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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 981 (1995), 982 (1995) AND 983 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983 (1995) of 30 March 1995, the Security Council decided to establish three separate, but interlinked, peace-keeping missions in the former Yugoslavia: the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO; the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A theatre headquarters, known as United Nations Peace Forces headquarters (UNPF-HQ), was retained in Zagreb. The mandate of these missions was for a period of eight months, terminating on 30 November 1995. The present report is intended to assist the Council in its deliberations on the future of these missions.

II. STRUCTURE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES

2. UNPF-HQ, until recently headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who was succeeded on 1 November 1995 by Mr. Kofi Annan, exercises overall policy direction, administration and logistics for the three missions in the former Yugoslavia. A Theatre Force Commander commands the military elements of the forces under his authority. As of 17 November 1995, the strength of the military component, commanded by the Theatre Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier of France, amounted to 32,385, including 576 United Nations military observers from 36 countries. Details of troop deployments and casualties may be found in annexes I to III of the present report. There are 366 civilian police, 1,763 international civilian staff (including 1,195 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 2,873 local staff.

3. Each separate component of the United Nations Peace Forces is headed by a civilian chief of mission and has its own military commander. UNPROFOR is headed by Mr. Antonio Pedauye of Spain and its military commander is Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; UNCRO is headed by Mr. Byung Suk Min of the Republic of Korea and its military commander is Major-General Eid Kamal Al-Rodan of Jordan; and

UNPREDEP is headed by Mr. Henryk Sokalski of Poland and its military commander is Brigadier-General Juha Engstrom of Finland.

III. CROATIA

4. Since my report of 29 September 1995 (S/1995/835), in which I reviewed the situation following the Croatian Government's military takeover of three of the four sectors of the UNCRO, the primary tasks of UNCRO have continued to be to seek to reduce tensions in the area known as Sector East (Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium) and to monitor the conditions of minorities in the former United Nations protected areas of Sectors South, North and West, while withdrawing and repatriating all United Nations military personnel from the former sectors and closing the Sector headquarters and UNCRO military headquarters, which should be completed no later than 21 December 1995.

5. Against a background of rising military tension in Sector East, including a build-up of Croatian troops west of the Sector, and repeated statements by Croatian leaders of their intention to recapture the area if negotiations for a peaceful reintegration were unsuccessful, UNCRO supported the ongoing political negotiations by seeking to uphold the integrity of the zone of separation between the two sides and initiating local confidence-building measures, including family reunions and humanitarian visits. In view of the possibility of imminent attack, precautions were taken to reinforce and fortify UNCRO positions. Contingency plans were also made to establish sanctuary for persons who might become displaced, including assisting the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in stockpiling food, water and humanitarian supplies, which are now in place. Concern remains high for the security of United Nations troops and personnel in the Sector.

6. Following intensive local negotiations throughout September and October 1995, undertaken by my Special Envoy, Thorvald Stoltenberg, and the United States Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, and further negotiations at the peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, a commitment was reached on 3 November 1995 between President Milosevic and President Tudjman to reinvigorate local negotiations. These concluded with the signing of the basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium on 12 November 1995. The text of the basic agreement has been communicated to the Council in document S/1995/951. In its resolution 1023 (1995) of 22 November 1995, the Security Council welcomed the agreement and expressed its readiness to consider expeditiously the request to establish a transitional administration and authorize an appropriate international force.

7. Meanwhile, in accordance with resolutions 981 (1995), 994 (1995), 1009 (1995) and 1019 (1995), UNCRO personnel, in close cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNHCR and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), have continued to monitor the situation of vulnerable groups, including refugees from Velika Kladusa and the mainly Croatian Serb minority in the former sectors. Approximately 6,000 Croatian Serbs have remained in Sectors North and South, many of whom are elderly or disabled and living in remote areas in desperate conditions. UNCRO continued to document serious violations of their human rights, including harassment, looting

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of property, burning of houses and killing of civilians. While the Croatian Government has recently made efforts to improve the conditions of Croatian Serbs in the Sectors and incidents of house-burning have decreased, the continuing pattern of violence and intimidation raises serious concerns about their welfare, including the ability of many of them to survive the winter under conditions of economic and physical deprivation. UNCRO has provided assistance to these people, but the clear responsibility for their welfare lies with the Croatian Government, which will have to demonstrate, by concrete action, its willingness to ensure respect for the rights of the Croatian Serb minority in the former sectors, and to cooperate with international organizations towards this end.

8. There has not yet been a positive response from the Croatian Government to the Council's concern, most recently expressed in resolution 1019 (1995) of 9 November 1995, about time-limits placed on refugees to return to Croatia to reclaim their property. The law on the temporary management of currently abandoned property in the formerly occupied territory is due to come into effect on 3 December 1995. It allows the Croatian Government to make abandoned homes and property available for the housing of displaced persons unless the owners of the property claim their property for personal use by returning to Croatia. At the present time, designated administrative procedures and justified concerns for security constitute virtually insurmountable obstacles to the return of Serbs to claim their property.

9. UNCRO has conducted a series of prison visits to follow the cases of some 800 Croatian Serbs detained following the Croatian military operations in the former sectors. Difficulty of access to lawyers is a persistent complaint; there is also concern about the lack of specificity of charges. UNCRO has also provided civil affairs and civilian police assistance to the UNHCR operation in Kuplensko refugee camp in former Sector North. The camp houses more than 20,000 Bosniac refugees (Abdic loyalists) from Velika Kladusa.

10. The situation around the Prevlaka peninsula has remained stable, although there have been provocations on both sides. The presence of United Nations military observers in both the Prevlaka and Dubrovnik areas has contributed to controlling tensions in these potentially explosive regions.

IV. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

11. During the current mandate period, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been dominated by three main elements. First, there has been an unprecedented level of military activity in the theatre, including offensives by all sides, which have resulted in major movements of refugees and displaced persons and in widespread violations of international humanitarian law by Bosnian Serb forces. Secondly, there has been a change in the roles of UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both of which became militarily engaged against the Bosnian Serbs. Thirdly, the United States-led peace initiative, together with a significant and country-wide decrease in fighting, have, in recent weeks, provided the first real opportunity in many months for a political solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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12. In the first part of the current mandate period, UNPROFOR faced major difficulties in implementing its mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina owing to the apparent determination of the parties to achieve a military solution to the conflict following the expiration of the December 1994 cessation-of-hostilities agreement (see S/1995/8, annexes I and II). The Bosnian Serb non-compliance with the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone and weapon collection points in May 1995 and the use of NATO air strikes against a Bosnian Serb ammunition depot in Pale as a riposte to the failure of the Serbs to return heavy weapons to storage sites resulted in the Bosnian Serb forces taking over 300 UNPROFOR personnel as hostages, some of whom were used as "human shields" in strategically important locations. In response to the hostage crisis and to the untenable situation of UNPROFOR, the Security Council, by its resolution 998 (1995), approved the deployment of a rapid reaction capacity in order to provide UNPF/UNPROFOR with an enhanced capability to carry out its mandate.

13. As described in detail in my report to the Council of 30 August 1995 (S/1995/755), the Bosnian Serbs launched a full-scale assault on 6 July 1995 against the safe area of Srebrenica, as a result of which a large number of human rights abuses were inflicted on the population. Following this assault, the Serbs began an attack on the nearby safe area of Zepa, which fell to their forces on 25 July. On 21 July, as the Serbs were attacking Zepa, the foreign ministers of the Contact Group, NATO and UNPROFOR troop-contributing nations met in London to discuss future action in the light of the inability of UNPROFOR to deter attacks on Srebrenica. Following this, the parties to the conflict, in particular the Bosnian Serbs, were warned that further violations of the safe areas would be met with decisive force, including the use of NATO air strikes.

14. On 28 August 1995, 5 mortar rounds landed in the vicinity of Sarajevo's Markale market place, 1 of which killed 37 people and wounded 88 others. In order to restore the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo and to deter any further attacks on safe areas, multiple NATO air strikes were conducted with the approval of the UNPF Force Commander against Serb anti-aircraft systems and heavy weapons in the vicinity of Sarajevo, as well as against ammunition supply depots and other military facilities throughout eastern Bosnian Serb territory. During this operation, mortars and artillery of the rapid reaction force engaged Bosnian Serb targets in the area of Sarajevo.

15. Soon after NATO began air operations in eastern Bosnia, Bosnian government and Croatian forces began to advance in the western part of the country. In the week of 10 September 1995, Bosnian government forces took much of the Ozren salient, while, simultaneously, Croatian forces made sweeping advances in the south-west of the country, including the capture of areas traditionally populated by Bosnian Serbs. Major flows of displaced persons began. At the same time as fighting was raging in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States continued actively to pursue the peace initiative it had begun during the summer. On 5 October 1995, the United States delegation secured a country-wide cease-fire agreement that included non-military elements such as humane treatment for detained persons, freedom of movement and the right of displaced persons to return to their original homes. UNPROFOR military and civilian personnel immediately undertook various measures to ensure the successful implementation of the cease-fire agreement, including demining activities that were necessary for the repair and reopening of utilities for Sarajevo. The

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Chief of Mission of UNPROFOR conducted the negotiations that led to the entry into force of the cease-fire.

16. Since 12 October 1995, when the cease-fire agreement entered into force, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has improved significantly. Passage in the city on "blue routes" has been unrestricted since the cease-fire, and UNPROFOR has been escorting civilian convoys in the area of Sarajevo in order to guarantee freedom of movement. Implementation of the action plan of the Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo accelerated dramatically with the improvement in the security situation. For most of the period between April and September 1995, restrictions on access of goods into the city delayed project implementation. However, with the opening of the route over Mount Igman, spare parts and equipment have been able to reach the city in considerable quantities for the first time since the Office was established. The United Nations Trust Fund has committed funds totalling more than \$11 million to vital projects in the city, many of which are now coming to fruition. In addition, the Office has been actively involved in the restoration and stabilization of the utilities network and played a leading role in the negotiations on utilities that preceded implementation of the cease-fire on 12 October 1995. On 30 October, the first convoys of civilian trucks and buses were escorted between Sarajevo and Gorazde. Escorted convoys enjoy freedom of movement on main routes, but Bosnian government forces have recently prevented United Nations escorts provided by the Russian contingent from entering Gorazde.

17. Compliance with the current cease-fire has been noticeably better than with previous cease-fires. Neither side has engaged in offensive activity, and all parties are participating constructively in joint military commissions. United Nations military observers now operate in Bosnian Serb-held areas and UNPROFOR and humanitarian convoys, as well as escorted civilian vehicles, move freely in and out of Sarajevo and Gorazde. Sarajevo airport operates safely and without hindrance, and releases of prisoners of war and detainees have taken place. However, none of the sides has yet complied fully with the provisions of the cease-fire agreement with respect to freedom of movement for UNPROFOR patrols. For example, restrictions are still being imposed by Bosnian Croat military units in north-western Bosnia.

18. Investigations of recent expulsions from northern Bosnia have revealed significant human rights abuses, while denial of access to Srebrenica continues to impede efforts to determine the full extent of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights that followed the fall of the enclave. Minority residents of Banja Luka continue to face escalating threats to their security and the possibility of imminent expulsion. Of particular concern are reports that hundreds of men of military age were separated from the persons forcibly displaced from Banja Luka and other Bosnian Serb-controlled towns, both at the collection points where people were forced to assemble for the convoys and at stops along the way to Bosnian Government-held territory. The fate of these men and of many hundreds of others who had been conscripted for forced labour before the expulsions occurred remains unknown. Concerns have also been raised over the welfare of Bosnian and Croatian Serb refugees and displaced persons and over the Bosnian and Croatian Governments' practice of resettling refugees and displaced persons, occasionally against their will, in areas recently brought under their control.

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19. The limited progress in the political, social and economic integration of the Bosniac-Croat Federation has resulted in difficulties for United Nations activities. Continuation of the Federation, which serves as a foundation of the peace process, is threatened by the failure of both the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniacs to agree on certain fundamental issues and to implement what they have agreed. The most important include transfers of responsibility to the Federation, accommodation in areas recently recovered from the Bosnian Serbs in western Bosnia and the resettlement of displaced persons. While an accord on these issues was recently announced, this has yet to be translated into meaningful cooperation on the ground. The difficult relationship between the Government of the Federation and that of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has also caused some operational problems for the United Nations, notably in connection with the deployment of the rapid reaction capacity of UNPROFOR.

V. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

20. The attempt on the life of President Kiro Gligorov of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been the most significant single event during the mandate period. This terrorist act, which was unanimously condemned by all major political forces in the country, has fortunately neither destabilized national life nor slowed down the processes of internal reforms and foreign policy initiatives.

21. The country's growing role in the international arena has contributed considerably to maintaining internal peace and security. Although opposition parties continue to challenge the outcome of last year's parliamentary elections, the ruling coalition's majority in the legislature has made it possible to pass several important laws in the areas of democratization, privatization, formation of political parties, local self-government and education. However, internal differences remain, and internal threats to the country's stability have not ceased. Dissatisfaction continues to be strongest among the ethnic Albanian minority. The Government, on the other hand, believes that inter-ethnic relations unnecessarily "internationalize" domestic issues and that this can work against the interests of the country. In the past eight months, however, the Government has taken steps to meet some of the concerns of the ethnic Albanian community. All persons serving prison terms related to the arms affair and the disturbances at Tetovo last February have been released. A special four-year course for teachers in the Albanian language has been offered at the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje. A 10-per cent quota has been reserved at institutions of higher learning for students representing ethnic minorities, and the first ethnic Albanian general in the army has been appointed. The new laws on education and local government now contain a number of provisions relating to the needs and rights of ethnic minorities. Significantly, ethnic Albanian members of Parliament have ceased boycotting parliamentary sessions and have resumed active participation in the work of the National Assembly.

22. Externally, there is little evidence to indicate any imminent military threat to the country's territorial integrity. Three of the four neighbouring countries have given their official recognition to the State of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) remains pending.

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23. The interim accord between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (S/1995/794, annex), signed on 13 September 1995, has been a milestone in relations between the two countries, and will have far-reaching implications for the region as a whole. I wish to express my warm appreciation to the two Governments for their constructive approaches, which helped me and my Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, to respond effectively to the Council's request contained in resolution 845 (1993). I am continuing the efforts to find solutions to the remaining differences between the two countries. The accord, which strengthened the Republic's international standing, was immediately followed by the establishment of full diplomatic relations with several other States, the country's admission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, participation in the "Partnership for Peace" initiative and a number of other international and regional arrangements.

24. Economically, the country has for too long been exposed to the double effects of the embargo from the south and the consequences of international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). One consequence has been frequent sanctions violations. However, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and a number of friendly countries, the Government has been taking various measures to stabilize the economy. Their success has been only partial. Whereas the inflation rate has been reduced and the pace of privatization and banking reforms has continued, industrial production has considerably declined and unemployment has increased to 50 per cent of the workforce.

25. The effective role of UNPREDEP has been of major importance to the highest authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. UNPREDEP's regular maintenance of working contacts with a number of government ministries has allowed for the development of exemplary cooperation and partnerships at different levels of Government. Contacts with all political forces in the country, including the opposition and those representing ethnic minorities, have been of special value to the functioning of the mission and the implementation of its mandate. Mutually beneficial contacts have also been initiated by the UNPREDEP Commander with the military authorities of Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). There is consent on both sides that more tolerance should be displayed during border encounters and that potentially explosive but minor border crossings will be considered as "honest mistakes". Consequently, the number of border incidents between patrols of the two sides has significantly decreased.

VI. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

26. Throughout the duration of the mission, the United Nations peace-keeping force has maintained a presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to conduct political liaison and public information functions, along with the tasks relevant to monitoring of the Prevlaka peninsula, as mandated by resolution 779 (1992), and of airfields, as mandated by paragraph 5 of resolution 786 (1992). The level of cooperation with the federal authorities that the Belgrade Liaison Office enjoys has proved to be a vital element in the effective functioning of the three missions, and it remains necessary to maintain a United Nations presence there. In this regard, it is

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important that the Federal Government should extend to the United Nations, its personnel, property, funds and assets the necessary privileges and immunities deriving from Article 105 (1) of the Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the customary principles and practices applicable to United Nations peace-keeping or similar operations.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

27. The general framework agreement, which was initialled by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia on 21 November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, at last provides the basis for peace to become reality in the war-torn lands of the former Yugoslavia. I have already publicly expressed my welcome and support for the agreement and I should like to commend all those whose efforts were instrumental in bringing the agreement about. That this agreement has been reached only after the loss of perhaps quarter of a million lives, most of them innocent civilians, is a cause for deep mourning by the international community, especially since the killings were often the result of appalling atrocities. For peace to be durable, there should also be justice.

28. The framework agreement, which was informally made available to the Security Council on 21 November 1995, is comprehensive and detailed and contains many aspects with far-reaching implications not only for the United Nations peace-keeping forces currently deployed in the former Yugoslavia, but also for the future role of the Organization in that region. These implications have yet to be fully assessed and analysed, but I stand ready to assist and support the Security Council in the decisions and actions that need to be taken with regard to the implementation of the general framework agreement and its relevant annexes. Some of the following recommendations concerning the mandates of UNCRO, UNPROFOR, UNPREDEP and UNPF-HQ already reflect, on a preliminary basis, certain provisions of the agreement reached in Dayton. However, I intend to submit further reports shortly regarding the tasks for the United Nations and its specialized agencies that may be required in the implementation of the agreement of 21 November 1995.

A. UNCRO

29. The basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, signed on 12 November 1995, is a landmark accomplishment that provides for the peaceful integration into Croatia of the region known as Sector East. It also opens the way for the return to their homes of all Croatian displaced persons who so wish.

30. The basic agreement requests the Security Council to establish a transitional administration to govern the region during the transitional period of 12 months, which may be extended by up to a further 12 months and to authorize an international force to maintain peace and security during the transitional period and to otherwise assist in the implementation of the agreement. The region will also be demilitarized not later than 30 days after its deployment. During the transitional period, civilian tasks include ensuring that refugees and displaced persons can return, supervising property matters,

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monitoring human rights, re-establishing the normal functioning of all public services, coordinating international support and assistance and organizing and monitoring the conduct of elections. In addition, the basic agreement envisages the establishment and training of temporary local police forces and the presence of international monitors along the international border of the region to facilitate free movement of persons across existing border crossings.

31. It has yet to be determined which States, international organizations or institutions are to perform these and other complex tasks but, in the light of the recent history of broken agreements followed by rapid escalation of violence, it is clear that, should the basic agreement not be fully and properly implemented, war would probably be resumed, with potentially grave consequences for the prospects for peace not only in Croatia but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Timeliness of implementation is also of the essence for the present momentum of peace to be sustained. For these reasons it merits full international support for its effective and timely implementation. The alternative is a return to the cycle of political stalemate and escalating violence leading to renewed war and tens of thousands more refugees. As already noted, the Security Council, in its resolution 1023 (1995) of 22 November, has acknowledged the need for expeditious follow-up action on the request made to it in the agreement to establish a transitional administration and to authorize an international force.

32. There would appear to be only two realistic options for the future of UNCRO: either the Security Council could decide to terminate its functions when its current mandate expires on 30 November 1995 in the expectation that interested States, international organizations and other institutions would assume responsibility for implementing the basic agreement from that date, or the Council could decide to continue the presence of UNCRO for a limited period, during which UNCRO would, to the extent possible, perform its present tasks until the transitional administration is established and an international force is deployed to carry out the tasks envisaged in the basic agreement.

33. In keeping with Security Council resolution 1023 (1995), my Special Representative is maintaining close contact with all parties concerned. In recent meetings with my Special Representative, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, stated clearly that he could not agree to a further extension of the mandate of UNCRO. However, he would agree to retain the two currently deployed battalions as a transitional arrangement. He has insisted that the implementation of the basic agreement, particularly its demilitarization aspects, begin on 1 December. However, to terminate the UNCRO mandate on 30 November 1995 without the certainty that other institutions are able to assume the responsibility for the implementation of the basic agreement could severely destabilize the area. In the light of the position taken by President Tudjman, the Council may wish to maintain the presence of UNCRO for a transitional period of two months or until it has decided on the deployment of the international force, whichever is the sooner. During this period, UNCRO could facilitate and provide appropriate assistance to the deployment of the international force and the establishment of the transitional administration, but would not be in a position, as presently mandated and constituted, to facilitate the demilitarization envisaged in the basic agreement. At this point, there is no concurrence on the part of the Croatian Government to UNCRO's

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continuation of its present functions in Croatia, except perhaps for the monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula as a confidence-building measure. In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to confirm the UNCRO's presence as a transitional arrangement pending the establishment of an international force; designate, as quickly as possible, a civilian transitional administrator for the region; and determine the date on which implementation of the basic agreement should begin.

B. United Nations Protection Force

34. The general framework agreement initialled at Dayton on 21 November 1995, promises to mark a turning-point in the endeavour to re-establish stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since it envisages the implementation of the military and regional stabilization aspects to be the responsibility of a new Implementation Force (IFOR), to be authorized by the Security Council, a primary task for UNPROFOR is to arrange for the transfer of responsibility to IFOR. Planning for this transfer has been under way in close consultation with NATO, on which I shall report to the Council as soon as possible.

35. Meanwhile, UNPROFOR's recently improved ability to carry out its mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been due primarily to the revitalization of the peace process. This process, which has now culminated in the initialling of the framework agreement, coupled with Bosnian Serb military reverses, has brought about enhanced compliance by the parties with the cease-fire of 12 October. The assumption by President Milosevic of the authority to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Republika Srpska has been an important factor in this context. Another critical element is the increased deterrence achieved as a result of the manner in which NATO air power and the rapid reaction force were employed in August and September, following redeployments that greatly reduced UNPROFOR's vulnerability throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

36. In the light of the improving situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the critical financial situation of the United Nations, I have accepted the recommendations of my Special Representative and the Force Commander that only essential forces should be retained to implement UNPROFOR's mandate pending a transition to other arrangements. In this context, two battalions and four sub-units are being repatriated, six other battalions are being reduced to a standard strength of about 965 all ranks and portions of the rapid reaction force placed on standby in their home countries. As a result, UNPROFOR will decline in strength from about 30,500 to about 21,600 by mid-December 1995. Some further reductions, with an associated streamlining of command and control and administrative support, are also possible, given the greatly reduced need for UNPROFOR to escort humanitarian convoys in the more secure environment currently prevailing. These reductions do not pre-empt any decision by the Security Council on the military aspect of the implementation of the framework agreement. It should be noted that some countries contributing troops to UNPROFOR have expressed interest in joining IFOR, which would implement the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would be my intention to withdraw as soon as practicable those contingents not joining the multinational force.

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37. Pending finalization of the arrangements for transfer of responsibility to IFOR, I recommend that the current mandate of UNPROFOR be extended for two months, or until an appropriate transfer of authority has been executed between UNPROFOR and the incoming Implementation Force, subject to authorization by the Security Council, whichever is sooner. To this end, UNPF-HQ has held exploratory discussions with NATO about action to be taken if it should be decided to replace UNPROFOR with a NATO-led multinational force. These discussions have taken place at all levels on issues that will be relevant to the smooth transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to a multinational force, taking into account the political and financial responsibilities of both organizations. I am currently analysing the implications for the United Nations, should the Security Council decide to authorize the continuation of civilian tasks, such as humanitarian and civilian police activities, which are contained in the framework agreement. It is anticipated that, prior to any such transfer of authority, increased demands will be placed on UNPF to allow Sarajevo Airport to be used for categories of air traffic other than those specified in the agreement of 5 June 1992 (S/24075, annex) as endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 761 (1992) of 29 June 1992. Considering that expanded use of the airport is critically needed at this time, I am authorizing my Special Representative to permit, on a case-by-case basis, expanded use of the airport, taking due account of the nature of the flights, the physical and technical limitations of the airport and the potential liabilities for the Organization. I trust that this will meet with the Council's concurrence.

C. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

38. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPREDEP's preventive deployment role has contributed greatly to the peace and stability of the southern Balkans. The operation has proved that preventive deployment is an effective form of peace-keeping and that results can be achieved even with a small, almost symbolic deployment of United Nations peace-keepers, if it is done at the right time and with a clear mandate. The host country does not expect the United Nations to defend its borders and considers the very presence of an international force a deterrent sufficient to discourage potential aggressors. So far, the fundamental objective of the operation, that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia be prevented from spreading, has been achieved. However, the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is of the opinion, which I share, that the causes that led to the establishment of the United Nations preventive deployment operation have not ceased to exist. The continued presence of UNPREDEP, with basically the same mandate, strength and troop composition, is vital to the maintenance of peace and stability in the country. I also remain conscious of the need to revert to the Council, as soon as practicable, on the establishment of UNPREDEP on a fully independent footing, reporting directly to New York. This will require adjustments to the administrative, logistic and military support structures of the mission and thus minor adjustments to its authorized strength. It is my intention to make appropriate recommendations to the Council on these issues as soon as possible. In any event, the mandate of UNPREDEP should be renewed for a further 12-month period irrespective of developments elsewhere in the theatre.

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D. United Nations Peace Forces headquarters

39. In the light of the actions that will have to be decided in order to implement the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the transfer of responsibility from UNPROFOR to a multinational force, and the basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, I am not in a position, at this stage, to recommend definitive changes in the structure of the United Nations presence in the former Yugoslavia, or for the future of the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters in Zagreb. As already indicated, I shall revert to the Council with appropriate recommendations once the situation is sufficiently clear.

40. In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute to my former Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, my Special Envoy, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Force Commander, General Bernard Janvier, the chiefs of mission and the military commanders of UNCRO, UNPREDEP and UNPROFOR, and the courageous and dedicated men and women of the three UNPF missions for their devoted efforts in the service of the United Nations, and of peace, in the former Yugoslavia.

41. Further, I should like to commend all those Governments, institutions, organizations and their respective representatives and other personnel whose patient and tireless efforts over the past five years have made an invaluable contribution to preparing the ground for the basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium signed on 12 November 1995, and the general framework agreement that was initialled in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995. This long list includes prominently the members of the Security Council, the Contact Group and the former and current Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia.

42. Finally, I pay tribute to those men and women of the United Nations peace-keeping operations and humanitarian organizations who lost their lives in their mission to alleviate the suffering of the peoples in the former Yugoslavia and to restore peace in that region.

Annex I

Deployment of units, military observers and
civilian police as of 17 November 1995

		Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
1. CROATIA (UNCRO)					
(a)	Headquarters, Zagreb	271	39	26	
(b)	Gar Comd - Zagreb	7		19	
(c)	Gar Comd - Split	10		4	
(d)	Gar Comd - Ploce	6			
(i)	Infantry battalions				
	Sector East				
		Belgium	693		
		Russian Federation	912		
		1 605	48	16	
	Former Sector North				
		Denmark	119		
		Poland	461		
		Jordan (2)	6		
		Ukraine (2)	5		
		591	31	61	
	Former Sector South				
		Canada (1)	9		
		Czech Republic	523		
		Jordan (3)	6		
		Kenya	2		
		540	34	71	
	Former Sector West				
		Nepal	165		
		165	12	99	
	Subtotal	3 195	164	296	

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	Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
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(ii) <u>Support units</u>				
Canadian support unit	450			
Danish logistic contingent	11			
French logistics battalion	828			
Finland HQ Finguard	39			
Indonesian medical battalion	236			
Netherlands logistic base	78			
Norwegian movement control unit	114			
Slovak engineer battalion	590			
Swedish headquarters company	100			
United States field hospital	361			
Ukrainian helicopter unit	60			
German hospital	519			
	<hr/>			
Subtotal	3 386			7 041
	<hr/>			
2. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (UNPROFOR)				
(a) <u>UNPROFOR headquarters</u>	171	14	13	
(b) <u>Infantry units</u>				
Sector Sarajevo				
Headquarters	78			
Egypt	413			
France (2) [incl HQ pers]	854			
France (4)	850			
France (5)	892			
Ukraine (1)	566			
Russian Federation (2)	498			
	4 151	79	8	
(c) <u>Support units Sector Sarajevo</u>				
French Headquarters company	215			
French air operations group	241			
French medical detachment	27			
	483			

		Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
<hr/>					
(d) <u>Infantry Battalion Groups</u>					
Sector North East	Headquarters	44			
	Nordic (2)	1 122			
	Jordanian radar unit	102			
	Pakistan (1)	1 309			
	Pakistan (2)	1 313			
	Pakistan (NS HQ+HQ)	370			
		4 260	68		
Sector South West	Headquarters	106			
	United Kingdom (2)	433			
	New Zealand company	250			
	Canada (2)	189			
	Malaysia	971			
	Spain	1 237			
	Turkey	1 450			
		4 636	71	2	
Bihac	Headquarters	11			
	Bangladesh	334			
		345	45	22	
Banja Luka			34		
Subtotal		14 046	311	45	
<hr/>					
(e) <u>Support units</u>					
Belgian transport battalion		95			
United Kingdom SP Elms		1 204			
Danish headquarters company		158			
French support unit (DETALAT)		301			
French engineer battalion		558			
Norwegian air unit		41			
Norwegian logistic battalion		688			
Indonesian engineer battalion		469			

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	Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
Netherlands transport battalion	555			
Tuzla air base	17			
	4 086			
Subtotal	4 086			
(f) <u>Rapid reaction force</u>	6 046			24 534
3. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (UNPREDEP)				
(a) Infantry units				
		Nordic Battalion 1		
		United States units		
	556			
	494			
Subtotal	1 050	24	25	1 099
4. OTHER LOCATIONS				
(a) Airfield monitors		47		
(b) Prevlaka		30		
Subtotal		77		77
Total	<u>31 809</u>	<u>576</u>	<u>366</u>	<u>32 751</u>

Annex II

Casualty list as of 17 November 1995
(Military personnel)

	Croatia				Bosnia and Herzegovina	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Other areas	Total
	Sector East	Former Sector West	Former Sector North	Former Sector South				
War casualties								
Fatal	3	3	12	11	51	0	0	80
Total	36	24	71	93	477	0	7	708
Other casualties								
Fatal	3	9	9	5	28	0	12	66
Total	43	42	32	30	215	12	80	454
Traffic casualties								
Fatal	3	3	4	9	36	1	10	66
Total	41	56	52	59	239	11	51	509
Total								
Fatal	9	15	25	25	115	1	22	212
Total	120	122	155	182	931	23	138	1 671

Annex III

Strength by country as of 17 November 1995

Country	Troops	Military observers	Civilian police
Argentina	0	5	0
Bangladesh	340	42	25
Belgium	794	15	0
Brazil	0	32	3
Canada	661	14	0
Czech Republic	523	17	0
Denmark	399	15	26
Egypt	427	16	33
Estonia	33	0	0
Finland	464	15	8
France	7 555	10	25
Germany	519	0	0
Ghana	0	30	0
Indonesia	707	5	0
Ireland	0	9	17
Jordan	114	45	30
Kenya	2	47	14
Lithuania	32	0	0
Malaysia	1 004	0	0
Nepal	165	6	0
Netherlands	861	32	10
New Zealand	250	9	0
Nigeria	0	26	26
Norway	921	28	13
Pakistan	3 028	22	0
Poland	461	19	15
Portugal	0	12	30

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Country	Troops	Military observers	Civilian police
Russian Federation	1 417	32	20
Senegal	0	0	20
Slovakia	590	0	0
Spain	1 259	19	0
Sweden	1 152	19	25
Switzerland	0	6	6
Tunisia	0	0	0
Turkey	1 466	0	0
Ukraine	646	10	20
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4 867	19	0
United States of America	858	0	0
Venezuela	0	0	0
Others <u>a/</u>	294		
Total	<u>31 809</u>	<u>576</u>	<u>366</u>

a/ UNPF HQ, GAR COMD - Zagreb, Split and Ploce (includes personnel from countries above).

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English

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