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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period from 12 December 1980 to 12 June 1981)

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## INTRODUCTION

1. The present report contains an account of developments relating to the functioning of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period from 12 December 1980 to 15 June 1981. Some of the information contained in this report was submitted to the Security Council in my special report (S/14407) of 16 March 1981 on the incidents which occurred at Al-Qantara in the Nigerian battalion sector. The purpose of the present report is to provide the Security Council with a comprehensive picture of the activities of UNIFIL in pursuance of the mandate laid down by the Council in its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and extended or reaffirmed by resolutions 434 (1979), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980), 474 (1980) and 483 (1980). The last extension of the Force's mandate, as decided by the Security Council in resolution 483 (1980), was for a period of six months, until 19 June 1981.

2. The activities of UNIFIL from its inception up to 12 December 1980 are outlined in my periodic reports on the Force to the Security Council (S/12845, S/13026, S/13384, S/13691, S/13994 and S/14295).

### I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

#### A. Composition and command

##### (a) Composition

3. The composition of UNIFIL as of 15 June 1981 was as follows:

##### Infantry battalions

Fiji	628
Ghana	377
Ireland	601
Nepal	430
Netherlands	810
Nigeria	696
Norway	688
Senegal	561

##### Headquarters camp command

Ghana	99
Ireland	51

##### Logistic units

France	738
Italy	34
Norway	143
Sweden	144

Total	<u>6000</u>
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4. In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL is assisted by 67 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). These observers are under the operational command of the Force Commander of UNIFIL.

5. During the period covered by this report, the Nepalese battalion, which had been withdrawn from UNIFIL in May 1980, began rejoining the Force as of 1 June 1981. The Ghanaian contingent, which had been reinforced to take over the area previously controlled by the Nepalese, is being reduced accordingly.

(b) Command

6. The present Commander of UNIFIL is Lieutenant-General William Callaghan. He assumed command as of 15 February 1981, replacing Major-General Emmanuel A. Erskine, now Chief of Staff, UNTSO.

(c) Rotation of contingents

7. During the six months covered by this report, all contingents have carried out rotations, with the exception of the Nepalese, which is rejoining UNIFIL.

(d) Casualties

8. During the period under review, 15 members of the Force lost their lives and 49 were wounded. Of the fatalities, 8 died as a result of hostile actions (see para. 41 below) and others from accidents or natural causes. Of the injured, 24 were wounded as a result of hostile actions and the others in accidents.

9. Since UNIFIL was established, 62 members of the Force have died, 31 of them as a result of firing and mine explosions, 22 in accidents and 9 from natural causes. More than 100 have been wounded in armed clashes, shellings and mine explosions.

(e) Discipline

10. The discipline, devotion and bearing of the members of UNIFIL, as well as of UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force, who have continued to serve in difficult and often dangerous conditions, reflect credit on themselves, their commanders and their countries. Their self-restraint in the face of hostile action deserves special recognition. A case in point was the unprovoked attack on the Nigerian platoon headquarters at Al-Qantara by the de facto forces (Christian and associated militias), when the soldiers of UNIFIL and members of the Lebanese army unit withstood intense shelling for several hours, incurring numerous casualties without firing back, as such action would have entailed the risk of hitting innocent civilians.

B. Deployment

11. A major change in deployment is being brought about by the return, as of 1 June, of the Nepalese battalion, which had been withdrawn in May 1980 and temporarily replaced by an additional Ghanaian battalion (see S/14295, para. 11).

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The Nepalese battalion is again being deployed in the northeastern sector, and the Ghanaian battalion-North is being withdrawn.

12. In order to prevent infiltration by armed elements (mainly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese National Movement), UNIFIL redeployed some of its units and established additional check points and observation posts as necessary. Further, in order to check incursions into the UNIFIL area by the de facto forces, patrol activity was increased, as were measures for the protection of those villages most prone to attack by the de facto forces, such as Brashit, Al-Qantara, Yatar and Shaqra. Additional defensive steps had to be taken to protect the Force headquarters in Naqoura following a hostile demonstration on 7 April, which nearly became a riot (see para. 49 (ix) below).

13. UNTSO military observers, organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), continued to man five observation posts (Lab, Hin, Ras, Mar, Khiam) along the Lebanese side of the 1949 Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line (ADL). In addition, six UNTSO teams assist UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks. There is a team based in Metulla (Israel), which serves as liaison with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in that locality and with the de facto forces; a team based in Tyre, serving as liaison with local representatives of PLO, the Lebanese National Movement and AMAL (Lebanese Shi'ite armed organization); and four mobile teams whose functions are to prevent and investigate incidents.

14. The present deployment of UNIFIL is as follows (see annexed map):

- (a) The Force headquarters is located at Naqoura;
- (b) The Senegalese battalion is deployed in the northern part of the western sector, with its headquarters at Marakah;
- (c) The Fijian battalion is deployed in the southern part of the western sector, with its headquarters at Qana;
- (d) The Nigerian battalion is deployed in the northern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Tayr Zibna;
- (e) The Dutch battalion is deployed in the south-western part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Haris;
- (f) The Irish battalion is deployed in the south-eastern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Tibnin;
- (g) The Ghanaian battalion is deployed in the eastern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Kafr Dunin;
- (h) The Nepalese battalion is deployed in the western part of the eastern sector, with its headquarters at Blate;
- (i) The Norwegian battalion is deployed in the eastern part of the eastern sector, with its headquarters at Ebel es-Saqi;

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(j) The headquarters camp command, composed of Ghanaian and Irish troops, is based at Naqoura;

(k) The French logistic component is located at Naqoura;

(l) The French engineer company is located at Al Hinniyah;

(m) The Norwegian maintenance company is located in the vicinity of Tibnin;

(n) The Italian helicopter wing is based at Naqoura;

(o) The Swedish medical company is located at Naqoura;

(p) Observer Group Lebanon is based at Naqoura;

(q) A guard detachment is stationed in Tyre barracks. This 45-man unit from one battalion continues to be drawn on a two-week rotation basis from all infantry battalions in the Force;

(r) The military policy company is based at Naqoura; it functions throughout the UNIFIL area of operation and outside it as required.

15. The Lebanese national army unit, under the operational control of the UNIFIL Commander, was increased in strength from 617 to 1,350, all ranks. Its headquarters is at Arzun; subunits are attached to UNIFIL battalions in the western and central sectors. In January, an infantry platoon was deployed in Tyre barracks, and, subsequently, other subunits have been deployed in Al-Qantara, Al Qulaylah, Abbasiyah and Dayr Qanun. They are increasingly involved in patrolling and in manning observation posts and check-points jointly with UNIFIL.

16. A Lebanese engineering company, 130 strong, has been stationed at Arzun and is working on improving existing buildings and the construction of shelters. It will also undertake projects for the benefit of the civilian population in the area of operation. A Lebanese medical team of nine, led by a doctor, has joined the staff of the Tibnin hospital.

17. During the period under review, relations between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) were significantly strengthened. In addition to ISF personnel assigned to UNIFIL check points, ISF has started to carry out independent patrols within the UNIFIL area and has organized mobile check points, always in close co-ordination and co-operation with UNIFIL. ISF also assists UNIFIL with special investigations of mutual concern and is making an important contribution towards restoring law and order in the area.

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## II. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

18. During the period under review, UNIFIL experienced administrative and logistic difficulties for a variety of reasons. Those difficulties, and the efforts to remedy them, are set out below.

### A. Accommodation

19. Efforts continued to implement the UNIFIL prefabricated building programme and to improve facilities at UNIFIL headquarters and in the battalion areas. However, some troops still have to be accommodated in tents, and the number of such troops will increase with the return of the Nepalese battalion. An extensive fencing programme to protect the headquarters compound was completed. Additional efforts are now being made to reinforce physical security throughout the area of operation and, in particular, in the forward areas.

20. Contractors were engaged to build the Norwegian battalion petrol station at Ebel es-Saqi and to install a 4,000-litre-capacity kerosene tank, with protective walls, at the Irish battalion petrol station in Tibnin. Contracts were made for asphaltting 5,850 square metres at the Force forward headquarters in Al Hinniyah and in battalion areas. Contracts were also entered into for the following essential jobs at Naqoura headquarters: building of an ammunition magazine and the repair of four warehouses for the French logistic contingent; installation of armoured electrical power telephone cables; installation of four fibreglass water-tanks; and asphaltting of areas totalling 5,575 square metres of the headquarters compound.

### B. Communications

21. The installation of the communications equipment, acquired from the stocks of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) is now nearly complete. All battalions have been equipped with teleprinters, and, with the temporary exception of the Fijian and Senegalese battalions, all have also been provided with dial telephones. The generator and radio workshops required for maintaining the newly acquired equipment have been completed. Owing to the expansion of the Naqoura camp, the old electrical grid proved to be insufficient. New generators and distribution systems were installed by UNIFIL during the current mandate.

### C. Logistics

22. Logistic support for UNIFIL continues to be provided by a headquarters logistic branch, a French logistic component, a Norwegian maintenance unit, a Swedish medical company and an Italian helicopter wing. A welcome development was the arrival of a Ghanaian engineer platoon.

23. During the period under review, financial constraints and delays in delivery time for supplies and spare parts affected logistic support to the Force. For instance, petrol consumption had to be restricted at a time when the Force was

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seeking to increase its operational capability. Special measures had to be taken in an effort to alleviate those and related difficulties and the situation is being kept under careful review.

24. In my report of 12 December 1980 (S/14295, para. 21), I informed the Security Council of the efforts undertaken by the UNIFIL administration and of the progress made in enlarging the purchase of supplies from Lebanese sources or through Lebanese ports. This policy has continued, and in spite of recent developments in the area, which caused irregularities in the delivery of essential commodities, procurement from Lebanon has been maintained at a high level.

25. Fresh food has been supplied from Lebanese sources, except for the units in Naqoura, which are supplied from Israel. Dry and frozen food rations continue to be obtained from Cyprus. Certain supplies from Cyprus and elsewhere have been routed via Haifa, particularly during periods of closure of the Beirut port.

26. The unserviceability of equipment is now such as to place a strain on the operational capacity of the Force. The fleet of vehicles, mostly contingent-owned, comprises more than 40 different makes and 80 models, some of them 20 years old; this has created serious maintenance problems. Unfortunately, plans to use maintenance facilities in Lebanon (see S/14295, para. 21) failed to materialize. UNIFIL has therefore started an emergency programme aimed at reaching an acceptable maintenance level in the near future.

27. In order to lessen UNIFIL dependence on costly generators, a study was made, in conjunction with the Lebanese Electricity Authority, to determine where a combined local network/generator electric system could be installed. The matter has been followed up with the Lebanese Government, as has the question of the maintenance and improvement of the roads in the UNIFIL area of operation. The water supply is not entirely satisfactory, and efforts have been undertaken to improve it at headquarters and in battalion areas.

28. During the period under review, the French engineering company defused 160 shells, mines and grenades, and neutralized 187 cluster bombs. It also cleared 20,000 square metres of mined ground and destroyed 4,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition. Its works and plant platoon moved 58,840 cubic metres of earth, levelling sites for prefabricated buildings, shelters, septic tanks and roads.

29. The UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura continued to provide health services to Force personnel. In conjunction with the battalions' medical centres and in the absence of other facilities, it also continued to treat the local population as required. During the period, the out-patient clinic had a total of 5,084 patients - 3,070 UNIFIL personnel and 2,014 Lebanese civilians. In the same period, the hospital admitted and treated 422 patients - 274 UNIFIL personnel and 148 Lebanese civilians. The operation unit of the hospital, in its two operational theatres, performed 269 operations - 189 cases of minor surgery and 80 cases of advanced surgery. A total of 1,449 x-ray examinations were performed. The hospital dentist treated 1,643 patients.

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30. As in the past, UNIFIL personnel or Lebanese civilians wounded in the area as a result of shelling or accidents were evacuated by UNIFIL helicopter to the hospital at Naqoura. During the period under review there were 55 medical evacuations, 47 of them by helicopter and 8 by ambulance. The services of Rambam Hospital in Haifa remain available for emergency cases which cannot be treated at the UNIFIL hospital. In this connexion, appreciation is reiterated to the Israeli Government for the assistance provided by Israeli health authorities for the treatment of wounded UNIFIL personnel, especially at Rambam Hospital. During the period under review, UNIFIL medical personnel intensified contacts with the Lebanese authorities in connexion with both the upgrading of medical services for the population in the area and the use of hospitals in Tyre and Saida for the referral of civilian cases.

31. The Italian helicopter wing transported a total of 2,588 passengers, including seriously wounded and sick persons. In some emergencies, flights had to be undertaken at considerable risk to the helicopter crews and hospital personnel involved.

### III. FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

#### A. Guidelines and terms of reference

32. UNIFIL continued to operate in accordance with the guidelines set out in my report of 19 March 1978 (S/12611) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) which was approved by the Council in its resolution 426 (1978). According to that report, UNIFIL was envisaged as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once that was achieved, UNIFIL was to establish and maintain an area of operation. In that connexion, the Force was to supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its authority in the area.

#### B. Co-operation with UNTSO

33. UNTSO military observers of OGL continued to assist UNIFIL and to co-operate in the performance of its tasks under the institutional arrangements described in my reports of 12 January 1979 (S/13026, para. 14), 12 June 1980 (S/13994, paras. 26 and 27) and 12 December 1980 (S/14295, para. 26).

34. During the period under review, the only change in the operational assignments linking UNTSO and UNIFIL was the formation of an additional team to operate in the sectors of the Norwegian and Ghanaian/Nepalese battalions.

35. In my report of 12 December 1980 (S/14295, paras. 27-29), I informed the Security Council of the meeting which took place in Naqoura on 1 December 1980 between Israeli and Lebanese representatives, under the chairmanship of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, in relation to the efforts to reactivate the Israel-Lebanon Mixed

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Armistice Commission (ILMAC). In its resolution 483 (1980), adopted on 17 December 1980, the Council called "on all parties to continue such efforts as are necessary for the total and unconditional implementation of the General Armistice Agreement". Accordingly, I instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to pursue actively negotiations with the parties and, as a first step, to make arrangements for another meeting as soon as possible. Throughout those efforts, the Israeli authorities continued to maintain their position that ILMAC was no longer valid, and the Lebanese authorities continued to uphold the view that the Armistice Agreement was still in force and that ILMAC should be reactivated. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO sought to convene another meeting under his chairmanship in early April. While that did not take place because of recent developments in the area, efforts towards the reactivation of ILMAC will be resumed at the earliest opportunity.

### C. Contacts with the parties

36. During the period under review, contacts with the parties concerned were maintained both at United Nations Headquarters and in the area, with a view to further implementing the UNIFIL mandate. In this connexion, it will be recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 483 (1980), requested that I "take the necessary measures to intensify discussions among all the parties concerned, so that UNIFIL may complete its mandate". As a practical arrangement, I requested Mr. Iqbal A. Akhund, who is serving in Beirut as Co-ordinator of Assistance for Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon, to establish contact with the Lebanese authorities and representatives of various groups concerned, including PLO. The purpose of those contacts was to promote better understanding and support of UNIFIL and to build support for further efforts to fulfil the UNIFIL mandate, including the strengthening of the Lebanese Government presence, both military and civilian, in the south. Those contacts were intensified and widened when Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, visited the region from 7 to 17 April 1981 at my request. In the course of that visit, Mr. Urquhart had wide-ranging discussions with the leaders and senior officials of Lebanon and Israel. In Beirut, he also met with leaders of political groups and with the Chairman of PLO.

37. General Callaghan and his senior staff have been in continuous contact with the parties on matters regarding the deployment and functioning of the Force. To that end, they have continued to meet at regular intervals with high Lebanese officials in the ministries concerned and, particularly, with the Army Commander. In the area of operation, negotiations and consultations have been held by members of UNIFIL with the various armed groups, as required, to ensure the smooth functioning of the Force and to reduce the risks of confrontation and armed clashes. Contacts with the various armed groups have generally been undertaken by UNIFIL headquarters staff, through OGL military observer teams and through contacts by the battalion commanders. The battalion commanders have investigated local violations of the cease-fire and all other situations involving incidents which might have led to hostile activities within the UNIFIL area of operation.

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38. As in the past, the headquarters of ILMAC in Beirut has functioned as a liaison office for UNIFIL and provided valuable assistance to the Force. The services of the Director of the United Nations information centre in Beirut, Mr. Samir Sanbar, have continued to be most useful to UNIFIL.

39. In Jerusalem, General Erskine, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, and his senior staff have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities, as necessary, on matters pertaining to UNIFIL.

D. Situation in southern Lebanon and activities of UNIFIL

40. The situation as of 11 December 1980 was described in my last periodic report (S/14295). After examining that report, the Security Council, on 17 December 1980, adopted resolution 483 (1980), in which it renewed the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months and reiterated its commitment to the full implementation of the UNIFIL mandate throughout its entire area of operation up to the internationally recognized boundaries, according to the terms of reference and guidelines as stated and confirmed in the relevant Security Council resolutions. In spite of intensive efforts made both at United Nations Headquarters and in the field, the basic situation has remained essentially the same as last reported. During the period under review, the activities of armed elements (mainly PLO and the Lebanese National Movement), the de facto forces (Christian and associated militias), and IDF in and near the UNIFIL area of operation continued and, on occasion, intensified.

41. I regret having to report that, during the period, UNIFIL again suffered fatal casualties. On 10 January 1981, a Fijian soldier was mortally wounded and later died as a result of fire by armed elements; on 16 March, three Nigerian soldiers were killed by fire directed at their position in Al-Qantara by the de facto forces. Earlier, during the night of 18/19 January, three Senegalese soldiers were found murdered at their post in the vicinity of Barish; on 27 April, one Irish soldier was murdered and another was missing from an observation post in the vicinity of Dayr Ntar. In the last two instances, despite intensive investigations, it has not been possible to determine the identity of the perpetrators, and, to date, the missing Irish soldier has not been located.

(a) Incidents involving armed elements

42. Armed elements continued their attempts at infiltration into the UNIFIL area of deployment but on a lesser scale than during the previous mandate period, in part, because of increased patrolling and surveillance by UNIFIL. UNIFIL patrols continued to apprehend or prevent groups of armed elements from entering its area: 5 such groups were stopped during the second half of December, 13 in January, 11 in February, 4 in March and 7 in April, 12 in May and 10 in early June. Repeated attempts were also made to enter the UNIFIL area or to move within it by individuals who were armed or in military uniforms or refused to have their vehicles searched. Those individuals were stopped at UNIFIL check-points and their weapons confiscated. There were 36 such denials of entry during the second half of December, 99 in January, 67 in February, 62 in March, 66 in April, 83 in May and 77 in early June. In certain instances, tension developed at the check-points because of the refusal of individuals to co-operate with UNIFIL. Those incidents were usually resolved through firm but restrained handling by UNIFIL troops, who, when the situation warranted, drew on the assistance of the liaison officers of the groups involved.

43. In my last periodic report, I referred to the establishment of two new positions by the armed elements in the Senegalese and Fijian sectors (S/14295, para. 36). Continued intensive efforts by UNIFIL to have those positions removed have not yet proved successful. Armed elements have sought to relocate certain of their positions and to increase their presence with additional positions

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in the Fijian, Senegalese and Dutch sectors. In this connexion, the PLO leadership has stated that it has had to relocate positions for defensive reasons. At the time of reporting, certain of the positions have been evacuated, and intensive efforts to have others removed continue. Pending the settlement of these questions, UNIFIL has increased its surveillance of the remaining positions, with a view to ensuring that they are not used for tactical or hostile purposes.

44. Although the number of incidents involving armed elements in the UNIFIL area remained comparable to those in the previous mandate, certain groups have shown an increased reluctance to co-operate with UNIFIL. Some of the more serious incidents involving armed elements and UNIFIL personnel are outlined below:

- (i) On 21 December, armed elements opened fire with rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons against two Fijian positions south of Qana.
- (ii) On 25 December, a UNIFIL helicopter flying to Tibnin to evacuate an injured civilian came under machine-gun fire from positions near the Rashidiyah refugee camp.
- (iii) On 10 January, armed elements fired at the headquarters of the Fijian battalion. As mentioned in paragraph 41 above, a Fijian soldier was killed as a result of that firing.
- (iv) On 16 January, armed elements fired on a UNIFIL helicopter in the area of Jabal Kabir. The Force Commander was aboard the helicopter.
- (v) On 20 January, armed elements opened fire on a Fijian position after being denied entry into the UNIFIL area.
- (vi) On 30 January, armed elements fired rockets from the Fijian sector after forcing their way through a check-point.
- (vii) On 1 March, armed elements fired at the headquarters of the Fijian battalion, one rocket-propelled grenade impacting on the signal store.
- (viii) On 29 May, a check-point manned by Fijian soldiers came under intense fire from armed elements following the denial of entry to two men who had refused to have their cars searched. In a prolonged exchange of fire, a Fijian soldier and at least one armed element were wounded. Fijian personnel contained the situation using minimum force. Later in the day, the leader of a local group apologized for the incident.
- (ix) On 4 June, two members of the French contingent attached to UNIFIL headquarters were forcibly detained by armed elements near the village of Dayr Qanun in the UNIFIL area of deployment. They were released in the evening after having been maltreated and threatened with execution.
- (x) On 11 and 12 June, an armed element check-point east of Kaoukaba stopped, in one case by firing, Norwegian vehicles and held UNIFIL personnel hostage in retaliation for petty matters. In both cases, UNIFIL personnel were released following intensive negotiations.

45. During the period under review, various UNIFIL positions and personnel came under close fire by armed elements. A total of 42 such incidents were recorded

throughout the period. There were also several serious incidents of harassment of UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel by armed elements. Those incidents occurred for the most part in areas where the members of the various armed factions were trying to increase their presence and met with UNIFIL opposition. Certain of the hostile actions by armed elements took the form of arbitrary detention of personnel, hijacking of vehicles and stealing of weapons, ammunition and personal property of the soldiers and unarmed observers. A typical such case occurred on the night of 24 May, when an ambulance of the Swedish medical company, carrying a sick Irish soldier, was stopped by armed elements on the road to Tyre and allowed to proceed only after protracted negotiations. Such actions have been firmly protested.

(b) Incidents involving the de facto forces

46. In addition to its headquarters in Naqoura, UNIFIL has established 16 positions in the enclave. Further, the five observation posts, originally set up by UNTSO in 1972 in pursuance of a consensus of the Security Council, have been maintained and are manned by UNTSO observers of OGL, which is under the operational control of the UNIFIL Commander. During the period under review, the de facto forces continued to oppose and prevent further deployment of UNIFIL in the enclave.

47. There was no change in the restrictions on freedom of movement of UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel within the enclave. Thus, UNIFIL personnel could move in the enclave only on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays for resupply purposes, and UNTSO observers could move only on Mondays and Thursdays for logistical purposes and only on the main road. The restriction on the observers' freedom of movement greatly hampered their operational capability and limited their ability to observe the situation in the border area. UNIFIL and UNTSO are pursuing their efforts to remedy the situation and to enable the observers fully to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

48. As indicated in my previous periodic report (S/14295, para. 43), the de facto forces had established encroachments in the UNIFIL area at Bayt Yahun, Blate, Ett Taibe, Jabal Basil and Rshaf. They no longer occupy the position at Jabal Basil and, at the end of April, they removed their tanks from the positions at Bayt Yahun and Rshaf. Efforts are continuing to have the remaining encroachments removed.

49. Harassment of UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel, as well as the Lebanese army personnel serving with the Force and the local population in the UNIFIL area, continued during the period under review: there were also violent incidents involving the de facto forces and UNIFIL personnel. Some of the more serious incidents are outlined below:

- (i) In the night of 17/18 December, the de facto forces blew up houses in the Dutch and Irish battalion sectors. Three people were killed and four seriously wounded in those actions.
- (ii) On 1 February, the de facto forces fired on an Irish foot patrol in the village of Ayta az Zutt.

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- (iii) On 9 February, the de facto forces attempted to kidnap a 16-year-old Lebanese boy from the village of Majdal Zun. After exchanges of fire with Dutch soldiers who were manning a check-point, they fled, leaving the boy behind.
- (iv) On 15 February, a patrol of the de facto forces, using a half-track, tried to force its way through a Dutch position near Shihin. There was an exchange of fire, after which the patrol withdrew.
- (v) On 13 March, following threats by the de facto forces against the stationing of one platoon of the Lebanese army in Al-Qantara, a Lebanese army doctor, two army medical assistants and a driver were forced to proceed in their ambulance into the enclave, where they were temporarily detained.
- (vi) On 16 March, the de facto forces fired approximately 60 mortar and tank rounds on the village of Al-Qantara, resulting in direct hits on the headquarters of a Nigerian platoon. Three Nigerian soldiers were killed and 20 wounded; 4 Lebanese soldiers and 10 civilians were also wounded. This incident was the subject of a special report (S/14407). On 19 March, the President of the Security Council made a statement on the situation on behalf of the Council members (S/14414).
- (vii) On 27 March, the Irish battalion prevented the abduction of a 16-year-old Lebanese boy by the de facto forces near Brashit.
- (viii) On 5 April, a Dutch listening post near Majdal Zun came under machine-gun fire from a de facto forces position west of Al Bayyadah. A Dutch armoured personnel carrier received some direct hits, and mortar rounds impacted within 80 metres of the Dutch troops.
- (ix) On 7 April, the de facto forces organized a demonstration at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. A group of men, some of them armed, accompanied by women and children, forced their way into the compound. Television crews and journalists were allowed by IDF to come to the scene from Israel to report on the demonstration. Only the self-restraint of the UNIFIL headquarters defence team prevented a violent escalation of the incident.
- (x) On 26 April, an ambulance of the Swedish medical company, en route to Tyre barracks to evacuate a seriously ill UNIFIL soldier, came under fire from the de facto forces check-point north of Naqoura, despite prior assurances of safe passage.
- (xi) On 30 May, a de facto forces half-track attempted to force its way past an Irish check-point between Bayt Yahun and Brashit. The attempt was prevented by the use of an Irish armoured vehicle, in spite of machine-gun fire by the de facto forces.

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50. In the period under review, there were also many cases of firing at or close to UNIFIL positions. There were 22 such cases in the second half of December, 40 in January, 30 in February, 56 in March, 61 in April, 26 in May and 21 in early June. In some cases, the fire was returned by UNIFIL personnel. Such incidents pose a serious security threat to UNIFIL personnel at all times.

51. Attempts at incursion by the de facto forces into the UNIFIL area were mostly in the form of patrols sent into areas contiguous to the enclave. The most serious of those, were an attempt in February to move to the village of Zibqin in a combined patrol with IDF personnel, which was blocked by the Dutch battalion, and another to the village of Brashit, using an armoured personnel carrier and two civilian vehicles. In the latter case, the de facto forces fired at Irish personnel, who, in the end, were able to block the move.

(c) Exchanges of fire across the UNIFIL area

52. During the period under review, there were heavy and frequent exchanges of fire between the de facto forces in the enclave and armed elements stationed in the Tyre pocket and north of the Litani River. On a number of occasions, IDF personnel joined the de facto forces in the firing. These exchanges of fire took place over and across the UNIFIL area of deployment, but on occasion shells fell near UNIFIL positions. In this connexion, it is important to underline the relationship between those firings and other acts of violence which occurred outside the UNIFIL area of operations (see para. 59 below). The most serious exchanges of fire were as follows:

- (i) During the night of 18/19 December, there were heavy exchanges of fire affecting areas both to the west and to the north-east of the UNIFIL area. The de facto forces fired some 400 rounds, and armed elements fired approximately 55 rounds. On 19 December, 26 rockets fired by armed elements impacted in the Norwegian and Ghanaian sectors, and one Norwegian soldier was seriously wounded.
- (ii) Shelling was light during the first half of January. However, a heavy exchange of fire, initiated by armed elements, took place on 23 January, mainly in the north-eastern sector. On 28/29 January, another heavy exchange, covering all sectors, was recorded. On that occasion, the firing was initiated by the de facto forces. On 29 January, following an Israeli air raid, armed elements fired 8 rockets into Israel, followed by 6 more on 30 January.
- (iii) On 11 February, the de facto forces and IDF again exchanged heavy fire with armed elements. On 22 February, in conjunction with an IDF ground operation against targets north of the Litani, the de facto forces and IDF fired 300 artillery, mortar and tank rounds. Armed elements artillery later returned 180 rounds, mainly towards the Marjayoun area.
- (iv) On 2 March, following an Israeli air raid, armed elements fired into northern Israel. That was followed by another Israeli air strike.

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Shelling was also initiated by the de facto forces and IDF in the north-eastern sector and spread rapidly to the western sector and lasted until the next morning. Armed elements responded by firing 64 rockets in the western sector, with many impacting in Israel. On 14 and 22 March, there were brief exchanges in the north-eastern sector between the de facto forces and armed elements. On 27 March, the de facto forces, later joined by IDF, fired heavily to targets north of the Litani. Armed elements artillery responded an hour later. The exchange was resumed on the night of 28 March by the de facto forces; both sides fired close to 200 rounds each. On 29 March, the de facto forces resumed fire in the morning, firing more than 100 rounds by late evening. Armed elements response was limited to 30 rounds. On the fourth day, 30 March, the de facto forces started shelling Chateau de Beaufort. From noon on 30 March to the early morning of 31 March, the de facto forces and IDF fired approximately 340 rounds towards targets north of the Litani. In that exchange, armed elements fired 205 rounds towards targets in the enclave. On the same day, there was also an exchange of fire in the western sector, in which Israeli gunboats were involved.

- (v) On 3 April, firing was initiated by the de facto forces in the eastern sector, with armed elements responding four hours later. The de facto forces also fired to the vicinity of Rashidiyah camp on that day. On 4 April there was another heavy exchange, initiated by the de facto forces, later joined by IDF. In the eastern sector, the de facto forces and IDF fired 400 artillery, mortar and tank rounds; armed elements fired 300 artillery and mortar rounds and 19 rockets. In the western sector, the de facto forces started shelling the Tyre area; the armed elements response came an hour later. By midnight, the de facto forces had fired 50 artillery rounds, and armed elements had fired 80 rockets and 10 mortar rounds towards the enclave. During the day, artillery, mortar rounds and rockets fired from both sides impacted close to Norwegian, Dutch and Fijian positions. Firing continued throughout 5 April but at a lower level. On 6 April, there was a minor exchange of fire initiated by armed elements.
- (vi) On 8 April, the de facto forces and IDF fired approximately 30 rounds, to which armed elements responded with 11 rounds to Marjayoun. On 9 April, armed elements initiated the firing at night, and the de facto forces and IDF responded shortly thereafter. By the early hours of the next morning, the de facto forces and IDF had fired close to 650 artillery, mortar and tank rounds, and armed elements artillery close to 440 rounds. On 9 April, Israeli gunboats fired naval artillery into the Tyre area. On 10 April, armed elements fired rockets into Israel; that was followed by an Israeli air attack and a limited exchange of fire in the north-eastern sector. That same night, armed elements fired 19 rockets towards El Qlaiaa, to which the de facto forces responded with 31 mortar rounds.
- (vii) On 17 April, armed elements fired 15 rockets, 6 of which impacted in the northern area manned by the Ghanaian battalion. On 18 April, there was

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another exchange of fire, which was initiated by armed elements. During that exchange, both sides fired approximately 60 rounds each. On 19 April, a minor exchange was initiated by the de facto forces in the north-eastern sector. The same day, in the western sector, armed elements initiated rocket firing into the enclave. At one point, Fijian soldiers fired warning shots over a mobile rocket launcher which had been moved into the UNIFIL area, forcing it to withdraw. The de facto forces responded with 27 artillery and mortar rounds, some of which fell close to Fijian positions at Al Qulaylah.

- (viii) On 20 April, in the western sector, armed elements fired 44 rockets towards the enclave. Fire was later returned by the de facto forces and IDF. That night, 19 more rockets were fired in the same sector, with many impacting in northern Israel. The same day, firing in the north-eastern sector was also initiated by armed elements and lasted from 0730 hours until midnight. A total of 250 artillery and mortar rounds and rockets were fired, with some impacting in northern Israel and close to UNTSO observation post Mar. The de facto forces and IDF responded at noon and fired 450 rounds. The day also saw a series of Israeli air strikes north of the Litani over a period of six hours.
- (ix) On 21 April, armed elements initiated the firing and fired 10 rounds in the course of the day. The de facto forces and IDF responded with approximately 230 rounds. In the western sector, the de facto forces and IDF shelled the areas of Ras al Ayn and Rashidiyah.
- (x) On 24 April, in the early morning, there were exchanges of fire between Israeli gunboats and the coastal positions of armed elements. At night, firing in the north-eastern sector was initiated by armed elements. They fired about 110 artillery and mortar rounds and approximately 100 rockets into the enclave. The de facto forces and IDF responded with 140 rounds of artillery and mortar.
- (xi) On 25 April, armed elements opened the shelling: 24 rockets fell into the Ghanaian and Norwegian battalion areas and 38 into Marjayoun. The de facto forces and IDF responded one hour later with 185 rounds of artillery and mortar. On 26 April, the de facto forces and IDF responded with 125 rounds.
- (xii) On 27 April, there were intense hostilities. Firing in the north-eastern sector was initiated by the de facto forces and IDF in the morning and lasted until the early hours of the next day. Approximately 800 artillery, tank and mortar rounds were fired by them. During the same period, armed elements fired approximately 340 artillery and mortar rounds and rockets, with some rockets impacting in Israel. In the western sector, on the same day, armed elements fired 41 rockets, most of them falling into western Galilee. In that sector, while the response by the de facto forces was limited, IDF shelled the Rashidiyah area. Also on that day, Israeli jets conducted heavy raids against the Tyre pocket and other targets north of the Litani.

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- (xiii) On 29 April, the de facto forces initiated the firing in the eastern sector, joined by IDF shortly afterwards. They fired 150 artillery and mortar rounds; armed elements responded with 40 mortar rounds. In the western sector, 12 rockets fired by armed elements impacted in Israel and drew heavy fire from the de facto forces and IDF. Firing continued in all sectors throughout the night.
- (xiv) On 4 May, the de facto forces and IDF fired close to 300 rounds of artillery and mortar in the north-eastern sector. The response by armed elements was relatively limited. Heavy firing ceased on 6 May but was resumed on 13 May, when the de facto forces, later joined by IDF, fired 150 rounds of artillery and mortar. Again, armed elements response was limited. A brief exchange of fire occurred on 17 May in the north-eastern sector.
- (xv) On 18 May, the de facto forces and IDF fired 64 artillery and mortar rounds. Five 155-mm shells fired from the enclave, east of Ett Taibe, impacted near the Lebanese battalion headquarters at Arzun. Armed elements response was limited. On 19 May, the de facto forces and IDF fired 72 rounds from eight positions in the north-eastern sector, and armed elements responded with 4 mortar rounds. On 20 May, 21 rounds were fired from the enclave, and armed elements returned 6 rounds during the night. On 24 May, 66 rounds were fired from the enclave.
- (xvi) On 25, 26 and 28 May, armed elements initiated the firing in the north-eastern sector, but the situation did not develop into heavy exchanges. On 29 May, IDF shelled north of Khardala with a total of 37 artillery and mortar rounds; armed elements returned fire with 27 rounds.
- (xvii) In the first 15 days of June, shelling was relatively low. On 2 June, the de facto forces and IDF fired more than 70 artillery and mortar rounds, with no return fire. The same pattern continued on 4 and 6 June but on a lesser scale.

53. Throughout the period, I and my senior advisers, as well as the Commander of UNIFIL, were in touch with both sides, with a view to bringing those very heavy exchanges of fire to an end. On 1 May, I once again appealed to the parties to exercise restraint and instructed General Callaghan to make every effort to achieve a cease-fire.

(d) Activity of IDF in and near the UNIFIL area of operation

54. The activities of IDF in and near the UNIFIL area of operation further increased during the period under review. UNIFIL and UNTSO raised the matter of IDF activities repeatedly with the Israeli authorities.

55. The presence of IDF personnel inside the enclave remained at a high level during the reporting period. IDF gun and tank positions were developed and observation positions established. IDF personnel were regularly sighted in various localities in the enclave. On 25 December 1980, IDF personnel killed five armed

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elements and blew up their ammunition and equipment in an incident at Wadi al Ayn in the enclave. On the basis of reports by UNIFIL soldiers who were in the vicinity, UNIFIL issued a press bulletin, stating, among other things, that the IDF soldiers had piled the bodies on each other and detonated an explosive charge on top of them. That was denied by the Israeli authorities. In view of the controversy that arose, I established a board of inquiry to look into the matter. The Board concluded that there was no evidence to support the account contained in the UNIFIL press bulletin. It was of the view, however, that the UNIFIL soldiers had reported in good faith what they thought they had seen. In making public the findings of the Board on 10 February 1981, I expressed regret that the UNIFIL bulletin contained what proved to be an incorrect statement of the facts. I also instructed the Force Commander to review UNIFIL reporting procedures.

56. While the movements of IDF personnel were generally confined to the enclave, there was a serious incursion by them into the UNIFIL area of deployment on 1 April. On that occasion, IDF personnel entered the village of Tulin in the Nigerian sector, blew up three houses and kidnapped two persons, who were eventually released on 12 May. In that incident, one Lebanese army sergeant was killed when a house near which he had taken cover was blown up. During the incursion, there was a brief exchange of fire between IDF and a combined Nigerian and Lebanese army patrol.

57. There were numerous violations of Lebanese air space by Israeli military aircraft and of Lebanese territorial waters by Israeli naval vessels. UNIFIL observed 159 air and 38 sea violations in the second half of December, 191 air and 92 sea violations in January, 222 air and 91 sea violations in February, 225 air and 127 sea violations in March, 281 air and 84 sea violations in April, 302 air and 90 sea violations in May and 144 air and 41 sea violations in early June. Pilotless reconnaissance flights over and north of the UNIFIL area, which had decreased during the winter months, increased notably from the beginning of April. There was also an increase in IDF helicopter activity over the UNIFIL area, especially over the western sector.

58. IDF also conducted a number of air operations against targets north of the Litani and adjacent to the UNIFIL area. In particular, locations were hit in the Tyre pocket, in the area north of Kasmiyah Bridge and near Chateau de Beaufort.

(e) Other incidents in the area affecting UNIFIL

59. In a situation as complex as the one in which the Force must operate, incidents occurring in the region outside the UNIFIL area of operation and involving various armed forces and groups inevitably have a bearing on developments in the UNIFIL area. During the period under review, there were serious outbreaks of violence in various parts of Lebanon which have compounded the problems facing UNIFIL. There are repercussions on the work of the Force whenever there are shellings of northern Israel or explosions and other actions inside Israel or in the Israeli-occupied territories for which Palestinian organizations claim responsibility; the same can be said about the shelling by the de facto forces of targets in Lebanon, such as Sidon, outside the UNIFIL area of operation and about military operations carried out by the IDF, including air and sea attacks. Such

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incidents have been brought to the attention of the Security Council and/or the General Assembly by the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/14297, A/35/783, S/14316-A/36/57, S/14322-A/36/62, S/14328-A/36/72, S/14355-A/36/88, S/14394, A/36/122, S/14398, S/14403-A/36/127, A/36/130, S/14409-A/36/132, S/14427-A/36/169, S/14438-A/36/186, S/14448-A/36/211, S/14449-A/36/212, A/36/219, S/14454, S/14476-A/36/235, S/14492-A/36/292); the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/14307, S/14354, A/36/87, S/14381, A/36/109); and the Permanent Observer of PLO (S/14435, A/36/217, S/14470, S/14507-A/36/310). In addition, a number of communications on the subject have been addressed to me by PLO.

E. Humanitarian activities

60. During the period under review, UNIFIL continued to carry out its humanitarian activities in close collaboration with the Governor of South Lebanon and the United Nations Co-ordinator of Assistance for Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon. UNIFIL also continued its co-operation with United Nations programmes, particularly UNICEF, in a number of activities aimed at improving the social and economic conditions for the population of the area. Special efforts were made to restore and upgrade water, electricity, education and health services, the distribution of food supplies and the rebuilding of schools, houses and roads. The humanitarian section of UNIFIL assisted on several occasions in resolving cases of kidnapped villagers.

#### IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

61. By its resolution 35/115 A of 10 December 1980, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed \$12,180,500 gross (\$12,060,166 net) per month for the period from 19 December 1980 to 18 December 1981, inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 474 (1980) of 17 June 1980. Accordingly, should the Security Council renew the UNIFIL mandate beyond 19 June 1981, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining UNIFIL up to 18 December 1981 will be within the commitment authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/115 A, assuming continuance of the Force's existing strength and responsibilities. Appropriate financial provision will need to be made by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session in respect of periods after 18 December 1981, if the period of extension determined by the Security Council goes beyond that date.

#### V. OBSERVATIONS

62. Since I reported on UNIFIL to the Security Council on 12 December 1980, developments in Lebanon have commanded the increasing attention of the international community. These developments and the heightened tension which has accompanied them have underlined the importance of UNIFIL as a conflict control mechanism in a particularly sensitive area of the Middle East. Indeed, the complexity of the problems in the region and their interrelationship have had a profound bearing on the work of the Force.

63. Since its establishment, UNIFIL has encountered serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate. I regret that the parties have not so far found it possible to extend to the Force the full co-operation that it requires. Despite the calls of the Security Council, this situation has persisted during the period which is now coming to an end.

64. Thus, the Force has continued to be faced with attempts by armed elements to infiltrate personnel and weapons into its area of operation and has almost daily had to deal with such incidents, sometimes at grave risk to the safety of its personnel. Armed elements have also sought to relocate certain of their positions in the UNIFIL area, stating that their actions were defensive because of the danger of attack. For its part, UNIFIL has made strenuous efforts to prevent infiltration and to contain such activities. Difficulties have persisted, however, in spite of the fact that the leadership of the PLO has renewed its assurances of co-operation with UNIFIL and has assisted in defusing tense or difficult situations.

65. To the south, the de facto forces have continued to resist further deployment of UNIFIL in the enclave held by them. Restrictions relating to freedom of movement of UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel in the enclave have also continued to complicate UNIFIL operations. In the UNIFIL area of deployment, while one encroachment has been removed and tanks have been withdrawn from two other encroachments, four positions are still maintained by the de facto forces. These forces have also

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sought to harass the local population in the UNIFIL area of deployment. Following the grave incident which occurred in March 1981 (see para. 49 (vi) above), intensive efforts were made both locally and at the diplomatic level to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. While these have been avoided, it is essential to keep in mind that the mandate of UNIFIL in relation to the remainder of its area of operation, now controlled by the de facto forces, remains to be fulfilled.

66. Since the de facto forces are known to be supported and supplied by Israel, close contact has been maintained with the Israeli authorities at all levels in an effort both to secure further progress in the implementation of the UNIFIL mandate and to reduce incidents between the de facto forces and UNIFIL. Such incidents have been reduced in recent weeks, with the assistance of the Israeli authorities. However, these authorities, citing overriding considerations of national security, have not, as yet, extended to the Force the degree of co-operation necessary for the fulfilment of its mandate.

67. During the period under review, the activities of the Israeli forces in and near the UNIFIL area of operation increased. Encroachments along the international border and a high level of Israeli military activity within the enclave continue. In addition, Israeli forces have repeatedly violated Lebanese air space and territorial waters and have, on many occasions, launched attacks against targets in Lebanon outside the UNIFIL area. These activities, as other violent incidents in the region, inevitably affect the task of UNIFIL by making even more difficult the efforts of the Force to secure and maintain a cease-fire between armed elements to the north and west of its area, and the de facto forces and Israeli forces to the south. Indeed, there have been extremely heavy exchanges of fire over and across the UNIFIL area. I have been particularly concerned with this aspect of the Lebanese situation during the recent weeks of greatly heightened tension in the region and have made constant efforts to reinforce the cease-fire in southern Lebanon, with a view to avoiding any incidents which might have the effect of escalating the over-all danger of conflict in the area.

68. Despite the many difficulties which it has had to face, UNIFIL has continued in its endeavours to consolidate its position and, in co-operation with the Lebanese Government, to strengthen and make more effective the Lebanese presence, both civilian and military, in its area of operation. The strength of the Lebanese army in the south was increased by more than 700 during the period under review and now stands at 1,350, all ranks, which the Lebanese Government points out is within the limit of 1,500 allowed by the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon. This is a significant development, particularly at a time when the Lebanese Government is dealing with most serious crises in other parts of the country. I wish to pay special tribute here to the support which the Lebanese Government has been providing to UNIFIL. It is also important to note that the population in the UNIFIL area is living and working in relative quiet and has recently increased with the arrival of relatives and friends from other, more troubled regions of the country. Civil administration is gradually being restored, along with education, health, water, electricity and other services. The collaboration between the Governor of South Lebanon, the United Nations Co-ordinator of Assistance for Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon and UNIFIL has continued and intensified, with a view to expediting the programme of activities for the benefit of the civilian population throughout southern Lebanon.

69. In the course of the current reporting period, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO has continued his efforts towards the reactivation of ILMAC, in accordance with Security Council resolution 483 (1980). Though recent developments in the area have prevented progress, these efforts will be resumed at the earliest opportunity.

70. Although the Force has not yet been able to fulfil the mandate in the way intended by the Security Council, I have no doubt that its presence and activities in southern Lebanon are an indispensable element in maintaining peace, not only in the area but in the Middle East as a whole. It would, I believe, be disastrous if UNIFIL were to be removed at the present time when the international community is witnessing with acute anxiety the tensions and conflicts in this vital area of the world. For these reasons, I find it necessary once again to recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of UNIFIL be extended for a further period of six months. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon has informed me of his Government's agreement to the proposed extension. In doing so, he has submitted a letter dated 16 June 1981, setting forth the views of his Government concerning the renewal. The text of his letter is attached to the present report.

71. In making this recommendation I wish to renew my appeal to all concerned to co-operate with UNIFIL in its task, to exercise restraint and to review policies which militate against the fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to the Force by the Security Council. It remains my view that all the parties concerned must observe strictly the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and avoid actions which inevitably lead to violent reactions. Likewise, a determined effort must continue to be made on all sides to render possible the consolidation of the UNIFIL area by the removal of positions that have proved to be provocative. It is essential that the parties desist from challenging the authority of UNIFIL and from using its area for hostile acts against each other. It is also necessary that they take reciprocal steps progressively to reduce their armed presence in the area.

72. In conclusion, I wish to express once again my deep appreciation to the troop-contributing countries for their support and co-operation in this essential peace-keeping operation. I wish also to pay tribute to the Commander of UNIFIL, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan, and his staff, both civilian and military, to the officers and men of the contingents of UNIFIL, as well as the UNTSO military observers assigned to the area. They have continued to carry out their important tasks, often at great risk, with the highest courage and dedication. They are indeed a credit both to their countries and to the United Nations. I wish also at this time to express my sincere appreciation to Major-General Emmanuel A. Erskine, for his outstanding performance as Commander of UNIFIL for nearly three years, from the inception of the Force to mid-February 1981. Finally, I should like to pay special tribute to the memory of those soldiers of UNIFIL who have given their lives in the cause of peace.

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ANNEX I

Letter dated 16 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon  
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

1. As the Security Council is about to meet to examine the renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL, the Government of Lebanon wishes to express its deepest gratitude to you personally, and, through you, to members of the Secretariat, to the Commanders and staff of UNIFIL, to the officers and soldiers of the various contingents and last, but not least, to the troop-contributing countries and friendly Governments for their efforts in preserving international peace and security in our country and beyond. The sacrifice of human lives for the cause of peace in the ranks of UNIFIL will forever be remembered by Lebanon as a challenge for us all to do our utmost in fostering the ideals of liberty and international justice embodied in the United Nations Charter.

2. My Government feels a particular commitment towards UNIFIL since we have been able to meet part of the challenge and deploy substantial contingents of the Lebanese Army, under UNIFIL command, in UNIFIL's area of operation as a major step in fulfilling the objectives of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), and the ensuing resolutions: the return of Lebanese authority and the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty. Given the present tragic conditions in Lebanon and the grave difficulties which our Government is confronting, our efforts in the south will no doubt acquire a particular importance.

3. Pending your report on the activities of UNIFIL, I am instructed by my Government to draw your attention and the attention of the Security Council to Lebanon's attitude when the present mandate was extended by resolution 483 (1980). On 15 December 1980, the Government of Lebanon had submitted to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council a memorandum (S/14296), discussing problems that should be approached in a practical manner, so as to enable UNIFIL to implement its mandate in the totality of its area of operation, up to the internationally recognized boundaries. We had quoted amply from your own report of 12 December 1980 (S/14295) to underline the importance of the role of UNIFIL, as well as the difficulties and obstacles it was encountering. We had also referred to Security Council resolution 444 (1979) of 19 January 1979, repeated a number of times since, by which the Council

"Reaffirms its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978)".

4. In our memorandum of 15 December 1980, my Government expressed its desire that the renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL be accompanied by a number of dispositions designed to enhance the Force, articulate its deterrent capability and review even the methods of definition of the "area of operation", so as to render the mandate more credible, more effective and more implementable. Not only are the

adverse conditions under which UNIFIL operates rendering progress difficult, hazardous and, indeed, limited; there has also been a distinct and declared tendency on the part of Israel to broaden the scope of its so-called "pre-emptive" attacks in a manner that threatens the safety of UNIFIL, its very existence and the very significance of its role as a peace-keeping force.

5. I am instructed by my Government, once more, to ask from the Security Council that the renewal of the mandate for another term should accent the interim character of the Force by creating the objective conditions of its success, within an immediate time-frame and according to a phased programme of action. The Government of Lebanon feels compelled to ask that the renewal be accompanied by efforts as discussed in this and in previous memoranda. Only such a disposition will enable us all to overcome the present status quo, avoid an ever expanding state of war and attain significant progress for the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and its clear objectives.

6. When, therefore, the Council renews the mandate of UNIFIL, we request that the resolution should embody a clear reference to conditions stated above.

(Signed) Ghassan TUENI  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative

