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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED
NATIONS TRANSITION MISSION IN HAITIAddendum

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with resolution 1123 (1997) of 30 July 1997 and with the letter of the President of the Security Council of 30 September 1997 (S/1997/755), I have submitted to the Security Council on 31 October a comprehensive report on the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) (S/1997/832). In that report, I informed the Council that, in view of President René Préval's request of 29 October 1997 (see S/1997/832, annex II) for continued United Nations assistance to the Haitian National Police, the Governments of several Member States had been approached in order to establish whether they might be willing, under appropriate security arrangements, to place the necessary personnel at the disposal of the United Nations, should the Security Council decide to establish a follow-on mission in Haiti whose main task would be to support the Haitian National Police and to contribute further to its professionalization. I promised to revert to the Council in due course on the outcome of those consultations and to present recommendations concerning such a follow-on mission, including the related financial implications. The present report includes such information, as well as a concept of operations for the proposed mission, should the Security Council approve its establishment.

II. MANDATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OF THE
FOLLOW-ON MISSION

2. Bearing in mind the training requirements of the Haitian National Police, as described in the letter of the President of the Republic of Haiti (ibid.), the Security Council may wish to consider establishing a United Nations police mission in Haiti (to be known as MIPONUH) in order to assist the Government in its continuing efforts to professionalize the Haitian National Police. The mission would be composed of up to 290 police officers, including a 90-strong special police unit. The police personnel of MIPONUH would continue to carry personal weapons.

3. The proposed mission would have its headquarters in Port-au-Prince. It would oversee the technical assistance to the Haitian National Police funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and would cooperate closely with the joint Civilian Mission of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (MICIVIH).

4. The proposed mission would be led by a Head of Mission who would be assisted by a Police Commissioner and would report to me and, through me, to the Security Council. In addition to heading MIPONUH, the Head of Mission would have overall responsibility for United Nations politically related activities in Haiti and would maintain contacts with the Government of Haiti. In order to continue to ensure close coordination between the mission and UNDP, the UNDP Resident Representative would serve as Deputy Head of Mission, in addition to his responsibility as the coordinator of United Nations development activities in Haiti.

5. The substantive element of MIPONUH would include some 150 officers, who would be deployed in the nine départements. They would give special emphasis to assistance at the supervisory levels and to training specialized units of the national police force. In addition, they would, periodically and in selected areas, continue to monitor the performance of the Haitian National Police, guide agents in their day-to-day duties and maintain close coordination with technical advisers to the Haitian National Police funded by UNDP. They would not undertake patrolling activities.

6. Technical assistance to the Haitian National Police will be carefully monitored by UNDP and, where relevant, by MICIVIH, with special attention to the professional conduct and management of the police force, as well as respect for human rights. Respect for such standards will be a factor in any future decisions to continue such assistance.

7. As the resources available to the Haitian National Police remain insufficient and the countries contributing the majority of the civilian police element are not prepared to deploy their personnel without appropriate security backing, the role of the special police unit would be essential. The unit would be responsible for providing assistance to the personnel of the Mission and protecting its property.

8. The special police unit would be based in Camp Maple Leaf in Port-au-Prince. Its members would operate round the clock in three shifts of 30 each and would be supported, on a 24-hour basis, by three shifts of 10 officers each to secure the camp. The unit would not undertake any patrolling activities. An additional 10 officers would constitute the command structure and a further 10 would ensure first-line maintenance.

9. On the basis of the consultations conducted with Member States, it is expected that the substantive police element of the new mission would continue to be contributed by Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, the Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia and the United States of America. The Government of Argentina has offered to contribute the special police unit, which, once deployed, would be provided with briefings on international humanitarian law, peacekeeping principles and other related matters. The potential contributing

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countries have stressed that their police personnel must be provided with adequate medical and helicopter support. The requirement of air support equipped with night-vision capability pertains both to the substantive element and to the special police unit of the proposed mission. In view of the current financial crisis facing the Organization, it is essential that Member States continue to fund this support on a voluntary basis.

10. While the majority of the proposed mission's personnel are already in theatre, there is likely to be a gap of some weeks between the establishment of the mission and the deployment of the special police unit. The Secretariat is making every effort to ensure the expeditious deployment of the unit, should the Security Council decide to establish MIPONUH. However, the Secretariat is concerned about maintaining civilian police officers in Haiti without appropriate security backing and is, therefore, consulting Member States on appropriate transitional arrangements pending the arrival of the special police unit.

11. New guidelines governing the mission's operations would have to be established. As regards the guidelines for the special police unit, they would authorize the use of force in self-defence, but only in the performance of tasks described in paragraph 7 above and bearing in mind conditions on the ground as determined by the Head of Mission in consultation with the Police Commissioner and in close cooperation with President Préval and the Government of Haiti.

12. In assisting the Government of Haiti, the mission would continue to operate with the full consent of the authorities and in close cooperation with them. In this connection, it would be my intention to consult the Haitian authorities with a view to concluding expeditiously an agreement on the status of the mission's personnel. The mission's police officers, as all United Nations civilian police personnel, would enjoy the status of experts on mission, within the meaning of article VI of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

III. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

13. The estimated costs associated with the operation of MIPONUH for a period of six months would amount to approximately \$14 million (see annex). This estimate provides for a strength of up to 290 civilian police, including the 90-strong special police unit, supported by a civilian establishment of some 72 international and 133 local personnel, as well as 17 United Nations Volunteers. However, since the personnel who would constitute the special police unit would be treated as a formed unit, the Government providing the unit would be reimbursed on that basis.

14. Should the Security Council decide to authorize the deployment and implementation of a United Nations police mission in Haiti, it would be my intention to recommend to the General Assembly that the costs relating thereto be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to a special account established for the purpose.

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IV. OBSERVATIONS

15. While the Haitian National Police has made substantial strides forward, its development into a professional force continues to be slow and uneven. The young police force continues to have difficulty in dealing effectively with the country's increasing security demands resulting from banditry and drug trafficking, and there is still a fear that it could be manipulated by certain political groups as has happened in the past. In the political and economic climate prevailing in Haiti, the national police will need international assistance if it is to continue to pursue its own institutional development while meeting the country's security needs. I, therefore, share President Préval's view that the assistance of a civilian police mission to support the training of the Haitian National Police would ensure that this institution, indispensable to the establishment of a State truly under the rule of law, can develop in a balanced way, smoothly and quickly (see S/1997/832, annex II).

16. Accordingly, the Security Council may wish to consider establishing the proposed mission in Haiti for an initial period of six months, until 31 May 1998. Bearing in mind the crucial importance of the November 1998 legislative elections and the likely increase in security demands during that period, it is anticipated that the Haitian National Police would continue to need international support until the elections are held. While the proposed mission would allow for continued international support through the critical election period, the Government of Haiti must prepare itself to assume full responsibility for the further strengthening and effective functioning of its own institutions, including the national police, following the elections.

17. It should be stressed that the absence of a functioning judicial system has severely hindered the ability of the Haitian National Police to carry out its tasks. It has also limited its ability to ensure the prosecution of those officers who do not conduct themselves professionally. Indeed, violations of human rights and wrongdoing by police officers continue to be reported, notwithstanding the efforts of the Inspector-General of the Haitian National Police to rid the force of bad elements. Without a functioning judiciary, the international community's efforts to assist in creating an effective, politically neutral and professional police force would become increasingly difficult, if not impossible. I strongly urge the Government of Haiti to move forward in the area of judicial reform and call on the international community to provide the necessary assistance in this regard.

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Annex

Estimated cost of the United Nations police mission
in Haiti for a period of six months

	<u>Thousands of United States dollars</u>
1. Military personnel	-
2. Civilian personnel	9 700
3. Premises/accommodation	960
4. Infrastructure repairs	-
5. Transport operations	950
6. Air operations	15
7. Naval operations	20
8. Communications	270
9. Other equipment	145
10. Supplies and services	1 090
11. Election-related supplies and services	-
12. Public information programmes	70
13. Training programmes	-
14. Mine-clearing programmes	-
15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-
16. Air and surface freight	30
17. United Nations Logistics Base, Brindisi	-
18. Support account for peacekeeping operations	-
19. Staff assessment	<u>750</u>
Total, lines 1-19	<u><u>14 000</u></u>
