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### PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

#### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, by which the Council requested me to report by 9 August and by 9 October 1994 on progress made by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards a cease-fire and political reconciliation.

2. Since my last report on the situation in Rwanda, dated 3 August 1994 (S/1994/924), the Secretariat has provided the Security Council with oral updates on relevant developments, especially with regard to the Mission's support for humanitarian operations, efforts to accelerate the return of refugees, progress made in the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR and the UNAMIR take-over from Operation Turquoise.

#### II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

3. As members of the Security Council are aware, since the cease-fire declared on 18 July 1994, the fighting in Rwanda has all but ceased. The Broad-based Government of National Unity (BBGNU), installed at Kigali on 19 July, has established control over the whole of the national territory. While over two million Rwandese refugees remain in the neighbouring countries, the Government has undertaken efforts, in coordination with my Special Representative and other United Nations officials on the ground, to encourage their safe and voluntary return to Rwanda. At the same time, there is steady progress in efforts to normalize the situation inside Rwanda, with the gradual re-establishment of such basic services as water, electricity and communications facilities, particularly at Kigali. The Government has also begun to put civilian administrative structures in place at the central, provincial and local levels. My Special Representative has circulated to donor countries, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, a Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan, outlining the priority services for which both technical and financial assistance are required.

4. While initial progress has been made in normalizing the situation, the Government is faced with the arduous task of rebuilding a country where the social and physical infrastructure has been almost totally destroyed and where a deep mistrust continues to prevail between the various political and ethnic groups that make up Rwandese society. The Government has a difficult road ahead in establishing safety and security for all and in creating a climate where those who have participated in the genocide can be held accountable while others rebuild their lives without fear of revenge or retribution. Furthermore, the Government suffers from a severe lack of basic resources, including cash reserves to pay the salaries of its civil servants, banks having been looted during the fighting. This is a serious problem, as civil servants and the military may turn to other means of ensuring an income.

5. In order to create stability and lasting peace in Rwanda, the Government seems to recognize the need to include all its citizenry, regardless of ethnicity, within its administrative and security structures. The President of Rwanda has assured my Special Representative that efforts are continuing to make the Government more inclusive by inviting some members of the Mouvement républicain national pour le développement (MRND), which is the only major political party not presently represented in the BBGNU, to join the Government. However, these efforts have not yet produced positive results.

6. In a further effort towards national reconciliation, members of the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) are being encouraged to join the new national army. These soldiers have the choice of registering at specified centres, set up by the Government, or with UNAMIR personnel deployed in the country. It seems, however, that the response to this government initiative remains limited.

7. In order to promote national reconciliation and assure the population that their civil and human rights will be respected, the Government has continued to organize mass rallies in several cities, including Ruhengeri, Kibungo, Byumba, Kibuye, Gikongoro, Cyangugu and Butare. Through these rallies, the Government has attempted to address the population's concerns with regard to such issues as property rights and the fair treatment by the Rwandese judicial system of those accused of crimes against humanity.

8. During the month of August, members of the Government made several visits to refugee camps in Zaire in an attempt to encourage the refugees to return voluntarily to their places of origin. Those efforts have caused some increase in the numbers of returning refugees. Some 360,000 refugees have returned to Rwanda spontaneously since the cease-fire on 18 July. The Government has expressed its concern about the presence in the camps of elements who continue to incite people to flee from Rwanda and to threaten those in the camps from returning to their homes and farms in Rwanda. In September, reports and preliminary investigations pointed to the possibility that refugees returning to Rwanda might have been subjected to reprisals by government troops; further investigations are in progress (paras. 14 and 15 below).

9. The misinformation propagated during and after the hostilities is considered to have been a major factor in inciting the massacres and subsequent exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries. Information remains an important element in creating both stability in the country and a climate

conducive to the safe and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons. Rwanda has no newspapers or television, and radio is the only medium of information. UNAMIR, in association with concerned United Nations agencies, is therefore developing a broadcasting capability in order to provide the Rwandese people with factual information on the situation in their country, to assist in explaining UNAMIR's mandate and to disseminate information on humanitarian programmes. UNAMIR is currently installing at Kigali an FM broadcasting capability with a 20-kilometre range. Additional equipment, which would enable UNAMIR broadcasts to cover the whole country, is being procured and the necessary specialists recruited. UNAMIR has also asked the Rwandese authorities for formal authorization to begin broadcasting and for a frequency allocation. I hope the Government will respond positively to those requests in the near future.

### III. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

10. A Commission of Experts was established on 26 July 1994 under Security Council resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994 to examine and analyse information concerning grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including evidence of possible acts of genocide. The Commission started its work on 15 August 1994 and visited Rwanda as well as Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire from 29 August to 17 September. In accordance with resolution 935 (1994), the Commission is to report its findings to me by 30 November 1994. I have, however, asked the Commission to expedite the preparation of its report. Accordingly, the Commission submitted to me on 30 September a preliminary report which I have made available to the Council (S/1994/1125).

11. During the Commission's visit to Rwanda, the Government urged the Commission to conclude its work expeditiously and also urged that an international tribunal, along the lines of that organized for the former Yugoslavia, be created. The Government expressed the view that the trial of those accused of serious breaches of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide by an external impartial body would help promote peace and reconciliation among the parties and contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Rwanda. The Government has given assurances that it will make every effort to prevent summary trials, revenge executions and other acts of violence and that it will arrest those accused of such crimes.

12. On 25 May 1994, the Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution S-3/1, appointed a Special Rapporteur to report on the root causes of the recent atrocities and on the ongoing human rights situation in Rwanda. Under this mandate, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has deployed human rights officers to Rwanda to assist the Special Rapporteur in the implementation of his functions. Following the establishment of the Commission of Experts, I reported to the Security Council, on 26 July 1994 (S/1994/879), that the Commission would be based at Geneva and benefit from the resources of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and, in particular, those already made available to the Special Rapporteur. Subsequently, it became apparent that a much larger number of human rights staff would be required to deal with the extremely complex situation in Rwanda. Therefore, the High Commissioner for

Human Rights, on 2 August 1994, launched an appeal to the international community for voluntary contributions to expand human rights activities in the field. As at 30 September 1994, the High Commissioner had deployed 31 human rights officers to Rwanda. In accordance with an agreement reached with the Government during his second visit to the country on 19 and 20 August 1994, he intends to increase that number to 147 as soon as possible so as to cover each one of the communes in Rwanda.

13. The objective of the human rights field operation in Rwanda is to carry out investigations into violations of human rights and humanitarian law; to monitor the ongoing human rights situation and, through the presence of human rights officers, help redress existing problems and prevent possible human rights violations from occurring; to cooperate with other international agencies in re-establishing confidence and thus facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons and the rebuilding of civil society; and to implement programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human rights, particularly in the area of administration of justice. Following a request from the High Commissioner, UNAMIR is providing assistance within its existing resources in order to enable the human rights officers already deployed to become fully operational. That assistance will continue as further human rights staff are deployed.

14. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees sent a mission to Rwanda in August to assess how far conditions existed for the safe return to that country of refugees who had fled to Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire. In the course of its work, the mission of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) obtained certain information that appeared to indicate that soldiers of the RPF might have been engaged in systematic killings of members of the majority community in Rwanda.

15. On 16 September, the High Commissioner briefed senior officials of the United Nations on the matter. On the basis of that briefing, I directed that the allegations should be immediately taken up with the Government of Rwanda. This was done by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, who was in Rwanda on mission at that time, and my Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar Khan. The Government of Rwanda undertook to investigate the matter urgently and a team consisting of four government ministers, representatives of UNAMIR and UNHCR and a United Nations human rights monitor, paid a visit on 23 September to some of the places where the killings were alleged to have taken place. Those allegations have been reported to the Commission of Experts and to the Special Rapporteur and arrangements are now being made for a thorough investigation to be carried out under the mandate of those two mechanisms.

#### IV. MISSION OF MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ZAIRE AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

16. The presence of former RGF political leaders, military elements and militia in the Rwandese refugee camps, especially those in Zaire, have had a destabilizing effect on security in the camps and a number of violent incidents have occurred. Refugees suspected of favouring a return to Rwanda have

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frequently been attacked. The humanitarian agencies are reviewing how they can continue to deliver assistance in this insecure environment. There are also signs that ex-RGF troops located in the camps may be preparing to make incursions into Rwanda.

17. In view of that situation, I instructed my Special Representative for Rwanda to undertake a mission to Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania to explore with the authorities of both countries ways in which the problem can be addressed. Mr. Shaharyar Khan visited Zaire from 12 to 14 September and the United Republic of Tanzania on 16 September. In Zaire, he met with President Mobutu and Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dongo. In the United Republic of Tanzania, he was received by President Mwinyi.

18. My Special Representative has reported that the Government of Zaire expressed its commitment to address the refugee crisis and to improve security in the camps. The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania had already undertaken to move certain unruly elements away from places where refugees were located. On the basis of his discussions with the Governments of Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania, my Special Representative has recommended that attention be focused, as a matter of priority, on the camps in Zaire where the problems are significantly more acute than in the United Republic of Tanzania.

19. The population of the camps in Zaire fall into the following categories:  
(a) political leaders, estimated at approximately 50 heads of family;  
(b) uniformed military elements of the RGF, estimated at 16,000 and accompanied by their families, bringing the total to approximately 80,000; (c) militia, whose number is unknown since they have mingled with the refugees; and  
(d) ordinary refugees, estimated at about 1 million persons.

20. It was agreed with the Zairian authorities that the only effective way of ensuring the safety of the refugees and their freedom to exercise their right to return to Rwanda would be the separation of those in categories (a), (b) and (c) from the rest of the population of the refugee camps. The militia (category (c)) represent the greatest threat for the refugees. However, their separation from the others would be a difficult and complex undertaking, especially as they would be likely to resist, and incite others to resist, any attempt to relocate them. A strong security mechanism would be needed in order to protect both the refugees and those carrying out the operation. The separation of these persons is, however, the only means of providing security for the refugees and allowing them to choose freely to return to Rwanda.

21. While the Government of Zaire has indicated its desire to address these issues, it has also indicated that it would require substantial assistance from the international community both in financial and logistic support and in the provision of security for such an operation.

22. The Secretariat has examined my Special Representative's recommendations in consultation with UNHCR. In order to address more fully the problems of separating former RGF political leaders, military and militia from the others in the camps, and to evaluate the financial, logistic and security requirements, it was decided, during the visit of my Special Representative to Zaire, to establish a Joint Zairian/United Nations working group. The group, composed of

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representatives of the Government of Zaire, UNAMIR, UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has already begun its work. A technical team from UNAMIR has been sent to Zaire to join the working group and will submit a report to my Special Representative as soon as possible.

#### V. MILITARY ASPECTS

23. Since the 18 July 1994 cease-fire and the formation of the BBGNU a day later, the military situation in Rwanda has been relatively calm. At that time, the armed forces of the new Government, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), had established control over the entire country, with the exception of a "humanitarian protection zone" in the south-west. That zone was under the control of Operation Turquoise, the multinational operation launched by the French Government in pursuance of Security Council resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994.

24. UNAMIR maintained close cooperation at all levels with Operation Turquoise and developed a detailed plan for taking over from it on 22 August, the date of its scheduled withdrawal. On 10 August, UNAMIR began deploying troops in the zone and on 21 August it assumed responsibility from Operation Turquoise. Arrangements were made with the French Government for the continuation of logistic support until UNAMIR could assume full responsibility. The French Government has submitted to the Security Council a final report, which has been circulated as document S/1994/1100.

25. UNAMIR troops established a presence throughout the zone, ensuring stability and security and providing support for humanitarian relief operations. The Government of Rwanda also launched a concerted effort to reassure the population. As a result of those efforts, a major exodus of civilians to Zaire was averted.

26. The Government's civilian and military take-over of the south-western zone was fully coordinated with UNAMIR. The civil administration in the zone is being restored as a first priority and RPA troops are gradually being deployed there. The Government installed prefects at Kibuye, Gikongoro and Cyangugu on 6 and 7 September and in cooperation with UNAMIR deployed RPA platoons in each location. Through successive incremental deployments, those elements were increased to company- and battalion-size units. The gradual establishment of the Government's authority in the south-west zone has now been completed without incident.

27. At the same time, former RGF troops in the south-western zone are being encouraged to enlist in the new national army. In addition, a programme was started on 2 September to encourage elements of the local gendarmerie to surrender their arms voluntarily. UNAMIR has collected nearly 600 arms under the programme.

28. The RPA now operates throughout the country, conducting patrols and manning roadblocks and checkpoints to monitor personnel and vehicle movement. Occasionally, it conducts cordon and search operations for weapons or personnel checks. It also protects vital points, such as infrastructure and all major

border crossings. Additionally, in the absence of a police force, RPA troops perform policing functions to the extent possible.

29. Relations between UNAMIR and the RPA have been cordial and cooperative. However, movement restrictions have sometimes been imposed on UNAMIR troops. The formal understanding between UNAMIR and the BBGNU, particularly with reference to the United Nations Status-of-Forces Agreement with Rwanda, is that there should be no restrictions on the movement or deployment of UNAMIR personnel and vehicles throughout Rwanda. However, as illustrated by the three-week delay in providing clearance to occupy accommodation and concurrently deploy troops in the north-east and south-east (sectors 1 and 2), as well as periodic, local limitations placed on movements of UNAMIR troops in the south and north-west (sectors 3 and 5), the reality on the ground is sometimes different. In addition, some local RPA commanders have sometimes indicated that they are under instructions to deny UNAMIR access to areas where RPA troops are deployed. When such incidents are brought to the attention of senior government officials, they are usually quickly resolved.

30. The rapid reinforcement of UNAMIR in early August has contributed significantly to the improvement of the security situation in Rwanda. In accordance with its mandate, UNAMIR has continued to provide security support to all humanitarian operations in Rwanda. It has also provided support in re-establishing basic services and in the provision of relief supplies. None the less, delays in reaching the full authorized force level are hampering UNAMIR's further efforts in that regard. As at 3 October, UNAMIR's troop strength consisted of 4,270 all ranks (out of its total authorized strength of 5,500). On 19 August, the new Force Commander, Major-General Guy Tousignant (Canada), took over from Major-General Romeo Dallaire (Canada).

31. As noted above, the successful deployment of UNAMIR troops in the former humanitarian protection zone (sector 4) has provided the stability necessary to commence the gradual introduction of RPA forces to the south-west of the country. In order to facilitate that introduction, however, it has been necessary for UNAMIR to concentrate its efforts in this potentially volatile area. Accordingly, the requirement to extend UNAMIR presence throughout Rwanda is yet to be fulfilled.

32. As stability in Rwanda improves, emphasis in UNAMIR activities is shifting from purely military security-related tasks to the support of humanitarian operations aimed at assisting the population in need and facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

33. In the expectation that the remaining troops committed to UNAMIR will be deployed during the coming weeks, the Force Commander plans to deploy the force in six sectors, as indicated on the map annexed to the present report. The current and planned deployment schedules are as follows:

Sector 1 (north-east) Deployment of the Nigerian independent infantry company group is in progress.

- Sector 2 (south-east) Two platoon groups from Canada and Ghana currently operate in this sector (which presently includes Kigali). Planned deployment in the sector will consist of one infantry battalion (Ghana).
- Sector 3 (south) An independent infantry company from Malawi operates in the sector. Planned deployment will consist of two independent infantry companies, one each from Malawi and Mali.
- Sector 4 (south-west) Current deployment consists of the Ghanaian Battalion, a United Kingdom field ambulance capability, the Ethiopian battalion and the inter-African battalion, composed of troops from Chad, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, the Niger and Senegal. Planned deployment will consist of three mechanized/motorized infantry battalions (Zambia, Ethiopia and the inter-African contingent).
- Sector 5 (north-west) Although not part of UNAMIR, a Canadian field ambulance capability is currently operating in this sector. Planned deployment will consist of one infantry battalion from Tunisia, which is scheduled to commence deployment in early October.
- Sector 6 (Kigali City) Planned deployment will consist of one composite infantry battalion from India. This battalion is scheduled to be fully deployed by the end of October.

34. The main objective of the UNAMIR deployment schedule is to promote security in all sectors and to create a climate conducive to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, as well as to support humanitarian operations. The Force Headquarters continues to operate from Kigali along with specialized communications, logistics and medical support units from Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia respectively. The United Kingdom contingent is scheduled to withdraw by 1 December and the Canadian contingent by mid-January.

35. The deployment of UNAMIR has been a difficult process, as many contingents were in need of major equipment items and as the United Nations has neither the resources in stock nor an advance budget which would ensure that the required equipment could be made available in a timely manner. It was for this reason that, in paragraph 24 of my report of 13 May (S/1994/565), I underlined the necessity for Member States to agree to make arrangements on a bilateral basis to provide the troops, equipment and airlift required for UNAMIR. As this did not occur, the Secretariat was required to identify sources of equipment and to arrange for its transport. This was a time-consuming task, which significantly delayed deployment. It also restricted the initial operational capability of UNAMIR, as contingents were in some cases unfamiliar with equipment supplied to them. One way of achieving a more rapid response in such circumstances would be the extension of the standby forces concept to include equipment, whereby a Member State would hold equipment on standby at a high state of readiness for deployment on lease terms.

36. With the induction of new contingents, the UNAMIR force strength is expected to exceed temporarily the authorized level during the period from November 1994 to January 1995. However, as at February 1995, the expected withdrawal of some contingents and normal rotations will bring it back to its authorized level. The fact that UNAMIR will exceed its authorized strength for a short period will have no financial implications for its budget, as the excess expenditure would be offset by the savings resulting from a force strength below the authorized level up to October 1994.

37. The UNAMIR authorized strength of 320 military observers has been met and military observers are deployed in all sectors. They are engaged primarily in supporting humanitarian activities and liaising with the RPA.

#### VI. CIVILIAN POLICE

38. As indicated in the concept of operations set out in my report of 13 May to the Security Council (S/1994/565, chap. 4), it was initially envisaged that the main task of the civilian police component of the expanded UNAMIR would be to maintain liaison with the local civilian authorities on matters relating to public security, with a total authorized strength of 90 civilian police observers.

39. However, as a result of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the country's administrative structures, no real police force or gendarmerie remained in place when the new Government was established on 19 July. Police functions were entrusted to an embryonic gendarmerie consisting mainly of RPA soldiers. At the same time, the Government sought the urgent assistance of UNAMIR in establishing a new, integrated, national police force. Given the importance to Rwanda's security and stability of creating a professional national police force, UNAMIR responded positively to that request, within its existing resources. Accordingly, on 16 August, UNAMIR initiated a training programme with 103 students selected by the Government as volunteers from different social and ethnic groups. The aim of the programme is to provide trainees with the basic knowledge of routine and investigative police work, thus enabling them to address the immediate law and order problems at Kigali. I recommend that the Security Council authorize UNAMIR to pursue these efforts.

40. The activities of the UNAMIR civilian police component have thus evolved from liaison with local authorities to assisting the Government in the creation of a new police/gendarmerie. The component is also charged with monitoring the activities of local police and gendarmerie, monitoring the activities of the civil authorities with regard to human rights violations and assisting UNAMIR military observers and troops in dealing with police matters.

41. The headquarters and training activities of the UNAMIR civilian police component are based at Kigali. A two-phase deployment of police observers is being implemented. Under phase I, which has been completed, police observers have been deployed at the civilian police headquarters, training centre and the prefectures of Kigali, Gikongoro, Cyangugu, Kibuye, Gitarama and Butare. Phase II will be executed once the full strength of police observers is reached.

Under this phase, civilian police monitors will be deployed in all prefectures of the country.

42. To date, the component has a total strength of 30 police observers, with 10 each from Ghana, Mali and Nigeria. More observers are scheduled to be deployed shortly, although the Secretariat is having difficulties in obtaining from Member States a sufficient number of French-speaking police personnel.

#### VII. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

43. Current estimates suggest that Rwanda's pre-war population of 7.9 million has fallen to 5 million. Estimates of internally displaced persons range from 800,000 to 2 million. There are more than 2 million refugees in Zaire, the United Republic of Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda. At the same time, it is estimated that more than 200,000 former refugees have returned to Rwanda from Burundi and Uganda. The victims of genocidal slaughter could number as many as 1 million.

44. The humanitarian demands of the Rwandan emergency continue to stretch the capacity of the international community. In addition to the refugee crisis at Goma, the humanitarian community has had to address several crucial issues: the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise from the south-west; assistance to the internally displaced people; the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation; the humanitarian implications of human rights violations; and the need to examine the Rwanda crisis in a regional context.

45. Prior to the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise, there was extreme concern among the international community that fear of reprisals by the RPA would drive thousands of Hutus across the border into Zaire. With poor road conditions, large distances to the camp-sites and other logistic difficulties, the scenarios were recognized by the humanitarian community as being cataclysmic, with the potential for refugee movement exceeding even that to Goma.

46. Under the coordination of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office, the international community adopted a policy of confidence-building in the south-west to encourage the internally displaced not to flee across the borders. At the political level, the RPA agreed not to occupy the south-west until conditions had stabilized. The timely and large-scale influx of United Nations and non-governmental organization resources, combined with the deployment of UNAMIR troops into the area, defused the situation. Some 350,000 people did cross the border into camps around Bukavu in Zaire; however, the majority remained within Rwanda.

47. It is agreed that the return of refugees to Rwanda is the only lasting solution and that it is critical to the resumption of normal economic and social life. However, the intimidation of refugees by former militia and army elements in the camps and the fact that those former soldiers and militia have not been disarmed are serious obstacles to the implementation of a repatriation programme. UNHCR does not feel at the present stage that it is in a position to encourage refugees to return home, partially because of deteriorating security for the returnee candidates in the camps and also because of concerns about

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security conditions in parts of Rwanda. UNHCR is none the less facilitating and assisting the return of spontaneous returnees.

48. As for the internally displaced persons, agreement has been reached among the humanitarian agencies to focus on facilitating their return to their areas of origin. By strengthening community capacity-building, providing rehabilitation support and improving security, the aim is to provide an attractive return option for those in the displaced persons' camps.

49. This policy of voluntary return of the internally displaced is vital. Many camps will become uninhabitable during the rainy season because of contamination of water supplies by sewage, inadequate shelter and poor access for relief convoys. In addition, if people stay in the camps, the fields are untended. Already the harvest has been missed and it is likely that the planting season will also be missed in many areas. This will mean that the international community will have to provide food aid for a second season. The resettlement of the displaced and the resumption of agricultural production are critical to the Government's efforts to rehabilitate the country. The longer people stay in camps, the longer rehabilitation is likely to take. There are now regular convoys carrying those who wish to return from Cyangugu in the south-west to Butare, Gikongoro and Kigali. Between 7 September and 23 September, some 3,337 people were transported home from Cyangugu. Returnees have also been transported from the north-west.

50. As the country strives to return to normalcy, increasing attention must be given to the transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation. The Government faces the huge challenge of rebuilding the country after a devastating war with almost no financial and human resources. It is vital that the international community provide quick and efficient rehabilitation assistance. In that connection, the Special Representative and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs have distributed among donor countries, agencies and non-governmental organizations the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan, which outlines the initial areas requiring both financial and technical assistance. UNDP has begun initial projects to support the capacity-building of government ministries. Other United Nations organizations are contributing to the process in their respective areas of competence. As a result of those efforts, the infrastructure is improving. Essential services such as electricity and water supply have been restored at Kigali and services are being repaired around the country.

51. One major impediment for rehabilitation is the presence of mines. It is believed that there are 50,000 to 60,000 uncleared land-mines in Rwanda, with an average of two civilian mine casualties a day. United Nations de-mining experts have visited Rwanda to assess the scope of the problem. As the security situation stabilizes and de-mining can begin, the United Nations will coordinate with all concerned in providing assistance in that area.

52. Without reconciliation among the various parties to the conflict, it is likely that humanitarian operations will be protracted and difficult and will ultimately require greater commitments from the international community. This is directly linked to the human rights activities discussed in chapter III above.

53. It is apparent that the Rwanda crisis and its spill-over into neighbouring countries has serious political, economic, social and environmental implications for Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda. In order to examine the merits of a broader and more comprehensive regional approach to the Rwanda problem, I appointed Mr. Robert Dillon as my Special Humanitarian Envoy for Rwanda and Burundi. The Special Envoy made a visit to the area from 8 to 22 September and has submitted his recommendations to me.

54. The United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda was launched on 22 July 1994. It requested a total of \$435 million to enable United Nations organizations to carry out their humanitarian programmes. This figure was revised upwards in the light of increasing needs to \$552 million. As at 1 September, contributions received amounted to \$384 million, covering 70 per cent of the total requirement. Based on information received by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, bilateral and other direct contributions for the Rwanda crisis, including those in response to the Appeal, bring the total contributions up to \$762 million.

55. The response of the international community to the crisis in Rwanda has been encouraging and has served to avert what could have been a major humanitarian disaster in the south-west. It is essential that this support be maintained as we enter into a delicate period of reconciliation and rehabilitation. For its part, the United Nations will continue its efforts to provide an appropriate framework for coordination of humanitarian assistance and the transition to reconstruction and development.

#### VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

56. By its resolution 48/248 of 5 April 1994, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments for UNAMIR, at a rate not to exceed \$9,082,600 gross (\$8,881,000 net) per month for the period from 5 April to 31 October 1994. This authorization was subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Assistance Mission beyond 4 April 1994. In its resolution 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, the Council, inter alia, decided to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 9 December 1994.

57. By its decision 48/479 B of 14 September 1994, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments in the amount of \$37,182,100 gross (\$38,043,200 net) to meet the immediate operational requirements of UNAMIR for the period from 5 April to 30 September 1994, this amount being in addition to the full commitment authority of \$62,367,187 gross (\$60,982,867 net) already provided by resolution 48/248.

58. My report on the financing of UNAMIR to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session includes the cost estimate for the period from 5 April to 9 December 1994 in the amount of \$179.6 million, after taking into consideration voluntary contributions in kind of \$4.5 million pledged by Member States. My report also estimates costs for the period from 10 December 1994 to 9 December 1995 at \$20 million per month, based on the current authorized strength and mandate of UNAMIR. On the basis of this cost estimate, I have requested the Assembly to provide the necessary resources for the maintenance of

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UNAMIR, should the Security Council decide to extend its mandate beyond 9 December 1994.

59. As at 27 September 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAMIR special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to \$30 million. The total unpaid assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations at that date amounted to \$1.9 billion.

#### IX. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

60. There are signs that the situation in Rwanda is stabilizing and slowly returning to more normal conditions. Inevitably, there are serious obstacles to be overcome in the long road to recovery from the war and carnage that have devastated the country, inflicted trauma and hardship on its people and destroyed its institutions. The first priority remains the resolution of the massive humanitarian crisis, including the problems faced by the Rwandese refugees in Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania. Acts of intimidation and violence within the refugee camps have inhibited the refugee population from choosing to return home. The Government is engaged in efforts to find a solution to these problems, with the support of United Nations agencies and programmes on the ground, coordinated by my Special Representative. Determined efforts will have to be made by the Government to create conditions under which the refugees and displaced persons can return to their homes in safety and dignity. Indeed, without the assurance that their human rights will be respected, it is unlikely that the refugees and displaced persons will return. In this regard, I have conveyed to the Government of Rwanda, through my Special Representative, the need to undertake broader efforts towards national reconciliation. I am encouraged that the Government has taken concrete steps in this direction and I urge the international community to support its efforts and encourage it to ensure that these efforts are both genuine and comprehensive.

61. I endorse the recommendation made by the Commission of Experts in its preliminary report that trials of individuals suspected of serious breaches of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide be carried out by an international criminal tribunal. The Commission considers it preferable that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia be expanded to cover international crimes committed in Rwanda from 6 April rather than to create a separate ad hoc international criminal tribunal. It is now for the Security Council to decide on the course of action to be adopted.

62. Among the many tasks facing the new Government and the Rwandese people is the reconstruction of the social and economic infrastructure of the country. Rwanda will require massive amounts of external technical and financial assistance on an urgent basis in order to create stability and re-establish basic services and a functioning economy. Donor agencies have undertaken the initial planning required before assistance can be released for reconstruction projects, and some small-scale rehabilitation of basic infrastructure is taking place. I urge donor Governments and international bodies to ensure that their programmes of assistance for Rwanda are implemented urgently. One aspect that is rapidly assuming the dimensions of an emergency is the Government's total

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lack of funds to re-establish even the most rudimentary administration and pay its employees. It is essential that at least bridging assistance be devised to provide relief bilaterally or by international financial institutions. In that connection, I should like to appeal to bilateral donors to consider ways and means to help the Government resolve the problem of its arrears with the World Bank, so as to secure access to the resources of that institution. I should also like to urge Member States to contribute generously to the Trust Fund which I established on 14 July 1994 in order to finance humanitarian relief and rehabilitation programmes in Rwanda. It would also be helpful if Governments could share with the United Nations information about their bilateral programmes of assistance so that there can be a coordinated response to Rwanda's needs.

63. Long-term peace and stability in Rwanda require genuine reconciliation between all elements of Rwandese society. Refugees and displaced persons must have the opportunity to return to their homes in peace, safety and dignity. The human and civic rights of all Rwandese people must be respected. I urge the new Government to maintain an open dialogue with all other political interest groups in Rwanda, including former government officials, except for individuals who are found, through due process, to have been directly implicated in acts of genocide. This is the only way the country can achieve durable political stability, within the principles of the Arusha Accords.

64. The evolving developments in and around Rwanda strengthen the case for a broader approach to the question of national reconciliation and the other aspects of the crisis. The Council will recall that the Mission it dispatched to Burundi from 13 to 14 August 1994 recommended, inter alia, that an international conference be convened to look into the problems of the subregion. I shall continue to consult with all relevant parties with a view to determining how the United Nations could assist in the preparation and convening of such a conference.

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