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NINTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 972 (1995) of 13 January 1995, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for a period of three months, until 13 April. In the same resolution, the Council requested me to report by 1 March on the situation in Liberia, on the role of UNOMIL and of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), including the needs of ECOWAS States to maintain their troops in ECOMOG. The report covers the main developments in Liberia since my last report of 6 January 1995 (S/1995/9) and contains some options for addressing the continuing stalemate in the peace process.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. It will be recalled that the agreements signed by the Liberian parties in Accra on 21 December 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the Accra agreement) comprised the acceptance and accession agreement and the agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo agreement (S/1995/7, annexes I and II). The Accra agreement clarified the terms of the Akosombo agreement (S/1994/1174, annex), signed on 12 September 1994 by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Alhaji Kromah wing of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO-K), and provided a specific timetable for the implementation of the peace plan. It also provided an opportunity for those factions and civilian leaders who had not signed the Akosombo agreement - namely, General Roosevelt Johnson's wing of ULIMO (ULIMO-J), the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), the breakaway NPFL group known as the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL) and the Liberia National Conference (LNC) - to accept the terms and conditions of that agreement as modified. The Accra agreement also reaffirmed the Cotonou agreement (S/26272, annex), signed on 25 July 1993, as the basic framework for peace in Liberia. In reaffirming the Akosombo agreement, it added further detail to those aspects of the Cotonou agreement that were either too general or, for other reasons, had proved deficient in their implementation.

3. In accordance with the timetable set out in the Accra agreement and as noted in my last report, the Liberian parties re-established the cease-fire at midnight on 28 December 1994 and were to have nominated a new five-member Council of State within two weeks thereafter, i.e., by 11 January 1995. NPFL, ULIMO, the AFL/Coalition and LNC were each to nominate one member to the new Council of State and the fifth member was to be a traditional chief jointly selected by NPFL and ULIMO in the person of the Honourable Tamba Tailor. The Liberian parties met in Accra, under the auspices of ECOWAS, on 9 January to consult on the composition of the Council of State, with a view to installing it by 11 January. However, they were not able to reach agreement on its composition and chairmanship.

4. In its resolution 972 (1995) of 13 January, the Security Council expressed deep concern at the failure of the Liberian parties to reach agreement at the talks in Accra and called upon them to implement all aspects of the Accra agreement in accordance with the timetable set out therein. The main bottleneck to reaching agreement on the Council of State was the inability of the AFL and Coalition forces (ULIMO-J, LDF, LPC and CRC-NPFL) to reach agreement on their joint nominee. Nominees from the other parties included Charles Taylor, President of NPFL; Alhaji Kromah, Chairman of ULIMO-K; and Oscar Quiah, representative of LNC.

5. In a further effort to break the deadlock, President Rawlings invited the heads of State of the ECOWAS countries most intimately concerned with the problem to assist in helping the factions to reach an agreement. On 24 January 1995, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, President Lansana Conte of Guinea, President Sani Abacha of Nigeria and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Côte d'Ivoire met in Accra for this purpose. My Special Representative was also present in Accra for these consultations. The heads of State recommended the expansion of the Council to six members in order to enable the AFL and the Coalition forces to be represented separately. In accordance with this recommendation, AFL nominated its Chief of Staff, General Hezekiah Bowen, and the Coalition forces nominated Mr. Thomas Woewiyu to represent them on the Council of State.

6. Mr. Woewiyu's nomination was, however, unacceptable to NPFL, which indicated that it would accept the proposal of a six-member Council only if the Coalition forces did not designate a former member of NPFL as its nominee, and as long as NPFL was given responsibility to nominate the Chairman. The Coalition, however, insisted on the nomination of Mr. Woewiyu. On 30 January, after almost one month of intensive but unsuccessful efforts to bring the parties to agreement, the Chairman of ECOWAS informed the parties that they should return to Liberia to continue their deliberations.

7. It will be recalled, in this regard, that it took the parties some six months to install the present Council of State, which, in accordance with the Cotonou agreement, should have been installed within 30 days of its signing. The parties' failure to install the new Council of State in a timely manner led to massive demonstrations in Monrovia on 14 January. These appeared to be aimed at certain faction leaders and resulted in injuries to both innocent civilians and party members, as well as the destruction of property. The security

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situation in Monrovia has since improved, thanks to the efforts of ECOMOG to maintain calm.

8. After the meeting of the factions in Accra broke up on 30 January, NPFL, ULIMO-K and AFL met among themselves and proposed to the Chairman of ECOWAS that the five-member Council be retained, with Chief Tamba Tailor as its Chairman, and NPFL, ULIMO-K and AFL designated as its Vice-Chairmen, with equal standing. They recommended that the three Vice-Chairmen, as well as the nominee of LNC, be given oversight responsibilities of the various ministries and that the Coalition be given the opportunity to appoint certain ministers. The Chairman advised them to consult with the other Liberian parties who were not involved in their discussions with a view to obtaining their support for the agreement. This support seems not to have materialized and the proposal has apparently been dropped. Chief Tamba Tailor has since taken up consultations inside Liberia with the main protagonists and other prominent Liberians with a view to resolving the problems that have prevented the installation of the new Council.

9. In accordance with the Cotonou and Accra agreements, the Council of State is essentially a temporary arrangement for sharing the responsibility of governance until elections are held, but the attitude of the parties suggests that they consider the Council of State as a means to strengthen their respective positions and gain further influence. It appears, moreover, that they are not yet ready to rise above their limited individual interests and to focus their attention on the fundamental issues of national reconciliation and the establishment of a foundation for a democratic process giving a voice to all Liberians.

10. During the last two and a half months, my Special Representative has continued his consultations with the Liberian leaders and has met the heads of State and senior officials of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. He has also held extensive discussions with the Chairman of ECOWAS. The leaders stressed their frustration and impatience at the inability of the Liberian parties to reach the agreements necessary to install the Council of State. They recounted the loss of life and the financial burden that they, and the countries contributing to the expanded ECOMOG, have endured and the strenuous efforts they have made to assist the Liberian parties to reach a lasting solution to their conflict.

11. In this context, some ECOWAS heads of State expressed the view that the recalcitrance of the Liberian parties was due, in part, to a lack of harmony that States members of ECOWAS have shown in their policies towards Liberia. While some of the leaders stressed the need for the international community to become more involved in Liberia, others seemed more determined, at least in the short term, to remain engaged themselves in the search for a solution to the Liberian problem.

12. Under resolution 972 (1995), the Security Council expressed the hope that the ECOWAS States would convene, at the earliest possible date, a summit with a view to harmonizing their policies on Liberia and promoting the implementation of the Accra agreement, including tightening the application of the arms embargo. While these leaders generally supported the idea of a summit, some felt that such a meeting would be more effective if held at a later stage.

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13. The participation of my Special Representative in the intensive efforts undertaken by the Chairman of ECOWAS to promote the implementation of the Accra agreement has significantly increased the workload of the political component of UNOMIL, which was already seriously understaffed. I am therefore taking steps to deploy to UNOMIL a few additional staff members, within the resources provided to it under resolution 866 (1993), to assist my Special Representative in his efforts to support the peace process.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Status of the cease-fire

14. In my report of 6 January, I informed the Security Council that, following the signing of the Accra agreement on 21 December, a cease-fire had come into effect at midnight on 28 December 1994. Since then the cease-fire has generally held. In recent weeks, however, UNOMIL has received an increasing number of reports of low-level skirmishes between NPFL and LPC, especially in the south-eastern region of the country.

15. UNOMIL has reported that these skirmishes seem to have resulted from attempts by field-level commanders and combatants to steal food and property from civilians. The humanitarian agencies located in the city of Buchanan have reported an increase in the number of displaced people in Grand Bassa and Rivercess counties as a result of NPFL and LPC activity (see map). They have also reported that LPC combatants have harassed relief workers in Buchanan and have infiltrated camps for internally displaced persons to steal property and food.

16. The Chief Military Observer of UNOMIL has reminded the leaders of both NPFL and LPC of their commitments under the Accra agreement to maintain the cease-fire and to ensure that their combatants do not harass innocent civilians. These leaders have indicated that their combatants have acted on their own and they have assured the Chief Military Observer that they will attempt to regain control over their combatants and put a stop to the harassment of civilians. The Chief Military Observer has also raised this problem with ECOMOG, which is deployed extensively in and around Buchanan.

B. Role of ECOMOG

17. In paragraph 5 of resolution 972 (1995), the Security Council requested me to report on the role of UNOMIL and of ECOMOG in Liberia and the resource requirements of ECOWAS States to maintain their troops in ECOMOG. Accordingly, I dispatched a small technical team to Monrovia, which, under the direction of my Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer, held detailed consultations from 6 to 10 February 1995.

18. ECOMOG informed the technical team that its present strength is about 8,430 troops, organized in 10 self-contained infantry battalions. The Government of Nigeria contributes the bulk of the force (4,908), while troops are also provided by the Governments of Ghana (1,028), Guinea (609), the United

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Republic of Tanzania (747), Uganda (760) and Sierra Leone (359). Smaller contingents are also provided by the Gambia (10) and Mali (10). The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania has recently informed me of its intention to withdraw its contingent from ECOMOG because of the financial burden involved in maintaining its troops in Liberia and the lack of progress in the peace process. With the withdrawal of the Tanzanian contingent, the strength of ECOMOG will be reduced to 7,684 all ranks.

19. The main military functions of ECOMOG, in accordance with the Cotonou and Accra agreements, are the protection of civilians in safe havens; establishment and provision of security for assembly sites, where the combatants will initially congregate pending disarmament; establishment of and provision of security for encampment sites where ECOMOG will disarm combatants and carry out other activities related to demobilization; assistance in the enforcement of the arms embargo through the establishment of border crossing points and patrols; and maintenance of general security throughout the country.

20. ECOMOG's concept of operations includes the maintenance of a force headquarters in Monrovia and the deployment of troops in the current four sectors of the country as follows: 9 safe havens (9 battalions); 10 assembly sites (3 battalions); 10 encampment sites (3 battalions); 13 main entry points along the borders, airports and seaport (1 battalion).

21. In accordance with the Cotonou and Accra agreements, ECOMOG's operation for the demobilization of combatants, in collaboration with the Liberian National Transitional Government and with the observation and monitoring of UNOMIL, was to take place in the following time-frame:

Phase 1 (36 days): Verification of disengagement of combatants, preparation of safe havens, assembly sites and encampment sites;

Phase 2 (84 days): Deployment to safe havens and assembly sites;

Phase 3 (60 days): Deployment to encampment sites and disarmament;

Phase 4 (60 days): Conclusion of the demobilization process.

22. Some of the above phases would have taken place simultaneously but the entire process of demobilization would take some six months.

23. In accordance with the Accra agreement, the exact location and number of assembly and encampment sites would be determined by ECOMOG and the Liberian National Transitional Government, in consultation with the factions and UNOMIL. Given the present stalemate in the installation of the Council of State, such consultations have not yet taken place.

C. Needs of ECOWAS

24. In order to carry out its responsibilities under the Accra agreement, as described above, ECOMOG has indicated that it would require a force of some 12,000 all ranks. The present troop strength would, therefore, need to be

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reinforced by seven additional self-contained battalions (about 4,250 troops), taking into account the proposed withdrawal of the Tanzanian contingent. ECOMOG has stated that it would be preferable for these troops to be contributed by countries members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), provided satisfactory financing arrangements could be made.

25. The Force Commander of ECOMOG provided details of the logistic and other requirements to enable ECOMOG (at a troop strength of 12,000 all ranks) to carry out its tasks under the Accra agreement. A summary of these requirements, which has been approved by the Chairman of ECOWAS, is presented in annex I. The countries which initially contributed troops to ECOMOG continue to bear most of the financial burden of maintaining their troops in Liberia. Approximately 90 per cent of the \$17 million that has been provided to ECOMOG through the Trust Fund has been earmarked for the two battalions which make up the expanded contingents of ECOMOG and only 10 per cent for the initial ECOMOG force. However, some 20 trucks have been provided by the Government of Germany for the use of ECOMOG.

D. Role of UNOMIL

26. Because of the security situation in the country, the 78 military observers and seven paramedical staff serving with UNOMIL are deployed only in the greater Monrovia area, including Buchanan and Kakata. Should UNOMIL be brought back to full strength, it is estimated that 303 military observers and 16 medical staff would be required to enable it to perform the tasks entrusted to it under resolution 866 (1993). These personnel would be deployed as follows:

UNOMIL headquarters (Monrovia): 25 observers;

4 regional headquarters (Monrovia, Tubmanburg, Gbarnga and Tapeta):
8 observers in each site, for a total of 32 observers;

41 observer teams: 6 observers in each team to be deployed at safe havens, assembly and encampment sites and border crossings and for investigations, for a total of 246 observers;

Medical component: 3 doctors and 13 paramedical personnel at UNOMIL headquarters and 3 regional headquarters, for a total of 16 staff.

E. Military provisions of the Accra agreement

1. Responsibilities of the Liberian parties

27. In accordance with the Accra agreement, the parties, in consultation with the Liberian National Transitional Government, UNOMIL and ECOMOG and the appropriate international organizations, were to have undertaken the following activities:

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| D-day | - Cease-fire (28 December 1994) |
| | - Factions inform combatants of cease-fire |

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- D-day + 2 wks
 - Installation of the Council of State
 - Disengagement of forces
 - Establishment of Cease-fire Verification Committee composed of representatives of UNOMIL, ECOMOG, the Liberian National Transitional Government and the warring factions
- D-day + 3 wks
 - Combatants move to assembly/encampment sites
- D-day + 7 wks
 - Demobilization process begins
- D-day + 21 wks
 - Preparations for elections begin
- D-day + 42 wks
 - Elections

28. In addition to the above, the Liberian National Transitional Government was to have immediately put in place internal security arrangements, including police, customs and immigration, and begun the formation of an appropriate national security structure, i.e., the restructuring of AFL so that it could assume its character as a national army. These measures would, inter alia, facilitate the disarmament process, as they were meant to absorb qualified combatants. The Liberian National Transitional Government was also to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with ECOWAS within four weeks of the signing of the agreement. The Council of State was to have established appropriate committees charged with determining the criteria for recruitment of combatants and non-combatants into a restructured national army, as well as police, immigration and other internal security agencies. Because of the delay in installing the Council of State, none of these activities has yet taken place.

29. Under the agreement, the factions committed themselves to the regroupment of their combatants to encampment sites and to maintain command and control over them while they remained at these sites. They also called on the Liberian National Transitional Government, the United Nations, OAU, ECOWAS, other international organizations and donor countries to design a programme under which financial assistance could be provided for the process of demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and the reintegration of former combatants into normal civilian community life.

2. Outstanding issues

30. The Accra agreement is based on several assumptions that could, in addition to the intractability of the parties, affect its implementation. The parties assumed that the assembly and encampment sites would be established by ECOMOG, UNOMIL and the Liberian National Transitional Government, in collaboration with them, from four to eight weeks after the establishment of the cease-fire. However, the establishment of encampment sites is not within UNOMIL's mandate as established under resolution 866 (1993). The parties also assumed that financial assistance would be forthcoming on a voluntary basis for demobilization, the establishment of internal security mechanisms and the restructuring of the national army. Such funding has not, however, been secured.

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31. It is evident that certain aspects of the peace process need greater coordination. For example, some crucial issues relating to the demobilization process have yet to be coordinated. These include the transportation of combatants to encampment sites and their home communities, provision of food and other supplies for combatants and their families while they are at the assembly and encampment sites, the construction of these sites and the coordination and financing of the reintegration of combatants, as well as war-affected civilians, into Liberian society.

32. There is also a need for better coordination at all levels between ECOMOG and UNOMIL. It is my intention to recommend to ECOWAS that a Joint ECOMOG-UNOMIL Liaison and Coordination Cell be established in ECOMOG headquarters with a view to enabling UNOMIL and ECOMOG to coordinate more effectively the implementation of their respective mandates.

33. The implementation of the Accra agreement will also depend on the provision of the resources necessary for ECOMOG to carry out its responsibilities. The technical team found that the resources and logistic assets of ECOMOG were clearly insufficient for it to carry out its tasks effectively. Accordingly, the team concluded that ECOMOG's estimates of its logistic support requirements were justified. The team was not convinced, however, that seven additional battalions would be required for the implementation of ECOMOG's concept of operations.

34. It is unlikely that all the resources required for ECOMOG could be provided through voluntary contributions. I have therefore asked the Chairman of ECOWAS to indicate which areas of the budget the troop-contributing countries would be prepared to continue financing and which are the critical areas for external financing on a voluntary basis. In this context, it should be noted that close to 25 per cent of the budget is required for stipends of \$5 per day for each soldier.

35. Finally, the implementation of the agreement may also be affected by the weather patterns of Liberia. If the process is delayed into the rainy season (April to September), the movement of combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons is likely to be more difficult and to create additional delays.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

36. Developments relating to the Accra peace process have had little effect on humanitarian assistance activities in Liberia. The absence of credible security guarantees from the factions continues to prevent the sustained expansion of relief activities beyond those areas of Grand Bassa, Margibi and Montserrado counties that are controlled by ECOMOG. While sustained emergency relief activities are limited to greater Monrovia and Buchanan town, the number of non-combatants within Liberia who have been affected by the conflict has reached 1.8 million. Of this number, 1.5 million persons are being provided with life-saving assistance in those zones where United Nations agencies and their relief partners are able to operate. In addition to those civilians within Liberia affected by the conflict, the most recent available information shows that there

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are now 870,000 Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria.

37. The humanitarian crisis in Monrovia itself is of particular concern and continues to be aggravated by a steady flow of internally displaced persons, seeking refuge, and a small number of combatants wishing to demobilize. Built to support a population of 300,000, Monrovia is now sanctuary to over 1.3 million people. The strain on the war-damaged infrastructure of the city and on relief organizations is tremendous. Although United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and national organizations (including the Liberian Refugee, Repatriation and Resettlement Commission) have been able to respond to the city's steadily rising needs, they are approaching the limits of their capacity to do so.

38. Success in responding to rising needs in Monrovia and throughout ECOMOG-controlled areas has been due largely to operational coordination among relief partners. This coordination and the resultant complementarity of activities is well illustrated by the implementation of water, sanitation and shelter programmes in the camps for internally displaced persons in Buchanan, where United Nations agencies, NGOs and national organizations are assisting a growing number of displaced Liberians.

39. On 3 February, I launched an inter-agency consolidated appeal for Liberia, for the six-month period January to June 1995, seeking the US\$ 65 million in extrabudgetary resources required by United Nations agencies to continue to carry out life-saving interventions in a number of key emergency sectors. While the appeal sought funds for activities to be undertaken in those areas of Liberia secured by ECOMOG, it also made allowance for the possibility of expanding humanitarian assistance programmes to other areas, should security conditions allow.

40. In accordance with this strategy, a number of United Nations agencies and NGOs undertook exploratory initiatives in January to expand the scope of their operations. As a result, preliminary assessments of long cut-off areas were carried out, both across the border from Côte d'Ivoire and across the front line from Monrovia. Previously inaccessible areas of Nimba county and the towns of Totota, Gbarnga and Salala were visited by relief teams. A number of international NGOs have also made preliminary overtures to the factions concerning the possibility of commencing activities on a larger scale.

41. For more than a year, the relief community in Liberia has been frustrated by the factions' disregard for humanitarian mandates. January's activities represent efforts to re-establish operating relationships destroyed by the looting of United Nations and NGO equipment and abuse of relief staff. Although these are positive developments, it must be stressed that they do not represent a definitive or even significant change in the factions' approach to the delivery of relief assistance. The internally displaced persons who have recently entered Buchanan from inaccessible areas describe the conditions in these areas as dire. Until viable security guarantees are provided and sustained by the factions, relief activities outside ECOMOG-controlled areas will continue to be sporadic.

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42. My Special Representative and the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Liberia will continue to press the factions to increase access to populations in need. The success of such a campaign will require a fully coordinated effort on the part of the humanitarian assistance community. This same coordinated approach will have to be brought to bear in the development of demobilization programmes for ex-combatants. To date, targeted demobilization activities by the humanitarian assistance community are limited to a food-for-work programme for ex-combatants in the Monrovia area.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

43. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/3 of 3 December 1994, authorized me to enter into commitments in an amount not to exceed \$1,593,800 gross (\$1,511,100 net) per month for a period of six months beyond 13 January 1995 for the maintenance of UNOMIL, subject to its mandate being extended by the Security Council.

44. As at 13 February 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIL special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to \$11.3 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations was \$2,119 million. In order to provide UNOMIL with the necessary cash flow, a total of \$2.8 million has been borrowed from other peace-keeping accounts. These loans remain unpaid.

45. Contributions to the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in Liberia as at 13 February 1995 totalled \$18.4 million and disbursements of \$17.4 million had been authorized. The Government of the United States has contributed \$16.5 million, primarily earmarked for the expanded contingents of ECOMOG. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has provided \$1 million for humanitarian assistance. The Governments of the Netherlands and Denmark have provided \$261,584 and \$294,616 respectively in unearmarked funds, which were used for stipends. The Government of Germany provided 20 trucks for the use of ECOMOG and the Government of Norway has contributed \$291,056 in unearmarked funds. No Member State has indicated its intention to provide significant resources for ECOMOG for the year 1995.

VI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

46. As the present report shows, the peace process in Liberia is, once again, at a standstill. The signing of the Accra agreement on 21 December 1994 and the coming into force of a cease-fire one week later had generated some hope that the civil war that has inflicted so much suffering on the Liberian people might be coming to an end. However, two months later, the Liberian factions and political leaders are still haggling over the composition and chairmanship of the Council of State and have yet to show that they are genuinely committed to the fulfilment of their obligations under the Accra agreement. Moreover, their inability to re-establish a cease-fire verification committee, as stipulated in the Accra accord, threatens the already fragile cease-fire.

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47. With the failure of the Liberian parties to implement yet another agreement, despite the untiring efforts of the Chairman of ECOWAS, I feel that the time has come to consider carefully how the international community can continue to assist in the search for peace and stability in Liberia and what form this assistance should take.

48. In this connection, it is worth recalling the efforts that ECOWAS and the international community have made over the past five years to support the Liberian peace process. ECOWAS first deployed its monitoring group, ECOMOG, in Liberia in August 1990. Since then, numerous peace agreements have been concluded, only to be broken. The most important, signed in Cotonou on 25 July 1993, assigned to ECOMOG the primary responsibility for assisting the Liberian parties in the implementation of a detailed peace plan providing for a seven-month transitional process leading to free and fair elections. ECOMOG troops were to be deployed throughout Liberia to ensure compliance with the arms embargo, create buffer zones along the country's borders and supervise the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants. The Cotonou agreement also called for the ECOMOG force to be strengthened by troops contributed by OAU countries outside the west African region. UNOMIL, established on 22 September 1993 by Council resolution 866 (1993), was entrusted with the task of observing and monitoring the implementation of the agreement.

49. In view of the financial burden that the countries contributing troops to ECOMOG had carried since 1990, the Security Council welcomed my decision to establish a trust fund under which Member States could provide voluntary contributions for both the initial and new contingents of ECOMOG. In my report of 9 September 1993 (S/26422), I had stressed that it was crucial for the successful implementation of the Cotonou agreement that sufficient resources be made available to the Trust Fund. However, despite some contributions to it, the resources provided to enable ECOMOG to meet its requirements for logistic support have been insufficient. The resulting logistic constraints have, understandably, compromised ECOMOG's efforts to deploy throughout the country as envisaged under the Cotonou agreement.

50. After protracted delays in the implementation of the agreement, the security situation in the country deteriorated last summer when fighting between the various factions intensified, resulting in the massive displacement of civilians. At that time, more than 43 UNOMIL military observers were detained and mistreated and a considerable amount of United Nations property was looted or stolen. ECOMOG troops and relief workers were also caught in the fighting and several ECOMOG soldiers were killed. It thus became necessary to reduce UNOMIL's strength and regroup the remaining personnel in the Greater Monrovia area. Today, both UNOMIL and ECOMOG remain deployed only in that area, which includes Buchanan and Kakata. Humanitarian activities have also been significantly scaled down.

51. The present mandate of UNOMIL will expire on 13 April 1995. At that time, the Security Council will have to choose between a number of options for the United Nations future political and military involvement in Liberia. The most important criterion in deciding between those options will be whether the political stalemate continues or whether the Liberian factions have finally given convincing evidence of being ready to make the compromises necessary to

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rescue their country from its long ordeal. This is, of course, a situation that has faced, and continues to face, the Security Council in a number of other conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.

52. If, as is to be hoped, the parties demonstrate a clear willingness to implement the Accra agreement, the Council's options will be:

(a) To maintain UNOMIL as currently mandated under resolution 866 (1993). I would like to stress, however, that if the Accra agreement is to be implemented, it is imperative that ECOMOG be provided with the resources required to carry out its responsibilities in Liberia. If the Trust Fund does not receive the necessary contributions, other financing options may have to be considered for, if ECOMOG cannot carry out its responsibilities, then UNOMIL will be unable to fulfil its own mandate. The viability of this option would also depend on a restructuring of ECOMOG, effective enforcement of the arms embargo and more effective harmonization of the policies of the ECOWAS member States towards Liberia;

(b) To consider an enhanced role of the United Nations in Liberia through the establishment, subject to the consent of the Liberian National Transitional Government and in cooperation with ECOWAS, of a United Nations peace-keeping force to help the parties to implement all aspects of the Accra agreement. Such a force, which would be under the command and control of the United Nations, could be composed of troops provided both by the current ECOMOG contributing countries and by other Member States, as necessary to achieve an effective and balanced force.

53. If, on the other hand, the current political stalemate continues, the Council's options will be:

(a) To reduce further UNOMIL's military component and limit the Mission's mandate to the provision of good offices, until the parties clearly demonstrate the political will necessary to reactivate the peace process;

(b) To withdraw UNOMIL, a decision that would inevitably send a signal to ECOWAS and the Liberian people that the international community had given up its effort to help to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Liberia.

54. Whichever option is chosen, the international community will need to continue to play an active role in finding ways of providing humanitarian assistance to those in need.

55. I do not expect the Security Council to pronounce itself on these options immediately. I feel however that, in view of the continuing impasse in the peace process, it is useful at this time to outline some possible courses of action, so as to give the members of the Council, ECOWAS and, above all, the Liberian parties an opportunity to reflect upon the difficult choices that have to be made before the mandate of UNOMIL expires on 13 April 1995.

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Annex I

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

Summary of cost estimates for a 12-month period

(In thousands of United States dollars)

Military personnel costs	58 641.0
Premises/accommodation	2 750.0
Infrastructure repair	1 700.0
Transport operations	17 498.5
Air operations	174.0
Naval operations	563.1
Communications	3 826.1
Other equipment	2 354.9
Supplies and services	<u>3 197.5</u>
Total	<u>90 705.1</u>

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Annex II

Composition of the military component of UNOMIL

February 1995

<u>Country</u>	<u>Observers</u>
Bangladesh	15
China	5
Czech Republic	6
Egypt	7
Guinea-Bissau	5
India	6
Jordan	9
Kenya	11
Malaysia	8
Pakistan	8
Uruguay	<u>5</u>
Total	<u>85</u>

