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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
MISSION IN HAITI

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 1048 (1996) of 29 February 1996, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a final period of four months until 30 June 1996. The present report is submitted in compliance with paragraph 10 of that resolution, by which the Security Council requested me to report on the implementation of the resolution by 15 June 1996, including information on activities by the United Nations system as a whole to promote the development of Haiti. On 8 May 1996, as members of the Security Council will recall, my Special Representative briefed the Council on recent developments in Haiti.

2. The report also contains my recommendations with respect to the role of the United Nations in Haiti after the expiration of the mandate of UNMIH. These recommendations take into account the letter addressed to me on 31 May 1996 by President Préval expressing his Government's wish for a continued international force for a further period of six months and my Special Representative's discussions with the Government about the country's needs for international support in the future. The Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti - Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, the United States of America and Venezuela - have also made a valuable contribution to the elaboration of the recommendations.

3. On 5 March 1996, my Special Representative for Haiti, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, relinquished his post. Mr. Enrique ter Horst was appointed to succeed him (see S/1996/155 and 156). The Commanders of the military and civilian police (CIVPOL) components of UNMIH, Major-General Joseph Kinzer of the United States of America and Chief Superintendent Neil Pouliot of Canada, also completed their tours of duty and were succeeded by Brigadier-General Pierre Daigle of Canada (see S/1996/157 and 158) and Colonel Philippe Balladur of France respectively.

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

4. The electoral process, which culminated with the election of President René Garcia Préval on 17 December 1995, has provided Haiti with newly elected democratic institutions. An essential further step is to ensure that these institutions function properly. This step is hampered by numerous obstacles of a practical or financial nature, such as the lack of qualified staff, adequate premises and equipment. The absence of consensus, even among the ruling Lavalas movement, on major issues such as economic reform, will also test the capacity of the newly elected institutions.

5. Soon after his inauguration, President Préval nominated Mr. Rosny Smarth as the new Prime Minister. Mr. Smarth took office on 6 March. Strengthened by a five-year mandate, the new Government has moved quickly to address the fundamental problems impeding development, such as weak governmental institutions, economic inefficiency and corruption, and has laid out economic policies which seek to stimulate growth and reduce inflation by encouraging domestic investment and job-creating programmes. A detailed work programme on the institutional development of the new Haitian National Police (HNP) has been put into place and an ambitious strategy to reform the justice system is being designed. The Government's initiatives are unfolding in an environment which, in spite of certain worrying trends, remains generally stable and secure, thanks in great part to the presence of UNMIH. The dismantling of the Haitian armed forces by former President Aristide has greatly expanded the space available to the present Government to pursue its chosen policies.

6. Yet there is a growing demand for social services and infrastructure, such as medical and educational facilities, roads, electricity, and improved living conditions. These unmet demands and heightened expectations, generated by the installation of a democratically elected government, have led to frequent demonstrations in the capital and throughout the country. These events have been generally peaceful. However, the potential for violence has increased.

7. While the Mission has no indication that an organized threat to the Government exists at this time, deep apprehension persists that persons associated with the de facto regime, many of them disgruntled and marginalized, could foment unrest by capitalizing on public frustration. UNMIH's diminished presence has led to a growing concern in this regard in certain sectors of Haitian society, and many Haitians fear that, following the Mission's departure, elements of the former military and militia forces may again pose a threat to the consolidation of democracy in Haiti.

III. DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

8. By paragraphs 6 and 7 of its resolution 1048 (1996), the Security Council decided to reduce the troop strength of UNMIH to no more than 1,200 and the civilian police strength to no more than 300. During March and April, the force Headquarters staff was reduced and an almost total rotation of the military contingents was conducted. Contingents from Djibouti, Nepal and the United States left the mission area as envisaged in my last report (see S/1996/112,

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paras. 35, 36 and 54). The contingents from Bangladesh and Pakistan have been reduced to 525 each. As a result, as at 1 June 1996, the strength of UNMIH's military and civilian police contingents stood at 1,193 and 291, respectively (see annex). Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the same resolution, by which the Security Council requested all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by the United Nations and by Member States to carry out the provisions of UNMIH's mandate, the Government of Canada has contributed, at its own expense, a contingent of 700 military personnel to complement the force.

9. On 15 March 1996, the boundaries of the operational zones of UNMIH were redrawn to conform to the Mission's reduced strength and the closure of base camps. A small Pakistani unit was withdrawn from Gonaïves in May. As planned, a permanent military presence is maintained in the key areas of Cap Haïtien (Zone I) and Port-au-Prince (Zone II); the remainder of the country has been divided into four "Response Zones" (see attached map). Although the military and civilian police components of UNMIH have been reduced to a third of their original strength, the Mission maintains a visible presence throughout Haiti by means of periodic patrols.

10. As mandated by the Security Council, and in keeping with the priorities established by the Government of Haiti, the UNMIH military component has continued to assist the Haitian authorities in their security tasks, such as ensuring an outer cordon of security and logistical support for President Préval during his travels around the country, as well as providing security to former President Aristide. It also provides a security presence at key installations, including the Port-au-Prince international airport and the seaport. Together with the Haitian National Police and CIVPOL, UNMIH military personnel patrol the capital, thereby maximizing the impact of the Mission's reduced resources and providing on-the-job training to HNP. The military component is also assisting HNP in creating an efficient logistics system.

11. The UNMIH civilian police component is deployed at 19 locations throughout Haiti. With the completion of the deployment of HNP, CIVPOL officers are focusing their efforts on helping HNP draw up an institutional development plan in the various joint working groups set up to ensure a smooth and orderly transfer of the tasks currently carried out by UNMIH (see S/1996/112, para. 37). CIVPOL are actively involved in the training of HNP and nine CIVPOL officers have been deployed at the Police Academy. In addition to assisting in the training of HNP senior officers and instructors, CIVPOL personnel are training the VIP security team (équipe de sécurité rapprochée) of HNP, as well as providing additional instruction to the crowd control units (compagnies de maintien de l'ordre). CIVPOL detachments at various locations around the country are providing on-the-job training and guidance, as well as monitoring and evaluating the performance of HNP officers in the field. CIVPOL is also assisting in the creation of the HNP Officer Corps, including the preparation of selection criteria. Five CIVPOL officers are providing full-time technical assistance at HNP headquarters and an equal number are deployed with the Special Investigative Unit (brigade criminelle).

12. As mandated by the Security Council, in paragraph 9 of resolution 1048 (1996), I have initiated planning for the withdrawal of UNMIH personnel and

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assets from Haiti. It provides for the withdrawal to be completed within three months of the expiration of the Mission's mandate.

IV. HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE

13. The ninth and last class of the Haitian National Police cadets, which recently completed its training at the Police Academy, was deployed on schedule in late February, thus bringing HNP strength to nearly 6,000. The Haitian National Police is making its presence increasingly felt in Port-au-Prince and in the other towns, as well as in the countryside, and has been working diligently to provide the country with a stable and secure environment. Yet challenges to this force are constant and considerable. In particular a spate of attacks against HNP personnel has cost the lives of five officers in recent weeks. While it has not been possible, at this stage, to establish that there is a clear pattern which would indicate a political motive for these deplorable incidents, they not surprisingly have an adverse effect on the force's morale and its ability to carry out its responsibilities.

14. Many of the young police officers work conscientiously and enthusiastically, a fact which is reflected in the results they have achieved. However, as I pointed out in my previous report (see S/1996/112, para. 14), the force continues to suffer from the absence of an effective senior officer corps, as well as from a lack of adequate equipment and appropriate operating procedures. These shortcomings are compounded by a lack of coordination within the public security sector. The consequences were underscored in March 1996 when agents attached to several police units stormed the Cité Soleil slum in Port-au-Prince after receiving information that it was used as a base by several well-armed criminal groups. This operation, which was not adequately planned, led to the deaths of eight civilians. President Préval's decision to dissolve the intelligence body formerly known as Service d'intelligence national is encouraging and demonstrates the Government's commitment to consolidating all public security functions within HNP.

15. The new leadership of HNP, under Mr. Robert Manuel, the Secretary of State for Public Security, and Mr. Pierre Denizé, the new Director General of the Police, is working closely with the civilian police component of UNMIH. They have prepared an immediate and long-range work programme to promote the institutional development of HNP in four major areas: training, infrastructure and logistics, management, and operations. To ensure rapid progress, working groups including representatives of the Government, UNMIH and the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti have been set up in each area. President Préval, the Prime Minister and other senior officials are kept informed on a weekly basis of the progress achieved by these groups.

16. The working group on management, which is focusing on crucial aspects such as recruitment, promotion and rules of discipline and service, is expected to complete its work by the last quarter of 1996. The various working groups on organization and operations have laid the groundwork for properly organizing the force and for establishing operations and information centres at all levels. The central operations centre (centre d'opérations) was established in Port-au-Prince on 15 May. These working groups are also planning the

establishment of specialized units such as the judicial police, two additional crowd control units and an armed intervention squad (brigade d'intervention rapide). The Government, demonstrating its resolve to strengthen the rule of law, has decided to reinforce the department charged with criminal investigation, the Special Investigative Unit.

17. Notwithstanding these positive steps, consolidation of the Haitian National Police presupposes the existence of senior- and intermediate-level officers selected in a transparent process based on professional criteria. To overcome the serious shortage in leadership, the first of three accelerated courses has begun to train about 80 commissaires. The participants were selected on the basis of criteria elaborated by CIVPOL. Similar courses have been planned for departmental directors and inspectors. Graduates of these courses should provide HNP with about two thirds of its projected senior officer corps by July 1996. Regular full courses for the remaining officers will begin thereafter, to be completed in the second half of 1997.

18. On numerous occasions, I have mentioned that the four-month basic training course provided to HNP personnel in the Police Academy was widely considered insufficient. The force's training programme accordingly envisages additional instruction for all HNP personnel at nine departmental training centres to be established in the coming months. Senior officers who have taken the accelerated courses will also receive additional training.

19. While training of the Coast Guard and a VIP security team has already begun, instruction in specialized fields such as criminal investigation, narcotics and crowd control is also planned. According to the established timetable, this phase of training will be completed by the end of 1997. Thereafter, advanced studies, which will take another three years, will commence for specialized police units. By that time Haiti should have a well-trained, multi-disciplinary and experienced police force. Much credit for this achievement will be due to the assistance generously provided by Canada, France and the United States.

20. Nevertheless the Haitian National Police continues to suffer from a serious lack of equipment, despite significant donations from the international community. Its headquarters does not even have the means to communicate directly with police headquarters in the Departments and it lacks a reliable system for the routine distribution of documents. A number of police stations have no vehicles, electricity, or water and lack secure detention facilities. A detailed list of minimum needs to be met by the end of 1996 in the areas of equipment and logistics includes radio, telephone and facsimile capability, as well as computerization. In order to improve basic infrastructure, 22 police stations are being renovated with resources from the Trust Fund for the creation of HNP. It is my hope that Member States will continue their support of this worthy cause by contributing generously to the Fund.

21. Experience to date indicates that fundamental reform and professionalization of the country's justice sector is required for the new police force to operate effectively. To demonstrate the high priority his Government attaches to this sector, the Prime Minister chaired a meeting on 20 April with representatives of the international community. Subsequently the

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Minister of Justice sponsored a three-day seminar on a work programme for reform of the judicial system covering the internal management of the Justice Ministry, judicial and legal reforms, human rights, police, and the prison system. While the details and time-frame for this programme are still being finalized, it is expected that the bulk of the work should be completed by the end of 1997.

V. DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

22. The new Government inherited an extremely difficult economic situation characterized by low growth and high unemployment. Its attempts to introduce much needed economic reforms have met resistance in some quarters. Taxes and import duties are being collected more aggressively and an economic reform programme, including the privatization of many state-owned enterprises, is currently being crafted in collaboration with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Inter-American Development Bank and the European Union are also participating in these consultations.

23. The Haitian economy is passing through a difficult phase with inflation of about 20 per cent, a budget deficit for the first six months of fiscal year 1995-1996 at over US\$ 60 million, and an annual trade deficit close to \$450 million. Resourceful and determined policies will be required to secure steady and non-inflationary economic growth. The funds committed by bilateral and multilateral donors and creditors which I mentioned in my report of 6 November 1995 (S/1995/922) have not been fully utilized and remain well above \$1 billion. These resources are earmarked for development programmes rather than emergency measures.

24. Faced with this dire economic situation, the agencies of the United Nations system have adopted a strategy which seeks to accelerate economic growth while protecting the environment and ensuring basic social services for all segments of the population. Believing that development is only sustainable when buttressed by strong domestic institutions, United Nations efforts stress the strengthening of Haitian institutions, both governmental and non-governmental. Disbursements projected by United Nations agencies total \$118 million in 1996 and \$155 million in 1997. Of these, the World Bank will disburse close to \$67 million in 1996 and \$80.5 million in 1997 in support of private sector development, water supply, transportation, energy, forest protection, basic social services and balance of payments. IMF is supporting a programme of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform with \$18 million in financing for fiscal year 1995-1996 and \$36 million for fiscal year 1996-1997.

25. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), including its Capital Development Fund, is slated to allocate about \$30 million for the period 1996-1997 for governance activities, modernization of the State, economic growth, poverty alleviation and protection of the environment. The World Food Programme will disburse close to \$5 million in 1996 and \$6.5 million in 1997 for mostly rural development projects and food for school children. UNICEF, with disbursements close to \$15 million in 1996-1997, will concentrate its assistance on vaccination and nutrition programmes for children, developing and improving potable water systems, primary education, community organization and leadership training for women. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

(FAO) will focus its institution-building efforts on the agricultural sector, revitalizing agricultural production and improving the seed pool. Together with the International Fund for Agricultural Development, FAO will allocate \$1.6 million to agricultural development in 1996 and \$5 million in 1997. The World Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization will concentrate \$2.3 million in each of the next fiscal years on improving the health of Haitians and the quality of health services available to them. The two organizations will target maternal and child health, control of infectious diseases, provision of drinking water and basic sanitation, distribution of fundamental medicines and epidemiological tracking and surveillance. The United Nations Population Fund, with \$2.1 million in 1996 and \$2.5 million in 1997, will continue to support improvements in reproductive health, family planning and the special needs of women and adolescents. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization will focus on literacy programmes, formulation and implementation of a National Plan for Educational Development and the protection of Haiti's historical and cultural patrimony. This wide array of projects invariably leads to joint initiatives among the various agencies of the United Nations system, the international financial institutions and key multilateral and bilateral donors. This collaboration is coordinated by UNDP, on which I shall continue to rely as the efforts of the United Nations system focus increasingly on strengthening Haitian institutions and the country's long-term development.

26. UNDP has submitted to the Prime Minister a list of nearly 20 projects covering infrastructure, health, irrigation, drinking water, and renovation of schools, clinics, and courthouses. Some \$400 million in financing for these projects has been secured and, if quickly launched, these initiatives could demonstrate the Government's active commitment to promoting change and thus help build confidence in the country's future stability and security. The United Nations will remain engaged in promoting the development of Haiti over the long term in continuation of its commitment during the current period of transition. To this end, the formulation of a shared vision among Haitians of their country's future would constitute a very useful framework for international support.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

27. The General Assembly, by its resolution 50/90 of 19 December 1995, authorized me to enter into commitments in connection with the maintenance of UNMIH at a rate not to exceed \$10 million (gross) per month for the period from 1 March to 31 May 1996. UNMIH's operations costs until 30 June 1996 will amount to \$45,314,000.

28. Should the Security Council decide to proceed along the lines described in paragraphs 34 to 37 below, I shall, as soon as possible, submit, as an addendum to the present report, a statement of the financial implications of the proposed Mission.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

29. By its resolution 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994, the Security Council mandated UNMIH to assist the Government of Haiti in creating a new police force. President Préval and his Government have demonstrated great determination to build an effective and professional force, committed to the rule of law and respect for the human rights and dignity of all citizens. For the first time in its history, Haiti now has the foundation for such a police force. However, the memory of the distressing circumstances imposed upon the majority of Haiti's population by the former military rulers, the militia and their sympathizers lingers in the minds of most Haitians. Many remain fearful that at this stage the ill-equipped and inexperienced HNP may not alone be able to protect them from those groups, whom they suspect of retaining a capacity to destabilize the country's emerging institutions.

30. Withdrawal of international support at this juncture could jeopardize the objective of completing the creation of the new civilian police and ensuring for all Haitians the security needed to advance development and consolidate democracy. As members of the Council are aware, President Préval and his Government have resumed negotiations with the international financial institutions. The success of the proposed reforms, which are so necessary for Haiti's economic recovery, requires a peaceful environment. The readiness of private investors, both domestic and foreign, to accelerate growth and boost export earnings, depends not only on pragmatic and attractive investment policies but also on a sense of security. Nationwide elections for local assemblies are planned for the very near future. One third of the members of the Senate are also up for re-election in November. While the new Haitian police, with extensive support from UNMIH, performed creditably last December in their efforts to ensure peaceful conditions for the election of a new president, continued support to HNP by United Nations military and police personnel would help to ensure that the forthcoming elections proceed smoothly.

31. At a meeting held on 22 April under the chairmanship of President Préval, Haiti's Secretary of State for Public Security, Mr. Robert Manuel, provided an assessment of the security situation. He said that the young HNP was not currently in a position to maintain a secure and stable environment on its own. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fritz Longchamp, expressed the Government's view that continued support by the international community was necessary in its current form beyond 30 June 1996 to consolidate the present environment and the institutional development of the Haitian police. In his view, an extension of the present mandate of UNMIH until 31 December 1996 should be the preferred option. Subsequently, in his letter of 31 May 1996 President Préval asked me to seek the Security Council's authorization for the continued presence of an international force in Haiti for an additional period of six months.

32. For the reasons indicated above, I believe, as does my Special Representative, that the concerns expressed by the Haitian authorities are well-founded, at least in the short term. I therefore share their view that the presence and assistance of the international community continues to be required in Haiti to support HNP and to consolidate the progress achieved by the Haitian people after the restoration of democracy. The Friends of the Secretary-General

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for Haiti have also expressed their support for the position of the Haitian authorities and their interest in adjusting the operations of the United Nations to reflect the new realities on the ground.

33. I am, of course, mindful of the decision of the Security Council that the extension of the UNMIH mandate until 30 June 1996 was intended to be final. At the same time, it is clear that the Haitian National Police is still not in a position to ensure, on its own, the stable and secure environment required for the consolidation of democratic rule in Haiti, and that complete withdrawal of the United Nations military and police presence at this time could jeopardize the success achieved so far by the Haitian people with the help and support of the international community. It will be recalled that in my report of 15 July 1994, on the basis of which the Security Council adopted resolution 940 (1994), I noted that, by accepting my proposals, the Council would implicitly commit the international community to a long-term continuing programme of support to Haiti (S/1994/828, para. 28). In my report of 17 January 1995 I stressed that the stability of the country required that the international community live up decisively to its commitment to help the Government of Haiti to achieve its aim of rebuilding the nation (S/1995/46, para. 21).

34. Against this background, and as the mandate of UNMIH draws to an end on 30 June 1996 in accordance with resolution 1048 (1996), I would like to invite the Security Council to examine carefully the arguments stated in the present report in favour of the maintenance of a United Nations military and police presence in Haiti. Were this to be agreed, I would recommend the establishment, for a period of six months, of a new Mission to be known as the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) with a mandate limited to the following tasks:

(a) Assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police;

(b) Assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force;

(c) Coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.

35. If the Security Council decides to accept these recommendations, I would propose that the new Mission should include military and civilian police elements. The military element, with an initial strength of 1,200 personnel, would be located in Port-au-Prince only and be composed of one reduced infantry battalion and one reduced reconnaissance battalion, a helicopter unit, a military police unit, an engineer unit, transport and logistic elements, as well as adequate medical support. Some of the existing UNMIH contingents could remain in Haiti to facilitate the transition. The new Mission would need to be provided with sufficient air assets, especially medium lift helicopters, to assure a quick reaction capability. In accordance with the usual practice, consultations would be conducted with the Member States to secure the necessary contributions.

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36. Mindful of the need for economy, I would recommend a phased reduction of the military element from its initial strength of 1,200 to 1,000 personnel within three months of the beginning of the mandate. I would also be alert to further opportunities to reduce the strength of the Mission, if the situation permits, so that it can implement its tasks at the lowest possible cost to Member States.

37. As regards the civilian police element, members of the Security Council will recall that, in my report of 17 January 1995, I pointed out that the task of the civilian police would be quantitatively greater and qualitatively more demanding than had been the case in previous peace-keeping operations in which United Nations civilian police had been deployed (S/1995/46, para. 86). The experience of UNMIH has shown that this assessment was justified. Accordingly, I recommend that, if the Council approves my recommendations, the new Mission's civilian police element should have a strength of 300.

38. Experience in Haiti has clearly demonstrated that those 300 police officers, who will be equipped only with personal weapons, cannot by themselves ensure the maintenance of the secure and stable environment vital for the training of HNP, the consolidation of democracy and economic development in Haiti. Retention of the military quick reaction capability referred to above is required to provide protection to the civilian police personnel who will be deployed throughout the country in support of the Haitian authorities at a time when the law and order resources available to them are not yet adequate. The issue of security remains central to the entire United Nations presence in Haiti and to the success of the Haitians' efforts to build a better future.

39. Finally, I should like to commend my Special Representative, the Commanders of the military and civilian police components and the international and local civilian personnel, troops and civilian police officers who serve in UNMIH for their unfailing efforts in support of the consolidation of democracy in Haiti.

Annex

COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH OF UNMIH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE
COMPONENTS AS AT 1 JUNE 1996

Nationality	Military			CIVPOL
	Operational forces	Support	HQ	
Algeria				13
Bangladesh	522		18	
Canada		72	38	97
Djibouti				18
France			1	89
Mali				62
Pakistan	523		18	
Russian Federation				5
Togo				7
Trinidad and Tobago			1	
Total	1 045	72	76	291
Grand total	1 193			291

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