>67</sup> Panel of Experts database of incidents, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

association, and is suspected of having struck an agreement with the anti-balaka group of Gaëtan Bouadé in Bambari.<sup>68</sup>

### **Weaponry of the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique**

69. On 25 May, the Panel inspected four assault rifles (two type 56-2, one AKM-type, one FN-FAL) and one M20-type pistol (TT-33 copy) seized by international forces from UPC elements. In March, international forces patrolling the north checkpoint of Bambari observed a dozen UPC elements carrying AK-type and M16-type assault rifles.<sup>69</sup> This latter type was also seized in Bria during the Sangaris force-MINUSCA operation on 10 February.<sup>70</sup>

### **Exploitation of natural resources**

70. The Panel remains of the view that UPC is militarily deployed in the prefectures of Ouaka, Haute-Kotto, Basse-Kotto and Mbomou<sup>71</sup> primarily to control and tax gold exploitation, sugar smuggling and coffee production, trade and export to the Sudan. The UPC business model was described in detail in the Panel's final report for 2014 (S/2014/762, paras. 144-145 and annexes 41-44). The Panel confirmed the scope of UPC control during field missions in Bambari, Kouango and Bangassou.<sup>72</sup>

71. Apart from exercising control over the gold mining site of Ndassima, UPC elements were also present in the diamond mining areas of Dimbi and Kembé (Mbomou prefecture) to extort money from artisanal miners and coffee traders.<sup>73</sup> The officer of the special anti-fraud unit based in Bangassou has no access to those areas. Gold and diamonds from Ndassima, Dimbi and Kembé are traded through Béma and Satema.

72. Most of the UPC revenue from coffee is derived from taxation arrangements in Bambari, whence coffee transporters move north to the Sudan. In April, UPC forced the State tax office for agricultural products and the main coffee transporter, Ouaka Café, to accept an agreement whereby they would systematically underdeclare the volume of trucks, so as to lower taxes, and add the discount to security payments to UPC. These would then total FCFA 400,000 (\$800) per truck.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>68</sup> See details in annex 9.34.

<sup>69</sup> Confidential report, 3 April 2015, archived with the United Nations.

<sup>70</sup> Inspection at Camp de Roux, Bangui, 16 April 2015. Two researchers from Conflict Armament Research were also present.

<sup>71</sup> See details in annex 9.35.

<sup>72</sup> Missions to Kouango on 16 April and from 15 to 18 May 2015; mission to Bangassou on 16 April 2015; mission to Bambari on 25 May 2015.

<sup>73</sup> Meetings with gendarmes and coffee traders, Bangassou, 16 April 2015; the mining sector is structured as follows: digger (*creuseur* or *ouvrier minier* or "Nagbata"), artisanal miner (*artisan minier* or *chef de chantier*), collector (*collecteur*) and buying house (*bureau d'achat*).

<sup>74</sup> Confidential report, 25 April 2015; see photographs of coffee plantations and Sudanese trucks in annex 2.14.

### Anti-balaka networks in Ouaka

73. The regional structure of the anti-balaka in Bambari-Grimari-Kouango, provided by the Parti centrafricain pour l'unité et le développement (PCUD) of Patrice-Edouard Nguissoua on 10 December 2014, includes most individuals involved in armed group activities. In Bambari, the anti-balaka military structure as at 15 April was composed of some 20 individuals under the PCUD banner and the command of the regional coordinator, Grâce à Dieu Endjezapou, also known as "Empizado" (see annex 2.1).<sup>75</sup>

74. Gaëtan Bouadé's deputy zone commander was then officially Giscard Raskia Ndarata, also known as "Cerveau rouge" or "Carie dentaire".<sup>76</sup> The tension was perceptible between the two leaders, with Gaëtan implementing a local agenda, while Ndarata, who arrived in Bambari from Bangui in December 2014 alongside six other anti-balaka military commanders (Thierry Madibo, Séraphin Guébanda, Tonton Mambikpongo, Frédéric Feïndirongaï, Charlin-Chabardo Momokama, also known as "Charly", and Guy Vivien), appeared to have a national agenda. The UPC political leaders accused the transitional authorities of supporting Ndarata as a proxy force against a former Séléka Fulani faction in Ouaka.<sup>77</sup>

75. On 26 April, an attack on Gaëtan's house in Bambari by Ndarata's deputy, "Fally", repelled by Gaëtan's group, officialized the division of the anti-balaka movement in Bambari into two factions. On 16 June, Mokom included Ndarata as part of his movement.<sup>78</sup> The conflict escalated further on 15 October when Ndarata's group, led by Guy Vivien, attacked Gaëtan's stronghold at Kidjigera. Gaëtan's faction again repelled the attack, during which four people died, including Vivien, who was then beheaded. Following the defeat of his affiliates, Maxime Mokom reportedly sent reinforcements the next day to Yakéché, under the command of Rodrigue Yagbanga.<sup>79</sup>

76. The Panel's inspections of the weapons seized in the area, including those seized by MINUSCA at Ndarata's house on 24 May, showed that his group possessed some conventional weapons.<sup>80</sup>

77. That local anti-balaka groups in the Kouango area are in contact with Bambari-based anti-balaka leaders was corroborated through interviews with demobilized child soldiers previously under Gaëtan's command. They stated that their function in the anti-balaka was to travel by foot or bicycle and transmit Gaëtan's messages or instructions from Bambari to the local anti-balaka commanders around Kouango.<sup>81</sup>

### Anti-balaka versus Union pour la paix en Centrafrique in Ouaka

78. The anti-balaka and UPC have been competing for control of Ouaka since 2014 in the light of its strategic position and the economic interests at stake.<sup>82</sup> Both

<sup>75</sup> See annex 2.2 for the regional structure of PCUD dated 10 December 2014, including Bambari, Grimari and roads to Kouango. "Empizado" is based in Bangui and has little leverage with regard to the situation in Bambari; e-mail from a Bambari-based confidential source, 23 April 2015.

<sup>76</sup> Registered as a Central African soldier with identification number 2009-2-1983.

<sup>77</sup> See UPC press communiqué in annex 2.3 (24 August 2015).

<sup>78</sup> See annex 2.4 for the structure of Mokom's movement in Bambari and Grimari.

<sup>79</sup> Confidential report, 18 October 2015.

<sup>80</sup> See details in annex 9.36.

<sup>81</sup> Interviews with demobilized child soldiers, Bambari, 20-22 May 2015; see annex 7 for more details.

<sup>82</sup> A passenger travelling from Bambari to Kouango will have his mission order signed by three different military commanders from the anti-balaka and UPC (see annex 2.5).

armed groups also committed a wide range of human rights violations during that period and drove Central Africans into refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>83</sup>

79. The roads from Bambari and Grimari towards Liotto are the main access routes to Kouango. From Liotto, secondary roads provide access to remote villages located to the east and the west. Most of the human rights violations have been committed in those areas, where the anti-balaka and UPC are attacking and forcibly displacing civilians who could potentially support one group or the other.

80. The road from Grimari to Liotto, where the Panel observed burned houses and displaced persons, remains contested, as does the road from Bambari to Liotto.<sup>84</sup>

81. The Panel also investigated the killing of an aid worker in Bambari. During the evening of 15 March, a State nurse at the health centre located at the internally displaced persons site known as “Sangaris”, Benoît Kabé, was kidnapped by three anti-balaka elements. He was then shot and had his throat slit (see annex 2.7).

82. The road south-west from Liotto is not accessible by vehicle (see annex 2.8), preventing the Panel from visiting the area. However, witness statements indicated that, since October 2014, several attacks against civilians, in particular Fulani communities, had been conducted by anti-balaka elements commanded by one “Manda Kara”. The attacks have left dozens of civilians dead and hundreds of households displaced. Victims explained to the Panel that “Manda Kara” and his group generated significant revenue from stealing their cattle.<sup>85</sup>

83. On 16 May, the Panel visited the villages of Bolo I and II, attacked on 10 November 2014 by a UPC group under the command of Colonel Mahamat Bandi. At the outset of the attack, some 10 civilians were killed, including 3 older women who were burned alive in their houses (see annexes 2.9 to 2.11).<sup>86</sup>

84. In the area east of Kouango on the road to Bianga,<sup>87</sup> several confrontations occurred between the former Séléka, UPC elements and anti-balaka militias commanded by “Maguya” and “Samba André”.<sup>88</sup>

### C. Anti-balaka stronghold of Bossangoa-Bouca-Batangfo

85. The resumption of anti-balaka activities on main supply road 1 between Bangui and Boali, where the Vice-President of the Transitional National Council and MINUSCA police personnel were abducted on 18 October by Hubert Sélébondo, also known as “Colonel Hubert”, and the regular presence in the area of Damara of Thierry Lébéné, also known as “12 Puissances”, and of Andilo’s brother, indicate that the north of Bangui continues to be one of the main strongholds of the anti-balaka faction of Mokom. In addition, the PK12 neighbourhood, at the junction of main supply roads 1 and 2, where the main checkpoint to gain access to Bangui is located, is still

<sup>83</sup> See details in annex 9.37.

<sup>84</sup> See photographs of destroyed houses in the area of Liotto in annex 2.6, and annex 9.38 for more details.

<sup>85</sup> See details in annex 9.39.

<sup>86</sup> See details in annex 9.40.

<sup>87</sup> See map in annex 2.12.

<sup>88</sup> Testimony collected of victims from Oumba, 25 km east of Kouango, which was attacked by the anti-balaka on 20 November 2014. See annex 9.41 for more details.

under control of an anti-balaka commander, Mokpem, and a place where attacks on MINUSCA convoys occur regularly. The complete structure of the anti-balaka in Ouham prefecture is detailed in annex 2.13.

#### **Attacks against humanitarian actors**

86. The Panel investigated a series of five attacks on World Food Programme convoys on the road from Bangui to Damara between January and March.<sup>89</sup> The perpetrators, who had information on the departure time of non-escorted convoys and the types of load and routings, followed the convoys on motorbikes. They would identify the trucks with the goods of interest, divert them from the convoys on to a secondary road and loot the goods.

87. The Panel identified the perpetrators as anti-balaka elements based in Boy-Rabe under the command of the PK12 zone commander Teyemebe Ambios, also known as “Tex”. Azounou, Mokom’s deputy, acknowledged during an interview that he had been informed of those incidents upon returning from Nairobi and subsequently discharged “Tex” as zone commander on 30 May. Nevertheless, Mokom and Azounou told the Panel that they had refused to arrest and hand over “Tex” to the judicial authorities. Recent reports indicate that “Tex” is still active in his area of operations.<sup>90</sup>

### **III. Eastern region and border with the Sudan and South Sudan<sup>91</sup>**

88. Similar to the north, the eastern region of the Central African Republic remains a stronghold of former Séléka groups, in particular the prefectures of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto. In the absence of State authority, former Séléka factions have established checkpoints on all the main routes, where they levy taxes on road movements, and operate parallel administrations in the main towns.

89. Provision of armed escorts and static security, taxation at checkpoints and racketeering affecting local businesses, including those involved in the exploitation of natural resources, represent the main source of income for former Séléka groups. When various factions coexist in the same location, they share the resources collected, in accordance with informal agreements, as reported by UPC to the Panel in Bria.<sup>92</sup>

90. Reports are regularly received of movements of armed elements on the main roads, including to and from the Sudan,<sup>93</sup> notwithstanding the presence of the tripartite force on the Sudanese side of the border town of Am Dafok (see annex 3.1). The progressive deployment of MINUSCA in the eastern prefectures has not yet had an impact on the capacity of former Séléka groups to operate freely, in particular FPRC of Nourredine Adam. The exceptions are Bria, where the joint Sangaris force-MINUSCA operation to restore State authority on 10 February forced General Arda Hakouma<sup>94</sup> to move north with his FPRC troops, and Sam-Ouandja, Kotto and Nzako,

<sup>89</sup> See details in annex 9.42.

<sup>90</sup> See details in annex 9.43.

<sup>91</sup> See map in annex 3.

<sup>92</sup> Meeting with UPC Colonel Makaï and Moussa, Bria, 14 April 2015.

<sup>93</sup> See details in annex 9.44.

<sup>94</sup> Hakouma was appointed by Adam on 2 November 2014 as chief of general of FPRC in Kaga Bandoro.

where the African Union Regional Task Force<sup>95</sup> is imposing strict limitations on former Séléka groups,<sup>96</sup> very similar to the confidence-building measures enforced by the Sangaris force before the progressive handover to MINUSCA (see S/2014/762, annex 56).

91. Movements of well-known former Séléka leaders are also reported regularly in the north-east, sometimes with large groups of armed elements.<sup>97</sup> In particular, General Hakouma and FPRC generals, Oumar Younouss (Sudanese Fulani), also known as “Oumar Sodiam”, Tom Adam, also known as “Ben Laden” (Goula), Ibrahim Shafadine (Goula), Zacharia Damane, also known as Zakaria Damane (Goula), and Zacharia Samtchago, also known as General “Santiago”, and Colonel Ali Ousta have been travelling frequently in this area, but also between Kaga Bandoro and Ndélé.<sup>98</sup>

92. A more detailed overview of the situation of former Séléka factions in Vakaga prefecture is in annex 3.

93. Activities of groups belonging to LRA and of Sudanese poachers also persist in the region. The overall strength of LRA is estimated at between 119 and 188 fighters,<sup>99</sup> although two LRA groups active in Haute-Kotto prefecture are considered to be splinter groups. Defectors also reported that two other smaller groups loyal to the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, passed through Central African territory from the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards the Kafia Kingi enclave in Radom, a disputed area between the Sudan and South Sudan, where the LRA leadership is still based.<sup>100</sup> In addition, the Panel received corroborated information about active cooperation between former Séléka factions and LRA groups in Haute-Kotto prefecture.

## A. Former Séléka networks in the Sudan

94. Nourredine Adam travelled several times to the Sudan in 2015. In particular, his chief of staff, Lambert Lissane Moukouvé,<sup>101</sup> confirmed to the Panel his presence in the Sudan, for family reasons, at the end of September.<sup>102</sup> The Panel notified the Sudan on 24 April that those trips were in violation of the travel ban imposed by the Security Council following the listing of Adam by the Committee on 9 May 2014.

95. General Oumar Younouss is seemingly well connected to the Sudan, being a Sudanese national born in the locality of Tullus, South Darfur, located some 150 km from Am Dafok. On a social networking website, he appears in a photograph wearing the uniform of the Sudanese Central Reserve Police, also known as “Abu Tera”, into which some Janjaweed of Arab origin have been integrated since 2006.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>95</sup> See details in annex 9.45.

<sup>96</sup> The Panel visited Sam-Ouandja and Bria on 27 September and 14 April 2015, respectively, observing no armed elements.

<sup>97</sup> United Nations reports, 22 June, 7 and 8 July and 7 September 2015; meetings with military sources in Bangui, January-September 2015.

<sup>98</sup> See details in annex 9.46.

<sup>99</sup> Figures provided during debriefings of recent high-level defectors.

<sup>100</sup> Debriefings of fighters from Kony’s group in the Sudan who defected in April 2015 and were found by the African Union Regional Task Force on 14 June 2015.

<sup>101</sup> See details on Lambert in annex 9.47.

<sup>102</sup> Meeting with Lambert, Ndélé, 3 October 2015.

<sup>103</sup> Meeting with researcher on Darfur, Paris, 4 September 2015.

96. General Moussa Suleiman as-Simeh, also known as “Abu Qasim” (Arab),<sup>104</sup> is allegedly involved in smuggling activities from the Sudan to the Central African Republic, including of weapons and ammunition.<sup>105</sup> He is reportedly now based in his home locality of Edd al-Fursan in South Darfur, located some 200 km from Am Dafok. General Hakouma and the RPRC political adviser, Mahamat Abbas (formerly a close adviser to Nourredine Adam and the successor of Michel Djotodia as the consul of the Central African Republic in Nyala), are also reported to be maintaining strong relationships with networks in the Sudan and with Sudanese officials in Nyala.<sup>106</sup>

## **B. Fragmentation of the former Séléka**

### **Competition for taxation of trade with the Sudan**

97. Birao<sup>107</sup> is the entry point for Sudanese traders proceeding by truck to the Central African Republic through Vakaga prefecture. They are mainly responsible for supplying commercial goods to the areas under former Séléka control — as far as Moyen-Sido (Ouham prefecture, border with Chad) and Kouango (Ouaka prefecture, border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Vakaga is mostly inhabited by ethnic groups with a presence in Darfur (Goula, Rounga and Sara-Kaba) and South Sudan (Kara).

98. Ouandja, Ouanda Djallé and Ouadda host the main checkpoints and are key rest stops for Sudanese trucks travelling to Bria and beyond. Competition is high between FPRC, UPC and RPRC to tax and provide armed escorts for convoys.<sup>108</sup> Smaller checkpoints are reportedly also present in Délembé and Tala and between Ouadda and Bria.

99. Ouadda is also known as an arms market where Sudanese traders sell ammunition to former Séléka generals. Younouss is reported to have purchased ammunition there in September ahead of the march on Bangui. The FPRC zone commander in Bria, Colonel Ousta, has reportedly replaced Younouss in mobilizing resources and men in the region.<sup>109</sup>

### **Sam-Ouandja**

100. Although the administrative control station in Sam-Ouandja is under the full control of FPRC, African Union Regional Task Force troops based in Sam-Ouandja and Kotto impose strict limitations on FPRC operations in the area, preventing FPRC elements from carrying weapons in the town and controlling their movements in and out of the area. In accordance with the Task Force’s practices, a weekly security meeting is organized at the mayor’s office, where information about the general security situation and, especially, the LRA presence and activities is shared.

<sup>104</sup> See details in annex 9.48.

<sup>105</sup> Meetings with two independent confidential sources with good knowledge of armed trafficking networks, Bangui, 15 January, and Paris, 28 January 2015.

<sup>106</sup> Meeting with Sudanese rebel leader, 3 September 2015.

<sup>107</sup> The Panel was supposed to travel to Birao on 29 September 2015, but the flight was cancelled owing to the escalation of violence in Bangui.

<sup>108</sup> See details in annex 9.49.

<sup>109</sup> E-mail from a Bria-based confidential source, 8 October 2015; the Panel met Colonel Ousta in Bria on 15 May 2014.

101. Officially, according to Shafadine, Sam-Ouandja is under the collegial control of himself, Alanta and “Ben Laden”.<sup>110</sup> The zone commander, Ahmat Maadi Grégoire, allegedly reports to them.

102. In reality, FPRC in Sam-Ouandja is divided between the faction of Alanta and Shafadine (under the command of the latter) and the faction of “Ben Laden”. The last-mentioned recently arrived in the town, after reportedly being forced to leave the towns of Bambari, Alindao, Bria and Birao.<sup>111</sup>

103. However, businesspeople in Sam-Ouandja consider that the commander is currently “Ben Laden”, to whom the zone commander directly reports. Moreover, the African Union Regional Task Force reported that a serious incident involving Alanta and “Ben Laden” had occurred on 25 October, during which the latter had threatened to kill the former.

### **Bria**

104. Three factions of the former Séléka (FPRC, UPC and RPRC) share control of Bria. Generals Yaya Scout, a former FPRC member,<sup>112</sup> and Damane are also based there, although the latter travels frequently to Sam-Ouandja and Ouadda for business.

105. Initially a stronghold of RPRC, Bria came under FPRC control at the end of November 2014 after several groups commanded by Hakouma and Colonel Adam Moktar left Kaga Bandoro to take over Bria, following Nourredine Adam’s instructions.<sup>113</sup> At the same time, Darrassa in Bambari also sent a detachment of around 50 elements under the command of Colonel Makaï and his deputy, Moussa, to have a presence there.<sup>114</sup>

106. Although an agreement was struck between the groups to share resources, FPRC and RPRC have nevertheless reportedly clashed several times for control of a checkpoint located 25 km north of Bria, in a village called Bounou.<sup>115</sup>

107. Currently, Ousta represents FPRC in Bria, following the dismissal of Colonel Bachar Adramen Issène as zone commander by Shafadine, and his deputy, Colonel Mani Ngombé Kette, also known as “Fakimani”. FPRC has its stronghold in the north of Bria, in the Bornou neighbourhood, predominantly inhabited by members of the Goula ethnic group. The RPRC zone commander, “Colonel” Azor Kalit, has expressed to MINUSCA and the Central African authorities his desire to be reintegrated into his military unit in Bangui.<sup>116</sup> The UPC zone commander, Makaï, assisted by Colonel Moussa and Hamadou Tanga, is in direct contact with General Darrassa. The UPC detachment in Bria is reported to be firmly integrated into the UPC command and control structure in Bambari.<sup>117</sup>

108. During the joint Sangaris force-MINUSCA operation on 10 February, significant quantities of arms were seized, providing a detailed overview of the type and the

<sup>110</sup> Meeting with Shafadine and Alanta, Sam-Ouandja, 27 September 2015.

<sup>111</sup> The Panel met General “Ben Laden” in Bambari on 3 July 2014 (see [S/2014/762](#), annex 9).

<sup>112</sup> General Scout, also known as “Scouth”, was appointed as first deputy chief of general staff of FPRC during its general assembly in Kaga Bandoro on 2 November 2014.

<sup>113</sup> Meeting with international forces, Kaga Bandoro, 16 January 2015.

<sup>114</sup> Meeting with Makaï, Bria, 14 April 2015.

<sup>115</sup> See details in annex 9.50.

<sup>116</sup> Registered as a Central African soldier with identification number 2001-2-1397.

<sup>117</sup> E-mail from a Bria-based confidential source, 14 June 2015.

origin of the weapons in possession of FPRC. The Panel documented 8 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 6 machine guns, 2 machine gun barrels, 15 assault rifles, 1 SA-7 missile, 1 mortar tube and 3 hunting rifles. Approximately 3,000 rounds of 7.62x39 mm, 7.62x54 mm, 7.62x51 mm, 5.56x45 mm, 12.7x108 mm ammunition and hunting ammunition from several countries of origin were seized during the operation. MINUSCA also seized in Bria 9x19 mm and 40 mm ammunition, as well as large numbers of rocket-propelled grenade rounds and hand grenades (see annex 3.3).<sup>118</sup>

### C. Sudanese poachers

109. Sudanese poachers and traditional traders heading south, towards Haute-Kotto prefecture and Mbomou prefecture, and west, along the Central African side of the Chadian border, regularly cross the eastern region of the Central African Republic.<sup>119</sup> In recent years, for security reasons, Sudanese merchants, travelling on secular trading routes, have enjoyed the protection of poachers.

110. In May, two groups of some 200 poachers originating from the Sudan were active in the eastern Central African Republic. The passage of one of the groups was also reported to the Panel by former Séléka leaders in Sam-Ouandja.<sup>120</sup> Smaller groups of Sudanese poachers on donkeys were also seen by locals interviewed in Ndélé in mid-September (see sect. IV).

111. The poachers usually establish a base camp whence they split into smaller groups of 20 to 30 poachers.<sup>121</sup> They hunt elephants for ivory and other wild animals, such as cheetahs, lions, giraffes, buffalo and antelope, although the drastic decrease in the pachyderm population — some 400 savannah elephants remain in the eastern region of the Central African Republic from an initial estimated population of 20,000 — is obliging poachers to stay longer in the country than before, including during the rainy season. Other groups reportedly pass through the country to poach in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

112. Sudanese poachers are reportedly experienced, well-armed (mainly equipped with AK-type assault rifles with 7.62x51 mm ammunition from several countries of origin)<sup>122</sup> and feared by local communities and armed groups.<sup>123</sup> They have, in some instances, attacked LRA fighters on the assumption that these groups transport elephant tusks, gold and other valuables. Although poachers are reported to have robbed and regularly harassed civilians, no killings or acts of sexual violence have been reported. This is probably due to the poachers' strategy to avoid the African Union Regional Task Force.

<sup>118</sup> See also annex 1.13 for the full listing, and annex 9.51 for more details.

<sup>119</sup> Meetings with local officials, armed group leaders, expatriates, representatives of non-governmental organizations and African Union Regional Task Force senior officers, Obo, Sam-Ouandja, Ndélé and Bangui, April to September 2015.

<sup>120</sup> Meeting with Generals Shafadine and Alanta, Sam-Ouandja, 27 September 2015.

<sup>121</sup> See details in annex 9.52.

<sup>122</sup> See details in annex 9.53.

<sup>123</sup> See photograph of Sudanese poachers in annex 3.4.

## D. Lord's Resistance Army

### Operations

113. LRA remains one of the main threats in the east and south-east of the Central African Republic, in particular in the prefectures of Haute-Kotto, Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou bordering the Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. LRA operations remain primarily focused on generating revenue from the exploitation and trade of natural resources, specifically ivory and gold. A detailed map of LRA operations is provided in annex 3.5.

114. According to the figures provided by the former LRA second in command, Dominic Ongwen, before his transfer to the detention facility of the International Criminal Court on 21 January, the strength of LRA was 188 fighters and 227 non-combatants, comprising 111 fighters and 164 non-combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 38 fighters and 7 non-combatants in the Central African Republic and 39 fighters and 56 non-combatants in the Sudan.<sup>124</sup>

115. LRA elements avoid confrontation with other armed groups or international forces to preserve their ammunition for hunting purposes. LRA has continued to adapt its operations to the constant extension of the perimeter of action, including the permanent deployment of the African Union Regional Task Force in 2014 to Nzako and Kotto. Recent LRA defectors consistently reported that the command centre of the group, under Joseph Kony, remained in the Kafia Kingi enclave, Radom locality, South Darfur.

116. The Panel obtained information that the authorities in Radom tolerate Kony's presence. Two independent sources confirmed that he had received medical treatment in Nyala in December 2014 and had travelled by aeroplane from a Sudanese military-controlled airfield located in the vicinity of Songo, in Radom, north of Kafia Kingi.<sup>125</sup> The Panel also obtained evidence that Sudanese traders met LRA leaders in the Sudan in the first half of 2015 and provided them with the equivalent in Sudanese pounds of \$200,000, most likely in exchange for goods looted or poached by LRA.

117. In December 2014, Okot Lukuang, recently identified by defectors as a commander close to Kony, reportedly met LRA groups operating in northern Orientale Province (Democratic Republic of the Congo) to transmit direct instructions from Kony, including performance targets in terms of ivory, mostly poached in the Garamba National Park (Democratic Republic of the Congo), and gold looted from artisanal mines in the region.<sup>126</sup> Consequently, significant quantities of elephant tusks, gold and other goods looted during LRA raids are being regularly transported back to Kafia Kingi by small groups led by commanders loyal to Kony and subsequently traded in the town of Songo.<sup>127</sup>

<sup>124</sup> A high-level defector, Okello David Adilang, mentioned during a debriefing on 11 September 2015 a total of 119 fighters and 107 non-combatants.

<sup>125</sup> Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 27 June 2015; meeting with Sudanese rebel leader, 3 September 2015; see annex 3.6 for imagery of the Songo airstrip and Sudanese armed forces camps.

<sup>126</sup> See details in annex 9.54.

<sup>127</sup> Meetings with African Union Regional Task Force officials, Obo, 20-23 April 2015; meetings with international non-governmental organization representatives that focus on LRA, Bangui, 27 June 2015; written debriefings from senior LRA fighters, end 2014-early 2015; see annex 3.6.

118. The recent increased activity in the Central African Republic by LRA groups around Bria and the recruitment campaign conducted as far west as Morabanda (sub-prefecture of Mbrès)<sup>128</sup> are new developments having a significant impact on the security situation in the Central African Republic. Incidents of LRA attacking and looting villages and, in some instances, abducting children remain of great concern. In Bria, investigations conducted in July concluded that two LRA groups were operating in the prefecture under Alfonse Lamola and “Adam Sam”, possibly identified as Odong Kidega Murefu. Their *modi operandi* indicated that they might be disconnected from the central leadership.<sup>129</sup>

119. However, both groups reportedly maintain regular contact with General Scout, who joined the UPC faction of Darrassa on 1 April. The former Séléka and LRA have apparently concluded a non-aggression pact and exchanged food and non-food items. The area south of Ouadda, in particular the village of Mouka, is reportedly where Scout met “Adam Sam”. They also reportedly met in Mbali and Ibanda, villages also located in the Bria-Ouadda strategic area through which Sudanese trucks under UPC protection have to pass.

120. The Panel inspected arms and ammunition seized by the African Union Regional Task Force from LRA since 2009.<sup>130</sup> The types of weapons and ammunition recovered — assault rifles of type AK, G3, Galil, Kbk-AKMS, AKM, 56/56-1/56-2, as well as MAS 36-type rifles, artisanal rifles, mortar rounds, hand grenades, hunting and other ammunition of various origin — were similar to weapons used by armed groups in other parts of the Central African Republic. Over a period of six years, the Task Force seized 72 conventional weapons in the Central African Republic, 30 of which were recovered in a single cache in June. Unlike the inspected weapons, which were rather old, a significant quantity of the 7.62x39 mm ammunition, of Sudanese origin, was manufactured in 2011, 2012 and 2013.<sup>131</sup>

#### **Humanitarian impact of Lord’s Resistance Army activities in the eastern Central African Republic**

121. In 2015, the Panel documented 38 incidents in which LRA elements attacked and looted villages and targeted civilians in Haute-Kotto and Haut-Mbomou prefectures. In total, 4 of the 38 incidents resulted in the killing of civilians,<sup>132</sup> with 11 civilians killed by LRA elements from 1 January to 30 September.<sup>133</sup>

122. The presence of LRA and other armed elements, including Fulani and Sudanese poachers, in eastern Central African Republic have caused the forced displacement of civilians. Those movements, usually of a temporary nature, and the provision of basic education and health services, are not currently addressed by the humanitarian community.

<sup>128</sup> Interviews with two LRA victims, Obo, 22 April 2015.

<sup>129</sup> According to the Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative, 2015.

<sup>130</sup> Inspections in Obo on 24 April and 25 September 2015 (see photographs in annex 3.2).

<sup>131</sup> See details in annex 9.55.

<sup>132</sup> See details in annex 9.56.

<sup>133</sup> See the humanitarian section in annex 7 and more details in annex 9.57.

## E. Exploitation of natural resources

### Cross-border cattle rustling<sup>134</sup>

123. Herders of Fulani origin are spending more time in the east with their cattle following the deterioration of the security situation in the west and the subsequent overgrazing in the centre of the country. They usually poach wild animals, but avoid confrontations with Sudanese or LRA groups. Fulani are reportedly purchasing goods, including weapons and ammunition, from Sudanese merchants.

124. Fulani are also victims of cattle rustlers from South Sudan, including a group in January using a South Sudanese police pickup from the unit based in Tambura (Western Equatoria State).<sup>135</sup>

### Diamonds

#### *Security*

125. The eastern production zone of the Central African Republic has been a central concern of the Kimberley Process. Since September 2011, the Process has issued three calls upon participant Governments and members of the diamond industry, most recently on 18 April 2013, to be vigilant regarding the possible illicit introduction of rough diamonds into the supply chain by the former Séléka and affiliated groups in the areas of Bria and Sam-Ouandja in the east and Bamingui in the north.

126. The scenario of the possible illicit introduction of conflict diamonds described by the Process narrows down its own general definition of conflict diamonds, i.e. “rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments”,<sup>136</sup> and does not fully describe the various ways in which illicit diamond production and trade may provide support to armed groups, as monitored by the Panel. The Panel’s investigations in Bria and Sam-Ouandja show that former Séléka rebels rarely exercise commercial control over trade, but rather benefit from illicit taxation, security payments and infiltration of the mining administration.

127. In October 2014, FPRC forces in Bria were occupying government buildings, including the regional directorate of mines, and had appointed 23 elements to run the directorate (see annex 3.7). Twelve of those elements had been illegally integrated into the special anti-fraud unit to conduct patrols.<sup>137</sup> One Bangui-appointed gendarme had been kept in place in the unit to sign pay slips for local diamond purchases and authorizations to transfer diamonds to Bangui, to maintain a semblance of legality.<sup>138</sup>

128. On 10 February, international forces drove FPRC General Hakouma out of Bria. Dislodged elements took positions at mine sites, including Caréfrée, Dawango, Kalaka, Aigbandou, Mouka and Ngbéhidou, taxing miners FCFA 2,000 (\$4) per day

<sup>134</sup> Meetings with local officials, armed group leaders, expatriates, non-governmental organizations and African Union Regional Task Force officials.

<sup>135</sup> See details in annex 9.58.

<sup>136</sup> See [www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document](http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document).

<sup>137</sup> Meeting with the chief of post of the special anti-fraud unit, Bria, 13 April 2015.

<sup>138</sup> Photographs of transfer authorizations are provided in annex 3.8. Under the normal procedure, the regional director of mines would co-sign such authorizations, but the person was rotated out of Bria in July 2014 without being replaced.

upon entry.<sup>139</sup> At least 10 artisanal miners, licensed in Bria, are active at two occupied sites identified, demonstrating how registered sales to collectors and buying houses can indirectly finance armed groups.<sup>140</sup> The special anti-fraud unit in Bria is incapable of patrolling mining sites to inspect the legality of operations and address illegal taxation. Furthermore, former Séléka forces in Bria received security payments of FCFA 10,000 (\$20) per night from collectors for guarding their premises for most of 2014 until FPRC was forced out of the town centre in February.<sup>141</sup>

129. In Sam-Ouandja, FPRC control over production and trade is similar to that in Bria. Four armed elements run the special anti-fraud unit, working alongside an official subregional director of mines (see annex 3.9). Two unit officials had been present in 2014, their weapons provided by the former Séléka. During field inspections, FPRC elements, operating as a unit, obtain fees from artisanal miners when settling disagreements.<sup>142</sup> For security reasons, their patrols stay within 15 km of the centre of Sam-Ouandja. Collectors and artisanal miners with houses in the town are charged FCFA 10,000 (\$20) per night to protect their premises.<sup>143</sup> The unit's commander in Bangui denies that the unit has ever worked with non-conventional forces in any part of the country since the beginning of the crisis.<sup>144</sup>

130. In Nzako, the African Union Regional Task Force removed former Séléka forces from power in July 2014, following an incident (see [S/2014/762](#), para. 152). The mines close to Nzako are free of armed group interference, but some further afield have been ransacked by LRA.<sup>145</sup> No mining administration is present in Nzako.

#### *Recorded diamond trade and company due diligence*

131. The Ministry of Mines and Geology has at no point suspended domestic trade from the east, yet has insisted that buying houses store diamonds from the east separate from the west, under so-called "red" purchase slips,<sup>146</sup> and not allow the transfer of diamonds from east to west (see annex 3.10). In the last half of 2014 and the first half of 2015, Bureau d'achat de diamant en Centrafrique/Kardiam (Badica) purchased 1,779 carats from Bria, while Sud Azur purchased 534 carats.<sup>147</sup> From Sam-Ouandja, the local mining service registered 1,338 carats purchased by the Société centrafricaine du diamant (Sodiam), 847 carats by Sud Azur and 108 carats by Badica during the same period (see annex 3.11). Sodiam also purchased 233 carats from a licensed collector based in Nzako. Among those purchases, a parcel of 152 carats was

<sup>139</sup> Meeting with the special anti-fraud unit in Bria, 13 April 2015; confidential report, 12 November 2015.

<sup>140</sup> In 2015, there were 32 artisanal miners and 16 collectors in Bria, according to data from the Ministry of Mines and Geology, archived with the United Nations.

<sup>141</sup> Meeting with diamond collector formerly based in Bria, Bangui, 24 August 2015.

<sup>142</sup> Meeting with subregional mining director, Sam-Ouandja, 27 September 2015.

<sup>143</sup> Meeting with diamond collectors and artisanal miners, Sam-Ouandja, 27 September 2015. In 2015, two collectors in Sam-Ouandja obtained licences in Bangui, but records in Bangui do not indicate the existence of licensed artisanal miners in Sam-Ouandja.

<sup>144</sup> The letter was annexed to the response from Badica regarding its purchasing policies in annex 3.10; see also annex 9.59 for more details.

<sup>145</sup> Telephone interview with local authorities in Nzako, 21 September 2015.

<sup>146</sup> Meeting with the permanent secretary for the Kimberley Process in the Central African Republic, Bangui, 15 April 2015.

<sup>147</sup> Official purchasing records for 2014-2015 provided by the Ministry of Mines and Geology and archived with the United Nations.

confiscated by the Central African authorities upon arrival by air at Bangui International Airport because Sodiam agents had failed to declare it.<sup>148</sup>

132. The Panel further considered, as detailed in annex 3.12, the purchasing policies of buying houses for the eastern Central African Republic in view of systematic former Séléka activity having an impact on production and trade. This was done through oral and written communication/consultation, including of relevant policy documents, including as they refer to internationally accepted guidance such as the due diligence framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which recommends that engagement with upstream suppliers be suspended where a reasonable risk is identified that they are sourcing from, or linked to, any party providing direct or indirect support to non-State armed groups, e.g. through their illegal control, taxation and extortion at mine sites and of intermediaries.<sup>149</sup>

#### *Diamond smuggling*

133. Official purchases by buying houses in Bangui capture only a fragment of the total production capacity of the eastern region, estimated at about 60,000 carats before the crisis.<sup>150</sup> According to the special anti-fraud unit, traders from the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad come to Bria to purchase diamonds illegally.<sup>151</sup>

134. Foreign buyers are not common in Sam-Ouandja and the immediate surroundings, but may frequent mine sites out of the reach of the special anti-fraud unit.<sup>152</sup> The Panel has information that Yakoma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nyala in the Sudan are hubs through which diamonds, as well as gold from the east, are traded.

## **IV. Northern region and border with Chad<sup>153</sup>**

135. The northern region of the Central African Republic is characterized by the total absence of State authority and international forces, except in Paoua, Kaga Bandoro and Ndélé. Armed groups, specifically Révolution et justice in the north-west and the former Séléka in the north and north-east, have filled the security vacuum.

136. The Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) and FPRC are in control of around 800 km of border between the Central African Republic and Chad, from the north of Ouham prefecture to the border with the Sudan. The closure of the border by the Chadian authorities in May 2014 significantly reduced the movements of armed men, although confidential sources have reported the travel of former Séléka generals, including sanctioned individual Nourredine Adam.

<sup>148</sup> Special anti-fraud unit report, 4 November 2014, archived with the United Nations; meeting with Sodiam, Bangui, 26 January 2015; see annex 9.60 for more details.

<sup>149</sup> See OECD, *OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 2013). Available from [www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf).

<sup>150</sup> Between 40,000 and 50,000 carats for Bria, 10,000 carats for Sam-Ouandja and 5,000 to 7,500 carats for Nzako. See [www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2012-wgde-footprint-car-final](http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2012-wgde-footprint-car-final).

<sup>151</sup> Meeting with special anti-fraud unit, Bria, 13 April 2015.

<sup>152</sup> Meeting with subregional mining director, Sam-Ouandja, 27 September 2015.

<sup>153</sup> See map in annex 4.

137. The Panel conducted several missions to the areas of Paoua and Bémal (Ouham-Pendé prefecture), Markounda, Kabo and Moyen-Sido (Ouham prefecture), Kaga Bandoro (Nana-Grébizi prefecture) and Ndélé and Akroussoulbak (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture). The Panel concluded that individual members of the Chadian security and military forces had repeatedly violated the decision of their Government, taken on 11 May 2014, to close the border with the Central African Republic and had looted villages, set up mobile checkpoints and attacked civilians on the Central African side of the border.

138. Central African refugees are also prevented from returning to their region of origin except when they pay for safe passage. Chadian forces also benefit from humanitarian aid channelled through a Chadian government agency.

139. The Government of Chad, during a meeting of the Committee on 21 August, denied that elements of its security forces were involved in such incidents and refuted the Panel's findings. Chad has never replied to requests for information on those topics.<sup>154</sup>

## A. Security vacuum in the north-west

### Révolution et justice

140. On 11 April and 22 June, the Révolution et justice leadership in Markounda and Paoua confirmed to the Panel its armed re-emergence to defend the local community against incursions from Chad. All the Révolution et justice military commanders interviewed by the Panel, who were members of the Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie (APRD) of Jean-Jacques Démafouth, a close adviser of the Central African Transitional Head of State,<sup>155</sup> confirmed that they were under the command and control of, and receiving continuous financial support from, the leader of Révolution et justice in Bangui, the Central African Minister of Youth and Sports Arnel Bedaya Sayo.<sup>156</sup>

141. The Panel remains particularly concerned that a military commander of an active armed group in the north-western Central African Republic,<sup>157</sup> Arnel Sayo, has served since 22 August 2014 as the Minister of Youth and Sports,<sup>158</sup> travelling to Europe in his official capacity. He has also posted photographs of himself in his ministerial office in military uniform (see annex 4.2).

142. On 8 April, representatives of the former Séléka faction of UPC approached the Révolution et justice leaders in Markounda to negotiate the safe passage of cattle from Chad allegedly belonging to the UPC leader, Darrassa.<sup>159</sup> A confidential report indicated that Darrassa eventually struck an agreement with General Al-Khatim of MPC.<sup>160</sup>

<sup>154</sup> See details on correspondence in annex 9.61.

<sup>155</sup> See details on APRD in annex 9.62 and the documents on Révolution et justice in annex 4.1.

<sup>156</sup> Interview with Révolution et justice detainees, Bangui, 1 June 2015; interview with Révolution et justice commander, Paoua, 22 June 2015.

<sup>157</sup> See details in annex 9.63.

<sup>158</sup> See details on Sayo in annex 9.64.

<sup>159</sup> Confidential meeting with government official, Bangui, 30 May 2015; telephone conversation with former local official, Markounda, 6 June 2015; meeting with Révolution et justice representative, Paoua, 22 June 2015. A political leader of UPC also confirmed during a meeting with the Panel in Bangui on 27 April 2015 that Ali Darrassa owned cattle currently located in Chad.

<sup>160</sup> The agreement was reportedly negotiated between the UPC political adviser, Hassan Bouba, and the MPC zone commander in Kaga Bandoro, Ali Hafis; confidential military report, 17 April 2015.

### **Groupe des patriotes**

143. The prospect of a potential financial windfall from a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process has brought about an environment conducive to the creation of opportunistic armed groups.

144. In Paoua, the Panel met representatives of a splinter group of Révolution et justice called the Groupe des patriotes,<sup>161</sup> based in Pougol, 20 km west of Paoua, comprising former APRD members. The 37-member group is poorly equipped.<sup>162</sup> It claimed that it provided security to local populations in the absence of legal authority and that it had no political ambitions. It has a strong ethnic base similar to that of the former APRD and to Révolution et justice.<sup>163</sup>

## **B. Security vacuum and parallel administrations in the north and north-east**

145. In Moyen-Sido, Kabo, Kaga Bandoro, Mbrès and Ndélé, the Panel observed armed elements from MPC and FPRC travelling on motorcycles and in vehicles, wearing military uniforms and openly carrying weapons. In all locations visited, armed groups occupied most official buildings and had established a parallel administration.

### **Former Séléka faction of General Mahamat al-Khatim**

146. A significant swathe of north-east Ouham prefecture, including parts of the sub-prefecture of Kabo and Batangafo, and Nana-Grébizi prefecture and its capital, Kaga Bandoro, are under the administrative and security control of Al-Khatim.<sup>164</sup>

147. Al-Khatim operates like a local warlord with a pragmatic agenda. Until recently an FPRC leader,<sup>165</sup> he created MPC, with General Mahamat Bahar,<sup>166</sup> on 1 August.<sup>167</sup> His group, composed of some 100 elements,<sup>168</sup> shares control over the main towns and villages with FPRC.<sup>169</sup> The group imposes taxation at checkpoints and provides security to cattle herders passing through its area.

148. Early in June, he mobilized some 50 armed elements to secure the safe passage of Mbarara cattle herders heading back to the Moïssala area of Chad before the rainy

<sup>161</sup> Interview with Elie Sénapu, also known as “General Elie”, Paoua, 22 June 2015; the Panel also met Laurent Mandjou, also known as “Colonel Laurent” (see annex 4.3).

<sup>162</sup> According to the list of members of the Groupe des patriotes provided by Laurent Mandjou to the United Nations for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This contradicts previous statements to the Panel that the group was composed of 1,891 elements (see the list in annex 4.4).

<sup>163</sup> Members of the Sara ethnic group of the former President, Ange-Félix Patassé, mostly populate Ouham-Pendé prefecture.

<sup>164</sup> Missions to Kaga Bandoro, Kabo and Moyen-Sido, 25-29 May and 29 June-3 July 2015. During those missions, the Panel met Al-Khatim in Moyen-Sido on 26 May and 1 July 2015, zone commanders in Kaga Bandoro and Kabo, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, United Nations staff and community representatives. See photographs of Al-Khatim taken by the Panel on 26 May and 1 July 2015 in annexes 4.5 and 4.8.

<sup>165</sup> Al-Khatim was appointed by Nourredine Adam in Kaga Bandoro as the FPRC military adviser for security on 2 November 2014.

<sup>166</sup> The former head of Séléka military intelligence, “General” Mahamat Bahar is officially registered as a colonel in the Support Services Battalion with identification number 2013-1-1003.

<sup>167</sup> See details in annex 9.65.

<sup>168</sup> See details in annex 9.66.

<sup>169</sup> See details in annex 9.67 and photographs in annex 4.6

season,<sup>170</sup> in the area of Kambakota (sub-prefecture of Bédé, west of Batangafo and north of Ben Zambé).<sup>171</sup>

149. In Kaga Bandoro, Ali Hafis<sup>172</sup> decided to remain loyal to Al-Khatim. Notwithstanding the split between MPC and FPRC, both zone commanders operate from the same building, the police station, albeit reporting to their respective superiors. In Mbrès, the MPC zone commander, Colonel Abdulaye Oumar, was appointed in July. Oumar confirmed that he and his deputy, Abou Sale, reported to Hafis and had sworn allegiance to Al-Khatim.<sup>173</sup>

### **Structure and activities of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique**

150. Since the return of Nourredine Adam to Kaga Bandoro from Chad on 8 October, FPRC appears more structured and active, with command and control over a 500-strong force. Moussa Maouloud, since his promotion to FPRC deputy coordinator,<sup>174</sup> and Nourredine Adam's chief of staff, Lambert Lissane Moukové, are increasingly calling for a third transition.

151. The new FPRC zone commander, appointed on 22 August by Nourredine Adam, is Sergeant Amalea Jean Chérif, from Birao.<sup>175</sup> At the time of writing, most of the FPRC leaders still loyal to Adam were in the town, including Generals Kanton and Baba Hissène.<sup>176</sup> Both men confirmed that FPRC was planning to establish its headquarters in Kaga Bandoro.

152. An area of the size of Belgium — including Vakaga prefecture and part of Haute-Kotto prefecture, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture as well as significant parts of Nana-Grebizi prefecture — is under the direct administrative and security control of FPRC. Except for the prefects and deputy prefects and the sultans of Ndélé and Birao, who for their own safety depend on good relationships with FPRC, the national security forces and administration are entirely absent.

#### *Mbrès area*

153. In Mbrès, the Panel observed joint FPRC-MPC military training (see annex 4.9). On all the routes between Kaga Bandoro and Mbrès, as well as between Ndélé and the Chadian border, the Panel witnessed the constant presence of armed elements, most of them belonging to FPRC.<sup>177</sup> While former Séléka elements in Kaga Bandoro and Mbrès

<sup>170</sup> See details in annex 9.68 and photographs in annex 4.7.

<sup>171</sup> Confidential reports dated 3, 5, 10 and 12 June 2015.

<sup>172</sup> Meetings with Ali Hafis, Moyen-Sido, 26 May 2015, and Kaga Bandoro, 19 and 23 August 2015; see photographs in annexes 4.5 and 4.8.

<sup>173</sup> Meeting with Colonel Abdulaye Oumar, Mbrès, 22 August 2015; see photograph of Oumar in annex 4.8.

<sup>174</sup> During meetings between the Panel and Moussa Maouloud on 16 January and 27 May 2015, he strongly reiterated his allegiance to Nourredine Adam, notwithstanding the absence of the latter; in August 2014, the Panel had already observed Maouloud trying to challenge Al-Khatim's authority over Batangafo (see S/2014/762, para. 56); see photographs of Maouloud and Lambert in annex 4.8.

<sup>175</sup> Meeting with Amaléa Jean Cherif, Kaga Bandoro, 23 August 2015; he is registered as a chief corporal in the Support Services Battalion with identification number 2001-1-21378.

<sup>176</sup> Meeting with Generals Kanton and Baba Hissène, Kaga Bandoro, 24 August 2015. In addition to those generals, Generals Youssouf Ibrahim, Issa Israel, Saleh Zabadi, Kiningar, Kader and Bordas were reported as present in Kaga Bandoro in mid-October 2015.

<sup>177</sup> See annexes 4.10 and 9.69.

were all carrying mission orders, this was not always the case in the Ndélé area, a former stronghold of the Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP).

154. FPRC is officially represented in Mbrès by Ousman Abakae, also known as “Chauffeur”, who is of Fulani origin and who declared his loyalty to Ali Darrassa (UPC), although he is officially part of FPRC.<sup>178</sup> Before the creation of MPC, “Chauffeur” was the sole zone commander operating in Mbrès and its surroundings. Given that he refused to swear allegiance to Al-Khatim and Ali Hafis, the latter replaced him as zone commander with Colonel Abdulaye Oumar, confirming to the Panel that “Chauffeur” had disregarded his instructions.<sup>179</sup>

155. “Chauffeur” has remained in Mbrès, acting as the FPRC zone commander with his deputy, “Djido”, and protecting UPC commercial interests. The Panel observed that the relationship between “Chauffeur” and Colonel Oumar was tense.<sup>180</sup>

156. On the route between Mbrès and Mboussa, towards Bakala, the Panel observed a checkpoint south of Mbrès. Between Mbrès and Kaga Bandoro, through Blakadja, the Panel observed five checkpoints under the control of “Chauffeur’s” elements.<sup>181</sup> In the village of Azen, at the junction between the roads from Kaga Bandoro to Ndélé and from Mbrès to Ndélé, “Chauffeur’s” fighters controlling the checkpoint declared that small vehicles had to pay FCFA 3,000 and large vehicles FCFA 5,000. Five checkpoints were also observed on the route from Mbrès to Kaga Bandoro through Azen.

157. FPRC, MPC and UPC also organized armed escorts for trucks travelling on these routes,<sup>182</sup> to protect against recurrent attacks by the anti-balaka.<sup>183</sup> The Panel was able to document one such attack in the village of Sueur on 12 August, during which a truck under UPC protection was looted.<sup>184</sup> “Chauffeur” ordered a retaliation attack during which the villages of Lakouetene and Ndjangala were burned on 20 August. At those locations, the Panel counted 150 houses burned and found spent 5.56 mm cartridges, the remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade and collected testimony that former Séléka elements fired at civilians on a daily basis when passing through villages. Most of the villagers were still hiding in the forest when the Panel visited.

#### *Ndélé area*

158. In Ndélé, FPRC is headed by zone commander Senoussi Soumaine, who was appointed on 10 September to replace General Issa Israel.<sup>185</sup> However, the prefect, Abdullaye Mohamed, and the sultan, Ibrahim Senoussi Kamoun (Rounga), share some form of administrative control with FPRC.<sup>186</sup> While the sultan remains a respected traditional institution with judicial and mediation authority, the prefect is de facto

<sup>178</sup> During a meeting with the Panel in Mbrès on 22 August 2015, Ousman Abakae said that he worked for FPRC (“who gave him a job”), but that he remained loyal to Ali Darrassa.

<sup>179</sup> Meeting with Ali Hafis, Kaga Bandoro, 23 August 2015.

<sup>180</sup> Notwithstanding the apparent tension between “Chauffeur” and Oumar during a meeting with MINUSCA in Mbrès on 22 August 2015, both left the meeting on the same motorbike.

<sup>181</sup> See details in annex 9.70.

<sup>182</sup> See details in annex 9.71.

<sup>183</sup> Meeting with Muslim and former Séléka representatives, Mbrès, 20 August 2015.

<sup>184</sup> See details in annex 9.72.

<sup>185</sup> Interview with Senoussi Soumaine, Ndélé, 28 September 2015; see details in annex 9.73.

<sup>186</sup> See details in annex 9.74.

under FPRC authority, especially after he was attacked and injured by FPRC elements on 30 November 2014.<sup>187</sup>

159. FPRC is visible at all strategic locations in the town, with armed men and women in military uniforms openly carrying their weapons and moving freely. However, some of the Rounga fighters of FPRC still claim allegiance to CPJP of Abdoullaye Hissène Ramadane, who recently left RPRC to join FPRC.

160. The Panel visited three routes between Ndélé and Chad during a field mission from 24 September to 5 October. On the Ndélé-Tiri route, the Panel documented nine checkpoints up to the border.<sup>188</sup> On the route between Ndélé and Doum/Boul-Kinia, the Panel documented six checkpoints.<sup>189</sup> However, on the Ndélé-Manovo route, which is sparsely populated, no checkpoints were observed.

161. Checkpoints are manned by two to five armed elements who occasionally wear military uniforms, with only one or two AK-type assault rifles, and little ammunition.<sup>190</sup> On one occasion, a child soldier was observed manning an FPRC checkpoint in Tiri.<sup>191</sup> Members of the public have complained about checkpoints, mentioning that they are obliged to pay taxes at every passage.<sup>192</sup>

162. In most villages, where FPRC or CPJP were officially represented,<sup>193</sup> the local population had also set up local self-defence groups equipped with artisanal rifles and MMC hunting ammunition<sup>194</sup> purchased in Ndélé.<sup>195</sup> In the Manovo-Gounda St Floris National Park, old containers had reportedly recently been occupied by poachers. The inhabitants of the remote and predominantly Christian village of Dakobo reported that they were regularly harassed by FPRC, with goods stolen and locals tied and beaten. However, except for Dakobo, the local population reported no ill-treatment by FPRC.<sup>196</sup>

*Free movement of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique*<sup>197</sup>

163. The Panel documented significant movements of armed men on motorcycles carrying type 56-2 and AKM assault rifles towards Ndélé and Kaga Bandoro, in particular between the Chadian border and Ndélé.

164. The Panel inspected two armed men on a motorcycle in Tiri (90 km north of Ndélé), wearing traditional turbans and carrying type 56-2 assault rifles, and three men on a motorcycle between Zoukoutouniala and Zobossinda (48 km from Ndélé) carrying one AKM-type assault rifle and one R4 Vektor-type assault rifle.<sup>198</sup> Some of

<sup>187</sup> Interviews in Ndélé with Abdoullaye Mohamed and the sultan, 29 September 2015; see more details in annex 9.75.

<sup>188</sup> See details in annex 9.76 and photographs in annex 4.11.

<sup>189</sup> See details in annex 9.77.

<sup>190</sup> Magazines inspected at the Koundi checkpoint contained between two and eight rounds of ammunition each.

<sup>191</sup> See photograph in annex 7.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with local authority, Bangbali (60 km from Ndélé), 25 August 2015; see details in annex 9.78.

<sup>193</sup> See details in annex 9.79 and photographs of armed former Séléka elements in annex 4.12.

<sup>194</sup> On MMC, see annex 1.11, paragraphs 12 and 13.

<sup>195</sup> See sources in annex 9.80.

<sup>196</sup> Mission to Manovo and Dakobo, 27 September 2015.

<sup>197</sup> See photographs of former Séléka elements in pickups and on motorcycles in annex 4.13.

<sup>198</sup> See photographs of former Séléka movements in annexes 4.13 and 4.14.

the armed men interviewed also declared that FPRC had just installed 37 elements at checkpoints along the route.<sup>199</sup>

165. On 25 August, residents of the village of Bangbali informed the Panel that FPRC/CPJP members had departed a few days earlier from the village towards the south,<sup>200</sup> and that 30 armed men belonging to FPRC had left the village of Léména for Kaga Bandoro in July.<sup>201</sup> Armed elements manning the checkpoints at Akroussoulbak and civilians told the Panel that, since mid-September, between 50 and 100 FPRC elements had moved towards the south following Abdoullaye Hissène's instructions.<sup>202</sup> That information was confirmed by civilians in Boul-Kinia, where 40 armed elements had just left for Ndélé at Hissène's request.

166. During the 12-day presence of the Panel in Bamingui-Bangoran, three trucks loaded with armed elements and about 250 motorcycles — some stolen — with two to three armed men left Ndélé for Kaga Bandoro, representing a force of 600 fighters.<sup>203</sup>

### **Exploitation of natural resources**

#### *Wildlife*

167. The inhabitants of villages visited on three routes towards the Chadian border reported armed men identified as Janjaweed or poachers moving with fully loaded donkeys from either the Sudan or Chad in late September. Eyewitnesses counted groups of 8 to 12 men, speaking Arabic, wearing traditional turbans and carrying AK-type assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.<sup>204</sup>

#### *Diamonds and gold*

168. In Ndélé, FPRC established a parallel mining administration, issuing annual licences to collectors (FCFA 250,000 (\$500))<sup>205</sup> and certificates to artisanal miners (FCFA 30,000 (\$60)).<sup>206</sup> The FPRC mining brigade in Ndélé covers a dozen mine sites, around Ndélé, and up to 100 km to the south-east, towards Ippy. The number of artisanal miners averaged about 10 per site, each employing dozens of diggers.<sup>207</sup> They sell to four collectors in Ndélé who paid for their licences in 2015.

169. The main collector in Ndélé is part of an FPRC tax collection committee that, since the beginning of March, has operated independently of the FPRC customs service in Kaga Bandoro.<sup>208</sup> The collector told the Panel that he sold his diamonds to

<sup>199</sup> Mission to Bangbali, 25 September 2015.

<sup>200</sup> Meeting with villagers, Bangbali, 25 September 2015.

<sup>201</sup> Meeting with local authority, Léména, 26 September 2015.

<sup>202</sup> Meetings with local population and former Séléka elements manning the checkpoints, Akroussoulbak and Koundi, 26 September 2015.

<sup>203</sup> Meetings with international forces and local population, Ndélé, 24 September-2 October 2015.

<sup>204</sup> Meetings in Djamassinda, Birbatouma, Bangbali, Manga 1 and Manga 2, Dakabo and Akroussoulbak, 24 September-5 October 2015; interview with the sultan, Ndélé, 29 September 2015.

<sup>205</sup> Meeting with diamond collector, Ndélé, 24 September 2015.

<sup>206</sup> A copy of a receipt for an artisanal mining certificate issued by an FPRC mining brigade is found in annex 4.15.

<sup>207</sup> Meeting with artisanal mine operators, Léména, 25 September 2015.

<sup>208</sup> Confidential report, 7 March 2015.

a sanctioned entity, Badica, in Bria. During the dry season, diamonds from Ndélé are also sold to collectors coming from Chad and the Sudan.<sup>209</sup>

#### *Cattle*

170. In Kaga Bandoro, Kabo and Mbrès, a resource-sharing agreement was negotiated between MPC and FPRC, allowing Al-Khatim to collect taxes in Kaga Bandoro at checkpoints while FPRC extorts businesspeople, merchants and shopkeepers.<sup>210</sup>

171. The Panel observed an FPRC zone commander adviser, Adam Moussa, collecting money in Kaga Bandoro from a truck transporting cattle (see annex 4.16). He explained that merchants had to pay FCFA 20,000 per head of cattle and that 80 to 100 head passed through the town every day. Those collections totalled FCFA 576 million annually (\$1 million).

172. In Kabo, the local administration in place before the Séléka collected up to FCFA 700,000 (\$1,200) per month from market activities and FCFA 25,000 (\$40) for a laissez-passer per head.<sup>211</sup> Based on the approximate number of cattle in the Moïssala area of southern Chad (Mandoul Region) only,<sup>212</sup> the Panel estimated that taxation of livestock movement under the control of MPC and FPRC could generate \$1.2 million annually. Moussa Maouloud's interest in gaining control of Kabo on behalf of Nourredine Adam was certainly related to the town's strategic position in terms of cattle migration.<sup>213</sup>

#### **Former Séléka weaponry**

173. Former Séléka armed elements are primarily equipped with AK-type assault rifles of various origins,<sup>214</sup> but the Panel also observed several other types of assault rifles, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and rounds.<sup>215</sup> Arms in the possession of former Séléka were old and without readable serial numbers. The Panel also inspected an AKM-type rifle with a deliberately erased serial number.

174. Even though arms appeared to be issued on an individual basis or assigned to specific posts (checkpoints or enforcement of parallel administrative functions such as law and order, customs, water and forestry matters and tax collection), the shortage of weapons has forced FPRC to reassign weapons from checkpoints to the elements instructed to assemble in Kaga Bandoro.<sup>216</sup>

<sup>209</sup> Meeting with diamond collector, Ndélé, 24 September 2015; confirmed by a second diamond collector during a telephone conversation on 6 November 2015.

<sup>210</sup> Meeting with military source, Kaga Bandoro, 29 May 2015.

<sup>211</sup> See a copy of an FPRC appointment letter for a herder representative in Moyen-Sido in 2015 in annex 4.17.

<sup>212</sup> See details in annex 9.81.

<sup>213</sup> Former Séléka officers loyal to Adam were appointed in Kabo, namely former Chadian Army Colonel Naha as zone commander, alongside former Chadian sub-prefect Hassan Salleh, "General" Oumar Kafin, and Hassan Ginderu; confidential report, 29 July 2015.

<sup>214</sup> See photographs in annex 4.18.

<sup>215</sup> See details in annex 9.82 and photographs of FPRC armed elements, one of them with hand grenades hung on his military shirt, in annex 4.12.

<sup>216</sup> Missions to Kaga Bandoro, Mbrès and Ndélé areas, 19 August and 28 September 2015; see details in annex 9.83.

### Anti-balaka groups in Nana-Grébizi prefecture

175. Although former Séléka factions (MPC and FPRC) are in control of most of Nana-Grébizi prefecture, anti-balaka groups under the authority of local commanders but affiliated with the national coordination structure are also operating in the same area.

176. Max Narbé, also known as Nabbré or Narqué, of Mokom's anti-balaka structure, commands anti-balaka factions in Kaga Bandoro and Mbrès after "Yves" stepped down. Anti-balaka groups in the north are armed with hunting rifles (often artisanally manufactured) and grenades. Except for a case in Blakadja, the Panel did not observe armed elements openly carrying weapons.<sup>217</sup>

177. Between Kaga Bandoro and Mbrès, several villages are under control of local anti-balaka groups. "Gauthier" controls the village of Doukouma and surroundings, under Max's authority.<sup>218</sup> "Pelé", who is part of Mokom's structure, is zone commander in Blakadja, while Maroka is controlled by "Colonel" Pata.<sup>219</sup>

178. Between Mbrès and Bakala, the Panel met in Mboussa with Kouazingo Gomez, originally from Sibut, who controls the zone around Mboussa including the gold mine of Kagbi.<sup>220</sup> Kouazingo, who is also under Mokom's authority, is acquainted with MPC zone commander in Mbrès.<sup>221</sup> On that same route, a zone commander, "DKZ", also known as "Décabouna", a Central African soldier from Bossangoa,<sup>222</sup> was killed on 15 August in the village of Morabanda, while looting a former Séléka truck transporting goods and weapons.<sup>223</sup>

179. From 1 February to 30 September, the Panel recorded four incidents of anti-balaka elements attacking civilians in the area of Mbrès, leaving 13 people dead, threatening local authorities and looting commercial vehicles.<sup>224</sup>

180. During its field missions between Kaga Bandoro and Mbrès and between Mbrès and Bakala, the Panel also investigated several anti-balaka attacks.

181. On 12 August, in the village of Ndenga, a group of anti-balaka elements, reportedly from Mbrès, cut off a woman's ears and beat a man to death in front of the house of the deacon, before dumping his corpse in the school's latrines (see annex 4.20). On the same day, in the village of Sueur, anti-balaka elements looted a truck operated by the former Séléka that had become stuck.

182. From 10 to 12 July, at the request of the newly installed deputy prefect, the former Séléka had lifted the checkpoints surrounding Mbrès. Immediately thereafter, anti-balaka groups attacked and looted the villages of Marona and Jafara and attacked a vehicle belonging to the former Séléka, looting all the merchandise and FCFA 4.3 million (\$7,300).

<sup>217</sup> Missions to Akroussoulbak and Doum checkpoints, 26 September and 2 October 2015.

<sup>218</sup> Interview with Gauthier, Doukouma, 19 August 2015.

<sup>219</sup> Interviews in Blakadja, 19 August 2015.

<sup>220</sup> According to Kouazingo, gold was previously sold in Mbrès and now in Bambari; Ali Hafis confirmed that Kouazingo controlled the gold mine; meeting with Ali Hafis, Kaga Bandoro, 23 August 2015.

<sup>221</sup> See photograph in annex 4.19.

<sup>222</sup> Meetings with international forces, local authorities and FPRC representative, Kaga Bandoro, 16 January 2015.

<sup>223</sup> Meeting with Ali Hafis, Kaga Bandoro, 23 August 2015.

<sup>224</sup> Panel of Experts database of incidents, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

183. On 15 August, anti-balaka elements killed five civilians (a child, two men and two women) in Maorka.<sup>225</sup> In Gbakon Bangu, the Panel interviewed three young adults who had been kidnapped by 12 anti-balaka elements. They were released after 14 hours during which they walked 50 km towards Mbrès carrying goods stolen from the village.

### **C. Incursions into the Central African Republic by individual members of the Chadian security and military forces**

184. In 2014, the Panel reported several security incidents in the north-west Central African Republic bordering Chad (see S/2014/762, paras. 42-46). From 11 May 2014 — the date of the closure of the Central African Republic-Chad border — to 1 October 2015, these incidents resulted in, at least, the deaths of 86 civilians and injuries to 18 others, several disappearances and the forced displacement of communities living in the border area.<sup>226</sup>

185. During its investigations, the Panel visited the sub-prefectures of Mia-Pendé, Markounda and Kabo and the prefectures of Nana-Grébizi and Bamingui-Bangoran, where it interviewed victims, witnesses and perpetrators and collected supporting evidence.<sup>227</sup>

186. The Panel gathered evidence establishing that individual members of the Chadian security and military forces had committed human rights violations against Central African nationals, including killings of civilians, looting and destruction of civilian property, forced displacement, extortion, illegal detention and violation of the right of return of Central African refugees in Chad.

187. Since May 2014, members of the Chadian security forces have often attacked the villages of Bembéré, Békia, Bépikassé, Markounda and Dokabi (Mia-Pendé and Markounda sub-prefectures).<sup>228</sup> Attacks in the area follow the same modus operandi: after shooting in the air to drive people away, armed men in military uniform loot and destroy villages in the early hours of the morning.

#### **Sub-prefecture of Mia-Pendé**

188. Testimony from the sub-prefecture of Mia-Pendé consistently indicates that perpetrators were identified as members of the Chadian security forces from the border post in Békoninga. Witnesses who regularly crossed the border before its closure recognized attackers, including the police commissioner, Madjiademngar N'Gamjadjibe, of the Chadian internal security service.<sup>229</sup> Moreover, the uniforms and weaponry of the attackers are similar to those of the Chadian security and military forces.<sup>230</sup>

<sup>225</sup> Mission to Kaga Bandoro and Mbrès from 19 to 24 August 2015; see photographs in annex 4.20.

<sup>226</sup> Panel of Experts database of incidents, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>227</sup> Missions to Markounda from 11 to 14 April 2015; Kabo and Moyen-Sido from 25 to 29 May and 29 June to 3 July 2015; Paoua and Bémal from 21 to 23 June 2015; Kaga Bandoro and Mbrès from 20 to 24 August 2015; Ndélé and towards the Chadian border from 24 September to 5 October 2015.

<sup>228</sup> See more details in annex 9.84 and photographs of the destruction of Bépikassé in annex 4.21.

<sup>229</sup> See photograph in annex 4.22 and more details in annex 9.85.

<sup>230</sup> See more details in annex 9.86 and photographs in annex 4.24.

189. On 22 June the Panel was present in Békoninga when the police commissioner, N’Gamjadjibe, requested MINUSCA to send a message to Bembéré, located just 2 km south of the border post on the main road, accusing the villagers of having stolen five head of cattle in Anja (Chad), located 7 km east of Békoninga. The message informed the population that, were the cattle not returned without delay, the village would be attacked “with no mercy” by the Chadian security forces.<sup>231</sup> The following day, at 5.30 a.m., armed Chadian men in military attire attacked the village of Bépikassé.<sup>232</sup>

### **Sub-prefecture of Markounda**

190. The sub-prefecture of Markounda has also suffered acts of violence at the hands of individual members of the Chadian security and military forces. In the recent attacks on the villages of Markounda and Dokabi, the attackers were Chadian army members based along the Nana Barya River who were part of the former Chadian contingent of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) and continue to wear MISCA uniforms and call themselves MISCA.<sup>233</sup>

191. According to testimony gathered in Markounda on 11 April, a rocket-propelled grenade was fired on 5 April from the Chadian side of the border towards Markounda, hitting a location adjacent to the primary school. The Panel observed the damage caused (see annex 4.25).<sup>234</sup> A week later, fighting erupted between members of Révolution et justice in Markounda and armed men from Chad. According to a Révolution et justice member who took part in the fighting, a Chadian soldier was killed and a pullover with Chadian army markings was recovered (see annex 4.26).<sup>235</sup>

192. The Panel visited the localities of Bélé I, Bélé II, Békinga, Galé II and Manda, located north-east of Markounda along the Chadian border, where, on 11 and 12 March, villagers saw seven military pickups bearing Chadian army markings and some 20 armed men dressed in military uniforms on the road along the Chadian bank of the Nana Barya River. The same group was identified by victims as crossing the river, shooting in the air and looting and burning the village of Dokabi on 12 March.

193. The Panel counted 15 houses burned in Dokabi and observed bullet holes in walls, and spent cartridges on the ground (see annex 4.27). The Panel also collected testimony that five bicycles and one motorcycle had been stolen, in addition to all the cattle.

194. According to villagers living between Markounda and Dokabi, attacks similar to those described to the Panel have been perpetrated once or twice annually over the past 10 years.<sup>236</sup>

<sup>231</sup> See the letter dated 19 May 2015 sent by a Chadian official to Bembéré in annex 4.23.

<sup>232</sup> Telephone conversation with military source in Paoua, 24 June 2015; see more details in annex 9.87.

<sup>233</sup> Mission to the villages of Komra and Sido, Chad, 7 December 2014; meeting with Chadian security forces, Békoninga, 22 June 2015. During the meeting on 22 June 2015, the internal security service commissioner told MINUSCA to be very careful when seeking to establish contact with the Chadian army given that there were instructions to shoot anyone approaching the border.

<sup>234</sup> Confidential report, 7 April 2015.

<sup>235</sup> See details in annex 9.88.

<sup>236</sup> Interviews conducted by the Panel in Bélé I and II, Békinga, Galé II, Manda and Dokabi on 11 April 2015.

### **Violations of international humanitarian law by the Chadian security and military forces**

195. In the sub-prefecture of Kabo, testimony from former Central African refugees in Chad highlighted that they had been fired upon or beaten by Chadian security and military force members while seeking to return to the Central African Republic. According to victims and witnesses in the sub-prefecture of Kabo and the prefecture of Ndélé, civilians, including women and children, crossing the border are indiscriminately targeted, day and night.<sup>237</sup>

196. In Sido, the village located across from Moye-Sido on the Chadian side of the border, Central African refugees who expressed to the Chadian authorities their intention to return have been denied their right to do so owing to the closure of the border. The Chadian security forces in charge of specific border posts have, however, allowed some refugees to cross on certain dates and times, after receiving payments.<sup>238</sup> Nonetheless, witnesses and relatives of victims have described cases in which the illegal payments did not prevent refugees from being killed, wounded or detained when crossing the border.<sup>239</sup>

197. An official message dated 19 May 2015 signed by the Minister of Security of Chad, Abderahim Bireme Hamid, indicates that the Chad-Central African Republic border remains “strictly” closed, but instructs security and armed forces to stop shooting “systematically” at people approaching the border (see annex 4.28).

198. Local sources and former Séléka in Moye-Sido have documented since 12 May 2014 cases of refugees from the Central African Republic being killed (42 cases) and injured (140 cases), but also illegally detained, harassed and robbed while crossing the border from and to Chad (see annexes 4.29 and 4.30).

199. Following the closure of the border on 11 May 2014, Central African nationals were denied access to Chad at the border posts of Ngarba and Massamai Kébing in Bamingui-Bangoran. In contrast, Chadian merchants are authorized to enter the Central African Republic, where they have to pay taxes to FPRC, while Chadian security and military forces have reportedly established mobile checkpoints as far as 25 km inside the Central African Republic.<sup>240</sup>

## **V. Western region and border with Cameroon<sup>241</sup>**

200. FDPC of Miskine poses the main security threat in the western Central African Republic. The group is able to call upon up to 70 well-armed men and loots vehicles on main supply road 1, as well as Fulani herders and isolated villages along the Cameroonian border, north of the road. The group has also been responsible for multiple hostage-takings, including two separate groups of Cameroonian nationals. A case study on FDPC is included in annex 5.1.

<sup>237</sup> Interviews in Moye-Sido on 1 July and in Zobossinda, Akroussoulbak, Boul-Kinia and Doum on 26 September and 2 October 2015.

<sup>238</sup> Interviews, Moye-Sido, 27 May and 1 July 2015; see more details in annex 9.89.

<sup>239</sup> See also details in annex 9.90.

<sup>240</sup> Meetings with former Séléka and local population, Manga and Tiri, 25 September, and Zobossinda, Akroussoulbak, Boul-Kinia and Doum, on 26 September and 2 October 2015; interview with Senoussi Soumaine, Ndélé, 28 September 2015.

<sup>241</sup> See map in annex 5.

201. Difficulties by MINUSCA and the Central African forces in protecting commercial convoys from deadly attacks by FDPC and other criminal groups led to strikes by truck drivers in the Cameroonian border town of Garoua-Boulai in June, August and October. Since May, the Central African armed forces have been deployed along the Niem Yéléwa-Besson route, north-west of the provincial capital, Bouar (Nana-Mambéré prefecture). This has provided some degree of security, but only in town centres. The presence in the area of an Ndalé clan-led anti-balaka militia further complicates the security situation.

202. Another hotspot in the west is the remote but pasture-rich and diamond-rich Amada-Gaza plateau (Mambéré-Kadeï prefecture). Since mid-2014, anti-balaka militiamen, under the command of Nice Démowance from Berbérati, have controlled territory at the expense of pastoralist Fulani (see [S/2014/762](#), para. 147). Armed Fulani retaliated in May, attacking several villages along the Cameroonian border.

203. The flare-up of violence in the north-west has not affected the diamond production belt in the south-west around the towns of Nola, Berbérati and Carnot (Mambéré-Kadeï prefecture). Armed group activity persists, however, including at a few diamond sites. The return of an escaped prisoner and anti-balaka coordinator, Chrysostome Yapélé, also known as “Chicki Chicki”, to Berbérati, where he was arrested on 21 June, may further threaten security at one of the sites.

204. Similarly, the move of “Colonel Rombhot” from Bangui to Mbaïki (Lobaye) in August with his armed militia could lead to the renewed involvement of his forces in natural resource sectors. In the same area, an irregular guard unit armed with hunting rifles has been established at a newly discovered gold mine in Ndolobo.

#### **A. Reactions to the proliferation of the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain**

205. Since early 2015 the emergence of the Ndalé clan-led anti-balaka militia has restricted the FDPC-controlled areas. Operating north-east of the provincial capital, Bouar, along the Niem Yéléwa-Besson route towards the Cameroonian border, clan members have pledged to protect Fulani herders from FDPC attacks.<sup>242</sup> However, the clan has also engaged heavily in cattle raiding and taxation of herders and other travellers moving through its area.<sup>243</sup>

206. In April, the arrest of the military chief, Marcel Ndalé, and the participation in the Bangui Forum in May of Ndalé militia political representatives, Adamou Ndalé and Michel Belo, calmed the activities of the group. The group had also expressed its willingness to participate in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and to collaborate with the deployment of the Central African military in the area.<sup>244</sup> The return of Marcel Ndalé after escaping from the Ngaragba prison in Bangui, however, could reignite the group’s violent activities and revenge-based violence, including against Fulani.

<sup>242</sup> Meeting with Adamou Ndalé, Bangui, 14 April 2014.

<sup>243</sup> Meeting with cattle herders, north of Bouar, 12 April 2015.

<sup>244</sup> Meeting with Ibrahim Ndalé, Niem, 20 June 2014.

207. In May, the Minister of Defence deployed 62 soldiers in Kouï (20), Besson (20) and Niem Yéléwa (22).<sup>245</sup> While the deployment helped to secure those areas from attacks and racketeering by FDPC and other armed groups, areas between them remain insecure owing to the military's lack of capacity.<sup>246</sup> In addition, the soldiers rely entirely on the local community for their daily subsistence,<sup>247</sup> which jeopardizes their relationship with local villagers.<sup>248</sup> On several occasions, military elements have been accused of abusing their power or behaving like another armed group.<sup>249</sup>

## B. Cross-border trafficking of hunting ammunition

208. Frequent seizures and arrests along the Cameroonian border indicate continued trafficking of hunting ammunition from Cameroon into the Central African Republic, in violation of the arms embargo and national laws. All parties to the conflict in the Central African Republic use hunting ammunition, at times modified by hand to reinforce its lethality.<sup>250</sup>

209. On 8 January, the Cameroonian authorities in the border town of Kenzou arrested Roger Ngaïdoua, also known as "Ousmane Roger", an ammunition trafficker identified by the Panel as selling arms to the anti-balaka in Berbérati (S/2014/762, para. 167 and annex 53). In his possession were 4,500 12-gauge cartridges purchased from the Batouri branch of Dollah Yankam.<sup>251</sup> Fifty rounds of 12 mm ammunition had been modified with 7.62 mm bullets, similar to those observed in Berbérati.<sup>252</sup> Ngaïdoua is in detention in Bertoua pending an investigation.

210. The Batouri branch of Dollah Yankam remains open, although the name has been replaced with a general sign indicating that it is an arms shop.<sup>253</sup> The shopkeeper acknowledged that it still belonged to Yankam, and the Panel confirmed the use of the same stamp on the invoice found on Ngaïdoua upon his arrest.<sup>254</sup> On 17 August, the shopkeeper confirmed that sales had slumped since earlier instructions from the prefect prohibiting arms shops from selling more than 250 cartridges to individual clients. On sales to Ngaïdoua — in 2014, Ngaïdoua had on seven occasions purchased between 3,000 and 4,500 cartridges (a total of 24,250 rounds) from Yankam<sup>255</sup> — he provided no information, including why the shop had accepted Ngaïdoua's outdated import authorization issued by the Central African authorities on 19 September 2011.<sup>256</sup>

<sup>245</sup> See annex 5.2; MINUSCA was reportedly not informed of such deployment.

<sup>246</sup> Meeting with local government officials in Niem, 20 June 2015; see details in annex 9.91.

<sup>247</sup> Meeting with Central African military officer, Bouar, 5 June 2015.

<sup>248</sup> Meeting with international personnel, Bouar, 29 May and 5 June 2015.

<sup>249</sup> Meeting with international personnel, Bouar, 28 May 2015.

<sup>250</sup> See annex 5.3 and sect. II.

<sup>251</sup> See invoice for hunting ammunition sales found on Ngaïdoua at the time of his arrest in annex 5.4. See photographs of Ngaïdoua and seized hunting ammunition in annex 5.5.

<sup>252</sup> Meeting with a Cameroonian army captain, Kenzou, 16 June 2015. See photographs of the seizure in annex 5.6.

<sup>253</sup> Meeting with shop owners next to the arms shop, 17 August 2015. See photograph of the Batouri branch of Dollah Yankam in annex 5.7.

<sup>254</sup> See copy of import authorization in annex 5.8.

<sup>255</sup> See history of sales in annex 5.9.

<sup>256</sup> Reference to Ngaïdoua's trade licence of 2011 is shown on the invoice in annex 5.4. The import licence itself can be found in S/2014/762, annex 52.

211. On 8 July, a representative of the Cameroonian Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization informed the Panel that the Ministry had restricted supplies to existing retailers of hunting ammunition and suspended the licensing of additional retailers in eastern Cameroon owing to the arms embargo. Nevertheless, the Panel is unaware of any legal proceedings against Dollah Yankam or any other retailer in the east. The representative further stated that the Ministry was raising the awareness of local authorities in the east of the arms embargo.

212. It should be noted that the Cameroonian customs authorities in Batouri had authorized Ngaïdoua to export ammunition before the security services inspected and halted the goods in Kenzou. It can be assumed that the Cameroonian customs authorities had also authorized Ngaïdoua's earlier exports of hunting ammunition purchased from Yankam in 2014.

213. Ngaïdoua's arrest and the restrictions on sales of hunting ammunition in eastern Cameroon may have only slowed down the trafficking of ammunition to the Central African Republic. The trafficking of smaller quantities (200 to 250 cartridges) remains lucrative, and the Panel documented two cases of seizure in the Central African Republic (see annexes 5.10 and 5.11).

214. The Panel also documented significant seizures of hunting ammunition elsewhere in the Central African Republic.<sup>257</sup> A large shipment of 12-gauge hunting cartridges, mostly manufactured in Pointe-Noire, Congo, by MACC, was seized by MINUSCA in Bria (Haute-Kotto prefecture) on 9 March and inspected by the Panel on 14 April.<sup>258</sup> Hunting ammunition from the Congo is mostly trafficked into the Central African Republic up the Ubangi River by boat (see sect. V).

215. In Bossangoa (Ouham-Pendé prefecture), MINUSCA seized a large quantity of 12-gauge hunting cartridges, including a box of cartridges produced by a French company, Nobel Sport, between January and March. At the request of the Panel, the company was able to trace the box back to a shipment that it had exported on 3 September 2014 to a retailer based in Yaoundé, Ane Rouge.

216. In the Central African section of the Sangha River tri-national protected area,<sup>259</sup> park rangers, with the support of the Worldwide Fund for Nature, seize hunting rifles and ammunition from poachers almost every day. Significant quantities of 7.62x39 mm, 7.62x54 mm, 7.62x51 mm, 5.56x45 mm, 7.5x54 mm and 9 mm ammunition, from several countries of origin, have been recently seized.<sup>260</sup>

<sup>257</sup> In Bouar and Baoro, MINUSCA also seized a few artisanal hunting rifles and rounds of hunting ammunition from anti-balaka elements, but without any indication of origin; inspections in Baoro on 4 June and Bouar on 28 and 29 May 2015.

<sup>258</sup> The seized ammunition disappeared during its transfer by the gendarmerie from Bria to Bangui (see sect. I).

<sup>259</sup> See paragraph 1 (e) of resolution 2196 (2015) for reference to the Sangha River tri-national protected area; see a map of the area at [www.dzanga-sangha.org/node/309](http://www.dzanga-sangha.org/node/309).

<sup>260</sup> According to data forms for seized weapons and ammunition, provided between 27 April and 24 June 2015, by the Worldwide Fund for Nature/Aires protégées de Dzanga-Sangha; archived with the United Nations.

### **Seizures of other arms and ammunition**

217. Since the beginning of its deployment, in September 2014, MINUSCA has seized a small quantity of conventional arms and ammunition in the west, which was inspected. Findings relating to those inspections are detailed in annex 5.12.

## **C. Natural resources**

### **Diamonds**

#### *Partial lifting of the suspension*

218. On 17 July, the Kimberley Process adopted an administrative decision authorizing the resumption of exports of rough diamonds from what it termed “compliant zones” in the Central African Republic.<sup>261</sup> Pursuant to an operational framework annexed to the decision, such compliant zones are those sub-prefectures:

- (a) Under government control, in particular by the territorial administration, the mining administration, the special anti-fraud unit, the gendarmerie and the police;
- (b) Where there is no systematic armed group activity with an impact on diamond production or trade;
- (c) Where the security situation enables the free movement of goods and persons.

219. A national committee composed of the Central African authorities and civil society and industry representatives is to assess security and compliance in proposed sub-prefectures and share its determination and justification with a tripartite Process monitoring team at the international level for review. At the time of writing, the follow-up committee was assessing the situation in eight sub-prefectures in the west (Gamboula, Berbérati, Carnot, Nola, Sosso-Nakombo, Dédé-Mokoumba, Bambio and Boda).

220. Pursuant to the operational framework, the follow-up committee is to coordinate with MINUSCA and the Panel to exchange relevant information in assessing compliance. In September, the committee sought the Panel’s input and the Panel provided relevant information collected during field visits to five of the proposed sub-prefectures in June and August (see below).

#### *Diamonds and security*

221. Armed groups are present at several diamond mining sites in the western Central African Republic, some of which are both inside and outside the proposed green zone. In the sub-prefecture of Amada-Gaza, outside the green zone, anti-balaka and Fulani militiamen are fighting for control over the mines. The mining authorities in Carnot said that they had no access to the area, but claimed that diamonds were smuggled out of the country through the Cameroonian border town of Gbiti (see [S/2014/762](#), para. 132). Diamonds could, however, also be traded through Berbérati and Carnot.

222. Another site, outside the proposed green zone is Sasélé (Gadzi sub-prefecture). In June, special anti-fraud unit agents from Carnot noted the presence of 15 anti-balaka militiamen from Yaloké, under the command of “Le Bleu” (see [S/2014/762](#),

<sup>261</sup> Available from [www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2015-administrative-decision-car](http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2015-administrative-decision-car).

para. 140), involved in racketeering artisanal miners. The agents also acknowledged the formation of a self-defence militia by an artisanal miner called “Mama Drogba” (S/2014/762, para. 129).

223. Within the proposed green zone, an anti-balaka militia commanded by a former chief corporal, “General Dalé”, has been involved in diamond mining at a site called Balu (Sosso-Nakombo sub-prefecture) where he forcefully confiscated gravel from diggers.<sup>262</sup> According to a mining cooperative representative, Dalé’s real name is Crépin Messamba. As zone commander of Sosso-Nakombo, he addressed a letter of 15 July to a local mine operator commandeering one of his motorcycles for his personal use (see annex 5.13). Another problematic mining area in the green zone is Salo, in Nola sub-prefecture, where armed anti-balaka elements under the command of Ferdinand Nobadji are involved in the illicit exploitation of diamonds.<sup>263</sup> Government control in Salo and Sosso-Nakombo is limited to the gendarmerie. Special anti-fraud unit patrols have not reached the areas.

224. Several anti-balaka members, including some active combatants, obtain cards as artisanal miners or diggers. The special anti-fraud unit in Berbérati, for instance, noted that Démowance, Steve Private Sérégaza and Maximin Vobouadé had licences.<sup>264</sup> Démowance is engaged in operations in Amada-Gaza and in April attacked the Cameroonian border town of Gbiti.<sup>265</sup> While Sérégaza and Vobouadé claimed that they had been demobilized, they are in close contact with Démowance and the fugitive “Chicki Chicki”, who was arrested in Berbérati in June.<sup>266</sup> In Carnot, eight known anti-balaka, who, according to the special anti-fraud unit, were demobilized, have received licences.<sup>267</sup>

225. Muslims, including collectors and artisanal miners, are often restricted from moving to urban centres. Notwithstanding recent notable progress regarding the resettlement of Muslim internally displaced persons and refugees in Berbérati, Nola and Carnot, Muslim collectors highlighted that they still feared returning to their homes or moving to mine sites, referring to assaults by local people, police harassment and the presence of anti-balaka militiamen.<sup>268</sup> Several security incidents documented in relevant areas in 2015 relate specifically to diamond operators being targeted. A selection of security incidents for the south-western Central African Republic, including diamond-related incidents highlighted in yellow, is provided in annex 5.15.

226. Local miners in several locations expressed particularly strong sentiments against so-called “Arab” collectors, whom they claimed to be of Chadian and Sudanese origin and who allegedly had previously collaborated with Séléka

<sup>262</sup> Meeting with civil society representatives, Berbérati, 17 June 2015; telephone interview with a representative of a mining cooperative in Berbérati, 1 May 2015.

<sup>263</sup> Meeting with Central African military officer, Nola, 15 June 2015; meeting with artisanal miners, Nola, 16 June 2015.

<sup>264</sup> Meeting with special anti-fraud unit regional commander, Berbérati, 17 June 2015; see copy of Vobouadé’s digger card in annex 5.14.

<sup>265</sup> Meeting with special anti-fraud unit commander, Carnot, 18 June 2015; meeting with residents, Gbiti, 18 August 2015.

<sup>266</sup> Meeting with Vobouadé and Yapélé, Berbérati, 17 June 2015.

<sup>267</sup> Meeting with special anti-fraud unit commander, Carnot, 18 June 2015.

<sup>268</sup> Meeting with Muslim collectors, Berbérati, 17 June and 20 August 2015; meeting with Muslim collectors, Nola, 20 January 2015; meeting with Muslim collectors, KENZOU (Cameroon), 16 June 2015.

elements.<sup>269</sup> Most Muslim collectors in Nola look to live near the MINUSCA base for security reasons, while some in Berbérati have made protection arrangements with newly deployed Central African soldiers.<sup>270</sup>

227. A few collectors of West African descent, mostly Mauritians, have begun to travel to remote mine sites to invest and purchase diamonds.<sup>271</sup> At the production level, the Panel observed Muslim and non-Muslim diggers working together at only one mine site, just outside Boda, under the close supervision of MINUSCA and the local security forces (see annex 5.16).

228. Anti-balaka activity has only an incidental impact on diamond production and trade in the sub-prefectures included in the proposed green zone. A risk does exist, however, that events in Bangui in September 2015, especially the Ngaragba prison break, could lead to more systematic involvement as anti-balaka leaders return to their former areas of influence. Already, “Chicki Chicki” has attempted to free his anti-balaka comrades who were in detention in Berbérati.<sup>272</sup> In 2014, he visited regularly Sosso-Nakombo to extort money from local miners and worked with a Lebanese diamond collector in Berbérati, Hassan Fawaz.<sup>273</sup>

#### *Recorded diamond trade and due diligence*

229. Buying houses in Bangui legally purchase and stock a significant quantity of diamonds produced in the proposed “green zone” in the west. Although there is no systematic anti-balaka activity having an impact on production and trade, potential purchases from licensed but yet militarily active anti-balaka members and mine sites at which armed anti-balaka elements are involved in illegal exploitation would still constitute a violation of the sanctions regime (see annex 5.17).

#### *Diamond smuggling through Cameroon*

230. The recorded diamond trade captures only a fragment of all diamonds produced in the western region, historically representing 80 per cent of diamond production in the country. Even with an estimated 40 per cent slowdown in production since the suspension,<sup>274</sup> more than 90,000 carats are unaccounted for. Some may be stored, but most leave the country, through Bangui or neighbouring countries.

231. Trafficking networks through Cameroon are well established (S/2014/762, paras. 132-134). Such illicit trade is, by definition, a violation of the sanctions regime, given that there is no way of ascertaining the origin and chain of custody of diamonds necessary to rule out armed group financing. The decline in 2015 of official Cameroonian diamond exports (2,619 carats recorded from January to October 2015

<sup>269</sup> Meeting with local miners, Mbanza (Nola sub-prefecture), 17 June 2015, and Bomandoro (Boda sub-prefecture), 12 June 2015.

<sup>270</sup> Meeting with Central African military and MINUSCA officers, Nola, 20 January 2015; meeting with Muslim collectors, Berbérati, 20 August 2015.

<sup>271</sup> Meeting with local miners, Lopo and Bania (Nola sub-prefecture), 13 June 2015.

<sup>272</sup> Confidential report, 2 October 2015.

<sup>273</sup> Meeting with civil society representatives, Berbérati, 15 June 2015; meeting with local security forces, Berbérati, 17 June 2015.

<sup>274</sup> The Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics strategy on the mining sector for 2015-2020 (April 2014) is archived with the United Nations.

compared with 3,600 carats in 2014)<sup>275</sup> suggests that Central African diamonds are not inserted into the legitimate trade in any large volume.

232. However, the Panel believes that part of the diamonds exported under Kimberley certificate by Gems Africa originate from the Central African Republic (see [S/2014/762](#), para. 133). The buyer, Patrick Ayandho, told the Panel in Kenzou that, although he could only rely on oral assurances of origin, his supplying collectors needed to purchase diamonds locally in Cameroon because they no longer had access to diamond fields in the Central African Republic.<sup>276</sup> From collectors in Kenzou, however, the Panel learned that they did receive diamonds from places such as Berbérati and sell them on to Gems Africa (see *ibid.*, para. 133).

233. Bertoua is another key hub for illicit diamond trade in the east of Cameroon. Late in 2014, two rather large diamonds, each potentially worth more than \$250,000, were sold there. One had been smuggled by a non-licensed collector from Carnot, Jean Bassaku, in November 2014.<sup>277</sup> The prospective buyer was Idriss Gaudache ([S/2014/762](#), para. 125), who died in a car accident while on his way to Bertoua to fetch the stone.

234. In December 2014, a collector from Berbérati, Bienvenue Mataka, smuggled a second stone to Bertoua, which was sold to Fawzi Jawad, a former collector from the Bangui Primo buying house.<sup>278</sup> A security officer assigned to the Ministry of Mines and Geology had followed Mataka's trail and seized his car at Gamboula on the Cameroonian border. Upon his return, Mataka explained that he was in Bertoua to pay his children's school fees, and the officer, satisfied, returned his vehicle.<sup>279</sup> No large stones were declared in Cameroon in 2015.<sup>280</sup>

235. In 2014, the Panel identified three diamond dealers based in Kinshasa who exported diamonds through three exporting companies that, through the United Arab Emirates,<sup>281</sup> went into the shipments to Kardiam (the Belgian affiliate of Badica) that were seized in Antwerp in May 2014 after an examination by the Kimberley Process Working Group of Diamond Experts revealed that it was highly probable that diamonds from the Central African Republic were in the parcels (see [S/2014/762](#), para. 118).

236. Four independent sources, including an eyewitness in Bertoua, attested that dealings involving Central African diamonds had taken place in Cameroon between three Lebanese dealers and collectors from the Central African Republic before the seizure in Antwerp.<sup>282</sup> One source linked one of the dealers, Abbas Fakih, to Idriss

<sup>275</sup> Diamond export data received from the permanent secretary for the Kimberley Process in Cameroon, archived with the United Nations.

<sup>276</sup> Meeting with Patrick Ayandho, Kenzou, 19 August 2015.

<sup>277</sup> Meeting with Central African refugees, Bertoua, 16 August 2015; meeting with mining specialist, Bangui, 24 August 2015.

<sup>278</sup> Meeting with diamond collectors, Carnot, 18 June 2015; meeting with Central African refugees, Bertoua, 16 August 2015; meeting with collectors, Berbérati, 17 August 2015.

<sup>279</sup> Meeting with Bienvenue Mataka, Berbérati, 17 June 2015; meeting with security agent, Bangui, 25 August 2015.

<sup>280</sup> Meeting with the permanent secretary for the Kimberley Process in Cameroon, 8 July 2015.

<sup>281</sup> See more details in annex 9.92.

<sup>282</sup> Meeting with trader, Bertoua, 17 August 2015; telephone interview and meeting with diamond collector, Bangui, 11 December 2014 and 11 June 2015; e-mail from a former official of the Ministry of Mines and Geology, 10 October 2014; telephone interview with a confidential source in the State buying house, Comptoir des minéraux et gemmes, 11 December 2014.

Gaudache (see S/2014/762, paras. 125 and 238). The Panel was able to contact one of the dealers, Ahmad Ibrahim, who denied having purchased diamonds in Cameroon.<sup>283</sup>

237. On 17 April, the Cameroonian authorities confiscated 160 carats of undocumented diamonds from two Indian traders, Chetan Balar and Rushitkumar Patel, who had travelled to Bertoua and Kenzou.<sup>284</sup> Balar had visited Bangui previously and befriended Ismailia Sylla, who is also involved in diamond trafficking (see *ibid.*, para. 138). Balar told the Panel in writing that on neither occasion did he or his companion purchase diamonds.<sup>284</sup> The Panel spoke to a third Indian national whom Balar identified as their local contact, who explained that he had sold the two traders diamonds from Yokadouma, Cameroon, but that they had refused to follow legal procedures.<sup>285</sup> The two traders were supposed to have presented themselves at the national permanent secretariat of the Kimberley Process in Yaoundé the morning after their arrest, but had already fled the country. The Cameroonian seizure is the only significant seizure of suspected Central African diamonds in neighbouring countries.

### Gold

238. In August, the Panel visited the gold-mining village of Ndolobo (Lobaye prefecture), where mining had taken off in the preceding months, attracting hundreds of diggers. The diggers are working for at least nine licensed artisanal miners,<sup>286</sup> but there may be many more who have not paid their licence fee.<sup>287</sup> Representatives of the Central African mining services are not permanently present, but visit the area from Bangandou (Lobaye prefecture). There is no special anti-fraud unit presence. Eleven gendarmes are present, but only in the town centre. Security at the mine site is organized by mine operators in the form of a guard unit of about 30 men armed with machetes and hunting rifles.<sup>288</sup> National and international security forces are not allowed access to the mine site, and the Panel was similarly denied access.

239. In August, the buying house Adamasswiss purchased close to 5 kg of gold from Ndolobo through a single collector (see annex 5.18), which it exported to Chad.<sup>289</sup> Adamasswiss provided the Panel with all purchasing and export details.

### Palm oil and timber

240. Palm oil plantations around Mbaïki began to resume operations at the beginning of 2015. Plantations have allowed the anti-balaka forces of Alfred Yékatom to provide security.<sup>290</sup> Yékatom, who was added to the list of sanctioned individuals on 20 August, attended the opening ceremony of a company, Palme d'or, early in 2015 and engaged in conversation with diplomatic staff invited for the occasion. As at late

<sup>283</sup> Telephone interview with Ibrahim, 1 October 2015. The Panel was unable to contact the other two dealers, Abbas Fakih and Louay Charara.

<sup>284</sup> Meeting with the permanent secretary for the Kimberley Process, Cameroon, 8 July 2015.

<sup>285</sup> Telephone interview with Indian diamond trader based in Batouri, 24 October 2015.

<sup>286</sup> List of artisanal miners having paid their licence fees for 2015, Ministry of Mines and Geology 2015, archived with the United Nations.

<sup>287</sup> Meeting with artisanal miners and mining services, Ndolobo, 30 August 2015.

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>289</sup> The export authorization is in annex 5.18; additional information is in annex 9.93.

<sup>290</sup> Meeting with the Central African gendarmerie, Mbaïki, 23 April 2015.

August, he was continuing to provide security for the company, while at Centrapalm his forces had been replaced by the gendarmerie.<sup>291</sup>

241. Compared with 2014, Yékatom kept a lower profile on the Bimbo-Pissa-Mbaïki route in 2015, but his forces, operating under the banner of the Forces de défense et de sécurité, never disappeared.<sup>292</sup> While his men no longer visibly maintain roadblocks to tax vehicles, they have kept a presence in the town of Pissa, engaging in criminal activity.<sup>293</sup> Travellers with high-value goods, such as gold from Ndolobo, travel by night in disguise to avoid being robbed.<sup>294</sup> During its current mandate, the Panel received no information that Yékatom's men continued to tax timber trucks passing through the area, unlike in 2014.

242. Elsewhere in the south-west of the Central African Republic, anti-balaka influence over the timber sector has similarly declined. Nevertheless, the Panel obtained information about security payments made in 2014 by personnel of the Société d'exploitation forestière centrafricaine, as detailed in annex 5.20.

## VI. Travel ban violations and implementation of the asset freeze

243. By paragraph 6 of its resolution 2196 (2015), the Security Council emphasized that violations of the travel ban could undermine the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic.

244. During its mandate, the Panel noted several travel ban violations by sanctioned individuals Nourredine Adam and François Bozizé. Information obtained indicates that Adam violated the travel ban at least six times and Bozizé at least seven times.

245. Moreover, some violations were facilitated by the Governments of the Congo and Kenya in the case of Nourredine Adam and by Kenya, South Africa and Uganda in the case of Bozizé. The latter has already travelled twice to South Africa, in September 2014 and October 2015.

246. Detailed information on violations of the travel ban and the implementation of the asset freeze, in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 7 of resolution 2196 (2015), is provided in annex 6.

## VII. Recommendations

247. The Panel recommends:

### Regional

(a) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on the sanctions regime on the Central African Republic, request countries in the region to cooperate with the Panel in implementing the travel ban and asset freeze with regard to sanctioned individuals;

<sup>291</sup> Meetings with international forces, Mbaïki, 30 August 2015.

<sup>292</sup> Yékatom's forces surrendered some arms and ammunition to the national collection committee on 7 March 2015 in Pissa; see the list in annex 5.19.

<sup>293</sup> Meetings with international forces, local authorities and gendarmerie, Mbaïki, 30 August 2015.

<sup>294</sup> Interview with artisanal gold miner in Ndolobo, Mbaïki, 30 August 2015.

(b) That the Committee request neighbouring countries and those in the region, as well as regional organizations such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, to coordinate their political initiatives with those of the Central African Republic-based transitional institutions and the Group of Eight;

(c) That the Committee urge the Governments of the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan to implement the tripartite agreement signed on 23 May 2011 in Khartoum to enhance security in their common border areas through joint patrols, in cooperation with MINUSCA;

(d) That the Security Council consider, in its next resolution on the sanctions regime on the Central African Republic, not applying the measures set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2196 (2015) to supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the tripartite force in cooperation with MINUSCA and that the Council request the tripartite force to report to the Committee on measures taken in that regard;

#### **Armed groups**

(e) That the Committee urge the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic to transmit to the Committee and the Panel the names of individuals and entities that, in the view of the transitional authorities, are engaged in or provide support for acts undermining the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic;

(f) That the Security Council reiterate its call upon the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic to ensure that perpetrators of violations and abuses of applicable international law, in particular those committed against children and women, are excluded from the Central African security and armed forces;

(g) That the Security Council request the international forces in the Central African Republic, including MINUSCA and French forces, to provide the Committee and the Panel, every six months, with detailed information about attacks conducted against United Nations missions or international security presences, including, if available, the identification details of perpetrators and the names of the entities responsible;

#### **Arms**

(h) That the Committee encourage MINUSCA, in cooperation with the national authorities, to proceed with the construction and rehabilitation by the United Nations Mine Action Service of safe and effective facilities for the storage of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons for the Central African security and armed forces in Bangui and in all prefectures of the Central African Republic;

(i) That the Committee encourage MINUSCA and the European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic, in cooperation with the national authorities, to provide stockpile management training to the national security and armed forces and ensure capacity-building for the identification, registry and tracing of arms and ammunition and for the destruction of surplus and obsolete weapons;

(j) That the Security Council, in its next resolution on the sanctions regime on the Central African Republic, decide that the measure set out by paragraph 1 of resolution 2196 (2015) is not to apply to supplies of non-lethal equipment, or provision of operational training, to the Central African security forces, intended solely for supporting or use in the Central African process of security sector reform;

**Natural resources**

(k) That the Committee reiterate its call upon the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic to suspend buying houses that purchase diamonds from areas under the direct or indirect control of armed groups;

(l) That the Committee urge the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic to freeze the assets of individuals and entities sanctioned by the Committee;

(m) That the Committee urge MINUSCA to designate a focal point to coordinate and exchange relevant information with the follow-up committee in charge of implementing the operational framework annexed to the Kimberley Process administrative decision on the resumption of exports of rough diamonds from the Central African Republic;

(n) That the Security Council request the Committee, in determining whether to designate an individual or entity supporting armed groups or criminal networks in the Central African Republic through the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources, pursuant to paragraph 12 (d) of resolution 2196 (2015), to consider, among other things, whether the individual or entity has exercised due diligence consistent with the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas of OECD or equivalent guidance;

**Humanitarian**

(o) That the Security Council reiterate the need for the transitional authorities, with the support of MINUSCA police, justice and correction personnel, to strengthen the capacity of the judicial authorities in the Central African Republic, in particular for the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators, as well as to reinforce the corrections and penitentiary system to ensure that prisoners are held in the appropriate security conditions and serve their sentences;

(p) That the Committee urge the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Children's Fund and all the international organizations that participate in the monitoring and reporting mechanism in the Central African Republic to cooperate with the Panel in order to identify perpetrators of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including those involved in the use of children in armed conflict and in gender-based violence.

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
**Annexes to the final report of the Panel of Experts  
on the Central African Republic extended pursuant  
to Security Council resolution 2196 (2015)**

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Annex 1: Bangui

Map



**Annex 1.1:** Chronology of events related to the 26 September 2015 escalation of violence in Bangui

From **26 September 2015** to **3 October 2015** Bangui was the scenario of a new escalation of violence. This surge of violence resulted in the killing in a week-time of 42 civilians, 335 injured, 20 attacks against UN premises and staff, and attacks against 12 INGOs' and seven local NGOs' guesthouses and offices.<sup>1</sup>

Isolated incidents have still affected the capital since 3 October 2015, while a new escalation of violence was taking place at the time of writing, end of October, following the assassination by an anti-balaka group in Combattant of two representatives of the UPC, Captain Ahmad Nadjat and Hassan Bouba.

On 16 October 2015, the total count was of 79 dead and 512 wounded.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, OCHA reported on the same date that the escalation of violence caused the displacement of 17,090 persons in Bangui and surroundings as well as 2,894 new refugees in Zongo, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>3</sup>

1. **25 September 2015** – During the night of 25-26 September, a young Muslim man who worked as a Moto-taxi driver was killed in the fifth district of Bangui.<sup>4</sup>

*Photograph of the moto-taxi driver killed on 26 September 2015*



*Source: "La Centrafrique connaît un nouvel accès de violences interreligieuses", Le Monde, 29 September 2015*

<sup>1</sup> Confidential source, 6 October 2015. INGO confidential document – compilation of incidents suffered by INGOs in Bangui, received by the Panel on 20 October 2015. OCHA Central African Republic. Flash Update 5. 2 October 2015. Accessed on 23 October 2015 at: [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/OCHA\\_CAR\\_Flash\\_Update\\_5\\_Bangui\\_FINAL.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/OCHA_CAR_Flash_Update_5_Bangui_FINAL.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> OCHA Central African Republic. Flash Update 8. 2 October 2015. Accessed on 24 October 2015 at: [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash\\_update\\_8.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash_update_8.pdf)


<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015. Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

## 2. 26 September 2015

- 09:00 hours – The body of the Muslim Moto-taxi driver (killed during the previous night) was left in front of Arbabolo mosque, in PK5, 3<sup>rd</sup> district. This set off an escalation of violence most notably in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> districts with hotspots in Combattant, Miskine, PK5, and Boy-Rabe neighbourhoods. Preliminary information indicated an unconfirmed number of 20 dead and an estimated 100 injured resulting from sectarian violence.<sup>5</sup> According to INGO sources as retaliation for the killing of the young Moto-taxi driver, several Muslims from PK5 regrouped and fired several times around the Koudoukou avenue. This caused panic among people from surrounding areas who fled to the 5<sup>th</sup> district, via the avenue de France. Movements of civilian population continued throughout the day. Several anti-balaka elements started to group at Boy-Rabe on their way to Miskine, in the 8<sup>th</sup> district.<sup>6</sup>
- 09:30 hours – Two UN vehicles were stoned in Combattant Market, 8<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui and near Corail Market, 1<sup>st</sup> district of Bangui.<sup>7</sup>

*Photograph of UN vehicle stoned at Combattant market*



*Source: MINUSCA*

- 10:00 hours – MINUSCA patrol in the PK5 area confirmed the existence of at least 23-armed elements in motorcycles carrying AK-47s and one motorcycle passenger carrying an RPG. Roadblocks were being placed using stones and different types of obstacles in different parts of the city including avenue des Martyrs by protestors and insurgents.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015. Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>6</sup> INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>7</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

- 12:00 hours – Five armed men broke into the residence of two MINUSCA peacekeepers in the 1<sup>st</sup> district of Bangui, beat them, and stole all their personal belongings. The two officers managed to escape and were treated at MINUSCA hospital.<sup>9</sup>
- 12:50 hours – INGO sources reported that the Police station in the 5<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui and a health centre in the Malimaka area were set on fire by a Muslim mob. Around the same time market stands in the 8<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui were burned by anti-balaka elements.<sup>10</sup>

*Roadblock with burnt market stands*



*Source: MINUSCA*

- 14:30 hours – Barricades were erected at avenue Combattant blocking access to the airport.<sup>11</sup> International flights were cancelled from 26 September to 5 October.

*Roadblock on the airport access road in the Combattant neighbourhood*



*Source: MINUSCA*

<sup>9</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>10</sup> INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

- 15:30 hours – The residence of a MINUSCA UNPOL was attacked at 36 Villas.<sup>12</sup>
- 18:30 hours – Armed men in motorbikes and vehicles circulated throughout the city, mainly in the districts of Combattant, PK5, Miskine and Boy-Rabe. Premises of the radio station AMA were looted and partially destroyed.<sup>13</sup>

*PK5 self-defence militia patrolling by car marked with "PARACHOCK" signs*



*Source: MINUSCA*

### 3. 27 September 2015

- During the night a call for "civil disobedience" was launched on the local radio Ndéké Luka.<sup>14</sup>
- INGOs were advised to remove any signs that indicated their identity as INGOs from guest houses and offices, this was a response to the fact that the UN, INGOs and expatriates were being intentionally targeted by mobs, anti-balaka elements and criminals in Bangui.<sup>15</sup>
- Several INGO offices and guesthouses were attacked and looted. UNDSS undertook an operation to extract all personnel in danger and relocate them to MINUSCA HQ and Leger Hotel.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Confidential source, 07 October 2015.

<sup>13</sup> INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Telephone conversation with UN Security, 27 September 2015, and INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>16</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

*INGO compound looted**Source: MINUSCA*

- 09:00 hours – Barricades and roadblocks were erected in most of the main axis in Bangui (Martyrs Roundabout, PK12, Gobongo, CNS and Lycée Boganda) and protected by crowds of young people; some of whom were armed with machetes, AK-47s, grenades, and RPGs.<sup>17</sup> MINUSCA forces intervened to dismantle some of the barricades but reports indicated that they were raised somewhere else immediately after.<sup>18</sup>
- 09:30 hours – About one hundred (100) protesters erected a barricade in front of MINUSCA's JTF on avenue Boganda. They showed signs of hostility against the United Nations by throwing stones.<sup>19</sup>
- 11:00 hours – Local population at the United Nations roundabout attacked one INGO vehicle with stones. The driver, a local staff member was slightly injured.<sup>20</sup>
- 12:15 hours – Armed elements, aboard two pickup vehicles, opened fire on a static MINUSCA Military position at the Marabena Roundabout. Several bullets hit the armored vehicle of MINUSCA with no casualties recorded.<sup>21</sup>
- In the course of the afternoon a Sangaris convoy was shot at resulting in one soldier wounded.<sup>22</sup>
- 14:00 hours – Three MINUSCA military officers were attacked by protesters on the avenue de France, near the National Center for Safety in the 1<sup>st</sup> district while travelling in a MINUSCA vehicle. The officers suffered from minor injuries.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>21</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>22</sup> Confidential source, 07 October 2015.

<sup>23</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

- 23:30 hours – Several criminals broke into the office of the IOM in Bangui and looted its entire contents. The perpetrators also sabotaged five vehicles present at the compound at the time of incident.<sup>24</sup>

*IOM compound after the looting and destruction of the fleet of vehicles*



*Source: MINUSCA*

- Late hours of the night – Gendarmerie HQ at Camp Izamo attacked by anti-balaka elements led by Guy Mazimbélet (killed during the attack).<sup>25</sup>

#### 4. 28 September 2015

- 01:00 hours – Around 15 armed men with knives attacked and looted the guest house of an INGO few hours after UNDSS had relocated the personnel.<sup>26</sup>
- 01:00 hours – Armed groups raided and looted an INGO office. Nine motorbikes, all office equipment and furniture were stolen.<sup>27</sup>
- 05:00 hours – Armed groups raided and looted an INGO office in SICA I. Two vehicles and all office equipment were stolen.<sup>28</sup> A grenade was thrown at MINUSCA BUR Patrol in 1<sup>st</sup> district, no casualties or injuries reported.<sup>29</sup>
- 10:15 hours – A demonstration was reported around PK0 moving towards the United Nations roundabout in the *avenue de l'Indépendance*, shooting in the air was heard, at the same time several barricades were erected at the United Nations roundabout. Around 1,000 protesters arrived at the UN roundabout before MINUSCA forces dispersed the demonstration.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>25</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015.

<sup>26</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Confidential source, 07 October 2015.

<sup>30</sup> INGO confidential report, 28 September 2015. Confidential source, 07 October 2015.

*Gervais Lakosso leading gatherings and demonstrations in Bangui*



Source: Social network website, accessed by the Panel on 27 October 2015 at <https://www.facebook.com/hervecyriaque.serefio/posts/10205147773270752>

*Anti-balaka military commander and gendarmerie officer Olivier Koudémon leading Lakosso's demonstration in Bangui on 28 September 2015*



*Source: Social network website accessed by the Panel on 27 October 2015, op.cit.*

- 11:00 hours – La Kouanga mosque in the 2<sup>nd</sup> district vandalized by unidentified armed men.<sup>31</sup>

*Lakouanga mosque in the 2<sup>nd</sup> district has been destroyed twice since December 2013*



*Source: MINUSCA*

<sup>31</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 28 September 2015.

- 12:00 hours – Several criminals broke into an empty INGO office located at SICA I neighborhood and looted all the valuables and contents.<sup>32</sup>
- 12:00 hours – In the course of the day an INGO relocated their staff through the Oubangui River to Zongo, DRC.
- 17:00 hours – All prisoners at the Ngaragba prison in Bangui escaped.<sup>33</sup> According to the information collected by the Panel, there was a first attempt of escape earlier that day, at this time the prisoners obtained the key of the main entrance. Given the fragility of the situation the FACA elements guarding the prison called for reinforcements, the reinforcement, consisting of 45 FACA elements arrived at the prison, the commander addressed the prisoners (from outside) in Sango and after that the door was opened and all the prisoners left the prison in a straight line.<sup>34</sup>
- 17:45 hours – An armed group fired at MINUSCA FPU convoy on the road to M'Poko airport. MINUSCA and Sangaris forces returned fire and repelled the attackers. No casualties reported.<sup>35</sup>
- 22:00 hours – The guesthouse and office of an INGO were looted by armed men in SICA I neighbourhood. Staff had been relocated earlier.<sup>36</sup>
- 22:00 hours – Several criminals broke into the guesthouse of the INGO where expatriates were still present. The INGO staff managed to escape using a vehicle. However, one international staff was wounded while escaping. The guesthouse was totally looted afterwards. UNDSS extraction Team and Sangaris could not extract the INGO staff before due to roadblocks.<sup>37</sup>

##### 5. 29 September 2015

- 03:00 hours – Several criminals broke into the empty office of an INGO located in SICA I neighborhood and totally looted its contents.<sup>38</sup>
- 10:00 hours – Several criminals broke into the empty guesthouse of an INGO located at SICA I neighbourhood and totally looted its contents.<sup>39</sup>
- 12:00 hours – Two INGO vehicles were victims of an attempted hijacking by armed men in front of the Cathedral; one of the drivers lost control of the vehicle due to nervousness and caused an accident that threw the vehicle into a pitch at

<sup>32</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>33</sup> The Panel obtained two different figures on the number of prisoners escaped from Ngaragba prison. One from CAR judicial authorities (email communication on 19 October 2015) indicating 677 prisoners and the figure of 686 from MINUSCA Justice and Corrections Section. The Panel also requested the name of escaped prisoners but it has not been yet possible to obtain such a list, which was unavailable at the time of writing.

<sup>34</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015. INGO confidential report, 29 September 2015. Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>35</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>36</sup> INGO confidential report, 29 September 2015.

<sup>37</sup> INGO confidential report, 29 September 2015. Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

the side of the road. The perpetrators left the scene at the moment of the accident without being able to take anything. No injuries were reported.<sup>40</sup>

- 13:00 hours – A MINUSCA Force (PAKBAT) patrol was fired upon by armed elements near Gobongo Market, 4<sup>th</sup> district. Two peacekeepers were severely injured and a third suffered from minor injuries.<sup>41</sup>
- 15:00 hours – Armed men clashed with FACA elements close to the Ministry of Interior (PK0 area), resulting in three FACA elements wounded.<sup>42</sup>
- 22:50 hours – MINUSCA Formed Police Unit (FPU) patrol was fired upon at the Martyr roundabout, 2<sup>nd</sup> district of Bangui, by unknown armed elements.<sup>43</sup>
- 23:00 hours – Unidentified armed men attempted to break into the health centre of a local NGO in the Benz VI. The national security forces intervened forcing the perpetrators to flee.<sup>44</sup>

## 6. 30 September 2015

- 03:00 hours – Unidentified men attacked the office of a national NGO located in Benz VI and stole all its contents including the safe.<sup>45</sup>
- 14:00 hours – Unknown individuals attempted to attack the water reserve of Bangui and loot the office of an INGO as well as a WFP depot near the CNT. MINUSCA Force and Sangaris deployed to the three locations before they could be damaged and the assailants fled.<sup>46</sup>
- 15:00 hours – Total fuel station in the 4<sup>th</sup> district was looted. MINUSCA troops were deployed to the scene and exchanged fire with assailants. Assailants retreated from the area.<sup>47</sup>
- 16:50 hours – Unidentified individuals fired at the MINUSCA static position in front of the transitional Council (TNC) in the 1<sup>st</sup> district of Bangui. MINUSCA forces returned fire forcing the attackers to flee.<sup>48</sup>

## 7. 1 October 2015

- 09:00 hours – 11:00 hours – Gathering of people at the round point Marabena towards Koudoukou. MINUSCA dispersed the crowd.<sup>49</sup>
- 13:00 hours – Looters approached the Lycee Boganda but no crime took place.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>40</sup> INGO confidential report, 29 September 2015.

<sup>41</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>42</sup> Confidential source, 30 September 2015. Confidential source, 07 October 2015.

<sup>43</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>44</sup> INGO confidential report, 30 September 2015. Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>45</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>46</sup> Confidential source Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>47</sup> Confidential source, 07 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 30 September 2015.

<sup>48</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>49</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

- 16:00 hours – Unidentified armed men looted the commissariat and the Mairie in the 4<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui.<sup>51</sup>
- In the late hours of the night, unidentified armed men attacked and looted buildings close by Camp Izamo, Gendarmerie HQ.<sup>52</sup>

#### 8. 2 October 2015

- 14:00 hours – Armed men looted the office of a local NGO in Benz VI neighborhood. MINUSCA forces arrived to the scene after the assailants had left.<sup>53</sup>
- 16:10 hours – Two armed individuals riding a motorcycle fired two rounds of ammunition at the MINUSCA Static Guard Post in the 4<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui (close to Lycée Boganda).<sup>54</sup>
- 23:05 hours – Unidentified armed individuals opened fire on MINUSCA Force elements guarding the missions' HQ. MINUSCA Forces fired back forcing the assailants to flee riding motorbikes.<sup>55</sup>
- In SICA 1 (2<sup>nd</sup> district) and Castors (3<sup>rd</sup> district) of Bangui, UN Staff and NGOs reported that unidentified individuals extorted money for “protection of residences” in the neighborhood. A UN staff had to pay CFA 40,000 (USD 67) to a self-proclaimed security group.<sup>56</sup>

#### 9. 3 October 2015

- 08:00 hours – Attempted prison escape at Camp de Roux.<sup>57</sup>
- 14:30 hours – A group of Muslims were allegedly attacked, one of the individuals was killed and the body was left in front of MINUSCA log base.<sup>58</sup> The incident was not confirmed.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. Confidential document, 7 October 2015.

<sup>54</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. Confidential document, 7 October 2015. Confidential source, 5 October 2015.

<sup>55</sup> Confidential source, 2 October 2015.

<sup>56</sup> Confidential source, 2 October 2015.

<sup>57</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

**Annex 1.2:** Photographs of anti-balaka leaders Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona and Sébastien Wénézoui

*Ngaïssona at the VIP lounge of Bangui international airport, discussing with former Séléka General Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane, on 29 August 2015*



*Source: Photograph taken by the Panel*

*Wénézoui (centre – wearing a blue jacket from the Belgian or Dutch Police) poses on 17 January 2014 with his men at his base, in the Boeing district of Bangui*



*Source: Reuters, accessed on 27 October 2015 at <http://news.yahoo.com/photos/wenezoui-poses-men-boeing-district-central-african-republic-photo-104901016.html>*

**Annex 1.3:** Letter sent by the Co-mediator in the Central African crisis, Abdoulaye Bathily, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Central Africa, to the International Mediator on 8 February 2015

UNITED NATIONS  
United Nations Regional Office  
for Central Africa

NATIONS UNIES  
Bureau Régional des Nations Unies  
pour l'Afrique Centrale

UNOCA

Ref: SRSG-UNOCA/FO/2015/02-08-IEX-BT

Libreville, le 8 février 2015

Monsieur le Président,

Les discussions qui ont cours en ce moment à Nairobi à votre initiative et sous la facilitation d'autorités kényanes sont presque hors de contrôle, si l'on en croit la presse kenyane, qui s'est fait l'écho d'une cérémonie de signature d'un accord de cessez-le-feu la semaine prochaine.

Le texte proposé par les acteurs de Nairobi viole les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition de la République Centrafricaine et l'esprit de Brazzaville.

La Communauté économique des Etats d'Afrique centrale, l'Union Africaine et les Nations Unies se sont maintes fois inquiétées des conséquences de cette initiative sur le processus en cours en République Centrafricaine.

Malgré les rappels à l'ordre contenus dans votre communiqué du 17 janvier 2015 et dans votre récente lettre, les acteurs engagés dans l'initiative de Nairobi persistent à poursuivre leur démarche qui, dans les faits, conduit aujourd'hui à saper tout le processus de paix en cours en République centrafricaine et les gains enregistrés par la Médiation et la communauté internationales. Des chefs militaires de l'ex-Séléka se prévalent des discussions de Nairobi pour entraver les consultations populaires à la base en cours dans certaines préfectures de la RCA. Des éléments Anti-Balakas profitent de la confusion ainsi créée pour procéder à des enlèvements de personnes, accentuant ainsi le climat d'insécurité pour les personnes et les biens à Bangui et dans d'autres localités.

**Son Excellence**  
Monsieur Denis Sassou Nguesso  
Président de la République du Congo  
République du Congo  
Brazzaville

La continuation de cette initiative est manifestement de plus en plus en contradiction avec les décisions pertinentes du GIC-RCA du 7 novembre et de la position qu'ont prise les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la CEEAC lors de leur concertation du 31 janvier 2015 à Addis Ababa. Elle est aussi de nature à compromettre les résultats obtenus par les efforts conjugués de l'ensemble de la communauté internationale pour une sortie de crise en RCA selon le chronogramme retenu pour la suite de la Transition, comme vous l'avez-vous-même indiqué dans votre lettre aux autorités de la Transition.

C'est pour les raisons qui précèdent que j'ai l'honneur de vous demander, Monsieur le Président, de mettre fin, de manière à la fois formelle et publique, aux consultations en cours dans la capitale du Kenya, et à inviter tous les acteurs à s'insérer dans le processus de Brazzaville. La crédibilité de la Médiation Internationale et le déroulement apaisé de la Transition en République Centrafricaine en dépendent.

Je vous prie d'agr er, Monsieur le Pr sident, l'expression de ma tr s haute <sup>et fr. nouvelle</sup> consid ration.



Abdoulaye Bathily,  
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire général  
des Nations Unies, Représentant les Nations  
Unies au sein de la Médiation Internationale

**Annex 1.4: KnK press communiqué dated 4 October 2015**

Kwa Na Kwa

\*\*\*\*\*

Bureau Politique

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Secrétariat Général

République Centrafricaine

\*\*\*\*\*

*Unité – Dignité – Travail*

N° \_\_\_\_\_/KNK/BP/SG.15

**Déclaration relative à la recrudescence des violences à Bangui**

A quelques mois du terme de la décision n°76/CEEAC/CCEG/XVI/15 du Président en exercice de la CEEAC portant « *ultime prorogation de la Transition* » en République Centrafricaine, une crise, d'une violence inouïe, a éclaté en date du 26 Septembre 2015 provoquant plus d'une quarantaine de victimes, une centaine de blessés graves, des milliers de déplacés internes, des dégâts matériels et des pillages.

A l'origine de cette crise qui a émaillé la capitale centrafricaine, la découverte du cadavre d'un individu de religion musulmane. Cet engrenage infernal fait rappeler l'avertissement prémonitoire lancé par S.E **Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO**, Président de la République du CONGO et Médiateur International dans la crise Centrafricaine dans son allocution à l'ouverture du Forum National de Réconciliation de Bangui : « *Faites bien attention, car c'est souvent au port que les navires chavirent* ».

Rentrée précipitamment à Bangui alors qu'elle participait à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies à New York, Mme le Chef d'Etat de Transition a adressé un message à la Nation en date du 30 Septembre 2015. Outre les accusations de tentative de Coup d'Etat lancées à l'endroit de nombreux leaders politiques, elle a mis l'accent sur les points suivants :

1. Le désarmement forcé des groupes armés non conventionnels ;
2. L'ouverture imminente d'un dialogue avec l'ensemble des forces vives de la Nation.

Le Bureau Politique du KNK rappelle que dans le document intitulé « **SCHEMA CENTRAFRICAIN INCLUSIF DE SORTIE DE CRISE** », l'ensemble des plateformes, Partis, Associations et Personnalités Politiques Indépendantes représentant 90% de la classe politique centrafricaine réunis en concertation élargie les 04 et 05 Septembre 2015 a fait l'amer constat qu'aucune des missions assignées aux Autorités de Transition et prescrites à l'Article 44 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition n'a été réalisée avec succès. Toutefois, il y'a bien lieu de noter que l'annonce faite par Mme le Chef d'Etat de Transition au double sujet du désarmement et de la tenue d'un dialogue inter-centrafricain rejoint le contenu du document susmentionné.

Par ailleurs, tout le monde, mis à part les partenaires internationaux, s'accorde à reconnaître que ni les conditions technique, de soutenabilité financière et de sécurité ne sont réunies pour la tenue d'élections législatives et présidentielle libres, démocratiques, transparentes, régulières et incontestées avant la fin de l'année 2015 au regard des récents événements qui ont considérablement impacté le chronogramme électoral qualifié de "*chimérique et dangereux*" voire de "*bombe politique*" par **Thierry VERCOULON**, Directeur du Projet Afrique Centrale de l'International Crisis Group.

Dans un article publié en date du 22 Septembre 2015, ce dernier vient de dresser le constat suivant : « **Bien que la feuille de route de sortie de crise qui prévoyait le désarmement des milices et un minimum de réconciliation ait déraillé, les partenaires internationaux maintiennent pourtant un calendrier électoral chimérique et dangereux. L'entêtement des partenaires internationaux à appliquer une feuille de route obsolète est politiquement contre-productif** ».

A l'entêtement des partenaires internationaux à vouloir organiser, coûte que coûte, ces élections avant la fin de l'année 2015, s'ajoutent leur détermination avérée ainsi que celle des Autorités de Transition de mettre à l'écart les principaux acteurs de la crise centrafricaine, à savoir les anciens Chefs d'Etat **François BOZIZE YANGOUVONDA** et **Michel DJOTODIA**.

Cette position tout aussi contreproductive vient d'être contrebalancée par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies qui a souligné « **l'importance de la tenue d'élections présidentielles et législatives libres, justes, transparentes et inclusives, conformément à la charte constitutionnelle de transition...** ». Le Conseil de Sécurité a également souligné la nécessité « **qu'un dialogue national inclusif, comme celui initié au Forum de Bangui en mai 2015, est la seule voie possible vers la réconciliation et une paix durable** ».

S'agissant de la nécessité d'un dialogue national inclusif, c'est-à-dire ouvert à tous les acteurs politiques, est-il besoin de rappeler la sage préconisation lancée par le Président Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO à l'ouverture du Forum de Bangui : « **Je voudrais rappeler que la recherche du consensus inclusif à laquelle j'appelle l'ensemble des acteurs politiques et de la société civile, n'est pas incompatible avec la justice. Ce n'est pas un appel à l'impunité. Dans cette démarche, je le dis pour la Centrafrique comme je l'ai dit pour mon pays, nous devons veiller pour que tous ceux qui sont en mesure d'apporter leur pierre à la construction de la maison commune soient associés. A travers le monde et l'histoire, des exemples ne manquent pour soutenir cette sage prudence** ».

Devant la gravité de la crise que vient de connaître la capitale centrafricaine et de ses conséquences sur les plans politique, sécuritaire, humanitaire et socio-économique, le Bureau Politique du KNK :

1. Présente ses profondes condoléances aux parents des victimes de ces actes ignobles et barbares;
2. Condamne avec fermeté les violences perpétrées par des Musulmans et des Non-musulmans, les pillages et les destructions des biens meubles et immeubles ;
3. Exige l'ouverture d'une enquête internationale pour identifier les commanditaires, auteurs et co – auteurs de ces violences ;
4. Réitère sa pleine et totale adhésion au "**SCHEMA CENTRAFRICAIN INCLUSIF DE SORTIE DE CRISE**".

Afin d'éviter de reproduire le type de "*Dialogue Exclusif*" organisé en mai 2015, le Bureau Politique du KNK réclame la tenue, dans la capitale congolaise (Brazzaville) sous les auspices du Médiateur International, S.E. **Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO**, d'un *Dialogue Inclusif* pour débattre de l'avenir de la Transition en cours.

Fait à Bangui le 04 Octobre 2015

**Pour le Bureau Politique**

**Bertin BEA,**

*Ancien Ministre,*

*Ancien Député*

**Annex 1.5: Copy of the signed pages of the Nairobi agreement**

EN FOI DE QUOI, les représentants dûment mandatés des Parties ont adopté le présent Accord à NAIROBI, KENYA, le 22 janvier 2015 en 10 Originaux en Anglais et en Français.

Signé par les Parties:

Pour les EX-SELEKA:

(a) NOUR ALDINE ADAM   
M. Adame Nouraldine


(b)   
M. Moustapha Saboune


(c)   
Mme. Batoul Achta

Pour les ANTI-BALAKA:

(a)   
M. Joachim Kokate

(b)   
M. Maxime Mokom

(c)   
M. Come Hippolyte Azounou

  
11  
MM    


En présence de:

Représentants de la Société civile de la RCA:


(a)   
.....  
M. Alexis Ngoya

(b)   
.....  
M. Ali Mahamat Issa

(c)   
.....  
M. Mahamat Ibrahim

(d)   
.....  
M. El Mackine Mansour Ben


En présence de:

(a)   
.....

**Le Médiateur en Chef: Honorable Kenneth Otiato Marende, EGH**

(b)   
.....

**Le Médiateur en Chef Adjoint: Lt. Général (Retraité) Njuki Mw  
MGH, CBS, OGW, 'ndc' (K) 'psc' (K).**

(c)   
.....

**Ambassadeur Zaddock M. Syong'oh, HSC  
(Pour le Gouvernement de la République du Kenya)**

En présence de :



**Annex 1.6:** Photograph of Bertin and Nadia Béa during electoral campaign in Bégoua (Ombella-Mpoko province) on 2 May 2015



Source: "Bea Nadia: La reine de Bimbo 2", *Centrafrique Libre*, 5 May 2015  
Accessed on 29 October 2015 at <http://news.abangui.com/h/26301.html>

**Annex 1.7: Extract of the Constitutional Court decision number 008/15/CCT on 20 July 2015**

**EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES DISPOSITIONS NON CONFORMES**

**a) Sur la question du droit de vote des réfugiés centrafricains**

Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 20 alinéa 6 de la Charte : « Tout citoyen a le droit de vote » ;

Qu'il résulte de cette disposition, que la Loi Fondamentale garantit à chaque citoyen centrafricain le droit de vote ;

Considérant qu'en matière de contrôle de conformité d'une loi à la Charte Constitutionnelle, la Cour statue uniquement sur l'ensemble des moyens soulevés et qu'elle peut cependant soulever d'office d'autres moyens en cas de violation des dispositions de la Charte ou de principe de valeur constitutionnelle ;

Qu'en application de l'article 28 de sa loi organique n° 13.002 du 14 août 2013, la Cour avait relevé d'office comme étant une violation d'une disposition de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition en son article 20 alinéa 6, la non prise en compte du droit de vote des Centrafricains déplacés et réfugiés, dans sa Décision n°002 du 16 janvier 2015 sur un précédent examen de conformité de la loi portant dérogations à certaines dispositions de la loi n°13.003 du 13 novembre 2013 portant Code électoral de la République Centrafricaine ;

Que cette décision doit être appliquée conformément aux termes de l'article 84 alinéa 1 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition qui disposent : « Les décisions de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition ne sont susceptibles d'aucun recours. Elles s'imposent aux pouvoirs publics, à toute autorité administrative et juridictionnelle et à toute personne physique ou morale » ;

Que si les situations complexes du moment mettent en relief les difficultés du vote des citoyens centrafricains déplacés et réfugiés, cette question d'organisation technique et matérielle ne permet pas de dénier aux citoyens centrafricains qui ont craint pour leur vie, leur droit de vote, énoncé à l'article 20 alinéa 6 de la charte Constitutionnelle de Transition du 18 juillet 2013 et réaffirmé fortement par les recommandations du Forum de Bangui du 11 Mai 2015 (page 26) ;

Qu'en conséquence, l'examen des **articles** :

**5 nouveau ;**

**30 nouveau ;**

**32 nouveau ;**

**et 34 nouveau ;**

de la loi portant dérogations à certaines dispositions de la loi n°13.003 du 13 novembre 2013 portant Code électoral de la République Centrafricaine, fait apparaître la non-conformité des dispositions des articles susvisés avec les dispositions de l'article 20 alinéa 6 de la loi fondamentale ;

*M.*

**Annex 1.8: Decision number 010/15/CCT of the transitional Constitutional Court dated 28 August 2015**

COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE TRANSITION  
\*\*\*\*\*

RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité – Dignité – Travail  
\*\*\*\*

**DECISION N° 010/15/CCT DU 28 AOUT 2015**

**Sur la demande du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition relative à l'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition**

AU NOM DE PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAIN  
LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE TRANSITION

Vu la loi N° 13.001 du 18 juillet 2013 portant Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition :

Vu la loi N° 13.002 du 14 Août 2013 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition :

Vu la lettre de saisine du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition en date du 23 juillet 2015 relative à l'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition :

Le Rapporteur ayant été entendu :

APRES EN AVOIR DELIBERE CONFORMEMENT A LA LOI

Considérant que par requête en date du 23 juillet 2015 enregistrée au greffe de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition le 28 juillet 2015 à 13h30 minutes sous le n° 123, le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition a saisi la Haute Juridiction pour solliciter l'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition relatif aux inéligibilités :

Que le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition justifie sa saisine en se fondant sur les articles 76 tiret 8 de la Charte et 10 tiret 8 de la loi n° 13.002 du 14 Août 2013 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition :

Que le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition expose qu'à l'approche des élections présidentielle et législatives, les dispositions de l'article 106 font l'objet de deux courants d'interprétation : que pour certains, l'application des dispositions de l'article 106 concerne uniquement les seuls acteurs en fonction et pour d'autres, l'application inclut l'ensemble des dirigeants de la Transition depuis le commencement.

**I- SUR LA FORME**

**1. Sur la compétence**

Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 76 tiret 8 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition est chargée d'interpréter la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition :



Que l'objet de la demande étant relative à l'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte ;

Il y a lieu de déclarer la Cour compétente ;

**2. Sur la recevabilité**

Considérant que l'article 76 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition donne compétence à la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition pour interpréter la Charte ;

Considérant qu'en cette matière ni la Charte ni la loi n'ont déterminé les personnes ayant qualité pour saisir la Cour ;

Considérant le caractère fondamental de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, toute personne intéressée doit pouvoir saisir la Cour Constitutionnelle en vue de son interprétation ;

Considérant que la demande émane du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition ;

Il y a lieu de la déclarer recevable ;

**3. Sur les délais**

Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 79 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, le délai imparti à la Cour pour statuer est de un mois, en cas d'urgence, il est ramené à huit(8) jours ;

Considérant que dans sa requête le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition a sollicité l'examen selon la procédure d'urgence ;

Considérant que la requête du Chef de l'Etat a été enregistrée par le greffe le 28 juillet 2015 mais que la densité des activités de la Cour ne lui a pas permis de statuer suivant la procédure d'urgence ;

Que de ce fait, la Cour ne peut rendre sa décision selon la procédure d'urgence ;

**II- SUR LE FOND**

Considérant que le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition a sollicité de la Haute Juridiction l'interprétation des dispositions de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition relatif aux inéligibilités ;

Qu'il y a donc lieu pour la Cour d'explicitier le sens de l'article 106 et d'en déterminer la portée ;

**1. Sur le sens de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition**

Considérant que la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition dispose en son article 106 : le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, le Premier Ministre de Transition, les membres du Gouvernement de Transition et les membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition sont inéligibles aux élections présidentielle et législatives organisées à l'issue de la Transition : Qu'en outre, les Juges Constitutionnels de Transition et les membres du Haut Conseil de Communication de



Transition ne peuvent être candidats aux élections présidentielle et législatives organisées à l'issue de la Transition :

Considérant que l'inéligibilité est la condition des personnes à qui il est interdit d'être candidates aux élections et résulte en une incapacité à briguer un mandat électoral déterminé, en l'occurrence le mandat présidentiel d'une part et le mandat législatif d'autre part :

Considérant que pour répondre à la demande d'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle présentée par le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, il y a lieu de déterminer si les inéligibilités telles que fixées s'appliquent aux personnalités qui ont cessé d'exercer leurs fonctions avant la fin de la Transition au même titre qu'à celles qui demeurent en fonction à la date d'échéance de la Transition :

Considérant que pour répondre à cette question, il convient d'une part de rappeler la période et l'unicité de la Transition et d'autre part, le principe du caractère général et impersonnel de la loi, en particulier de la Loi Fondamentale qu'est la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

#### **1.1 Sur la période et l'unicité de la Transition**

Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 102 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition la durée de la Transition est de dix huit mois, portée à vingt quatre mois sur avis conforme du Médiateur International. En cas de nécessité, la durée de la Transition peut être examinée par la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) sur proposition conjointe et motivée du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, du Président du Conseil National de Transition et du Premier Ministre de Transition :

La période de Transition débute par une cérémonie officielle après l'entrée en vigueur de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Considérant qu'en application des dispositions de l'article précité, la période de Transition a débuté par l'investiture du Chef de l'Etat par la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition au cours d'une cérémonie officielle qui s'est déroulée au palais du Conseil National de Transition le 18 Août 2013, après l'entrée en vigueur de la Charte et devait prendre fin le 17 février 2015;

Que conformément à l'article 102, la Transition a été prolongée une première fois de six(6) mois sur avis conforme du Médiateur International de la crise centrafricaine en date du 22 décembre 2014, Avis dont la conformité a été constatée par la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition dans sa décision n° 003/15/CCT du 16 janvier 2015, la fin de la Transition étant ainsi reportée au 17 Août 2015 ;

Que par décision des Chefs d'Etat de la CEEAC du 30 juillet 2015, dont la conformité à la Charte a été constatée par la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition dans sa décision N° 009 du 14 Aout 2015, la Transition a été à nouveau prorogée jusqu'au 30 décembre 2015 ;

Que ces différentes prorogations ont été faites en conformité avec la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition du 18 juillet 2013, qu'elles n'ont pas eu pour conséquence l'instauration de transitions successives mais la prolongation de la Transition ayant démarré le 18 Août 2013 et devant s'achever désormais le 30 décembre 2015 ;

*M.L.*

Qu'ainsi, la démission des fonctions de Chef de l'Etat de la Transition par le premier Chef de l'Etat de la Transition Michel DJOTODIA AM NONDROKO, la vacance de la fonction de Chef de l'Etat de la Transition assurée par le Président du Conseil National de Transition Alexandre Ferdinand N'GUENDET conformément à l'article 23 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, et la fonction actuelle de Chef de l'Etat de la Transition assurée par Catherine SAMBA PANZA, n'ont pas eu pour effet d'instaurer plusieurs Transitions :

Qu'il en résulte que les différentes personnalités ayant accédé aux fonctions visées par l'article 106 de la Charte les ont exercées dans le cadre d'une seule et même Transition conformément aux dispositions de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition du 18 juillet 2013 :

Que de ce fait, la Transition est unique et indivisible :

### **1.2 Sur le caractère général et impersonnel de la Loi Fondamentale**

Considérant qu'il est de principe en droit que la loi est générale et impersonnelle, que de ce fait, elle ne vise nommément aucune des personnalités ayant exercé ou exerçant les fonctions visées par l'article 106 pendant la Transition : celles de Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, de Premier Ministre de Transition, de membre du Gouvernement de Transition, de membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition, de Juge Constitutionnel de Transition ou encore de membre du Haut Conseil de Communication de Transition;

Qu'ainsi, les personnalités désignées aux postes se succèdent aux fonctions sans qu'il y ait lieu pour la Loi Fondamentale de les distinguer les unes des autres, ceci quelles que soient les personnalités ayant exercé ces fonctions et quelle qu'ait été la durée d'exercice de leurs fonctions :

Que de même, il n'y a pas lieu pour la Loi Fondamentale de faire référence, le cas échéant, aux anciens Chefs d'Etat de la Transition, aux anciens Premiers Ministres de Transition, aux anciens membres du Gouvernement de Transition ou encore aux anciens membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition, chaque fonction demeurant régie de façon impersonnelle par les articles concernés de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition :

Qu'il résulte de ce qui précède, que la Loi Fondamentale vise les titres et décrit les fonctions de façon générale et impersonnelle :

## **2. Sur la portée de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition**

Considérant que pour rechercher la portée de l'article 106 de la Charte, il y a lieu de faire des rapprochements entre les dispositions des différents articles pour établir la volonté du Constituant :

### **2.1 Sur le caractère permanent et irrévocable des inéligibilités prévues à l'article 106 de la Charte**

Considérant que par l'article 101 tirets 2, 3 et 7 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, le Pouvoir Constituant a inscrit les inéligibilités des Autorités ayant géré la Transition de façon irrévocable en excluant expressément de la révision de la Charte :

- l'inéligibilité du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, du Premier Ministre de Transition, des membres du Gouvernement de Transition et des membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition aux élections présidentielle et législatives organisées durant la Transition :



- l'inéligibilité des Juges Constitutionnels de Transition et des membres du Haut Conseil de Communication aux élections présidentielle et législatives ;

- l'article 101 lui-même ;

Qu'il en résulte que le Pouvoir Constituant a institué un verrou constitutionnel prohibant toute velléité de révision de la Charte en ce qui concerne les inéligibilités et exprimant ainsi clairement sa volonté de voir scrupuleusement ces inéligibilités être respectées par les acteurs de la Transition et par toutes les personnalités ayant exercé les fonctions faisant l'objet desdites inéligibilités;

Qu'en outre, le législateur a tenu à insérer ces inéligibilités dans la loi n° 13.003 du 13 novembre 2013 portant Code Electoral de la République Centrafricaine en ses articles 110 en ce qui concerne les candidatures à l'élection présidentielle et 151 en ce qui concerne les candidatures aux élections législatives organisées à l'issue de la Transition ;

Que de ce fait, le Constituant, dans le cadre spécifique de la période de Transition, a expressément dérogé au principe d'égalité de tous les citoyens à pouvoir se porter candidats aux élections présidentielle et législatives organisées à l'issue de la Transition en ce qui concerne les personnalités ayant occupé et occupant les fonctions visées à l'article 106 de la Charte ;

## **2.2 Sur la distinction entre les inéligibilités et la durée d'exercice des fonctions par les différentes personnalités**

Considérant que les conditions de désignation aux fonctions sont prévues par la Charte notamment en son article 23 en ce qui concerne le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition ; à l'article 29 en ce qui concerne le Premier Ministre de Transition et la nomination des membres du Gouvernement, à l'article 51 en ce qui concerne les membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition, à l'article 80 en ce qui concerne les Juges Constitutionnels de Transition et à l'article 93 en ce qui concerne les membres du Haut Conseil de Communication de Transition ;

Considérant que si l'article 23 alinéa 1 de la Charte précise que le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition est élu pour la durée de la Transition, l'article 23 alinéa 2 prévoit également les cas où celui-ci serait amené à être remplacé, en cas de décès, de démission ou d'incapacité définitive médicalement constatée, et organise la vacance du pouvoir ;

Que si l'article 36 alinéa 2 précise que le Premier Ministre ne peut être révoqué par le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition ni par le Conseil National de Transition pendant la durée de la Transition, et si l'article 101 tiret 4 de la Charte exclut de la révision l'irrévocabilité et la diminution des attributions du Premier Ministre de Transition, l'article 36 alinéa 3 quant à lui liste expressément les cas de remplacement de ce dernier en cas de décès, de démission ou d'incapacité définitive médicalement constatée ;

Que l'article 29 de la Charte prévoit expressément que le Chef de l'Etat nomme les membres du Gouvernement et met fin à leur fonction, qu'il s'agit donc là d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire dévolu au Chef de l'Etat de la Transition:

Que si l'article 51 alinéa 2 précise que les membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition sont élus par leurs pairs pour la durée de la Transition, l'alinéa 3 et 4 prévoient les causes de cessation de leurs fonctions et les modalités de leur remplacement :

Qu'il en est de même pour les Juges Constitutionnels à l'article 80 et les membres du Haut Conseil de Communication à l'article 93 ;

Qu'ainsi les fonctions de ces personnalités, désignées pour la durée de la Transition, peuvent être interrompues en cours de Transition, la Charte ayant prévu également les modalités de leur remplacement ;

Que par contre, les inéligibilités telles que fixées par l'article 106 sont énoncées de façon définitive, irrévocable et pour toute la durée de la Transition par le Constituant et concernent les fonctions expressément listées et par voie de conséquence, les personnalités ayant exercé ces fonctions pendant la période de Transition telle que déterminée plus haut:

Considérant que l'interprétation faite par le Juge Constitutionnel, gardien de la Charte, ne peut aboutir à une violation de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition :

Que toute interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition tendant à supprimer les inéligibilités pour les personnalités ayant cessé d'exercer les fonctions avant la fin de la Transition conduirait inexorablement à une négation de ces mêmes inéligibilités, les personnalités visées et encore en fonction pouvant alors démissionner au moment du déclenchement du processus électoral pour pouvoir briguer les mandats présidentiel ou législatifs qui leur sont interdits :

Qu'une telle compréhension conduirait de fait à la suppression du verrou constitutionnel institué et donc à une violation de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition et serait contraire à la volonté du Constituant:

Que cette interprétation doit donc être écartée ;

Qu'il en résulte que toute personnalité ayant porté le titre et exercé les fonctions visées pendant la période de Transition est frappée par les inéligibilités ;

Considérant enfin, qu'il y a lieu de rappeler les dispositions du préambule de la Charte par lesquelles les Représentants des forces vives de la Nation réunis au sein du Conseil National de Transition réitérent leur pleine adhésion aux Accords de Libreville du 11 janvier 2013, aux Décisions des troisième et quatrième sommets extraordinaires élargis des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la CEEAC des 03 et 18 avril 2013 et engagent l'Etat et les parties prenantes à les respecter scrupuleusement, ces différentes assises, de façon consensuelle, constituant le socle de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition.

En conséquence de tout ce qui précède :

#### DECIDE

**Article 1<sup>er</sup>** : La Cour est compétente.

**Article 2** : La requête est recevable.



**Article 3 :** En application de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, toute personnalité ayant porté le titre et ayant exercé les fonctions de Chef d'Etat de la Transition, de Premier Ministre de Transition, de membre du Gouvernement de Transition, de membre du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition, de Juge Constitutionnel ou de membre du Haut Conseil de Communication est frappée par les inéligibilités prévues à l'article 106 de la Charte quelle que soit la durée pendant laquelle elle a exercé ces fonctions pendant la Transition et quelles que soient les causes de la cessation des fonctions ainsi exercées.


**Article 4 :** La présente décision sera notifiée au Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, au Président du Conseil National de Transition, au Premier Ministre de Transition et publiée au Journal Officiel de la République Centrafricaine.


Ainsi délibéré et décidé par la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition en sa séance du **28 Août 2015**.

Où siégeaient :

- Zacharie NDOUBA, Président
- Danièle DARLAN, Vice-président. Rapporteur
- Emile NDJAPOU, Membre
- Jean-Pierre WABOE, Membre
- Clémentine FANGA NAPALA, Membre
- Alain OUABY-BEKAI, Membre
- Marie SERRA, Membre

Assistés de Maître Florentin DARRE, Greffier en Chef.

LE GREFFIER  
  
 Florentin  


LE PRESIDENT  
  
 Zacharie NDOUBA  


Annex 1.9: Flyers of Gervais Lakosso's civil society platform "*Le temps de Béafrîka*"

# ~~Le Temps De Béafrîka~~

Mouvement Citoyen pour l'appropriation de la destinée du pays

## NOTE DE MOTIVATION

Nous sommes le peuple de Centrafrique,  
Toujours vivant et décidé à nous autodéterminer.

Chaque chose à son temps et chaque peuple a ses besoins particuliers et ses aspirations profondes.

Aujourd'hui le moment est venu pour que les Centrafricains s'approprient leur destinée.

On ne peut pas manipuler éternellement un peuple contre ses propres intérêts et soulever les uns contre les autres tous les jours.

Ce mouvement est une invitation à une prise de conscience nationale car :

La Paix n'est pas un fruit qu'on peut manger sans effort. Mais c'est une graine que chacun doit planter dans son cœur et l'arroser par les eaux de l'amour du prochain, du pardon, de l'unité dans la diversité...

Le développement n'est pas un produit que les développés peuvent livrer aux sous développés. Mais un processus dont les initiateurs et acteurs principaux doivent être ceux là mêmes qui sont concernés par le développement qui est en fait une aspiration naturelle de chaque être humain.

Aussi longtemps que nous ne prendrons pas les choses en main sur tous les plans, notre pays sombrera dans les crises à répétition et son peuple ne tirera jamais profit de ses nombreuses ressources.

Nous invitons donc les Centrafricains à se lever comme un seul Homme et de s'approprier la destinée du pays. On ne fait pas le développement avec l'argent, ni avec la solidarité. Mais avec un engagement citoyen ferme et une détermination à trouver des solutions à tous nos problèmes. Nous ne sommes pas un sous peuple. Le Temps de Béafrîka est arrivé. Soyons des dignes descendants de nos vaillants ancêtres. Levons nous dans le calme pour revendiquer de manière pacifique et ferme notre droit à la sécurité et au bien être.

# ~~Le Temps De Bêafrica~~

Mouvement Citoyen pour l'appropriation de la destinée du pays

## LISTE DES REVENDICATIONS A SATISFAIRE AVANT LA LEVEE DU MOT D'ORDRE DE DESOBEISSANCE CIVIQUE NATIONALE


1	Le respect de la volonté du peuple souverain de Centrafrique par tous les organismes et organisations internationales dans leur relation avec le pays et leur implication dans la résolution de la crise ;
2	Le redéploiement sans conditions et immédiat des Forces Armées Centrafricaines sur toute l'étendue du territoire pour procéder au désarmement des forces illégales et le rétablissement de la sécurité. ;
3	Le retrait des militaires français de l'opération sangaris du territoire centrafricain ;
4	L'application du mandat des casques bleus présents en Centrafrique. A défaut leur retrait du territoire centrafricain ;
5	Le désarmement volontaire ou forcé dans le 3 <sup>ème</sup> , le 4 <sup>ème</sup> , le 5 <sup>ème</sup> et le 8 <sup>ème</sup> arrondissement de Bangui. ;
6	Le désarmement volontaire ou forcé de tous les groupes armés dans le centre -est ainsi que dans le centre nord. du pays ;
7	L'arrestation de Ali DARASSA et la dissolution du mouvement criminel UPC ;
8	L'arrestation de Haroun GAYE et ses acolytes ;
9	La mise en route sans délai de la cour pénale spéciale pour juger les auteurs des crimes durant cette crise et les autres ;
10	La redéfinition d'un nouveau calendrier électoral réaliste par l'ANE et l'engagement des tous les acteurs politiques à respecter ce calendrier
11	L'organisation dans un meilleur délai par la Cheffe d' Etat de transition d'un dialogue citoyen pour la validation du nouveau calendrier électoral et pour faire consensus national autour du processus électoral

Fait à Bangui, le 27 septembre 2015

Pour le Mouvement Citoyen,

Le Coordonateur

Gervais LAKOSSO



## Annex 1.10: Minister of Justice Aristide Sokambi's statement dated 28 September 2015 on the escalation of violence and potential instigators

### DECLARATION DU MINISTRE D'ETAT A LA JUSTICE, GARDE DES SCEAUX, CHARGE DE LA REFORME JUDICIAIRE ET DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

\*\*\*\*\*

Le Samedi 26 Septembre 2015, suite à l'assassinat odieux d'un sujet musulman dont le corps a été jeté dans la concession de la FNEC au quartier Combattant dans le 8<sup>ème</sup> arrondissement, des violences inouïes ont éclaté à Bangui dans la matinée, au niveau du 5<sup>ème</sup> arrondissement et de ses environs qui se sont poursuivies dans la nuit.

En date du 27 Septembre 2015, face à cette situation, le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement de Transition, en l'absence du Chef de l'Etat en mission aux États Unis, appelait au calme, à la retenue et à l'apaisement quelle que soit la situation en cause, conformément aux différents engagements pris lors du forum de Bangui.

Alors que le Gouvernement recherchait une issue pacifique à cette situation, voilà que les 27 et 28 Septembre 2015, trois événements majeurs viennent donner une signification à ces violences :

· D'abord, la déclaration de M. **LAKOSSO Gervais**, Conseiller National de Transition, se disant coordonnateur d'une plate-forme de la société civile dénommée « **Temps de Béa Africa** », appelle la population à la désobéissance civile et demande à l'armée de se joindre à son mouvement pour s'emparer des destinées de la nation. En outre, il a incité la population à s'en prendre à la SANGARIS, à la MINUSCA et aux organisations non gouvernementales qui « **se pavent** », selon ses propres termes, dans notre pays ;

Ensuite, la marche organisée sans autorisation préalable en compagnie des hommes armés, pour demander la démission du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition et du Gouvernement, dont l'objectif était de prendre le Palais de la Renaissance.

Enfin, l'attaque coordonnée dans la nuit du 27 au 28 Septembre 2015 visant la gendarmerie, le Palais de la Renaissance et la Radio Nationale.

Il y a lieu de rappeler que la déclaration faite par M. **LAKOSSO Gervais** a été immédiatement suivie d'effet, car dans la même soirée des barricades ont été érigées et le lendemain, plusieurs ONGs internationales ont été systématiquement attaquées et pillées, notamment l'**Organisation Internationale pour la Migration (OIM)**, la **Croix Rouge Française**, **Première Urgence-Aide Médicale Internationale**, **Action contre la faim, Médecins du Monde**, **CORDAID**, **PAM**, etc.

Certains responsables de partis politiques se sont également réunis pour réclamer une troisième transition et soutenir publiquement ces violences, alors que le moment était à la recherche de solutions pacifiques.

Des Officiers de l'armée, comme le Capitaine **NGAIKOISSET Eugène**, le lieutenant **NGBANGOUMA Olivier**, le nommé **MOKOM** et autres, recherchés par la justice centrafricaine pour divers crimes commis dans notre pays, se sont impliqués ouvertement dans tous les différents mouvements pour attenter à l'ordre établi.

En dépit des différents appels à la reprise et au dialogue de la majorité des partis politiques, des Associations, des leaders religieux et communautaires, M. **LAKOSSO Gervais** et ses complices persistent dans la voie de la désobéissance civile au mépris des instructions gouvernementales.

Devant de tels comportements flagrants qui sont constitutifs d'atteinte à la sûreté intérieure de l'Etat, de complot, d'incitation à la guerre civile, à la désobéissance civile, à la haine et de complicité, le Gouvernement a instruit les autorités judiciaires compétentes, aux fins d'ouverture d'une enquête à l'effet de rechercher et d'arrêter les présumés auteurs et complices pour qu'ils répondent de leurs actes.

Je voudrais saisir cette occasion, pour rappeler à tous, que le Forum national a recommandé la lutte contre l'impunité des auteurs des crimes et autres violations des droits humains.

De même, depuis le déclenchement de ces violences, la communauté nationale et internationale réclame toutes, la poursuite des auteurs et instigateurs de ces événements.

A cet effet, je lance un appel à témoins à tous, pour contribuer à l'identification des autres auteurs et complices qui ont volontairement endeuillé de nouveau notre pays.

Appel est également lancé à tous les citoyens pour dénoncer sans délai aux autorités judiciaires les lieux de refuge ou de retraite de ces personnes.

Le Gouvernement prendra toutes les dispositions nécessaires, avec l'appui des forces internationales pour traduire devant la Justice nationale et internationale les principaux auteurs des différents actes répréhensibles survenus ces derniers jours.

Je vous remercie.

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**Annex 1.11: Incidents of non-compliance****Case study: MINUSCA**

1. The Panel documented three cases of weapons and ammunition seized by MINUSCA and transferred to the *Section Recherche et Investigation* (SRI) of the CAR gendarmerie to be sealed as evidence, as per judicial practices in the CAR,<sup>59</sup> that were actually diverted from the judicial procedure to equip gendarmerie forces in Bangui. As stressed earlier, in view of the absence of safe storage place at the latter's office, all seized arms are kept at the SRI.
2. According to a high-ranking official within the gendarmerie,<sup>60</sup> breaches of seals to equip the gendarmerie are almost systematic, even in the context of serious criminal investigations. As a matter of fact, none of the weapons listed as having been transferred by MINUSCA to the SRI were present at the SRI during the inspection conducted by the Panel in July 2015.<sup>61</sup>
3. In the first case, MINUSCA handed over an AK-type weapon – to be used in evidence in a legal case concerning Samuel Ndoumbélé to the SRI. This weapon was subsequently made available to the head of the gendarmerie, according to an SRI internal document obtained by the Panel.

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<sup>59</sup> Interview with Mr. Kossy, Head of SRI Section, Bangui, 5 July 2015; Interview with investigating judges, Court of Appeals, Bangui, 1 July 2015.

<sup>60</sup> Meeting with a high-ranking official within the gendarmerie, Bangui, 5 July 2015.

<sup>61</sup> Inspections conducted at SRI on 4 and 6 July 2015; see photographs in.

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
 UNITE DIGNITE TRAVAIL  
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MINISTERE DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE  
 IMMIGRATION - EMIGRATION  
 \*\*\*\*\*

  
**LE G I O N    D E    G E N D A R M E R I E**  
**T E R R I T O R I A L E**  
**S E C T I O N   D E   R E C H E R C H E S   E T**  
**D ' I N V E S T I G A T I O N S**

A Bangui, le 02 Juin 2015

N° /4.SRI.

**ETAT D'ARMEMENT DECHARGE PAR LA MINUSCA A LA SECTION DE RECHERCHES ET D'INVESTIGATIONS**

TYPE	N° ARME	AFFAIRE	OBSERVATIONS
AK 47	1113	DOMONGUERE-TOMORO, Achille	
AK47 PA	03873 15857	Lt BETI-BANGUI-DEYOMBO, Sylvain	
AK 47	7149	NAMBATE, Gildas et Autres.	
AK 47	35038990	GREKAMBA, Yohann	
PM MAT 49	J12359	IDOROFIO, Didier et Autres.	
AK 47	17688	NDOUMBELE, Samuel	
PM MAT 49	G87.802	MBOZOUNMSE, Évariste et Autres.	
AK 47	TRIPOTE	BEATEM, Grâce à Dieu	
AK 47	56-2-2804173	Dotation aide camp Ministre T.P	
AK 47 AK 47	463592 15197	NDALET-YABENDJI, Bernard et Autres.	

Lieutenant **KOSSI, Serge - Stanislas**  
 Commandant la Section de Recherches  
 et d'Investigations à.....**BANGUI**.

il est de tous les  
 les armes récupérées

Source: Document from the SRI on arms transfers from MINUSCA to the gendarmerie

Document obtained by the Panel in Bangui on 3 June 2015 from a confidential source.

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
 UNITE DIGNITE TRAVAIL  
 \*\*\*\*\*

MINISTERE DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE  
 IMMIGRATION - EMIGRATION  
 \*\*\*\*\*

  
 LEGION DE GENDARMERIE-  
 TERRITORIALE  
 SECTION DE RECHERCHES ET  
 D'INVESTIGATIONS

A Bangui, le 02 Juin 2015

N° /4.SRL

**ARMEMENT MIS A LA DISPOSITION DU DIRECTEUR GENERAL GENDARMERIE  
NATIONALE**

TYPE	N° ARME	OBSERVATIONS
AK 47	9553	
AK 47	3255	
AK 47	8242	
AK 47	17688	
AK 47	04219	
AK 47	01074	
PM MAT 49	7802	
PM MAT 49	7795	
PM MAT 49	TRIPOTE	
PM MAT 49	TRIPOTE	

Lieutenant KOSSI, Serge - Stanislas  
 Commandant la Section de Recherches  
 et d'Investigations à.....BANGUI

armes de Bangui  
 à la D.G. (10)

Source: Document from the SRI regarding hand-over of weapons from the SRI to the head of the CAR national gendarmerie. Document obtained by the Panel in Bangui on 3 June 2015 from a confidential source.

4. In the second case, in legal procedures against Evariste Mbozounse and Bernard Ndalet-Yabendji, MINUSCA handed over three weapons to the *Section Recherche et Investigation*. The Panel noted during an inspection at the Légion de la gendarmerie mobile on 6 July 2015 that those three weapons were now equipping national forces
5. The Panel expressed concerns regarding this matter during a meeting on 2 June 2015 with MINUSCA.<sup>62</sup> MINUSCA representatives noted that both the Force and the Police components of MINUSCA were not systematically documenting the transfer of weapons and ammunition to the CAR judicial system, such as the number and type of weapons, circumstances of seizure, and date of transfer. MINUSCA also admitted lack of capacity in terms of follow-up on judicial procedures, in particular with regard to the integrity of the chain of custody of sealed evidence, even in cases initiated by MINUSCA.
6. The Panel retrieved several documents with details of MINUSCA transfers, but it seems that not all arms transfers are documented. For instance, while in the case of “Ousman Mahamat Ousman and others” the Gabonese MINUSCA battalion kept minutes of the transfer of weapons dated 9 March 2015, the Bangladeshi MINUSCA battalion did not keep minutes of the transfer of weapons in the case of “Marcel Ndalé and others” dated 25 April 2015.

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<sup>62</sup> MINUSCA was represented by: Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Deputy Police Commissioner, UNPOL Legal Adviser, UNPOL/JTF Chief Investigation Section, Chief Political Affairs, Chief Justice and Correction, Chief JMAC, Legal Affairs, UNMAS, and a Senior Adviser of the SRSG; the Panel and MINUSCA agreed that a follow-up meeting should be organized within a reasonable timeframe.





DECHARGE

Le sous-officier LTN Serfy Kassi  
Commandant la SRI de la  
Gendarmerie Nationale, reconnu  
avoir reçu du Bataillon Gabonais  
de la MINUSCA, quatre (04)  
fusils d'assaut de type AK47  
n° HT21331 - 36546 - HT5617  
et 265539.  
A Bangui le 09/03/2015 à 19h12


LTN Serfy Kassi  
Cdt SRI

(L) TSOUMOU  
Combat GABON

Source : Investigation file on General Ousman Mahamat Ousman with record of arms transfer from MINUSCA to the SRI. Documents obtained by the Panel in Bangui on 5 July 2015 from a confidential source.





*Source : Documents obtained by the Panel in Bangui on 5 July 2015 from a confidential source. Investigation file on NDALET, in which no document indicate that the transfer of weapons was made by MINUSCA.*

7. It was also noted by MINUSCA that no clear guidelines under which arms can or cannot be transferred to the national authorities are currently implemented. While some arms seized by MINUSCA are transferred to the gendarmerie, others are entrusted to UNMAS, and it is unclear on what basis such decisions are taken. For example, in the case of “Yousouf Ahmat and others” the seized weapons were kept by MINUSCA under UNMAS custody.<sup>63</sup>
8. MINUSCA informed the Panel that since 24 November 2014, they have been working on guidelines for the safe transfer and storage of arms and ammunition.<sup>64</sup>

#### **Other potential cases of non-compliance**

9. The Panel also documented one case of non-compliance with paragraph 1 of resolution 2196 (2015) in which a French company exported to the Central African Republic non-lethal military equipment on 31 March 2015 in accordance with French and European Union regulations, but without having received prior approval of the Committee in pursuance of paragraph 1(c) of resolution 2196 (2015).
10. Another potential case of non-compliance involved another French company, which signed a 20-million euros contract on 4 February 2015 an agreement with Security Minister Niçaise Samedi Karnou regarding the provision of security equipment to the CAR security forces. The contract was terminated in June 2015 by the Prime Minister and no equipment was actually delivered to the CAR.
11. On 1 June 2015, in Bossangoa, the Panel prevented MINUSCA to hand over to the CAR local police and gendarmerie units weapons seized by international forces during disarmament operations. The MINUSCA officer informed the Panel that he was not aware of the arms embargo.

#### *Production of hunting ammunition in Bangui*

<sup>63</sup> Panel interviews with MINUSCA officials, 26 May 2015, 5 July 2015, 31 August 2015, 23 September 2015.

<sup>64</sup> Meeting by MINUSCA and the Panel on sharing of information on monitoring the arms embargo, Bangui, 24 November 2015. Meeting by MINUSCA and the Panel on sharing of information on monitoring the arms embargo, Bangui, 2 June 2015. Panel interviews with MINUSCA officials, 26 May 2015, 5 July 2015, 31 August 2015 and 23 September 2015.

12. In March 2015, the company *Manufacture des Munitions de Chasse* (MMC) addressed a letter to MINUSCA requesting authorization to import raw materials from France and Portugal needed to produce the hunting ammunition. Both Member-States suspended all exports of weapons, ammunition and related materiel to the CAR following the imposition of the arms embargo on 5 December 2013.<sup>65</sup>
  
13. MMC production facilities, visited by the Panel on 23 September 2015, were still closed at the time of writing.<sup>66</sup> However, the Panel has on several locations seen cartridges produced by MMC, at occasions seized by MINUSCA in Bossangoa and Berbérati.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Letter from MMC to the SRSG of MINUSCA, Bangui, 5 March 2015.

<sup>66</sup> Visit of MMC production facilities and meeting with MMC manager Luis Morais, Bangui, 23 September 2015.

<sup>67</sup> Inspections in Bossangoa on 26 April 2015 and Berbérati on 27 August 2015.

### Annex 1.12: Voluntary disarmament operation

1. The voluntary disarmament operation launched in March 2015 by the former Minister of Defence, Marie-Noëlle Koyara, has witnessed a decreasing rate of success:
  - From 23 March to 25 April, FACA handed over 96 arms, 9600 rounds of ammunition, 69 hand grenades, 29 mortar bombs and 26 rockets
  - From 26 April to 8 June 2015, members of the FACA handed over 14 arms, 873 rounds of ammunition and 30 hand grenades.
  - From 9 June to 7 July 2015, no weapons and ammunition were turned over to the collection Committee.
  - From 8 July to 5 October 2015, only 9 weapons were reportedly handed over to the ad-hoc *Comité de collecte* (collection committee).<sup>68</sup>
  
2. In total, the Panel inspected 114 weapons, 10,500 rounds of ammunition, 88 hand grenades, 29 mortar bombs and 26 rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) launchers voluntarily handed over by mainly FACA elements.<sup>69</sup> The Panel also inspected 21 weapons, 12,253 rounds of ammunition, 18 hand grenades and 33 RPG launchers reportedly handed over by elements of the gendarmerie.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Due to the recent escalation of violence, these weapons could not be inspected.

<sup>69</sup> Inspections at Camp Izamo, Bangui, 25 April, 22 May, 5 June and 8 June 2015. On 5 July 2015, the Panel inspected four out of the 16 arms reportedly returned by 16 FACA soldiers active in the National Instruction Centre in Bouar; see **annex 1.13** below for the full list of weapons and ammunition inspected by the Panel.

<sup>70</sup> Inspection at Camp Izamo, Bangui, 8 June 2015. At different time periods, the explanation regarding the origin and destination of these arms and ammunition has changed. Whereas at first it was reported that they arms and ammunition belonged to the national gendarmerie, later it was reported that they were part of the voluntary collection programme. Due to the recent escalation of violence, this could not be verified; see again **annex 1.13** below for the full list.

*Photograph taken by the Panel at Camp Izamo during an inspection on 8 June 2015*



3. The relative failure of the voluntary disarmament programme is a matter of concern, considering the important amount of arms and ammunition known to be in the possession of elements of the national security and armed forces.<sup>71</sup> Collected weapons – including RPG launchers – were distributed by transitional authorities to FACA elements patrolling the capital or in charge of static security of official buildings.<sup>72</sup>
  
4. Upon request, the collection committee transmitted to the Panel the list of arms and ammunition in the possession of senior FACA officers.<sup>73</sup> The document indicates that 25 officers declared that they were in possession of several types of weapons, including 30 assault-rifles and 4 rifles, 4 MAT-49 submachine guns as well as a total of 2,585 rounds of ammunition, two grenades and one rocket-propelled grenade launcher.<sup>74</sup> While most senior officers declared to be in possession of between one and three weapons, two officers possessed eight weapons with 1,000 rounds of ammunition and six weapons with 531 rounds of ammunition, respectively.

<sup>71</sup> High ranking FACA officers declared to the Panel that they keep undeclared weapons at home, to be able to defend themselves in case of a new upsurge of violence; interviews with high ranking FACA officers, Bangui, 5 July 2015 and 25 August 2015.

<sup>72</sup> Interviews with FACA and gendarmerie officers, Bangui, 20 May, 4 and 5 July 2015; from mid-May onwards, the Panel has not been able to inspect weapons carried by FACA elements during patrols in Bangui.

<sup>73</sup> FACA officers were instructed to declare their weapons only, while non-commissioned officers and soldiers had to return all weapons and ammunition in their custody.

<sup>74</sup> Document archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

### Annex 1.13: Inspections of weapons and ammunition by the Panel from 14 April 2015 to 5 October 2015

#### *Arms inspections at the CAR gendarmerie*

1. During inspections conducted by the Panel at different brigades and units of the gendarmerie, the quantity of ammunition available to CAR security and armed forces appears disproportional to the number of weapons, although some units – namely the *Légion de la Gendarmerie Mobile* (LGM) – seem better equipped than others.
2. The Panel inspected a total of 72 weapons, 128 rounds of ammunition and 20 explosives. On 4 July 2015, the Panel inspected PK 12, Sûreté aéroportuaire, PK 9, Brigade fluviale and Brigade territoriale landja. On 6 July 2015, the Panel inspected Légion de la gendarmerie mobile, Brigade territoriale and the Section recherche et investigations. The Panel inspected weapons at the Sûreté aéroportuaire, one weapon at PK 12, eight weapons at PK 9, two weapons at Brigade fluviale, four weapons at Brigade territorial Landja, 33 weapons at Légion de la gendarmerie mobile, 17 weapons at the SRI and seven weapons at the Brigade territoriale. This phenomenon of the gendarmerie units having very few weapons and ammunition at their disposal is also apparent in the different provinces visited by the Panel. To illustrate, the gendarmerie in Bouar only possesses two functioning weapons and two loaders; they have no vehicle at their disposal.<sup>75</sup>
3. Of the 72 weapons inspected, 17 were stored at the *Section Recherche et Investigation* (SRI) of the gendarmerie after having been seized at criminal investigation sites.<sup>76</sup> According to national rules and regulations, all evidence of judicial procedures must be sealed and retained either at the SRI or at the Prosecutor's Office.<sup>77</sup> In practice, even though these arms are part of judicial procedures, those which are functional are used by different units of

<sup>75</sup> Panel's inspection, Bouar, 29 May 2015.

<sup>76</sup> The number of 72 does not take into account the weapons inspected at Camp Izamo on 8 June 2015 since it remains unclear who these weapons belong to.

<sup>77</sup> In view of the absence of safe storage place at the latter's office, all seized arms are kept at the SRI.

the gendarmerie. On 23 September 2015, the newly appointed deputy director general of the gendarmerie affirmed to the Panel that the gendarmerie was willing to stop this practice.<sup>78</sup>

4. The Panel notes with concern that the SRI does not have safe storage facilities for weapons and ammunition, with arms subsequently deposited in the various offices which are easily accessible even to the public.<sup>79</sup> The Panel also considers that neither the CAR security nor its armed forces have proper procedures for weapons management. Moreover, the Panel received detailed information on one case of diversion of ammunition by a warrant officer from the gendarmerie to anti-balaka.
5. On 28 August, the Panel has seen several boxes of inspected ammunition at the Etat-Major, where they were transferred to for security reasons.<sup>80</sup> For example, out of the 33 weapons inspected at the Légion de la gendarmerie mobile, at least four had reportedly been seized at criminal sites and used by the gendarmerie; the head of the SRI justified this practice as a consequence of lack of weapons and argued that official registers are filled in to track all inputs and outputs. The Panel could not confirm the latter because registries were not made available.
6. The Panel came across several cases of deficient chain of custody of ammunition seized by the gendarmerie. As a result, either nobody is able to tell where seized ammunition ended up, or seized ammunition is only recovered after a lengthy process of investigation among recipient gendarmerie elements.
7. A confidential report dated 15 June 2015 obtained by the Panel on 3 July 2015, mentions that ammunition seized by the gendarmerie was supplied to a Bangui-based anti-balaka military commander with FACA background;<sup>81</sup> a

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<sup>78</sup> Interview with Bruno Ouaholo, 23 September 2015.

<sup>79</sup> See photographs of seized weapons stored at the SRI in **annex 1.14**.

<sup>80</sup> Inspection at Camp Izamo, Bangui, 8 June 2015. Interview with collection committee focal point, Bangui, 29 August 2015.

<sup>81</sup> Archived at the UN/DPA/SCSOB.

national military source confirmed such cases of diversion to the Panel during a meeting in Bangui on 3 July 2015.

8. The Panel inspected two MAT-49 submachine guns, three Type 56(-2) assault rifles, one MPI-KM assault rifle, one Kbk-AKMS assault rifle and a dozen rounds of ammunition at Customs and six Type 56(-1) assault rifles, one MAS-36 rifle and one grenade launcher at Water and forestry. However, in June 2015 the Panel inspected large stocks of ammunition reportedly belonging to the gendarmerie at Camp Izamo.
9. Several high-ranking security officials informed the Panel that part of the armament of the gendarmerie was bought from individuals (FACA elements, gendarmes, politicians and civilians) and armed groups. The gendarmerie reportedly pays FCFA 50,000 (USD 100) for one arm with one or two magazines.<sup>82</sup>

*Arms inspections at CAR customs and water and forestry*

10. On 28 August, the Panel inspected the arms and ammunition of the custom authorities and water and forestry services in Bangui. Custom authorities only presented seven weapons and a dozen rounds of ammunition of calibre 7.62x39mm.
11. Water and forestry presented eight weapons and six rounds of ammunition of calibre 7.62x39mm. Government officials admitted to the Panel that both departments buy weapons from both anti-balaka and former Séléka elements.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Interviews with confidential sources in the gendarmerie, Bangui, 25 August 2015. This was confirmed by a confidential FACA source, 25 August 2015.

<sup>83</sup> Interviews with Government officials, Bangui, 25 August 2015.

*List of locations where inspections were conducted by the Panel*

12. One inspection in Bria (14 April 2015), two inspections in Camp de Roux Bangui (16 April and 27 May 2015), two inspection in Sangaris Bangui (17 April and 22 May 2015), two inspections in Mbaiki (23 April and 30 August 2015), two inspections in Obo (24 April and 25 September 2015), three inspections for the Collecte volontaire in Bangui (25 April, 22 May, 8 June 2015), two inspections in Bossangoa (26 April 2015 and 1 June 2015), one inspection in Bambari (25 May 2015), two inspections in Kaga Bandoro (25 May and 23 August 2015), four inspections in Bouar (28-29 May and 4-5 June 2015), two inspections in Baoro (4 and 5 June 2015), one three-day inspection of the units and brigades of the Gendarmerie in Bangui (8 June, 4 July, 6 July 2015), one inspection in Berberati (27 August 2015), one inspection at custom services (28 August 2015), one inspection at water and forestry (28 August 2015), one inspection of Chinko seizures in Bangui (1 September 2015), inspection on the Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès axes (20-24 August 2015) and inspection on the Ndélé-Chadian border axes (24 September-5 October 2015). As background information, the Panel also included some weapons inspected under previous mandate in this list.
13. During several arms inspections conducted in Bangui and Bria, two researchers of Conflict Armament Research (CAR), a private research institute working on an EU-funded project, and UNMAS/THE HALO TRUST staff inspected the armament at the same time as the Panel.

**List of Arms**

<b>Date documented</b>	<b>Location documented</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Serial/Markings</b>	<b>Origin</b>
25 May 2015	Bambari	Crosman 2200 Magnum Pneumatic Rifle		USA
25 May 2015	Bambari	MAT-49 submachine gun	D66290	France
25 May 2015	Bambari	MAT-49 submachine gun	G23168	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60mm mortar tube	1329TH	USA
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	100076	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	102764	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AA52 machine gun	A25472	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AIM-AKM Model 63 (AK pattern)	1975 GI 1418	Romania
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AIM-AKM Model 63 (AK pattern)	UE 3250 1998	Romania
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AK 47 rifle (AK pattern)	K 82255	Russia
05 June 2015	Bangui (SRI)	AK 47 rifle (AK pattern)	BE 25 3730	Bulgaria
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AK55 assault rifle (AKM pattern)	457865	Hungary
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	IOH 521	Russia
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	G3 assault rifle	231924	Portugal
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Galil assault rifle	701333	Israel
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Galil assault rifle	G-2087182	Israel
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	FF 249900	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA 0167	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA 0168	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0019	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0145	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0153	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0153	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0186	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0204	UK

24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0211	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0234	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0320	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0465	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Chatellerault rifle	AB 59103	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Chatellerault rifle	AD22021	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Chatellerault rifle	BE 88955	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Continsouza rifle	27200	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Tulle rifle	BC 68067	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	M70 B1 assault rifle	369413	Serbia
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M80 machine-gun	324690	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	277471	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	?17233	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	FH45732	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	FH78437	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	FH78442	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	FH78453	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	FH78485	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	FJ10136	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	L12845	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	L24822	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	L96827	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	M22920	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	M69924	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	M75276	France

24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N13660	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N16866	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N18379	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	N18582	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	N22432	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N27938	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N28024	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N35257	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N52204	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle mod51	G19873	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A10051	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A54486	France
05 June 2015	Bangui (SRI)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A60398	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A75413	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A83376	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	B4962	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	C.A4	France
05 June 2015	Bangui (SRI)	MAT-49 submachine gun	E18977	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F51829	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F53266	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F5641	France
05 June 2015	Bangui (SRI)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F69445	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87465	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87880	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun		France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	74 ?A 6967	East Germany

24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	78 GU 4406	East Germany
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	88 34 7739	East Germany
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MPI-KMS assault rifle (AKM pattern)	89 11 0534	East Germany
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	R4 Vector assault rifle	791860A1	South Africa
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	RPD-type machine gun	69-61894	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	SAR 80 assault rifle	SER 019651	Singapore
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	SIG 542 assault rifle	32804/46595	Switzerland
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	SOLTAM 81mm mortar tube (type N°1 MKB type)	1615	Finland/Israel
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Sten MK type submachine gun	4372-04	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Sten MK type submachine gun	4439-04	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Steyr AUG assault rifle	913SA327	Austria
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	2801668	China
22 May 2015	Camp Henry Izamo (Bangui)	T56-2 assault rifle	2802972	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	2803568	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	2803685	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	3718854	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	T56-2 assault rifle	3720804	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	T56-2 assault rifle	3725636	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	3728850	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	5036543	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12005026	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	T56-2 assault rifle	12007070	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12011130	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12015360	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12019950	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12019950	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3808549	China

24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3819695	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3835215	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3903387	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3903676	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	9402161	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	9405253	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	35046486	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	35058091	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	35062863	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	37000427	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	unreadable	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Type 56 Rifle	3564662	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 Rifle	21000784	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Type 56 Rifle	35064459	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	UZI submachine gun	3427	Belgium
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Vz.52 machine gun	CD4884	Czechoslovakia
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK12)	MAS-36 rifle	N3129	France
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	3725413	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	61625	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	3680094	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	35059820	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	2006895	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	76220	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle		China
4 July 2015	Bangui (Brigade fluviale)	Type 56 Rifle	5009	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (Brigade fluviale)	MAS-36 rifle	FJ0547	France
4 July 2015	Bangui (Landja)	MAT-49 submachine gun	85929	France

4 July 2015	Bangui (Landja)	MAS-36 rifle	N25818	France
4 July 2015	Bangui (Landja)	Galil assault rifle	800805A1	Israel
4 July 2015	Bangui (Landja)	Type 56 Rifle	35068774	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87802	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F30546	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F/P56163	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	E018171	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	D15618	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87795	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	erased	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G10750	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7493	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7487	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7488	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7490	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7491	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7494	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	unreadable	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	N14409	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	N13647	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	FH78441	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	FJ0126	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	T56-2 assault rifle	3706020	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	367232	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	35073191	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	unreadable	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	35070465	China

6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	380856	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	Type 56 assault rifle	36061449	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	T56-1 assault rifle	28168193	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	AKM pattern	Br8093	
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	T56-2 assault rifle	12003487	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	Type 56 assault rifle	3745467	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	T56-2 assault rifle	12007247	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	T56-2 assault rifle	3710646	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	Type 56 assault rifle	3644550	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	MAS-36 rifle	N18000	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	MAS-36 rifle	N34891	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	Type 56 assault rifle	3805674	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	T56-2 assault rifle	5066282	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	Type 56 assault rifle	3658976	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	MAS-36 rifle	FJ05418	France
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G53361	France
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	MAT-49 submachine gun	E012539	France
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)		East Germany
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1978 LK15537	Poland
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	T56-2 assault rifle	3728035	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	T56-2 assault rifle	12007732	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	Type 56 assault rifle	3907078	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	MAS-36 rifle	D90899	France
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	37010595	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	RPG7 launcher (Sinnar model)	NZ-08-311	Sudan
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	59063	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	35065236	China

28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	T56-1 assault rifle	3607445	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	3809041	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	35062414	China
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1965 CT733	Russia
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1976 C74294	Romania
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 Rifle	35049932	China
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 Rifle	3801478	China
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AKM rifle (Karabinek)	1976 KP 10140	Poland
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	67-2 machine-gun	251147	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	12010480	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	12017254	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	5050632	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1964 M07857	Russia
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Type 56 assault rifle	unreadable	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	2806091	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Type 56 Rifle	3842020	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Type 56 Rifle	37018743	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1972 IE6743	Russia
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Lee Enfield rifle	A897484	France
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Lee Enfield rifle	B473822	France
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Lee Enfield rifle	BD8614	France
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Lee Enfield rifle	D43680	France
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	MAS-36 rifle	?91232	France
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	67-2 machine-gun	251453	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	HC 1715	Russia
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	T56-2 assault rifle	12002315	China
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	274514	Russia

26 April 2015	Bossangoa	MAC semi-automatic pistol	K5732	France
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	MAC semi-automatic pistol	S3689	France
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	89 11 0093	East Germany
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	MPI-KMS assault rifle (AKM pattern)	89 11 1208	East Germany
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	R4 Vector assault rifle	781182A1	South Africa
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	Type 56 Rifle	3903521	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1977 PP 01802	Poland
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	Type 56 Rifle	3800149	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	67-2 machine-gun	251785	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	51564	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	51589	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	90273	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	101595	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	295067	Russia
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Browning Hunting Rifle	370908	Belgium
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	DShK (?) Machine gun barrel	240219-2	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	G3 assault rifle	172872 Zh-3 6531 (all in Farsi)	Iran
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Galil assault rifle	2070357	Israel
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Galil assault rifle	10000946	Israel
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Hunting shotgun		
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	KPVT machine-gun barrel	9398	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	M16-A1 assault rifle	5631996	USA
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	M80 machine-gun	275549	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Model 60 Marlin Hunting Rifle	95440683	USA
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Mortier (tube)	WA12 16000	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Mousqueton d'artillerie Modèle M16 (shotgun)	BC 11100	France
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	78 GA ??10	East Germany

16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	QLZ-87 (35mm grenade launcher)	161308	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	R4 Vector assault rifle	711282A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	R4 Vector assault rifle	792539A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	R4 Vector assault rifle	796167A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPD-type machine gun	61672	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPD-type machine gun	2201089	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPD-type machine gun	??-293	Russia
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPD-type machine gun	Fully unmarked	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPG-7B launcher	AB-21-88	Bulgaria
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPG-7B launcher	KT-19-497	Bulgaria
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPG7 launcher	SY890051	Possibly Iran
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPG7 launcher	SY890069	Possibly Iran
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	SA-7 (battery missing)	Serial number cancelled	Russia
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Shotgun	B 61718	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	T56-2 assault rifle	2805798	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	T56-2 assault rifle	3729769	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	T56-2 assault rifle	12011863	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Type 56 assault rifle	3678132	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Type 56 assault rifle	360?????	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Type 56 Rifle	22001532	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Verney-Carron Hunting Rifle	F04088	France
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	AKS-74 assault rifle (AKM pattern)	125935	Hungary
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	88 36 2551	East Germany
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	MPI-KMS assault rifle (AKM pattern)	89 11 0039	East Germany
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	RPD-type machine gun	69-61499	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-1 assault rifle	3604304	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	2805133	China

07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	2806865	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	2806905	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	3704979	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	5071083	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12003685	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12011586	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12011854	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12019313	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	16187731	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	35070485	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	37002923	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	MAB semi-automatic pistol	159 XT 02054	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	T56-2 assault rifle	3710972	China
25 May 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	Erased	Russia
25 May 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	FN-FAL assault rifle	1020320	Belgium
25 May 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	M20 type (TT-33 copy) pistol	n°00179	China
25 May 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	3721102	China
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	Type 56 Rifle	35064236	China
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	?	61498	Russia
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1000973	Russia
23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	3701069	China

23 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro (Minusca)	Type 56 assault rifle	3821927	China
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	MAT-49 submachine gun	E11911	France
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	R4 Vector assault rifle		South Africa
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	M70AB2 assault rifle (AK pattern)	A43843	Yugoslavia
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	Type 56 assault rifle	19631	China
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	? (AK pattern)	Unreadable	
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	? (AK pattern)	Unreadable	
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	? (AK pattern)	Unreadable	
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	Type 56 assault rifle	Unreadable	China
22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	? (AK pattern)	Unreadable	
B	Kaga-Bandoro/Mbres area	RPG-7B launcher	By-661	Bulgaria
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	Galil assault rifle	2093804	Israel
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	T56-2 assault rifle	3717862	China
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	MAS-36 rifle	P28064	France
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	MAT-49 submachine gun	B815	France
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	Type 56 assault rifle	3907502	China
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	Type 56 assault rifle	Unreadable	China
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	Vz.58 V assault rifle	D57809	Czechoslovakia
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	84 MQ 0656	East Germany
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12016891	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	14009895	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	20066588	China
29 September 2015	N'dele area	hunting shotgun		
25 September 2015	N'dele area	hunting shotgun		
25 September 2015	N'dele area	T56-2 assault rifle	5047661	China
25 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	IE1729	Russia
25 September 2015	N'dele area	T56-2 assault rifle	3704012	China

25 September 2015	N'dele area	hunting shotgun		
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	erased	Russia
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1974 ???752	Russia
26 September 2015	N'dele area	R4 Vector assault rifle		South Africa
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	erased	Russia
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1969 yH1116	Russia
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AMD 65M	E06088	Hungary
29 September 2015	N'dele area	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87891	France
28 September 2015	N'dele area	Type 56 assault rifle	471125	China
2 October 2015	N'dele area	MAS-36 rifle (bolt action)	L64065	France
23 April 2015	Obo	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	101173	
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	CT 9919	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	EB 3691	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	AJI 7757	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	AP 5991	China
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	IT 6138	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	H9 3312	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	49008212	?
23 April 2015	Obo	G3 assault rifle	2468	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Galil assault rifle	G-2087859	Israel
23 April 2015	Obo	Galil assault rifle	G-2088061	Israel
23 April 2015	Obo	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1976 HT 19508	Poland
23 April 2015	Obo	MAS-36 rifle	7682	France
23 April 2015	Obo	MAS-36 rifle	37665	France
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-1 assault rifle	4501293	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-1 assault rifle	18176298	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	2806086	China

23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	3711122	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	3725797	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	12009401	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	12011395	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	37?0842	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	37?0872	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	17217401	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	35044836	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	35061669	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	1808332?	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	3?05602	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	2862	China
25 September 2015	Obo		3?E1?	
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1967 ME 5241	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	T56-1 assault rifle	17010773	China
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1969 OK767	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	68??016	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	Unreadable	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	35??3305	China
25 September 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	3706819	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1977 SS00950	Poland
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	196? B07847	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle		China
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1966 ??	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	Unreadable	China
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern) (probably)	1966???	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	35053606	China

25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	12???	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	377758?	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	79028	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	40380	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	??386	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	Unreadable	China
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	51612	China
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1985 PN 3109	Romania
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	FN-MaG machine-gun	1107	Belgium
07 November 2014	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Galil assault rifle	2065145	Israel
19 January 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Galil assault rifle	2090779	Israel
05 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Galil assault rifle	778616A	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	782307A1	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	795902A1	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	796193A1	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	796520A1	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	799107A1	Israel
/	/	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1976 HT 13860	Poland
/	/	M70AB2 assault rifle (AK pattern)	1989-M70-AB2 564287	Former Yugoslavia
05 June 2015	Bouar	M79 grenade launcher (40mm)	61510	USA
/	/	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	78 GA 4271	East Germany
07 November 2014	M'POKO	R4 Vector assault rifle	222	South Africa
06 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	250475	South Africa
06 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	701083	South Africa
12 November 2014	M'POKO	R4 Vector assault rifle	19000301	South Africa
30 October 2014	RDOT	R4 Vector assault rifle	790480A1	South Africa
30 October 2014	RDOT	R4 Vector assault rifle	790480A1	South Africa

03 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	791959A1	South Africa
03 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	792299A1	South Africa
03 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	797297A1	South Africa
06 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	KK3871	South Africa
04 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
04 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
19 January 2015	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
/	/	RPG7 launcher	SY890122	Possibly Iran
05 July 2015	Bangui-Gendarmerie Nationale	SAR 80 assault rifle	16519	Singapore
/	/	SAR 80 assault rifle	SER 020800	Singapore
05 June 2015	Bouar	T56-1 assault rifle	3608976	China
05 July 2015	Bangui-Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	3706020	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	3708339	China
05 July 2015	Bangui-Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	3710646	China
19 January 2015	Camp De Roux	T56-2 assault rifle	3711369	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	3712546	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	3714547	China
19 January 2015	Camp De Roux	T56-2 assault rifle	3715968	China
05 July 2015	Bangui-Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	5066282	China
08 June 2015	Bangui - HQ of the Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	12003487	China
/	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12007070	China
05 July 2015	Bangui - HQ of the Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	12007247	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12010345	China
19 January 2015	Camp De Roux	T56-2 assault rifle	12010470	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12010930	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12011695	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12012154	China

/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12013024	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12014008	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	T56-2 assault rifle	12014472	China

### List of ammunition

Date documented	Location documented	Calibre	Type	Headstamp	Possible Origin
25 May 2015	Bambari	40mm	PG-7L HEAT rocket		?
25 May 2015	Bambari	cal. 12	Small caliber	M.A.C.C. 12 Pte Noire 12	Congo (Brazzaville)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	55 023	?
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	12.7 x 99 mm	Small caliber	SF-1-82 12.7 S	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	188 * 70 *	Russia
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	40mm	PG-rocket (Type 69-II HEAT)	/	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	40mm	PG7-rocket (HEAT)	/	?
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	40mm	PG7-rocket (HEAT)	/	Russia
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	40mm RHE-F type grenades	Grenade for underbarrel launchers	/	Bulgaria
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	2 TZZ 4 88	Israel (?)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	20 Z 82 T	Israel (?)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	22 Z 82 T	Israel (?)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	85 13	South Africa
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86 13	South Africa
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar rounds (M83A-type)	/	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar rounds (M83A-type)	/	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar rounds	/	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar round (smoke)	/	?
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar round (illuminating model M802A4)	/	South Africa
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar rounds	/	China (?)

14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.5 x 54 mm	Small caliber	LM 3.60 B_7.5	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	7.62x39 / 01	Iran
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	84-SF	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	91_13	South Africa
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	92_13	South Africa
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	92_23	South Africa
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	LM_10	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_98	Sudan
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	188_74	Russia
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	61_90	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	7.62x54 / 01	Iran
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	7.62x54 / 01	Iran
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71_01	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71_75	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_07	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	9811_77	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	bxn_65	Czechoslovakia
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	norma_7.62 russ	Sweden
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	82mm	Mortar rounds	/	?
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	S PS * 9mm LUGER	Spain (?)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	S&B_10_9x19	Czech Republic
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	SF 82_9 mm	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	SF 72_1_9mm	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 25 mm	Small caliber	71_11	China

July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	40mm	PG-rocket (Type 69-II HEAT)		China
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7,5 x 54 mm	Small caliber	SUD_98_51	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	7.62x54_01	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	nny 1986	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber		
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	80_118	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	80_118	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (PK12)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	unreadable	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	unreadable	
04 June 2015	Baoro	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	MANUCAM 7.62 N	Cameroun
04 June 2015	Baoro	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	٧٠٠٠٠٠	Iran ?
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	17_*_74_*	Russia
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	21_76	China
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	13_Z_82_T	Israel (?)
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86_13	South Africa
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	FNM_84-13	Portugal
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	FNM_84-19	Portugal
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	IMI_07	Israel
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	S&B_222 REM	Czech Republic
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	60 mm	Mortar rounds	201-63-22 (engraved on the body of the round)	?
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	352	China
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_74	Russia(?)/China(?)
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	539_74	Russia
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_77	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	71_01	China

01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_08	China
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_73	Czechoslovakia
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	188_74	Russia
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_07	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	12 * 12 * 12 * 12 *	?
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	CLEVER_12_MIRAGE_12	?
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	M.A.C.C. 12 Pte Noire 12	Congo (Brazzaville)
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	NOBEL_12_SPORT_12	France
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	TRUST_12_EIBAR_12	Spain
05 June 2015	Bouar	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	41_95	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_74	Ukraine
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	60_74	Russia
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_65	Czechoslovakia
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_72	Czechoslovakia
04 June 2014	Bouar	cal. 12	Small caliber	CLEVER_12_MIRAGE_12	?
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	11_10	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	3_73	Russia
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	9631_06	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	21_77	?
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	3 * 74 *	Russia
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	23mm	Medium calibre	606_76	Russia

08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	37mm	Rocket	/	?
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	40mm	PG-rocket (Type 69-II HEAT)	/	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	40mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	40mm	Grenade for underbarrel launchers	/	?
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	40mm RHE-F type grenades	Grenade for underbarrel launchers	/	Bulgaria
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86_13	South Africa
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	96_93	South Africa (?)
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	FNM84-13	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	W_C_C_9_2	USA
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	57 mm	Air to Ground attack rockets (S5-MO type)	/	USSR (?)
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	7,5 x 54 mm	Small caliber	SF_81_1_7,5	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SU_1_51_01	Sudan
25 May 2015	Kaga-Bandoro	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_12	?
25 May 2015	Kaga-Bandoro	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_22	?
23 April 2015	Mbaïki	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86_13	South Africa
23 April 2015	Mbaïki	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	FNM_84_18	Portugal
23 April 2015	Mbaïki	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	HH_5.56	Singapore
23 April 2015	Mbaïki	cal. 12	Small caliber	12 * 12 * 12 * 12 *	?
14 April 2015	MINUSCA Spanish Camp in Bria	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SU_51_99_1	Sudan
14 April 2015	MINUSCA Spanish Camp in Bria	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_97	Sudan
14 April 2015	MINUSCA Spanish Camp in Bria	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_98	Sudan
14 April 2015	MINUSCA Spanish Camp in Bria	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
23 April 2015	Obo	40 mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
23 April 2015	Obo	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86_13	South Africa
23 April 2015	Obo	60 mm	Mortar rounds	/	China (?)

23 April 2015	Obo	60 mm	Mortar rounds	/	China (?)
23 April 2015	Obo	60 mm	Mortar fuze	/	China (?)
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	04_17 (inverted 04 and 17)	?
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17_73	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_71	Ukraine
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_73	Ukraine
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_74	Russia(?)/China(?)
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_97	China(?)/Russia(?)
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_01	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_04	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	71_11	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	711_72	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_06	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_11	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_12	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	90_17	?
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_72	Czechoslovakia
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	SU_1_39_01	Sudan
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	82-SF	France
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_12	?
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_22	?
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_97	Sudan
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	7.62x54 / 01	Iran
23 April 2015	Obo	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	13-MEN-10_9 X 19	Germany

23 April 2015	Obo	cal. 223	Small caliber	WINCHESTER 223 REM	?
23 April 2015	Obo	cal. 12	Small caliber	12*12*12*12	
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_75	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_97	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	311_06	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_91	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_92	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_93	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_95	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_98	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_02	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_04	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_07	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_08	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	611_11	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	81_97	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_93	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_02	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_06	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_07	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_08	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_11	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_12	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	blank	Ethiopia (probable)

25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_70	Former USSR (Lugansk)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_71	Former USSR (Lugansk)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17_73	Former USSR (Barnaul)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17_75	Former USSR (Barnaul)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	60_75	Former USSR (Frunze)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	711_72	Former USSR (Podolsk)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	539_70	Former USSR (Tula)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	7,62x39_03	Iran
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	SUD_39_98	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1_39_01_SU	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1_39_09	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	2_39_09	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1_39_011	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	2_39011	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1_39_012	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	2_39_12	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1_13_39	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	LI_02	Uganda (Luwer Industries)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	8??_93	
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_75	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_04	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_08	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_91	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	71_98	China

25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_93	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_08	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_11	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	(blank)	Ethiopia (probable)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_71	Former USSR
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_73	Former USSR
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17_73	Former USSR
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17_73	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	2_39_08	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1_39_12	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	LI_04	Uganda (Luwer Industries)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	LI_06	Uganda (Luwer Industries)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG7-rocket	/	China
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG7-rocket (type F7)	/	North Korea
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG7-rocket	/	USSR (?)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG7-rocket (HEAT)	/	China(?)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	VP-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG-7 type rocket	/	?
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	Propellant charge for RPG rockets	/	/
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	61_71	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	9631_06	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	40 mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	40 mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86_13	South Africa
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China

14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_64	Czechoslovakia
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	82-SF	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	83-SF	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	84-SF	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_12	?
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_22	?
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	92_13	South Africa
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	Arabic characters including 'sin'	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SU_1_51_01	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_97	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_98	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	Triple entry (Arabic characters)	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	3611_77	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	54_011_2	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	54_03_4	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	61_71	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	61_90	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71_01	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71_73	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71_90	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_10	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_11	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_12	China

14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	9611_77	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	bxn_66	Czechoslovakia
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	bxn_87	Czechoslovakia
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	15-MEN-05_9 X 19	Germany
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	311_09	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	NIM_9mm LUGER	
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	S PS * 9mm LUGER	Spain (?)
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	SF 82_9 mm	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	SF86_9mm	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	cal. 12	Small caliber	12*12*12*12	
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	cal. 12	Small caliber	M.A.C.C._12_Pte Noire_12	Congo (Brazzaville)

**Annex1.14:** Seized weapons and ammunition stored at the SRI unit of the CAR National gendarmerie

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Bangui on 3 June 2015*



**Annex 1.15:** Weaponry stored at the CAR National gendarmerie headquarters at Camp Izamo

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Bangui on 8 June 2015*



## Annex 1.16: Arms registry of the FACA National Instruction Center in Bouar

GRADE	NOMS	TYPE	NUMERO	DATE SCOTTÉ	DATE RÉLITRE	MISSION	SIGNATURE
SGT	DANBARÉCO	AK47	89-110430	20-05-15		Niém-Yéoua	[Signature]
Col	DANGALE	AK47	562806900	-11-11-		Niém-Yéoua	[Signature]
Col	YAMAKANA	AK47	85-110567	-11-11-		-11-11-	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	KINDA	AK47	35056066	-11-11-		-11-11-	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	NGATCHIATEMO	AK47	10N1973	-11-11-		-11-11-	[Signature]
2 <sup>el</sup>	BISSI-BERO	MAS36	14414	-11-11-		-11-11-	[Signature]
SGT	BIANDZO	AK47	CP 4082336	20-05-15		Kouï	[Signature]
clh	OUAKOUDOU	AK47	20896	-11-11-		Kouï	[Signature]
Col	NOE	AK47	85429	-11-11-		Kouï	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	YASSARA	AK47	1388456150	-11-11-		-11-	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	TEMOIN	AK47	66031	-11-11-		-11-	[Signature]
2 <sup>el</sup>	SOUNGONDO	MAS36	14893	-11-11-		-11-	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	Guinbi	A 452	25922	-11-11-		-11-	[Signature]

Source: Document consulted and photographed by the Panel on 5 June 2015

**Annex 1.17: Storage of arms and ammunition at MINUSCA bases**

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Mbaiki on 30 August 2015*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Bossangoa on 26 April 2015*



Annex 2: Central region – border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Map



## Overview

### *Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) parallel administration*

1. General Ali Darrassa Mahamat (UPC), also known as 'Ali Daras', commands the UPC faction of the former Séléka. General Darassa is the former military chief of staff of rebel leader of Peuhl origin, Mahamat Abdelkadr, aliases Mahamat Abdoul Kadre, and 'Baba Ladé' ('Babba Laddé'). Mahamat Abdelkadr is the commander of the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR). After Baba Ladé's return to Chad in December 2012, Ali Darrassa joined the Séléka with most of former FPR fighters, including the Peuhl as of one of its main ethnic component, together with the Goula, Rounga and Arab.<sup>84</sup>
2. Based in Bambari, the UPC retains a strong grip on a large part of the centre-south and centre-east of the CAR. General Darrassa, general coordinator of the UPC, is still officially the regional commander of the fifth military region of the CAR army, and commands one of the most structured, organised and respected factions of the former Séléka, still mostly composed of Peuhl.
3. The political leadership of the UPC was composed of six individuals, some of whom are divided over the approach that the UPC should adopt with regard to the DDRR process, as well as what type of relationship the UPC should maintain with the international community. Habyalah Awal,<sup>85</sup> political coordinator, Souleymane Daouda, political counsellor who signed the DDRR agreement on 10 May 2015 in Bangui on behalf of the UPC,<sup>86</sup> Hassan Bouba Ali, deputy political coordinator, Aboubakar Siddick Ali, UPC coordinator for Haute-Kotto, Youssoufa Bouba, UPC coordinator for Basse-Kotto, and Captain Ahmat Nadjat Ibrahim, spokesperson.<sup>87</sup> The last two, who were on the same moderate line led by Awal in terms of cooperation

<sup>84</sup> Written notes of an interview conducted with Baba Ladé by a researcher on Chad, 10 and 16 September 2014.

<sup>85</sup> Awal, a banker by profession, was arrested on 9 May 2015 in a vehicle at the Bangui PK12 checkpoint, together with 'General' Haroun Mahamat, a FACA/BSS Colonel registered 2013-1-1004, and his bodyguards for illegal possession of weapons, a month after a similar operation was conducted on General Ousmane Mahamat Ousmane.

<sup>86</sup> Daouda used to introduce himself also as political coordinator of the UPC, and signed the DDRR in this capacity; Awal is reportedly challenging Daouda's capacity to handle political issues (Confidential reports, 10 June 2015 and 12 June 2015).

<sup>87</sup> Former spokesperson of General Zoundeko when the new military structure of the former Séléka was established in Ndélé on 10 May 2014; Nadjat joined Darrassa when Zoundeko, Damane and 'Ben Laden' arrived end of May 2014 to try to take over Bambari; see section on Bambari in paragraphs 58 to 65 of the Panel's 2014 Final report, and interview with Nadjat, Bambari, 3 July 2014.

with the international community,<sup>88</sup> were killed during an attack on the UPC delegation in Bangui on 26 October 2015.

4. On the military side, the main UPC Generals are Mahamat Garba, military secretary general, Ahmat Ali, Hassan Ouattara (who replaced on 3 November 2014 General Mahamat Bandi in Kouango)<sup>89</sup> and Ousmane Abakar Daouda, deputy chief of staff for operations. General Yaya Scout, formerly FPRC in Bria, announced officially in Bria on 31 March 2015 that he proposed General Darrassa to join the UPC. The latter reportedly accepted the next day.<sup>90</sup>

*Anti-balaka structure in Ouaka*

5. At the time of drafting, the structures of the two anti-balaka opposing groups were as follows:
  - a) The faction of Ndarata and his deputies Thierry Madibo, also known as 'General Madibo', and René Pazou, also known as 'Fally', is recognized by Mokom as part of his movement.<sup>91</sup> The group also includes Maximin Ngbanga, also known as 'John l'Américain' and 'Homère' in Ngakobo (SUCAF area).<sup>92</sup> Ndarata was arrested by FACA in Bangui on 24 June 2015, after several failed attempts by MINUSCA in Bambari,<sup>93</sup> and subsequently jailed at Ngaragba prison after being convicted to a three-month sentence. He was then legally released on 25 September 2015, the day when the escalation of violence started. Ndarata's strongholds are located in Sabalet, a small village south of Bambari (7 kilometres on the road to Kouango) and Yakéché (40 kilometres west of Bambari, road to Grimari). 'Fally' is particularly active on the Bambari-Kouango axis, together with 'John l'Américain', 'Atakoli' and 'Manda Kara', and was also identified by the Panel as a perpetrator of exactions against Peuhl population in the Mendé area.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Confidential source, 30 July 2015. Archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>89</sup> Meeting with UPC deputy zone commander Colonel Abdourahmane Mahmat alias 'Sirongo', Kouango, on 16 April 2015.

<sup>90</sup> Confidential military report, 3 April 2015. Archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>91</sup> See **annex 2.4** for the structure of Mokom's movement in Bambari and Grimari.

<sup>92</sup> 'Homère' was reportedly arrested on 20 May 2015 by MINUSCA; meeting with MINUSCA, Bambari, 25 May 2015.

<sup>93</sup> Meeting with MINUSCA, Bambari, 25 May 2015.

<sup>94</sup> 'Atakoli', John l'Américain and 'Manda Kara' were arrested by MINUSCA but fled from Ngaragba jail and regrouped, at the time of drafting, in Yakéché.

*Photograph of Giscard Ndarata dated 13 April 2015*



*Source: Provided by a confidential source on 27 September 2015*

- b) After the split, the main part of the anti-balaka remained under Gaëtan Bouadé, based in the Kidjigera neighbourhood, who accepted to join the table of discussions on pre-DDR. Bouadé reportedly is back with Ngaïssona and his political party, the PCUD.<sup>95</sup> Bouadé's deputies are Marcellin Alix Orogbo and Gervais Pally. Victor Baba and 'Tombeau ouvert', active in Grimari and on the road to Liotto, are under Gaëtan's command.

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<sup>95</sup> Marcellin reportedly travelled to Bangui to discuss with Ngaïssona on 1 May 2015.

**Annex 2.1:** List of anti-balaka PCUD leadership active in Bambari on 15 April 2015

**LISTE NOMINATIVE DES CADRES DU PCUD DE BAMBARI**

<b>N°</b>	<b>Noms et Prénoms</b>	<b>Grades</b>
01	BOADE Gaétan	Général Chef de zone
02	NDARATA Giscard	Chef des Opérations Militaires
03	GALLY-BASSI Yves	Commandant
04	MODIBO Thierry	Commandant
05	PALLY Gervais	Commandant
06	GRAKOUSOU Wenceslas	Capitaine
07	MALEMASSI Michel	Capitaine
08	OUAGO Elisée	Capitaine
09	POUMARDO Rufin	Capitaine
10	OROGBO Alix Marcellin	Adjudant-chef (Secrétaire Général)
11	PADOUNDI Boniface	Adjudant
12	NDOUMENDE Michelin	Lieutenant
13	DEPARA Salomon	Lieutenant
14	SELEKELA Placide	Lieutenant
15	MOMOKAMA Charlin-Chabardo	Sergent Chef
16	ENDJIOUGBIA Bruno	Sergent Chef
17	MANIVELE Dieu-bénie Sonia	Sergent Chef
18	BOADE Emmanuel	Sergent
19	MAMBIKONGO Tonton	Sergent
20	FEINDIRONGAI Frédéric	Sergent
21	ENDJEZAPOU Grâce à Dieu	Coordonnateur préfectoral

**Annex 2.2:** Regional structure of anti-balaka PCUD in Bambari, Grimari and Grimari-Kouango axis on 10 December 2014

- BATA Simplicie

**Préfecture de la Ouaka (Bambari)**

- ENDJIDJAPOU Grâce à Dieu
- BOUADE Gaétan
- BALELOMA Albert
- YANGBANGA Claude
- PALI Gervais
- MALEMASSI Michel
- YAN Saint Cyr
- BOUGUEYE Ramces
- GRAKOUZOU Wenceslas
- MANIVELE Dieu béni
- BISSEKOUA Vivien

**Sous préfecture de Grimari**

**Grimari 1 :**

- KPANOU Sébastien
- AYOLMA Dimitri Placide
- MBILLAUME Serge
- NGOABADA Legrand


**Grimari 2 (Axe Kouango):**

- BABA Victor
- NDEMA BROTO Hugues
- POUMARDOU Innocent

Fait à Bangui, le


10 DEC 2014

Le Président



Patrice Édouard NGAÏSSONA

**Annex 2.3: UPC press communiqué signed by Captain Ahmat Nadjat, alias 'Capitaine Ahamat Nedjad Ibrahim'**



Ce sont les Anti Balaka et certains membres du gouvernement qui sont à l'origine de l'instabilité quotidienne en République Centrafricaine

- cas de MALEBASSA du 02/08/2015
- cas de l'assassinat du jeune de la communauté musulmane de PK7 axe Chimbolo survenu vendredi le 20/08/2015.
- l'attaque du village Ouarago commune de Yabongo dans la Sous-préfecture de Zangba le 22/08/2015.

L'UPC constate le renforcement en effectif et en armement du mouvement des Anti Balaka venant des différents horizons basé à Grimari, ayant pour objectif de déstabiliser l'Est de la République Centrafricaine plus particulièrement la Ouaka et la Basse-koto qui n'ont jamais connus ces phénomènes

Après plusieurs investigations, l'UPC constate que l'assassinat du jeune musulman de PK7 sur axe Chimbolo n'est qu'un prétexte en outre, un complot pour occasionner la reprise des hostilités afin de compromettre le processus électoral en cours.

Pour conclure, l'UPC demande à la communauté internationale d'être témoin ainsi qu'au gouvernement d'assumer ses responsabilités pour le retour à la normale.

Fait à Bangui le 24/08/2015



Le porte-parole général du Mouvement de l'Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique

*(Signature)*

**CAPITAINE AHANAT**  
NEOJADI - IERAMIM

**Annex 2.4:** List of anti-balaka commanders under Maxime Mokom, including the zones of Bambari and Grimari, on 16 June 2015



**ANTI BALAKA**

COORDINATION NATIONALE DES  
Patriotes ANTI BALAKA  
\*\*\*\*\*

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité – Dignité - Travail

COORDINATION NATIONALE DES  
OPERATIONS  
\*\*\*\*\*  
SECRETARIAT GENERAL

N° \_\_\_\_\_ /CN/CNO/SG

**LISTE DES COM -ZONES**

N.	NOMS	PRENOMS	FONCTIONS	ZONES
001	MAHANI	CONSTANT	COORDONATEUR	DAMARA
002	KOLO	OLIVIER	COORDONATEUR	SANGA MB.
003	NDOBADI	FERDINAND	COORDONATEUR	NOLA
004	GODONAM	ACHILLE	COORDONATEUR	BOUCA
005	NAMKOESSE	FERDINAND	COORDONATEUR	DEKOA
006	ZALO	JACQUES	COORDONATEUR	BOSSANGOA
007	BASSALA	SYLVAIN	COORDONATEUR	SIBUT
008	KOMBO	NARCISSE	COORDONATEUR	DAMARA
009	ZAHORO	SAMUEL	COORDONATEUR	BOZOUM
010	MBAINA	FLORENTIN	COM - ZONE	BOZOUM
011	BAGAZA	RODRIGUE	COORDONATEUR	MALA
012	DALIWANE	ALAIN	COM - ZONE	YALOKÉ
013	YABANDA	DIEUDONNE	ADJOINT COM - ZONE	YALOKÉ
014	WABILO	GUY	COORDONATEUR	GADZI
015	SINAKOLO	SYLVESTRE	COORDONATEUR	CARNOT
016	DEMOWANSSE	NICE	COORDONATEUR	AMADAGAZA
017	YERE	GUY	COORDONATEUR	BOGANGOLO
018	OUABIRO DANA	JO BRICE	COM - ZONE	DAMARA
019	BELLA	LOZACK	COM - ZONE	GAGA
020	YANGOUMALE	STANIE	CEMA	GRIMARI
021	FEIGANAZOUI	GUY	COM - ZONE	PK 42
022	OUAPOUTOU	BENJAMIN	COM - ZONE	BOSSEMBELE
023	KPANOU	SEBASTIEN	COORDONATEUR	GRIMARI
024	SEREMANDJI	AIME SERGE	COORDONATEUR	NDJO
025	YAPELE	CHRISOSTOME	COORDONATEUR	BERBERATI
026	NAMNENDOLA	SYLVAIN	COORDONATEUR	COROMPOKO
027	DIKA	BASILE	COORDONATEUR	OUHAM PENDE

028	OCTINAM	THIERRY	COM - ZONE	MBOUROUBA
029	AZOUNOU	HIPPOLYTE PACOME	CHARGE D'ADMINISTRATION	DAMARA
030	YANGUE	BAUDOUIN	S. G NATIONAL	BOGANGOLO
031	IYA	ARNAULD	COORDONATEUR	BOUAR
032	BARON	ADRAMANE	CONSEILLER SPECIAL	DEKOA
033	ZOKOUE	MAHAMAT HISSENE	MEDIATEUR INTERNE	NATIONAL
034	YAPENDE	GERVAIS	COM - ZONE	BOSSEMTELE
035	DIMANCHE	ANSELM	COORDONATEUR ADJOINT	YALOE
036	BANDA	VINCENT	CHEF DE SECTION	ZAWA
037	BANAFEI	RODRIGUE	COORDONATEUR	BOSSEMTELE
038	NARENA	VALENTIN	COM - ZONE GALAFONDO	OUMBA
039	MAKANZE	JEAN JACQUES	COM - ZONE BODA	BODA CENTRE
040	DANGBA PISSIDI	THEOPHILE	REPRESENTANT OUHAM	BOSSANGO
041	ANGA	CHARLES	COM - ZONE	BOUCA
042	NAMSSENE	HENRY LUNDI	REPRESENTANT	BOSSEMBELE
043	GAZAMODO	BERTRAND	COORDONATEUR	BANDORO
044	YANGBANGA	RODRIGUE	SECRETAIRE GENERAL	BAMBARI
045	SOUMALEKRA	RICHARD	PORTE PAROLE	BAMBARI
046	MAZIMBELE	GUY	COM - ZONE	BATANGAFO
047	GOTHIAS	PATRICK	COM - ZONE	BOEING
048	NOUIDEMONA	MARIEN	COM - ZONE	NDJO
049	KOTAOKO	RICHARD	COM - ZONE	YALOE
050	GOPORO	NESTOR	COM - ZONE	BOULI
051	BEOROFEI	SYLVAIN	COM - ZONE	MAMBERE

116 JUN 2015



**Annex 2.5:** Visa stamped by anti-balaka (Sergent-Chef Charlin-Chabardo Momokama in Bambari) and UPC (unknown in Liotto and Captain Ouattara in Kouango) commanders on the same *ordre de mission* of a member of a political party travelling from Bambari to Kouango on 11 April 2015



Source: Document obtained by the Panel from a Bambari-based UN staff on 22 April 2015

**Annex 2.6: Destroyed houses in the area of Liotto**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Liotto and surrounding villages on 18 May 2015*



### Annex 2.7.: Investigation of the killing of an aid worker in Bambari on 15 March 2015

1. During the evening of 15 March 2015, Benoît Kabé, a state nurse who was working in the health centre at the IDP site 'Sangaris' in Bambari was kidnapped at his residence by three anti-balaka elements. He was then killed by shotgun and a cut in his throat; his body was left six kilometres from Bambari on the road to Kouango.<sup>96</sup>
2. Benoît Kabé was born in the village of Liwa (south-east from Bambari on the route to Alindao) but resided in the village of Bokolobo (60 kilometres south-east from Bambari on the route to Alindao). He left his village in December 2014 for a training and registered himself as an IDP in Bambari since then. His family remained in Bokolobo.
3. According to investigations conducted by the Panel in Bambari, the local gendarmerie initiated an investigation to identify the perpetrators of the crime a few days after the incident. The information collected indicates that the group of anti-balaka executed Benoît Kabé because they suspected he had provided information to international forces on movements of anti-balaka elements in the village of Ngaluwa and a possible attack. The route from Bambari to Alindao has been scenario of multiple acts of violence in the past year, although the Panel has not recorded in its database any incident in this village.
4. On 18 March 2015, seven anti-balaka elements, all under the control of 'Gaëtan',<sup>97</sup> were identified by the Gendarmerie as suspects, four of them were arrested and three allegedly fled before they could be detained:<sup>98</sup>
  - Ghiovanie Manda, arrested on 19 March 2015, transferred to Bangui on 12 May 2015 (see photograph below);
  - Crépin Kosséré, also known as 'Ngarobo', arrested on 23 March 2015, transferred to Bangui on 12 May 2015 (see photograph below);
  - Ulrich Rékoama, arrested on 16 March 2015, transferred to Bangui on 12 May 2015; and,
  - Victorien Ngoundomatichi, arrested on 23 March 2015, transferred to Bangui on 4 June 2015.

<sup>96</sup> The Panel conducted an investigation on this case during a mission to Bambari on 21 May 2015. Several interviews and meetings were conducted with local Gendarmerie, NGOs and other confidential sources.

<sup>97</sup> Gaëtan is the anti-balaka commander in Bambari; see list in **annex 4.3.**; the Panel has various records of child soldiers who were recently demobilized and were under his command.

<sup>98</sup> The Panel could not obtain the complete names of the other three fugitives.

5. Ghiovanie Manda, Crépin Kosséré and Ulrich Rékoama were jailed on 26 May 2015 awaiting for their trial for abduction and murder at Ngaragba prison in Bangui, while Victorien Ngoundomatichi was jailed on 8 June 2015 for abduction only.
6. However, the four perpetrators escaped from prison on 31 July 2015, amongst a group of 17 prisoners, most of them belonging to anti-balaka groups in Bambari.<sup>99</sup>

*Photograph of the dead body of health worker Benoît Kabé*




*Photograph of Ghiovanie Manda (right) and Crépin Kosséré, handcuffed at the Gendarmerie in Bambari*




*Source: Photographs obtained by the Panel from the gendarmerie officer in Bambari on 21 May 2015*

<sup>99</sup> A list of the 17 detainees who escaped from Ngaragba jail in Bangui on 31 July 2015 was provided to the Panel by a confidential source.

Annex 2.8: Western road from Liotto to Kouango



**Annex 2.9:** Map of the area of Bolo I and II, located five kilometers east of the main road from Kouango to Liotto



**Annex 2.10:** Attack on Bolo I and Bolo II (according to the Panel, 178 buildings were destroyed)

*Screenshot of a video taken by the Panel from a MINUSCA helicopter on 16 April 2015*



**Annex 2.11.:** Photographs of destructions and of a dead body in the villages of Bolo I and II

*Photographs taken by the Panel on 16 May 2015*






*A dead body of a civilian allegedly killed by former Séléka attackers was found by villagers in a borehole in Bolo I*



### Annex 2.12: Map of east of Kouango-Bianga area



**Annex 2.13: Anti-balaka structure in the Ouham province**

1. Ouham province, and more specifically the triangle Bossangoa-Bouca-Batangafu, remains the main stronghold of the “fourth group” of anti-balaka in the country. Populated mainly by the Gbaya ethnic group, this area includes the *sous-préfecture* of Ben Zambé, birthplace of the anti-balaka movement and region of origin of former President François Bozizé.
2. The fourth group, as per the Panel’s classification outlined in its 2014 interim report, is mainly composed at the senior level of FACA and Gendarmes of Gbaya origin, and was the backbone of the original military insurgency against Séléka; see also page 42 of the Panel’s 2014 interim report. In its update on 19 May 2015, the Panel recalled that this group is neither directly concerned nor involved in the political discussions with the transitional government. The first group is Ngaïssona’s PCUD; the second group is the ‘anti-balaka from the South’ of Alfred Yekatom; the third group is composed of local self-defense groups with none or loose organizational ties with the national level.
3. If the presence of MINUSCA in Bossangoa and Batangafu prevents anti-balaka members of regional coordinator Florient Daniel Kéma, a FACA sub-commissioned officer, and Romain Finiri, zone commander in Ben Zambé, from carrying weapons in public areas, there are recurrent reports of the presence of large groups of anti-balaka where MINUSCA has no presence in the areas of Ben Zambé, Nana-Bakassa and Kouki, as well as of recruitment and training.

*Photograph of Florent Kéma and Romain Finidiri taken by the Panel in Bangui on 18 April 2015*



4. This faction of the anti-balaka has extended its operations to Nana Grebizi, and more specifically to the area of Kaga-Bandoro and south (road to Dékoa), and Mbrès.<sup>100</sup> The faction's *modus operandi* remains identical to that already identified by the Panel; i.e., anti-balaka military commanders, most of whom are former FACA, were sent to the area to mobilize Christian youth or to assume command of existing local self-defence militia groups.
5. According to a confidential report on 27 May 2015, the Imam of Dékoa was attacked on 25 May 2015 while walking in the street and was seriously wounded during an attack conducted by anti-balaka members of the group of Andilo's brother, in a context of local reconciliation efforts by both communities.
6. Several senior anti-balaka military commanders are still active in this region, which is closely connected to the leadership in Bangui, namely: Dieudonné Ngaïbona, Andilo's<sup>101</sup> brother, also known as 'Dié', who is particularly active in the region of Batangafo-Bouca

<sup>100</sup> Meeting with FPRC General Al Khatim, Moyen Sido, 26 May 2015.

<sup>101</sup> Rodrigue Ngaïbona, also known as 'Andjilou' ou 'General Andilo', has been first identified by the Panel as one of the most important anti-balaka leader in its 2014 interim report.

but also Bogangolo (Ombella-Mpoko),<sup>102</sup> and FACA officers Teddy Bozizé,<sup>103</sup> the adopted son of François Bozizé, reported in Ben Zambé area, and Eugène Ngaïkosset,<sup>104</sup> former head of Bozizé's presidential guard, also known as the *Paoua butcher*, who escaped from jail on 17 May 2015 following his extradition from Brazzaville, and who created since his own anti-balaka faction of former FACA under Mokom's coordination.<sup>105</sup>

7. An anti-balaka regional leader and former FACA non-commissioned officer informed the Panel that the objective of Ngaïkosset's group was still to expel all Muslims from Ouham.<sup>106</sup> The appointment of Yvon Konaté – a FACA lieutenant – as national coordinator for military operations and Guy Mazimbélet – a FACA Corporal – as zone commander for Batangafo, can be interpreted as another sign of the reinforcement of the anti-balaka's military capacities in the north of Bangui.<sup>107</sup>
8. Yvon Konaté and Guy Mazimbélet are historical military leaders of the anti-balaka; see paragraphs 76 and 77 of the Panel's 2014 final report and paragraphs 7 and 8 of annex 5 of the Panel's 2014 interim report. Members of Mazimbélet anti-balaka group in Boy-Rabe have been identified in a confidential report as perpetrators of an attack on Rwandan MINUSCA police unit taking part in a joint operation with CAR gendarmerie to recover a stolen vehicle on 3 June 2015. During that operation two Rwandan police officers were wounded, including one seriously. Mazimbélet was reportedly killed on 26 September 2015 during the escalation of violence in Bangui.

<sup>102</sup> List of 'Andilo' elements and area of operations, which includes also Ndoungbou and Boubou (Bouca area) is archived at the UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>103</sup> Teddy Bozizé's real name is Teddy Gbenengaina, born on 27 May 1984 in Bangui; Teddy is registered as a *sous-lieutenant* of the FACA with military identification number 2003-1-1125.

<sup>104</sup> Eugène Ngaïkosset, alias Ngakosset, is registered as a Captain of the FACA with military identification number 911-10-77.

<sup>105</sup> Missions to Bossangoa on 10 April, 30 April and 1 June 2015; interview with an anti-balaka leader, Bangui, 24 June 2015; Confidential reports, 8 and 16 July 2015; meeting with Mokom on 27 June 2015.

<sup>106</sup> Meeting with Florent Daniel Kéma, anti-balaka regional coordinator for the Ouham province, and Romain Findiri, zone commander for Ben Zambé, Bangui, 18 April 2015; see photographs in **annex 2.13**.

<sup>107</sup> Meeting with Maxime Mokom, Bangui, 27 June 2015; meeting with Mokom's deputy, Côme Hyppolyte Azoumou, Bangui, 6 July 2015.


**Annex 2.14:** Sudanese truck in Kouango; trucks bring commercial goods from Sudan and return with coffee from Kouango to Sudan

*Photographs taken by the Panel on 16 April 2015*



Coffee plantations north of Kouango; coffee trees are usually cultivated underneath higher forest trees

*Photographs taken by the Panel from a MINUSCA helicopter on 16 April 2015*



**Annex 3: Eastern region – border with Sudan and South Sudan**

**Map**



## Overview

### *Birao*

1. Due to its privileged location, the control of Birao has always been particularly strategic for the different factions of the former Séléka. The recent designation of a new mayor by transitional authorities in Bangui, in the person of the Sultan of Birao, Ahmad Moustapha Am-Gabo, was immediately challenged by the *Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice* (MLCJ), which appointed its own mayor, named Mustapha Bourma Léon. The previous mayor, Mahamat Kachmir, was accused by former Séléka factions of cooperating with central authorities in Bangui and was subsequently abducted and severely beaten by former Séléka armed elements on 21 September 2015.<sup>108</sup>

2. Similarly, the military control of Birao zone is contested by two commanders, Abdel Majid Moustapha from the MLCJ and Adam Souleimane from the FPRC, falling respectively under the commands of General Ali Abdulrahman and General Arda Hakouma. The latter reportedly arrived in Birao from Ouadda on 24 May 2015 with two pick-up vehicles,<sup>109</sup> after having left Bria following the attack on FPRC positions in occupied buildings by international forces.

*From left to right: Ali Abdulrahman, Abdel Majid Moustapha, Arda Hakouma and Adam Souleimane*



*Source: Confidential reports, 26 May and 3 August 2015*

3. Created by Abakar Sabone, alias Abakar Saboune or Saboun, who is the brother of FPRC general coordinator Moustapha Saboun,<sup>110</sup> the MLCJ was initially one of the components of the *Union des forces*

<sup>108</sup> Confidential source, 22 September 2015.

<sup>109</sup> Confidential report, 29 May 2015; his deputy would be Colonel Abel Aziz Mahamat Abakar.

<sup>110</sup> Moustapha Saboune, currently in N'Djamena (Chad), is a Chadian/Canadian national who acquired the CAR citizenship during Séléka regime, after he was appointed by President Djotodia head of the telecom regulation agency (ART).

*démocratiques pour le rassemblement* (UFDR).<sup>111</sup> The movement is now headed by one Gilbert Hamza Toumou-Deya (Goula), a former FPRC Colonel.<sup>112</sup>

4. Competition is, therefore, high between factions of the former Séléka for the control of checkpoints along commercial routes, taxation of markets in the main towns, and the provision of armed escorts riding on commercial trucks from Sudan. Former Séléka in Birao are also armed with a variety of conventional weapons which are mostly consistent with those inspected by the Panel in other former Séléka areas.<sup>113</sup> The failed redeployment of the Tripartite force in Birao has reinforced the perception that this part of the country is outside the sphere of control of the central government in Bangui.

*Ouandja, Ounda-Djallé and Ouadda*

5. Ouandja is the birthplace of Nourredine Adam (Rounga). The town of Ouanda-Djallé is reportedly controlled by FPRC General Emile Bézo, while the *sous-préfecture* of Ouadda is reportedly under the control of General Aubin Issa Issaka (Goula), of the RPRC, with around 40 armed elements. The latter, along with Arda Hakouma (Goula) and Abdoukarim Moussa (Goula),<sup>114</sup> is a historical military commander of the UFDR component of the former Séléka. He also used to be in charge of the cantoned former Séléka elements at the *Régiment de Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire* (RDOT) Camp, in Bangui.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Abakar Saboune signed the Brazzaville agreement on 23 July 2014 on behalf of the MLCJ; however the new leadership of the MLCJ in Birao considers that he resigned from the MLCJ in 2011.

<sup>112</sup> Gilbert Toumou Deya was appointed *Premier commissaire aux comptes* by Nourredine Adam when the FPRC was established in Birao on 10 July 2014. He was then under Mahamat Taïb Yacoub, appointed at the same occasion *Troisième vice-président chargé des questions économiques et financières*.

<sup>113</sup> Panel's inspection, Obo, 24 April 2015; see a photograph of material seized on 30 June 2014 in **annex 3.2.**; for the complete list of items seized from former Séléka by Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) component of the AU/RTF in Nzako, see paragraph 152 and annex 54 of the 2014 Panel's final report.

<sup>114</sup> Registered as a Brigadier General of BSS with military identification number 2004-1-1220.

<sup>115</sup> The Panel met three times with General Issa Issaka in April and May 2014 when the latter was at 36 villas and then RDOT camp in Bangui; at one occasion, the Panel also met at RDOT camp with General Harouna, whom criticized openly Issa Issaka while the latter was sitting few meters away from him. The representation of the cantoned former Séléka elements in Bangui has been at the centre of a political struggle amongst former Séléka political leaders as they represent an important leverage on the international community in terms of possible threat of destabilization.

*Sikikédé, Tiringoulou, Gordil and Mamou lake area*

6. The area bordering the Vakaga and the Bamingui-Bangoran provinces, where the towns of Sikikédé, Tiringoulou and Gordil are located, and the Mamou lake/Boromata area, bordering Chad, have been used as a rear base and a hideout by FPRC Generals of Goula origin. The PCA of Gordil is also the birthplace of former President Michel Djotodia, while N'diffa, located next to Gordil airfield, is the home village of Lambert Lissane Moukové, Nourredine Adam's chief of staff.

7. Boromata is the birthplace of Arda Hakouma, and Generals Tom Adam and Shafadine are also from the lake Mamou area.<sup>116</sup> Military sources reported movements of armed groups from Chad in this region,<sup>117</sup> which were not confirmed due to the absence of international forces in the area. However, road conditions, in particular during the rainy season, did not prevent General Hakouma in Birao, Generals Shafadine and 'Ben Laden' in Sam Ouandja, as well as Colonel Ousta in Bria, to reach Kaga-Bandoro in mid-October 2015 to attend the general gathering of the FPRC organised by Nourredine Adam.<sup>118</sup>

*Photographs of Generals Shafadine (left) and Alanta (right) taken by the Panel in Sam Ouandja on 27 September 2015*



<sup>116</sup> Meeting with local officials, Sam Ouandja, 27 September 2015.

<sup>117</sup> Confidential reports, 22 June 2015.

<sup>118</sup> Confidential source, 15 October 2015; General Hakouma and Colonel Ousta arrived in Kaga Bandoro respectively on 6 and 10 October 2015.

8. Sikikédé is reportedly under the command of FPRC zone Commander Tidjani Karan. General Adoum Kanton (Goula)<sup>119</sup> reportedly left Ndélé on 14 February 2015 to Sikikédé, after Sangaris instructed FPRC in Ndélé to vacate governmental buildings, anticipating a similar operation as the one conducted in Bria four days before.<sup>120</sup> He would have then mobilized armed men in the area and led the FPRC march on Bangui, together with General Oumar Younouss and Harouna. Sangaris and MINUSCA stopped this march to Sibut on 8 October 2015.

#### *Bria*

9. In Bria, the local dynamics within former Séléka were impacted by the operation led by international forces on the FPRC on 10 February 2015. Now, FPRC elements previously based in Bria were dispersed in mining area, in particular in Aigbando where former zone commander Bachar is now based with 56 elements.<sup>121</sup>

10. In Bria, the main general remains Yaya Scout, despite its change from FPRC to UPC, and colonels Makaï and Moussa.

*From left to right, photographs of General Yaya Scout, Colonels Makaï and Moussa, taken by the Panel in Bria on 14 April 2015*



<sup>119</sup> General Adoum Kanton was appointed “*Deuxième Chef d’Etat-major Général Adjoint*” of the FPRC during its general assemble in Kaga Bandoro on 2 November 2014.

<sup>120</sup> The Panel observed early October 2015 that these buildings are still occupied by the FPRC; see chapter IV.

<sup>121</sup> Confidential report, 12 June 2015.

**Annex 3.1:** Failed attempt of redeployment of the tripartite force CAR-Sudan-Chad in Birao on 15 June 2015

1. On 15 June 2015, the transitional authorities, with their Sudanese and Chadian partners, initiated a re-deployment of the tripartite force in the town of Birao. A group of 25 FACA, accompanied by a 25-man strong Sudanese unit and one Chadian officer, departed Am Dafok towards Birao.

*Photograph taken by MINUSCA of Sudanese Armed Forces Military attaché Colonel Jamal Al Shaheed (seated, on the right)*



*Source: MINUSCA*

2. As a result, the local population of Birao violently demonstrated against the FACA detachment of the tripartite force, which eventually returned to Am Dafok under MINUSCA protection.
3. Although the Panel recommended the redeployment of the tripartite force in its 2014 final report as a way of curbing the absence of State authority in the north-east and empowering CAR national sovereignty and regional cooperation frameworks, it should be noted that such deployment of armed personnel and equipment from Sudan and Chad without prior approval of the Committee represents a violation of the sanctions regime on the CAR.
4. To avoid such a scenario, the Panel's recommendation on the redeployment of the regional force was followed by a related recommendation to the Security Council to grant a permanent exemption to the tripartite force (see paragraphs 223 (b) and (c) of the Panel's 2014 final report).

*Photograph of Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Service, also known as 'Lapajou', former deputy FACA Chief of Staff*



*Source: MINUSCA*

*Message dated 21 May 2015 from the Minister of Defence of the Central African Republic addressed to MINUSCA*

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE  
LA RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMEE, DES ANCIENS  
COMBATTANTS ET VICTIMES  
DE GUERRE  
\*\*\*\*\*  
DIRECTION DE C A B I N E T  
SECRETARIAT PARTICULIER  
\*\*\*\*\*  
N° 155 /MDNCRAACVGD/DIRCAB/SP  
\* \* \*

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
*Unité - Dignité - Travail*  
\*\*\*\*\*

Bangui le 21 MAI 2015

*Le Ministre d'Etat*

**MESSAGE PORTE**

**ORIGINE :** SON EXCELLENCE, MADAME LA MINISTRE D'ETAT CHARGE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE, DE LA RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMEE, DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS ET VICTIMES DE GUERRE - **BANGUI** -

**DESTINATAIRE :** MONSIEUR LE REPRESENTANT SPECIAL DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES, CHEF DE LA MINUSCA - **BANGUI** -

**INFORMATIONS :** SON EXCELLENCE MADAME LA PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLIQUE, CHEF DE L'ETAT DE TRANSITION - **BANGUI** -  
SON EXCELLENCE, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT DE TRANSITION - **BANGUI** -

**TEXTE**

SELON INFORMATION A NOTRE POSSESSION -**STOP**- LES LOCAUX DES BATIMENTS CONSTRUITS PAR LE SOUDAN - **STOP** - AU PROFIT DES FORCES TRIPARTITES A BIRAO -**STOP**- SONT PRESENTEMENT OCCUPES PAR LES ELEMENTS DE LA MINUSCA -**STOP**- HONNEUR VOUS DEMANDER -**STOP**- LA LIBERATION DESDITS BATIMENTS - **STOP** - POUR ABRITER LES ELEMENTS DES FORCES ARMEES CENTRAFRICAINES STATIONNES NIVEAU AM-DAFOCK - **STOP** - CONSIDERATION DISTINGUEE -**STOP**- ET FIN.

  
*Marie Noëlle KOVARA*

**Annex 3.2:** Arms seized by the AU/RTF from former Séléka, LRA and Sudanese poachers in Nzako

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Obo on 24 April 2015 –  
Former Séléka, LRA and Sudanese poachers seizures*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Obo on 25 September 2015 –  
returned weapons and ammunition by LRA defectors and arms cache*



**Annex 3.3:** List of seizures of joint operation Sangaris - MINUSCA in Bria on 10 February 2015




RAPPORT DE LA MISSION DE BRIA

Ce rapport fait état des armes et des munitions saisies par la MINUSCA lors de la conduite d'une opération le 10 Février 2015.

1- Etat des armes inspectées le 11 Février à Bria  
2-

Nr	Type	Numéro de série	Pays d'origine	Etat
1	Tube de Mortier PP 93 60 mm	16000	CHINE	NF
2	Canon de Mitrailleur KPV	240219-2	RUSSIE	NF
3	Canon de Mitrailleur KPV	H9398	RUSSIE	NF
4	M16A2	5631996	USA	F
5	Fusil à air comprimé	NA	FRANCE	NF
6	Vektor R4	796167A1	AFRIQUE du SUD	F
7	Vektor R4	7925539A1	AFRIQUE du SUD	F
8	Type 56	3678132	CHINE	F
9	Type 56	36059590	CHINE	F
10	Type 56 Carabine	22001532	CHINE	F
11	Type 56-2	212011863	CHINE	F
12	Type 56-2	2805798	CHINE	F
14	AKM	78 GA1810	RUSSIE	F
15	Galil	2070357	ISRAEL	F
16	Galil	1000946	ISRAEL	F
17	PKM	275549	RUSSIE	F
18	FN HERSTAL	250583/250970	BELGIQUE	F
19	RPD	2201089	RUSSIE	F
20	RPD	61627	RUSSIE	NF
21	RPD	PG203	RUSSIE	F
22	Lance Roquette RPG-7V	588 /AB-21-88	RUSSIE	F
23	Lance Roquette RPG-7V	101595	RUSSIE	F
24	Lance Roquette RPG-7V	90273	RUSSIE	F
25	TYPE 69	51564	CHINE	F
26	TYPE 69	51589	CHINE	F
27	Lance Roquette RPG7-V	NA	RUSSIE	F
28	QLZ - 87	161308	CHINE	F

NF: non fonctionnelle  
F: fonctionnelle  
NA : non accessible


**UNMAS**

GETTING BARRAGE OUT OF THE BARRAGE, ICA
**2-Etat des munitions inspectées**

Nr	Type	Quantité	Origine	Nro Série Observations
1	Gr. à Fusil 35mm Type DFS 87 HE	07	CHINE	1-11-948 3-11-9624 (Fusée)
2	Gr à Fusil 40mm VOG25	23	RUSSIE / BULGARIE	FSQSD1 09-09
3	Roquettes Frag 40mm OG7	17	BULGARIE/ RUSSIE	1 a un impact de balle
4	Roquettes antichar de 40mm RPG7 G	36	RUSSIE	2 ont des impacts de balles
5	Roquettes antichar de 40mm RPG7 L	1	RUSSIE	8-553-72
6	Roquettes antichar de 40mm Type 69 HEI bondissante	2	CHINE	3-7-23 MJ7 2-07-9324 (Fusée)
7	Obus antichar de 82mm BK 881 m (sans recul)	1	RUSSIE	383-15-83-G 218-83-2403
8	Obus de Mortier de 60 mm DPS/PP93	21	CHINE	1-08-9613
9	Gr. Ma Type 82-2	1	CHINE	
10	Gr. Ma RG4	4	RUSSIE	
11	Charges propulsives de RPG	53	RUSSIE	
12	Munitions de petit calibre	3 000		En vrac
13	Fusées mortier DRP11J – DRP11 C	18	CHINE	5-11-9624

...

Photographs of weapons and ammunition seized in Bria during the joint operation Sangaris-MINUSCA on 10 February 2015, taken by the Panel on 14 April 2015






**Annex 3.4:** Group of Sudanese poachers, some of them in military attire

*Photograph taken by the informant of a confidential source of the Panel  
in the Mbomou province in 2014*



**Annex 3.5: Map of the Lord's Resistance Army area of operations**



Source: The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative


**Annex 3.6:** Satellite imagery of Songo airstrip, Sudanese Armed Forces camps and Songo town

*Coordinates of Songo airstrip and Sudanese Armed Forces base:  
9°46'28.09"N 24°18'23.05"E*





*Source: Google earth, imagery date: 12 April 2014*

**Annex 3.7: Copy of *Note de Service* appointing FPRC elements in key government services in Bria, obtained by the Panel in Bria on 17 April 2015**



Annex 3.8: Photographs of evacuation authorizations of diamonds from Bria, taken by the Panel on 17 April 2015



**Annex 3.9:** Photographs of USAF building in Sam-Ouandja with FPRC elements occupying the building posing in front, taken by the Panel on 27 September 2015



**Annex 3.10:** Letter from USAF central commander in Bangui to the Panel, and a letter from the Director General of the division of Mines to the Panel, received on 23 October 2015 and 12 September 2014 respectively in response to the Panel's requests for information to Badica/Kardiam

MINISTÈRE DES MINES  
ET DE LA GÉOLOGIE

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DIRECTION DE CABINET

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DIRECTION DE L'UNITÉ  
SPÉCIALE ANTI-FRAUDE

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité – Dignité – Travail

-----  
A Bangui le, 20 Octobre 2015.

N° 097/2-DIR-USA.F.BG

Le Capitaine *KONGA Alphonse Stanislas*,  
Commandant l'Unité Spéciale Anti Fraude  
à..... Bangui

A

Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Mines  
et de la Géologie à..... Bangui.

Objet: Réponse à la Note de Monsieur *Aurélien LLORCA*

Référence: Correspondance N° *S/AC 55/2015/PE/OC.072* du 16 Octobre 2015

En réponse à la note de référence portant vos annotations relatives aux accusations portées à l'encontre du *BAÏE BADICA* contenues dans la correspondance de Monsieur *Aurélien LLORCA*, Coordonnateur Panel of Experts on the car extended pursuant to security council resolution 2196 (2015) en date du *16 Octobre 2015*.

Selon lesquelles les Forces non conventionnelles (*Ex-seleka*) ont régulièrement infiltré ou absorbé de manière permanente les *Unités Opérationnelles Régionales de Bria, Sam-Ouandja et Ndele*, relevant de la Direction de l'Unité Spéciale Anti-fraude (*USA.F*).

1

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte que l'*USAF* est un *organisme public* placé sous l'autorité du *Ministre en charge des Mines et de la Géologie*.

Les éléments qui opèrent tant à la *Direction USAF* comme dans les *Unités Opérationnelles Centrales et Régionales*, sont des *Gendarmes et Policiers*, mis à la disposition du *Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie* par la *Gendarmerie Nationale et la Police Centrafricaine*, toutes les deux *(02) Institutions de l'Etat*.

Les *Agents de l'USAF* qui sont des *Officiers et Agents de Police judiciaire* donc investis des pouvoirs judiciaires ne peuvent accepter travailler de commun accord ou au solde des forces non conventionnelles au regard des textes portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de dite entité *(USAF)*.

A ce titre, les allégations distillées par le nommé *Aurélien LLORCA* sont de nature à ternir l'image de cette *Unité de Police Minière* qui à sa mission clairement définie par les textes en vigueur.

D'après cette correspondance, les *Unités Opérationnelles Régionales de Bria, Sam-Ouandja et Ndele* sont infiltrées ou absorbées de manière permanente par les forces non conventionnelles *Ex-seleka*. Cela signifie militairement que les éléments de l'*Ex-seleka* opèrent avec les *Agents de l'USAF* ou ont pris en otage les *éléments de l'USAF* qui travaillent pour leur compte dans les zones précitées.

Ces informations sans fondement n'ont de valeur que pour le rédacteur qui a délibérément l'intention de salir et de porter préjudice au Bureau d'Achat Import-export *(BAÏE) BADICA*, Société Commerciale de la Place et *l'USAF* qui est une institution de l'Etat.

Depuis la date *(10 Décembre 2012)*, du déclenchement des événements ayant porté la coalition *seleka* au pouvoir jusqu'à ce jour, il n'a été noté nulle part, les activités communes en matière minière des éléments de *l'USAF* et ceux des forces non conventionnelles *(SELEKA ou Anti-balaka)* dans une des régions de la République Centrafricaine.

En somme, les allégations formulées par le nommé *Aurélien LLORCA* figurant dans la note citée en référence sont dénuées de tous fondements lesquelles constituent des entorses graves aux bonnes actions de traçabilité entreprises par le département des Mines et de la Géologie.



MINISTERE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité - Dignité - Travail

DIRECTION DE CABINET

DIRECTION GENERALE DES MINES  
ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

N° 199 /14/MMEH/DIR-CAB/DGMG.

Bangui, le

12 SEPT 2014

LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL DES MINES  
ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

A

Monsieur Aurélien Llorca,  
Coordonnateur du Comité de  
Sécurité des Nations Unies,

**Objet:** Questionnaire du Comité de Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies,

**Réf.:** S.T. du 08/09/14

Monsieur le coordonnateur,

Faisant suite au soit-Transmis ci-dessus référencée, je viens d'être saisi de votre correspondance par laquelle certaines allégations ont été soulevées à l'encontre de l'administration minière qui méritent d'être clarifiées.

Dans votre correspondance, il ressort que, de source Gouvernementale le Bureau d'achat BADICA, entretient des réseaux de fraude vers Emirats Arabes Unis. Alors que le Département des Mines qui assure la gestion de la politique minière dans ce domaine ne se reconnaît pas dans cette velléité.

Par contre, l'exportation de (827g) d'or par BADICA, le 20 mai 2014 est légale du fait qu'il a respecté les procédures d'exportation des métaux précieux conformément à la réglementation minière. D'ailleurs il n'est pas le seul Bureau d'achat qui exporte d'autres substances minérales en ce moment.

Aussi, il m'est important de vous rappeler que la sanction du Processus de Kimberley ne touche que le commerce international de diamant Brut et non le commerce des diamants taillés, les pierres précieuses, semi-précieuses, les métaux précieux et semi-précieux.

Par ailleurs, pour mettre fin à ces allégations non fondées et vous permettre d'être aux mêmes niveaux d'information, je vous saurai gré, de bien vouloir vous approprier de la décision du 23 mai 2013 sur la suspension de la République Centrafricaine par le Processus de Kimberley.

Espérant que votre préoccupation à trouver de réponse, recevez mes collaborations les plus sincères.

Copie :

- MMG/DIRCAB.....2
- Représentante U.N en Belgique...1



Annex 3.11: Copy of Registry of diamond purchases kept by the sub-regional director of mines in Sam-Ouandja, obtained by the Panel on 27 September 2015

2014

N° D'ORDRE	DATES	BUREAU OU NOMS ET PRENOMS	N° Carrot de Cahier de Procédure collection	CARATAGES		QUANTITE	PROVINCE	DETERMINATION
				POUR	2014			
001	27-02-2014	MAHAMAT NOUR KOUÏFOU	N°0411130	154,30	/	SAM-OUANDE	SAM-OUANDE	Bangui
002	27-02-2014	SODIAM		530,00	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
003	18-03-2014	GARBA ABAKAR	HK43/011	17,85	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
004	18-03-2014	DEMBA ALI		329,00	/	-11-11-	SAM-OUANDE	Bangui
005	07-04-2014	SODIAM		231,14	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
006	07-04-2014	GARBA ABAKAR	HK43/011	92,82	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
007	08-04-2014	BADICA		86,34	/	-11-11-	SAM-OUANDE	Bangui
009	12-05-2014	SODIAM		226,44	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
010	14-05-2014	MAHAMAT NOUR KOUÏFOU	N°0411130	146,88	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
011	05-06-2014	DEMBA ALI		24,00	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
012	22-06-2014	BADICA		220,51	/	-11-11-	SAM-OUANDE	Bangui
013	12-07-2014	SODIAM		222,87	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
014	28-07-2014	DEMBA ALI (SUR-AROU)		110,00	/	SAM-OUANDE	SAM-OUANDE	Bra
015	15-08-2014	BADICA		199,23	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	Bangui
016	13-08-2014	SODIAM		242,91	/	-11-11-	-11-11-	Bangui
017	06-10-14	SODIAM		170,65	/	-11-11-	SAM-OUANDE	Bangui
018	06-11-14	SUD-AZUR		100,00	/	-11-11-	SAM-OUANDE	Bangui
019	27-11-14	SODIAM		225,20	/	-11-11-	SAM-OUANDE	Bangui
020	27-11-14	SODIAM		22,45	/	B. BANZOUÏ	B. BANZOUÏ	Bangui

021	05-12-2014	SUD D'AZUR						
022	05-12-2014	SUD D'AZUR						
023	05-12-2014	SUD D'AZUR						
024	24-12-2014	SODIAM						
025	31-12-2014	SUD D'AZUR						
				60 Carats				
				30,68				
				73,68				
				128,05				
				162,00				
				3627,59 carats				
2015								
001	17-03-2015	SUD D'AZUR	BG14/013	130,00	/	SAM-OUANDE	-11-11-	Bangui
002	18-04-2015	SUD D'AZUR	6614/013	131,00	/	SAM-OUANDE	-11-11-	Bangui
003	28-05-2015	SUD D'AZUR	BG14/013	100,00	/	SAM-OUANDE	-11-11-	Bangui
004	09-07-2015	SODIAM	MK151047	258,00	/	SAM-OUANDE	-11-11-	Bangui

**Annex 3.12: Buying houses' purchasing policies regarding the east***SODIAM*

1. SODIAM's procedures manual of June 2015 states that the company will neither purchase diamonds from mines under control of rebel groups, nor from collectors known to associate with these groups.<sup>122</sup> The manual does not specify how the company rules out any purchases of diamonds from such mines or collectors, other than by following regular chain of custody procedures. SODIAM's procedures manual refers to the sanctions regime insofar as to maintain the highest vigilance regarding the involvement in the diamond sector of sanctioned individuals.
  
2. According to an audit it published in September 2015, SODIAM closed its office in Bria in December 2013 and Sam-Ouandja late 2014 for political and security reasons, declaring both zones "red".<sup>123</sup> Indeed, the Company recorded no purchases from Bria after this date; however, it continued purchases from Sam Ouandja in 2015 up until July, as it had all through 2014.<sup>124</sup> In September 2015 SODIAM's General Director told the Panel that the company will ban purchases from the entire east, including Sam Ouandja.<sup>125</sup> He argued that SODIAM's ongoing purchases from Sam-Ouandja were not commercially interesting but rather served to preserve some legitimate trade in the area. A written response to the Panels request for information about SODIAM's purchasing policy states that the company does not have any information about suppliers from the east being racketed by armed groups.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Accessed on 23 October 2015 at <http://sodiam.cf/sodiam-c-a-r-company-principles-and-procedures>.

<sup>123</sup> See page 3 at <http://sodiam.cf/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/sodiam.pdf>, accessed on 18 October 2015.

<sup>124</sup> SODIAM purchased 1187 carats from Sam Ouandja in the first half of 2014. These purchases did not appear in the list of payslips for the first half of 2014 provided to the panel by the Division of Mines at the time of writing its 2014 final report and were therefore not included in the report.

<sup>125</sup> Meeting with SODIAM's General director, Bangui, 22 September 2015.

<sup>126</sup> Written response by SODIAM's legal representative to a Panel's information request, received on 22 October 2015 in **annex 3.12.1**.

*BADICA*

3. BADICA's ethical code of January 2015 specifies regular chain of custody procedures, and reiterates principles of self-regulation defined by the World Diamond Council (WDC) to exclude the purchase of conflict diamonds.<sup>127</sup> The ethical code does not repeat the central clause in WDC's guiding document that spells out that diamonds should be purchased, *inter alia*, in compliance with the sanctions regime. It makes no further reference to Security Council sanctions. A company memo on the company's initial steps to implement due diligence, dated 22 October, shared with the Panel, does refer to the OECD due diligence framework, and the Panel's recommendation in its final report of 2014 to the diamond industry to apply due diligence in order to mitigate the risk of armed group financing.<sup>128</sup>
4. OECD's due diligence framework recommends to suspend engagement with upstream suppliers where a reasonable risk is identified that they are sourcing from, or linked to, any party providing direct or indirect support to non-state armed groups, e.g. through their illegal control, taxation and extortion at mine sites and of intermediaries.<sup>129</sup>
5. Notwithstanding periodic illegal takeover by the FPRC of mining services in Bria and Sam-Ouandja, BADICA has at no point in time suspended diamond purchases from these locations. Its management, during a meeting in January 2015, admitted to the Panel that it was aware of payment of fees to former Séléka forces by its suppliers in

<sup>127</sup> Accessed on 20 October 2015 at <https://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/System%20of%20Warranties%20WDC%202014.pdf>.

<sup>128</sup> 'Démarches entreprises par BADICA pour se conformer aux standards contenus dans le Guide OCDE sur le devoir de diligence pour des chaînes d'approvisionnement responsables en minerais provenant de zones de conflit ou à haut risque et aux normes de l'Initiative pour la transparence des industries extractives', 22 October 2015, archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB. The OECD due diligence framework has been developed in tandem and is compatible with due diligence guidelines formulated by the Group of Experts concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2010, which is mandated to monitor a UN sanctions regime based on similar criteria as this Panel, including as it relates to support to armed groups through illicit trade of natural resources. See [http://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/due\\_diligence\\_guidelines.pdf](http://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/due_diligence_guidelines.pdf).

<sup>129</sup> See pages 21 and 22 at <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf>, accessed on 10 October 2015.

Bria.<sup>130</sup> Indeed, one of BADICA's supplying collectors in 2014 told the Panel that he was forced to make regular financial contributions to former Séléka, like all collectors in Bria.<sup>131</sup> A non-licensed collector from Ndélé, closely associated with FPRC<sup>132</sup>, told the Panel that he sold diamonds to BADICA in Bria up until the company was sanctioned in August 2015.<sup>133</sup> BADICA management argued that the Panel's attention on BADICA in its 2014 final report was disproportionate considering the limited purchases from collectors and, therefore, small amount of indirect financial support to armed groups.<sup>134</sup> BADICA's management also argued that the Panel's focus on the company was selective; claiming that former Séléka in Bria equally derives financial benefits from other sectors.

6. Contrary to statements made in January 2015, in a response to the Panel's request for information about BADICA's purchasing policies, dated 23 October, BADICA's legal representative stated that BADICA does not know about and cannot be held responsible for the behavior of collectors and artisanal miners, since, by the Central African mining code, they are independent operators.<sup>135</sup> The latter statement does not bode with OECD due diligence which asks companies to take responsibility for the behavior of their upstream suppliers, not reject it.

<sup>130</sup> Meeting with BADICA's legal representative and BADICA's deputy director general and buyer, Bangui, 23 January. In a letter dated 10 December 2015, BADICA's legal representative denied that his clients admitted to be aware of any such "protection rackets", archived at the United Nations.

<sup>131</sup> Meeting with one of BADICA's supplying collectors in Bria, Bangui, 24 August 2015.

<sup>132</sup> Confidential military report, 7 March 2015.

<sup>133</sup> Meeting with diamond collector, Ndélé, 24 September 2015; confirmed during a telephone conversation with a diamond collector, 6 November 2015; see chapter IV for additional information about FPRC control over diamonds in the Ndélé area.

<sup>134</sup> Meeting with the BADICA's Deputy Director General and Financial Manager, and BADICA's legal representative, Bangui, 23 January 2015.

<sup>135</sup> The letter from BADICA's legal representative in response to a Panel's information request, received on 23 October 2015 is in **annex 3.12.2**. The letter, *inter alia*, alleges that the Panel in April 2015 visited the office of the *Bureau d'Évaluation et de Contrôle de Diamant et d'Or* (BECDOR) in Bangui with an NGO representative, and implies the Panel shared trade data obtained. BADICA's legal representative on 27 April 2015 forwarded to the Panel a *compte rendu*, dated 20 April 2015, of the alleged joint meeting – drafted by BECDOR's chief of statistics and addressed to the director General of the division of Mines – as proof, see **annex 3.12.3**. The NGO in question addressed a letter, dated 17 June 2015 to the Director General of the Division of Mines to clarify that its' researcher visited BECDOR in February 2015, not in April, as stated in the *compte rendu*, and received a letter in return, dated 30 June 2015, from the Director General that he was not aware of any such *compte rendu*, see **annex 3.12.4**. In a letter to the Panel dated 20 August 2015, the director of cabinet of the Ministry of Mines and Geology corrected and apologised for the wrong information contained in the *compte-rendu*, see **annex 3.12.5**. As it has done repeatedly prior to the letter of 23 October 2015, the Panel reiterates it never visited BECDOR or shared trade data with the NGO in question.

7. BADICA's legal representative drafted a counter report, dated 11 March 2015, to the Panel's 2014 final report. The counter report was addressed to the President and Members of the Security Council and was forwarded to the Committee. The counter report was also published online without annexes on 8 September 2015 on a website.<sup>136</sup>

*Sud-Azur*

8. Sud-Azur has not published any guiding document regarding its purchasing policies. A related letter, dated 22 October 2015, sent by the company's General Director to the Panel states that the company has received alarming complaints from collectors and artisanal miners in the east about former Séléka elements imposing security payments of FCFA 150,000 (USD 300) to FCFA 250,000 (USD 500), despite having already paid for their licenses in Bangui.<sup>137</sup> The company intends to reorient its activities to pacified zones, once considered Kimberley Process compliant.

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<sup>136</sup> Accessed at [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Diamants-de-sang-en-RCA-Le-contre-rapport-de-BADICA-au-comite-de-sanctions-de-l-ONU\\_a22801.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Diamants-de-sang-en-RCA-Le-contre-rapport-de-BADICA-au-comite-de-sanctions-de-l-ONU_a22801.html) on 29 November 2015.

<sup>137</sup> Written response by the General Director of *Sud Azur* to the Panel's request for information, received on 22 October 2015 in **annex 3.12.6**.

**Annex 3.12.1:** Letter from SODIAM's legal representative to the Panel, received on 22 October 2015



Marc De Block  
Dominique Claes\*  
Sise Renders  
Advocaten

Antwerp, 22 October 2015

UN  
[REDACTED]

E-MAIL: [REDACTED]

UN  
Mr. David BIGGS

E-MAIL: [REDACTED]

UN  
[REDACTED]

E-MAIL: [REDACTED]

Concerns: ARSLANIAN FRERES / UN  
Y.ref.: S/AC55/2015/PE/JO.C.073  
O. Ref: 2015/0559

Dear Members of the Panel of Experts,

I am Attorney at Law in Belgium, together with Mr. Cameron Doley of the Law Office of CARTER-RUCK, London, United Kingdom, representing Mr. Viken Arslanian as well as SODIAM CAR.

My clients took note of your letter dated 16 October 2015, noted on the 19<sup>th</sup> of October 2015, giving them time to reply to you before 23 October 2015.

Law Office De Block Advocaten burgerlijke vennootschap o.v.a. z.v. z. ■ BE 0828 631 111 ■ Bourlastraat 3 ■ B-2000 Antwerpen ■  
\*ingeschreven bij de balie te Antwerpen en de balie te Mechelen - Bijkantoor : Molenaarsstraat 142 ■ B-2120 Helst-Op-den-Berg ■  
T. +31 (0)3 206 21 55 ■ F. +31 (0)3 206 22 50 ■ info@deblocklaw.com ■ www.deblocklaw.com ■



My clients can reply to your questions in time, namely as follows:

1. Information about security payments or other fees transferred by Sodiam to former Seleka forces, whether or not as part of USAF, in Bria, Sam Ouandja or Ndélé, if any; **The answer to this question is no, my clients do not have any such information for the simple reason they never transferred any security payments or other fees to former Seleka forces, whether or not as part of USAF, in Bria, Sam Ouandja or Ndélé.**
2. Sodiam's management's awareness of taxation and security payments being paid to former Seleka by collectors and artisanal miners supplying diamonds to Sodiam; **The answer to this question is equally no, my clients do not have any information and/or awareness of taxation and/or security payments being paid to former Seleka by collectors and artisanal miners supplying diamonds to Sodiam.**
3. Information about Sodiam's purchases from above mentioned locations or sites in the west of the Central African Republic, if any; **All purchases in CAR are recorded in the company invoices which were audited by a third party, Martello Risk, showing strict adherence to the red and green zone division whereby the purchasing policy is outlined in the company procedures document, based squarely on KP and UN directives and both were published on the website of the company.**
4. and Sodiam's purchasing policies in view of Security Council resolutions 2196 (2015), as well as in view of the Kimberly Process vigilance notice of 18 April 2013 concerning diamond producing areas around Sam Ouandja, Bria and Bamingui. **As already stated under question 3, the company procedures document, based squarely on KP and UN directives is published on the website of the company. This info is attached for your convenience but is also publicly available on the website <http://sodiam.cf>.**

Sodiam C.A.R. has worked closely with the Government of the CAR since the Kimberley Process was suspended. It has conducted itself at all times in accordance with the Kimberley Process and has stocked its purchases securely, as demonstrated to the joint KP/ and UN- Experts visit that took place in October 2014 and then again to the KP Review Mission in April/May 2015. On specific request of the C.A.R. Government SODIAM CAR made samples available to the Kimberley Process to enable the latter to develop a geochemical fingerprint for the CAR.

SODIAM CAR also arranged for an independent audit of the stock it purchased during the period of the suspension to be carried out by Martello Risk (a company owned by Alexander Yearsley, formerly Head of Special Projects at the prominent ngo Global Witness). This audit, which demonstrated the provenance of all purchases made by Sodiam C.A.R. during the period in question and established that the company had always made traceable and lawful purchases, was and is in the public domain (it appears on Sodiam C.A.R.'s website at <http://sodiam.cf>) and was drawn specifically to Amnesty's attention before Amnesty published its report. Sodiam C.A.R. is content for a further counter-audit to be conducted in order to demonstrate the validity of this first audit.

Law Office De Block Advocaten burgerlijke vennootschap o.v.v. BVBA ■ BE 6128 631 11 ■ Bourlastraat 3 ■ B-2000 Antwerpen ■  
 \*ingeschreven bij de balie te Antwerpen en de balie te Mechelen - Bijkantoor: Molenstraat 142 ■ B-2220 Heist-op-den-Berg ■

T. +32 (0)3 206 22 55 ■ F. +32 (0)3 206 22 56 ■ [info@deblocklaw.com](mailto:info@deblocklaw.com) ■ [www.deblocklaw.com](http://www.deblocklaw.com) ■



My clients hereby request to be enabled to exercise their right to answer and to receive the courtesy to be heard in person by the Panel of Experts. My clients hereby express their willingness to come to New York for a meeting in person and are available to travel as of October 30, 2015.

We await your soonest answer including your availability to meet with clients.

Yours sincerely,

Marc De Block

Attachments:

1. SODIAM C.A.R. COMPANY PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
2. MARTELLO RISK INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY FORENSIC AUDIT AND VERIFICATION

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T. +32 (0)3 206 22 55 ■ F. +32 (0)3 206 22 50 ■ info@deblocklaw.com ■ www.deblocklaw.com ■

**Annex 3.12.2:** Letter from BADICA's legal representative to the Panel, received on 23 October 2015



Monsieur Aurélien Llorca  
 Coordonnateur des experts pour la RCA

C/O Le Secrétaire du Comité du Conseil de Sécurité  
 Établi par la Résolution 2127 (2013) relative à la RCA  
 Monsieur David Biggs  
 United Nations Plaza  
 DC2-2042, New York, NY 10017

Bruxelles, le 23 octobre 2015

**PAR COURRIER ET E-MAIL : biggs@un.org**

Cher Monsieur Llorca,

**Concerne: Résolution des Nations Unies 2196 (2015)  
 Ma cliente Badica**

Comme vous le savez, nous agissons comme avocats des sociétés Badica et Kardiam.

Notre cliente accuse réception de votre lettre du 16 octobre 2015. Elle nous a communiqué les réponses à vos questions et nous a demandé de vous les transmettre.

Cependant, avant répondre à vos questions, nous souhaiterions formuler quelques remarques préalables.

Votre lettre du 16 octobre 2015 est surprenante à plus d'un titre :

1° Elle est envoyée un vendredi à 21h, heure de Bangui, à Badica, demandant des réponses à des questions importantes pour le vendredi 23 octobre 2015, soit dans les cinq jours ouvrables.

Or, vous n'ignorez pas que Badica est représentée dans ce dossier de sanctions par des avocats, qui doivent pouvoir être contactés et exercer le droit à la défense de Badica dans des conditions normales. L'envoi direct à Badica, dans une langue qui n'est pas la sienne, et le délai de cinq jours ouvrables ne sont conformes ni aux usages, ni au respect qui est dû à l'exercice du droit à la défense.

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Votre empressement est d'autant plus étonnant que pendant plus de dix mois, depuis votre rencontre du 23 janvier 2015 avec Me Luff, vous n'avez pas donné signe de vie, alors que la société Badica vous a signifié, ainsi qu'au Comité 2127, sa volonté de coopérer à votre enquête et a transmis un contre rapport circonstancié au Comité 2127. Le moins que vous auriez dû faire était de communiquer vos pièces et de procéder aux vérifications qui s'imposaient suite à la remise du contre rapport de Badica.

2° Au lieu d'enquêter de bonne foi directement auprès des responsables de la société Badica, vous les avez ignorés. Les éléments de notre dossier, décrits dans le contre-rapport de Badica, montrent que vous avez écouté des rumeurs au sujet de Badica, colportées par des personnes dont le nom reste inconnu et dont on a tout lieu de penser qu'elles ne sont pas des observateurs objectifs et neutres du marché du diamant en RCA. Pire, votre équipe a mené une soi-disant enquête en compagnie de personnes tierces, qui se sont présentées à des autorités officielles comme membres d'ONG, mais dont l'identité véritable reste encore inconnue. A ce titre, nous souhaitons que vous confirmiez l'identité de la personne qui a accompagné votre collègue expert M. De Koning au bureau du BECDOR en avril 2015 et qui s'est présentée sous l'identité de M. Kasper Agger de l'ONG Enough.

3° Votre lettre du 16 octobre 2015, la première depuis le renouvellement de votre mandat en vertu de la Résolution 2196 (2015), est envoyée à notre cliente après que les sanctions soient prises et après que Badica, par notre intermédiaire, ait attiré l'attention des membres du Comité 2127, ainsi que des gouvernements centrafricains et belge, au sujet des défaillances graves de votre enquête. Nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de penser que votre lettre est la conséquence maladroite de ces démarches. Il eut été plus judicieux, normal et professionnel d'effectuer des démarches d'enquête auprès de Badica peu après la remise du contre rapport, avant la prise des sanctions. C'est donc la crédibilité de votre initiative à ce stade, outre celle de l'ensemble de votre enquête relative à notre cliente, qui peut ainsi être mise en doute.

4° Toutes vos investigations au sujet de notre cliente ont porté uniquement sur des éléments à charge – vos questions dans votre lettre du 16 octobre en sont encore le reflet. Elles ont ignoré les contributions positives de Badica à l'économie et au trésor centrafricains, à la cohésion sociale et à la formation professionnelle et éthique des collecteurs, décrites dans le contre-rapport de notre cliente. Votre mandat du Conseil de sécurité vous demande pourtant de rapporter aux membres du Comité 2127 l'ensemble des renseignements pertinents relatifs aux personnes sanctionnées.

5° Notre cliente réserve ses droits par rapport aux défaillances fautive de l'enquête qui a été menée par le Groupe des experts à son encontre et qui a contribué à l'imposition de sanctions très dommageables pour notre cliente.

Venons-en à la substance de votre lettre et à vos questions.

Rue de Stassart 131; B-1050 Brussels, Belgium  
Phone (+32-2) 644.40.79; Fax (+32-2) 640.68.94  
David Luff Avocat sprl VAT BE 0836.996.073 – [www.appletonluff.com](http://www.appletonluff.com)

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Votre lettre, au même titre que votre rapport initial du 28 octobre 2014, contient des affirmations graves qui ne sont étayées par aucun élément de preuve qui soit communiqué à Badica et que celle-ci pourrait commenter. Cela concerne en particulier les affirmations suivantes, que vous formulez, « d'après les informations reçues par le Panel » :

- Les forces de l'ex Séléka ont, [dans les zones de Bria, Sam Ouandja et Ndélé dans l'est de la RCA] obtenu paiement de taxes et de services de sécurité de la part d'agents de bureaux d'achat, collecteurs et artisans miniers.
- Les forces de l'ex Séléka ont, [dans les mêmes zones], régulièrement infiltré ou absorbé de manière permanente les unités anti-fraude spéciales locales [USAF].
- Il existe une implication armée anti-balaka dans les mines de diamant dans l'Ouest de la RCA, plus spécifiquement dans la sous-préfecture de Amada Gaza, Salo (sous-préfecture de Nola), le site de Balu (sous-préfecture de Sosso-Nakombo) et à Sassélé (sous-préfecture de Gadzi).

Comme indiqué ci-dessous, Badica n'a offert aucun paiement direct ou indirect aux forces de l'ex-Séléka dans les zones concernées et ne dispose d'aucune information quant aux pratiques dénoncées (à part le paiement de taxes d'aéroport comprises entre 75 et 100 dollars US par atterrissage dans les zones concernées). Quant aux autres affirmations, celles-ci ne visant pas Badica, ou les zones dans lesquelles Badica est active, il n'y a pas lieu de les commenter. Nous supposons qu'en ce qui concerne les accusations graves faites aux services de l'USAF, vous avez communiqué les éléments de preuve en votre possession aux autorités officielles de la République centrafricaine afin que celles-ci puissent faire diligenter une enquête pour leur propre compte et dénoncer les fonctionnaires impliqués. En ce qui nous concerne, nous avons pris connaissance d'un démenti écrit formel de la part du commandant de la direction de l'Unité spéciale anti-fraude du Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie. Ce démenti est joint à la présente (**annexe 1**).

Vous trouverez ci-dessous les réponses à chacune des quatre questions posées dans votre lettre, au nom de Badica, sur base des informations que notre cliente nous a fournies. Nous tenons cependant à préciser par avance que le principe général et universel des droits à la défense interdit aux autorités d'enquête de demander aux personnes accusées d'apporter des preuves négatives d'actes qu'elle n'ont pas commis.

1\*) BADICA ne bénéficie d'aucun service de sécurité dans les zones de Bria, Sam Ouandja et Ndélé. Donc la société BADICA ne paye personne, ni les éléments de l'ex-Séléka ni de l'USAF. Les seuls versements qui ont été effectués aux autorités qui contrôlent les aéroports de Bria et de Sam-Ouandja sont des taxes d'atterrissage par la société Minair, distincte de Badica, à concurrence de 75 dollars des Etats-Unis à Bria et 100 dollars des Etats-Unis à Sam-Ouandja. Ces sommes sont peu importantes, mais indispensables pour arriver dans ces régions. Ces taxes ont été payées par toutes les entreprises qui ont affrété des vols dans ces régions, quel que soit leur secteur d'activité. Elles n'ont cependant plus été payées dès la deuxième moitié de 2014. En vertu des principes de proportionnalité et de non-discrimination, la petitesse des sommes concernées ne peut justifier

Rue de Stassart 131; B-1050 Brussels, Belgium  
Phone (+32-2) 644.40.79; Fax (+32-2) 640.68.94  
David Luff Avocat sprl VAT BE 0838.996.073 – [www.appletonluff.com](http://www.appletonluff.com)

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l'adoption de sanctions graves réservées à notre cliente, et à elle seule uniquement, alors que tous les opérateurs économiques des régions concernées ont été soumis à la même obligation.

La réponse ci-dessus ne concerne pas les services de gardiennage des services réguliers de l'armée dont ont bénéficié les locaux de Badica à Bangui entre le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 2010 et le 5 octobre 2013, en vertu d'un Protocole d'Accord conclu entre Badica et le Ministère de la Défense le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 2010. Ce Protocole d'accord est disponible à votre première demande. Badica n'a eu recours qu'à des services officiels de l'armée régulière, mandatée par les autorités formelles du pays, à l'exclusion de tout autre service.

2\*) BADICA ne paye aucune taxe ou autre imposition aux anciennes forces de Séléka. Comme vous le savez, les collecteurs et artisans miniers qui opèrent dans le secteur formel sont, en vertu du Code minier centrafricain, des personnes physiques indépendantes. Par conséquent, Badica ignore leur comportement comme personnes physiques et ne peut être tenue pour responsable de ce dernier. Par ailleurs Badica, en tant que bureau d'achat, traite uniquement avec des fournisseurs de confiance établis depuis plusieurs années, parfois de père en fils. Dès la suspension de la RCA au Processus de Kimberley, Badica a prié ses fournisseurs de doubler de vigilance dans l'exercice de leur métier. Il est important de rappeler que Badica a élaboré un Code éthique, qui vous a été remis en mains propres le 23 janvier 2015 et que vous semblez ignorer. Ce Code éthique contient des exigences élevées en matière de réduction des risques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement et reflète les normes de prudence et de transparence les plus rigoureuses dans le secteur du diamant. Il énonce spécifiquement en son article II.3 les règles suivantes que Badica impose à l'ensemble de ses collaborateurs :

- ne commercer qu'avec des entreprises faisant figurer la déclaration de garantie sur leurs factures;
- ne pas acheter de diamants auprès de sources suspectes ou de fournisseurs inconnus;
- ne pas acheter de diamants auprès d'une source quelconque qui, à l'issue d'une procédure en bonne et due forme et juridiquement contraignante, s'avère avoir enfreint les réglementations gouvernementales limitant le commerce des diamants de la guerre;
- ne pas acheter de diamants dans, ou provenant d'une quelconque région à propos de laquelle une instance gouvernementale a lancé un avertissement selon lequel des diamants de la guerre émanent de cette région ou y sont disponibles à la vente, à moins que les diamants ont été exportés de cette région dans le respect du Système de Certification du Processus de Kimberley;
- ne pas acheter ou vendre sciemment, ou aider à acheter ou à vendre des diamants de la guerre ;
- s'assurer que tout le personnel de l'entreprise qui achète ou vend des diamants est pleinement informé des résolutions commerciales et des réglementations gouvernementales limitant le commerce des diamants de la guerre.

Rue de Stassart 131; B-1050 Brussels, Belgium  
 Phone (+32-2) 644.40.79; Fax (+32-2) 640.68.94  
 David Luff Avocat sprl VAT BE 0836.996.073 – [www.appletonluff.com](http://www.appletonluff.com)

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Ainsi, en ce qui la concerne, Badica met en œuvre de bonne foi tous les moyens qui sont à sa disposition pour s'assurer que sa chaîne d'approvisionnement des diamants soit saine.

3\*) Comme longuement expliqué dans le contre-rapport de Badica précité, toutes les informations concernant les achats limités de BADICA et les stocks correspondants sont disponibles au BECDOR, à la direction générale des mines avec les bordereaux y afférents, lesquels révèlent les noms des fournisseurs, qui sont bien connus de Badica. Celle-ci a continué de travailler avec ses fournisseurs historiques dans le but de récupérer les avances de fonds qui leur avaient été octroyées avant la suspension du processus de Kimberley.

Nous relevons que les stocks de Badica et des autres bureaux d'achat, répertoriés en avril 2015, qui sont des données en principe confidentielles, sont à présent publiés suite à un rapport de l'ONG Enough, rédigé par Monsieur Kasper Agger, qui est de toute évidence la personne qui s'est présentée avec M. De Koning au bureau du BECDOR en avril 2015. Comme nous l'avons relevé dans des courriers officiels au Secrétaire du Comité 2127, ceci constitue une violation grave des devoirs éthiques et de prudence des experts des Nations Unies et ma cliente réserve ses droits par rapport à cette faute.

Un examen attentif des bordereaux d'achats de notre cliente montre que ses achats sont restés stables en 2015 par rapport à 2014, mais que, comme indiqué dans le contre-rapport, ils ont fortement décliné depuis 2013 et les années antérieures. Comme dans la deuxième moitié de 2013 et en 2014, il y a une concordance totale entre les relevés des achats et l'accroissement des stocks détenus par Badica en 2015.

Il est important de souligner que les bureaux secondaires de Badica à Berberati, Nola, Carnot et Boda ne sont plus fonctionnels depuis près de 2 ans. Ceux de Berberati et Nola ont été pillés et saccagés.

BADICA ne dispose d'aucun agent acheteur dans toute la zone Ouest de la République Centrafricaine et ce, depuis le mois de janvier 2014. En revanche, pour la première fois depuis la suspension du processus de Kimberley, Badica a procédé à des achats de pierres provenant de l'Ouest du pays, en particulier Boda, Nola et Yaloké en juillet et août 2015, dans le but de bénéficier de la levée partielle de la suspension du processus de Kimberley pour les diamants originaires de l'ouest du pays. Ces achats, effectués par le bureau de Bangui, concernent un poids total de moins de 300 carats.

4\*) Badica exerce la plus grande prudence et vigilance dans ses achats de diamants, conformément aux instructions données à ses collaborateurs et à son Code éthique (v. point 3\* ci-dessus). Ses fournisseurs sont des fournisseurs historiques, souvent depuis plusieurs générations, qui étaient en place bien avant l'émergence des groupes armés. Depuis la reprise partielle du processus de Kimberley, Badica a souhaité reprendre ses activités dans l'Ouest du pays. Elle a complété son Code éthique par un addendum pour s'assurer la traçabilité totale des diamants qu'elle aurait exportés. Une copie du Code éthique complété est jointe en annexe à la présente (**annexe 2**). Cependant, les sanctions de l'ONU sont tombées avant que Badica ait pu effectuer la moindre vente de diamants.

Rue de Stassart 131; B-1050 Brussels, Belgium  
 Phone (+32-2) 644.40.79; Fax (+32-2) 640.68.84  
 David Luff Avocat sprl VAT BE 0836.996.073 – [www.appletonluff.com](http://www.appletonluff.com)

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Badica compte à présent prendre des mesures complémentaires pour se conformer aux standards internationaux de traçabilité (v. ci-dessous).

Il résulte de ce qui précède que toute accusation générale que les experts des Nations Unies ont pu récolter auprès de dénonciateurs et de sources non-vérfiées sur ce qui semble se passer dans des zones contrôlées par des groupes armés ne s'appliquent pas à Badica. Il serait contraire aux principes les plus élémentaires des droits fondamentaux de développer une présomption de culpabilité à charge de Badica sur base de ces informations aussi peu étayées que non-spécifiques.

En revanche, votre rapport du 28 octobre 2014, votre enquête et vos affirmations sont clairement entachés de vices de procédure et de fond ainsi que d'erreurs manifestes d'appréciation des faits qui nuisent à la crédibilité de l'entièreté de votre travail sur le diamant et pèsent sur votre démarche actuelle.

C'est la raison pour laquelle, sans plus attendre, notre cliente nous a donné pour instruction d'utiliser les voies de recours à sa disposition pour obtenir la mainlevée totale des sanctions et leur annulation devant les instances internationales compétentes, sans préjudice d'autres actions possibles pour obtenir réparation des dommages subis.

Nous tenons à rappeler que Badica est la seule société détenue par des capitaux centrafricains qui opère depuis plus de trente ans dans le secteur formel du diamant et ce de manière efficace et concurrentielle. La rébellion Séléka a, comme tout opérateur économique pouvait s'y attendre, fortement endommagé tout commerce formel en RCA, réduisant ainsi à court terme toute perspective de développement économique durable dans le pays. Badica n'a de toute évidence aucun intérêt à soutenir une telle rébellion, encore moins des agissements qui exacerbent les conflits et compromettent le retour de la paix en République centrafricaine.

Badica est déterminée à présent, au-delà du Code éthique, à contribuer à assainir et à réglementer, en coopération avec toute autorité compétente, le secteur du diamant en RCA, conformément aux standards internationaux. Les sanctions imposées à l'encontre de Badica sont de toute évidence contraires à cet objectif. Nous joignons à la présente un document qui expose dans le détail les démarches déjà entreprises par Badica pour se conformer aux standards contenus dans le Guide OCDE sur le devoir de diligence pour des chaînes d'approvisionnement responsables en minerais provenant de zones de conflit ou à haut risque et aux normes de l'ITIE (Initiative pour la transparence des industries extractives) (**Annexe 3**).

L'assainissement du secteur du diamant, comme les autres secteurs clés de la République centrafricaine, requiert une approche participative multi-acteur, impliquant l'Etat, la société civile, les groupements professionnels, les organismes de régulation nationaux et internationaux, ainsi que les opérateurs centraux et périphériques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement des diamants. Badica souhaite, dans la limite de ses moyens humains et financiers, contribuer activement aux travaux qui seront engagés dans ce contexte.

Cette lettre est officiellement envoyée en copie à la Présidente du Comité 2127 et aux Représentantes permanentes de la Belgique et de la RCA auprès des Nations Unies. Nous nous

Rue de Stassart 131; B-1050 Brussels, Belgium  
Phone (+32-2) 644.40.79; Fax (+32-2) 640.68.94  
David Luff Avocat sprl VAT BE 0838.996.073 – [www.appletonluff.com](http://www.appletonluff.com)


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réserve la possibilité de la communiquer pour information aux autres membres du Comité des sanctions des Nations Unies.

Nous vous prions de croire, cher Monsieur Llorca, en l'expression de nos sentiments distingués.



P.P.

David Luff,  
Avocat au Barreau de Bruxelles

Lucette Defalque  
Avocat au Barreau de Bruxelles

**Annexes :**


1. Lettre du commandant de la direction de l'Unité spéciale anti-fraude du Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie, du 20 octobre 2015
2. Code éthique complété de Badica et accusés de réception du ministère des mines et du syndicat des collecteurs
3. Document interne exposant les démarches entreprises par Badica pour se conformer aux standards contenus dans le Guide OCDE sur le devoir de diligence pour des chaînes d'approvisionnement responsables en minerais provenant de zones de conflit ou à haut risque et aux normes de l'ITIE (Initiative pour la transparence des industries extractives)

**Cc : (par e-mail)**


- Her Excellency, Ms. Raimonda Murmokaitė, Chair, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic
- Son Excellence, Madame Ambroisine Kpongo, Représentante permanente de la République centrafricaine auprès des Nations Unies, New York
- Son Excellence, Madame Bénédicte Frankinet, Représentante permanente de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies, New York

Rue de Stassart 131; B-1050 Brussels, Belgium  
Phone (+32-2) 644.40.79; Fax (+32-2) 640.68.94  
David Luff Avocat sprl VAT BE 0836.996.073 – [www.appletonluff.com](http://www.appletonluff.com)  
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**Annex 3.12.3:** Erroneous *compte-rendu* claiming a joint visit by the Panel and Enough Project researcher to BECDOR in April 2015 (confidential information blacked out)



A leur demande, nous les avons confiés aux collaborateurs de notre Service pour les conduire auprès du Service du Fichier Minier en vue de vérifier si les collecteurs inscrits sur une liste en leur possession travaillent pour le compte de la société BADICA.



Haute considération.

Fait à Bangui, le 20 avril 2015

**LE CHIEF DE SERVICE DES STATISTIQUES**  
  
**YANGUERE FRANCK**

**Annex 3.12.4:** Letter of clarification by the Enough project regarding the alleged joint visit of one of its researchers with the Panel to BECDOR in April 2015, and the response letter it received from the Director General of the Division of Mines



Bureau d'Evaluation et de Contrôle de Diamants et Or (BECDOR)  
Bangui, République centrafricaine

17 juin 2015

À qui de droit :

Il a été porté à la connaissance de Enough Project d'un "compte rendu" établi à Bangui en date du 20 avril 2015 par le Bureau d'Evaluation et de Contrôle de Diamants et Or (BECDOR) en sigle. Ce compte-rendu atteste d'une visite, en avril, de l'expert des Nations Unies Ruben de Koning accompagné de Kasper Agger, Chercheur pour Enough Project. Nous aimerions, au nom de notre organisation, éclairer votre lanterne en précisant que contrairement à l'affirmation de ce "compte-rendu", Kasper Agger était à Bangui en février 2015 et a eu, à l'occasion, une réunion avec BECDOR. Kasper Agger n'a pas été à Bangui en avril et par conséquent, il n'a pas accompagné Ruben de Koning.

Enough Project reste ouverte à tout éclaircissement supplémentaire sur la question et souhaite poursuivre des relations de travail fructueuses et positives avec des entreprises privées, des représentants de la société civile et du gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine.

Cordialement,

Sasha Lezhnev  
Associate Director of Policy

CC:  
Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie  
Director de Cabinet  
Directeur Général des Mines et de la Géologie  
Directeur des données, de la régulation et du suivi de la commercialisation  
The U.N. Panel of Experts on CAR

24/06/15  
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MINISTERE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

\*\*\*\*  
DIRECTION DE CABINET  
\*\*\*\*

DIRECTION GENERALE DES MINES  
ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

DIRECTION DES DONNEES, DE LA REGULATION  
ET DU SUIVI DE LA COMMERCIALISATION

\*\*\*\*  
N° 213 /15/MMG/DIRCAB/DGMG/DDRSC.-

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité – Dignité – Travail  
\*\*\*\*

BANGUI, LE 30 JUIN 2015

LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL DES MINES  
ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

A

MONSIEUR SASHA LEZHNEV

**Objet :** Réponse à votre lettre  
du 17 juin 2015

Monsieur,

Nous accusons réception de votre correspondance en date du 17 juin 2015 et vous en remercions.

Pour nous permettre de faire la lumière sur ce compte rendu dont vous faites mention, nous souhaiterions avoir une copie de ce document par version électronique afin d'identifier les participants à cette réunion de travail.

Par ailleurs nous tenons à vous signaler que nous ignorons l'existence d'un tel compte rendu.


En attendant cette clarification, nous nous excusons du désagrément causé à votre structure.

Cordialement.

  
Sylvain Masius N'GBATOUKA

**Ampliation :**  
-MMG-----ATCR  
-DIRCAB-----1  
-CHRONO-----1

**Annex 3.12.5:** Letter from the Ministry of Mines and Geology to the Panel correcting information contained in an erroneous *compte-rendu*, received on 24 August 2015



**Annex 3.12.6:** Letter from the General Director of Sud Azur to the Panel, received on 22 October 2015



Le BUREAU D'ACHAT SUD AZUR est une société qui venait à peine de commencer ses activités, quelques mois après que les EX-SELEKA ont pris le pouvoir en CENTRAFRIQUE.

Le changement de régime a ralenti et voir même stopper nos projets d'installation de nos centres secondaires a l'EST et à L'OUEST. Sauf le centre secondaire de BERBERATI à l'OUEST qui d'ailleurs a été pilé pendant les événements.

- 1- N'ayant pas de bureau en provinces, le contact avec les éléments d'EX-SELEKA est impossible.

Toutes fois, les informations et les plaintes que nous recevons des collecteurs et coopératives des artisans miniers dans l'EST, sont alarmants du fait que des éléments d'EX-SELEKA, imposaient des montants qui varient de 150.000 à 250.000 F.CFA pour tous les opérateurs afin de garantir la sécurité de ces derniers pendant leurs circulations dans des chantiers miniers, surtout des collecteurs, malgré les patentes officiellement payés à BANGUI.

Faire la différence entre les éléments de l'EX-SELEKA et USAF, nous sera impossible pour la simple et bonne raison que nous ne disposons pas de bureau dans ces zones cités.

- 2- La direction de SUD AZUR se trouve à BANGUI donc nous ne sommes pas en contact avec les éléments de l'EX-SELEKA se trouvant dans les zones minières.
- 3- Nos achats se font à partir de BANGUI seulement auprès des collecteurs ou artisans miniers reconnu par le service de mine qui viennent de L'EST ou de L'OUEST.
- 4- La SOCIETE SUD AZUR va reprendre sa politique d'appui aux collecteurs et artisans miniers déjà identifiés par le département des mines et dans des zones pacifiées et approuvées par l'équipe de la mission de revue du Processus de Kimberly (P.K), ceci à la reprise des activités.



1

La déclaration de vigilance est devenue monnaie courante dans chaque réunion du comité de suivie, mis en place par le MINISTERE des MINES, dont la société SUD AZUR en fait partie.



Annex 4: Northern region – border with Chad

Map



**Annex 4.1:** Documents sent by RJ Commander Raymond Bélanga to MINUSCA in Paoua on 10 June 2015

*Composition and structure of RJ in Paoua.*

Site Regroupement RJ  
 sous-préfector Marbouna

- Bodjomo
- Béle
- Maïtiblaïe.

sous-préfector Boguila. site Boguila

sous-préfector Paoua. Nord

- ~~Bebo~~ Bebo
- Beboura
- Beboy 1

PAOUA SUD

- Lé Hourou
- Talet
- Kotto ~~ne~~

sous-préfector de Ngaoundaïe


- Kossé

sous-préfector Bocarange.

- site Bocarange
- Loura
- ~~Bebo~~ Zoli

TOTALE 16p. 12 Personnes

Belanga Raymond  
 Etat Major RJ



WAFIO ABDEL NOUR 72 79 78 55  
+ SENAPOU ELIE 75 62 91 11  
FETIBAYA MARCELIN 72 62 27 71

GROUPE ALME RIJ

+ BELANGA RAYMOND 72 28 45 36  
+ NIATOH JEAN BERNARD 72 60 42 88/7543  
QUETEL ESTHER 72 79 64 39 7499

PARTICIPANTS AU FORUM DE BANJARI  
DU 4 AU 7 JUIN 2015

Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source in Paoua on 22 June 2015

**Annex 4.2:** Photograph of Armel Sayo in his Minister's office in military uniform, including with the logo of *Révolution et Justice* on his left arm



Source: CAR Ministry of youth website, accessed on 29 October 2015 at <http://minjeunescentrafrique.over-blog.com/2015/10/discours-d-appel-de-paix-et-de-cohesion-a-l-endroit-du-peuple-centrafricain-en-general-et-plus-particulierement-la-jeunesse-de-centr>

**Annex 4.3:** Former APRD and RJ 'Colonel' Laurent Mandjou (left), leader of the *Groupe des Patriotes* (GP) and former RJ 'Général' Elie Sénapu (right)

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Paoua on 22 June 2015*



Annex 4.4: List of combatants of the *Groupe des Patriotes*

ÉTAT-major  
COMPAGNIE  
INDUT (R.C.A.)

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS  
( CIVILS )

N° page : .....

SECTION N° ..... NOM DU CHEF MANDJOU LAURANT PAOUA 3

Nom	Prénom		
YIMBATA	DIEU BENI	KAPITAIN	PEUDE
ZIMYAN	BRIGITE	COMMANANT	COMMANANT
BERO	KANGIAN	KAPITAIN	IBULAKA
NGUENGE	ELIZE	CC	IBULAKA
DEUMSOU	GAMARE MARC	AJDAN	VAMBERG
MAINGADI	PAULIN	LIEUTENANT	KARANDAO
YANERU	VANESSA	KAPITAIN	PEUDE
HERGUERC	BLAISE	KAPITAIN	IBULAKA
KOE	BLANDINE	AJDAN	GOULZ
HOUKREYVA	CHRISTIAN	KAPITAIN	IBULAKA
ZAYNE	ARISTID	KAPITAIN	GOULZ
DEUMANA	GERARD	COMMANANT	IBULAKA
MERAWOIN	JEAN MAKOSTA	KAPITAIN	GOULZ
YANON	FERDINAND	LIEUTENANT	GOULZ
VAMERE	SIMON	AJDAN	ZALEY
HABDULAV	YAYA	LIEUTENANT	PEUDE
VANDOU	LAURENT	COMMANANT	COMMANANT
VASSARANDI	JEAN	LIEUTENANT	DEICE
YAMERE	LAURENT	LIEUTENANT	IBULAKA
KELE	JOACHIN	AJDAN	YOUNG
MICIZARA	GURBIN	LIEUTENANT	PACUA
NGANARAHOLE	PAULIN	KAPITAIN	KARANDAO
VANDOU	MARC	LIEUTENANT	PEUDE
HEUANOU	PALASSE	LIEUTENANT	KOREGUELE
KAMANDI	JULE	LIEUTENANT	PEUDE
HEUANOU	JONAPHER	CAPITAIN	PEUDE
VANDOU	GERARD	AJDAN	SICCIA
CHEREGUEZI	BISSI	SERGEANT CHEF	PEUDE
KEBACHA	MATHURIN	SOUS LIEUTENANT	COMMANANT
VANANIA	ZABRIS	LIEUTENANT	PACUA
NGOUDDU	JEREMIE	AJDAN	IBULAKA
SOULEY	ISSA	LIEUTENANT	PACUA
YAPELE	BOBO	SERGEANT	PEUDE
KAMBA	DIEU DENNE	LIEUTENANT	COMMANANT
VANDOU	BRIGITE	LIEUTENANT	PEUDE
NGOURAHOLE	DELPHINE	SERGEANT CHEF	SICCIA
NABIKOESSE	LYDIBIN	AJDAN	PACUA

Source: Provided to the Panel by Laurent Mandjou on 22 June 2015 in Paoua

**Annex 4.5:** Photograph of meeting in Moyen Sido on 26 May 2015 between the Panel and General Al Khatim and FPRC representatives

*Photograph taken for the Panel by Ali Hafis of the meeting between the Panel (right) and Al Khatim (left), Moussa Maouloud (second from left), Abdoul Bassit Hissène (Al Khatim's personal assistant, third from left) and Colonel Bourma (in the back), and another FPRC representative who did not introduce himself (centre), in Moyen Sido on 26 May 2015*



**Annex 4.6: Al Khatim's parallel administration**

*Photograph of a former Séléka fighter riding on a commercial vehicle taken by the Panel on the road Kabo-Moyen Sido on 25 May 2015*



*Photograph of two former Séléka elements manning the checkpoint at the entrance of Moyen Sido, taken by Panel on 25 May 2015*



*Photograph of a former Séléka acting as Police in Kabo, taken by the Panel on 28 May 2015*



**Annex 4.7: Mbarara herders and their cattle**

*Photographs of a Mbarara herder on a horse and his cattle taken by the Panel on the road from Kabo to Moyen Sido on 26 May 2015*



*Photograph of a Mbarara herder and his daughter taken by the Panel on the road from Kabo to Kaga-Bandoro on 28 May 2015*



**Annex 4.8:** Photographs of armed groups (FPRC, MPC and anti-balaka) political and military leadership taken by the Panel – except the ones of Ali Hafis, Kanton and Baba Issène – during field missions in the Sido-Kabo-Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès-Ndélé areas on 27 May, 1 July, 22 and 23 August, and from 24 September to 5 October 2015

*Maouloud Moussa (left) and Lambert Lissane (right)*



*Photographs taken in Moyen Sido on 27 May (left) and in Ndélé on 4 October 2015 (right)*

*From left to right, photographs of Ali Hafis, Kanton, Baba Issène and Max Narbé*



*Photographs taken in Kaga-Bandoro on 12 July 2015 provided by a confidential source*

*Photographs of Gauthier (left) and Kouazingo (right)*




*Photographs taken by the Panel in Doukouma on 20 August (left) and in Boussa on 21 August 2015 (right)*

*From left to right, photographs of 'Chauffeur', Abdoulaye Oumar and Jean Chérif*



*Photographs taken by the Panel in Mbrès on 22 August 2015 (left and centre) and in Kaga-Bandoro on 23 August 2015 (right)*

*General Al Khatim Mahamat*




**Annex 4.9:** Military exercise of former Séléka elements of FPRC and MPC in Mbrès, 22 August 2015

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Mbrès on 22 August 2015*



**Annex 4.10: Sample of FPRC *ordres de mission* photographed by the Panel during field missions in Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès and Ndélé areas**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès area on 22 and 23 August 2015 (FPRC) and Ndélé area from 24 September to 5 October 2015*



**Annex 4.11: FPRC checkpoints in the Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès and Ndélé areas**

*Checkpoint in Tiri manned by armed elements without military uniforms  
Photograph taken by the Panel on 25 September 2015*



*Checkpoint between Koubou and Djamassinda – axis between Ndélé and Bangbali  
Photograph taken by the Panel on 25 September 2015*



*Checkpoint in Batélé – axis between Ndélé and the Chadian border  
Photograph taken by the Panel on 26 September 2015*



**Annex 4.12: FPRC armed elements in Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès and Ndélé areas**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Azène, between Mbrès and Kaga-Bandoro, on 22 August 2015*



*Photographs taken by the Panel in Bangbali, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 25 September 2015*



*Photographs taken by the Panel in Akkroussoulbak (alias Akroussoulback),  
between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 26 September 2015*



**Annex 4.13:** Movements of armed men observed by the Panel in Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès area on 22 and 23 August 2015 and Ndélé area from 24 September to 5 October 2015

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Azène,  
Kaga-Bandoro and Mbrès area, 22 August 2015*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Tiri, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 25 September 2015*



*Photograph taken by the Panel near Zobossinda, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 26 September 2015*



*Photographs taken by the Panel near Zobossinda, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 26 September 2015*



**Annex 4.14:** Armed elements on motorcycles carrying one AKM assault rifle and one Vector R4 type assault rifle

*Photograph taken by the Panel near Zobossinda, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 26 September 2015*



**Annex 4.15:** FPRC mining brigade receipt issued of payment for an artisanal mining certificate

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Léména on 26 September 2015*

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE      REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
UNITE - DIGNITE -  
PRESIDENCE      TRÉSORERIE GÉNÉRALE  
SERVIR  
QUITTANCE N° 31      N° 0000267

TRESORIER	DATE	RECU DE	DESTINATION DES PRODUITS	N° DE COMPTE DE REFERENCE	MONTANT (EN CHIFFRES)
KAZILASS Rakiss	31	M. NAMA-MAT RAKISS	—	—	15.000 F

CACHET DU TRESORIER      MODE DE PAIEMENT (ESPECE, CHEQUE, AUTRES)  
MONTANT EN LETTRES: *Quinze mille francs*  
*Rakiss*


DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES MINES  
LÉMÉNA

**Annex 4.16:** Taxation of cattle trade by FPRC in Kaga-Bandoro

*The photograph was taken by the Panel in Kaga-Bandoro on 23 August 2015 while Adam Moussa, FPRC adviser to the zone commander, was collecting money from the truck transporting cattle*



Annex 4.17: Laissez-passer for representatives of cattle herders appointed by Al Khatim in Moyen Sido on 10 June 2015.



Source: Document photographed by the Panel while shown by Al Khatim in Moyen Sido on 1 July 2015

**Annex 4.18:** Former Séléka elements with AK-type assault rifles, grenade launcher and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) round and launcher

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès area on 22 and 23 August 2015 and Ndélé area from 24 September to 5 October 2015*



*Some armed elements of the former Séléka wear full military attire, including the FACA insign and red beret*



**Annex 4.19:** Anti-balaka commander Kouazingo and MPC zone commander of Mbrès, Oumar

*The Panel observed that two zone commanders are well acquainted  
Photograph taken by the Panel in Mbrès area, 22 August 2015*



**Annex 4.20:** Former school's latrine in Ndenga where the dead body of a man killed on 12 August 2015 by an anti-balaka group from Mbrès was buried

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Ndenga on 19 August 2015*



**Annex 4.21: Houses destroyed in Bépikassé**

*Photographs taken by the Panel on 22 June 2015*



**Annex 4.22:** Police Commissioner of the Chadian *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (internal security) Madjiademngar N’Gamjadjibe at the border post of Békoninga

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 22 June 2015*



*Official stamp with his signature on an official correspondence*

Fait à Goré le 29 juin 2015

LE CHEF DE BRIGADE DE SUEVEILLANCE DU TERRITOIRE.

  
  
N’gamjadjibe Madjiademngar  
Commissaire de Police

*Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source*

**Annex 4.23:** Letter from Chadian *Chef d'Antenne* in Békoninga to the Chief of village of Bembéré in the CAR threatening that next time "there will be no mercy"

BEKONINGA Le 04-05.015

A

Honorable chef du village Bembéré.

Avant tout je vous salue beaucoup.  
 je vous écrit en quelques lignes pour vous  
 tenir informé que nous ne dormons pas,  
 et ce n'est pas une menace mais se dans  
 votre intérêt que je vous tiens à jours.  
 je vous demande encore de bien préciser  
 les complices qui st a kaba et a soh et  
 nous donne leur nom au complet.  
 Nous savons beaucoup des choses dans  
~~votre~~ vos villages donc faite beaucoup,  
 attention.

Vous avez intérêt d'arrêter les voleurs  
 de nos bœufs et nous livrés dans bonne  
 collaboration et bonne voisinage.  
 et je tiens a vous dire à l'idée de venir  
 attaquer le Tchad sa vous arrange pas.  
 et nous sommes informez nuit comme  
 jour.

si nous serions encore victime de vol  
 nos bœufs vous etes responsable et  
 cette fois si il y aura pas de pardon.

le chef d'ANTENNE  
 Békoninga

**Annex 4.24:** Remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade found in the village of Bembéré on 3 May 2015

*Photographs taken by MINUSCA*



*Source: Confidential report dated 4 May 2015 obtained by the Panel*

**Annex 4.25:** Remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade found in the village of Markounda by MINUSCA on 6 April 2015

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Bossangoa on 27 April 2015*



**Annex 4.26:** Pullover with the insigne of the *Armée Nationale Tchadienne* (ANT)

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Markounda on 11 April 2015*



**Annex 4.27: Houses burnt and destructions in Dokabi**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Dokabi on 11 April 2015*





**Annex 4.28:** Message from the Minister of Security and Territorial administration in N'Djamena to all regional governors dated 19 May 2015

REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 PRIMATURE  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 MINISTERE DE L'ADMINISTRATION DU TERRITOIRE  
 ET DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 COMMISSION NATIONALE D'ACCUEIL, DE REINSERTION  
 DES REFUGIES ET DES RAPATRIES  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 SECRETARIAT PERMANENT  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 N° \_\_\_\_\_/PR/PM/MATSP/CNARR/SP/2015

UNITE - TRAVAIL - PROGRES  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
  
 19 MAI 2015

**MESSAGE OFFICIEL RADIO/ URGENT**

FROM: MATSP/P.CNARR..... N'DJAMENA  
 TO : Gouverneurs Régions Moyen-Charil/Logone Oriental/Logone Occidental..... Sahr-Doba-Moundou  
 Gouverneur Région Salamat..... Am-Timan  
 INFO : SGP (à titre de CR)..... N'Djamena  
 PM (à titre d'info)..... N'Djamena  
 MAEIA..... N'Djamena  
 Préfets /Départements/Grande-Sido-Nya-Pendé..... Maro-Goré  
 DGN..... N'Djamena  
 Bureaux/CNARR..... N'Djamena-Goré-Maro-Haraze  
 HCR..... N'Djamena/Sud  
 OIM..... N'Djamena  
 PNUD..... N'Djamena  
 OCHA..... N'Djamena

N° \_\_\_\_\_/PR/PM/MATSP/CNARR/SP/2015 DU 18/05/2015 STOP HVI STOP SUITE AUX DIFFICULTES AUXQUELLES SONT CONFRONTEES AGENCES NATIONS UNIES AU SUDTCHAD STOP EU EGARD APPLICATION STRICTE DECISION FERMETURE FRONTIERE STOP TCHAD-RCA STOP PAR PRESENTE TO STOP GOUVERNEMENT CONFIRME FERMETURE FRONTIERE TCHAD-CENTRAFRIQUE STOP PAR CONTRE STOP AUCUNE INSTRUCTION N'A ETE DONNEE POUR TIRER SYSTEMATIQUEMENT STOP SUR TOUS CEUX QUI APPROCHENT FRONTIERE STOP VD STOP PRENDRE TOUTES DISPOSITIONS NECESSAIRES STOP EN VUE STOP APPLICATION ET RESPECT INSTRUCTION DONNEES STOP ET NOUS RENDRE COMPTE STOP ET FIN .-

Le Ministre de l'Administration du Territoire  
 et de la Sécurité Publique

  
 ABDERAHIM BIREME HAMID

*Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 25 May 2015*

## Annex 4.29: List of victims recorded by National Red Cross in Moyen Sido in June 2015

## List of CAR nationals killed in June 2015

Recensement de la population centrafricaine qui ont perdu leur vie en traversant la frontière. Quartier

N°	NOM	Prénom	Sexe	Age	Quartier
1	NABRADINE	BRAHIM	M	14 ans	Sido I
2	ALIMA	SALE	F	17 ans	Sido I
3	MAGBAYE	GASTON	M	35 ans	Sido I
4 -	Voi'Guidi	CELESTIN	M	28 ans	KRAMATA I
5 -	DEBY	FABIEN	M	27 ans	KRAMATA I
6 -	MOUSSA	BERAGE	M	31 ans	KOUTSABA
7 -	MARIAH	HAMADOU	F	45 ans	deplacée
8 -	ACHETOU	YAOU	F	26 ans	deplacée
9 -	NAFISSA	HAMADOU	F	18 ans	deplacée
10 -	SALEH	KOUTSSOUTI	F	1 ans	deplacée
11 -	ADUMRA	EVARICE	M	19 ans	Sido I

## List of CAR nationals detained in Chad in June 2015

Recensement de la population centrafricaine qui sont devenus au Tchad.

N°	Nom	Prénom	Sexe	Âge	Provenance
1-	ADJIM	OUHAR	M	35 ans	Moyenne-niolo
2-	BISSAFIO	PAUL	M	45 ans	Sido RCA
3-	BISSAFIO	RODRIGUE	M	26 ans	Sido RCA
4-	ZIZERIENE	DAMBETI	F	30 ans	Sido RCA
5-	DJIMAGRA	SALEMON	M	30 ans	Kalé-sido RCA
6-	MOUSSALA	MATHURIN	M	40 ans	KABO RCA
7-	MALA	SIMACO	M	30 ans	Sido RCA
8-	MALA	GABIN	M	27 ans	Sido RCA
9-	YAMIDI	PROSPERE	M	29 ans	Sido RCA
10-	NAMDESSEN	MEDARD	M	30 ans	Sido RCA
11-	SADA	MERCI	M	32 ans	Sido RCA
12-	MAYAN	PHILEMENE	F	36 ans	Sido RCA
13-	NGAUMBELE	DEBIRE	M	34 ans	Sido RCA

## List of CAR nationals robbed in June 2015

Recensement de la population centrafricaine avec qui les Fatah armés tchadiens les ont arrachés les bagages et Argent.

N°	NOM	Prénom	Sexe	Age	Provenance
1.	ZAMBA	Lydie	F	45 ans	side RCA
2.	NGOFIO	PHILOMENE	F	38 ans	side RCA
3.	NGANFIO	PAULINE	M	25 ans	side RCA
4.	BENAYA	ALINE	F	35 ans	side RCA
5.	PARAGO	TOUSSAINE	M	25 ans	side RCA
6.	SIRIGA	PATRICE	M	33 ans	side BOUCA
7.	MAZE	ELYSEE	M	40 ans	side RCA
8.	TOUADERE	DIMANCHE	M	25 ans	side RCA
9.	MATOIALLA	FREDERIC	M	35 ans	side RCA
10.	NAMDESSON	ALPHONCINE	F	25 ans	side RCA
11.	TARAGUIDI	ADEL	F	25 ans	side RCA
12.	PISSEI	ROGER	M	43 ans	side RCA
13.	MAMDOU	ARCILA	M	25 ans	side RCA
14.	MOYO	ALPHONCE	M	25 ans	side RCA
15.	TECNA	CLAVIERE	M	22 ans	side RCA
16.	BABA	GERMINE	F	26 ans	side RCA
17.	ADJALIL	ATAHIR	M	17 ans	{Déplacé?}
18.	IRADINE	SALEH	M	18 ans	{side RCA}

Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 1 July 2015

**Annex 4.30:** Extract of Local Red Cross registry in Moyen Sido of civilians killed while trying to cross the Chadian-CAR border from May 2014 to May 2015

Sido le 29/10/2014  
 Le procès-verbal de la mort Monsieur  
 IBKOUA BERNANZE.  
 Age de : 27  
 Provenance Moyenne Sido  
 Cause suite par les TEHADIENS.  
 Il a reçu un coup de balles vers  
 derriere, et la balle était sortie  
 au niveau de la poitrine droite.  
 C'est père de 9 enfant 1 de dix M et 1  
 de dix Femmin. La seconde femme est  
 en suite de 6 mois.  
 Une distance de 15 KM  
 Nombre des personnes assistées.  
 femme : 39  
 Homme : 46 82  
 TOTAL : 121

Vendredi le 19/09/2014  
 Le procès-verbal de la mort de Monsieur  
 MASTOURBANA GASTON - Age de 36 ans  
 Provenance : Moyenne Sido  
 Cause : suite et libéré par les TEHADIENS.

Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 1 July 2015.



**Annex 5.1:** Case study on the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC)

1. Martin Koumtamadji (alias Abdoulaye Miskine),<sup>138</sup> originally from Moyen Chari, Chad, and leading auxiliary forces loyal to former president Ange Félix Patassé, created the FDPC in 2005 in Kabo (Ouham province) in opposition to Bozizé's government. The FDPC shortly associated with the former Séléka, but forces clashed along the Cameroonian border near Gbiti (Mambéré Kadeï) in April 2013, and moved north to Nana Mambéré province. On 16 September 2013 the police in Bertoua in the east of Cameroon arrested Koumtamadji and transferred him to Yaoundé, where he was detained without being charged.
2. On 27 November 2014, Cameroonian authorities released Koumtamadji from custody in exchange for FDPC's liberation of a Polish priest and twenty-six other hostages (including fifteen Cameroonians). He was subsequently flown to Brazzaville on the presidential plane of Denis Sassou Nguesso, who as mediator of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the CAR crisis facilitated the exchange. Koumtamadji remains in Brazzaville, in liberty.
3. From Brazzaville, Koumtamadji has attempted, in vain, to engage in political negotiations with transitional authorities in Bangui. The FDPC participated in pre Bangui Forum discussions with the government,<sup>139</sup> but did not take part in the actual Forum and did not sign the resulting DDRR agreement.<sup>140</sup> FDPC representatives stated to the Panel that transitional authorities had not officially invited the group to the Forum.<sup>141</sup> In a press communiqué dated 11 May 2015 Koumtamadji announced to no

<sup>138</sup> Photographs of Koumtamadji prior to, during and after his detention in Cameroon in 2013 and 2014 are contained in **annex 5.1.1**.

<sup>139</sup> Discussions were led by Marcel Bagaza, FDPC political representative in Bangui, who was dismissed by Koumtamadji on 16 July 2015.

<sup>140</sup> On the DDRR agreement (*Démobilisation, Désarmement, Réintégration et Rapatriement*), see page 6 of the Panel's update on 19 May 2015. MINUSCA reported that "as a follow up on the signing of the Bangui forum DDRR agreement on 10 May, MINUSCA had facilitated the signing by the Front Démocratique pour le Progrès de la Centrafrique", which "had not initially signed due to logistical problems"; Confidential source, 12 May 2015.

<sup>141</sup> Meeting with FDPC representatives, Yaoundé, 7 and 8 July 2015; see a similar statement in a letter in **annex 5.1.2**.

longer recognize the legitimacy of the transitional Head of State of the CAR.<sup>142</sup>

*Organisation and military strength*

4. The Panel's interviews with FDPC representatives and analysis of documents, commander notebooks and other items retrieved by MINUSCA on 21 July from FDPCs base camp near Zoukombo, provide insight into the group's command structure, military strength, and operations.
5. Koumtamadji is and has during his detention in Yaoundé and stay in Brazzaville remained in full command and control of FDPC troops on the ground in the CAR, communicating via satellite phone.<sup>143</sup> A Thuraya simcard was recovered from FDPC's base camp, and commander notebooks indicated decisions and actions taken by the "General" or "Boss",<sup>144</sup> referring to Koumtamadji, including the transfer of money.<sup>145</sup> Koumtamadji's business cards were also retrieved from the camp.<sup>146</sup>
6. According to commander notes, the FDPC counts 92 men in possession of 38 conventional weapons.<sup>147</sup> Apart from G9 – potentially G3-type assault rifles – the profile of the FDPC arms is consistent with the arms seized from other armed elements in the CAR. Considering the size of the FDPC<sup>148</sup>, and the number

<sup>142</sup> See copy of the press communiqué in **annex 5.1.3**.

<sup>143</sup> Meeting FDPC representatives, Yaoundé, 7 July 2015

<sup>144</sup> Copies of commanders' notes and Thuraya simcard are archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>145</sup> See commander's note in **annex 5.1.4**.

<sup>146</sup> See photograph of business cards in **annex 5.1.5**.

<sup>147</sup> Notebook with a list combatants retrieved by MINUSCA, archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB; see notebook with a list of weapons retrieved by MINUSCA in **annex 5.1.6**; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB. The following weapons and ammunition in possession of FDPC are listed in the hand-over report: 27 AK-47, four RPG launchers, 12 RPG rounds, three PM, one DKM, one FAL, one pistol, one RPK, 207 G9 rounds of ammunition. Other FDPC internal documents refer to one PKM with 500 rounds of ammunition, 60 rounds of ammunition for PM, one MAS 36 with four rounds of ammunition, 20 rounds of ammunition of FAL, 17 G9 with seven boxes of ammunition, 106 rounds of ammunition for Galil, 1,234 rounds of ammunition for AK-47, two grenades, one artisanal weapon, 28 rounds of hunting ammunition and one machine gun.

<sup>148</sup> The complete list of soldiers included in FDPC notebooks retrieved by MINUSCA is archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

of arms and ammunition the group possesses, the FDPC is the best equipped armed group operating in western CAR.

7. FDPC leadership on the ground is shared between three persons. Edouard Bossian signed mission orders as chief of staff from May 2014 onwards, including for taking the hostages that were released in November 2014.<sup>149</sup> He was baptized in Nigeria but of Central African nationality, and a former Deacon of the Catholic Church in Berbérati.<sup>150</sup> He was replaced as chief of staff on 4 January 2015 most likely by either Francois Bernard Kemrangar who is also referred to as chief of staff in commander notes, or Leonard Kormadji.<sup>151</sup> Kemrangar is listed as contact point on school identity cards of Chadian soldiers – all adults – suggesting a role in recruitment.<sup>152</sup> On 16 March 2015, Kemrangar was in Yaoundé from where he transferred a sum of USD 1,000 to Brazzaville<sup>153</sup> and then returned on 18 March 2015 to the camp near Zoukombo. Kormadji was in charge of the mission on 12 October 2014 during which the Polish priest from Baboua was taken hostage.<sup>154</sup>
  
8. In Yaoundé, Lucien Assalbaye, of Chadian nationality but with permanent residence status in Norway,<sup>155</sup> acts as liaison officer for the FDPC in Cameroon. While characterizing himself as a mediator<sup>156</sup> – he facilitated contact between MINUSCA and the FDPC military leaders during the hostage crisis in November 2015<sup>157</sup> – commander notes show a more operational capacity.<sup>158</sup>

<sup>149</sup> See FDPC *ordre de mission* in **annex 5.1.7**; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>150</sup> See Bossian's Church ID card and Central African ID card in **annex 5.1.8**; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>151</sup> Meeting with FDPC representatives in Yaoundé, 7 July 2015.

<sup>152</sup> See one sample of Chadian school ID card in **annex 5.1.9**; copies of all ID documents recovered at the FDPC camp are archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>153</sup> See money transfer receipt in **annex 5.2.0**; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>154</sup> See FDPC *ordre de mission* in **annex 5.2.1**; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB. On 19 July 2015, in the village of Boré located on the main supply road 25 kilometres east from Baboua, the *sous-préfet* and the mayor of the *sous-préfecture* of Baboua (Nana-Mambéré) were abducted by armed elements, reportedly belonging to the FDPC; telephone conversation with a MINUSCA staff in Bouar, 20 July 2015.

<sup>155</sup> See Lucien Assalbaye's ID card in **annex 5.2.2**.

<sup>156</sup> Meeting with Lucien Assalbaye, Yaoundé, 7 July 2015.

<sup>157</sup> See photograph of Lucien Assalbaye with MINUSCA peacekeepers in the CAR in November 2014 in **annex 5.2.3**.

<sup>158</sup> For example, Assalbaye has ordered a transfer of three weapons from the base camp to Cameroon; see Commander's note in **annex 5.2.4**.

*Human rights violations and financing*

9. Between 1 January 2015 and 30 September 2015, FDPC elements committed a large number (95) of criminal incidents resulting in the death of 39 civilians.<sup>159</sup> Incidents included attacks against vehicles on the main supply route connecting Bangui to Cameroon, attacks against Peuhl herdsmen and isolated villages, targeting of civilians, ransoming local population and nomads, stealing cattle and lootings goods. Incidents also included ten (10) instances where MINUSCA peacekeepers were attacked and one attack against trucks of the World Food Program escorted by MINUSCA peacekeepers.<sup>160</sup>
10. On 19 March 2015, the FDPC again took Cameroonian citizens hostage. The hostages included 16 people from the town of Lagdo in northern Cameroon, who were ambushed near the border town of Garoua-Boulai while travelling on a bus from Bertoua, and two local bystanders. On 17 May 2015, two Cameroonian hostages escaped with the help of a member of the FDPC, Patrice Bissi, in return for a promised sum of money.<sup>161</sup> Patrice Bissi's name is on a list of FDPC combatants, retrieved by MINUSCA from FDPCs base camp.<sup>162</sup> The 16 hostages from Lagdo remain in captivity.<sup>163</sup>
11. In the press Martin Koumtamadji denied that FDPC was responsible for the hostage taking on 19 March 2015.<sup>164</sup> FDPC representatives in Cameroon shared with the Panel a press communication signed by an FDPC Colonel, claiming his forces captured two armed men from Cameroon who supposedly

<sup>159</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>161</sup> After their escape the two Cameroonian hostages stated to MINUSCA that that 16 Cameroonians remained in captivity; meetings with MINUSCA civilian staff in Bouar, 18 and 19 May 2015.

<sup>162</sup> An extract of the list of FDPC combatants including Patrice Bissi is in **annex 5.2.5**.

<sup>163</sup> "Est: Le mairie de Lagdo toujours otage de ses ravisseurs (gouverneur)", 23 September 2015, see <http://www.journalducameroun.com/article.php?aid=21595>, accessed on 25 October 2015; confidential military report, 2 May 2015.

<sup>164</sup> "Cameroun / RCA (Interview Exclusive) - Le Général Abdoulaye Miskine: «Les ravisseurs du maire de Lagdo sont des camerounais du Grand Nord et non des centrafricains", Cameroon Infonet, see [http://www.cameroon-info.net/stories/0\\_67314\\_@cameroun-rca-interview-exclusive-nbsp-le-general-abdoulaye-miskine-laquo-les-rav.html](http://www.cameroon-info.net/stories/0_67314_@cameroun-rca-interview-exclusive-nbsp-le-general-abdoulaye-miskine-laquo-les-rav.html), accessed on 25 October 2015.

admitted to have taken hostages to demand the release of their leader, Aboubacar, detained in Cameroon.<sup>165</sup> The name of the Colonel is not on the above mentioned list of FDPC elements, and the Panel could not confirm the detention of a militia leader called Aboubacar in Cameroon.

12. FDPC goes at length to disassociate itself from the latest hostage taking, considering likely political fall-out. The real motive is most probably economic. Cameroonian press articles, and confidential military reports have made reference to ransom demands.<sup>166</sup>
  
13. Economic motives also drive most of FDPC's day-to-day military operations. Commander notes and Panel interviews with victims make frequent reference to confiscated cattle, currency and gold.<sup>167</sup> The abduction and intimidation of civilians and local authorities are part and parcel of FDPC's efforts to raise funds. For example, in Koundé, the Panel interviewed a resident who was abducted on 16 June 2015 and subsequently released after his family paid a ransom of USD 1,600. On 10 June 2015, FDPC elements also burned a car belonging to a merchant from Koundé after he was unable to pay a sum of USD 3,300 requested by the same fighters several days earlier.<sup>168</sup> FDPC fighters frequently ransack a gold mining area near Koundé.<sup>169</sup> In a letter to the mayor of Besson, the FDPC Secretary-General demanded USD 8,300 to be paid on the same day.<sup>170</sup> FDPC cash entries, presumably from looting and extortion, amounted to USD 13,000 for the months of April and May 2015.<sup>171</sup>

<sup>165</sup> Press communication in **annex 5.2.6**.

<sup>166</sup> Le Jour, "Rapt du maire de Lagdo: le gouvernement ne veut pas payer la rançon", accessed on 21 July 2015 at <http://www.camer.be/42774/11:1/cameroun-rapt-du-maire-de-lagdo-le-gouvernement-ne-veut-pas-payer-la-rancon-cameroon.html>; confidential military report, 2 May 2015.

<sup>167</sup> See Commander's notes in **annex 5.2.7**.

<sup>168</sup> See photograph of the burnt vehicle in **annex 5.2.8**.

<sup>169</sup> Meetings with villagers and artisanal miners, Koundé, 19 June 2015.

<sup>170</sup> See the letter in **annex 5.2.9**.

<sup>171</sup> FDPC account book, archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

5.1.1: Photographs of Martin Koumtamadji

*Photograph posted on 25 July 2015 in Brazzaville<sup>172</sup>*



*Photograph posted on 11 December 2014 in Brazzaville<sup>173</sup>*




<sup>172</sup> Accessed on 26 October 2015 at [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-Je-n-ai-pas-peur--l-entretien-exclusif-avec-le-chef-rebelle-Abdoulaye-Miskine\\_a20938.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-Je-n-ai-pas-peur--l-entretien-exclusif-avec-le-chef-rebelle-Abdoulaye-Miskine_a20938.html)

<sup>173</sup> Accessed on 26 October 2015 at [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrigue-Interview-du-General-Abdoulaye-Miskine-chef-du-FDPC\\_a13898.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrigue-Interview-du-General-Abdoulaye-Miskine-chef-du-FDPC_a13898.html)

*Photograph posted on 2 July 2014, while in detention in Cameroon<sup>174</sup>*



*Photograph reportedly taken in March 2013<sup>175</sup>*



<sup>174</sup> Accessed on 26 October 2015 at <https://www.facebook.com/pages/G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-Abdoulaye-Miskine/164727260257773>

<sup>175</sup> Accessed on 26 October 2015 at <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=530>

**Annex 5.1.2: FDPC vice president's letter to Congolese interior minister stating that Central African authorities did not approach the group in relation to the Bangui forum**

**FRONT DEMOCRATIQUE DU PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAIN (FDPC)**

A

Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre de  
L'Intérieur de la République du Congo

**Objet : Audience à propos du Forum de Bangui du 04 au 12 Mai 2015**

Excellence,

En Novembre 2014 en sa qualité de Médiateur International pour la crise en République Centrafricaine, le **Président Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO** a dépêché une importante délégation auprès de son homologue camerounais le **Président Paul BIYA** qui a permis la libération du Prêtre Polonais ainsi que celui du **Président** de notre mouvement (FDPC) à savoir le **Général de Division Abdoulaye Miskine** détenu illégalement et abusivement au Cameroun pendant 14 mois et 02 semaines.

Et le 27 Novembre de la même année, le **Général** est conduit ici à **Brazzaville**. Pour les démarches entreprises concernant la libération du **Général** et notre prise en charge ici au Congo, nous voulons à travers cette audience remercier son Excellence le **Président Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO**, les autorités de ce très beau pays ainsi que ce magnifique peuple congolais pour leur légendaire hospitalité qui n'est plus à démontrer.

Aussi Excellence Monsieur le Ministre, le Forum de **Bangui**, un rendez-vous capital durant lequel les centrafricaines et centrafricains de tout bord doivent se réunir pour s'entendre sur l'avenir de leur pays se tiendront du 04 au 12 Mai 2015.

Mouvement Politico-militaire, le **Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC)** est appelé à prendre part à ces assises afin d'apporter sa contribution quant à la recherche collective des solutions aux problèmes qui sont causes de la désintégration de notre pays.

Cependant, nous constatons avec beaucoup de regret que ni les autorités de transition en **Centrafrique** ni ceux de notre pays d'accueil ne nous ont pas approchés pour la circonstance et pourtant les autres entités sont à la page.

C'est pour cette raison que nous voulons vous rencontrer afin de comprendre précisément l'origine du blocage et se faire une idée sur la place du **FDPC** dans ce meeting qui s'annonce.

Fait à **Brazzaville** 23 Avril 2015

Le Vice-président du **FDPC**



**Ferdinand MBOKOTO-MADJI**

Annex 5.1.3: FDPC press communiqué on the Bangui forum<sup>176</sup>**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N°03/FDPC/11/05/2015****FRONT DEMOCRATIQUE DU PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAIN (FDPC)**

Le **Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain** (FDPC) vient par la présente marquer son indignation et sa désapprobation face au déroulement des travaux du Forum de **Bangui** tenu courant Mai 2015. Toute attitude qui ne milite guère pour un retour rapide, calme et favorable à la quiétude à la concorde et à l'unité nationale car dénué de tout caractère inclusif.

En effet, depuis le début du chaos en **République Centrafricaine** (Mars 2013), le FDPC a toujours pratiqué la politique de la « main tendue » pour le retour sans condition de la **PAIX** sur toute l'étendue du territoire. Malgré notre bonne volonté manifeste et notre ambition de voir le pays pacifié dans son entièreté, les dirigeants actuels de la transition nous ont toujours servi une fin de non-recevoir. Nous en voulons pour preuve, la multitude des correspondances envoyées au **Médiateur International** pour la crise centrafricaine le **Président de la République du Congo son Excellence Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO** ainsi qu'à la **Présidente de Transition** et dont les objets ont toujours indiqué notre position qui est celle de la promotion de la **PAIX** et le retour à l'ordre constitutionnel. Hélas, ces correspondances sont quasiment et toujours restées sans réponse de leur part.

Ce silence complice de la Très Haute Institution du pays, de nature à mettre en hibernation tout projet et concept sur la **PAIX**, nous pousse à croire qu'il s'agit là d'une attitude consciente et souhaitée ; et dont le principal but inavoué est basé sur les calculs électoraux à venir. Bien plus, la désinvolture avec laquelle certains ministres et hauts dignitaires gèrent les questions publiques est criarde.

Car comment comprendre que pour la tenue et l'organisation d'un tel Forum, hautement stratégique pour la **Centrafrique** et les Centrafricains, que le **Conseil National de Transition**, les acteurs emblématiques, les mouvements politico – militaires combattantes et non combattantes en soient à la fois ignorés et minorés par la **Présidente de Transition** ? Ceci témoigne comme nous l'avons relevé précédemment, qu'il s'agit à la fois d'un jeu de positionnement politique des uns à la solde du système ou des soient disant « potentiels candidats » et d'une épuration systémique des autres artisans de la démocratie.

Ce jeu, s'il fait les affaires de certaines personnes tapies dans l'environnement de **Madame la Présidente de Transition**, est loin de ramener une **PAIX** future aux Centrafricains. Car il s'agit là d'une POLITIQUE DISCRIMINATOIRE pratiquée par le système politique actuel. Or la crise politico-sociale qui traverse le pays actuellement ne nous permet pas de construire notre avenir politique sur la discrimination. Ceci est une autre porte ouverte à l'impasse.

<sup>176</sup> Accessed on 5 November 2015 at <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2015/05/communique-de-presse-n-03-fdpc-11-05-2015.html>

Toute attitude et lassitude d'une classe politique que le **FDPC** déplore pour la simple raison qu'il s'agit là des germes prémonitoires d'une future crise qui peut s'avérer plus cruelles que les précédentes.

Comment allez-vous expliquer aux Centrafricains que c'est exclusivement un tel qui a le monopole de la gestion de sortie de crise ?

Comment allez-vous expliquer aux Centrafricains que pour une pacifique et réussie transition, il faut exclure voire écarter certaines tendances ?

Comment allez-vous expliquer aux Centrafricains que vous les prenez en considération alors que jour après jour, leur quotidien est fait de pleurs, de viols, de famine, de discrimination, de deuils, de rapt, d'emprisonnements illégitimes, d'appauvrissement croissant et de tribalisations exaspérées ?

Comment allez-vous expliquer aux Centrafricains que la transition a réussis alors que rien n'a évolué, surtout dans le domaine politico-économique- social du pays à cause de l'hypocrisie manifeste et de la mauvaise gestion des fonds alloués au pays ?

Convaincu que la **République Centrafricaine** a besoin, pour le redécollage de tous ses secteurs d'activités d'une révolution idéologique, le **Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain** réaffirme son engagement de voir éclore une nouvelle classe politique dont le leitmotiv sera basé uniquement et exclusivement sur la modernisation inconditionnelle et la promotion irréversible de la **PAIX en RCA**.

A ce titre ; le **FDPC** décide :

1. Ne pas reconnaître les résolutions du dernier Forum de **Bangui** car présentant des caractères de non inclusion ;
- 2.
3. Ne plus reconnaître la légitimité de la **Présidente de Transition** et de son gouvernement transitoire dans l'état actuel de sa gestion ;
- 4.
5. Soutenir la reconfiguration du **Conseil National de Transition** pour le rendre plus représentatif à l'échelle nationale ;

Toutefois, nous mettons en garde les autorités actuelles Centrafricaines sur les risques sécuritaires que peuvent entraîner leurs calculs électoraux et leurs jeux d'intérêts égoïstes après ce forum de **Bangui** de Mai 2015. Le peuple sera seul juge au temps convenable.


Fait à **Brazzaville**, le 11 mai 2015

**Le Président du FDPC**

**Le Général de Division**

**Martin KOUMTA MADJI (Abdoulaye MISKINE)**

**Annex 5.1.4:** Commander's note dated 3 March 2014 referring to the "General" who will send money, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015




MATE du 03-03-2014 à 8h45 mn  
Le Capitaine MATE aurait nous dit  
à la réunion que le général lui a  
designé avec ZACHO de garder bien  
les enfants et le général va leur  
envoyer de l'argent pour leur vivre.


**Annex 5.1.5:** Koumtamadji's business cards retrieved by MINUSCA from FDPC base camp near Zoukombo, CAR, on 21 June 2015



**Annex 5.1.6:** Hand-over report referring to weapons transferred to the newly appointed Chief of staff on 4 January 2015, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015.



**Annex 5.1.7:** *Ordre de mission* signed by Edouard Bossian referring to hostages taken in Cameroon, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015



**Annex 5.1.8:** Church ID card and Central African ID card of Edouard Bossian, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015



**Annex 5.1.9:** Chadian school ID card referring to Francois (Bernard) Kemrangar as contact person, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

Nom: Mazoutana  
 Prénom: Alice  
 Date et Lieu De naissance: 16/12/93  
a Kobdogué  
 Fils/Fille de: Kemrangar  
 Et de: Barnabé Nardine  
 Domicile: Berhou  
 N° Matricule: 6091/15  
 Délivrée le: 05 FEV 2015  
 Signature de l'élève  
A

Classe de: 8<sup>me</sup>/3  
 En cas d'accident veuillez prévenir  
 Mr: Kemrangar Francois  
 B.P. \_\_\_\_\_ Tél: 6235990  
 Lien de parenté: Cousin



**Annex 5.1.10: Money transfer receipt referring to Francois Bernard Kemrangar as sender, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015**

Anne Messudom Changer mot de passe - Déconnexion - Accueil

**DETAILS DE LA TRANSACTION**

**0914274473**  
**Cash à cash**

Transaction non autorisée. Veuillez contacter le Chef d'agence ou l'Administrateur


CLIENT EMETTEUR	
Code :	0837395742
Nom :	KEMRANGAR
Prénom :	FRANCOIS BERNARD
Téléphone :	
Fax :	
Adresse :	
Email :	
Ville :	YDE
Pays :	Cameroun

TRANSACTION	
Montant :	600 000,00 XAF
Commissions :	11 952,00 XAF
Question secrète :	
Réponse secrète :	
Raison du transfert :	
Agent émetteur :	Voir détails
Date de dépôt :	2015-03-16 12:11:58
Date de paiement :	0000-00-00 00:00:00
Pays d'émission :	Cameroun
Pays d'origine :	Congo
CBU référence :	
CBU référence :	
Pays de paiement :	

CLIENT RECEPTEUR	
Nom :	MOKENGA
Prénom :	GABRI CLOTAIRE
Téléphone :	+242066835285
Fax :	
Adresse :	
Ville :	
Pays :	Republique du Congo
Type de pièce :	Carte d'identité
Numéro pièce :	
Date de naissance (jj/mm/aaaa) :	
Date de délivrance (jj/mm/aaaa) :	
Date d'expiration (jj/mm/aaaa) :	
Lieu d'antécédents :	Cameroun


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**Annex 5.1.11:** *Ordre de mission* referring to Leonard Kormandji as chief of mission, and to a “white” hostage being taken, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015



**Annex 5.1.12: Lucien Assalbaye's Norwegian residence permit**

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Yaoundé on 9 July 2015*



**Annex 5.1.13:** Photograph provided to the Panel by Lucien Assalbaye showing himself with MINUSCA peacekeepers in the CAR in November 2014 in relation to the hostage situation



**Annex 5.1.14:** Commander's note making reference to Lucien (Assalbaye) ordering weapons to be brought to Bertoua (Cameroon), retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

DATE DU 02-03-2014  
BERTOUA - Base par le sp  
Leonard.  
Motif de son arrivée à la base  
- Faire de vidéos des elts  
- Récupération de 3 ARMES pour  
à Bertoua au lieu de Lucien.  
Sans à refuser, sans l'ordre du Général  
rien ne va aboutir.  
DATE DU 03-03-2014 à Bertoua retour  
de spécifique au BERTOUA.

**Annex 5.1.15:** Extract of the list of FDPC combatants including Patrice Bessi, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

56	BEMADJI HONI ALFRED	
57	NBIRANDJIM MATTHIAS	
58	BOMI	MARCHEL
59	ABBOULAYE	IDRISS
60	ALLARAMADJI	JEAN
61	NOITOUROU	ZEKEMAN
62	KORMADJE	ISMAEL
63	GOGALTAN	DEBONHEUR
64	GOUTE	TUBO
65	DUPIN STEVE	JUVENAL
66	PIANGUE	TUBO
67	ALLASRA	JULIUS
68	NGA-BOU	ALAIN
69	ADMOTAN	MAXIME
70	BESSI	PATRICE
71	NANKRE	HENRI
72	MASRABAYE	PASCAL
73	ABOUMWOITI	ALEXI
74	GLABE JEUN	CHARLE
75	MIANMADIAN	PHILIPPE
76	YAMTA DIMANCHE	FREBERIC
77	NBITAO GUINGUI	RENE GUSTAVE

**Annex 5.1.16:** Press communiqué by FDPC Colonel concerning the capture of two armed elements

**FRONT DEMOCRATIQUE DU PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAIN (F D P C)**

**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 2**

Ce matin à 06 heures 15 minutes à 32 kilomètres de **Garoua-Boulai** sur l'axe **Bouar (RCA)** ; les hommes de notre poste avancé ont intercepté 05 hommes armés en provenance du territoire camerounais.

Les 05 assaillants ont 03 ânes transportant du riz, de l'huile, du sucre, 547 munitions de kalachnikov et 02 kalachnikovs.

Avec leur refus de s'arrêter, une fusillade éclate.

**Bilan :**

-02 des assaillants abattus sur le champ pendant les échanges de tirs et un blessé puis maîtrisé par nos soldats.

-De notre côté ; 01 soldat blessé.

**NB :** les deux assaillants neutralisés portaient des armes d'assaut (kalachnikov) ainsi que les deux autres en fuites activement recherché par nos hommes. Le blessé quant à lui un bâton d'éleveur.

Tous sont de nationalité camerounaise car détenteurs de cartes nationales d'identité de ce pays.

Après audition du blessé, il en ressort ce qui suit :

-Il s'exprime en **foulbé**, **haoussa** et en **arabe chouar** mais ne parle ni ne comprend la langue nationale centrafricaine : **Sango**.

-Il déclare venir du **Cameroun** et entrain de rejoindre leurs frères qui sont sur le sol centrafricain.


-Ils sont entrain de lutter pour la libération de leur Chef **Aboubacar** détenu au **Cameroun**. Et s'est même pour cette raison qu'ils ont pris les otages.

**Conclusion :**

A cause de manque de confiance vis-à-vis des autorités camerounaises, nous sommes présentement dans l'impossibilité de leur remettre le blessé pour investigation. Car en en Avril 2013, un policier (gardien de paix) camerounais nommé **Djezet Doumtio Gerard Thomas** avait eu la vie sauve grâce à notre Chef le **Général Abdoulaye Miskine** qui a tout mis en œuvre pour le libérer et le remettre aux autorités de son pays. Mais le remerciement de ses derniers n'est autre que l'arrestation puis séquestration de notre Chef susmentionné pour une durée de 14 mois 02 semaines alors que blessé, il était dans ce pays rien que pour se faire soigner.

Fait à **Baboua** (RCA) le 31 Mars 2015

**Le Ministre de la Défense du FDPC**



**Le Colonel Pierre YAKOUA**

*Source: Obtained by the Panel from FDPC representatives in Yaoundé on 8 July 2015*

**Annex 5.1.17:** Commander notes making reference to cattle, gold, money, telephones and arms brought back from missions, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

Renseignements

- 1 Job une moto - au mois de janvier
- 2 Tibo une moto - enivo
- 3 Aire des boeufs 53.
- 4 - Ndirandjiri une moto.
- 5 - un peu d'or.
- 6 - Ordinateur.

DATE DU 21 - 06 - 2014

Patrouille effectuée par le Commandant ZACKO et le Capitaine Mougoumbou ABDEL avec les elts. Ils ont amené à la base avec une somme de 500.000 Fcs 10 appareils Téléphonique en mauvais état, une mitrailleuse composée de 8 munitions.

RHS

**Annex 5.1.18:** Photograph of a car burned by FDPC on 10 June 2015 on main supply road, taken by the panel on 19 June 2015





**Annex 5.2:** Order of deployment of FACA in Nana-Mambéré obtained from MINUSCA in Bouar on 28 May 2015.

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE  
DE LA REPUBLIQUE PLURINATIONAL DES ARMES  
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS ET DES  
VICTIMES DE GUERRE  
\*\*\*\*\*  
DIRECTION DE CABINET  
\*\*\*\*\*  
WOLLAJAMBAALVUORICAR

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Drapeau - Tricolore  
\*\*\*\*\*  
D 1 80 2015

*Le Ministre de l'Etat*

**ORDRE DE MISSION COLLECTIVE**

Nom (N) : YAGRANGA	Titulaire (N) : Ibrahim
Grade : Chef de Battalion	Unité en Carga : CI-BOUAR
Lieu de départ :	BANGUI
Date de départ :	17/05/2015
Date de retour :	FIN DE MISSION
Destination (N) :	BOUAR / NYEM-YELGUA / KOU / BESSAN
Mode de transport :	Voie Routière
Nature de la mission :	Mission Opérationnelle
Implication budgétaire :	Direction de l'Intendance des Corps de Troupes
Liste des éléments :	En service

**DESTINATAIRES**  
-EMA  
-CI-BOUAR  
-Intéressés  
-Archives et classes  
PRE ET PM à titre de CR

  
*Marie-Noëlle KOTARA*

**Annex 5.3:** Hunting ammunition sold on the market in Nola, Obo (21 April 2015) and Baoro (4 June 2015)

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Nola on 19 January 2015*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Baoro on 4 June 2015*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Obo on 25 September 2015*



**Annex 5.4:** Invoice from Cameroonian ammunition retailer “Armukad”, also known as DOLLAH YANKAM, and export authorization provided to ‘Ousmane Roger’ by Cameroonian customs authorities in Batouri on 8 January 2015

**ARLUKAD**  
 AGENCE DE BATOURI  
 TEL: 79 85 98 00  
 CONT: P107600571684K  
 Doit:

Date 08-01-2015  
**FACTURE C** N° 0001/81  
 OUSMANE ROGER

Quantite	Designation	P.U.	Prix Total
	Vu de l'ordonnance MINAT N° 035 MAID. DIRCAM	300	
	de l'ATP.P. du 19/10/2014		
4500	450 Cartouches calibre 12		
	Le chasse Mouton		
<b>PAYE COMPTANT</b>			
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>300.000</b>

Les marchandises vendues ne sont ni rapatriées, ni réexportées.  
 Signature du Client: *[Signature]*  
 Signature du Vendeur: *[Signature]*

No passe à l'exportation: 08 JAN 2015  
 BUREAU DES FINANCES  
 DOUANES CAMEROUNAISES  
 Batouri

Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source

**Annex 5.5:** Photograph of Roger Ngaidoua alias 'Ousmane Roger' and seized hunting ammunitions taken on 8 January 2015



*Source: Obtained by the Panel from MINUSCA*

**Annex 5.6:** Hunting ammunition, weapons and hand grenades seized by MINUSCA in Berbérati

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Berbérati on 27 August 2015*






**Annex 5.7: Batouri branch of Dollah Yankam arms shop**

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 17 August 2015*





**Annex 5.9: Purchasing history of Roger Ngaïdoua at Dollah Yankam arms shop in Ngaïdoua's possession during his arrest on 8 January 2015**



Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source

**Annex 5.10:** Case of 12-gauge hunting cartridges seized on the road between Nola and Yanti border post

1. The first case dates back to 24 May 2015 when a local defence militia seized 250 12-gauge hunting cartridges from a FACA Chief-Corporal on the road between Nola and the border town of Yanti.
2. He told the local defence militia that he had purchased the ammunition from small dealers coming from across the border in Mboy, Cameroon.<sup>177</sup>
3. MINUSCA and FACA sources in Nola informed the Panel that the ammunition was intended for a planned anti-balaka attack on the town, which, lacking ammunition, eventually did not take place.<sup>178</sup>

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 15 June 2015*



<sup>177</sup> Meeting with local defence militia, Nyamachoke, 15 July 2015.

<sup>178</sup> Meetings with MINUSCA and FACA military staff, Nola, 14-15 June 2015.

**Annex 5.11:** Case of seized ammunition at B eloko border by CAR authorities on 31 May 2015

1. Regarding this second case, in B eloko (Mamb er  Kad e ), along the main border crossing with Cameroon, the Panel received information from the CAR police regarding a seizure on 31 May 2015 of 200 12-gauge hunting cartridges.
2. The trafficker, while in custody in Bouar, never specified the origin of the ammunition as coming from Cameroon, and no receipt was found on him.<sup>179</sup>

*Photograph obtained by the Panel from Police authorities in B eloko on 21 June 2015*



<sup>179</sup> Meeting with judicial authorities in Bouar, 22 June 2015; see photograph of the seizure in annex 5.11.

**Annex 5.12:** Cases of weapons and ammunition seized in Berbérati and Baoro

1. In Berbérati, MINUSCA seized fifteen arms of three different types, i.e. type 56(-2) and AKM-type assault rifles and MAS 36 and Lee Enfield rifles. Two type 56(-2) were seized from former-Séléka element. The identity of the owners of the other assault rifles remains unclear. MINUSCA also seized twelve hand grenades of different types but these could not be properly inspected due to their advanced decomposition and risk of explosion.
2. In Baoro, MINUSCA on 19 May 2015 seized 483 rounds of AK-47 ammunition that were found in two bags of charcoal dropped in a tailor shop in Baoro town (see photograph below). The bags had been deposited by a trucker on his way from Bangui to Bouar.
3. The above seizures appear to indicate that anti-balaka groups rely on different types of arms. Indeed, anti-balaka elements in and around Baoro, on the main supply road, possess AK-type arms.<sup>180</sup> In Berbérati, several eyewitnesses and victims claim that anti-balaka in town carry automatic pistols.<sup>181</sup>

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Bouar on 4 June 2015*



<sup>180</sup> Interview with Henri Jean-Christophe Béthom, anti-balaka coordinator in Baoro, Baoro, 4 June 2015; MINUSCA military and civilian sources, Bouar, 29 May and 5 June 2015.

<sup>181</sup> Interviews with victims of Peuhl origin of anti-balaka attacks, Berbérati, 27 August 2015.



REPUBLIQUE CAMBODGIENNE  
INTÉRIEUR - SÉCURITÉ - TRAVAIL

MINISTRE DE LA SÉCURITÉ PUBLIQUE  
IMMIGRATION-ÉMIGRATION ET DE L'ORDRE PUBLIC

ARRÊTÉ TERRITORIAL  
PREMIÈRE PARTIE  
ORDONNANCE DE P.S.S.A. B

AL ROUEN, le 26 Mai 2015.  
N° 017/6-CLB No.

Le Sous-Lieutenant, HEUNG, SEAY,  
Commandant le Compagnie de la Gendarmerie  
Territoriale de..... - ROUEN -

AL

Captaine, Commandant le Troisième Groupement  
Gendarmerie Territoriale de..... - ROUEN -


B ORDONNANCE - 1) ENVOI  
\*\*\*\*\*

DESCRIPTION DES PIÈCES	QUANTITÉ	OBSERVATIONS
4 gouverne et boîte de Munitions de calibre de 7,62 mm en date du 2 Mai 2015 par le Commandant le Brigade Territoriale de P.S.S.C.	463	
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>463</b>	

BOUCHE DE RÉCEPTION sous le n° 0113  
At ROUEN le 27/05/2015  
Lui CAS BONAM, Rouen  
015 05 667 8714

Le Sous-Lieutenant, HEUNG, SEAY,  
Commandant le Compagnie  
Gendarmerie Territoriale de..... - ROUEN -


**Annex 5.13** : Copy of a letter sent by Crepin Messamba as zone commander of Sosso-Nakombo



Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source in Berbérati on 20 August 2015

**Annex 5.14:** Maximin Vobouadé's artisanal miner card

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Berbérati on 17 June 2015*



**Annex 5.15:** Security incidents for Nola, Berbérati and Carnot *sous-préfectures* drawn from the Panel of Experts database <sup>182</sup>

	DATE	VILLAGE / TOWN	SUB-PREFECTURE	KILLINGS AVERAGE	SUMMARY
1	20/Dec/14	NGOULO	NOLA	1	On 20 December 2015, a Muslim mine operator called Ramadane was killed at a mine site near Ngoulo by an anti-balaka from Yaloké called Francis Zamane.
2	05/Jan/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 5 January 2015, MINUSCA Force reported an attack by unknown men on a Muslim family in Poto Poto neighbourhood in Berberati. A woman was reportedly injured and rescued by MINUSCA along with her three daughters. A seven-year-old boy is believed to be kept hostage.
3	16/Jan/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	1	On 16 January 2015, in Berbérati, MINUSCA elements who had left Berbérati to help some gendarme 8 kilometres from Berbérati, fell into an ambush set up by anti-balaka elements. One of the anti-balaka was shot dead. Two hunting rifles were recovered. The next morning, the body of the perpetrator was transported to the town hall to be exposed but the situation remained tense.
4	16/Jan/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	1	On 16 of January 2015, in Berbérati, the Gendarmerie arrested two anti-balaka elements with the support of MINUSCA Congo Brazzaville Peacekeepers. Later the same day, anti-balaka elements opened fire on MINUSCA Peacekeepers to free the detainees. During the exchange of fire, one anti-balaka was killed and three weapons were recovered. No MINUSCA Peacekeepers were wounded.
5	19/Mar/15	AMADA GAZA	AMADA GAZA	1	On 19 March 2015, eight (8) alleged anti-balaka crossed the border to extort money from Peuhl refugees in Cameroon. Since the victims could not pay the requested amount, one refugee was reportedly shot dead and buried on the spot. The anti-balaka leader in Amada Gaza confirmed that he had sent a group of his elements in Cameroon territory to get money and cattle from refugees. When informed, local anti-balaka leader refuted the responsibility but managed to arrest six of his elements and handed them over to the local gendarmerie in Gamboula, 84 kilometres from Berbérati.

<sup>182</sup> Diamond related incidents are highlighted in yellow.

6	25/Sep/15	PAMA	BODA	0	On 25 March 2015, a 12-year old girl who was going to the farm with her parents at 10 kilometres from the village Pama was kidnapped by SONGOLE, an Anti-balaka comzone, who forced her into his house and raped her. The parents quickly informed the gendarmerie, who arrested him and transferred him to Bangui where he is in pre-detention pending trial. The girl has been referred for medical treatment.
7	29/Mar/15	NOUFU	GAMBOULA	7	On 29 March 2015, in Noufou village, 85 kilometres of Gamboula, southwest of Berbérati, prefectural authorities informed that alleged armed Peuhl from Cameroon reportedly killed up to seven people, wounded another and burnt down four houses. According to local authorities, the motive of the attack would be retaliation for the assassination of a Peuhl refugee in Cameroon on 19 March 2015. MINUSCA has dispatched a patrol to the area.
8	11/Apr/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 11 April 2015, in Berbérati, a thief attempted to rob the House of a Muslim diamond dealer was arrested and beaten up by Muslims and later taken to the hospital. The non-Muslims attempted to retaliate but were prevented of doing so by the Congolese contingent. No casualties were reported.
9	14/Apr/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 14 April 2015, in Berbérati, an anti-balaka element shot in the legs of an 18 year-old individual who refused to rent his house. The victim was taken to the hospital.
10	15/Apr/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 15 April 2015, in Berbérati, an anti-balaka elements and his group destroyed the doors of houses belonging to Muslims in Poto Poto neighbourhood. The perpetrator was seen by the Mayor who ordered his arrest.
11	04/May/15	GADZI	GADZI	1	On 4 May 2015, following up reported of a stranded Peuhl community in Gadzi, MINUSCA received additional information that up to 140 Peuhl are stranded in Gadzi, while 50 to 100 children are reportedly detained against their will by anti-balaka elements in Gbanabozoum village, Carnot sub-prefecture. Anti-balaka elements reportedly killed the Peuhl leader of Fadzi on 8 February 2015.
12	04/May/15	GAMBOULA	GAMBOULA	0	On 4 May 2015, the Mayor of Gamboula, 86 kilometres West of Berbérati, confirmed reports by UNHCR of extortion by armed elements on the local population in 11 villages in the area bordering Cameroon. The Mayor said attackers were a mix of well-armed men from FDPC, former Séléka and Peuhl. UNHCR reported that due to

					the activity of these criminal elements, 87 families had arrived to Gamboula from throughout the Gamboula and Amada Gaza sous-prefectures since April 2015, while others had fled to Cameroon.
13	07/May/15	NZAERI	GAMBOULA	0	On 7 May 2015, in Nzaeri village, the mayor of Gamboula informed MINUSCA of an attack. Two civilians arrived in Gamboula with AK47 wounds on 8 May, while other wounded civilians continued to reach Gamboula village. According to the mayor, the attackers were a mix of well-armed men from FDPC, former Séléka and Peuhl, while other sources suspected former FACA.
14	11/May/15	GODAWA	GAMBOULA	5	On 11 May 2015, in Godawa village, 100 kilometres north of Gamboula, three men and one woman were reportedly killed by unidentified individuals. A local self-defence group killed one suspect the following day. According to the information, the individual killed the following day was the mayor of Gamboula, this was not confirmed.
15	20/May/15	NOUFOU	GAMBOULA	0	On 20 May 2015, one day after the passage of a MINUSCA patrol, Noufou village was reportedly attacked once more by some 100-armed elements.
16	27/May/15	BAMBO-MBOKO	GAMBOULA	0	On 27 May 2015, in Bambo-Mboko village, 18 kilometres from Gambia, anti-balaka elements launched reprisals attacks on Peuhl herders. This caused Peuhl to flee the area leaving behind two teenagers, 12 and 14 years old. The children were handed over to the village chief for further transfer to a humanitarian organization based in Berberati.
17	17/Jun/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 17 June 2015, in Berberati, a young Muslim IDP chased by presumed anti-balaka elements, sought refuge at the MINUSCA FO.
18	01/Jul/15	MBOULA	CARNOT	0	On 1 July 2015, in Mboula, the local Gendarmerie intercepted a group of anti-balaka elements who were armed with two AK-47s. The two suspects were released at the conclusion of the investigation. One of the MSF ( <i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i> ) workers based at the Mboula Hospital asked a local person to transfer a medical patient to Carnot Hospital by motorbike belonging to the Gendarmerie. Anti-balaka combatants robbed the person when he was returning from Carnot and the attackers fled with the motorbike to SOUKPE village.

19	11/Jul/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 11 July 2015, in Berbérati, a 25-year old disabled woman was physically attacked by alleged anti-balaka elements.
20	11/Jul/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 11 July 2015, in Longote 1 neighborhood, in Berbérati, a 23-year-old was arrested at an illegal check point by 11 alleged anti-balaka elements and detained and ill-treated. He was released the following day after payment of a ransom.
21	20/Jul/15	GBANBIA	AMADA GAZA	0	Around 25 July 2015, over the past days, hundreds of anti-balaka elements are reported to have been converging in the area to repel an imminent Peuhl attack. Tensions have been rising since two Peuhl minors, aged 8 and 9 years, were taken hostage by anti-balaka elements two months ago. According to the Amada Gaza sub-prefect, the anti-balaka have requested 15,000,000 CFA as a ransom to release the two minors. MINUSCA will continue facilitating negotiations between the Peuhl and anti-balaka representatives in order to ease tension and secure the release of the hostages. The two children were rescued by MINUSCA patrol on 26 August 2015.
22	29/Jul/15	CARNOT	CARNOT	0	On 29 July 2015, the Gendarmerie in Berbérati informed MINUSCA of the arrest of an anti-balaka element the same day in Carnot, Mambere-Kadei prefecture. Allegedly, the suspect was involved in illicit activities and death threats against the Berbérati Mayor in the night of 17 July. Local authorities are considering the suspect's transfer to Bangui or Berbérati, however the local police fear retaliation from the anti-balaka. MINUSCA Force is ready to provide security.
23	05/Aug/15	NANDOBO	BERBERATI	0	On 5 August 2015, in Nandobo, a Muslim, who had returned from Cameroon, where he had been a refugee since 2014, was threatened by local anti-balaka elements and consequently saved by MINUSCA and the national gendarmerie. Local authorities asked MINUSCA to help transferring the man to Berbérati.
24	15/Aug/15	CARNOT/BAORO	CARNOT	0	On 15 August 2015, a Muslim diamond dealer, returning from Cameroon by car, was attacked by anti-balaka militia in Baoro, but managed to escape. On arrival to Carnot local police apprehended him

					and tore his identity card apart.
25	20/Aug/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 20 August 2015, in Berberati, six Muslims, alleged former Séléka elements, returned from CAR refugee camps in Cameroon. A crowd of several hundred people in reaction surrounded them but MINUSCA Forces intervened, saving the six from mob justice and subsequently handing them over to the Gendarmerie.
26	23/Aug/15	KATAGBA, WOTORO	BERBERATI	0	On 23 August 2015, in Katagba and Wotor villages, 6 and 8 kilometres from Berberati respectively, seven presumed anti-balaka elements, including one former FACA, attacked the villages. The attackers were arrested on 25 August.
27	23/Aug/15	ZINGA	MBAIKI	3	On 23 August 2015, in Zinga village, located approximately 20 kilometres east of Batalimo, an unknown person killed three local residents. The local people wanted the suspect killed but the suspect was taken by the Gendarmerie for safety as they proceed with the investigation.
28	27/Aug/15	AMADA GAZA	AMADA GAZA	0	On 27 August 2015, in Amada-Gaza, a self-defence militia group under the leadership of 'Colonel' Nice, allegedly based in Bangui, has been identified. The group is mostly comprised of anti-balaka members are seen carrying shotguns while conducting their "duties". They are often involved in the adjudication of both criminal and civil cases.
29	02/Sep/15	BAYANGA, BILOLO	NOLA	0	On 2 September 2015, The COGBAT detachment in NOLA is following two suspected armed groups, one led by Ferdinand Ndombi based in Bayanga village, 120 kilometres south of Nola and another located between Salo and Bilolo led by Eric Ekemo. Both groups are suspected to be involved in various criminal activities and aligned with the anti-balaka.
30	05/Sep/15	NOLA	NOLA		On 5 September 2015, in Nola, presence of anti-balaka coordinator Olivier Bienvenu Kolo (who lives in Bayanga) with a group of anti-balaka is reported. It appears that he had set up a group of anti-balaka

					in QRF (Quick reaction Force) 60 kilometres from Nola IOT to intervene at the appropriate time to try to deny Muslims to come back there or to attack them and their properties.
31	05/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 5 September 2015, in Berberati, the illegal presence of an anti-balaka criminal escaped from Ngaragba prison in Bangui on 7 July 2015 is reported. His name Aaron Wilibona aka Aron Oulibona accompanied by a group of about 8 anti-balaka combatants. He fled to Garoua-Boulaye in Cameroon after his escape, and now he could destabilize the precarious security situation of Berberati.
32	07/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 7 September 2015, in Berberati, Imam Nandobo was attacked at his home by armed individuals. He confronted the perpetrators and wounded one of them. One weapon was abandoned on the scene. An investigation was opened by the gendarmerie.
33	09/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 9 September 2015, in Berberati, the sub Prefect of Berberati informed that Muslims who abandoned their homes at the crisis time, are still being threatened by some unruly residents of their localities. He gave a reference of one, Mr Adam Abah (diamond dealer) a resident of Baniya village, who stayed as refugee in Cameroon during the crisis. He returned to Balego village on 8 September 2015 but he faced bitter anger of the residents, but he was saved by the timely intervention of the Baniya Gendarmerie. He is currently in the custody of Gendarmerie of Berberati for safety. In Soso Nakombo, similar treatment is reported to have been experienced by a number of Muslim businessmen who also attempted this week to go back and commence their various businesses.
34	14/Sep/15	NOGOTTO	BODA		On 14 September 2015, in Ngotto, a number of unidentified armed groups who are believed to be hiding in the Ngotto forest for rebel training and other criminal purposes. Though no clear identification, these said groups are alleged to be mostly former President Bozizé supporters with a likely intention of disrupting the election in those areas.

35	17/Sep/15	CARNOT	CARNOT		On 17 September 2015, in Carnot, anti-balaka elements attempted to attack the Carnot gendarmerie post to free a comrade who had been arrested for killing a diamond dealer. The local gendarmerie requested MINUSCA to transfer him to Bangui. The next day, a gendarme shot the escaped anti-balaka causing protests of the unhappy population. The victim was taken to the hospital.
36	23/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 23 September 2015, in Berbérati, Mambere-Kadei, anti-balaka elements reportedly started harassing the group of 70 Peuhl transiting from Boda to Cameroon. Tensions rose due to a rumour of an upcoming attack by Muslims. The local gendarmerie now guard the Peuhl camp. The same day, anti-balaka elements reportedly tried to prevent the return from Cameroon of the Peuhl chief of Gbabaza, 30 kilometres from Berbérati.
37	30/Sep/15	CARNOT	CARNOT	1	On 30 September 2015, in Carnot, alleged anti-balaka elements attempted to loot the house of a Muslim family. One of the victims succumbed to his injuries in the night of 30 September 2015.
38	30/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 30 September 2015, in Berbérati, anti-balaka group was reinforcing its elements, with the intention of going to Bangui to support their partners in the escalation of violence. Anti-balaka also continues blocking the MSR 1 between Bossembélé and Bangui, while armed anti-balaka members are continuously arriving in Boali for the same purpose. They are arriving by trucks and motorbikes since 29 September. They are putting barricades and threatening to the population on the MSR 1.

**Annex 5.16: Mining site in Boda**

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 12 June 2015*



**Annex 5.17: Purchasing policies of buying houses for the west of the CAR**

1. SODIAM is the main buyer of diamonds from the western production zone, purchasing 21,043 carats between 1 July 2014 and 5 September 2015, bringing its total stock to 70,036 carats.<sup>183</sup> SODIAM's buyer and supplying collectors in Carnot explained to the Panel that they do not purchase from anti-balaka members and have not received any signals among their suppliers in the field of interference by armed groups in the Carnot *sous-préfecture*.<sup>184</sup> They were not aware of the situation in Sasélé, from where a supplying collector of SODIAM previously purchased diamonds.<sup>185</sup> SODIAM's General Director further told the Panel that the company no longer purchases diamonds from Hassan Fawaz, on grounds of links he apparently developed with anti-balaka elements.<sup>186</sup> SODIAM's last purchase from Fawaz was recorded on 2 February 2015.<sup>187</sup>
  
2. The second largest buyer of diamonds from the west is Sud-Azur, with 2,936 carats purchased between June 2014 and September 2015, followed by BADICA (listed on 20 August by the 2127 Sanctions Committee) with 186 carats from Carnot between May and September 2014, and 500 carats purchased in July and August 2015 from Boda, Nola and Yaloké.<sup>188</sup> In a written response to a query by the Panel about buying houses' purchasing policies, BADICA's legal representatives communicated that recent purchases from the west were meant to benefit from the partial lifting of the Kimberley suspension.<sup>189</sup> Sud Azur's Director General emphasised in his response that purchases from the west made in Bangui derive exclusively from collectors and artisanal operators recognised by mining authorities.<sup>190</sup>

<sup>183</sup> Official purchasing records provided by the Ministry of Mines, 2014-2015, archived at the UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>184</sup> Meeting with SODIAM's buyer and supplying collectors, Carnot, 18 June 2015.

<sup>185</sup> See paragraphs 129-131 of the 2014 Panel's final report.

<sup>186</sup> Meeting with SODIAM's General Director, Bangui, 21 September 2015.

<sup>187</sup> Official purchasing records provided by the Ministry of Mines, 2014-2015, archived at the UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>189</sup> The letter from BADICA's legal representative is in **annex 3.12.2**.

<sup>190</sup> The letter from Sud Azur Director General in annex is in **annex 3.12.6**

**Annex 5.18:** Case of gold purchased by the buying house Adamas-Swiss

1. The General Director of the company explained to the Panel that he was assured by state mining authorities and security services that Ndolobo was not under armed group control. The company had not gone to mine site itself to verify the situation.
2. A guard unit like the one active in Ndolobo constitutes *per se* a private security force, for which the same supply chain due diligence approach applies as for armed groups.<sup>191</sup> OECD due diligence guidance, *inter alia*, recommends companies to require that private security forces contracted by any party in the supply chain will be engaged in accordance with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.
3. The guidance further recommends that companies adopt and implement a plan to mitigate the risk of direct or indirect support to private security forces, and suspend engagement with upstream suppliers if after six months of adopting the plan conditions are not met.<sup>192</sup>
4. In the present case, it is unlikely that the guard unit can fulfil conditions, not in the least because, according to the voluntary principles, private security should not be engaged in activities exclusively the responsibility of state military or law enforcement authorities<sup>193</sup>, which is the case in Ndolobo, since it is not covered by any privately held mining title.<sup>194</sup>

<sup>191</sup> See the section on “Diamonds and security” in chapter III about due diligence *vis-à-vis* former Séléka-controlled areas.


<sup>192</sup> See for full recommendations with regard to private and public security companies, see OECD, 2013, *op. cit.*, pages 22 and 23.

<sup>193</sup> See The Voluntary Principles, 2000, The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights”, p. 6, last accessed in October 2015 at: [http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/voluntary\\_principles\\_english.pdf](http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/voluntary_principles_english.pdf).

<sup>194</sup> For web map, including mining titles, see, Filip Hilgert, Lotte Hoex, Steven Spittaels, Yannick Weyns, 2014, “Mapping Conflict Motives: the CAR”, International Peace Information Service (IPIS), accessed on 23 October 2015 at <http://ipisresearch.be/publication/mapping-conflict-motives-central-african-republic-2/>.



## Annex 5.19: List of arms and ammunition handed in by Alfred Yékatom alias 'Rhombot'



Source: Photograph of the document taken by the Panel

**Annex 5.20: Security payments to anti-balaka by related to exploitation of timber**

1. Personnel of the *Société d'Exploitation Forestière Centrafricaine* (SEFCA) in its main concession in Mambélé told the Panel in August 2015 that they had not faced any disturbances since the height of anti-balaka insurrection in the first half of 2014; however, they admitted to having made payments to avoid anti-balaka sabotaging operations during this time.<sup>195</sup>
2. Anti-balaka coordinator in Berbérati, 'Chiki Chiki', told the Panel that prior to his departure to Nairobi in December 2014, his group had provided protection to SEFCA premises in Berbérati, at a rate of FCFA 150,000 (USD 300) per week.<sup>196</sup>
3. Two other confidential sources to the Panel confirmed the arrangement and amount.<sup>197</sup> One of the sources was present during an anti-balaka meeting in Berbérati on 18 June 2014 on the subject.
4. SEFCA's Deputy Director told the Panel he would investigate the matter, but already explained that at the time anti-balaka forces were posing a serious threat to company personnel and assets in the company's area of operation.<sup>198</sup> In early 2015, police authorities in Berbérati put a stop to protection arrangements between anti-balaka and business operators.<sup>199</sup>

<sup>195</sup> Meeting with SEFCA personnel, Mambélé, 20 August 2015.

<sup>196</sup> Meeting with Yapélé, Berbérati 17 June 2015.

<sup>197</sup> Meeting with a civil society source present during the meeting, Berbérati, 15 June 2015; telephone interview with religious authority in Berbérati, 6 April 2015.

<sup>198</sup> Telephone conversation with SEFCA Deputy Director to follow up on the Panel's request for information, 2 November 2015.

<sup>199</sup> Meeting with Yapélé, Berbérati, 17 June 2105; Meeting with deputy police commander, Berbérati, 17 June 2015.

**Annex 6: Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze****Implementation of the assets freeze**

1. Following the listing on 9 May 2014 and on 20 August 2015 of six individuals and one associated entities subject to the travel ban and assets freeze established and maintained by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 2127 (2013), the Panel requested information about the accounts and transfers of those individuals and of known family members and associates from financial institutions operating in the Central African Republic and the region to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources be prevented from being made available to or for the benefit of the designated individuals.
2. One financial institution, the *Banque Populaire Maroco-Centrafricaine* (BPMC), has not responded to two requests for information sent by the Panel. The lack of cooperation is reason for the Panel to put BPMC under close scrutiny in the future.
3. On 26 July 2014, a financial institution informed the Panel that François Bozizé received in Kampala USD 300 that sent by his son, Socrate Bozizé, from the French island of *La Réunion*, in the Indian Ocean. Bozizé's bank account at one financial institution in Bangui is under "no debit" instruction, as is the one of Nourredine Adam. The accounts were not credited since both individuals were listed.
4. BADICA holds accounts at three different banks in the Central African Republic. One informed the Panel that BADICA took several loans in 2010 of FCFA 2,308,548,637 (USD 4,617,274) to purchase real estate and diamonds, of which FCFA 1,596,167,726 (USD 3,192,335) is still outstanding. The real estate consists of two properties, one valued at FCFA 2,046,675,082 (USD 4,093,350) and one at FCFA 400,000,000 (USD 800,000), with a note that associated rental income should service the loan debt.
5. The Panel notes that in accordance with Security Council resolution 2196 (2015), the guidelines of the Committee, section 12 (g.ii), provide for exemption to the asset freeze in case of payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the assets freeze. However, such exemption requests have to be submitted through the State of residence or registration in case of entities.

### Violation of the travel ban

6. During the course of its mandate, the Panel noticed several travel ban violations by Nourredine Adam and François Bozizé. Information obtained by the Panel indicates that Nourredine Adam violated the travel ban at least six times and Francois Bozizé at least seven times.
7. By paragraph 4 of resolution 2196 (2015), the Security Council decided that “all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee.” By paragraph 6 of resolution 2196 (2015), the Security Council emphasized “that violations of the travel ban can undermine the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic”, and observed “that individuals who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria provided for in this resolution”.
8. The majority of violations by both listed individuals took place around the organisation of the Nairobi talks from December 2014 to April 2015 at the initiative of the International Mediator with the support of the government of Kenya, thereby setting the scene for the violations.


*Photograph of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta with sanctioned individuals François Bozizé (first rank – second left) and Nourredine Adam (first rank – third right), surrounded by anti-balaka and former Séléka political and military commanders*



*Source: Posted on the Kenyan Presidency twitter account @StateHouseKenya on 14 April 2015 at 8:38 am.*

9. The Panel also believes that Albino Mathiem Ayuel Aboug, a South-Sudanese and US national, played a key role in the organisation of the Nairobi talks, in his capacity as Special Adviser of the Congolese President Sassou N’Guesso.<sup>200</sup> He facilitated the travels of sanctioned individuals Adam and Bozizé, which represent a designation criteria pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2196 (2015), and he was also in charge of some logistical aspects, including hotel bookings and *per diem*. Some participants also mentioned that he was suspected of having diverted part of the money for the organisation of the event.


*Albino Aboug and its appointment decree*



10. While attending the Nairobi Forum, Nourredine Adam travelled to Addis Ababa on 5 February 2015 and returned on 17 February 2015 onboard Ethiopian Airways (ET305 and ET302). The governments of Ethiopia and Kenya each received a letter from the Panel on 11 March 2015 requesting more information about Adam’s trips.

<sup>200</sup> “Presidential decree number 2014-633 of 26 November 2014 appointing Albino M. Ayuel Aboug as Special Adviser of the President of the Republic of the Congo”.

*Photograph of Nourredine Adam at Nairobi airport on 5 February 2015*



DOB : 01/01/1970  
 Birth Place :  
 Height :  
 Gender : Male  
 Weight :  
 Marital Status :  
 Nationality : CAF Central African Republic  
 Ethnicity :  
 Hair Color :  
 Eye Color :

#### Documents

Document Type	Document Number	Country	Issue Date	Expiration Date	Issued
	00001104	CAF Central African		09/04/2018	

*Source: Interpol*

11. Since his listing Nourredine Adam went to Chad in October 2014, (letter sent 11 December 2014), and on 21 April 2015 (letter sent 24 April 2015). He is reported to have entered the Central African territory from Chad on 8 October 2015, a few days before his troops started their march from Kaga-Bandoro to Sibut where they were stopped by international forces. While travelling from Nairobi to N'Djamena, Adam transited in Cameroon on 21 April 2015. A letter was sent to the Cameroonian authorities in this regard on 28 April 2015.
12. On 28 November 2014, the Panel informed the government of South Africa about a potential travel of Bozizé to South Africa on or around 13 September 2014. On 15 October 2015 the Panel sent another letter to the government of South Africa indicating travel of Francois Bozizé to South Africa on 14 October 2015, again in violation of the travel ban.
13. On 28 November 2014, the Panel also informed the government of the DRC that Francois Bozizé was reported to have travelled to Kinshasa earlier that month. On 1 December 2014, the Panel informed the government of the Republic of Congo about the entry of Francois Bozizé in Brazzaville on 30 November 2014. On 11 December 2014, the Panel informed the government of Kenya of a reported travel of Francois Bozizé, as well as Nourredine Adam to Nairobi on or around 13 September. On 11 December 2014, the Ugandan government was informed by the

Panel about the use of their country by Francois Bozizé as a hub for travels in the region in violation of the travel ban.

14. Between September 2014 and October 2015 the Panel sent 22 letters to a total of 10 countries and 3 entities requesting details about possible travel ban violations. One Member State provided an answer, three only acknowledged receipt, and six failed to reply at all. One entity provided an answer, while one did not reply. The lack of cooperation with the Panel reduces Member States' ability to implement the travel ban. Warnings from the Panel that Nourredine Adam was most likely traveling under a different identity, Adam Mahamat or Mahamat Adam, were not acknowledged in any response by relevant Member States.
15. On 3 March 2015, the CAR Head of State of the transition sent a letter to the Sanctions Committee in which she called for a thorough implementation of the sanctions measures. This letter should be understood in the context of security risks linked to Member States' trivialisation of the sanctions regime, and of the credibility of sanctions and threats of sanctions to political spoilers. The Security Council Committee reacted by inviting the concerned States to a meeting with the Committee during which it solicited explanations, and released a press communiqué.
16. Security Council resolution 2196 (2015) further enhanced the travel ban mechanism by observing that individuals who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria. A Security Council's Presidential Statement of 20 October 2015 and the conclusions of the March 2015 meeting of the International Contact Group of the CAR, mention the intention to further apply sanctions to political spoilers and implement those on already designated individuals.

## Annex 7: Humanitarian section

1. The humanitarian situation in the CAR can be described as complex and in much need of attention. Despite all the efforts undertaken by the humanitarian community the situation remains at a critical emergency level, as witnessed by the Panel on different occasions throughout the mandate. This section will provide information on some of the key elements, as follows: acts involving sexual violence, the targeting of civilians, attacks on schools, attacks on hospitals, the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, and obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid.

### Acts involving sexual violence

2. In the course of 2015, UNFPA and humanitarian partners participating in the sub-cluster, registered 23,361 cases of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in 47 Sub-Prefectures of the Central African Republic. The data registered does not specify the type of violation, but according to the sub-cluster they include rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery and sexual exploitation.<sup>201</sup> In 2014, 6,700 cases were reported to the GBV Sub-Cluster (Gender Based Violence Sub-Cluster) in 14 Sub-Prefectures in the country. From 5 December 2013 to 31 July 2014, three of the five main partners (INGOs) that provide data to the sub cluster reported a total of 784 cases of sexual violence in the Central African Republic.<sup>202</sup> The increase in the number of reported cases, as reported by UNFPA, is explained by the fact that sub-cluster partners had more access to information and more operational capacity in 2015 as compared to 2014.<sup>203</sup> Perpetrators were not frequently recorded in the Information Management tool, but according to the information provided by UNFPA perpetrators include: unknown armed men, family members, neighbours, and unknown individuals. See below the disaggregated data provided by the sub-cluster.

<sup>201</sup> Email communication from UNFPA, 22 October 2015. UNFPA also informed the Panel that this information should be published before the end of 2015.

<sup>202</sup> See Panel's 2014 final report.

<sup>203</sup> Email communication from UNFPA, *op.cit.*

*Data collected by GBVIMS members (12 international and national NGOs working in 47 sous-préfectures in the CAR) and consolidated by UNFPA between 1 January and 30 October 2015*

	Number of incidents of sexual violence segregated by sex and age of survivors				Total
	Men	Women	Girls	Boys	
Bangui	123	10810	6431	394	17758
Bamingui- Bangoram	0	51	55	1	107
Basse Kotto	0	56	41	0	97
Haut Mbomou	0	67	44	0	111
Haute Kotto	16	170	139	43	368
Kemo	0	163	110	38	311
Lobaye	0	101	73	0	174
Mambere-Kadei	0	116	95	0	211
Mboumou	0	126	91	0	217
Nana Gebrizi	10	292	148	32	482
Nana Mamabere	2	238	150	3	393
Ombrella Mpoko	5	286	170	2	463
Ouaka	68	552	422	167	1209
Ouham	0	365	229	2	596
Ouham Pende	0	145	93	0	238
Sanga Mbaere	0	0	0	0	0
Vakaga	28	284	226	88	626
<b>Total</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>13822</b>	<b>8517</b>	<b>770</b>	<b>23361</b>

Number of incidents of sexual violence segregated by number and kind of perpetrators											
ALLEGED PERPETATORS	Armed med (this category includes: parties to the conflict, non-identified armed youth, state security forces and peacekeepers)					Civilians					Tot
	PREFECTURES	1	2	3	More than 3	Total	1	2	3	3	
Bangui	7925	2102	1047	1535	12609	4813	148	93	95	5149	17758
Bamingui Bangoran	54	12	9	7	82	14	4	3	4	25	107
Basse Kotto	21	14	18	16	69	23	2	3	0	28	97
Haut Mbomou	41	10	15	19	85	16	4	6	0	26	111
Haute Kotto	123	28	66	90	307	31	0	21	9	61	368
Kémo	52	50	57	68	227	34	22	15	13	84	311
Lobaye	46	18	33	26	123	23	16	12	0	51	174
Mambéré Kadéï	54	24	27	45	150	36	16	9	0	61	211
Mbomou	38	26	33	54	151	42	18	6	0	66	217
Nana Grébizi	119	32	51	79	281	106	74	21	0	201	482
Nana Mambéré	102	62	45	69	278	81	26	3	5	115	393
Ombella M'Poko	86	16	54	91	247	99	58	33	26	216	463
Ouaka	327	88	132	237	784	162	142	72	49	425	1209
Ouham	124	64	42	51	281	165	56	87	7	315	596
Ouham Pendé	93	8	27	21	149	74	12	3	0	89	238
Sangha Mbaéré	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vakaga	273	72	36	61	442	142	24	12	6	184	626
<b>TOTAL/TYPES AUTEURS</b>	<b>9478</b>	<b>2626</b>	<b>1692</b>	<b>2469</b>	<b>16265</b>	<b>5861</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>399</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>7096</b>	<b>23361</b>

3. In the course of 2015, confidential sources reported a total of 23 cases in which minors were victims of sexual violence that resulted in 26 victims of rape, namely, 25 females and one male.<sup>204</sup> Out of the 23 cases, anti-balaka elements were responsible for 12 of the incidents reported; two were committed by LRA elements; six by former Séléka – UPC faction elements, and three by unidentified individuals. These 23 cases are to be considered as a small sample of the GBV situation in the country but not as a representative sample of what is happening in the entire country. The cases were investigated in detail, and this is not the case for all sexual and gender based violence in the CAR. Illustrated below are details of cases where perpetrators were identified.

<sup>204</sup> Confidential report, 22 September 2015.

*Details of anti-balaka cases where perpetrators were identified*<sup>205</sup>

4. On 25 March 2015, a 12-year-old girl who was going to the farm with her parents at 10 kilometres from the village Pama was kidnapped by "Songole", an anti-balaka element from Boda in Lobaye province who forced her into his house and raped her. The parents informed the gendarmerie who arrested him and transferred him to Bangui for trial, he escaped on 28 September 2015 from Ngaragba prison in Bangui. The girl was referred for medical treatment.<sup>206</sup>
5. On 15 May 2015, a 14-year-old girl was raped by an anti-balaka element known as Salomon Depara, affiliated to the Comzone Gaetan Boade, in Kidjigra area, Bambari. The incident happened at around 20:00 hours, while the girl was returning home from her brother's place. She was forced to follow five men to the house of the alleged perpetrator who held her by force and raped her. He reportedly tried to give the victim FCFA 5,000 afterwards, which she refused. The victim received medical support on 22 May 2015 and psychosocial assistance on 29 May 2015. No complaint was filed to judicial authorities.<sup>207</sup>

*Details of LRA cases where perpetrators were identified:*

6. On 8 February, a 15-year-old girl was kidnapped by an LRA group in the village of Morabanda, along with other children. The girl was used to carry goods, conduct domestic work, and she was raped on numerous occasions by an LRA element called Samuel. The perpetrator apparently told her several times that the sexual intercourse was to prepare her for her future wedding. The girl managed to escape in July 2015. The victim received medical treatment and had returned to her family at the time of writing of this report.<sup>208</sup>
7. On February 2015, a 14-year-old girl was abducted along with two of her brothers by armed men suspected to be members of the LRA in the village of Wago, 70 kilometres from Bria on the Bria-Yalinga axis. She reported that on several occasions, she was repeatedly raped by one of the armed group leaders called Moufoulanga. The victim received medical attention after her escape.<sup>209</sup>

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*; Panel's Database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.<sup>209</sup> Confidential report, *op.cit.*; Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

*Details of UPC cases where perpetrators were identified*

8. Six of the 23 reported cases of rape were allegedly committed by UPC elements in the Ouaka province.<sup>210</sup> In three cases the perpetrators were not identified. The following cases have identified perpetrators:
9. On 3 March 2015, a 13-year-old girl resident in Boubala, situated 23 kilometres on the Kouango-Lioto axis was raped by Colonel Abdourahmane Mahmat alias “Sirongo” of the former Séléka faction of UPC. The perpetrator claimed to confidential sources that he wanted to marry the victim, but later abandoned her. Later in April 2015 the same Colonel “Sirongo” was accused of raping a 16-year-old girl in the 2<sup>nd</sup> district of Kouango. No judicial action has been taken against the perpetrator for any of the cases at the time of writing.<sup>211</sup>
10. On 15 April 2015, a 13-year-old girl from the village of Ngakabo, approximately 60 kilometres on the Bambari-Bangassou axis, was raped by the local zone commander of the former Séléka UPC faction of Ngakobo. The victim is a fruit vendor and the local zone commander under the pretext of wanting to buy her fruits, lured and raped her. The incident was not reported to the police and the name of the perpetrator was not available at the time of writing. The victim received medical attention.<sup>212</sup>
11. On 19 April 2015, a 12-year-old girl was raped in the village of Gandjia by Aroune Agoudji, the local commander of the former Séléka, UPC faction. The perpetrator forced the victim into marriage and is currently living with her in Lioto village located 45 kilometres on the Kouango-Grimari axis. No judicial action has been taken against the perpetrator at the time of writing.<sup>213</sup>

**Targeting of civilians**

12. In the course of 2015 the Panel continued to monitor the killings of civilians throughout the country based on credible reports from different sources that include UN, NGOs, civil society and investigations undertaken by Panel members in the field. Since 5 December 2013 until 15 November 2015, a total of 4,278 civilians have been killed in the context of the conflict. The grand majority of these took place in 2013 during the peak of violence in Bangui where more than

<sup>210</sup> Confidential report, *op.cit.*

<sup>211</sup> Panel’s database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>212</sup> Confidential source, obtained by the Panel on 22 September 2015; Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; Archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>213</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

1,200 civilians were reported to be killed in the month of December.<sup>214</sup> The Panel has registered 723 civilians killed since 1 January 2015 until 15 November 2015.<sup>215</sup> This does not include the killings reported during the recent escalation of violence in Bangui, which started on 26 September.

13. According to the Panel's database, the escalation of violence in Bangui from 26 September 2015 until 16 October 2015 resulted in the death of 79 people and 512 wounded.<sup>216</sup>

#### **Attacks on schools and misuse of education facilities<sup>217</sup>**

14. In the course of 2015 the Panel has been monitoring incidents where unlawful activities have taken place in schools in the Central African Republic or where schools and students were victims of violence.<sup>218</sup> Additionally, this section will also touch on information concerning MINUSCA's occupation of two schools. The Panel and other organizations continue to point out that MINUSCA forces have been occupying one school since 2014 and no solution to move these forces from these schools has been agreed on.
15. On 13 February 2015, around 19:00 hours, in Bangui, an IOM national staff on his way to his residence in Gobongo was stopped by 10 anti-balaka elements. One of them forced the staff onto a motorbike with two other anti-balaka elements. The perpetrators took the victim to a school in Gobongo where they stole a VHF radio, one laptop and a camera. The individual was released unharmed at 20:00 hours.<sup>219</sup>
16. On 6 March 2015 in Bobazi village (east of Batangafo, Ouham Province), a group of anti-balaka elements from Batangafo pillaged the Bobazi primary school. An INGO had provided support to this school since 2013. On the day of the incident, armed anti-balaka elements robbed the zinc sheets from the school's roof leaving the building exposed to the elements. No further damages or casualties were reported. It should be noted that most of the population in the village had been displaced to Batangafo IDP sites due to the fragile security situation in the area.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>214</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>216</sup> OCHA Central African Republic, Flash Update 8, 16 October 2015. Accessed on 23 October 2015 at: [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash\\_update\\_8.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash_update_8.pdf)

<sup>217</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>219</sup> Confidential source, 17 February 2015.

<sup>220</sup> Email communication with CAR Education Sub-Cluster on 22 August 2015. Sub-Cluster Education RCA - Attaques contre l'éducation - Database - Document archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB. Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

17. On 13 May 2015, around 14:30 hours, in Batangafo, six staff of an INGO were attacked by anti-balaka elements and an angry mob during a food distribution at the IDPs school Bagga. Despite the fact that the INGO staff tried to explain that they were conducting humanitarian assistance activities, the attackers wounded two of the staff present prompting the INGO to stop its activities.<sup>221</sup>
18. On 14 May 2015, in Bambari, an attempted murder of a student by a group of armed men created panic among the other students of a mixed high school. The armed elements were identified as relatives of former Séléka UPC elements.<sup>222</sup>
19. On 3 June 2015, around 10:00 hours, in the 4<sup>th</sup> arrondissement of the Boy-Rabe area of Bangui, MINUSCA elements were attempting to arrest an anti-balaka who had stolen two vehicles in the past weeks. MINUSCA recovered one of the stolen vehicles and on the way back, around Lycée Barthelemy Boganda the patrol fell into an ambush set up by anti-balaka armed elements. In violation of international law, anti-balaka elements from the Maxime Mokom faction,<sup>223</sup> led by Guy Mazimbélet<sup>224</sup> used the school as a theatre of operations to attack peacekeepers putting in danger the life of students who were attending school at the time of events. Guy Mazimbélet was killed on 28 September 2015 during the escalation of violence in Bangui.<sup>225</sup> According to Watchlist International “anti-balaka members allegedly used students as human shields during fighting with MINUSCA troops”.<sup>226</sup> During the incident two peacekeepers were wounded. The gunshots caused panic among the students who fled the scene. 85 children were transferred to four different hospitals for medical attention. Most of them sustained minor injuries from the scuffles that ensued. Some witnesses stated that the anti-balaka deliberately put the children in danger by choosing the site across from the schoolyard for their ambush. The number of casualties on the anti-balaka side remains unknown.<sup>227</sup>

<sup>221</sup> Confidential source, 20 May 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>222</sup> Confidential report 16 May 2015.

<sup>223</sup> List of AB Zone Commanders of Maxime Mokom faction provided by Military Chief of Staff on 6 July 2015 in Bangui; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>224</sup> Telephone interview on 22 September 2015 with an eyewitness present at the time of the event and confidential source, 22 September 2015, Bangui.

<sup>225</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>226</sup> Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 2015 Report “Vulnerable Students, Unsafe Schools: Attacks and Military Use of Schools in the Central African Republic”, September 10, 2015, on 24 October 2015, at: <http://watchlist.org/vulnerable-students-unsafe-schools-attacks-and-military-use-of-schools-in-the-central-african-republic/>

<sup>227</sup> Confidential source, 3 June 2015; confidential source, 4 June 2015; Confidential report, 5 June 2015; confidential source, 5 June 2015; confidential source, 1 to 5 June 2015; confidential source, 2-8 June 2015. MINUSCA Press Release, “La MINUSCA condamne fermement l’attaque contre les casques bleus à Bangui”, June 5, 2015, accessed on 23 October 2015 at:

20. On 5 June 2015, around 22:00 hours, in Bria, five individuals, two armed with AK47s and three with machetes, assaulted a garage's guard. The attackers put a mask on his face and took him to the Mbramake schoolyard, where the victim was beaten and sustained a wound on the arm. The attackers then left the scene and the local population took the victim to the hospital. The local police opened an investigation, however, at the time of writing no results have been reported from the investigation.<sup>228</sup>
21. On 25 June 2015, around 20:00 hours, in Bangui, the headmaster of the Boganda high school reported a robbery in his office by a group of six armed individuals. They stole some education and teaching materials. No casualties were reported.<sup>229</sup>
22. On 8 July 2015, in Bongbagalo and Mbagolo (east of Bambari, Ouaka Province) UPC elements continued to raise barriers in front of two Health Centres. The barriers dissuade the community from receiving health care. Moreover, UPC elements have also occupied a nursery school and a youth centre in Ngadza (Bambari-Kouango axis) preventing humanitarian actors and the local community from using these buildings.<sup>230</sup>

*Occupied school by MINUSCA forces:*

23. In Bangui's 3<sup>rd</sup> district, MINUSCA police officers have been based in the primary public school of Koudoukou since 2014.<sup>231</sup> The education sub-cluster last update was on 31 August 2015 and at the time of writing of the report the school in Bangui was still being used by MINUSCA Police Officers.<sup>232</sup> It is important that the mission ceases the occupation of these schools and finds other locations as bases without ceasing to provide protection in the area.

<http://minusca.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=aktXwAt9nnk%3D&tabid=5620&mid=9622&language=fr-FR> ; Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 2015 Report "Vulnerable Students, Unsafe Schools: Attacks and Military Use of Schools in the Central African Republic". September 10, 2015; accessed on 24 October 2015 at: <http://watchlist.org/vulnerable-students-unsafe-schools-attacks-and-military-use-of-schools-in-the-central-african-republic/>

<sup>228</sup> Confidential source, 8 June 2015; confidential source, 5 to 12 June 2015. Archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>229</sup> Confidential source, 29 June 2015. Archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>230</sup> Confidential report 9 July 2015; confidential source, 9 July 2015. Archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>231</sup> Sub-Cluster Education RCA - Attaques contre l'éducation - Database - Document archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB. Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 2015 Report, *op. cit.*

<sup>232</sup> Email communication with CAR Education Sub-Cluster in August 2015. Sub-Cluster Education RCA - Attaques contre l'éducation - Database - Document archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB. Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB. Email communication with Bangui UN staff who confirmed that Bangui school was still being used at the time of writing of this report.

### Attacks on hospitals

24. Between 1 February and 30 September 2015 the Panel recorded six (6) incidents in which medical staff, operations or facilities were affected by violence in the Central African Republic.<sup>233</sup> They are as follows:
- a. On 17 February 2015, in Bambari, UPC elements forcefully entered Bambari hospital and fired several shots in the air. The possible reasons for the assault include the intimidation of local anti-balaka elements and of wounded Christians from the previous day's inter-communal violence. No casualties were reported.<sup>234</sup>
  - b. On 26 February 2015, around 20:00 hours, in the village of Borno, 6 kilometres east of Bria two unidentified armed men forcefully entered the INGO run hospital and stole medication and money.<sup>235</sup>
  - c. On 5 March 2015, in Bouar, the WHO Bouar office chief noticed the theft of all the WFP items that were stored in a shop at the Bouar's hospital. An investigation has been opened by the gendarmerie but no results had been rendered by the time of writing this report.<sup>236</sup>
  - d. On 15 March 2015, during the night, in Bambari, the manager of Bambari's provincial hospital was kidnapped by three anti-balaka elements. His body was found the next day. The perpetrators are on the run. The incident led to a 48 hours strike by the hospital staff.<sup>237</sup>
  - e. On 3 July 2015, on the Baboua-Beloko axis, unidentified individuals attacked an ambulance transporting two Cameroonian peacekeepers wounded on 1 July in Yagbet village. No casualties were reported. The victims were transported to MINUSCA's hospital in Bangui on 4 July.<sup>238</sup>
  - f. On 12 July 2015, in Ndélé, during the night, family members of a patient who died in a hospital run by an INGO attacked the hospital staff. No major injuries were reported. The incident was apparently linked to the break-in the same night in the compound of the INGO that runs the hospital.<sup>239</sup>

<sup>233</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

<sup>234</sup> Confidential source, 17 February 2015; confidential source, 18 February 2015.

<sup>235</sup> Confidential source, 27 February 2015; confidential source, 2 March 2015.

<sup>236</sup> Confidential source, 2 to 9 March 2015.

<sup>237</sup> Confidential source, 17 March 2015.

<sup>238</sup> Confidential source, 6 July 2015; UN Report, 8 July 2015; confidential source, 3 to 10 July 2015.

<sup>239</sup> Confidential source, 14 July 2015; confidential source, 10 to 17 July 2015.

### Recruiting or use of children in armed conflict in the CAR

25. The use of children in armed conflict in the Central African Republic remains a serious violation of international law by all parties to the conflict. Although the Panel did not receive any reliable and credible information of new recruitment of children by any of the armed groups in the country, the Panel found that the use of children is widespread throughout the country. Progress has been made in terms of identification, demobilization and reintegration into civilian life of many children, but much more has to be done.
26. In 2014, UNICEF announced that they had identified around 6,000 children in the Central African Republic associated with armed groups.<sup>240</sup> Since then, two public events of demobilization of children associated with armed groups, led by UNICEF, have taken place in the Central African Republic, one in May 2015 in Bambari, Ouaka Province and the second and most recent in Batangafo, Ouham Province, in August 2015.<sup>241</sup> Demobilized children belong to both former Séléka factions and anti-balaka groups.
27. In May 2015, the Panel visited Bambari and conducted extensive interviews with demobilized children and with different stakeholders related to the identification, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers.<sup>242</sup> The Panel found that at least 50% of the minors demobilized were former combatants<sup>243</sup> (according to information obtained from the UNICEF implementing partners' database and interviews conducted by the Panel in Bambari), the other 50% were involved in other activities that include messengers, manning checkpoints, personal assistants, cleaning, cooking, and general support services for the troops. The Panel did not register sexual violence cases during interviews however it is plausible that there were such cases.
28. In the course of its investigations the Panel has identified military commanders of different armed groups, who continue to be active in different parts of the country, who also released children from their ranks for demobilization. These include: anti-balaka commanders in Bambari, Gaëtan Bouadé (see chapter IV Central

<sup>240</sup> UN News Centre, "Central African Republic: over 6,000 child soldiers may have been involved in fighting, UN says", 17 January 2014. Accessed on 27 October 2015 at <https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46954&Cr=central+african+republic&Cr1#>

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.* and UNICEF Press Centre, "New release of children by armed group in the Central African Republic brings total to more than 600 since May", 28 August 2015. Accessed on 27 October 2015 at: [http://www.unicef.org/media/media\\_83024.html](http://www.unicef.org/media/media_83024.html)

<sup>242</sup> Mission to Bambari from 20-23 May 2015.

<sup>243</sup> For this report the Panel considers that child combatants are those children who are / were armed and took part in combats, not those who undertake "support" functions.

Region) and “Tchenenguere”<sup>244</sup> and Séléka commanders: General Ali Darrassa Mahamat (see chapter IV Central Region), Colonel “Zakaria”, Colonel Bourma (see chapter II Northern region and border with Chad), General “Tarzan” (see chapter IV Central Region), Ahamat Mahadi Grégoire (see chapter II Northern region and border with Chad), Tidjani Karan, Issa Issaka Oubin (see chapter III Eastern region and border with Sudan and South Sudan), Amos Nadre, Deya Issaka and Sallet Djouma.<sup>245</sup>

29. According to information collected by the Panel, one of the main problems that the demobilization process of children is facing is the lack of medium and long-term strategies for re-integration. Some of the demobilized children have families and want to go back to school but the grand majority (especially those who have lost all their family and are closer to the age of 18) want to work, and be trained to undertake activities that can bring them some income. At the moment of writing of this report the Panel had not received any information from UNICEF in relation to programmes set in place for such projects.
30. Additionally, the Panel throughout the missions undertaken in the course of the 2015 mandate had seen minors on three different occasions within the ranks of different Séléka factions, particularly FPRC and UPC.

*Photograph of FPRC camp in Njamassinda  
taken by the Panel on 24 September 2015*



<sup>244</sup> Anti-balaka zone commander in Mandayeba, north of Bambari, Ouaka Province, information obtained by the Panel indicated that he is under command of Gaëtan Bouadé.

<sup>245</sup> Mission to Bambari from 20 to 23 May 2015; interviews conducted with demobilized children in different transit sites and with NGOs and INGOs providing support and assistance to these children.

*Photograph of FPRC child soldier  
taken by the Panel on 24 September 2015*





*Photograph of UPC child soldier under command of General Colonel Abdourahmane  
Mahmat alias "Sirongo" taken by the Panel on 16 April 2015*



31. According to the last update that the Panel received from UNICEF, on 27 October 2015 “the total number of children released in 2015 is 2,209 (1,719 boys and 490 girls, or 22%). This figure includes 148 children who had release ceremonies on 26 October 2015. In 2014, 2,807 children were released (including 646 girls, or 23%). Thus, the total combined number of children released thus far is 5,016 children, or 83% of the estimate of 6,000 children, or 50% of the estimate of 10,000 children. With the 2,209 children released thus far this year, we have reached 63% of our target of 3,500 children for 2015. With another 1,479 children already identified for release of which 250 are in Lobaye, 1,000 in Ouham and Ouham Pende, 150 in Bangui and 79 in Ex-Seleka groups, we are on track to reach our target by 31 December”.<sup>246</sup>

<sup>246</sup> Email communication with UNICEF CAR on 27 October 2015.



**Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to CAR, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in CAR**

32. From 5 December 2013 until 30 September 2015, the Panel has registered 482 incidents against humanitarian operations, workers and organizations.<sup>247</sup> This count does not include the incidents registered during the escalation of violence in Bangui from September-October 2015 (this will be addressed separately). The 482 incidents resulted in a total of 27 aid workers killed, 74 injured and an

<sup>247</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

undetermined amount of money and goods looted (humanitarian aid material, office and personal properties).<sup>248</sup>

33. Since 1 February 2015 until 30 September 2015, 142 incidents were reported. The grand majority of incidents were reported to have taken place in Bangui (42) followed by incidents reported in the province of Ouham (35), this tendency of high levels of incidents in Bangui and in the above-mentioned province is normal due to the fact that this is where the majority of humanitarian workers and organizations are present. During the same period, two aid workers (CAR nationals) and one contracted driver have been killed in three different incidents.<sup>249</sup>

*Attacks against humanitarians that resulted in the death of aid workers or civilians associated with humanitarian operations*

34. A case study on the killing of an aid worker in Bambari on 15 March 2015 is included in **annex 2.7**.
35. On 18 July 2015, in Lokoti village, BANBAT reported that armed elements, allegedly FDPC, fired on two WFP trucks within a commercial convoy on MSR 1 travelling from Béloko to Bouar at Lokoti Bangui village, located at 28 kilometres from Baboua. The WFP truck with license plate LTTR 285AJ rolled off the road killing the driver and injuring the passenger. The BANBAT escort conducted a search operation but did not locate the criminals. MINUSCA also assisted the injured with first aid before transporting him to the hospital.<sup>250</sup>
36. On 23 July 2015, in Korakouri village, the Regional Protection Cluster reported the killing of a national INGO staff by alleged anti-balaka elements. MINUSCA Force confirmed the incident on 28 July 2015. The victim was robbed on his way to Bossangoa, then killed and beheaded. According to available reports the murder might have been triggered by the fact that the deceased had reported a robbery by the same anti-balaka elements to the group's hierarchy on 21 July 2015, following which the perpetrators had been punished. At the moment of writing no judicial action had been taken.<sup>251</sup>

<sup>248</sup> As per practice of the Panel killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In the incidents documented in this report drivers and assistants who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>251</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived at UN/DPA/SCSOB.

**Annex 8: Outreach and cooperation with stakeholders and organizations**

1. The Chair of the Committee, Her Excellency Ms. Raimonda Murmokaitė, undertook a visit to the CAR from 25 to 28 August 2015, where she met the transitional authorities, including the Head of State, the Prime Minister and some key ministers, including those of Defence and National Security, MINUSCA senior management, members of the diplomatic community and of the civil society. The Chair also undertook a field mission to Berbérati (Mambéré-Kadéï), to visit a diamond mine site and meet with local authorities, representatives of civil society and the mining sector.
2. The Panel would like to highlight again the excellent level of cooperation with the transitional authorities of the CAR, and more particularly with the Presidency and the Defence Ministry. In addition, the Panel would like to express gratitude for the cooperation of the newly appointed permanent secretary of the Kimberley Process in the CAR.
3. The Panel receives valuable support from MINUSCA, which provided logistics (air and road transportation) and security, including armed escorts and armoured vehicles when required. The Panel had also an excellent cooperation with Sangaris, EUMAM, and the AU/RTF, the last of which also provided valuable information and logistical support in its area of operations. In general, the Panel has continued to develop and maintain effective cooperation with a large range of international actors, companies, individuals and organisations.
4. The Panel transmitted a total of 77 official correspondences to States, organisations and private entities, and has received 31 replies to date that provided the information requested, while 21 requests are still pending. See the table below for more details:

Country/ Other Entity	Number of letters sent	Requested information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer/ Information not supplied	Pending *
Angola	2	2			
Asky Airlines cc PM Togo	2	2			
ARMSCOR	1				1
AZUR	1	1			
BADICA	1	1			
BCBA	1				1
BEAC	2				2
Bénin	1				1
BIA	1	1			
BVI	1				1
BSIC	1				1
Cameroon	4		1	2	1
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority	1			1	
CBCA	2	1			1
Central African Republic	1	1			
Chad	3			2	1
China	2				2
COFREXPORT	1			1	
Dominican Republic	1			1	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	3	1		2	
Ecobank	2	2			
Ethiopia	1			1	
Ethiopian Airlines	1			1	
EUROFOR	1	1			
Eurodistribution	1				1
France	1				1
Groupe Marck	1	1			
Guermesey	1	1			
Israel	1	1			
IWI	2	2			
Jersey	1	1			
Kenya Airways	2			1	1
Kenya	2			1	1
Luxembourg	1	1			

MagForce	1	1			
MINUSCA	2			2	
MIXJET	1	1			
Nobel Sport	1	1			
Panama	1			1	
Poland	1			1	
Reya	1	1			
Republic of Congo	1	1			
Singapore	1	1			
SODIAM	1	1			
South Africa	4	1	1		2
SUD-AZUR	1	1			
Sudan	1			1	
Switzerland	2	1			1
Tanzania	1			1	
TELCEL	1			1	
UAE	2	1			1
UBAF	1				1
Uganda	2			2	
Western Union	1	1			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21</b>

\* A request pending indicates that the Member State or the entity indicated in a communication to the Secretariat of the Committee that a response to the Panel's request of information is forthcoming.

**Annex 9: Additional information and references**

1. The previous significant escalation of violence in the CAR also took place predominantly in Bangui from 8 to 17 October 2014.
2. Confidential report, 6 October 2015; INGO confidential document compiling incidents suffered by INGOs in Bangui, 20 October 2015, archived at the United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, Department of Political Affairs (UN/DPA/SCSOB); OCHA, 2015, "CAR, Flash Update 8", accessed on 24 October 2015 at [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash\\_update\\_8.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash_update_8.pdf)
3. In its Panel's 2014 interim report, the Panel described the political culture of the CAR as characterized by violence utilized as a means to access power. With very few exceptions, this culture shapes the behaviour of most of the political elite and non-state armed groups' leaders. The Panel also noted that every time the Transition Government political actors put a political offer on the table, armed groups' leaders engaged in a fierce fight for representation. This was the case with the Brazzaville and Bangui Forums and is the case with the on-going perspective of elections.
4. Despite their tight control of vast parts of the territory, in which some of them have set up parallel administrations, armed groups still consider the control of Bangui as the last stage of political domination.
5. Transitional institutions are comprised of all organs of the political transition, including: the transitional Government, the Transitional National Council (TNC) and the transitional Constitutional Court. Divergences between the Executive and the Legislative branches have sometimes been expressed publicly, exposing personal rivalries between individuals of the two organs.
6. This includes the electoral law, the draft constitution as well as the decision by the transitional Constitutional Court about the conditions for eligibility in upcoming elections.
7. This was reflected among others in the share of delegates allocated to each delegation to the Forum. The RPRC got 11 out of 25 seats assigned to the former Séléka, yet the RPRC does not represent the biggest military threat posed by the former Séléka. As a consequence, Ngaissona and Djono Ahaba were appointed as sole representatives of armed groups within the Follow-up Committee of the

Forum. This structure has since its inception on 23 May 2015 hardly been operational.

8. Armed groups considered by the government as radical are: Nourredine Adam's FPRC, Abdoulaye Miskine's FDPC, Ali Darrassa Mahamat's UPC, Al Khatim's MPC and Abakar Sabone's MLJC, and some specific factions of the anti-balaka, in particular the group of Eugène Ngaïkosset. This information is based on meetings in Bangui with government Ministers and Minister-Counsellors at the presidency between July and September 2015.
9. On 9 October 2015, a MINUSCA delegation met with Nourredine Adam in Kaga-Bandoro. Nourredine Adam reiterated his call for a third transition and explained why the country's partition should still be considered as a last resort to ensure the security of Muslims in the CAR; Confidential communication, 10 October 2015.
10. Meeting between ECCAS' envoy and Nourredine Adam happened on 14 October 2015; email communication from two confidential sources, 14 and 16 October 2015; according to media sources members of the Group of Eight discreetly met with Nourredine Adam on 14 October 2015. RFI, 2015, "En RCA, l'ex-Seleka Nouredine Adam revient dans le jeu", accessed on 25 October 2015 at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20151015-rca-ex-seleka-nouredine-adam-revient-le-jeu>; and Vincent Duhem, 2015, « Nouredine Adam, le seigneur de guerre de l'ex-Séléka, est de retour en Centrafrique », Jeune Afrique, 14 October 2015, accessed on 25 October 2015 at : <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/271737/politique/centrafrique-faut-craindre-retour-seigneur-de-guerre-nouredine-adam/>
11. The information included in the table was provided to the Panel by a confidential source who was in Nairobi, during two meetings in Bangui on 20 April and 24 June 2015.

A photograph of the two delegations with President Kenyatta is included in **annex 6**.

The Panel also met with the following Nairobi participants:

- The Panel met with former President Bozizé, 'Jojo' and his lawyer in Entebbe, Uganda, on 6 June 2014; during the meeting, General Bozizé denied commanding the anti-balaka in the CAR, stating that the fact that a number of anti-balaka leaders were family-related – including his son Teddy – or close to him did not imply that he coordinated anti-balaka operations. This view was reiterated to the

Panel during meetings with Bozizé's lawyer in Paris on 30 June 2014 and 4 September 2015.

- The Panel met with Abel Balenguélé in Bangui on 5 May 2015.
- The Panel met with Azounou in Bangui on 6 July 2015.
- The Panel met with Sylvain Béorofei, Michel Bello and Adamou Ndalé in Bangui on 15 April 2015; Gobéré is a small village located between Bozoum and Bossangoa.
- The Panel met with 'Chiki Chiki' in Berbérati on 17 June 2015; he admitted being part of Mokom's organisation.

Based on its list of names of anti-balaka, the Panel considers that Rodrigue could be identified most likely as Rodrigue Yangbanga alias Yagbanga (Mokom's Secretary-General, now in Yakéché area, between Grimari and Bambari). Another three people named 'Rodrigue' are in the Panel's list: Rodrigue Bagaza, zone Commander from the *sous-préfecture* of Mala (Kémo province), Rodrigue Banafeï, zone Commander from Bossemtélé and Rodrigue Feïkoumon (anti-balaka Bangui).

12. Born on 30 January 1968, Haroun Gaye presents himself as a businessman, who owns two trucks transporting commercial goods to Bangui, and as a diamond dealer, who had to flee the west following anti-balaka attacks. He has been involved directly or indirectly in most of the incidents in the PK5 neighbourhood since the beginning of the Panel's mandate on 5 December 2013.
13. Born on 4 March 1979, appointed as FPRC *Chargé de Mission Logistique* by Nouredine Adam in Kaga-Bandoro on 2 November 2015; his brother's name is Moussa. The Panel met with the Tidjani's brothers on 20 August 2014.
14. In a particular incident, Ahmadou Roufaï, Second Counselor of the Mayor of Bangui 3<sup>rd</sup> district, reported to local media that he had been beaten by Haroun Gaye during the opening ceremony of the electoral registration office on 26 June 2015, in presence of the head of MINUSCA, General Gaye, and the French Ambassador to the CAR, Charles Malinas. Radio Ndéké Luka, 2015, "Boycott du lancement officiel des opérations électorales à Bangui", 26 June 2015, accessed 28 October 2015 at <http://www.radiondekeluka.org/politique/item/22347-boycott-du-lancement-officiel-des-op%C3%A9rations-%C3%A9lectorales-%C3%A0-bangui.html>

15. Born on 11 March 1974; according to an US-based research organization, Mahamat Nour Binyamine is a resident of Philadelphia. He was in Bangui at the time of writing.
16. At the same of writing, only anti-balaka military commander 'Andjilo' is jailed at Camp de Roux, although his brother took over his group and operations in Bangui-Damara axis, as well as Bouca and Batangafo area; see below chapter II on central region for more details.
17. Didacien Blaise Kossimatchi is the former President of the *Mouvement pour l'Unité, la Paix et la Sécurité* (MUPS) which was established to mobilize youth to support Bozizé's political campaign during his regime; he also presented himself as an anti-balaka leader, together with Yvon Konaté, to foreign journalist on 11 January 2014; Xinhua, 2015, "Centrafrique: les anti-Balakas "soulagés" par la démission de Djotodia et Tiangaye", 11 January 2014, accessed on 27 October 2015 at [http://french.xinhuanet.com/2014-01/11/c\\_133037088.htm](http://french.xinhuanet.com/2014-01/11/c_133037088.htm)
18. Baron Clotaire Adramane was part of the anti-balaka delegation conducted by Joachim Kokaté and Maxime Mokom during the discussions in Nairobi; Adramane has been also associated since 2003 with Kossimatchi in youth movement in support of Bozizé.
19. Several National Councilors told the Panel in August 2015 that this was an unacceptable interference in national affairs of CAR by the international community, which they suspect of favouring some presidential candidates by pressing for a refugees' vote. UNHCR estimated the number of CAR refugees scattered between Cameroon, Chad, the DRC and the Republic of Congo at about 460,000 out of which 120,000 are of voting age. A substantial amount of these refugees are said to be Muslims.
20. During the Bangui Forum, former Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye requested the delegates to make a recommendation allowing former members of transition governments to run for presidential and legislative elections. The call was rejected by the Forum but has sparked a debate, which only ended with the Court's decision recalling Article 106 of the Transition National Charter.
21. Among these actors are important political figures like former Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye but also rather electorally less relevant personalities like Joseph Bendouga and Crépin Mboli-Ngoumba, both former ministers under Djotodia.

22. The *Concertation élargie des plateformes, partis et associations politiques et personnalités politiques indépendantes* has been the most vocal advocate of a third transition and among the most virulent voices against elections and the role of international forces.
23. The Panel has often reported on the rivalry between the President of the TNC and the Executive. In official statements and media interviews the TNC President often behaved like an opposition leader whose role was to expose the government's weaknesses: see for example the statement in an interview with *Jeune Afrique* "La transition n'a que trop duré. Elle a été menée avec inexpérience, c'est un fait", Dorothee Thienot, 2015, « Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet : « La Centrafrique ne dispose même pas d'un fichier électoral! » ; *Jeune Afrique*, 10 September 2015, accessed on 26 October 2015 at : <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/262343/politique/alexandre-ferdinand-nguendet-la-centrafrique-ne-dispose-meme-pas-dun-fichier-electoral/>.
24. Gervais Lakosso is a well-known figure, i.e. a singer who was appointed to the TNC as a civil-society representative. His newly-created civil-society platform, *Le temps de Béafrika*, aims to find internal solutions to the crisis in the CAR. He led a campaign last year against Chadian troops deployed in the CAR and believes that only the FACA can restore order in the country.
25. Several TNC sources told the Panel that the TNC President lobbied various TNC members to vote against the refugees' vote while he was publicly advocating for their participation in the elections. The TNC President was one of the candidates to the succession of former Transition President Michel Djotodia in January 2014.
26. The Panel has requested for the support of the Chinese authorities for the identification of type 56-2 assault rifles belonging to two particular production lots – Factory 66 lot marked with serial number "120XXXXX" (120 followed by five digits) and the Factory 313 lot marked with serial number "37XXXXX" (37 followed with five additional digits). Type 56-2 assault rifles belonging to both production lots circulate in high number in the CAR (request for 38 arms belonging to serial number 37XXXXX and 51 arms belonging to serial number 120XXXXX, even if they are not part of the authorized exports to the CAR, as documented in annexe 45 of the Panel's 2014 final report. The Panel has requested for the support of ARMSCOR (South Africa) for the identification of nine Vector R4 assault rifles - seven marked with serial number "79XXXXA1" (79 followed by 4 digits and closing with A1) and two marked with serial number "71XXXXX1" (71 followed by 5 digits and closing with 1).

27. A large amount of seized hunting ammunition in Bria was seized on 9 March 2015 and sealed in bags to be sent to the SRI in Bangui for the judicial procedure. On 6 July 2015, the Panel was informed at the SRI that the bags never arrived.
28. This analysis is shared by The Halo Trust, as mentioned on its website: The Halo Trust, 2015, "Physical Security & Stockpile Management (PSSM) is the organization of ammunition and weapons into safe and secure storage areas." Accessed on 28 October 2015 at: <http://www.halotrust.org/what-we-do/physical-security-and-stockpile-management>; and by Cédric Poitevin, 2015, « Contrôle des transferts d'armes en Afrique Subsaharienne », GRIP, 24 August 2015, accessed on 28 October 2015 at <http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1811>, and Claudio Gramizzi, 2014 « Le traçage des armes sur les lieux de conflits », Rapport du GRIP, 20 October 2014, accessed on 28 October 2015 at <http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1391>; see also recommendations "h" and "i" in paragraph 256
29. For the information on the identification, recording, tracing of weapons and arms management, see Conflict Armament Research website at <http://www.conflictarm.com/>, and the Small Arms Survey website at <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/>
30. If the same report indicates that "several mass grave sites" were also located in the region of Bossangoa, further investigations conducted by MINUSCA from Bossangoa found out that the sites were actually traditional burying sites.
31. Rombhot's forces tax river transport on the Ubangi towards the Republic of Congo. Between Mongoumba, located at the Congolese border, and Bangui, Rombhot's elements force engine boats and dugout canoes carrying agricultural goods and passengers to come to shore to perceive taxes. His forces are also present at the port of Kolongo on the south end of the capital, where river traffic into Bangui from the south generally arrives; annex 5.4. of 2014 Panel's interim report. During the Panel's mission to Mbaïki on 30 August 2015, it was confirmed to the Panel that Rombhot forces were still active on the bank of the river.
32. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "two rival factions of former Séléka rebels battled for control of a customs post in Béma, 900 kilometres east of Bangui, leading residents to take refuge in the DRC",

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2015, "Africa Data", accessed on 27 October 2015 at <http://www.acleddata.com/data/>

33. Replies received to letters 49 and 75 sent by the Panel on 31 August and 16 October 2015. The exporter reported that Galil rifles No. 2093715, 2093804, G2087182, G2087859, G2087867, G2088061, G2088680 and G2088766 were sold to the government of the Republic of Zaire (now DRC), by Israel Military Industries Ltd. (IMI), prior to 1995. Two SAR 80 rifles (serial numbers 015162 and 019651) were also traced back to the Republic of Zaire.
34. The agreement was reportedly reached on 8 April 2015; confidential military report, 17 April 2015; General 'Tarzan' and Marcellin, deputy of 'Gaëtan', congratulated each other on their fruitful cooperation during a security meeting; Confidential report, 12 October 2015.
35. In Ouaka: Bambari (capital), Grimari, Ippy, Bakala, Ngakobo (SUCAF sugar factory), Kouango and Liotto; in Haute-Kotto: Bria (capital); in Basse Kotto province: Mobaye (capital) and Alindao; in Mbomou: Ouango.
36. On 25 May 2015, the Panel inspected in Bambari 40 artisanal rifles, three hunting rifles (Robust brand), 30 knives, bows and arrows, two MAT-49 submachine guns, one pistol Crosman Magnum 2200.22, eight hand grenades, one RPG round and hunting ammunition; however, MINUSCA was not able to provide contextual information on the seizure of the RPG round, which could have confirmed previous reports of anti-balaka carrying a RPG launcher in Bambari (see paragraph 171 of the Panel's 2014 final report).
37. During missions to Kouango on 16 April 2015 and from 15 to 18 May 2015, the Panel could interview several victims and witnesses as well as corroborate destruction of villages and civilian property in different areas around Kouango. **Annex 7** also reports on crimes committed by UPC deputy zone commander in Kouango, named Colonel Abdourahmane Mahamat, also known as 'Sirongo'.
38. The presence of international forces in Grimari has significantly reduced criminal activities and clashes between the two groups, but since patrols are less frequent in the south, on the road from Grimari to Liotto, criminal activity by armed groups remain high. MINUSCA has a base in Bambari and they operate in Grimari and its surroundings. MINUSCA also established a temporary base in Kouango in May 2015.

From Lakadja to Liotto, the area is controlled by UPC Colonel Ibrahim Yahyia. Ibrahim Yahyia is the former Séléka Zone Commander in Bambala, a few kilometres south from Liotto. He has around 40 elements under his command and his commanding officer is Colonel Mahammat Bandi, based in Kouango. Both are UPC elements. The Panel verified that attacks had been committed by UPC from January to July 2014, causing significant displacement of population and destruction and burning of villages. However, the Panel observed during its visit in mid-May 2015 that the population had started to return and there was a certain sense of stability in the area.

Due to the volatile security situation on the road from Bambari to Liotto, the Panel was unable to conduct a field mission to the area. However, the Panel received reports indicating that several targeted killings of civilians in retaliation attacks had been committed by both anti-balaka and UPC elements. Attacks in this area also involved the burning of villages and extortion of merchants.

39. Most of the victims have taken refuge in Kouango permitting the Panel to obtain the information from eyewitnesses and victims. Manda Kara has been identified by various victims and witnesses as main anti-balaka leader on that road. His base is located in the village of Pendé. Manda Kara is originally from Ngula – south of Toko-Ippy. He is the grandson of Inbandi Béyamé, chef de village of Ngula, and the other grandfather is *chef de groupe* of the zone of the same area. Manda Kara used to be a merchant, about two years ago he was contacted by the anti-balaka from the north, he went to Pousser (route Nduku) to buy arms and ammunition and recruit men, and subsequently returned to Pendé to become head of the anti-balaka. He is active in Liotto, Pendé, Gbama. Manda Kara is still fighting former Séléka, he has more or less 40 elements, but his operations are carried out by only 12 elements. Information collected during several meetings and interviews in the *sous-préfecture* of Kouango from 15 to 18 May 2015.

Due to poor road conditions, the Panel was unable to visit the route that goes from Kouango to Liotto, but on 16 and 17 May 2015, the Panel interviewed ten different displaced persons who had recently arrived to Kouango seeking refuge and security

40. The Panel also took testimonies of victims from the villages of Moalango I and II (around eight kilometres east from Bolo) who were in Bolo I and II at the time of visit of the Panel and that were also attacked by former Séléka elements at the end of November 2014.

In Bolo, witnesses reported that around 40 armed former Séléka elements under the command of Colonel Mahamat Bandi arrived in the village carrying assault rifles at around 14:00 hours on 10 November 2014. They arrived shooting in the air and at people, burned houses and looted all valuables from the villagers.

During visit to Bolo I and II on 17 May 2015, the Panel was able to interview witnesses and victims who reported that the names of the victims as Marie Issaké, Henriette Hiékato and Catherine Yasi.

Some anti-balaka elements were also killed during the attack, but the population could not tell how many anti-balaka were killed because the anti-balaka themselves collected the corpses a few hours after.

41. Attacks against civilians, killings, destruction of villages and displacement of population have been reported in the area east of Kouango by different humanitarian and human rights organisations and by the Panel in the course of 2015, according to Interviews conducted with displaced victims and witnesses in the village of Kouango on 16 and 17 May 2015 and to the Panel's Database, which include reports from UN Agencies and INGOs that have conducted at least five missions to the area in the course of 2015.

The interviews were conducted by the Panel with *chef de chefs de village* from the *commune* of Oumba and three additional victims; all interviews were conducted in Kouango on 16 and 17 May 2015. The victims are currently IDPs in Kouango. Oumba was attacked by a group of anti-balaka led by 'Maguya' and 'Samba André'. The perpetrators recognized the witnesses as originating from the same region.

According to the same witnesses, on 20 November 2014, in early hours of the morning, some 70 armed anti-balaka entered the village from three different sides, shooting in the air and forcing the population to flee to the forest. After looting the village – food, bicycles, furniture, animals and other items were stolen – they burned several houses. The Panel also obtained information from witnesses in Kouango that the village of Kanga, located east of Kouango, was attacked on 7 December 2014 by a group of former Séléka. According to the testimonies collected during Interviews conducted with displaced victims and witnesses in the village of Kouango on 16 and 17 May 2015, 14 men from the same family were executed during the attack.

42. On 20 January 2015, at 15:10 hours, on the Damara-Bouca axis, about ten kilometres north of Damara, a convoy of 15 WFP trucks was intercepted by armed anti-balaka. One of the vehicles carrying food was taken by the armed individuals and driven towards Bouca with its driver. On 21 January 2015, the truck and driver were found few kilometres away from where the incident happened by MINUSCA forces. The driver was unharmed but all the contents of the truck were robbed. On 30 January 2015, at around 13:20 hours, at PK30, armed anti-balaka elements stole a WFP truck transporting foods on its way to Damara. The anti-balaka used three motorbikes and was armed with AK-47. The anti-balaka again kidnapped the driver and headed to Bogangolo where they robbed 12 tons of food and then fled the scene. The driver was released unharmed. On 8 February 2015, on the Bangui-Damara axis, a WFP truck was stopped and ambushed by anti-balaka elements who stole 43 bags of rice. On 23 February 2015, in Damara, a convoy of WFP trucks fell in an ambush set by anti-balaka elements. The three first vehicles were re-routed to Bogangolo village before being looted. On 27 March 2015, at 08:30 hours, at PK55 of the Bangui-Damara axis, armed anti-balaka attacked a convoy of WFP trucks, of which five were looted and one shot at.

43. The responsibility of 'Tex' was confirmed by Azounou during an interview with the Panel on 6 July 2015; the information was later corroborated by a confidential source within the anti-balaka during a meeting on 28 June 2015 and an independent confidential source during a meeting on 20 June 2015.

Côme is officially "Peace Ambassador" for the anti-balaka under Mokom, and also *Chargé de Administration des Patriotes Antibalaka* and *Guide Formateur à l'analyse de Conflit et Dialogue*; Côme was in Nairobi with Mokom for the whole Nairobi forum, from December 2014 until 29 May 2015

On 31 October 2015, a confidential report from a local NGO mentioned that Captain 'Tex', former FACA, anti-balaka commander from Féré village and now in charge of the road between Damara and Bangui, threatened the *sous-Préfet* of Damara while she was traveling from Damara to Bangui.

44. On 15 May 2015, military sources observed a convoy of a dozen of vehicles, including two "technicals" (pick-up truck vehicles mounted with machine-guns), coming from Am-Dafok area to resupply (water) at 35 kilometres from Birao, leaving then towards the Chadian border. The source suspects that the convoy may belong to a Sudanese armed group unrelated to the CAR conflict.

45. MINUSCA regional command for eastern CAR is based in Bria; deployment of MINUSCA in Birao took place in May 2015.

Deployment in 2009 in eastern CAR of the Regional Task Force of the African Union (AU/RTF) to combat the LRA prevented the Séléka to establish a parallel administration in Obo and Zémio in the Haut-Mbomou province, and in Rafaï in the Mbomou province; in Nzako, AU/RTF (UPDF contingent) confronted former Séléka forces on 29 and 30 June 2014, where it does not exist as an armed group anymore; see also annex 3.1 and paragraph 152 of the Panel's 2014 final report.

46. Oumar Younouss, listed by the Committee on 20 August 2015, was reportedly killed alongside General Harouna during an airstrike on 8 October 2015. Conflicting reports mention that General Sylvain Oumar Bordas was also killed during the same attack, although unconfirmed information indicate that he was back in Kaga Bandoro.

Registered as a Brigadier General of BSS with military identification number 2013-1-1001, General Shafadine was appointed as *Sous-Chef d'Etat-major Chargé des opérations* of the FPRC during its general assemble in Kaga Bandoro on 2 November 2014.

According to a Human Rights Watch report, Zacharia Damane real name would be Moustapha Maloum; "State of Anarchy", HRW, September 2007.

General Samtchago was appointed as *Premier Sous-Chef d'Etat-major Adjoint chargé des opérations* of the FPRC during its general assemble in Kaga Bandoro on 2 November 2014.

47. Born on 6 February 1973 in N'diffa, Lambert Lissane Moukové, alias Mokové, known as Lambert, graduated in 2007 from the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration et de Magistrature* (ENAM) in Bangui. He was appointed General Secretary at the Carnot *prefecture* and then *sous-préfet* of Carnot from 2011 to 2013. He was appointed chief of staff of the Djotodia's Water and Forestry Minister, Rizzigala Ramadan.
48. Moussa As-Simeh, known in the CAR as a Janjawid commander, left Bangui with a dozen of his men in October 2013 after receiving the medal of *Commandeur de l'ordre national de la reconnaissance centrafricaine* from Djotodia. See also Conflict Armament Research, 2015, available at: <http://www.conflictarm.com/wp->

[content/uploads/2015/01/nonstate\\_armed\\_groups\\_in\\_central\\_african\\_republic2.pdf](#); Akshaya Kumar, Omer Ismail, 2015; “Janjaweed Reincarnate - Sudan’s New Army of War Criminals”, The Enough Project, June 2014, available at: <http://enoughproject.org/reports/janjaweed-reincarnate-sudan%E2%80%99s-new-army-war-criminals>; International Crisis Group, 2015, “The Chaos in Darfur”, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°110, Nairobi/Brussels, 22 April 2015 available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/b110-the-chaos-in-darfur.pdf>; RFI, 2013, “Centrafrique: retour au Soudan du général Moussa Assimeh ex-Seleka”, 21 October 2013, assessed on 25 October 2015 at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131021-rca-centrafrique-general-moussa-assimeh-ex-seleka-retour-soudan/>

49. The level of taxation depends on the type of goods, size of the truck, and acquaintance between the Sudanese trader and former Séléka leadership; it can go up to FCFA 300,000 (USD 500); multiple taxation of the same truck is frequent considering the fragmentation of the former Séléka, however the Panel understands that compensation mechanisms exist in order to avoid an increase of market prices of basic goods coming from Sudan.
50. Meeting with humanitarian actors, Bria, 13 April 2015; a confidential report dated 9 March 2015 mention a serious incident on 6 March during which 10 former Séléka were killed, including 8 FPRC and 2 RPRC, while a media report from RJDH says that several former Séléka combatants were wounded at a checkpoint by a rival group led by General Yaya Scout, see, RJDH, 2015, “Une operation de désarmement tourne au drame”, 7 March 2015; accessed on 24 October 2015 at <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2015/03/centrafrique-ndele-une-operation-de-desarment-tourne-au-drame.html>.
51. Inspections in Bria and at Camp de Roux, Bangui, on 7, 14 and 16 April 2015. Two researchers of Conflict Armament Research inspected the armament at the same time. The seized armament was also documented by UNMAS at the Camp de Roux, Bangui.

The Panel documented four RPG-7B launchers and four 69 type launchers (PG7 pattern), four RPD-type machine guns, one 67-2 machine gun and one M80 machine gun, KPVT machine gun barrel and probable DShK machine gun barrel, six Type 56(-2) assault rifles, one AKM type assault rifle, one MPI-KM assault rifle, two Galil type assault rifles, one G3 assault rifle, three R4 Vector type assault rifles and one M16-A1 type assault rifle.

52. One group of around 50 poachers has been camping in the area of Derbissaka (Mbomou province), a small town located 100 kilometers north of Zémio (Haut-Mbomou province), since 14 March 2015, at that time the village was looted and population (2,934 inhabitants) were forcibly displaced and returned a few weeks later. AU/RTF and local authorities also reported presence of merchants selling ammunition and weapons inside the camp.

53. In February 2015, the AU/RTF seized weapons – all type 56 assault rifles – from Sudanese poachers operating in the region of Koto. The Panel notes that these weapons are similar to those seized from other armed groups operating in the CAR. In July 2015, the Chinko project discovered an arms cache in which poachers had left six weapons (no ammunition), i.e. five AK type assault rifles of various origin and one 67-2 type machine gun.

Inspection on weapons and ammunition seized incidentally by AU/RTF on Sudanese poachers since 2009, Obo, 23 April 2015. The Enough Project also inspected ammunition seized on Sudanese poachers: “Tusk Wars. Inside the LRA and the Bloody Business of Ivory”, October 2015; the researchers of the Enough Project qualify Sudanese poachers as “Janjawid”.

54. Looting and trade of diamonds by LRA have been reported over the past years, in particular in the region of Nzako and Sam Ouandja, but does not appear as systematic but more opportunistic.

55. Various origins include China, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Iran, South Africa, Sudan, Russia, Ukraine, USSR and Uganda. Data on Sudanese ammunition was compiled by the Panel and analysed by Conflict Armament Research (CAR), in a correspondence dated 27 October 2015 which is archived at the UN.

56. On 2 July 2015, LRA elements entered Malatca village, 115 kilometres from Bria on the Yalinga axis, Haute Kotto prefecture killing eight civilians, setting houses on fire and looting property: Confidential reports. Panel’s Database, archived at the UN/DPA/SCSOB.

57. A total of 17 persons were able to escape, seven were young men (under the age of 18) who had been held by the LRA from 2012 to 2014; two young females (under the age of 18) who were captured in different incidents during 2015, and eight were male adults. Seven of these young adults defected in Obo and according to the information obtained by the Panel they had been in recent contact

with Joseph Kony. The Panel also documented 10 incidents where civilians were able to escape from LRA groups following capture and three instances where LRA combatants defected. Two cases of sexual violence against children were also reportedly committed by LRA elements in the CAR during 2015.

58. The FACA contingent based in Obo and Bambouti, at the border post between the CAR and South Sudan, reported this incident which happened on 12 January 2015 in a village located 15 kilometres in the CAR territory. 30 out of the 70 heads of cattle stolen during the raid were recovered following the intervention of a joint UPDF/FACA patrol.
59. The same annex contains a letter from the Director General of the Division of Mines that the Panel received in response to an earlier request for information to BADICA on 8 September 2014, which BADICA's legal representative regards as exonerating evidence in his counter report of 11 March 2015. The Panel considered the letter an attempt to exonerate the mining administration from being considered as the government source of incriminating information mentioned in the Panel's request for information
60. The case was wrongly reported in the media as an attempt to smuggle 152 kilograms of diamond out of the country. See Davy kpenouwen, 2014, "RCA: Importante saisie des diamants de la société Sodiam a Bangui-Mpoko", Alwihdainfo, 9 November 2015, accessed on 23 October 2015 at [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/rca-importante-saisie-des-diamants-de-la-societe-sodiam-a-bangui-mpoko\\_a13523.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/rca-importante-saisie-des-diamants-de-la-societe-sodiam-a-bangui-mpoko_a13523.html)
61. The Panel has sent three official correspondences to the Chadian mission in New York, in relation to the Human Rights and security situation in the border with CAR; furthermore, during the official mission conducted by the Panel in Chad in December 2014, this matter was closely followed up and addressed; the topic has been also addressed during all the bilateral meetings organized by the Secretariat in New York between the Panel and representatives of the Chadian mission to the United Nations. The reference of the Panel's correspondences and subject matter are as follows: (1) **S/AC.55/2014/PE/OC.27 dated 3 June 2014**: the Panel informed Chad of the mandate of the Panel and requested a visit to Chad from 18 to 25 June 2014, and requested information from the Chadian government concerning armed groups operating along the CAR/Chadian border. (2) **S/AC.55/2014/PE/OC.30 dated 5 June 2014**: the Panel informed Chad that in the context of its investigations, the Panel had come across information that arms sold to Chad were found in CAR, and requested information on some of the arms

from Chad in CAR. (3) S/AC.55/2015/PE/OC.77 dated 16 October 2015: the Panel requested information on armed groups from CAR entering illegally into Chadian territory to commit criminal acts, and further requested information concerning Chadian security forces activities in CAR to conduct retaliatory attacks.

62. The *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* (APRD) of Démafouth signed a DDR agreement with the CAR government of Bozizé on 9 May 2007 and benefited from significant international funding through UNDP for its demobilization. Nevertheless, the backbone of Arnel Sayo's group, *Révolution et Justice*, is composed of demobilized APRD military commanders. Information obtained indicated that Sayo inflated the number of members of RJ to 14,000 – instead of 60, as reported by the Panel in paragraph 103 of its 2014 final report – in order to benefit from DDR the same way as Démafouth did in the past. This also contradicts a document provided by RJ commander Belanga to MINUSCA in Paoua on 10 June 2015 mentioning only 172 elements.
63. Sayo's deputies within RJ, Raymond Belanga and Luther Betuban, also known as 'Colonel Luther', former APRD, Sergeant in the FACA, identified in paragraph 101 of the Panel's 2014 final report, are also still active. According to a confidential report dated 22 June 2015, Colonel Luther and his RJ elements attacked and looted the market of Kowone on 19 June 2015.
64. Arnel Bedaya Sayo, alias Arnel Ningatouloum Sayo, has served as the Minister of Youth and Sports of the transitional Government since 22 August 2014. He is also one of the ten signatories of the DDRR agreement signed on 11 May 2015 in his capacity as commander of *Révolution et Justice*. See also the executive summary and annex 18 of the 2014 final report; annexes 4, 4.1 and 4.2 of the 2014 interim report, and the Panel's updates to the Committee dated 28 January and 20 May 2015.
65. During meetings with the Panel in Bangui on 26 and 28 June 2015, one senior military commander of international forces in the CAR who met Al Khatim commented that he believes that Al Khatim does not have a national agenda and does not share the political views of Nourredine Adam. However, confidential reports in October 2015 mention the fact that Al Khatim might be forcibly convinced by Nourredine Adam to reintegrate the FPRC, and that he fell out with the political leadership of the movement in Bangui, Mahamat Bahar and Abel Balenguélé.

66. Including a strike force of around 90 armed men travelling on 30 motorcycles; part of this strike force was spotted by the Panel in Farazala on 30 June 2015 and 2 July 2015; a confidential military report based on aerial surveillance observed around 400 armed elements gathered on 2 June 2015 in Kabo. However, the split from the FPRC had an impact on the size of Al Khatim's force: former Al Khatim military commanders of Goula origin chose to stay with the FPRC, based on ethnical consideration, since Al Khatim is of Arab/Salamat origin.
67. The Panel observed constant presence on the road of armed elements protecting trucks – see photograph in **annex 4.6.** – and riding motorcycles, and of checkpoints manned by Al Khatim armed elements at the following locations:
- on the road from Kaga-Bandoro to Kabo: Patcho, Ouandago, Farazala, Ouaki, Zoumanga;
  - on the road from Kabo to Moyen Sido (see photograph of Sido's checkpoint in **annex 4.6.**): Petit Sido and Mbo.
68. The Mbarara community lives mostly in the Sarh and Moundoul provinces of southern Chad, from where they drive their cattle down to the CAR provinces of Ouham and Nana-Grébizi for the short transhumance, during the dry season; meeting with a Mbarara representative, Kabo, 28 May 2015; Mbarara are of Arab origin, different from Mbororo of Peuhl origin, and some of them have settled in Kabo – around 700 families and 1,000 heads of cattle – and Kaga-Bandoro, from where they also trade cattle with Bangui-based businessmen. See a photograph taken by the Panel of a Mbarara herder riding his horse and Mbarara's cattle – which is red instead of black and white for Peuhl cattle.
69. Out of the 11 *ordres de mission* collected, 9 referred to FPRC, one to UPC and one to *Forces Républicaines*. The latter is most likely used by General Baba Hissène who still considers himself as military chief of staff of the *Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix* (CPJP) and wants therefore to distinguish his forces from FPRC. Baba Hissène is also the brother of Abdoullaye Hissène, former leader of the CPJP.
70. The Panel observed and inspected checkpoints at the following locations: (1) the gendarmerie controlled by former Séléka in Mbrès; (2) Azen; (3) at the entrance of Mbrès coming from the axis towards Bambari; (4) at the entrance of Mbrès coming from the northern Mbrès-Kaga-Bandoro axis.

71. The Panel observed a vehicle operated by the UPC in the village of Gbakon Bangu on 22 August 2015; according to witnesses, the vehicle that got stuck in Sueur was also operated by UPC elements which regularly use the Mbrès-Bambari axis.
72. According to the information collected by the Panel, the anti-balaka robbed all the merchandise transported by the truck, including a box of weapons.
73. On 28 September 2015, the Panel met with the following representatives of the FPRC faction in Ndélé: (a) Abdelaziz Mahamat, Chef d'état major des armées de la terre; (b) Zararia Yaya, Conseiller militaire; (c) Abdel Kani, Adjoint Comzone; (d) Mahamat Saleh, deuxième adjoint; (e) Abdalla Zibert, Secrétaire de la région militaire; (f) Adam Nwat, Directeur de renseignement militaire; (g) Assan Assabala, Conseiller du Comzone. The Panel also visited the customs, police station, taxes, and forestry department.
74. The deputy Mayor is Madam Aziza; the *sous-préfet* of Ndélé is Tébéfra Dieu Béni Sénesta. The national government has tried to install in Ndélé 15 elements from the Water and Forestry administration as well as gendarmerie elements, yet they have been forced out by FPRC as soon as they arrived; meeting with MINUSCA human rights officer, Ndélé, 24 September 2015.
75. The Sultan declared to the Panel that important divergences exist between the FPRC and the Sultanate, including, amongst others taxes. Today, only the FPRC is levying taxes and the Sultan abstains from doing so even if he could do so theoretically. In Birao, the situation between the Sultan and former Séléka factions is also very tense.
76. On 25 August 2015, the Panel observed checkpoints at the following locations: (1) Koubou (15 km from Ndélé); (2) between Koubou and Djamassinda (20 km from Ndélé); (3) Tiri entrance (90 km from Ndélé); (4) Tiri exit (90 km from Ndélé). According to primary sources, there were additional checkpoints in (5) Gouzama; (6) Miamere; (7) Miamami; (8) Ngolongozo; and (9) Shari.
77. On 26 August, the Panel observed checkpoints at the following locations: (1) Batélé entrance (3 km from Ndélé); (2) Batélé exit (3 km from Ndélé); (3) Koundi (60 km from Ndélé); (4) Akroussoulbak (80 km from Ndélé). According to primary sources interviewed by the Panel, there were additional checkpoints in (5) Ngarba (120 km from Ndélé) and (6) Massamai Kébing.

78. According to the villagers of Birbatouma, every time a civilian crosses a checkpoint he/she has to pay between 1500 and 2000 CFA. For large vehicles, the taxes can rise up to 10 000 CFA. Meeting with villagers, Birbatouma, 25 August 2015. Interview with villagers of Birbatouma, in Birbatouma, 25 August 2015.
79. In Djamassinda, the Panel documented a 10 man strong FPRC delegation. On 25 August 2015, the armed men of Djamassinda affirmed to the Panel that they formerly belonged to the CPJP but that presently, they respond to the FPRC zone commander Soumaine Senoussi. On 25 August 2015, in Birbatouma (25 kilometres from Ndélé), the Panel documented the presence of five CPJP elements. On 25 August 2015, in Bangbali (60 kilometres from Ndélé), the Panel was informed that several young men of the village joined the FPRC/CPJP. On 26 August, the Panel was informed that in the village of Léména there was a 45-man strong FPRC delegation. In July, 30 armed men left the village in order to go to Kaga-Bandoro. On 26 August, the Panel was informed that FPRC elements of the village of Koundi left the village to go to Ndélé for a mission.
80. Meeting with the village chief of Djamassinda, Djamassinda, 25 August 2015; meeting with villagers of Birbatouma, 25 August 2015; meeting with the village chief of Bangbali, Bangbali, 25 August 2015; meetings with the two village chiefs of Manga 1 and 2, Manga 1 and 2, 25 August 2015; meeting with the village chief of Léména, Léména, 26 September 2015; meeting with villagers of Doum, Doum, 26 August 2015.
81. A March 2014 evaluation mission to the area of Moïssala estimated the number of heads of cattle at 31,000; the evaluation of the aggregated number of heads of cattle in Chad impacted by the crisis in the CAR is 1,804,901, which could represent a potential income for CAR of USD 75 million. *Diagnostic et propositions opérationnelles pour le soutien à l'élevage pastoral perturbé par la crise centrafricaine*, Mission d'étude au Logone Orientale, Mandoul/Moyen Chari du 04 au 14 mars 2014, Plateforme des Acteurs du Développement Pastoral au Tchad.
82. During its missions in the Ndélé and Kaga-Bandoro-Mbrès axis, the Panel inspected six AKM type rifles, two MAT 49 assault rifle, one MAS 36 rifle, two Vector R4 assault rifle, one M70 AB2 assault rifle, four type 56 assault rifle, three type 56-2 assault rifles, one AMD 65M assault rifle, four unidentified AK-47 type assault rifles, one RPG-7B launcher, and nine hunting rifles. The Panel also inspected remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), two RPG rounds, fifty-

two rounds of hunting ammunition manufactured by the company MACC, and little amounts of ammunition of calibers 7.62x54mm, 7.5X54 mm, 14.7 mm and 9 mm.

83. During both visits the Panel saw the same FPRC armed element carrying the same Vector R4 assault rifle on different axes, first in Mbrès area in August 19 2015 and after in Ndélé area in September 28 2015. Demonstrating that weapons are assigned to a specific member of an armed group.
84. During a mission conducted on 21 and 22 June 2015, the Panel was able to collect testimonies of victims, witnesses and communities in the above-mentioned villages; moreover, the Panel has been monitoring UN and INGO reports on the situation of the area since 5 December 2013 until the time of writing, and included them in the database of the Panel.
85. The Panel visited the border post of Békoninga twice, on 23 June 2014 and 22 June 2015. Forces at the border are from the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST – Police), *Armée Nationale Tchadienne*, *Gendarmerie*, and *Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad*. During the second visit to the border post on 22 June 2015, the DST Police Commissioner of Goré, Madjiademngar N’Gamjadjibe, who illegally detained two Experts of the Panel on 23 June 2014, was still present, despite claims to the Panel by officials in N’Djamena on 3 December 2014 that he had been disciplined and discharged from his position after the incident.
86. A confidential report dated 4 May 2015 on the attack of 2 May 2015 on Bembéré indicated that remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fired by the perpetrators of the attack were found on the location of the impact. According to information obtained by the Panel, there is currently no armed group in this area in possession of this kind of weaponry other than Chadian security and armed forces.
87. A confidential report from 27 May 2015 indicates that a MINUSCA fact finding mission to the village of Békayé established that the village was already attacked on 19 May 2015, when 30 heads of cattle and FCFA 450,000 (USD 745) were stolen, and two houses burnt. The team also found fired cartridges on the ground.
88. According to an RJ member Interviewed by the Panel in Markounda on 11 April 2015, who took part in the fighting, one Chadian soldier was killed and a pullover marked with Chadian army “ANT” insigne was recovered.

89. The amount paid – between FCFA 5,000 to 100,000 (USD 8 to 165) – depends on the type and social category of the refugee (trader, farmer, housewife, children, etc.), on the crossing point (river, bridge, etc.), and time of the day (day crossing being more expensive than night crossing, which is more dangerous).
90. The Panel collected one specific testimony from an individual whose sister and nephew were both killed by shotgun while trying to cross the border after having made illegal payments to a border Chadian official in Sido, Chad; during interviews conducted by the Panel in Moyen Sido, witnesses and relatives of victims have also mentioned cases where civilians who made illegal payments to Chadian officials were either killed, wounded or detained while crossing the border.
91. The Panel conducted a mission to Bouar to inspect 16 arms reportedly returned by 16 FACA soldiers active in the national instruction centre in Bouar, where between 30 and 50 FACA elements are on duty, out of the total of 340 FACA officially registered. The Panel was able to physically inspect only four weapons. The other arms were reportedly being used by FACA recently deployed in three communities north-west of Bouar.
92. The trading companies in UAE, Reya Diam and Ditrex Diamonds, which had shipped confiscated parcels to Kardiam provided the Panel with details regarding the origin of shipments. Ditrex declared not to have any indication to believe that Congolese shipments had not originated in DRC, adding a letter with corresponding message from Afrogem, one of the supplying exporting companies in DRC.
93. Apart from Adamas-Swiss the buying houses Sud Azur (5421.60 grams purchased in Bangui) and Sodiam (2121.45 grams purchased in Bangui and Berbérati) and the national union of mining cooperatives (520 grams from Yaloké and 654 grams from Bangandou) exported gold during the last half of 2014 and until September 2015, according to data provided by the Ministry of Mines and Geology in October 2015, archived at the UN/DPA/SCSOB. The Panel did not receive information about the destination of exports and has not inspected the respective mines of origin.
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