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### REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

#### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1195 (1998) of 15 September 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, decided to assess the overall situation in Angola and take action on the future role of the United Nations on the basis of a report and recommendations to be submitted by me no later than 8 October 1998. It covers developments since my last report, dated 7 September 1998 (S/1998/838).

#### II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. The period under review was marked by several developments which seriously threatened the continuation of the Angolan peace process as envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex). The most significant among those negative developments was the breaking by the Government of all contacts with the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) led by Mr. Jonas Savimbi and the Government's recognition of the leadership of the UNITA Renovation Committee (see S/1998/838, para. 10), as the only legitimate interlocutor for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Although some UNITA members in the National Assembly and the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation have dissociated themselves from Mr. Savimbi, the UNITA leadership in Andulo has insisted that it remains the legitimate partner in the peace process, thus creating a conflicting situation over the representation of UNITA in the Joint Commission and preventing that important body from effectively carrying out its duties.

3. My Special Representative, Mr. Issa B. Y. Diallo, in close consultation with the representatives of the three observer States, Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, continued to maintain contacts with all concerned in an attempt to foster a spirit of dialogue and avoid a total rupture in the peace process. On 9 September 1998, during his meeting with President José Eduardo dos Santos, he emphasized the need for the United Nations to remain in contact with Mr. Savimbi and his group, in order to explain to them the serious dangers facing the peace process and, at the same time, ascertain their position and concerns on the future of the Lusaka Protocol. Mr. Diallo

also underlined the importance of guaranteeing the safety of the personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and other international personnel. The President informed my Special Representative that he saw no utility in future contacts with Mr. Savimbi and that his Government would assume its responsibility in conformity with the wishes of the Angolan people. In this context, the President expressed his desire for MONUA to support the efforts of the Government and those of the States of the subregion and work with the Renovation Committee to conclude the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

4. In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1195 (1998) and in view of the obvious need to maintain contacts with those who control the situation on the ground, my Special Representative requested an appointment with Mr. Savimbi for 21 September 1998. This was communicated to UNITA in Bailundo, together with a request for a written guarantee for the security of my Special Representative and his team. The Government was also notified of the planned meeting with Mr. Savimbi and was requested to extend its cooperation. While UNITA responded positively to that request, a Government representative declined to provide any security guarantees to Mr. Diallo and even warned him that the Government would cease all contacts with the Special Representative if he undertook the trip.

5. In these circumstances, and in response to his letter of 10 September 1998 (S/1998/847), I sent a message to President dos Santos on 18 September, seeking his Government's cooperation with all Angolan parties, old and new, whose cooperation was vital for the effective resolution of the crisis, and reiterated the need to maintain dialogue. I also appealed to all parties concerned to reject military action and to refrain from any other action which might jeopardize further the Lusaka process. My Special Representative immediately requested an audience with the President for further consultations, and is still waiting to be received. However, at a meeting held on 2 October, the Vice-Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. Joao Miranda, assured me that President dos Santos would reply to my letter and would receive my Special Representative soon. In the meantime, Mr. Diallo continued to meet in Luanda with various representatives of Angolan civil society, including political parties and religious groups, in order to ascertain their views and to urge them to actively support peace and national reconciliation. He met with the leaders of the UNITA Renovation Committee, who conveyed to him their determination to assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

6. The Renovation Committee has been active in many provinces of the country, appealing to UNITA members to join its ranks and give up their weapons. The Government has been assisting the Committee in setting up provincial offices and holding political rallies, and was instrumental in transferring control over UNITA headquarters in Luanda to members of the Committee. It should be noted that, at their summit in Mauritius on 14 September, the leaders of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) expressed support to the new UNITA group and characterized Mr. Savimbi's behaviour as that of a "war criminal". The statement also contained an appeal to the United Nations, the three observer States and the international community to recognize the UNITA Renovation Committee. In another regional meeting held at Libreville on 24 September, a number of Central African leaders also expressed support for the UNITA Renovation Committee.

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7. On 23 September 1998, the Government lifted the suspension it had imposed on 1 September on the four ministers of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation and seven vice-ministers designated by UNITA. On the same day, however, the President dismissed one UNITA minister and one vice-minister. In response, the UNITA leadership in Bailundo issued a communiqué asserting that the suspension of its members was a flagrant violation of the Lusaka Protocol and stating that any attempt to reinstate them or change the membership of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation should be done only with the consent of UNITA. In a related development, on 25 September, the Permanent Commission of the National Assembly decided to request the UNITA Renovation Committee to replace 15 of the 70 UNITA deputies by 15 October 1998, by which time the Assembly also intends to consider the abrogation of the law - adopted pursuant to the Lusaka Protocol - granting a special status to Mr. Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition party. On 26 September, 53 UNITA deputies signed a declaration seeking clarification of the decision of the Permanent Commission and reaffirming that all 70 deputies who had assumed their duties in the Assembly in 1997 constituted the UNITA parliamentary group under the leadership of Mr. Chivukuvuku. In a recent statement to the press, Mr. Chivukuvuku declared that, although he had severed contacts with Mr. Savimbi, he did not intend to join the UNITA Renovation Committee.

8. In the meantime, on 24 September, the Foreign Ministers of the three observer States issued a statement (S/1998/916) in New York, stressing that there could be no military solution to the conflict in Angola and underlining the validity of the Lusaka Protocol. They demanded that UNITA comply unconditionally with its obligations, and expressed support for my efforts and those of my Special Representative to reinvigorate the peace process through consultations with the Government and UNITA. The Troika also made public the joint letter they had addressed to Mr. Savimbi on the same day. On 6 September, my Special Representative dispatched a message to Mr. Savimbi recommending specific steps to put the peace process back on track.

### III. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

9. The security situation in Angola continued to deteriorate, primarily as a result of persistent UNITA attacks on strategic locations. The Government launched counter-attacks in several parts of the country, including Maquela Do Zombo and Puri in Uigé Province, Luremo and Milando in Lunda Norte Province and other locations. The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) appear to be determined to defend the key provincial capitals, while seeking to recover control over the diamond-mining areas in Lunda Norte and Malange Provinces. The apparent use of air power by FAA in Malange and the Lundas regions has also contributed to the intensification of the conflict.

10. In the north, UNITA forces, allegedly assisted by armed elements from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, occupied several locations during the first half of September. In Malange, their elements continued to control several areas north and south of the main provincial highway, thus cutting off the main route between Malange and the diamond-producing area of Luzamba in Lunda Norte. In the most serious incident involving the civilian population since the attack on Mina Bula (S/1998/723, para. 10), at least 89 people were killed when an

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armed group stormed the diamond-mining settlement of Luremo (Lunda Norte Province) on 31 August. The MONUA investigation indicated that the killings took place during the occupation of the locality by UNITA forces. There were also reports of numerous ambushes in Hùila, Benguela and Huambo provinces and mine incidents in Bié, Moxico and Lunda Sul Provinces.

11. The build-up of FAA troops in Bela Vista/Vila Nova in Huambo Province, as well as Cangandala in Malange Province and Kuito in Bié Province, is believed to represent a threat against the UNITA strongholds in the central highlands. It is widely assumed that FAA is preparing for a possible major military action in Uíge, Malange, Lunda Norte, Huambo and Bié Provinces.

12. On 16 September 1998, a United Nations convoy comprising MONUA and World Food Programme vehicles was ambushed 25 kilometres north of Lucala in Cuanza Norte Province. As a result, one local MONUA international contractor employee was killed and three others were injured. The courageous and timely intervention by the escorting United Nations troops prevented the attackers, who were dressed in FAA uniforms, from looting and killing more people. MONUA road convoys were temporarily suspended, but have resumed on routes that are determined to be relatively safe. However, monitoring and investigations conducted by MONUA observers continued by air, despite obstructions and the uncooperative attitude of UNITA and often of the Government authorities. MONUA has also taken stringent measures to enhance the security of its team sites and ensure the safety of its personnel. Some of the team sites, in particular in the UNITA strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo, are particularly vulnerable to possible military operations. I should like once again to remind the parties about their ultimate responsibility for the safety and the security of all United Nations personnel.

#### IV. POLICE ASPECTS

13. The civilian police component of MONUA continues, to the extent possible, to perform the various tasks described in my previous reports to the Council. Civilian police observers monitored the activities of the Angolan National Police (ANP) and, in collaboration with the human rights component of MONUA, investigated human rights violations and visited arrested persons and detention centres. Civilian police activities were also crucial for monitoring the security arrangements for UNITA leaders, particularly in Luanda.

14. The widespread hostilities continued to exert a heavy toll on the general law and order situation in the country. According to MONUA reports, the attitude of some ANP personnel towards the civilian population in areas formerly controlled by UNITA cannot be described as neutral. In a few cases, ANP personnel admitted that they were detaining people simply because they were UNITA members. In addition, MONUA is still seeking the Government's cooperation in initiating a training programme for ANP on internationally accepted police procedures and standards.

15. With the worsening security situation, the implementation of the important task of disarming the civilian population has virtually ceased. Moreover, there have been increasing reports of Government recruitment of civilians into local

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"defence brigades", which are not controlled closely by the authorities. The civilian police also conducted regular patrols and visits to checkpoints manned by ANP and FAA, with a view to preventing the obstruction of free circulation of people and goods. Recently, the number of those checkpoints has increased significantly.

16. The latest political developments have also created anxiety about security among UNITA members in Luanda still loyal to Mr. Savimbi (also see para. 18 below). The relevant department of ANP has continued to provide generally acceptable but inconsistent security protection to UNITA representatives in the capital. The General Commander of ANP reaffirmed to MONUA that the Angolan police would protect high-ranking UNITA members, irrespective of their political loyalties. However, in what appears to be a premeditated attack, on 2 October 1998, the vehicle of Mr. Chivukuvuku (see para. 7 above) was shot at in front of his residence in Luanda. Mr. Chivukuvuku's wife and bodyguard who were in the car were not injured. The representatives of the Troika and my Special Representative issued a statement strongly condemning this criminal act. According to reports, the leader of the Renovation Committee requested the authorities to withdraw the security personnel from the residences of those UNITA deputies who do not support the Renovation Committee.

#### V. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

17. The civilian population has continued to bear the brunt of military operations by both sides. Over the past few months, indiscriminate as well as summary killings, torture and harassment, abductions, destruction of property, forcible displacement and restrictions on freedom of movement have been reported in the course of attacks targeting entire villages. However, the number of abuses appears to have decreased slightly in September. Although in some cases it is impossible to identify the attackers, a significant number of the attacks have been perpetrated by UNITA elements. Civilian communities have also suffered at the hands of some FAA and ANP elements, including pillaging for food. Attacks or anticipation of attacks have continued to result in the massive displacement of whole communities, whose members have sometimes been subjected to further abuses. At such times, principles of humanitarian law are especially important as they seek to protect the most vulnerable groups - those who are not involved in military operations - from direct or indiscriminate attacks or being forced to flee.

18. In the light of the political developments, MONUA has also been concerned about the safety and security of UNITA members and party officials in Government-controlled areas who have not declared their support for the UNITA Renovation Committee. Recently, in Saurimo, a UNITA detainee died in custody, possibly for lack of medical care. Several UNITA members were found dead on 1 October, apparently the victims of an ANP revenge attack. In spite of all this, there are conscientious authorities throughout the country that are trying to improve respect for human rights.

19. The Prosecutor General of the Republic and the Ministry of Justice have taken some important initiatives to ameliorate the situation. In the provinces, Government officials often persist in their work, despite acute shortages of

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resources. MONUA is collaborating closely with Government ministries and local authorities in initiatives to strengthen the law enforcement and judicial systems. The MONUA Human Rights Division has continued to assist non-governmental organizations, including the churches and professional associations, in developing their capacity to promote human rights. Human rights officers also supported commendable local initiatives to create networks of human rights promoters and defenders, by teaching at training workshops and providing technical advice and materials. In collaboration with MONUA, an Angolan theatre group has written 12 plays about different human rights, performed them for national television and in the provinces and given training sessions.

20. Respect for human rights remains essential in times of political crisis. It would be important to continue the Human Rights Division so that its programmes may have a lasting impact. The short-term and long-term objectives are complementary: addressing human rights abuses as they occur and encouraging prevention and protection through institution-building projects. In close collaboration with the Government, it is necessary to continue to assist in making the Angolan law-enforcement agencies more professional, the justice system more responsive and the prison system more humane. It is also important to continue to report on the human rights situation so that problems may be understood and solutions suggested.

#### VI. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

21. As a result of the pervasive insecurity and instability, the humanitarian situation in Angola continues to deteriorate. The protracted conflict has forced the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and has contributed to widespread lawlessness, which in turn has compelled thousands of others to flee their homes. The humanitarian community has now confirmed that there are over 220,000 newly displaced persons since the beginning of 1998. This brings the total number of internally displaced Angolans to a staggering 1.3 million, or over 10 per cent of the country's population.

22. Lack of adequate access continues to impede the assessment and monitoring of the vulnerable groups. Despite the tremendous efforts of humanitarian relief workers to reach those groups, access to them is restricted because of insecurity, the suspension of escorts provided by MONUA infantry units, and newly laid landmines. It has also become increasingly difficult to obtain clearance from UNITA for visits to the areas it controls. While sufficient food stocks exist in the country, lack of access has prevented the distribution of food to the most vulnerable persons in many provinces. The absence of suitable national or community-based social services and local support mechanisms also contributes to the worsening of the situation. This is reflected in the shocking fact that almost 30 per cent of Angolan children do not survive beyond the age of five. The severe humanitarian condition is further compounded by the drought in the southern provinces, which has affected over 300,000 persons.

23. In view of these constraints, humanitarian organizations have been obliged to airlift relief supplies to the needy populations in Saurimo, Luena and Andrade. Those operations have diverted the already limited resources from

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other important humanitarian activities. According to recent assessments, it is expected that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate, unless there is an early resolution to the present crisis. The Government of Angola does not have sufficient capacity to meet the most urgent basic needs of its civilians and I am extremely concerned that unless relief organizations are provided with secure access to the vulnerable populations, the dire situation of those groups may become intractable.

24. Notwithstanding the current difficult conditions prevailing in Angola, the Government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have agreed that the suspension of the demining programme throughout the country should be avoided at all costs. However, owing to the deterioration of the general security environment, special contingency measures have been adopted. The possibility of temporarily relocating all demining brigades to safer areas is currently being studied. The worsening of administrative and logistical support to the demining brigades in the provinces has led to the cessation of operations by all but two national brigades out of seven established earlier. International non-governmental organizations involved face similar constraints and, as a result, have also redeployed their personnel. It is foreseen that a team composed of representatives of UNDP, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Mine Action Service will visit Angola to review the country programme in November.

## VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

25. The Angolan economy continued to show signs of deep stagnation: foreign receipts from oil have been declining, public budget allocations have been revised downward and public domestic debt has increased. The economic difficulties, compounded by the low price of oil in the world market, are seriously affecting key economic variables, such as consumer prices, foreign exchange rates and the fiscal deficit, among others. The decision to implement a weekly devaluation of the local currency by 4.5 per cent was intended to narrow the gap between the parallel and the official market exchange rates.

26. The drop in oil prices and the diversion of resources from investment in productive sectors to the national security needs have led to a further reduction of planned expenditure for the social sector. As a consequence, some social infrastructure rehabilitation projects launched early this year could be halted. Social problems are also becoming increasingly acute with the deterioration of the military situation in vast areas of the country. Following the discussions held in Washington at the end of August 1998, the Government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have agreed on the implementation of a programme aimed at increasing the Government's ability to effectively implement its medium-term programme for stabilization and economic recovery for 1998-2000. The programme may be replaced by an enhanced structural adjustment facility in 1999, if the Government and IMF recognize that reforms aimed at improving transparency in the oil accounts, launching a privatization programme and liberalizing trade operations have substantially moved forward.

#### VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

27. As indicated in my previous report (S/1998/838), pending the submission of further recommendations on the United Nations presence in Angola, the General Assembly, by its resolution 52/8 C of 26 June 1998, appropriated an initial amount of US \$43.6 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of \$10.9 million gross, for the maintenance of MONUA for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998.

28. Pending a decision by the Security Council on the mandate of MONUA beyond 15 October 1998, I am requesting the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in entering into commitments for the maintenance of MONUA in the amount of \$10.9 million gross for the month of November 1998.

29. Should the Council authorize the extension of MONUA as indicated in paragraph 34 below, I intend to submit the revised budget for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 for consideration by the General Assembly at the main part of its fifty-third session.

30. As at 30 September 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM/MONUA special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 15 October 1998 amounted to \$137.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 30 September 1998 was \$1,802.3 million.

#### IX. OBSERVATIONS

31. I continue to be seriously concerned about the apparent unravelling of the peace process in Angola, a country where the United Nations has made enormous efforts for peace, not to mention the ultimate sacrifices made by peacekeepers.

32. The international community has agreed that UNITA and its leadership in Bailundo bear the primary responsibility for the present crisis raging in Angola. Only the unconditional implementation of all crucial elements of the Lusaka Protocol, particularly full demilitarization and the extension of State administration throughout the whole country, can rescue the peace process. Such irreversible steps, accompanied by immediate measures by UNITA, in coordination with the Government of Angola and the United Nations, to bring the peace process to a conclusion will avert further human suffering and devastation in Angola.

33. A political settlement, based on the Acordos de Paz (S/22609 of 17 May 1991), the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions, remains the most viable means to restore normalcy in Angola. I therefore call on the Government and, in particular, on UNITA to fulfil their responsibilities before their people and the international community and to take resolute steps to avert another full-scale war. To this end, it is important to keep the door to dialogue open, in particular with those who could make a concrete and decisive contribution to the peace process. Accordingly, I have instructed my Special Representative to maintain contacts with all concerned, old parties and new, in an attempt to give peace a chance. On the basis of the mandate

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contained in Security Council resolution 1195 (1998), I asked Mr. Diallo to visit Mr. Savimbi to deliver the strong message of the international community and to ascertain his intentions concerning the speediest implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The Government should facilitate this contact, which would help to establish the real intentions of UNITA.

34. In view of the considerations set out above and keeping in mind the unstable situation in the region, I recommend that the Security Council extend MONUA for another short period of up to six weeks, in order to give my Special Representative an additional opportunity to revive the stalled peace process. In the meantime, the prevailing insecurity demands that additional measures be taken to protect United Nations personnel and reconfigure the deployment of MONUA on the ground if needed.

35. When establishing MONUA, by its resolution 1118 (1997) of 30 June 1997, the Security Council mandated the Mission to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability. If, after the expiration of the proposed extension, the pattern of UNITA non-compliance with those obligations continues, if the dialogue between the parties remains elusive and my Special Representative is unable to maintain meaningful contacts, and MONUA remains obstructed in its verification activities, I may have no alternative for the Security Council but to propose taking the course of action described below.

36. At the beginning of December, the United Nations would proceed with the immediate readjustment of its presence throughout the country, its deployment being concentrated mostly in and around six regional headquarters, as well as Luanda and the logistical base in Lobito. The reconfiguration would be conducted gradually, so as to fully protect United Nations personnel and property, and would be completed by the end of January 1999.

37. On the humanitarian side, the combined effects of any resumption of hostilities and the ensuing hunger and growing poverty would lead to a far-reaching human tragedy in Angola. Therefore, special urgent measures must be taken to enable the humanitarian operations to perform their tasks in accordance with internationally accepted principles. Security clearances with all parties concerned and urgent additional funding are the basic requirements to avoid further worsening of the present emergency situation. In the next few weeks, I intend to commence consultations aimed at defining the modalities for the increased flow of humanitarian assistance commensurate with the dramatic needs on the ground. I call, once again, on the donor community to respond generously to the growing humanitarian crisis in Angola.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions  
as at 5 October 1998

Country	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers <sup>a</sup>	Troops	Total
Argentina	-	15	-	-	15
Bangladesh	3	21	1	-	25
Brazil	4	12	2	-	18
Bulgaria	3	20	-	-	23
Congo	2	-	-	-	2
Egypt	3	15	-	-	18
France	3	-	-	-	3
Gambia	-	4	-	-	4
Ghana	3	6	-	-	9
Guinea-Bissau	2	4	-	-	6
Hungary	3	8	-	-	11
India	5	11	8	138	162
Jordan	3	27	-	-	30
Kenya	3	6	-	-	9
Malaysia	4	26	-	-	30
Mali	3	21	-	-	24
Namibia	-	-	2	138	140
New Zealand	3	-	-	-	3
Nigeria	4	20	-	-	24
Norway	3	-	-	-	3
Pakistan	3	-	1 <sup>b</sup>	-	4
Poland	4	-	-	-	4
Portugal	4	43	4	61	112
Romania	-	-	4	138	142
Russian Federation	3	-	3	99	105
Senegal	4	-	-	-	4
Slovakia	3	-	-	-	3
Spain	-	14	-	-	14
Sweden	3	19	-	-	22

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Country	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers <sup>a</sup>	Troops	Total
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Ukraine	3	2	1	-	6
Uruguay	3	31	3	-	37
Zambia	3	22	8	-	33
Zimbabwe	3	22	4	-	29
Total	90	372	41	574	1 077

<sup>a</sup> Including military police.

<sup>b</sup> A military specialist in the demining school.

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English

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