

**Security Council**

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**Note by the President of the Security Council**

At its 6335th meeting, held on 9 June 2010 in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation”, the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to the Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the President circulates herewith the report of the Director General dated 20 October 2015 (see annex).



**Annex**

**Letter dated 20 October 2015 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to enclose herewith the report submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Yukiya **Amano**

## Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English,  
French, Russian and Spanish]

### Status of Iran's nuclear programme in relation to the Joint Plan of Action

#### Report by the Director General

1. As foreshadowed in GOV/2014/2, this report provides information on the status of the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) nuclear programme in relation to the "voluntary measures" that Iran has agreed to undertake as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed between the E3+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013.<sup>1</sup> The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014, initially for a period of six months.<sup>2</sup> On 24 July 2014, the JPA was extended until 24 November 2014,<sup>3</sup> and on 24 November 2014 it was further extended until 30 June 2015.<sup>4</sup> On 30 June 2015, the E3+3 and Iran requested the Agency, on behalf of the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to continue to undertake the necessary nuclear related monitoring and verification activities in Iran under the JPA "until further communication".<sup>5</sup>
2. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:
  - i. not enriched uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities;
  - ii. not operated cascades in an interconnected configuration at any of its declared facilities;
  - iii. diluted — down to an enrichment level of no more than 5% U-235 — 108.4 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235;<sup>6</sup>
  - iv. fed 100 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 into the conversion process at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) for conversion into uranium oxide;
  - v. had no process line to reconvert uranium oxides back into UF<sub>6</sub> at FPFP;

<sup>1</sup> The text of the JPA was communicated to the Director General by the High Representative of the European Union (EU), on behalf of the E3+3 (INFCIRC/855), and by the Resident Representative of Iran to the IAEA, on behalf of Iran (INFCIRC/856).

<sup>2</sup> Previous reports on the status of Iran's nuclear programme in relation to the JPA were provided in GOV/INF/2014/1 (20 January 2014), GOV/2014/10, Annex 3 (20 February 2014), GOV/INF/2014/6 (20 March 2014), GOV/INF/2014/10 (17 April 2014), GOV/2014/28, Annex 3 (23 May 2014), GOV/INF/2014/14 (20 June 2014), GOV/INF/2014/16 (20 July 2014), GOV/INF/2014/19 (20 August 2014), GOV/INF/2014/21 (19 September 2014), GOV/INF/2014/23 (20 October 2014), GOV/INF/2014/26 (24 November 2014), GOV/INF/2014/29 (19 December 2014), GOV/2015/15, Annex IV (19 February 2015), GOV/INF/2015/7 (20 March 2015), GOV/INF/2015/8 (20 April 2015), GOV/2015/34, Annex IV (29 May 2015), GOV/INF/2015/12 (1 July 2015), GOV/2015/50, Annex V (27 August 2015) and GOV/INF/2015/17 (21 September 2015).

<sup>3</sup> GOV/INF/2014/18, Annex.

<sup>4</sup> GOV/INF/2014/28, Attachment.

<sup>5</sup> GOV/INF/2015/11, Attachment.

<sup>6</sup> For details, see GOV/INF/2014/26, footnote 4.

- vi. not made “any further advances” to its activities at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) or the Arak reactor (IR-40 Reactor), including the manufacture and testing of fuel for the IR-40 Reactor;
- vii. provided an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor and concluded with the Agency a safeguards approach for the reactor<sup>7</sup> (based on the updated DIQ and the safeguards measures agreed on 5 May 2014);
- viii. fed 4,334 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process at the Enriched UO<sub>2</sub> Powder Plant (EUPP) for conversion into uranium oxide;<sup>8</sup>
- ix. continued its safeguarded enrichment R&D practices at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), without accumulating enriched uranium;
- x. not carried out reprocessing related activities at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access;
- xi. provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine,<sup>9</sup> to the Saghand Uranium Mine<sup>10</sup> and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant;<sup>11</sup>
- xii. continued to provide daily access to the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow;
- xiii. provided regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and provided information thereon; and
- xiv. provided,<sup>12</sup> in relation to enhanced monitoring, the following:
  - plans for nuclear facilities and a description of each building on each nuclear site;
  - descriptions of the scale of operations being conducted for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities; and
  - information on uranium mines and mills, and on source material.

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<sup>7</sup> On 31 August 2014.

<sup>8</sup> On 9 October 2015, the Agency verified that 1,542 kg of uranium in the form of UO<sub>2</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced since the plant started operation.

<sup>9</sup> On 29 January 2014.

<sup>10</sup> On 6 May 2014.

<sup>11</sup> On 7 May 2014.

<sup>12</sup> As of 20 April 2014: pursuant to Iran’s undertaking to provide this information within three months of the JPA taking effect, i.e. 20 January 2014.

3. In addition, the Agency confirms that since 24 July 2014, Iran has:
- i. used 89.1 kg of  $U_3O_8$ , converted from  $UF_6$  enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR;<sup>13,14</sup>
  - ii. used 0.084 kg of  $U_3O_8$ , converted from  $UF_6$  enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of miniature fuel plates for  $Mo^{99}$  production;<sup>15</sup> and
  - iii. diluted about 4,118 kg of  $UF_6$  enriched up to 2% U-235 to the level of natural uranium.
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<sup>13</sup> The Agency has verified that, since 24 July 2014, an additional 15.5 kg of this  $U_3O_8$  (6.2 kg prior to 24 November 2014 and 9.3 kg since that date), have been generated by and removed from the fuel fabrication process as scrap. Iran reported that this nuclear material, which remains at the facility, had not met the technical specification for fuel fabrication.

<sup>14</sup> Since 16 September 2015, Iran has been recovering uranium in the form of  $U_3O_8$  from the solid and liquid scrap originating from the conversion and fuel fabrication processes associated with the manufacture of fuel items. As of 12 October 2015, the Agency had verified that, since 16 September 2015, Iran had recovered 30 kg of uranium in the form of  $U_3O_8$  suitable for fuel fabrication, of which 13.4 kg had been used for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR.

<sup>15</sup> In a letter dated 28 December 2014, Iran informed the Agency that FPPF was to start the production of miniature fuel plates for the MIX Facility for  $Mo^{99}$  production.