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REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SPECIAL MISSION TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA
ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 289 (1970)

SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FIFTH YEAR

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT No. 2

UNITED NATIONS

New York, 1971

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

S/10009 and Add I

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LETTER DATED 3 DECEMBER 1970 FROM THE MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL SPECIAL MISSION TO THE REPUBLIC OF
GUINEA ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 289 (1970)
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Security Council
Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea established under resolution 289 (1970),
in accordance with paragraph 3 of that resolution.

(Signed) P.B. KHATRI, Nepal (Chairman)

A. ESPINOSA, Colombia

M. JAKOBSON, Finland

E. KUŁAGA, Poland

V.J. MWAANGA, Zambia

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Establishment of the Special Mission

1. In a telegram dated 22 November 1970, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the President of the Republic of Guinea /S/9988/, the Government of the Republic of Guinea stated that an unjustifiable act of aggression against Guinea had been committed by Portuguese forces early on that day. According to the telegram, mercenary commando troops had landed in Conakry, the capital of Guinea, and had carried out bombing raids at several points of the town. The Government of the Republic of Guinea appealed to the United Nations for help; in particular, it requested the immediate intervention of airborne troops of the United Nations to co-operate with the Guinean national army in repelling the aggression in order to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guinea and to safeguard peace and security.

2. On the same day, the Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council /S/9987/, requesting him to convene a meeting of the Council, as a matter of extreme urgency, to consider the situation in Guinea.

3. In a letter of the same day, addressed to the President of the Security Council /S/9989/, the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Portugal to the United Nations categorically denied the accusations of the Government of the Republic of Guinea. He stated that his Government was not involved in the internal affairs of the Republic of Guinea, a neighbouring country which had been following a policy of endorsing to Portugal the responsibility for its internal difficulties with which, however, his Government was not in the least connected. He reiterated his Government's policy of scrupulous respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries bordering on Portugal, and expressed the hope that the Council would therefore reject the complaints raised by the Republic of Guinea.

4. The complaints raised by the Republic of Guinea were considered by the Security Council at its 1558th meeting on 22 November 1970. In a statement to the Security Council the Secretary-General read the texts of two messages he had received from the President of the Republic of Guinea concerning the landing of external forces in Conakry, and the text of a telegram he had sent in reply that

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evening, indicating that a meeting of the Security Council had been urgently convened. The Secretary-General further informed the Council that a message received from the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme in Conakry confirmed that "at 2.00 a.m. local time a debarkment of external forces described by the Government as Portuguese took place in Conakry" and that the representative "had personally seen four debarkment ships and fighters flying over the city".

5. The representative of Guinea in his statement informed the Council that Guinea was the object of armed aggression, premeditated and perpetrated by Portuguese colonial forces, which, in violation of Guinea's territorial waters, had landed mercenaries at several points in the capital city. In view of the serious violation of peace and security the Government of the Republic of Guinea requested that the Security Council should demand the immediate cessation of aggression, and the immediate withdrawal of Portuguese and mercenary troops and military equipment. He also requested that United Nations airborne and seaborne troops should be sent immediately to restore peace and security, and that the Government of Portugal should be condemned by the Security Council.

6. A draft resolution sponsored jointly by Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia /S/9990/ was circulated among the members of the Security Council. After further consideration the draft resolution, as revised /S/9990/Rev.1/, was introduced by the representative of Nepal and adopted unanimously by the Security Council as resolution 289 (1970). The resolution reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statement made by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Guinea,

"Having taken note of the request made by the President of the Republic of Guinea,

"1. Demands the immediate cessation of the armed attack against the Republic of Guinea;

"2. Demands the immediate withdrawal of all external armed forces and mercenaries, together with the military equipment used in the armed attack against the territory of the Republic of Guinea;

"3. Decides to send a special mission to the Republic of Guinea to report on the situation immediately;

"4. Decides that this special mission be formed after consultation between the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General;

"5. Decides to maintain the matter on its agenda."

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7. On 24 November 1970, following consultations between the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 289 (1970), and after consultations between the President and members of the Council, it was decided that the Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea would be composed of the following members of the Council: Nepal (Chairman), Colombia, Finland, Poland and Zambia. On the same day the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General jointly announced the composition of the Special Mission /S/9999/.

8. On the evening of the same day, the Special Mission consisting of Major General Padma Pahadur Khatri (Nepal), Mr. Augusto Espinosa (Colombia), Mr. Max Jakobson (Finland), Mr. Eugeniusz Kułaga (Poland) and Mr. Vernon Johnson Mwaanga (Zambia), left New York for the Republic of Guinea. The Special Mission was accompanied by a secretariat staff assigned by the Secretary-General.

B. Terms of reference

9. The Special Mission's terms of reference were set out in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 289 (1970), namely "to report on the situation immediately".

10. The Special Mission established its own procedures, which encompassed consultations with the Government of the Republic of Guinea, the arrangement of visits to specific areas and interviews with witnesses and the receipt of statements and documents.

11. Regarding the receipt of statements and documents, it was the view of the Special Mission that it could receive oral or written statements which might be requested from and submitted by the Government of the Republic of Guinea or by other Governments, as well as by individuals, including prisoners.

12. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in accordance with these terms of reference.

II. VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

13. The Special Mission left New York at 17.00 on 24 November and arrived in Conakry on the afternoon of the following day, travelling via Dakar. Shortly after its arrival, the Special Mission was received by the President of the Republic of Guinea, Mr. Ahmed Sékou Touré.

A. Meeting with the President of the Republic of Guinea

14. The President informed the Special Mission of the position of his Government regarding the action taken by the Security Council in sending the Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea, which did not entirely meet the Government's request to the Security Council.

15. He reiterated his accusation of Portugal's responsibility for the armed attack against the Republic of Guinea and recalled the background of Portugal's policies and attitudes, as well as the political and security problems in the relationships between the two countries. He expressed disappointment at the fact that the Security Council had not acceded to his request for military assistance and had instead asked for a report on the situation. However, as a Member of the United Nations, the Republic of Guinea would give all possible assistance and co-operation in the fulfilment of the tasks of the Special Mission. The President stated that a governmental delegation would be appointed for this purpose.

16. The Chairman, in answer to the points raised by President Sékou Touré, said that the Security Council, meeting in emergency session, upon the request of the Government of Guinea, had adopted a very important resolution. This resolution had dealt with the situation as referred to the Council, within the context of a high sense of responsibility, moral force, and political viability. Part of the Security Council's action was to send the Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea to report on the situation immediately, and he expressed the view that the report of the Special Mission might serve the important purpose of fully clarifying the situation and enabling the Security Council to take any further action it might consider necessary.

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17. While taking note of the reservations of the Government of the Republic of Guinea, and not failing to understand its sentiments, the Chairman stated that the Special Mission would do its best to carry out its tasks as decided by the Security Council. It fully appreciated and welcomed the offer of co-operation by the Government of the Republic of Guinea.

B. Meeting with the delegation of the Government
of the Republic of Guinea

18. At 10 a.m. on 26 November 1970, the Special Mission met with the delegation of the Republic of Guinea, consisting of the following members: Mr. Ismael Touré, Head of the delegation, Minister of Financial Affairs; Mr. Damantang Camara, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Abdoulaye Touré, Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations; Mr. Omar M'Baye, Director of the Department of Economic Affairs; Mr. Mamady Condé, Director of the Department of Trade.

19. The Head of the delegation made a statement of welcome to the Special Mission on behalf of the Chief of State, who had defined the framework within which the Guinean delegation would carry out its task. The Chairman of the Special Mission said that it was with a high sense of responsibility and concern that the Special Mission approached the important tasks bestowed upon it by the Security Council, the principal organ of the United Nations dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security. The Special Mission considered that the tasks before it were of great significance and urgency and that they should be executed in a thorough and objective manner. The Special Mission would spare no effort to carry them out in the spirit of the Charter and with all the means at its disposal.

20. The Special Mission was anxious to hear the statements of the representatives of the Government of Guinea concerning the events which had led up to the consideration of the situation by the Security Council, as well as on all aspects and implications of that situation. It wished to receive information on the state of compliance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Security Council resolution 289 (1970), and it was prepared to receive all statements and documents which would be relevant to its work, whether they emanated from governmental

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or other sources. To these ends, the Special Mission stood ready to undertake any activities which might prove to be necessary or beneficial to its tasks.

C. Working sessions

21. The Special Mission, in joint working sessions with the Guinean delegation, carried out an agreed programme of activities.

(a) Statement by the Head of the delegation

22. At the first working session the Special Mission heard a statement from the Head of the Guinean delegation which reaffirmed the position of the Government of the Republic of Guinea and urged a very speedy fulfilment of the Special Mission's tasks.

23. Members of the Guinean military and paramilitary personnel of the Guinean Government gave the Special Mission relevant material evidence and information.

24. At a working session held on the morning of 28 November 1970, the Guinean delegation made an oral report to the effect that there had been a new armed attack against the Republic of Guinea in the northern region of its territory. At a subsequent working session the same day the Guinean delegation submitted to the Special Mission photographic evidence relating to the events in Conakry on 22 and 23 November, as well as tapes of the working sessions. It also communicated to the Special Mission the text of a cabled message from the Government of the Republic of Guinea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the reported new armed attack. The Chairman of the Special Mission made concluding remarks.

(b) Oral or written statements by diplomatic representatives in Conakry

25. In the course of the working sessions, the Special Mission heard oral statements of diplomatic representatives in Conakry (which appeared in the following order):

Mr. Salim S. Rashidi, Ambassador, United Republic of Tanzania;
Mr. Hasimbegovic Selmo, Ambassador, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
Mr. Boris Milev, Ambassador, People's Republic of Bulgaria;
Mr. Bohuslav Malek, Chargé d'affaires, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic;
Mr. Anatoli Ratanov, Ambassador, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
Mr. Osman Ali Assal, Ambassador, United Arab Republic;
Mr. Imre Sztanronier, Ambassador, Hungarian People's Republic;
Mr. Oscar Oramas Oliva, Ambassador, Cuba;
Mr. Sorsoh Conteh, Ambassador, Sierra Leone;
Mr. Günther Fritsch, Ambassador, German Democratic Republic;
Mr. Ernest Schmid, Chargé d'affaires, Switzerland;
Mr. Paul Grégoire, Chargé d'affaires, Belgium;
Mr. Amadou Lamine Diallo, Ambassador, Republic of Senegal;
Mr. Peter Afolabie, Ambassador, Nigeria;
Mr. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Ambassador, United States of America;
Mr. Hans Christian Lankes, Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany;
Mr. Mohamed Hasan Adami, First Secretary of Embassy, Indonesia;
Mr. Mouzaffar Koubrously, Minister-Counsellor and Chargé d'affaires, Syrian Arab Republic.

26. They had responded to an appeal from the Government of the Republic of Guinea contained in a note informing the diplomatic, consular and commercial missions accredited to the Guinean Government of the arrival of the Special Mission and asking if they wished to provide concrete testimony to the Special Mission concerning their personal experience on the day of the aggression.

27. The Special Mission received a written statement from the Ambassador of Italy. It also received a letter from the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, transmitting a report by two German eye-witnesses regarding the events.

(c) Statements by members of the PAIGC (Partido Africano para la Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde

28. During the joint sessions, the Special Mission heard, on 26 November 1970, a statement by Mr. Aristides Pereira, member of the Political Bureau of PAIGC, and on 27 November statements from Mr. Vasco Cabral, Mr. Irenio Lopes and Mr. Mateus Correia, who submitted a documentary tape and captured arms and ammunition.

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(d) Statements by individuals

29. A number of foreign residents made statements to the Special Mission, including five doctors of Bulgarian nationality, two doctors of Cuban nationality, three Czechoslovak experts, a Belgian professor residing in Conakry and other persons. Some were in the company of the diplomatic representatives of their countries.

(e) Visual observations of the material effects of the hostilities

30. The Special Mission visited the two military camps of Boiro Mamadou and Samory and the summer residence of the President of the Republic of Guinea at Bellevue. It heard eye-witness accounts of the events which had taken place at those locations. It was shown a sample collection of captured arms and was taken on an inspection tour of damages resulting from the hostilities at the two camps and the President's summer residence. It also visited the headquarters of PAIGC. Eye-witness accounts of events were given by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Guinea, officers of the Guinean Army and Militia, and a Togolese who had been held at the camp.

31. The Special Mission was informed that the prisoners who had been held at Camp Boiro Mamadou had been released by the attackers.

(f) Hearings of prisoners captured during the invasion

32. The Special Mission travelled to Kindia on the evening of 27 November 1970, where it heard seven prisoners brought forward by the Guinean authorities. The prisoners were questioned by members of the Special Mission and of the Guinean delegation who were present. The Special Mission was informed that the total number of prisoners held at Kindia was between sixty and seventy.

III. CONCLUSIONS

33. From the information received and the observations made by the Special Mission during its visit to Guinea an outline of the events of 22 and 23 November 1970 clearly emerges.

34. During the night between 21 and 22 November a naval force appeared off the coast of Conakry. It consisted of two troop-carrying ships described as being of

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the type known as LST during the Second World War, as well as three or four smaller patrol boats.

35. In the early hours of 22 November troops were taken ashore in a number of motor-boats. The strength of the invading force seems to have been between 350 to 400 men. They wore uniforms resembling those used by the army of the Republic of Guinea, without any insignia, except green armbands. They were armed with infantry weapons, including bazookas and mortars.

36. The force split into several groups. Some of the groups were assigned to strategic points in Conakry, such as army camps, the airport and the electric power station. One group demolished the summer residence of the President of the Republic of Guinea, while another made an abortive attempt to assault the presidential palace. The headquarters of PAIGC was also attacked. The invaders occupied an army camp in which Guineans imprisoned for activities directed against the Government, as well as the Portuguese captured in the fighting with PAIGC, were being held; the prisoners were released, and some of them, among them the Portuguese prisoners, were apparently taken back to the ships. The motor-boats were seen to make frequent trips between the ships and the shore.

37. Fighting continued at various points in the city until the morning of 23 November, after which the raiders withdrew to their ships and departed. The number of casualties is not known to the Special Mission with any degree of certainty. According to the Guinean authorities, over 100 attackers are being held as prisoners.

38. The operation seems to have been well planned and carried out with professional skill and precision. The pattern of the operation suggests its possible aims and objectives. The attack against the residence of the President of the Republic of Guinea, coupled with the freeing of the Guinean prisoners, supports the belief expressed by the representatives of the Government of the Republic of Guinea that one purpose of the attack was to overthrow the Government and replace it with dissident elements. Another objective seems to have been to strike at the leadership and headquarters of PAIGC and thus weaken the liberation movement. A further objective was obviously the freeing of Portuguese prisoners.

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39. Regarding the origin of the invasion, the use of naval ships indicated that an external Power was involved. The representatives of the Government of the Republic of Guinea had no doubt that this Power was Portugal. This view was supported by information from other sources, including the prisoners interviewed by the Special Mission, as well as eye-witness accounts of independent observers and material evidence.

40. After a thorough analysis of all the material it has gathered concerning the external armed attack launched from the sea against the Republic of Guinea, the Special Mission has reached the considered opinion that:

(a) The ships used to transfer the invading force to Guinean waters were manned by predominantly white Portuguese troops and commanded by white Portuguese officers;

(b) The force consisted of units of Portuguese armed forces, mainly African troops from Guinea (Bissau) under the command of the regular white Portuguese officers, as well as of a contingent composed of dissident Guineans trained and armed on the territory of Guinea (Bissau).

41. In the best judgement of the Special Mission, the invading force was assembled in Guinea (Bissau). The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Guinea on 22 and 23 November was carried out by naval and military units of the Portuguese armed forces, acting in conjunction with Guinean dissident elements from outside the Republic of Guinea.

Annex I

VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE FIRST TO THE TENTH MEETINGS OF THE
SPECIAL MISSION, HELD FROM 26 TO 28 NOVEMBER 1970

First meeting, held at the Palais du peuple, Conakry, Republic of Guinea,
on Thursday, 26 November 1970, at 10 a.m.

Persons heard:

Mr. Ismael Touré, Minister for Financial Affairs and member of the
Political Bureau of the Republic of Guinea

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Mr. Ismael TOURE (interpretation from French): Excellencies, I welcome you in the name of the delegation that has been appointed by the Chief of State to hold talks with the Mission from the United Nations.

We have little to state, since the Mission has already had occasion to be received by the Chief of State. Thus it has heard the most authentic testimonial of our thought as to the presence of the mission in Conakry.

I can say that the words of the Chief of State were not simply words of welcome and hospitality to the Mission on the occasion of its stay in Guinea: at the same time, they defined the framework of the practical work that has been entrusted to the governmental mission, and we wish to express our happiness -- and our pride, too -- for having been chosen by the Chief of State to receive you and to exchange thoughts with you.

Before we begin officially our conversations in the room next door, we wish to welcome you again to Guinean soil. As Ambassadors of your respective countries to the United Nations, and as representatives of the Secretariat of the United Nations, we wish to express to you our feelings of brotherhood. Our aim is to have you comfortable. Please feel at ease and consider yourselves in a friendly country that wishes to help you and that is preoccupied with the good conduct of your meetings. We also wish you a pleasant stay, within the possibilities and in view of the circumstances, and a useful stay.

I now have occasion to introduce to you the Guinean delegation.

We have the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Comrade Damantang Camara.

You know Comrade Abdoulaye Touré, certainly, since he has travelled with you. He has one foot in the United Nations and another in the Republic of Guinea.

Then we have Comrade Sheikh Omar M'Baye, who is Director of the Department of Economic Affairs, and who also has had some experience in the international Organization; and Comrade Mamady Condé, who is the Director of the Department of Trade. He has also had some experience at the United Nations. Both of them have been appointed not only because

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

of their knowledge of United Nations problems, but also because of their knowledge of the English language. They certainly have other qualities, but those are the ones which interest us most at this time.

Please make yourselves at home.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the United Nations Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea, I wish to express to your Excellencies our sincere thanks for the warm reception accorded to us by the Government of Guinea upon our arrival in Conakry yesterday. We are particularly grateful for the kind and generous welcome given to us by the President of the Republic, His Excellency Mr. Ahmed Sékou Touré.

It is with a sense of high responsibility and concern that we approach the important tasks bestowed upon us by the United Nations Security Council, the principal organ of the United Nations, dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security. We feel that the tasks before us are of great significance and urgency, and that they should be executed in a thorough and objective manner. We shall spare no effort to carry them out in the spirit of the Charter and with all the means at our disposal.

The Special Mission is anxious to hear the statements of the representatives of the Government of Guinea concerning the events which led up to the Security Council's consideration of the situation, as well as on all the aspects and implications of that situation. It would like to receive information on the state of compliance with operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 289 (1970) of the Security Council. Finally, it will be prepared to receive all statements and documents which would be relevant to its tasks, whether they emanate from governmental or other sources.

To those ends, the Special Mission stands ready to undertake any activities which may prove to be necessary or beneficial to its tasks.

Mr. Ismael TOURE (interpretation from French): Excellencies, with your kind permission and after thanking you for the words of appreciation to the Government and people of Guinea, on behalf of the Government and people of Guinea we wish to express to you our sincere thanks and to begin with a general statement on the existing situation. My statement will be completed by my colleagues on the Guinean delegation -- and we also expect that there will be occasion for you to ask questions -- with the aim of informing you completely on the points of view of the Guinean Government.

I wish to state that the statement made by the Chief of State will be the basis of, and by which will be circumscribed, the statements to be made today here by the Guinean delegation.

We can therefore state that on 22 November we were the object of an armed aggression. The instrument of that aggression was, essentially, a naval unit. To the Government and people of Guinea, the author of that aggression is known: it is the Portuguese Government. No Guinean doubts this evident fact. The manner in which the aggression was carried out confirmed the fact that it was an act of premeditated aggression, perpetrated by the Government of Portugal against the Government and people of the Republic of Guinea.

The people of Guinea is equally convinced that that armed aggression was in violation of all its fundamental rights, and constitutes not only a violation of its national territory, but a direct threat to the peace and security of our State.

Thus we appealed to the United Nations to help us oppose a blatant armed aggression, whose author was known and whose aims are not in doubt. Our having appealed to the United Nations was based upon the fundamental aims of that international Organization, and on precedents that have obtained action from that same international Organization. Indeed, the United Nations affirms in its Charter that there is a principle of international solidarity for the keeping of peace and international security in the case of aggression against any of its Members.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

I believe it is time for us to say that, in our opinion, the fact-finding Mission that you represent here was not justified, in the eyes of the Guinean Government. It was not necessary, since what has happened is an act of war, and demonstrates the intervention of an outside Power in an act of aggression.

What we had been requesting -- and which was stated unambiguously by the Guinean request -- was military aid in order to oppose a military attack perpetrated against our State from the outside.

There is a second point to be stated precisely: it is the fact that the Guinean people believes that it itself has the first responsibility for its peace and security at the national level. It is therefore the belief of the Guinean Government that in no case, no matter how serious the situation, could we believe that the responsibility is in the hands of an outside Organization or agency, rather than in the hands of the Guinean Government.

We were therefore surprised by the decision taken by the United Nations. It implied a serious danger for the peace and security of the Republic of Guinea, since if the provision of the essential military supplies to oppose an aggression had been left exclusively in the hands of the United Nations, our country would today be in a tragic situation; the aggressor would have had time to perpetrate and complete its plan of colonial aggression and of endangering the very existence of the Guinean State -- despite the wishes of the Guinean people, and despite all the consequences that such an act would have on the Guinean people.

We therefore must state, on behalf of the Guinean Government, that we consider that the attitude of the United Nations, from the point of view of the Portuguese aggression, must be considered by us as a dangerous attitude for its Member States, and also as contradictory to the fundamental aim of the United Nations, which, as I have stated before, is that of bringing about international solidarity.

We believe, therefore, that the United Nations, in not acting with the speed requested by the Republic of Guinea, and in not sending it any military aid, has not fulfilled that aim of the Charter.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

In the view of the Guinean Government, this clarification is necessary and indispensable. Morally, as well as from the standpoint of consolidating United Nations action, we believe that these are regrettable facts. We believe that they are regrettable for the United Nations as an international Organization because, despite the United Nations, the Guinean people, with only its own forces to count on, has been able to stop that armed Portuguese aggression; and the United Nations runs the risk, as a result of its action in the face of the aggression against Guinea, of being considered as a useless instrument -- perhaps even a dangerous instrument -- in the international community. We therefore have to recall these thoughts, which have already been expressed eloquently by our Chief of State.

In the opinion of the Guinean Government, the resolution, not having mentioned Portugal as the aggressor, is therefore lacking in objectivity. The aggression was at least an external armed aggression. We could understand a reservation on the part of the United Nations as to identifying the aggressor; but the attitude of the United Nations in this case, and in this reservation that the United Nations may have had, seems to us to be a sign of a lack of objectivity -- and perhaps even a sign of complicity with the author or authors of the aggression -- and, of course, there will be talk also of the hypocrisy of the international Organization. These are things that are most serious for the future of the international Organization, at least in some parts of the world, such as Africa, since the Guinean problem is essentially an African problem, because the aggression has as its aim to act against the independence of an African country and to impose on the Guinean people a government that it has not chosen of its own will, overthrowing by violence the legal, democratically-chosen Government.

The United Nations has already condemned Portugal as a result of an act of aggression against the Republic of Guinea. It is a fact that this time the aggression was perpetrated on a much more dangerous scale, and that it was observed by the representative of the United Nations, who, naturally, should be considered by the United Nations as a person of good faith, and who has the duty of representing the United Nations in the Republic of Guinea.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

The acts of aggression perpetrated by Portugal against Senegal and Guinea are known by everyone, and by the United Nations. The aggression of 22 November had been decided some months before by the Lisbon Government. That decision had been taken after a journey to Lisbon by the "governor" -- that is the proper word in these circumstances -- of Guinea (Bissau), which is under Portuguese domination, who thought the time had come to prepare and to perpetrate a large-scale aggression against the Republic of Guinea.

A country friendly to the Republic of Guinea, through its embassy in Conakry, has reported to the Government of Guinea, in a confidential but official manner, this capital fact. The Ambassador of that country, who is at present in Conakry, has authorized us to give you this information.

I believe that if you consider the situation of emancipation, the problem of the accession to independence, and the problem of colonialism in Africa, the attitude of Portugal can no longer be debated: the position of Portugal is clearly hostile to the progress of Africa.

When the Portuguese forces invaded our country on the morning of 22 November, their first aim was the annihilation of the site and premises where the Portuguese prisoners were kept. Those Portuguese prisoners had been captured by the PAIGC in Guinea (Bissau). As is known, a struggle is going on there against the Government and the place where the Portuguese prisoners were kept was attacked by them -- was fired upon by means of bazookas -- and those prisoners of war were freed by the attacking forces.

Those prisoners were not only Portuguese nationals: they were white Portuguese. When we speak of Portugal we are compelled to use such a notion of colour, because, as is well known, Portugal is a country which is still at the stage of classifying and stratifying people on the basis of the colour of their skin.

The PAIGC is ready to give information on this aspect of the aggression perpetrated against the Republic of Guinea -- that is to say, the attack upon its building and also information on the identity of the white Portuguese prisoners. This would, of course, be a means of identifying the aggressor, and the PAIGC, as is known, is struggling in a war of liberation which is supported by the international Organization.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

We have seen information in the Press, both written and spoken, which provides basis for a hypothesis not, of course, to justify, but at least to explain the aggression: it is the presence in Conakry and in other cities of forces of the PAIGC -- and, particularly in the case of Conakry, the fact that here was the residence of Cabral, who, as you know, is the leader of the struggle; and you will be able to appreciate the state in which that residence has been left.

When the first commandos entered this area, it was clear that they had two main aims. The first was against the PAIGC: they wanted to free the white Portuguese prisoners, and also they wanted the physical elimination of Cabral himself. The second of their aims was to liquidate also physically -- the Head of State of Guinea, which can be seen by the fact that the first firing from the sea was against the summer residence of our Chief of State.

There is an officer of the Portuguese who occupied a military camp here in Guinea -- it is called Camp Boiro -- who has stated a certain thing to Guinean military personnel as well as to Guinean civilians who had been gathered by the Portuguese and could therefore be considered their prisoners.

Now, those prisoners are still alive, and they can be witnesses to this statement, and they can be questioned by you. What that Portuguese officer stated to them is that victory had been obtained by Portugal, because two things had happened: Cabral was out of combat, and the Chief of State of Guinea had been assassinated.

Now, that, of course, proves that the aggressors were out for two things: they wanted to fight against the leader of PAIGC and against the President of the Republic, and this can mean nothing else than that the aggressor must be Portugal; and we consider it regrettable that the United Nations does not accept the first version of the Guinean Government, which was later confirmed by the representative of the United Nations -- which is that Portugal is the aggressor in this case.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

In the case of a serious threat against a Member of the United Nations, a threat to its security, as proven by the armed intervention -- a threat which after having been expressed by the legally-constituted Government of the Republic of Guinea, was confirmed by the United Nations representative, the United Nations had a choice: it had to choose between intervening urgently in order to restore peace and put an end to the threat -- after which, of course, it might have had to verify whether that threat had been posed by an external or an internal force; or -- the other choice -- to leave it up to time: to send a mission to check on what had happened -- all of this before acting.

Now, that was the choice of the United Nations. It is a choice that seems to us to be heavy with consequences -- to be heavy with meaning. It cannot be interpreted as a preoccupation with objectivity and preoccupation with respect for the principles of the United Nations. It must be interpreted at least as indifference, and perhaps as complicity -- as approval of an act of aggression.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

The United Nations once had occasion to intervene in Africa, in a case which must now be a matter for reflection. I am referring to the intervention in Congo (Kinshasa). When the legal Government of that country had asked for military aid in order to oppose serious trouble, the United Nations then based its action on the fact that it was a legitimate appeal from that Government and that it was the United Nations duty to oppose trouble; and we know that in the case of the Congo it was not a matter of outside aggression. We ask ourselves today whether it was because of the noble aims of the United Nations that that Organization intervened in the Congo, or whether it was in order to support certain Powers that wanted to keep their interests, to the detriment of the will of the Congolese people. Naturally, the case of Guinea must be compared to the case of the Congo.

We must state here another fact: a Belgian expert who is at present in Guinea, and who was taken prisoner by the first commandos of the Portuguese aggressors, has told us that he saw that those commandos were led not only by Portuguese, but by white Portuguese, and that he is ready to testify to that fact.

It is true that in these circumstances the Portuguese, who do not believe that a man is worthy of being a man, no matter what the colour of his skin, had taken the precaution of using make-up; they had dyed their skin a dark colour. The action which was perpetrated against President Ahmed Sekou Touré and against Cabral was therefore directed by white Portuguese, because they could not of course trust Portuguese of another colour to commit this crime against the independence of a country.

General Diané, who was in charge of commanding the troops that Guinea sent to the Congo when the events of the Congo required it, and who was later made Minister of Defence, was a prisoner during the events of 22 November at Camp Boiro. He was questioned arrogantly by the same white Portuguese officer who had triumphantly announced the death of the President of Guinea and the death of Cabral. General Diané later was able to escape, and we are lucky, because, otherwise, he would have been cynically liquidated by the commandos, who, between the hours of 2 in the morning and 6 in the morning, were totally in power at that camp, Camp Boiro.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

General Diané and several witnesses to that event are ready to make statements. Likewise, the Belgian expert of whom I spoke before is ready to make a statement. The Portuguese commandos had asked the Belgian expert whether he was ready to indicate which was the residence of Cabral and which was the residence of President Ahmed Sekou Touré; and so that he would trust them, they removed the dark paint that they had put on their faces so that he would know that it was a dialogue between whites. Of course, they had not understood the true sentiments and the true conscience of that Belgian expert.

We have also stated, through our Chief of State, and also in the statement made to the United Nations, that there was a naval unit in our territorial water, and that two warships were visible to everyone. This is just one more proof of the fact that this aggression was not organized by some Guinean malcontents, but by a Power which has such naval force at its disposal.

We believe that the United Nations, through your Mission, should be concerned with rehabilitating itself not only in the eyes of the Guineans, but also in the eyes of all African public opinion, because Africa in this case solidly believes that this is something which is happening to all of Africa. We believe that your Mission can help the United Nations in this task of rehabilitating itself by means of questioning the numerous Portuguese prisoners who were captured by the Guinean army. There are more than 100 of them. Not only they speak Portuguese, but they still have enough conscience to tell you where they were born and where they have been trained and on what date and at what precise time they left Bissau destined for Guinea. They can also state whose battleships those were that transported them, and of what nationality are all of the sailors who were in charge of that naval operation.

It would be ridiculous today to state these same arguments to the Guinean people, because that would simply be stressing something that is evident. In any case, the Guinean army is ready to give you an opportunity to question those numerous prisoners.

It is true that the number of aggressors who have been definitively eliminated is much larger than the number of prisoners. The Guinean people is proud of being a Member of the United Nations, and it is also proud of having

(Mr. Imael Touré)

given proof of the fact that it can stop any aggression, no matter where it comes from, which is aimed at reducing its dignity. One of the Portuguese prisoners captured by the Guinean army has already made statements without hesitation. He has explained how the two groups of 150 mercenaries each had been recruited, and by whom. He has indicated in what place they had had their intensive training in so-called Portuguese Guinea.

It is true that Portugal would challenge us and say that it is not in so-called Portuguese Guinea that those people were trained, but on Portuguese territory, because they go on stating, even today, that they have no colonial problem, and that the "African provinces" are an integral part of Portuguese territory.

We believe that the statement which I have mentioned by one of the prisoners, and which was also broadcast over the radio, could be exploited by your Mission, not only to convince yourselves of the aggression and of the identity of the aggressor, but also to give you an idea of the mechanism of the fact that the aggression had been prepared in advance -- had been premeditated. The commandos proudly announced their war-name, which is a whole programme and philosophy: namely, commandos of death. And that prisoner also told us about the salaries which those commandos had received; he told us the sums received by the commandos, most of whom were Portuguese, and also the amounts received by the Guineans who had been recruited as guides during the action.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

In the expedition there were, of course, Portuguese of all categories, according to that famous classification of Portuguese citizens which is based on the hateful and backward colonialist idea: white Portuguese who participated in the landing and in the taking of the military camps and strategic points but who immediately thereafter went back to their naval units once the camps had been considered as completely occupied by the aggressors; then those of the second category also were taken back to the naval units. Those of the second category are the first category of mestizos -- because, as you know, the mestizos are divided into several categories by the Portuguese -- and they left; only the Portuguese of the lowest category -- the black Portuguese -- remained in the camp.

That explains the goings and comings of the small vessels between the Guinean coast and the naval units that were further out. That plan could not go into effect exactly as it had been foreseen. Thus our army was able to eliminate and to capture one white officer and several officers of the second category -- of mestizos.

We wonder when the international Organization will understand that the future of the international community is at stake if it continues joining forces with a State such as Portugal. Of course, no one expects Portugal to admit its actions, but it would be encouraging, at least for African States, if the United Nations were able to recognize that the presence of Portugal in Africa is the equivalent of a permanent aggression.

We must also state that in 1969 there was a conspiracy against Guinea. That conspiracy which took place in April 1969 had as its main aim the Guinean army itself. The army had been infiltrated by those elements of the conspiracy, and those elements managed to convince a Colonel Kaman, who belonged to the military staff of Guinea.

That conspiracy was crushed by the people of Guinea, its party and its Government. At that time, since that was an internal threat, the Republic of Guinea did not appeal to the United Nations, but the danger was the same as we are facing today.

That colonel -- Colonel Kaman -- was so impudent as to send a letter to our Chief of State after he had been condemned to capital punishment for

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having been a traitor to his fatherland -- he was so impudent as to ask for mercy, stating that he would be most grateful to our Chief of State if he were allowed to travel to Guinea (Bissau). That letter exists in the archives of the President of the Republic, and can probably be shown to you. Naturally, in order to deceive the good faith of our Chief of State, he had given as a pretext the fact that he wanted to join the FAIGC on the territory of Guinea (Bissau).

One of the things that happened on 22 November, once the Portuguese had taken Camp Boiro, is that the white Portuguese officer who was questioning people there had as his first preoccupation finding out in what prison Kaman was kept. Every single witness who had been there can confirm this. They were clearly trying either to free Colonel Kaman if he was in the prison in Camp Boiro, or to go anywhere he might be. They asked everyone this question of where was this Colonel Kaman, and this explains to you the fact that the Portuguese are always in contact with those elements that may be hostile to the Guinean Government.

All the prisoners who were at Camp Boiro, who had been condemned because of the events of April 1969, were immediately freed by the Portuguese forces, and it was stated to them that from then on they would be free, since Cabral was dead, and President Ahmed Sekou Touré was dead.

Two of those prisoners were so naive as to believe the statement of the Portuguese officer, and they went so far as to take a car from the prison; they went to the palace in order to admire not only the remains of the palace, but also the spectacle of the end of the popular and democratic régime in Guinea; and, of course, they were stopped in front of the palace.

The armed aggression directed by Portugal had as its aim the elimination of the legally-constituted Government of the Republic of Guinea, and its replacement by government made up of people who could only be found in the prisons of the Republic of Guinea, such as Colonel Kaman.

This Mission has been informed of the fact that the trial of Colonel Kaman and of his accomplices was a popular trial, which took place in this People's Palace.

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The Portuguese, who, like all colonialists, have a short memory, believed that by their aggression they would be able to extend their rule to the Republic of Guinea, starting from Guinea (Bissau). They even asked one of the Guinean prisoners to show around the keys of the prisons in which they were found. The person who was asked to carry out that psychological act was taken prisoner, and the Guinean authorities may ask him to make a statement to your Mission.

The Portuguese Government is against President Ahmed Sékou Touré because he is the symbol of the unity of the Guinean people; he is the symbol of the democratic Guinean régime; he is the symbol of an action which the Guinean people have been able to carry out in order to show that it could put an end to the hateful colonial régime, and also because he is a symbol of the fact that the resistance of the people of Guinea is a victorious resistance to conspiracies, whether internal or external, against its independence and sovereignty in the struggle that the people of Guinea has been carrying out since 1958; also because he is among the African leaders who best embody the will of unity and independence of the continent.

He is also one of the leaders who fight in order to develop their own people and to see to it that the development of their people be only in the hands of the people themselves -- that it be the choice of the people.

We are convinced that to cast any doubt upon the fact that the aggression was perpetrated by Portugal would have as its result only that all of Africa would oppose anyone who might have cast such doubt. Naturally, Portugal is among those Governments that cannot tolerate the existence of a régime such as the Guinean régime at the borders of one of its possessions, as Portugal knows clearly that the revolutionary action carried out by the people of Guinea will result in the liberation of Guinea (Bissau).

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

The Guinean revolution can be proud of being at the origin of one of the resolutions of the United Nations that had the greatest consequences for the acceleration of the process of independence for the countries of Africa, the resolution that speaks of the acceleration of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. I am referring to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which is one of the initiatives of Guinea in the United Nations in order to permit the international Organization to fulfill its duty for the good of Africa.

Naturally, Guinea is not only engaged in a determined struggle for the Guinean people, but for all African peoples; and such a struggle cannot be liked by Portugal, which is not only in Guinea (Bissau) at the borders of our country, but also in other parts of Africa; and what Portugal does in these parts of Africa is tolerated by certain Powers -- I might say, not only tolerated, but sometimes supported by them.

The Portuguese aggression is not a problem to Guinea, or to Africa: it is a problem to the United Nations, because it may give Africa a precious indication of the sincerity of the United Nations in carrying out its aims.

Of course, Portugal finds allies in South Africa and elsewhere outside the continent, and their aim is clear: it is a matter of preventing Africa from being itself, and of continuing to exploit Africa, and, in so doing, to annihilate international solidarity and, thereby, international peace.

Yesterday, the Voice of the Revolution broadcast a release from our security services which listed the victims of the foreign aggression among the foreign residents -- among the residents who are citizens of other countries: three dead -- citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Democratic Republic of Germany, and Yugoslavia -- and eight wounded, also of known nationalities; and all the countries that had sustained losses because of the Portuguese aggression are represented to the Government of Guinea at the embassy level. All of the ambassadors concerned have reported to their countries the deaths or the serious injuries suffered by their

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fellow-citizens; and those ambassadors are perfectly well-informed of the conditions that made for those murders or serious injuries suffered by their fellow-citizens, and they are ready to make statements and present documents to your Mission.

The fact of all of these victims proves irrefutably the responsibility of Portugal as being the aggressor. In any case, the Government of Guinea has no occasion to present any excuse, in view of these bloody murders. It is true that we have been aggressed against together by the same aggressor, and that those ambassadors know it.

Among the dead there is a diplomat -- which cannot leave your Mission indifferent. Among the eight wounded there is also a diplomat. Among the wounded we are revolted by the fact that there is also a baby of one and a half years of age, who had received parts of gun shell -- shrapnel -- and wounds from a bazooka and a flame-thrower. This is proof of the fact that Portuguese colonialism kills blindly and cynically and that the problem is not only for Africa: it should be of concern to the whole international community. It has to do with the relationship that must exist, in accordance with the United Nations, among countries and peoples, if the international community is to have an acceptable human meaning.

Guinea is happy to have received from sister African countries that aid which it did not receive from the United Nations. The idea of solidarity has been verified in shining fashion, not only because of the unanimous support of all of Africa on the moral and political levels, but also on the concrete, military level.

We therefore have all that is needed to face Portuguese aggression. On the other hand, at this time, our military staff believes that it has eliminated all of the aggressors; and in the future, if there should be an appeal, we can tell you in advance that it will not be a desperate appeal; there will never be, on the part of the Guinean Government, an appeal based on the inability of the Guinean people to face its difficulties, no matter what the circumstances may be.

Our appeal to the United Nations should have been interpreted as an appeal in order to show solidarity among all the Member States that wish

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to face the exigencies of a lasting peace, which is possible only if there is a respect for the fundamental rights of all the Member countries, small or large.

Finally, the situation in Africa should be of concern to all continents.

Evidence of the Portuguese aggression exists. The diplomats have been concerned with this event in a general manner. Some of them have filmed the events. They have filmed the warships that sailed into our territorial waters. Those documents can be produced to your Mission.

We do not think that your Mission is interested in having as support a legal basis for proving the identity of the ships, or to have as basis documents of a legal nature to show that it was a Portuguese aggression that was perpetrated in premeditated fashion against the Republic of Guinea.

Even more, we are authorized to state to you that your judgement of the situation has little importance for Guinea and for Africa -- very little importance. But as a Member of the United Nations and as a country which is sincerely interested in international peace and security for all nations, Guinea must point out to the Mission that your judgement will be interesting because it will permit the people of Guinea and of Africa to see what is the interest of the international Organization in the keeping of peace and security.

(Mr. Ismael Touré)

To judge the international Organization means to place it in relation to the interests of Africa, in relation to the independence of Africa, to the development of Africa, and to the solidarity between Africa and the other continents. The Organization of African Unity has the intention of holding a special extraordinary session in order to judge this problem of the aggression perpetrated by Portugal, against Africa through its aggression against the Republic of Guinea. We sincerely hope that the United Nations will live up to its responsibilities and will take into account the evolution of the African continent and the evolution of African consciousness in the union of nations. The whole matter is in this point.

As to any kind of aid, we do not expect it from the United Nations. He who has vanquished the aggressor and who has eliminated, alone, that aggression, should not hesitate in proclaiming it. We are completely ready to help you to see to it that your Mission can help the United Nations so that it will have a certain meaning. It is a matter of serving the United Nations, making it understand that Africa has evolved; it is a matter of showing the burning reality that the vital existence of nations depends on putting an end to colonialism and imperialism, and that this struggle against colonialism and imperialism is inseparable from the struggle for peace.

In any case, Africa has understood that the love of peace should not be an empty word, and that he who loves peace should be ready for the supreme sacrifice; that the time has passed when the life of Africa could be governed from the outside. From now on, arguments will no longer be of a philosophical nature. If we must fight, even if it is only with knives, we are ready to fight in order to defend our freedom and our fundamental interests.

We want you to know, finally, that Guinea is united and has a feeling of solidarity behind its leader; that, not only is the Guinean revolution irreversible, but it is now in the order of things against which no one can do anything any more. If the Portuguese were to come back tomorrow, they would find the Guinean people ready to crush them.

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We wish you a system of inquiry -- since that is a word the United Nations likes -- that will take into account the Guinean realities and that will take into account dignity, too -- dignity, which is dear to the Guinean people -- and that it will take into account that when there is aggression in Africa Guinea shall never hesitate in raising its voice and shall never hesitate in a complete engagement. We can say this easily today because we had sent two battalions to the Congo, at a time when our country did not have even three battalions that were sufficiently equipped. And everywhere that Africa has been attacked in any form, Guinea has always been present -- and immediately.

In the case of the Portuguese aggression, it was because the Guinean people was ready and was fighting that Guinea could make an appeal to the international community to fulfil its duty on Guinean soil. The evidence will be put at your disposal, and we believe that this can be done very quickly, that we do not need a week for that. In a few hours we can have all these proofs. We do not wish that your stay should be prolonged in the seeking of evidence, and our feelings are intact as to African hospitality -- which means that, of course, we would be happy to have you here for weeks and months, if that could be done in order to speak about useful things. But we would oppose systematically any inquiry that would take more than twenty-four to forty-eight hours, because, to tell the truth, we have condemned on several occasions certain methods of the United Nations -- methods which sometimes were bureaucratic to an exaggerated extent, and which have often revolted the dignity of certain Member States on certain occasions. Those methods, from now on, will be unbearable to Guinea if they tend to show the United Nations as some sort of an executive board favouring the great Powers, and against the small Member nations.

Once more, we express our trust in you as Ambassadors of your respective countries -- as personalities involved in international problems, who are seeking understanding and friendship among peoples, and also, beyond all this, as men who are convinced of human solidarity and of the need to develop in solidarity respect for the dignity and worth of everyone in accordance with his own personality. It is these things that justify our presence in the

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United Nations, and you know them better than I do. That is the meaning to us of the trust that has been given to you by the international community through the Secretariat of the United Nations.

We thank you for your patience and for having listened to the point of view of the Guinean Government. Again we thank you very much for the kind words you have addressed to our President, our Government and our people; and through you we also wish to greet the international community, which is still the hope of all peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to thank Your Excellency on my own behalf, and on behalf of my colleagues here. Your Excellency very rightly paraphrased what His Excellency the President told us last evening; moreover, you have indicated the complete co-operation that you would be giving to this Mission. We do, of course, realize your frustration and disappointment at having a mission of "chair-borne" diplomats instead of air-borne troops.

Your Excellency being familiar with the United Nations -- and indeed your representative is present here today -- you know full well and realize that the United Nations does not have a peace-keeping force. Even if the United Nations had decided to send air-borne troops here with all speed and dispatch, it could not have arrived here yet.

I, as one of the co-sponsors of the resolution on the strength of which we are here with this Mandate, can assure Your Excellency and, through you, your Government and people that every effort has been made in the six or seven hours of deliberations and consultations to have a more strongly worded resolution adopted. But, as Your Excellency and your colleagues know full well, it was a race against time, and it is through a series of compromises that the Organization works.

We in the United Nations do realize the aims and aspirations of this very great continent of Africa; and it is not unknown to us that the last vestiges of colonialism are still not only present, but rampant in this part of the world. But however imperfect the United Nations may be, we consider that it is still the best possibility available.

We do have a feeling of encouragement at the very effective and decisive steps that have been taken by that great Organization of African Unity. It does give us reasons to be proud that this great emerging and renascent Africa would contribute not only to the greatness and dignity of Africa itself, but would be very beneficial to the world at large.

We, of course, have tried to make our humble contribution in the Apartheid Committee, and we are always seized of the colonial and imperialist problems, and we are even trying to tackle the neo-colonialist methods of the present time. But coming to this Mandate which we have, and with which we are in duty bound to comply, I can assure you that the Security Council, or the co-sponsors, or the members who supported it, cannot be accused of being indifferent or of complicity

(The Chairman)

in the aggression or the armed assault against this great country. Within the allotted time at our disposal, this course of action was the best way of bringing to bear the moral power of the United Nations.

This special Mission would not like to embarrass you or to put you in a difficult position, or, far less, to hurt you in your great sense of dignity. We should only like to fulfil the Mandate given to us by the Security Council. And the Security Council very clearly stated that there should be immediate action; and in your intervention you have very kindly indicated the documents or witnesses to be available. After this session I should like to consult my own colleagues and the members of your delegation to find out the order in which it would be convenient for you to produce them and for us to investigate or interrogate or to hear from them.

I might add a word of caution here: during the hearing of the witnesses, if I myself or any of my colleagues would like to probe further into their statements, it will not be because we do not have our own convictions or beliefs on the version given by Your Excellency or members of your delegation; but it will be remembering our task, which is to convince the 121 Members who are still in New York. So any effort made by us to shed more light on the subject will be done not as members of particular delegations -- I believe all of us here know the problem, and we have our own convictions -- but it will be done with the other 121 Members in mind. It is in that spirit that our proceedings will be carried on.

I must tell you, very frankly, that I was very impressed with the unity and solidarity shown in this crisis by the people of Guinea, by the reaction of the armed forces, and by the rallying of all leaders behind your very great President, Mr. Ahmed Sékou Touré. All of you leaders and the people and armed forces deserve our hearty congratulations.

Mr. Ismael TOURE (interpretation from French): And now, Your Excellencies, I am going to be very brief, out of courtesy and out of a spirit of practicality.

I have followed with great interest your statement, Mr. Chairman. I should like to make some comments, however, not addressing you as individuals, but rather addressing the Organization and the Mandate that you have received.

It is indeed taking as a point of departure your Mandate from the Organization that you have been able to state that the United Nations does not have a peace-keeping force. I would say that that is true, but that in some cases, there was the possibility of acting with very considerable armed forces in very short periods of time. On some occasions the United Nations was able to intervene militarily in order to stop aggression -- not with its own forces, but utilizing the military forces of some Member nations which were put at the disposal of the United Nations; and I am sure that if there had been a will, they would have found some countries -- African and outside of Africa -- ready to put military forces at the disposal of the United Nations, if that had been its will; because, of course, you have to want to do that in order to be able to do it -- in order to stop the aggression that was perpetrated against Guinea.

I see that there were some difficulties in putting military forces at your disposal rapidly. Everything is a matter of interpretation, however. I do not believe that the request by the Chief of State contained any date -- any time-limit of any kind. Of course, it is normal, as a reaction from a country which is being invaded by forces that it considers to be greatly superior, to request military assistance within a brief time-limit. It was therefore up to the United Nations in this case of armed aggression in Guinea to suggest a minimum time-limit.

That was not done.

What was probably more serious was the fact that it seemed that it was thought that a resolution adopted quickly could compensate us for not receiving troops which could not be sent quickly.

Of course, in the first days, acting quickly or not has consequences for the very existence of any State. It is obvious that a resolution adopted quickly and on the basis of compromise among the five members of the Security Council cannot be considered as an efficient solution to the problem created by armed aggression. If the people of Guinea had not resisted valiantly, your resolution would have been aimless, because it was a matter of coming to see the situation on the spot. In

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the meantime, before your arrival, the aggression could have fulfilled its aims.

Not to have thought of that was actually a betrayal of the duties of the United Nations.

I am addressing your Mandate and the United Nations -- not you as persons; and I would be betraying the mission I have received from my Chief of State if I did not express that in those terms. We in Guinea cannot consider this resolution as the best possibility available. The action of the Organization of African Unity can, it is true, be placed outside the framework of the international Organization, because, in order to act, the Organization of African Unity does not have to refer to the United Nations, nor to its own principles. The action of the Organization of African Unity was possible because its members were convinced, without an inquiry, of the fact that there was such an aggression and that it had been perpetrated by Portugal. If you read the messages of all the Chiefs of State of the Organization of African Unity, you will see that not one of them has cast any doubt on these truths.

I believe that I am expressing the idea of our Chief of State when we express doubts as to your Mandate. We do not express doubts as to your presence here.

You have spoken of unanimity -- that it is a matter of the unanimity of the Security Council. Well, that may make some delegations at the United Nations smile -- mainly the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America -- those who know what the right of veto represents, and the need for compromise among the five. Moral support is something which can have a great value, and we believe that the United Nations has not given us that moral support, because it is no longer a matter of recognizing or of accepting moral aid on behalf of the United Nations, because the United Nations did not mention the armed aggression, nor the aggressor, nor the request for military aid, which constitute the fundamental elements of the appeal made to the United Nations.

That moral support could have existed if, for instance, the United Nations had answered "We cannot give military forces because we do not have them" -- that would have been moral support -- or if the answer had been, "We cannot give the military forces that we would like to give within the time-limit which we have".

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But neither one of those answers was given. It was thought that Africa had remained sufficiently naive to accept being fed with the United Nations resolutions which only displaced the problem.

Your Excellencies know full well all the resolutions voted on by the United Nations. What is certain is the fact that you cannot submit to the "big five", who enjoy the right of veto, any draft resolution which is not to their liking; and that, in any case, in certain instances of flagrant aggression such as have been recorded in Asia, Africa and in Latin America, carried out by certain great Powers which are considered in the United Nations as being important for international security, no resolution has been adopted.

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We therefore have to maintain all our reservations and all our disappointment at the principle of such a mandate which tries to substitute an inquiry for military assistance, thereby placing the country that has received the aggression in an uncomfortable and unjustifiable position in relation to the aggressor, in front of the international community. And when we speak now of moral support, that acquires an almost tragic nature, because what could have happened in that case would have been that we would have developed the will to give moral support not to an existing State, but to a State which no longer exists -- a State which had already been annihilated. That would have been no joke, and we are touching the heart of the problem here, as far as Africa is concerned.

For all these considerations, our delegation has been limited in the time that can be given to fact-finding, because we know that in a few hours we can inform people -- highly responsible people both at the national and international level. In any case, it is not really a problem of time, because the time available would be sufficient for some fact-finding; the problem is really that the international Organization has kept silent before the reality of the aggression committed against us, and, in addition, it has seemed to doubt our good faith. Such an institution, therefore, has no right to information on our part, because the international community is based upon a minimum of reciprocal respect and reciprocal trust.

Furthermore, Excellencies, I should like to say to you that all those who are on our side of the table have had certain experience with the United Nations. Therefore, when you spoke of the fact that you have to convince the other 121 remaining Members, that means they had some doubts and were tempted to interrupt you because they knew that this did not reflect reality at the United Nations.

We know also when the five permanent members adopt a draft resolution in the Security Council they cannot pretend to be reflecting the opinion of all 122 Members. It may be that in some cases the opinion of the 122 Members is reflected by the adoption of a draft resolution in the Security Council. That happens when the draft resolution does not

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affect the vital interests of one of the five permanent members, but it is not desirable to interpret the unanimity of the five as reflecting the unanimity of the 122.

Those are the comments we wanted to make, and we are authorized to state that the Guinean delegation is at your disposal to give you whatever information you may want, today and perhaps continuing tomorrow, with the conviction that it will thus have served the cause of truth.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Your Excellency. We understand your interpretation, and I appreciate the experience of leaders who know the working procedures of the United Nations. You understand our own limited Mandate, too.

Therefore, before we disperse, I should like to thank you again and to say that we are prepared not to waste a minute, and that we shall also be at your disposal. We would appreciate whatever material, or witnesses or personnel you might care to present to us. Our task is to report our findings. That in itself is of a filtering nature, and based on our findings further decisions may be taken later by the United Nations Security Council.

Mr. Ismael TOURE (interpretation from French): Before we adjourn the meeting, I should like to ask you to present to us your plan of work so that that work can be done this afternoon and tomorrow, finishing it by 12 o'clock noon tomorrow; and I also should like to add that if you would like to put Guineans at ease -- and I would even say that if you would like to find enthusiasm among them -- I would recommend very kindly and courteously that you do not hesitate in pronouncing the word, "Portugal". That can be done here. You can, of course, repeat what we say, attributing to us the paternity of this statement -- that Portugal is the aggressor, in our view.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, your Excellencies. We shall consult among ourselves and let you know our programme.

There is one more point I should like to make before we disperse. It is the following: by operative paragraph 1 of resolution 289 (1970) the Security Council:

"Demands the immediate cessation of the armed attack against the Republic of Guinea;"

and, in operative paragraph 2:

"Demands the immediate withdrawal of all external armed forces and mercenaries together with the military equipment used in the armed attack against the territory of the Republic of Guinea."

My idea in pointing this out is to have some light thrown on what the Council has done in this respect.

Mr. Ismael TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes, I can tell you that I know the Security Council, and that I am of course aware of these matters. I am thankful to you for having reread to us a part of the text of that resolution, and we are willing to believe that if, when they speak of armed forces without going to the bottom of it, and without citing Portugal, that that was done because of a deep hatred for Portugal.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

Second meeting, held at the Palais du peuple, Conakry,
on Thursday, 26 November 1970, at 4.30 p.m.

Persons heard:

Mr. Damantang Camara, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Guinea

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Your Excellencies, we apologize sincerely for the time we have had you waste before beginning this meeting. We were looking at the programme you had prepared.

We have just been informed that all the prisoners have been evacuated to Kindia, which is 150 kilometres from here. We have been making telephone calls so that we could begin the questioning this afternoon. We had expected to have the prisoners here for this afternoon; but in view of the difficulty involved we shall have to leave that for tomorrow, when we will go together to Kindia and question the prisoners there. That will be somewhat troublesome, but I guarantee that the highway is good.

Therefore, what we have decided for this afternoon can be summarized as follows: we shall visit the places that have been destroyed, beginning with Camp Samory. Then we shall go to Camp Boiro; then to the summer villa of the President of the Republic, where the mercenaries thought he was sleeping, and you will be able to see the building that was destroyed by fire; and we can finish that tour with the headquarters of the PAIGC, where there was also numerous damage. We can take advantage of our presence there and listen to the members of PAIGC, in accordance with the request you have submitted.

On the other hand, we are making arrangements so that all members of the diplomatic corps who want to meet with you can come tomorrow to do so. We have not yet set the exact time, but perhaps what we could do is begin with the ambassadors, and as soon as we are through hearing them we will take the highway to Kindia, where perhaps we shall have lunch. In this manner we would finish our work at Kindia.

In addition, we are making arrangements so that the photographs can be submitted to you, together with samples of the captured weapons, as well as some recorded tapes of the testimony of witnesses, including the diplomats.

General Diané has been informed and we are going to meet him at Camp Boiro in a while, and you can hear him today.

(Mr. Damantang Camara)

The dean of the diplomatic corps has already been informed by us. He is going to inform his colleagues so they can make arrangements for tomorrow morning so that the diplomats may come if they wish. Those who are kind enough to reply to our appeal will be put in contact with you.

We can go now.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.

Third meeting, held at Camp Samory, Conakry, Thursday,
26 November 1970, at 4.45 p.m.

Persons heard:

Captain Traore Diarra, Guinean Army

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN TRAORE DIARRA

Captain DIARRA (interpretation from French): On Sunday, 22 November, at 2.30 a.m., I had just come back from a patrol. I had inspected the support points where our men were located. At 2.30 I came home. Just as I was getting dressed we heard firearms in the direction of the harbour. I immediately got dressed again and rushed downstairs. There I met a sentry who told me that he had heard shots from the direction of the Presidential palace, and that he thought the Presidential palace had been attacked; and he said: "We must go immediately".

I went to get dressed completely. I put my shoes on and I took my weapons, and came down immediately.

The commander in charge of the camp had already ordered the alert to be sounded, and all the soldiers started moving. I reached the ammunition store, where I found the commander distributing arms and ammunition to the men.

At 3.05 two trucks full of soldiers were going towards the harbour, so we rushed in the direction of the port. At the outer gate I met a customs official, who told me that the harbour had been occupied by the enemy, and that two people wounded seriously had already been transported to our clinic in the camp. We continued as far as the port, and there were already some people there. We ran towards the boats -- at the military dock -- and we saw that all of our boats were full of bullet holes.

Four nationalist military men were wounded; one was already dead; two had had their throats slashed; one had been scalped and had fallen into the water. I asked how that had happened, and the person in charge told me that Conakry had been attacked. He had seen three naval vessels with white people on board, and he thought they were Portuguese. They were small boats that went in among our boats and came to shoot against us. After they had shot at the harbour, those boats left. One went in the direction of the radio broadcasting building, and the other went towards the Presidential palace, eastward. The third boat went away straight.

(Captain Diarra)

When they were no longer in an exposed position, they started shooting from all sides. As soon as the men had finished reporting, shots were heard from all sides, and I gave the order to all the comrades who were near me to take the combat position. The reinforcements that came from our camp towards the harbour went in the direction of the information building; another group went eastward towards the A.P.T. depot. When I wanted to leave that position to come to the camp in order to obtain the rest of the reinforcements I met our Minister of the Interior, who took me with him. I was with another lieutenant, and he asked me not to leave the harbour, and he said that we had to stay together in order to co-ordinate our action.

The Portuguese, having taken advantage of the fact that all the soldiers had left the camp in the direction of the harbour, had certainly already disembarked behind our camp -- that is, it was an act of diversion. They wanted us to look in one direction, and when they saw that most of the people had gone in that direction, then they came into the camp. Thus they came inside the camp and killed everyone they met. They began with the police post, which you passed on your way in. The men who were guarding it were -- as soon as they came in, they started shooting everyone, and they took their position at the police post; they took a position at our gasoline supply place, and also in our Ministry.

The elements that remained there were under the command of Colonel Keita Namouri -- because they had already wounded the commander of the camp, the assistant chief of the military staff -- so the captain in charge of the navy came towards the harbour, and he was also shot at. Colonel Keita Namouri and Colonel Diallo Louis were able to regroup the few men they still had, and they made an involved manoeuvre, but their position was weak in relation to the position of the enemy, who had occupied the camp, because they occupied the building which is there and which is a strategic point, from which they could shoot at everyone.

The struggle lasted from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. At 7 a.m. I wanted to come into the camp to look for ammunition, because we had run out of it at the harbour. I didn't know what the situation was like in the camp after I left.

(Captain Diarra)

As soon as I got to the gate they shot at me. It was my luck that I escaped. I was with two other officers, and we ran out of the car and hid behind the houses. From there we observed the camp, and we saw the corpses of our comrades in front of the gate. Nevertheless, we managed to get towards the back, where a jeep was standing, and we went to get reinforcements in order to liberate our camp.

The struggle went on from 0900 to 1630 hours. At 1630 hours, thanks to the concentration of tanks, the machine-guns on wheels, and the reinforcements who had come from Camp Alphayaya, Camp Samory was re-taken from the hands of the aggressors. Thus our men re-took the positions that had been occupied by the aggressors.

The combat was very hard, and thus, as you go out you will be able to see how much in the camp has been demolished by them. They demolished our ministry almost entirely, because they had chosen the ministry as the command post. All the offices were searched and destroyed; the vehicles were attacked; our petrol supply was set afire; and we found more than thirty dead here. But we were able to capture and kill the aggressors. We killed seventeen, and captured thirteen. Beginning on the 23rd, up till today, we have been in complete control of the situation in Camp Samory and all the other control points around it.

(Captain Diarra)

As to the information building -- the broadcast house -- the attack there was also very hard, because there they had landed most of their forces. They wanted, at all costs, to seize our radio station. At that information building the attack was very hard, as I say, because they wanted to seize our radio station. We pushed them back, and there we counted about fifteen dead, among whom there were three whites. But since they had come by boat -- since the invaders were on board the boats -- those who died died on the boats; and in the water we saw three white men who had been shot.

That's what happened on the 22nd and 23rd, a time during which we were the object of an aggression.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to thank you for that detailed account; and I must say that I am impressed with the instant reaction, which you have described so efficiently. I do not have any questions; perhaps my colleagues have.

Mr. MWAANGA: Captain, is it possible to say how many troops were involved on the enemy side?

Captain DIARRA (interpretation from French): On the enemy side I can't tell you the exact number, but we know that they came in great strength.

By the way, I almost forgot to tell you: on Sunday we had in front of our harbour more than six frigates, and they were no farther out than two kilometres, because we could see them with the naked eye; and from those frigates the other, fast boats were coming towards the shore. All I know is that they were sufficiently numerous.

Mr. MWAANGA: That is all I wanted to ask.

Captain DIARRA (interpretation from French): If there are no further questions we can visit the damage caused by the attack.

The Special Mission was thereupon escorted around the camp in order to inspect the destruction and damage.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your co-operation.

The hearing rose at 5.45 p.m.

Fourth meeting, held at Camp Boiro Mamadou, Conakry,
Thursday, 26 November 1970, at 6 p.m.

Persons heard:

General Lansana Diané, Guinean Army
Commander Mamadou Oulare, Guinean Army
Captain Mamadou Condé, Guinean Army
Mr. Lucien Mensah, Togolese national

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL LANSANA DIANE

General DIANE (interpretation from French): I was arrested here at about 3 in the morning. I had left my home after I heard some gunshots. I was called on the phone by the First Secretary of the Party of Conakry. I took my car and went directly to the Presidential palace. There I saw the police and I asked: "Did you hear gunshots?" And they said: "Yes, we heard gunshots and firecrackers". I said: "Did you report immediately to the President?" They said: "No". I said: "Wake him up".

They woke him up. Before he came to the window, we heard more rifle shots and shots that sounded like cannon or bazooka next to the harbour. The President was at the window. I said: "There is shooting; there are cannon shots; we don't their origin. I am going to verify it immediately". So I left.

Since I live in this direction, on the way back I came via the camp. When I arrived at the camp my reaction was to ask the commander of the camp what was happening. At that time there was a jeep stopped in front of the entrance, preventing my entry. I didn't pay attention; I went slower, and went in with my car. As soon as the front of my car had come through the gate I saw the machine-guns pointed at me. I didn't expect anything like that. I said: "You're imbeciles. What's going on? Where is Lieutenant Souaka?" And they took my jacket and my trousers off. I could not understand what they were saying: they were speaking Portuguese.

Then they sat me down here, and they detained the driver who was with me. They asked me who I was. There was one white Portuguese who was asking them to question me. There were two of them. There was one who died during the attack. When one officer came in through the door they shot at him; he shot at the defenders, and the first white man died; and his jeep was stopped here. There was also another soldier here. They had some whiskey bottles and they were drinking from the bottle itself, and they were shouting their joy; and sometimes, after they took a drink they would pour the whiskey on their heads, and wash with it.

(General Diané)

They brutalized me, but I was lucky because they did not establish my identity too quickly. It was some time before they found out who I was. They had to free the prisoners in order to find out who I was -- that I was a Minister in the Government.

At that time they brought me back here, because we had gone in the other direction with all the prisoners. They gave me a blow here, on my side. After four days I could still not get up. Finally they finished the questioning.

The white men had a broadcasting apparatus -- there were two of them. The one whose name was Camara was the one who brutalized me. At a certain moment a white man who was here spoke to another European whom they had arrested, and whom we know. He too was going by, and they stopped his car. They were questioning him. There were two of them. They let one go, and the other one stayed. There is one soldier who knows him. We can ask that soldier to come here.

Another officer came with his jeep to see what was going on in town. When he came to the gate he wanted to go back. The driver wanted to turn around, and his chief who was with him said: "No, no -- quickly". And they shot him and killed him. It was the camp commander.

Afterwards, they said: "Free the political prisoners". They asked: "Where?" "Here".

They wanted to know where the underground passages were where we kept the political prisoners. Nobody knew, really -- first of all, because they don't exist; there is no such thing. But they thought they existed. The only prisoners we had they freed. But the fact that they looked for that was a good thing for us. At a certain time they had some information that the house of the President had been set on fire and that the President was dead. The one who was here was saying to me that they were angry with Sékou Touré because he had lost all his relatives in Portuguese Guinea after the attacks by Cabral, and they wanted revenge. There is only one left of his family, and that is himself; and that was said to me by the man who gave me this blow here (indicating) He was using a name which was not his own -- it was probably not his true name. He spoke Portuguese.

(General Diané)

When they found out about President Sékou Touré -- that he was "dead" -- and that the Minister of Defence had been captured, they would say to the people -- to the Guineans -- "You're nothing here; the laws are arbitrary; Sekou Touré is no good; why don't you rebel?"

And somebody said: "I know where the political prisoners are", and they freed them. And afterwards they were happy. The President was "dead", the Minister was seized; they were exulting; there were gunshots everywhere, and they said: "It's all over; the régime of Sékou Touré is dead".

There was one of them next to me, and I said to him: "Be careful; we will catch you again, one by one. A régime does not die like that". But they freed everybody; they told them to go to the city. And me -- they took me and they put me in one of the cells, from which I was able to free myself. I went through the roof, and I jumped over the wall. That's how things happened.

(General Diané)

All of the military personnel who were here -- who were armed -- they would shoot for any reason; and they said they were Portuguese from Bissau. They were against Sékou Touré, and against Cabral.

They finally found out that I was Minister for Defence, and they wanted to kill me; but they were feeling so much that they had won the game that they were not very prudent, because they let everybody go. They went out of there with the keys of the prison in order to go around and to show the keys to everyone and say that the régime of Sékou Touré, that everything was over, and that there would be no more political prisoners; the political prisoners had been released.

The CHAIRMAN: Were you taken by surprise by the whole thing?

General DIANE (interpretation from French): Yes, it was a surprise.

The CHAIRMAN: And you considered that it was a piece of luck that you were not being shot at?

General DIANE (interpretation from French): It was not by luck. How shall I say it? They committed successive mistakes. That is my luck -- a series of mistakes.

The CHAIRMAN: Such as what?

General DIANE (interpretation from French): As soon as I was caught I was able to throw away my papers before they had searched me; then they said: "Who are you?" I said: "I am a professor -- a teacher". Then they got out the last letter that I had, and it said: "Dear Diané". Then they said: "Well, here it says 'Dear Diané'. That's you; you're lying", they said. And I said: "It's for my master".

So they established my true identity only when the political prisoners had been freed. That is what happened. When they had established that

(General Diané)

they were even more convinced of their victory, because they were telling people: "Sékou Touré is dead; Cabral is dead". They believed that after they killed Count Hauzer whom they took to be Cabral. And they were saying: "Cabral is dead; Sékou Touré; the Minister is caught, so we can put him into prison". And they led me to a cell and shut me in, and an hour or two later I was able to free myself.

When I freed myself they were with their backs toward me, and I was able to run away. They were very drunk, because all of them had flasks of gin or whiskey, and they went right on drinking; they were drinking all the time. Sometimes they would kill without really wanting to kill. I decided that they must have been under the effects of drugs, and they were drinking constantly. And they would shoot for no reason whatsoever.

They had their transmitters and from all points where they had landed they would inform each others; they would tell each other about their progress. In their behaviour they committed many mistakes. They killed many civilians gratuitously -- for nothing. It was only out of stupidity that they didn't kill me, really. They were drunk; they didn't know what they were doing. They could not kill me. I myself don't know why they didn't kill me; I don't know, because everything was ready for me to die.

I was even ashamed for them, because their chief, a white, when the second car was taking after me, with two whites -- the white chief was very respectful towards them. He said hello to them; he greeted them with respect. They went on talking for half an hour or an hour, while they were brutalizing me with a savagery that I had never seen before. It was my own brother brutalizing me -- whether he was from Portugal or not, he was an African -- with a savagery whose parallel I have never seen anywhere else; whereas the white man was respecting the others.

At one point he was going to shoot, when another one came in and said: "Wait a while".

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

The witness withdrew.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Commander, do you have anything to say?

TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER MAMADOU OULARE

Mr. OULARE (interpretation from French): At about 2.30 in the morning they came to wake me up -- there were four of them. They said: "Come without weapons". I came out.

As soon as I came out they said: "Don't shoot; otherwise we'll kill you and your family".

When I got down to the ground floor they shot -- I heard shots -- but I think it was just to intimidate me. Then one of them asked: "Are you Oulare?" I said: "Yes, I'm Oulare", and he took me from behind and he gave me a blow with his rifle butt, and he said: "Show me the key to the cells of the prisoners". I said: "I don't have the keys", and one of them said: "If you hold your life dear, give me the keys". I swore to him that I didn't have the keys; I said: "The keys are inside the prison with the guards", and he started shooting again, around me.

He said: "Let's go to the cell anyway". We went. I found four more there in a ditch. They were pushing me, and when we arrived in front of the door they said: "Give orders to open the door". I tried to make them understand; I said: "Even if I give the orders they will not open; I am not their chief". But they said: "You must give the orders anyway". So I said to my comrades: "This is Oulare; please open up". I said it three times. My comrades did not want to open; and the other ones said that if the door was not opened they would kill me. I told them that I had no way of opening the door; and we just stayed like that.

(Mr. Oulare)

Then they said: "Do you someone who has the keys?" Well, they had a stool-pigeon who was in our prison here, and he gave the name of our comrade Mamadou Fofana. They made him come; they went to get him, and he met me in front of the door, and they told us to have the door open. We lost about an hour in front of the door. I told him: "Let's not waste our time here; come with me; I will show you the true chief". Thus we came in this direction, and when we were in front of the door there were white men in command, and he told them that it was not prudent to go out with them, because the chief lived outside the camp. They made me sit down.

At the time I was going by I saw them shoot one of my comrades, but he was not completely dead -- he was still shouting -- and I asked them: "May I take him to the clinic, which is next-door?", and he shot again next to me, and one of them came with his knife and put it to my neck. He said: "If you speak now I am going to kill you like a chicken". So I left my comrade there.

When they came here they shot another one. When they came inside the camp they began by going around the camp and shooting anybody who would come out. Anybody coming out would get it in his head. When we came to the gate I saw the bodies of three comrades. Their jeep is here. That jeep was filled with bullets. The wheels and also the engine show traces of bullets. There were two lieutenants in the jeep; both of them were killed by the bullets because they came in without noticing what was going on. Thus when the prisoners came they denounced me. They said: "He's one of the chiefs," and they called me by my name; they made me sit down here with General Diané. One of them said to me: "We'll take care of you later," and another one who came, asked me: "Do you know a certain Mamadou Condé?" I said: "I don't know that person". Then he said: "Sit down; we'll see you later".

Sometime later, they told the prisoners: "You may go; you're freed".

At that point I turned to the meanest of them, Bangoura -- I called him and said: "I'm going to say something to you". I took him through the doorway and I said to him: "I want to say something -- and this is very important". So we stopped under a small tree, and after some time his chief,

(Mr. Oulare)

the white one, called me in and he allowed me to stay there without being at attention, because he had been drinking. As soon as his back was turned to us -- because anybody who would run away would be killed without pity -- so as soon as his back was turned I stepped backwards. The prisoners were going out. I went among them till I got outside; and as soon as I was outside I ran away -- I went running out into this section of town.

They went back to my home to look for me. My family had already run away over the wall -- over the back wall. Since they didn't see me, they searched the house and left it in disarray, and I have not put it back in order; it is still as it was left by them.

They said they had come to free us, while what they wanted to do here was to kill President Sékou Touré; they had come to look for him. That's why Camara and Bangoura did not stop using the name of the President.

That's all I know of this affair.

The witness withdrew.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN MAMADOU CONDE

Captain CONDE (interpretation from French): My name is Captain Mamadou Condé; I am in charge of the paramilitary corps.

At about a quarter to three in the morning I was in bed at home. I was awakened by gunshots coming from everywhere. I got up immediately and got dressed and went towards the police post. On the way, I had already heard: "We are tired of the Sékou Touré régime; we have come to restore freedom".

Along the way I was stopped by a policeman, who said that the whole camp was occupied.

Since I was convinced that the principle of the people in arms was already a reality in Guinea, I jumped the wall in order to organize the counter-attack with the people's forces. Thus the next day, with the help of the civil service and the popular militia and the agents of the guard and the police who live in the city of Madina, we counter-attacked in order to free the camp. Thus they were pushed towards the sea. They left many corpses on the ground, and we also took some prisoners.

That is all I have to state.

The CHAIRMAN: Can you tell us how many you killed?

Captain CONDE (interpretation from French): When we started the counter-attack here, we killed three at the police post. The others fled towards the sea, where they were pursued. In the meantime, I was touched by a bullet in my thigh. I was hospitalized afterwards.

My comrades who remained continued the combat after me, and they told me later that, in all, there were fourteen or fifteen who remained on the ground.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

The witness withdrew.

TESTIMONY OF LUCIEN MENSAH

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): State your name.

Mr. MENSAH (interpretation from French): My name is Lucien Mensah; I am Togolese; I came to see a brother and I am being kept at the camp in order to verify my identity.

I spent the night at the police post there. It was about two in the morning. I heard shots over my head as I was sleeping there. I got up and at the time I got up there was the switchboard operator who was also there, and he came to the stairs. I wanted to ask him what was going on, but before I could, he was shot. I was covered with blood, and I ran. I went inside the telephone booth, where there was the under-officer who was permanently there. He had a gun; he wanted to shoot. I said: "Don't try, because otherwise we will be killed, both of us".

Some time afterwards, two of them came to the door. They asked: "Is there someone here?" We did not answer. They machine-gunned the room and the roof. Then the roof fell on us and the lights went out. They withdrew.

We tried to follow them, and we heard them ask two people: "Do you know where the political prison is?" The guard said: "I don't know". They started to beat him a little, and he said: "It's over there, but I don't have the key"; so they said to him: "Push the door down". Then they said to the prisoners: "Come out", but they didn't want to come out.

They finally did come out, and when they did the others asked them: "Who knows where the special section for prisoners is?" One of the prisoners said: "I know, and I will take you there".

We were there, and they continued shooting until the morning. In the morning they came, after I had left, to look in the debris of the building. They brought me here with the prisoners and they said there were 30,000 of them who had landed. They said: "We have twenty-three warships, and we

(Mr. Mensah)

have seized everyone, including the President"; and they told us: "You who are prisoners are free; you may go away". But I myself was afraid, because there was too much shooting in the streets, and I remained in the camp.

At about 2 p.m. there was a counter-attack, and they evacuated us towards the hospital.

That is all.

The witness withdrew.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

Fifth meeting, held at PAIGC Headquarters, Conakry, on
Thursday, 26 November 1970, at 6.55 p.m.

Persons heard:

Mr. Aristides Pereira, member of the Political Bureau of PAIGC

TESTIMONY OF ARISTIDES PEREIRA

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): My name is Aristides Pereira; I am a member of the Political Bureau of PAIGC.

I would like to say to the Mission that on the night of 22 November -- or perhaps it would be better to say around two or three in the morning -- there was a guard here in the office, and the guard was taken by surprise by groups that had landed at the beach, which is down below; and what was even more surprising to the guard was to hear people speaking Portuguese. When the guard asked: "Who are you? What are you doing here?" they did not answer. After that they began shooting. The guard was convinced that they were mercenaries who had just landed.

The same thing happened at the port: there were some of our comrades there who were in a boat, and they saw a small boat approaching. Someone from that boat that was approaching went into the other boat, and that man spoke to the other man in Portuguese; and he said, in Portuguese: "We must board that boat". He said: "Go on quickly" -- in Portuguese. They were convinced that their comrades did not know about this. But when they saw them, they started fighting against them.

That was the first demonstration that they were Portuguese, because they always spoke Portuguese. After that, the combats took place both here and at the harbour. We were able to see some of the Europeans who were at the head of the troops, who, after the response from our comrades, were the first to go back on board.

We were able to take some weapons -- which are weapons that are utilized by the Portuguese -- G-3 pistol machine-guns -- and we gave today to the Guinean authorities a bazooka rocket which was shot into one of these houses, but which luckily did not explode.

You will be able to see and you will have an opportunity to examine the rocket and all the inscriptions and the instructions on the rocket, which are in Portuguese.

(Mr. Pereira)

In addition to that, we have the services of a radio receiver, and we were able to hear the inter-communication between the groups that were on the land and the boats at sea, in Portuguese; we have recorded that.

I think those are all the facts I could give you that show that they were Portuguese.

If you have any questions I am ready to answer them.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you played your recording? You said you had recorded those conversations.

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French). When?

The CHAIRMAN: After having recorded them.

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): We can give a copy of the tape to the Mission.

The CHAIRMAN: That is excellent. I just wanted to know very briefly what it was all about -- the conversation or dialogue that is recorded on the tape.

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French). It is the dialogue of military operations from the command post, which was the ship, and the small groups that were on land. They were on land; they were asking: "Should we send boats? Are there people there?" and they reported what was going on.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Was the dialogue in Portuguese?

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): Yes, we can hear the difference between Portuguese as it is spoken in our land and the Portuguese of Lisbon, and this was truly Lisbon Portuguese.

Mr. ESPINOSA (interpretation from French): Would you be good enough to tell us where you are from?

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): I am from the Cabo Verde Islands.

Mr. MWAANGA: You said you were involved in combat here. Is it possible for you to give us a very rough indication of whether some of your people were killed; and, if so, how many?

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): Here we have had no dead -- only wounded. One of them is in hospital; another was slightly wounded. At the harbour we had three dead.

Mr. MWAANGA: What about the other side -- the enemy?

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): They had two dead here, and we figure about twenty wounded.

Mr. MWAANGA: But none of them were captured?

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): At the harbour we captured three. They were handed over to the Guinean authorities.

You can see here what damage was caused in all of these houses -- at least six houses.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Can we listen to the tape?

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): We will make two copies for tomorrow morning.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): The rocket with the instructions has been given to the police station. That is more important, because it has some writing on it in Portuguese. Tomorrow the tapes will be at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. MWAANGA: I just wanted to ask you one final question. I am assuming that they were able to talk to the people who were captured before they handed them over to the authorities. Is that correct?

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): We spoke a little, but it was not really a conversation; it was not questioning. I myself have not spoken to them. It was the combattants -- the fighters -- who were in the place.

And tomorrow we can get those people -- those comrades -- those who seized them themselves.

If the Mission so wishes, you could tell us now so that we could take the necessary measures.

Mr. MWAANGA. The question I was going to ask was really this: If they had talked to them, what did these people say they were doing here? Why were they here?

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): Those questions were put to them by the fighters.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): The fighters themselves can tell the Mission.

Mr. MWAANGA: I will reserve my question, then, until tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to thank you for your co-operation. The tape you have promised to give us should be very significant.

Mr. PEREIRA (interpretation from French): It is our duty.

The hearing rose at 7.15 p.m.

Sixth meeting, held at the Hotel Gbessia, Conakry, on
Thursday, 26 November 1970, at 8 p.m.

Persons heard:

Mr. Michel Lange, Belgian national and teacher at Polytechnic
Institute at Conakry

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Your Excellencies, we shall continue the hearings. We are going to listen to the Belgian teacher of whom we spoke to you before. He was an eye-witness to the events.

Please state your name.

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): I am a Belgian national; my name is Michel Lange, and I am a teacher of chemistry at the Polytechnic Institute of Conakry, here in the Republic of Guinea.

The CHAIRMAN: We should be very grateful if you would describe what you have seen as regards the incidents that happened on 22 November 1970.

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): On Sunday morning at 3.30, I was awakened by cannon shots. I got dressed quickly, and I went out towards the bar which is in front of my house. There I met the manager of the bar, and the night watchman. We asked each other questions; we were asking ourselves what had happened.

Not knowing what was happening, I left the bar and went slowly towards the beach. Further down from the bar I saw that the Bellevue villa was on fire.

I went back to the bar to tell the manager, and then the second time I went down all the way to the beach.

At the beach I saw shadows. I hid, but some military personnel came to look for me. They took me with them, and they compelled me to lie down on the sand. They asked for my name, my nationality and my profession. I answered them, and then I asked them questions. I asked them who they were, why they were there and what they came here to do. And these are the data that I have gathered:

They stated that they were mercenaries preparing a coup d'état in Guinea. The aim of the expedition was to kill Mr. Cabral, but they told me they had not found him; after which they said they had killed the President, who was asleep at the Bellevue villa.

(Mr. Lange)

They stated to me that this attempted coup d'état -- and they used those words "coup d'état" -- was carried out on behalf of a Guinean general who was living in France. As to who they were, they told me they were mercenaries, and they said that some of them were Italian, some Spanish, and some Senegalese. I was surprised to see that all of them were black. At that moment, with his finger he touched his own face, and then my arm, which left a black mark on my arm. Then I rubbed another one's arm and there was no trace from him. I came to the conclusion that there were certainly some Africans, as well as some people in disguise.

They told me that there were at sea three boats, and that near the beach there were from seven to eight other boats. They were motorboats.

I received the best explanations from one of them, who had studied at the University of Louvain, in Belgium.

They were wearing military uniforms -- I believe they were green. They were not wearing helmets, but cloth hats with drooping brims.

As to their weapons, I saw some pistol machine-guns, which they told me were of Czech manufacture. But, in fact, they are the same weapons as those of the Guinean army -- that is to say, they are pistol machine-guns of Soviet manufacture. I also saw one bazooka and several small transmitter-receivers.

A voice was constantly coming out of those transmitter-receivers, and they themselves, from time to time, would transmit messages. I was there at 4 a.m., approximately. At about 5 or 5.30 -- I'm not sure: I had no watch -- I saw a group of persons coming from the direction of the Bellevue villa. Among that group I saw some people -- I thought it was an illusion -- some people wearing swimming trunks or briefs. At that time I thought it was an illusion, but later I learned that the Portuguese prisoners had escaped from the Boiro prison.

Then that group, made up of men wearing briefs, and of military men, got into the boats and then went away to sea. It was dark, but I believe there were about fifty to sixty people.

(Mr. Lange)

At about 6.00 or 6.15 the people next to me got up and gave me back the keys of my lodging and let me go away, and they themselves went to sea in the other boats. At that time I came back in order to tell the members of the committee, after which I was asked to go to the palace of the President of the Republic in order to tell him what I had seen.

The impression that those people left on me in my mind is that they were very sure of themselves, because they were making lots of noise.

I believe that is all I remember.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Could you tell us in what language you were speaking with those persons?

Mr. LANGE: They obviously spoke Portuguese. I identified their language from the "sh" sound which is found in their sentences, and also by certain words they had pronounced -- for instance, the word "mercenarios". At one point I asked for a cigarette, and they said: "nao pode fumar" -- you can't smoke -- in Portuguese. In order to speak to them I spoke mainly by sign language, but the military man who had studied at Leuven was able to explain to me more correctly.

Mr. JAKOBSON: In French?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: You said that your guess in the dark was that there were about fifty or sixty people in that motor boat. Did that estimate include the prisoners who had escaped? How many of them do you think were prisoners, and how many were people who had come from the sea?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): I can't tell you, because I was not careful to look at those things, because I thought it was an illusion. Afterwards I understood, but at that time I thought it was rays from the moon that were shining on the chests of the people.

Mr. JAKOBSON: One more point about the language that was used: You said that all the time they were receiving messages by radio and speaking into a microphone. What language were they using, then?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): For the radio messages it would have been difficult for me to recognize the language. I cannot say. It sounded like the language they were speaking with me, but they spoke too quickly, and I could not identify any words.

Mr. MWAANGA: Did those invaders ask you any questions; and, if so, what sort of questions?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): No other question than my identity, my country of origin and my profession.

Mr. JAKOBSON: How long have you been in this country?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): I have been here as a professor since October 1968. This is therefore my third year.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): You said that the man who had studied at Leuven had spoken to you about the ships at sea and about the motorboats. Did he tell you where the ships had come from?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): That Portuguese who spoke French came rather late," and that's why I got some specifications on what I had already heard from the others. But to me that clarified it, because I wasn't sure I had understood.

Now, one other thing: they said they had belonged to the PAIGC -- the faction that tends to be against Cabral -- in other words, the adversaries of Cabral.

Before that, the other had spoken to me in sign language, and they said -- in order to tell me they were against Cabral, they made the sign that showed they were not in the same direction, and they said "Cabral", and then they made a sign as if they were slashing someone's throat, and they indicated that he had left; and with another sign they indicated that the President was asleep; and, by another sign they said they had killed him.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can you tell me whether the hats with the drooping brims were of the same colour as the bag that I am holding now (indicating)?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): I am not certain. I repeat that it was in the dark; but I believe it was a khaki-beige. But I am not sure.

Mr. M'BAYE (interpretation from French): Did they say they were against the party of Cabral?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): No, they said: "We belong to PAIGC, but of that faction which is against Cabral".

Mr. ESPINOSA (interpretation from Spanish): I have two questions. Did you find yourself in danger at any moment? Second, did they ever threaten you or shoot a weapon while they were with you?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): They aimed at me only once; and I must say, that was at the beginning, when they saw me coming up.

(Mr. Lange)

But I was wearing shorts and undershorts, and they must have realized that I was not dangerous, and they behaved very correctly with me.

As to shooting, the question was: Did they shoot while I was there. They did not shoot; those who were near me did not shoot. I believe they were people to guard the boats.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): I should to find out -- I don't know whether you can answer this -- whether the PAIGC faction opposed to Cabral which you have mentioned is a tendency or faction which exists in so-called Portuguese Guinea.

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): I have heard of PAIGC, but I have not heard of two factions or several factions.

Mr. CONDE (interpretation from French): Would you say the fact that he said "I am in the PAIGC" would have been a way of saying he was Portuguese? Because here the fighters of PAIGC are known in that manner.

Mr. LANGE (intepretation from French): The mercenaries stated to me that they belonged to PAIGC. I can't verify this. All I can say is that they spoke Portuguese.

Mr. ESPINOSA (interpretation from Spanish): In addition to the word "mercenarios", did you identify any others?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): In addition to the word "mercenarios" they asked me whether I came from that "casa", and they pointed to the "casa". And then they also used the words "Nao pode fumar". And finally, what is distinctive from Italian or Spanish was the "sh" sound.

Mr. MWAANGA: Is it possible to say again the number of ships you saw with your own eyes, Professor? How large were the ships: small, medium-sized, or large?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): As to the number I estimate it as seven to eight. As to the shape, I could not see, because it was dark, and I could not even see whether they were rubber or wood or metal. I did not even know that there were engines, that they were motorboats, until they started away and I heard the engines.

Mr. Abdoulaye CAMARA (interpretation from French): Can you tell us whether it was high tide or low tide?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): It is a matter of calculating it.

Now, the next day, at 12.30 or 1 in the afternoon, the footprints on the beach had not yet been erased. This means that when I saw them it must have been at low tide. Then the tide came up at this time -- 12.30 or 1; it had not yet reached the footprints.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Have you heard anything of conversations between the military men and the political prisoners who had been liberated by them?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): The words I could identify were those which I cited before from the people who were near me.

Now, as to the prisoners, as I said before, I did not realize that they were prisoners at first. But, anyway, I could hear it because they made lots of noise; but I could not understand anything.

Mr. CONDE (interpretation from French): Were those prisoners white or black?

Mr. LANGE (interpretation from French): Those prisoners -- as I said, at first I thought it was an illusion. The first thing I thought of was that they were Chinese -- Chinese wearing bathing trunks. Afterwards, I decided that it was not an illusion after all, but the only impression they made on me was this: Chinese men.

There is one thing to be added: it was very dark, and in addition it was foggy. So it was very difficult to identify the looks of the people and, of course, their colour.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Professor, for your co-operation in giving your testimony and answering our questions.

The meeting rose at 8.30 p.m.

Seventh meeting, held at the Palais du peuple, Conakry
on Friday, 27 November 1970, at 9:25 a.m.

Persons heard:

Dr. Deltcho Deltchev, Bulgarian national and doctor of medicine
Dr. Dimo Dimov, Bulgarian national and doctor of medicine
Dr. Emil Dimov, doctor of medicine
H.E. Mr. Salim S. Rashidi, Ambassador of the United Republic of
Tanzania
Miss Miriam Makeba
Mr. Stokeley Carmichael
H.E. Mr. Hasimbegovic Selmo, Ambassador of Yugoslavia
H.E. Mr. Boris Milev, Ambassador of Bulgaria
Dr. Trefon Tekov, doctor of medicine
Dr. Juliette Abadjieva, doctor of medicine
H.E. Mr. Bohuslav Malek, Chargé d'Affaires of Czechoslovakia
Mr. Vlado Stravala
Dr. Zahradnicek, doctor of medicine
H.E. Mr. Anatoli Ratanov, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
H.E. Mr. Osman Ali Assal, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic
H.E. Mr. Imre Sztanronier, Ambassador of Hungary
H.E. Mr. Oscar Oramas Oliva, Ambassador of Cuba
Dr. Blas Ledesma, doctor of medicine
H.E. Mr. Sorsch Conteh, Ambassador of Sierra Leone
H.E. Mr. Günther Fritsch, Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic
Mr. Heiner Schmid, Second Secretary, Embassy of the German Democratic
Republic
H.E. Mr. Ernest Schmid, Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland
H.E. Mr. Paul Grégoire, Chargé d'Affaires of Belgium
H.E. Mr. Amadou Lamine Diallo, Ambassador of Senegal
Mr. Babacar N'Diaye, Counsellor, Embassy of Senegal
H.E. Mr. Peter Afolabi, Ambassador of Nigeria
H.E. Mr. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Ambassador of the United States of
America
H.E. Mr. Hans Christian Lankes, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of
Germany
Mr. Vasco Cabral, Member of the Political Bureau of PAIGC
Mr. Mateus Correia, Member of PAIGC
Mr. Irenio Nascimento Lopes, Member of PAIGC
Mr. Mohamed Hasan Adami, First Secretary of the Embassy of Indonesia
Mr. Mouzaffar Koubrously, Minister-Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires
of Syria

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Excellencies, we shall resume our meetings. As have agreed that we would listen to anyone who can give testimony on the events, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs thought it would be useful to address a diplomatic note to all the embassies represented here, inviting those who wish to do so to come and speak to the Mission. A certain number of embassies are represented here, and we have a list of them. We are going to read that list to you, and you will determine the manner in which you wish to question them.

There are also three medical doctors who had to take care of and treat the wounded who were taken prisoner. They were able, I believe, to see what kind of people they were and what their nationality was. If later on other ambassadors should come, we would add them to the list.

We would suggest that we begin with the physicians, because they have to go back to their work; they have some urgent cases to see.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, your Excellencies. We appreciate this co-operation, and we agree with your suggestions that we begin with the doctors.

TESTIMONY OF DR. DELTCHO DELTCHEV

The CHAIRMAN: We welcome you here, Doctor, and we thank you for your co-operation. If you would begin with a statement, then later on, perhaps, we could ask you some questions.

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): What statement? I have come as a witness to the events that took place in Guinea.

The CHAIRMAN: The statement I had in mind was in connexion with your experiences when the wounded people started coming to you -- what sort of injuries they had, and how you treated them. Did they say anything? What, if anything, did they say to you?

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): This thing happened on Saturday -- the night between Saturday and Sunday -- at about 3 a.m. I was awakened by the noise of cannon, pistols, rifles and machine-guns. That went on until the morning.

In the morning, Sunday morning, at about 6 or 6.30 -- by the way, to the place where I live there is a cemetery -- that's where the noise of shooting was the loudest.

Then I saw the people who had already been taken prisoner. Their hands were up in the air, and they were wearing dark green uniforms. Three or four people passed in front of us. I don't know where they were being sent, but I understood that there were people who had come in -- mixed up in some kind of a conspiracy.

At about 8.30, although that day I wasn't supposed to go to the hospital, I decided to go on my own to the hospital.

There I found several wounded, mainly Guinean military personnel, and all day I worked in my office in order to operate on the wounded.

The CHAIRMAN: Did you treat any other casualties, besides the Guineans?

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): On that day I had only Guineans, but beginning yesterday they gave me some wounded, and they told me that were of Guinea (Bissau) nationality.

The CHAIRMAN: You have not had the opportunity yet to treat any other nationalities besides peoples from Guinea (Bissau)?

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): I had to treat one foreign expert of Italian descent, who is usually stationed here.

Mr. MWAANGA: Doctor, is it possible for you to estimate, in very rough terms, the number of wounded you think were at the hospital at the time you were there?

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): The first day?

Mr. MWAANGA: Yes.

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): I am not sure exactly, but I believe there were about forty wounded on Sunday morning at about 8.30.

Mr. JAKOBSON: May I ask you, Doctor, your nationality?

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): I am Bulgarian.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Can you tell me how many wounded from among the forces that attacked here have been treated by you?

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): As I stated before, on that day -- because I must say that in our hospital there are two sections for surgery, and I belong to the section that was not on duty on that day. In any case, since I went to the hospital, I helped treat some people; but most of the people were treated by the other section, which was on duty on that day.

Mr. MWAANGA: Is it possible to say what language the people you said were from Guinea (Bissau) were speaking? Were they speaking to you?

Dr. DELTCHEV (interpretation from French): The wounded person who came to our office yesterday is still unconscious. He's wounded in the head, and is somnolent, and he doesn't speak.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Doctor, for your co-operation.

The witness withdrew.

TESTIMONY OF DR. DIMO DIMOV

Dr. DIMOV (interpretation from French): I am Dr. Dimo Dimov. I am a medical doctor working here at Ignace Deen Hospital, here in Conakry. I have two children; I am of Bulgarian nationality. I have been working in Guinea ever since 1967.

On the night of the events I was at home, and on November 22nd, at about 3 o'clock in the morning, I heard loud shooting near my home, which is next to the Hôtel de France. I went out on the balcony of our building in order to see the situation, but everywhere there was darkness. I saw the machine-guns shooting next to the fishermen's port -- it's called the fishermen's port; it's near the Boulbinet building -- that's the tall building with ten stories. I didn't recognize the people who were doing the shooting, but I saw the fire from machine-guns and automatic rifles.

The strongest shooting seemed to be at an area called Petits Isles -- the small islands, as they call them here -- in front of the old square of the national museum. It's a peninsula.

Mr. M'BAYE (interpretation from French): It's an information centre.

Dr. DIMOV (interpretation from French): I also saw the light from bombs, and I was able to see boats. I didn't know whether they were the boats of the fishermen who bring in the fish at 3 a.m., or whether they were boats of another origin. But at one moment, in front of a certain island, I saw the silhouette -- the shadow -- of a boat, which I was unable to distinguish.

(Dr. Dimov)

I could not see that for longer than five minutes, because the bullets started falling in my direction. They were whistling, and they were falling, some of them, against the wall; so I had to go back inside for my safety.

With the first shot that I heard, my air conditioner. I thought it meant that there was no electricity, and I tried to put a light on, and it didn't go on. I remained in my living room next to the wall, and I heard the shooting continue in the direction of the Hôtel de France, which is 300 metres from my place, and also on the islands that are to the left, near the coast -- near the ocean.

My children -- and mainly the four-year-old girl -- started to cry because of the loud noise of the shooting, and I put them in the bathroom because there were two walls in the bathroom, one in front of the other, and that might have helped to prevent their being hit by bullets.

The shooting went on until Sunday morning. At times it would diminish, and then it would start again even stronger. From the first moment, it was clear to me that the shooting coming from the sea was much stronger than the shooting from the shore towards the sea.

Later on -- I don't know exactly what time it was, but it was already daylight -- the shooting from the shore towards the sea became stronger. At about 7.30 or a quarter to 8, I saw some Guinean military personnel go by with some prisoners, who were wearing clearly different uniforms from those worn here: they had this dark green shirt, and also they had the boots that came up to their knees. That's very different from what the Guinean soldiers use here. And I saw three prisoners with Guinean soldiers, and their hands were up above their heads -- the heads of these three prisoners -- and each prisoner was about ten metres apart from the next.

In front of my house there's a cemetery which is not being used at present; and on Sunday morning at about 8 a.m. there was strong shooting among the tombstones. At about 8 in the morning there was a telephone call from a United Nations expert, Dr. Popovitch, who is of Bulgarian citizenship, who said that there was a Yugoslav physician, Dr. Dimitch, who was seriously wounded.

(Dr. Dimov)

I went down from the first floor of my house into the courtyard, and from there I called the wife of the Yugoslav and asked her to come and give me some information.

She told me that her house, which is at Minière, next to Bellevue, had been attacked, and that there had been two periods of shooting, that her daughter was dead, and that the Doctor himself, as well as his wife and another small girl, were wounded; and would I come to the hospital to take care of them, because there was no physician there.

In view of the fact that I am a physician, I did not hesitate, despite the shooting everywhere, to take the road to the hospital. I tried, in view of the fact that my car had not come, to get in touch with the hospital in order to obtain an ambulance, but there was no telephone connexion with the hospital.

In order not to waste time, I went down again to the courtyard to try to find someone who would take me to the hospital. I was not successful, but at that time a car -- a Volkswagen 1600-TS -- which is owned by a Bulgarian national who is a dental technician at the hospital, came into the courtyard.

Fortunately, in the car there was a Bulgarian national who is a physician, who had come only a week before to Guinea. He had been appointed to work in Guinea at Kankan, but he had not yet taken up his work.

Well, all three of us took the road towards the Donka Hospital. We took the road called the Corniche -- the seaside boulevard. We took that highway because that was the shortest way. After the first turn, next to the Ignace Deen Hospital -- that's the first hospital -- we were shot at from the rocks in the sea. I asked the technician, who was also driving, to speed up. The strongest shooting was there, exactly in front of the hospital. The shooting was clearly coming from the rocks in the sea, towards the shore. In view of our speed, I couldn't distinguish the persons shooting.

After ten minute's ride we arrived in front of Camp Samory. The highway was completely empty; there was no traffic on it -- no cars, no people.

Before we got to the gate of the camp I asked the driver to slow down, and we weren't going faster than twenty kilometres an hour. I did that so that I could state, in case we were stopped, that I was a physician and that I was going there in order to give aid.

Just in front of the gate of the camp our car was stopped by five well-armed persons. Three armed persons came towards the car. Of those persons who came towards the car, one could speak some French, but so badly that I didn't understand what he was asking. At the same time, I saw that behind the wall there were three persons aiming guns at us -- not machine-guns, but automatic rifles. I am absolutely certain that those three persons behind the wall with the automatic rifles were wearing different uniforms from those of the people who had stopped me. Those behind the wall were dressed exactly in the same dark green uniforms that I saw the prisoners wearing.

One of the three who stopped me -- I showed him my doctor's bag and my stethoscope, because I understood there was something not normal going on, and I also showed him the blood-pressure apparatus and the other things in my doctor's case, and I told him I was a doctor going to help the wounded. One of them who had stopped our car went back inside the camp. He didn't stay long -- maybe no longer than five seconds -- after which he came out again; and, with a sign -- he didn't say anything -- with a sign he made us understand that we could go on.

The military men from the Samory Camp, where we were stopped, didn't shoot as the car went by.

About twenty metres outside of the camp there's a lot -- I don't know what they use it for -- and there's a wall; and next to it we saw a truck which was almost completely overturned; and from the courtyard we were shot at. I didn't see the people shooting, but I could hear the shots against the wall.

(Dr. Dimov)

Here, exactly in front of you (indicating) distinguished representatives, they shot from the rocks which are in the sea -- they shot from the rocks towards the highway and the buildings. I asked the driver to take the road that goes by the People's Palace, because I thought it would be more dangerous to take the road towards Donka.

When we came towards the People's Palace, which is the building we are in at present, we were stopped two or three times by armed men; but there was no difficulty, because they were Guinean military personnel, and when I showed my doctor's bag they let us go through very quickly, without asking for passports or making any difficulty, whereas we saw that some other cars were made to stop by those soldiers for a longer time than us.

On the other side of the building, or in front of the building where there is a bridge, there was shooting from both sides of the road. I couldn't say who was shooting, because there's lots of vegetation there, but it was clear that the shooting -- each shot corresponded to another shot. They would shoot from one side, and then there would be an answer from the opposite side.

When we were about 500 metres from the hospital, I told the driver to go at full speed to the hospital, because I understood that we should not go back, despite the shooting, because there was no physician in the hospital, and we wanted to take care of the wounded.

When I went to the room in front of surgery, we saw people on the floor -- there were more than fifteen -- and we saw Guinean male nurses giving first aid to the wounded. When I was in the hospital I also found there two Bulgarian physicians. One was a surgeon -- I don't know how or by what means they got to the hospital. One is a surgeon by the name of Trefon Tekov, and the other is Maurice Ganef, and he's a general practitioner -- the second one.

With the surgeon who had come with me, we started giving aid to the wounded who were on the floor, and to those who were in bed. They had put some wounded on the floor because there was no room for them in the beds. When we started giving aid to the wounded I saw the Yugoslav physician,

(Dr. Dimov)

whom I have already told you about, Dr. Dimitch. He was almost conscious. He had multiple wounds on the left foot and on one half of his face, which had been penetrated by shrapnel from hand grenades.

We began by immobilizing his foot, because there was no electricity, and therefore we couldn't make an X-ray photograph; but we assumed that there was a fracture, so we immobilized the foot. At that time we gave the physician an injection, and he regained consciousness. He wanted to tell me the sad story of what had gone on in the morning at his home, but I asked him not to speak so that he would not waste his strength.

Anyway, he spoke a little and he said to me that until 3 in the morning he had been together with some experts -- one Polish, and one from the Federal Republic of Germany -- and they had been celebrating a wedding anniversary -- I don't know whether it was ten or fifteen years.

The CHAIRMAN: Just one point, Doctor: Would you tell us how many persons you treated, and of what nationality they were, and what sort of injuries they had.

Dr. DIMOV (interpretation from French): At Donka Hospital there were about fifteen persons. They weren't dressed. I don't -- I assumed they were all Guineans. Anyway, it was Sunday morning, at 8 o'clock, and they were wearing only undershirts, and of course I gave them first aid. I didn't ask them where they were from. As a physician my duty is to take care of anyone; it was up later to Government people to find out whether they were friends or enemies, so I didn't ask them where they were from. I just gave first aid to all of them.

If you would permit me, I would like to give you some additional data on the things that happened. I will not take more than three minutes.

After that, I took the Yugoslav doctor to the Yugoslav embassy where his wife and his second child had been transported; and there I found the body of the other daughter in a car at the Yugoslav embassy. I saw the wife, who was wounded in the head, the neck and had a broken clavicle; and the daughter was less wounded.

As to the body of the other daughter, it practically had no head left: the head had been kind of crushed by the shell. I also felt the chest, and I saw it was like a bag; with something in it, but there were no ribs; they had also been destroyed by the firing.

Then I called my home on the telephone in order to find out how my family was; and my wife, who is also a physician, told me that they had called from the Bulgarian Embassy, and they stated that near the Embassy there were two Germans who had been wounded. I didn't tell my wife that I was going to go back to Donka to our Embassy, where there was so much shooting; and in that area there are many villas and a lot of shrubbery, and the shooting was very strong. But I took the ambulance -- I left the Volkswagen -- in order to be clearly distinguished, and went to treat the German wounded.

When I got there -- there are some villas belonging to Guineans there, and there's also the embassy of the German Democratic Republic -- when I got there, they told me they had taken them to the hospital.

Since there were no wounded in our Embassy, I left again; I took the ambulance; I used the siren and I also left on the danger signal, and I went back to Donka.

In front of the camp there were soldiers -- I am sure they were not Guineans -- I suppose they were Portuguese -- who aimed at the ambulance. They were hiding behind a wall, and their fingers were on the triggers; but they didn't shoot.

When I came to the People's Palace, I saw in front of the People's Palace three warships. They were about two miles from shore. I am sure that they were warships because I was born by the sea, and I grew up by the sea, in Bulgaria, and I can distinguish warships from transport ships. And there were three of them.

If the Mission so wishes, I can tell the Mission about the shooting that took place in the night between Monday and Tuesday. That shooting started exactly at midnight, and you can see the bullets, if you like, in my house. They came from the sea.

(Dr. Dimov)

There was shooting on Monday, and the grenades fell; and what's probably more important for this Commission is that at four in the afternoon on Monday I saw some merchant ships -- I don't know of what nationality -- and at that time I was in another apartment in my same building, at the home of another Bulgarian doctor. There was no shooting at that time. We were looking at those two merchant ships, and we were very surprised when, suddenly, a bomb fell near that ship which was nearer the shore -- nearer us. After that, we saw a second bomb fall, and we saw the water sprout up like a fountain, up to the height of about five metres.

When that happened, of course it attracted our attention, and we started looking, and we saw that the ship that was nearer to us had started moving out towards the sea in order to avoid those bombs, and the other ship was about one kilometre -- or one and a half kilometres -- behind. And at first -- and when the ship started moving we saw this strange sight: it looked like a ship inclined diagonally, and we thought -- and I told the other doctor -- that one ship had been hit and was going down; but then we saw that it wasn't like that, because when a ship is going down in the sea, the back part generally goes up; and we saw that it wasn't that, and then we discovered that what had happened was that we could see the third ship -- the ship that I said before was a warship -- we could see the cannons on the deck.

The first ship went out to sea, and the third ship -- that is, the warship -- started manoeuvring, because it was always lagging behind the merchant ships. After five minutes of manoeuvring there were times when we saw the warship on the left, and at other times we saw it on the right, because in front of it we saw the merchant ship, and that ship was not moving.

The CHAIRMAN: Could you identify that warship? Did it have any name that you could see from the distance?

Dr. DIMOV (interpretation from French): No, I couldn't distinguish any numbers or names, because it was too far away. Had I had binoculars I might have been able to distinguish it. The ship was narrow and long. In

(Dr. Dimov)

the centre there was something like a turret, and another one behind; and there were no masts which they use in order to load and unload cargo.

The warship, after some manoeuvring, went behind the Kassa Islands, which are in front of the coastline here, and afterwards came back, hid again behind the merchant ship, and finally went out to sea; and I didn't see the warship's shooting against the shore.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Doctor.

Do the other members have any questions?

Mr. MWAANGA: Doctor, you said at a certain point in your testimony that, when you were driving the ambulance some troops fired at you and that you assumed they were Portuguese troops. Why did you assume they were Portuguese troops?

Dr. DIMOV (interpretation from French): I said that when I was by the camp -- in front of Donka, they didn't shoot at the ambulance. I saw the men, who were armed and who were behind the gates -- they were aiming at us, but they didn't shoot, and they didn't shoot at the Volkswagon either. But the shooting was from both sides -- from in front of the camp and from in front of the villas, among the shrubbery.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Doctor, you said at one time during your statement that you had seen something strange happen -- I think those were your words -- as if a ship were going down into the sea. From the way you described it, it sounded like a submarine. Could you describe it further to us?

Dr. DIMOV (interpretation from French): To tell you the truth, I can't say whether it was a submarine. First, as I said before, I thought that it was one of the merchant ships going down, having been hit by a bomb, but it was something like seeing only one profile, but for two ships.

(Dr. Dimov)

Now, perhaps it was my imagination that made me think that one ship was inclined; but afterwards, three or four minutes later, there was a third ship. At first there were only two ships, and then, suddenly, there was a third ship. Now, I can't say whether that third ship was a submarine. That's up to the experts to tell you.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Doctor. The Mission is very grateful to you for your co-operation.

The witness withdrew.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Excellencies, I would like to suggest, because this procedure seems to be a bit long, that for the Ambassadors already waiting you might perhaps prepare a little questionnaire and we could give it to them, and then each Ambassador could come in after these doctors and answer your questions.

If you wish, we could put down on those sheets of paper two or three questions, and then we could circulate the sheets among the Ambassadors and they would know in advance what answers are expected from them, and that may save us some time -- because I wish to remind you of the fact that these are diplomats and that our conduct towards them should be correct -- perhaps we should not ask them insidious questions -- and our behaviour should be appropriate, because I must tell you that they have come here freely to make their contribution to the work of the Mission and to state the truth. So while the Doctor makes his statement, I would ask the Heads of Delegations to prepare their questions so that we can send them to the Ambassadors.

If you agree with me, we will give each of them five minutes so that only the essential things will be stated here.

We still have a long journey ahead of us.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, I am grateful for your suggestion.

I think, as you very correctly pointed out, that we would not like to pose any questions that would be awkward to them; but I do suggest that whatever statement they have to make, we would suggest five minutes' time for it, and another five minutes for questions, if the other members of the Mission agree -- it may not be five minutes, either; it may be only two minutes; five minutes may not be necessary. But even if each person's statement takes only ten minutes, that would still be 100 minutes, or nearly two hours.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): We agree.

TESTIMONY OF DR. EMIL DIMOV

The CHAIRMAN: We should like to welcome the next witness, and we would request him to give us a very brief statement regarding the patients he treated, and the types of injuries and the nationalities of those persons, so that we may finish our interview quickly.

Mr. DIMOV (interpretation from French): My name is Dr. Emil Dimov. I live at Boulbinet, in the large buildings which are on the Corniche. I am a general practitioner and have worked here for five years.

On the night of 22-23 November -- I am not sure of the time -- at about 2 or 3 in the morning, there was shooting, and I could hear shots from all sides. All night long we were alarmed, my wife and myself, and we were lying down on the floor, because we heard the whistling of the shooting.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I request the doctor kindly to tell us about his experiences with the incidents which took place, and the type of injuries, and the nationalities of the patients he treated?

Dr. DIMOV (interpretation from French): The place where I work is of general medicine; the wounded don't come to our place; they go to the surgical building.

We live fifty metres from the ocean, and all day long we were able to see three ships. Two of them were on the horizon and therefore we couldn't distinguish what kind of ships they were. But one of them was about 500 metres from us, and moved the whole time. In addition to that, there were two merchant ships in the harbour, and they had to go away from the harbour. We saw them leave; but afterwards we say the other three ships still there -- two on the horizon and one that kept moving and was about 500 metres from us.

Sunday I saw how they seized two men who were wearing soldier uniforms -- dark green uniforms -- and were also wearing green arm-bands. They asked them to put their hands up; they people who seized them were both military and civilians. This happened at the cemetery -- the French Catholic cemetery which is next to our place.

(Dr. Dimov)

On Monday I didn't go to work because the shooting was still going on. On Tuesday I went to work -- to the clinic -- and there was still shooting in the streets. On Wednesday I went to work at the hospital at Donka with my wife, and they shot at us at the intersection of the street that goes to Donka and the large highway that leads to the airport.

On Thursday again I went to work. There was no shooting, but I went to a friend who is from the Federal Republic of Germany and works in a military workshop. He was ill, and Thursday, at lunchtime, I heard some shooting, and he showed me later a Volkswagen that belonged to someone from the Federal Republic of Germany which had been shot through, and you can still see it with the perforations from the bullets.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Doctor. Since you are a general practitioner, the type of information we wanted about the injuries and casualties would not be your subject, so the Mission is very grateful for your co-operation.

The witness withdrew.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): We have given you the list of ambassadors. We have written their names down in the order in which they have been arriving. We can take them in any order you wish to determine, but I would suggest that we do take them in the order they have arrived here.

The CHAIRMAN: Well.

STATEMENT BY H.E. SALIM S. RASHIDI (UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA)

The CHAIRMAN: We thank the distinguished Ambassador of Tanzania, who has kindly come here to enlighten us about the critical situation that happened here. We shall be very interested to hear from him.

Mr. RASHIDI: Thank you, your Excellencies. I am sure, as you have noticed, I have come here together with two friends, Miss Miriam Makeba, who is very well known to you, and her husband, Mr. Stokely Carmichael, who is also very well known to you.

(Mr. Rashidi)

On the morning of Sunday, the 22nd, when the aggression was committed against Guinea, the three of us were together in my residence; and we were able to see, very clearly and visibly, four boats disembarking troops into the town. At least one of the points, where they were disembarking was next to my residence, so I was able to see very clearly.

The boats were stationary not far from the beach, and they would go out a little bit further into the sea and then come back. At the same time, the small craft which were disembarking mercenaries would communicate with those boats as they were going out and coming near the beach.

We also saw very visibly and clearly that the mercenaries were white and black. They were in uniforms with green arm-bands, and it appeared to us that they were very well-equipped.

That is as far as we saw in the morning at my residence. If my comrades want to make any additions...

Miss MAKEBA: On our way to the Ambassador's residence from our residence -- which is not very far from him -- we took our car and drove down to his residence, and along the way, just from the hotel onwards, we saw men dressed in army uniforms whom we thought could have been Guineans, because most of them were black. But something struck me, and I said: "But their uniforms seem rather different"; and they shot at us as we were going. We would slow down and wave, and they waved back, and they let us through until we got to the Ambassador's house. It was after we were there that my husband spoke to someone on the phone, and they told him that, you know, the mercenaries are wearing green uniforms and green arm-bands. It was only then that we realized that the armed people we had passed along the road were not actually Guinean troops.

Mr. MWAANGA: Mr. Ambassador, do you gain the impression that the mercenaries you saw were Portuguese; and, if so, why?

Mr. RASHIDI: I have the impression that I saw white mercenaries. It is a very vivid impression. I have an impression also that the aggression was committed by Portugal, and I will try to give my explanation if the Mission will allow me.

The CHAIRMAN: We should be very interested to hear from you.

Mr. RASHIDI: Well, Mr. Chairman, considering the boats -- the naval boats -- which I have seen with my colleagues next to my residence, it must need a Power to be able to -- an external Power -- to be able to mount such an aggression; and according to the geographic disposition of Guinea, these Powers could perhaps be her neighbours -- Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, or Guinea (Bissau); and if we discount any of those four countries, then it must be a bigger Power which has a naval presence in the Atlantic: namely, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain or France.

But it is inconceivable that any of those Powers or any of Guinea's friendly neighbours would mount such an aggression. So the only explanation which I can give is that, logically, the boats must have come from Guinea (Bissau), and that it is a Portuguese aggression. There are reasons for this -- political considerations -- which you have to take into account. For this reason -- I don't have any other reason than that -- the aggression must have been committed by Portugal.

Mr. KULAGA: Mr. Ambassador, I have followed your exposé with care. I should like to ask you two questions.

First, you said you had the impression that you had seen white people. Was it an impression, or was it more than an impression?

Mr. RASHIDI: I have seen them. I saw some whites.

Mr. KULAGA: In your analysis, I think you departed from the point that the naval boats you had seen were of importance -- that is, were big -- and that, in my opinion, would also show that the means used were of importance and would indicate a massive attack, I would say, against Guinean territory.

Mr. RASHIDI: Yes. I just said what I saw. But I heard, from about 3 a.m. or a quarter to three in the morning, when I got up, that it was an invasion, a sort of war, because one could hear a lot of gunshots and some very heavy equipment.

Mr. JAKOBSON: Mr. Ambassador, could you estimate the size of the boats that you saw -- the tonnage?

Mr. RASHIDI: I don't know; I don't possess the technical capacity to tell the number of tons.

Just finally, in the morning when I went out, when I was driving, I passed very close to mercenaries who were guarding Camp Boiro, and they told me to stop, but I never stopped; I just went in. But I saw them very close up.

Mr. CARMICHAEL: There's one thing we can say, and that is that there was an invasion from an external Power, and that that external Power was a European Power. We can say this definitely, because we saw the boats. They were controlled by Europeans, who brought the people back and forth. So whether or not it was a Portuguese invasion, we don't know. But we know it was an invasion and that it was European, with African mercenaries.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Your Excellency, for taking this time and for co-operating with the Mission.

Mr. Rashidi, Miss Makeba and Mr. Carmichael withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. HASIMBEGOVIC SELMO (YUGOSLAVIA)

The CHAIRMAN: We welcome you, your Excellency, and we appreciate your co-operating with the Mission. We should like to hear your version of the armed assault that has taken place, and perhaps I myself or my colleagues will have some questions to put to you.

Mr. SELMO (interpretation from Serbo-Croatian): Gentlemen, representatives of the United Nations: I am honoured to accept your invitation to make a statement. I should like to say that I myself was an eye-witness to everything that went on near my residence.

It so happens that that night I did not sleep, because I was reading until three in the morning. At that time I heard some shooting. At first I didn't attach any importance to it. Later there was a repetition of the shooting. I went out to the terrace of my residence, and at that time there was shooting over my residence, and there was even one shot that went by not far from me. I immediately went back inside; I got dressed -- I as well as my wife -- and I said: "Something serious is happening; let's get ready".

We got dressed, and we waited until dawn. The shooting ceased one hour before sunrise. I then looked towards the sea, because I had heard that something was going on on that side. My residence is right at the seaside. To the right of my residence, at a distance of about 300 or 400 metres, is the Boiro military camp, where there was shooting; and I heard the shooting from that camp during the whole night.

When I looked towards the sea, I saw, first, two ships, and then three ships, about two kilometres away. At first sight they were large ships. It was clear to me that those were not Guinean ships, because I know them. I therefore came to the conclusion that they were foreign war ships utilized for disembarking. I went and got my binoculars, and I started looking at them through my binoculars, because at that time there was no shooting. I was able to confirm my impression by looking through the binoculars that they were foreign warships.

(Mr. Selmo)

One of these ships -- the largest of them -- was black; and that one was the one that was most like a landing ship. The second was white; the third was grey. The ships were arranged in a position called the combat position. When I say that, I am speaking as a former officer, because for four years I was an officer in my country during the war.

(Mr. Selmo)

At the same time, I noticed, next to the three large ships, a small manoeuvre of small boats. They were shuttling between the large boats -- and very quickly.

I also noticed two boats that were filled with soldiers. Those boats were going from the shore towards the largest ship. The crew from the large black ship received the soldiers and took on board the soldiers of those two boats.

Two other boats were going back from the biggest ship to the seashore; they were going in the direction of a small harbour, in the direction of Camp Boiro. The same two boats took up two groups of soldiers from the shore. Both of those boats were commanded by persons who were wearing red shirts and were European; they were white. I noticed this well through my binoculars.

The people who were taken aboard those boats were black, and had no uniforms. Twice those two boats took up two groups from the land, and they went with them to the large ship. I also noticed that those boats were carrying some civilian articles from land, including files, perhaps, from the camp, and several beds, violins and guitars. It was clearly a matter of looting.

Then, after a small group was left on land, those two boats went towards the large boat and did not come back to land. I understood that it was a matter of evacuating the last groups from land toward the boat at sea. But a small group of black uniformed soldiers remained in a small corner next to the shore. After that, I went up to the larger of my terraces, which overlooks the street near the Hotel Camayenne. I was very surprised. I noticed three or four groups of armed soldiers in uniform, with green arm-bands. They were doing something in the street.

Even very near the Hotel Camayenne there was a small group. I did not notice any Europeans among them. I drew the conclusion, when I saw those Europeans dressed in civilian clothes on the boats, that they wanted, in case of being taken prisoner, to show that they were not military personnel, but civilians.

(Mr. Selmo)

Those three ships were near my house, but from time to time they would go further out to sea. Every time they would go out further, you could hear explosions on the Conakry side; so I have the impression that when they went further out it was in order to bombard the land. I do not know where those shells may have fallen -- probably very far from my position.

As an officer I know that for a ship to bombard the coast it cannot do it from near the coast; it has to go out far -- about five or six kilometres.

On the same day there was a foreign aeroplane that went around once above Conakry. The plane over-flew several times, between 5 and 6 p.m. on that same day. They looked at the situation over Conakry, and perhaps they filmed and also broadcast information.

These are all important things that I had noticed in the first hours after the attack; and I have also told you about what happened during the night. If you have any questions I am prepared to answer them.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, your Excellency. You said you had seen some boats through binoculars. Were you able to distinguish any markings that would indicate their nationality?

Mr. SELMO (interpretation from Serbo-Croatian): It was difficult to notice with a regular type of binoculars. They were not military binoculars that could enlarge at one kilometre or a kilometre and a half. But I could see that the black ship was filled with soldiers who were in uniform and were armed. I thought that those soldiers had either participated in battles during the night and then had been taken back to the ships, or were waiting in order to participate in an action afterward.

On that occasion I could not notice through the binoculars whether they were European or black; it was a distance at which one cannot notice the colour of the face.

I should like to state as an officer I know well this type of military operation; I have participated, in my own country, in such a military operation several times, and I can state that it was clear that this was an operation of foreign military aggression which was prepared beforehand.

Mr. MWAANGA: Mr. Ambassador, you said that on the 22nd, between five and six p.m., you had seen what you described as a foreign aeroplane.

Mr. SELMO (interpretation from Serbo-Croatian): Yes.

Mr. MWAANGA: What makes you say it was a foreign aeroplane? Did you see any markings on it, or was that just an impression?

Mr. SELMO (interpretation from Serbo-Croatian): I saw it was a type of aeroplane not possessed by Guinea; and as an officer I also noticed a red marking.

The CHAIRMAN: The Mission is very grateful for your co-operation, Sir. Thank you very much.

Mr. SELMO (interpretation from Serbo-Croatian): I also thank you for your attention.

Mr. Selmo withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. BORIS MILEV (BULGARIA)

Mr. MILEV (interpretation from French): I am the Ambassador of Bulgaria, and I have with me two Bulgarian physicians who were witness to some of the events.

Mr. CONDE (interpretation from French): Before we begin the questioning, I should like to state on behalf of the Guinean delegation that, in view of the great number of Ambassadors that we have to listen to, we are going to appeal once more to the United Nations Mission to be concise, precise and brief in the questions that it wishes to put to them, in view of the time available, which is very limited.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your co-operation. We should like to hear from you whatever statements you would like to make.

Mr. MILEV (interpretation from French): I should like to divide my statement into two parts. First I shall say what I have seen; then I will tell you what I have heard and what I have lived through.

What I saw was on Sunday morning at about 5 a.m. Two men in green uniforms hid in the manioca shrubbery next to our Embassy in the Donka section; and every time a car would go by in front of our Embassy those two men would shoot at the car; and I noticed there was a pattern: every time a car was about to go by, I thought: "Now they are going to shoot"; and, sure enough, they did shoot.

(Mr. Milev)

The next day -- on Monday -- I left the Embassy and I went to visit the Bulgarian specialists who live in the Boulbinet building. That was Monday afternoon.

There I talked with my compatriots, and I saw from the apartments of Boulbinet two ships in the water behind the old national museum. What I saw afterwards was on Wednesday.

I wanted to visit my colleague the Ambassador of Hungary, who is also my neighbour. Before I left the Embassy there was some shooting in front of the Embassy itself. When I went out, at first I saw three students who crossed the street in front of the Embassy, and then when I went into the street where the Hungarian Embassy is, I saw three other students. I met them and I asked them: "What's going on?" One of the students said: "Don't you see? They're shooting, and I myself am wounded".

Now I am going back to Sunday evening. On Sunday evening there was very heavy shooting near the military camp -- Camp Boiro Mamadou, which is about 200 to 300 metres from our Embassy. There had been a battle which lasted from three to four hours in the afternoon. After that battle I myself heard gunshots from the shrubbery which is next to our Embassy. That was at about 1800 hours -- 6 p.m.

During the shooting that took place near our Embassy I saw one white man, who hid in the grass which is in front of our Embassy. He had a sub-machine gun.

Those are the things I have seen and what I have heard and what I have lived through.

On Monday evening I went to bed at 10.30 at my residence, which is next to my Embassy. At about 11.10 I heard some very shooting from exactly in front of my window and in front of my residence. I had to put out the lights, and almost all night long there was shooting -- always from very near my residence. At one time I had to lie on the floor -- just to get out of my bed and lie on the floor -- for fear that some bullets might fall in my room.

At another time during the night, after midnight, I ventured to look through the blinds to see what was going on. At that time I saw somebody dressed in green climb up the wall in front of the residence and get into the courtyard. Other men, carrying weapons, were pursuing him. That shooting continued almost the whole night. I couldn't sleep at all.

(Mr. Milev)

I who have lived through the Paris insurrection -- I happened to be there, and participated in that insurrection -- had the impression that I was living in the midst of another insurrection. It was exactly the same atmosphere, and the same fear and the same emotion.

That is all I have to say. I am willing to answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Your Excellency, for your co-operation. I do not think we will bother you with any questions. We are grateful for your co-operation.

Mr. MILEV (interpretation from French): Perhaps you would like to hear from these physicians.

The CHAIRMAN: If they have treated any casualties we should like to hear what nationalities they were, and what sort of injuries they had.

Dr. Trefon TEKOV (interpretation from French): I am a surgeon at Lonka. On Sunday, early, between two and three in the morning, I heard shooting. I didn't understand what was going on. On Sunday they called me urgently from the hospital. I saw many wounded -- approximately fifteen persons -- five or six of them very seriously wounded in the abdomen, the chest, and head.

I went in in order to operate on the German -- the Secretary of the German Embassy -- of the Democratic Republic of Germany. I had to operate on him. I did three anastomoses: two in the small intestine and one in the large intestine. He had lost a lot of blood. He died later.

At the same time, I also had to operate on his colleague, the Commercial Attaché, Fischer. He was wounded in the back -- just a general case, not serious. So I left him for a while in order to take some X-rays and I went on to the more seriously wounded.

We left the operating room at 3 in the afternoon -- between 2 and 4 -- I couldn't leave the hospital; the operations were in the maternity ward.

(Dr. Tekov)

I stayed in the hospital. I wanted to go help others, but I couldn't get through the courtyard because of the shooting.

Then I saw many wounded who were undressed. I saw three or four in green trousers, but they were in shock; and, of course, I did not understand what they were doing there.

We operated during the whole night; we went on operating on Tuesday at 2 in the morning. There were forty-five patients in our section. In the other sections, I don't know how many there were. Of those forty-five, there were seven who were very seriously wounded in the abdomen. Many of them had fractures of the legs, femur -- multi-fragmentary fractures. Those who were wounded in the abdomen were very serious. There was a complete severe damage to the curvatura major -- very serious injuries, to the small intestines, rectum, and also many fractures.

They shot at my apartment. I have kept some bullets as a souvenir. Who shot them? Impossible to say.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Do you have anything to say, Madam?

Dr. Juliette ABADJIEVA (interpretation from French): First of all, I wish to apologize that my French is not very good and that my vocabulary is limited. I am a pediatrician; I have not had to take care of the wounded, but I lived in one of the two big Boulbinet buildings which are right by the seaside in Cornishe street.

During the night between Sunday and Monday I was awakened by pistol shots, sub-machine-gun shots. I didn't understand what was going on; I didn't look. But at about 6 or 6.30 I got up and went out to the terrace, which overlooks the sea, and I saw three ships. One of them was a military ship; one of them was very near. I am not sure of the distance, but it was perhaps 100 or 200 metres away. It was really very near the shore.

(Dr. Abadjieva)

Next to our building there is the radio station. There was a battle going on there. Perhaps it was six -- perhaps already seven -- in the morning. The ship was still there, and I saw armed Guineans who had taken seven or eight prisoners who were wearing green uniforms. Their hands were up -- they had green uniforms on, and they were holding their hands up.

All day Sunday there was shooting -- not all the time, but from time to time during the whole day.

Sunday night was terrible. The whole night they did not stop shooting. In the daytime it was occasional. The ships were still there. In the daytime the ships were on the horizon, but at night you could see their lights coming nearer the shore.

One more thing I could state is that on Wednesday afternoon, perhaps at five or six, I was on my terrace; I was looking at the sea, and I saw a ship. It scared me; I could not understand how it had happened: there was nothing, and then, suddenly, it was there. I went down quickly once more, where there is another Bulgarian family, and I asked them: "What is this? Perhaps it is a submarine". There was nothing, and then, suddenly, it was there. I don't know what it was.

That's all I have.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. Milev, Dr. Tekov and Dr. Abadjieva withdrew.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I am authorized to state to the Mission that some camp cots had been stolen by the mercenaries from Camp Boiro.

The CHAIRMAN: May I make a suggestion: In view of the fact that we have this large number of ambassadors waiting to be heard, perhaps it might be a good idea, instead of keeping them waiting all the time, if they could give us their views in a brief sort of note so that we do not have to keep them waiting. We appreciate their gesture of co-operation.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): It would be good for the Chairman of the Committee to go and tell the diplomatic corps so that he can apologize.

Mr. JAKOBSON: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if we could discuss this very briefly before we go ahead.

There was a discussion off the record.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, I have had consultations with my colleagues here, and the consensus we have reached is that we shall continue to hear from the ambassadors who are already here, because it would be discourteous to them, having heard a few, just to dismiss the others. We do not think that that would be correct procedure.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): I agree.

The CHAIRMAN: And we would then, instead of giving the witness the floor, start by asking pertinent questions, and try to be brief.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): We agree.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. BOHUSLAV MALEK (CZECHOSLOVAKIA)

The CHAIRMAN: We appreciate your co-operation in coming here to make a statement. We would request you to tell us briefly of the origins of the armed aggression that happened here.

Mr. MALEK (interpretation from French): In the first place, I should like to introduce myself. I am the Chargé d'affaires of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic before the Governments of Guinea and of Sierra Leone, both. I have brought with me three experts who are working at present in Guinea. To my right is Dr. Oldrich Zahradnicek, and to my left is Mr. Vlado Stravala and his wife, Olga Stravala. They were witnesses to the attack which took place in Guinea.

(Mr. Malek)

The experts live at present in La Minière. That's the place where the first attack of the foreign aggressors took place. Dr. Zahradnicek treated the first foreign experts who were wounded by the foreign aggressors.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I put a question to you before we go any further: Can you identify the aggression? If so, how?

Mr. MALEK (interpretation from French): I myself cannot state exactly the origin of the aggressor, but this expert and his wife have seen, with their own eyes, the foreign ships which were stationed not far from the beach at La Minière.

Mr. JAKOBSON: Could we ask whether they were able to identify the nationality of the ships?

Mr. MALEK (interpretation from French): Permit me to have them answer directly -- Mr. and Mrs. Stravala.

Mr. STRAVALA (interpretation from French): As to me, I can identify the exact identity of the ships. But what we did was -- first of all, we heard the motor speedboats during the night that circulated around the beach; and in the morning we could see those same speedboats, and we also noticed that the noise diminished as you went towards the ships which were at sea.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Did you see any of the mercenaries who disembarked?

Mr. STRAVALA (interpretation from French): We saw their shadows, because they landed about 400 steps from where we live; but, of course, we did not go towards them because they were shooting, and we heard them speak; we heard them give orders, but we couldn't understand what language they were speaking.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): The language was not French?

Mr. STRAVALA (interpretation from French): Certainly not.

The CHAIRMAN: I think those are all the questions we have, and I should like to thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for coming.

Mr. MALEK (interpretation from French): Allow me just a moment, if I can help, because you have not heard from Dr. Zahradnicek, who treated the wounded; and I believe the wounded have spoken about the origin.

Dr. ZAHRADNICEK (interpretation from French): I was awakened between 3.30 and a quarter to four by some Germans whom I know, and they took me to a house that had been completely destroyed by bombs; and there there were three wounded. But two of them were brought with them -- a lady and a child -- and the other one, the third one, they left behind because he was gravely wounded, and I bandaged him temporarily. That man was in a state of shock, and he was shouting that the Portuguese had come and killed all the nationals who were around there, and that his wife was dead -- that his wife and child were dead, and all those Portuguese were dead, and so on; but the wounded man whom I brought into my house died two days later.

(Dr. Zahradnicek)

He said that those who were killed were the victims of the kind of car that he had, because the Portuguese nationalists had light blue Volkswagens, and that man also had a light blue Volkswagen.

The INTERPRETER: This is the end of the first statement that was interrupted: "The three people who had been wounded are now in good health in Germany".

Dr. ZAHRADNICEK: We transported them all to my house, and we treated them afterwards all day.

(Spoke in French)

At a quarter of seven I left with a German doctor who came to look for sewing material for sewing up the wounds -- needles and so on -- and then we went to Donka and other places to alleviate the suffering.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. Malek, Dr. Zahradnicek, and Mr. and Mrs. Vlado Stravala withdrew.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): The Romanian Ambassador has stated that since he has not seen any of this with his own eyes, but has only heard about it, he has decided not to make a statement.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. ANATOLI RATANOV (UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS)

Mr. RATANOV (interpretation from French): Good morning, Excellencies.

Gentlemen: I have heard on the radio the appeal of the President of Guinea to all those who are in Conakry and have seen or heard the events to come and tell you what they have seen with their own eyes.

First of all, I should like to quote very briefly the statement made by The Soviet Government regarding the Portuguese aggression against the Republic of Guinea. Afterwards I shall tell you what I have seen with my own eyes and what I have heard with my own ears.

I quote the statement of the Soviet Government:

(Mr. Ratanov)

"On 22 November Portugal committed an armed attack against the Republic of Guinea, an independent and sovereign State.... Despite the false statements by the Portuguese colonialists, who are trying to camouflage that act, actually it is an open attempt to put an end to the progressive régime in the Republic of Guinea, and it is also a blow to the national liberation movements in Africa.... The Soviet Government condemns the criminal acts of the interventionists and of their protectors".

On the night of 22 November I was in my residence at a place which is next to the sea. From my residence one can see the harbour of Conakry and the beach, which is called the fishing beach, and the environs of the beach called La Minière.

At 3 a.m. my wife and myself woke up to the sound of cannon fire and explosions. The bedroom is on the second floor, if you do not count the ground floor -- because in French one does not count the ground floor, but in the Soviet Union we always count the ground floor -- and, therefore, I found myself on the third floor.

First of all, we looked out the window, and then we went out to the verandah on the third floor. We saw that the sea was lit up by the explosions, and we heard the cannon shots. I called the Embassy, which is in the centre of town, to ask the person who is there permanently what he thought of that and what he could hear. I told him: "Go up to the top floor and look at the horizon". He said that there were explosions coming from the sea and from the shore.

Mr. CONDE (interpretation from French): Some ships were at sea, and some were near the coast?

Mr. RATANOV (interpretation from French): Some were from out at sea, and others were near the shore. I saw the explosions and fire at sea.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, the Mission has gathered quite a bit of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work, might we very humbly request you to throw more light on the origin of the attack by making a very brief statement on it.

Mr. RATANCV (interpretation from French): Yes, I agree. I believe it was an external attack from the sea. That's why I insisted on the fact that you could see the explosions -- the gun shots -- from the seaside.

After the shooting to which I have referred I heard more shooting on the shore, near my residence. The gun shots were during the night, and after then is when I heard the shooting around the residence, to the left and to the right.

At sunrise, in the area of the residence, there was no longer any shooting, and I went out into the courtyard -- I went out with my wife. At sea we saw at least three grey ships. At 300 to 400 metres from our residences on the seashore we could see explosions in the sea. Next to my residence is the residence of the Minister of State for Industrial Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Diakité. I went near the fence, and I saw a young man. I asked him, and he said: "I'm the son of the Minister of Industry". I asked him: "Can one go through the centre of town? Because I would like to go to the Embassy". He said: "Yes, I believe it's possible, because everything is going on along the seashore". I said: "Well, I'm going", and he said: "Can you take me, too?"

I agreed. We took the car and we went on the highway that goes about 300 or 400 metres from Camp Boiro. As soon as we left by car he saw the armed soldiers, and he said: "These are not ours; we must go back quickly". They tried to approach us. We made a turn and we tried to go back to the residence.

Finally, I should like to make a third point. I should to say that this is not the first time that the Security Council of the United Nations has condemned the aggression of Portugal against an African State. At the end of 1969 the security Council condemned the aggression of Portugal against Guinea and against Senegal.

(Mr. Ratanov)

That is all I can say about what I have seen. I thank you for your attention; and in order to save your time, will you permit me to withdraw from the room.

The CHAIRMAN: We are very grateful for your co-operation, and we thank you very much.

Mr. Ratanov withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. OSMAN ALI ASSAL (UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC)

The CHAIRMAN: Excellency, I should like to thank you for your co-operation, and I might begin by saying that the Mission has gained a lot of information that the armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that act by making some very brief observations.

Mr. ASSAL: I shall begin with my personal impressions.

I was awakened by shots early Sunday morning. The firing came from left and right, everywhere. I tried to contact some of my colleagues on the telephone. I live next to the shore; I saw in the morning, along the shore, members of the Popular Militia. I began speaking to the people, naturally. I asked my watchman, and I also spoke to the fishermen who were there. My watchman had spoken to the fisherman, and he said to me: "There's a ship shooting at the presidential palace".

Naturally, my attention was directed towards the sea. After some time I saw some ships out at sea. There were four of them: one large white ship -- of a white colour -- and two smaller ones of a dark colour; the fourth was a landing ship. That's what I saw with my own eyes.

I thought then that it was an invasion coming from abroad -- from the sea; therefore from abroad. From my colleagues I found out that they were attacks against strategic positions such as military camps and against the Bellevue villas, which are a residence of the President.

That is all I can say.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, your Excellency. We appreciate it very much.

Mr. Assal withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. IMRE SZTANRONIER (HUNGARY)

Mr. SZTANRONIER (interpretation from French): My name is Imre Sztanronier; I am the Ambassador of Hungary.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, we appreciate your co-operation. The Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be very grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack.

Mr. SZTANRONIER (interpretation from French): Unfortunately, I cannot say much, but I can say something.

Last Sunday -- that is to say, 22 November -- during the night -- probably about 3.30 -- I was awakened, and I heard gunshots. In the morning, probably around 8 o'clock, a colleague from the Embassy of the German Democratic Republic came to see me and told me what had happened during the night. He told me that two comrades from the German Democratic Republic Embassy had been wounded during the night.

Probably around ten in the morning I paid a friendly visit to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union in order to exchange our points of view to find out what had happened; and from the garden of his residence I saw three ships. The residence of the Ambassador of the Soviet Union is next to the northern corniche. From there I saw the three ships, and I saw explosions in the sea.

That is all I have seen -- the three ships and the explosions.

The CHAIRMAN: Were you able to determine the origin of the ships? Did they have any identifying markings?

Mr. SZTANRONIER (interpretation from French): No, that was impossible.

Mr. Sztanronier withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. OSCAR ORAMAS OLIVA (CUBA)

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, we welcome you. The Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that act by making some brief observations.

Mr. OLIVA (interpretation from Spanish): To this United Nations delegation we should like to point out that we came here after having heard the call from Comrade President Sekou Touré, who asked the diplomats to come and tell you what they had seen.

In the second place, we should like to point out that we do not have the slightest doubt as to what was stated by Comrade Sekou Touré on these events.

Now, as to what we saw ourselves, we saw four warships, rather far from the entrance of the harbour of Conakry. One of them was white, and three were grey. We can clearly say that they were warships. We could not see their flags; we could not see the numbers. But we could clearly see that they were warships.

We also saw some small landing craft.

At about four in the morning we were awakened by the noise of guns -- of cannons and of heavy machine-guns -- that woke us, and we telephoned other Cuban colleagues, who stated that they had also heard the same noises, and we also agreed that the shots were coming from the sea.

I should like to relate a personal experience. On Sunday, at about 12 noon, we were walking towards the Embassy of Tanzania with the Ambassador of Tanzania, and as we went in front of the military camp -- Camp Boiro Mamadou -- some soldiers called to us from the gate.

We saw that those soldiers were dressed in very dark green uniforms which were different from the uniforms commonly worn by the soldiers of the Guinean army. They also had an arm-band of a lighter green colour. When we saw that we realized that they were mercenaries, and we ran away. The mercenaries were unable to shoot us.

(Mr. Oliva)

Next to me are two colleagues -- two medical doctors from Cuba -- and they can give some very interesting testimony because have taken care of the wounded mercenaries. They were at the hospital called Ignace Deen. One of them -- Dr. Blas Ledesma -- can understand fairly well Creole Portuguese. He doesn't speak it, but he understands it.

Dr. LEDESMA (interpretation from Spanish): On Sunday, at around noon, we had occasion to take care of a man who said he was the captain of the group -- he used the word "captain" -- and he was an African mercenary. He said that his family name was Fernando.

I believe it is important to mention, too, that that mercenary expressed himself always in Creole.

We had occasion to seen another mercenary, who was also taken care of by us, and who also spoke Creole all the time.

Mr. OLIVA (interpretation from Spanish): That is all the testimony -- it is very brief -- that we can give on these events. We know that you have a lot of work to do.

The CHAIRMAN: Did Your Excellency see any aircraft, other than those of the Republic of Guinea?

Mr. OLIVA (interpretation from Spanish): Personally, no.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your co-operation.
Mr. Oliva and his colleagues withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. SORSOH CONTEH (SIERRA LEONE)

Mr. CONTEH: My name is Sorsoh Conteh. I am the Ambassador of Sierra Leone to the Republic of Guinea.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Excellency, for your co-operation. The Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could shed some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack by making some very brief observations.

Mr. CONTEH: First of all, I wish to thank you very much for giving me this wonderful opportunity.

On 22 November 1970, at 2 a.m. exactly, I observed -- I was in bed and I observed that my lights went off. After some inquiries I came to know that all of Conakry was without light. At that juncture I was very curious to know what was going on, and I decided to take my car and drive to the city.

About 500 yards from my house -- that was in the morning hours, at about half past seven -- I left my house at about half past seven -- at about 500 yards from my house I happened to see that there was a fight between soldiers and Boulbinet, which is the radio station. I was curious, and my curiosity was, of course, two-fold: one, because I am definitely sure that whatever happens to

(Mr. Conteh)

Guinea will surely happen to Sierra Leone because of their relationship and because of the fact that the two countries are so near to each other and because of the good relations existing between the two countries; in addition, because of the fact that I am Ambassador here. I should see things for myself and report accordingly exactly as I see them to my Government. With those aims in view I proceeded to Boulbinet.

I saw people, with my naked eyes, coming from the sea, approaching the radio station. They were armed, and were shooting. It was an open confrontation. Then I asked myself if those people were not really mad, because at the time the radio in fact had not made any broadcasts. There were some broadcasts made, but I couldn't understand what they were saying, because I was far away from the radio; I was with the people.

So the matter became very serious. I mean, it became very tense; the situation became very tense at that time. According to my assessment at that time, the invaders took the Guinean soldiers by surprise -- at least, I was not expecting anything like that. So at that particular time, you know, my first thought was that there had been a bombardment from the direction of the coast-line. I was also curious, because my First Secretary and my Second Secretary were in that area, so I wanted to go to my Chancellery to telephone my First Secretary; because at that particular time it was not even possible for me to go to my First Secretary where he was, because there was heavy shooting around that area; the situation was very, very tense.

So I went to my Chancellery in order to be able to telephone from my Chancellery to my First Secretary. But there also I even had to risk my life before getting to my Chancellery, because, unfortunately, my Chancellery is just opposite the Villa Sily at Bellevue. So, unfortunately, when I happened to enter my Chancellery I found shells -- bullets -- in the compound of my Chancellery. I was in my office telephoning my First Secretary when I saw that the shells were falling in the Chancellery from the direction of the Villa Sily, and there was thick smoke coming from the Villa. So I insisted on telephoning my First Secretary. Then, in fact, when I telephoned he informed me: "Even now, Ambassador, I can see ships in the distance -- boats painted black -- in the sea". And I told him that he should make sure that he was safe.

(Mr. Conteh)

At that time I could not stay any longer in my Chancellery, but had to get out of my Chancellery and go to my house, because at my house there at that particular time there was not too much shooting.

That was on Monday. The following day I came to the Chancellery also, because, as I said earlier on, I was very anxious to see things for myself. On the way, with my own eyes, I saw dead people. I wanted to work, but at the same time I could not work, because there was no work on Monday; it was difficult for anybody even to go to work.

Along the coast at that time the population and the Guinean soldiers were very much engaged in defending the city. So, according to my First Secretary, he did see people coming from the sea, also from his end.

That was exactly what happened between Sunday and Monday; and then, on Tuesday, also, I was to receive a delegation from Freetown. I was at the Villa André, and the Villa André is just along the coast. I saw people with my own eyes, also for the second time, coming from the sea, and I called the attention of the leader of my delegation to that.

That was on Tuesday. But during the day, after the delegation had -- I mean, after a meeting had been held between the Government and my delegation -- my delegation had to leave, heavily guarded from here to the boundary. That was at about 3 o'clock. Then nobody was safe at all, as far as I could assess things, because in actual fact the attack was so severe that you could not even risk getting out of your place. So within that period I was in my house listening constantly to the radio, until Thursday, when I was able to go to work.

I saw the events at Boulbinet myself on Sunday, and I just had to ask myself whether the invaders were not crazy, because it was an open confrontation, as I said, in broad daylight. So I think that if I had to give my own version of how I saw things, that is the way I would give it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for your kind co-operation.

Mr. Conteh withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. GUNTHER FRITSCH (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GERMANY)

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to thank you for your co-operation, Your Excellency. The Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack by making some brief observations

Mr. FRITSCH: I should like to thank you very much for the opportunity of making a statement before this Mission of the United Nations.

If you will permit me, I will make a few remarks on the attack of the mercenaries on two diplomatic members of my embassy. I should also like to make some statements on my own observations which I made from the embassy building during the morning of 22 November about movements of various warships off our embassy building; and I should also like you to allow Mr. Schmid, Second Secretary of my embassy, to make a short statement, because Mr. Schmid was arrested on the morning of 22 November by mercenaries, in violation of his diplomatic status.

On the morning of 22 November, between four and four-thirty, the Second Secretary of my embassy, Dr. Siegfried Krebs, and the Commercial Counsellor of my embassy, Mr. Fischer, wanted to go from their residence to the embassy building. They went in a diplomatic car of my embassy, and Dr. Krebs was driving the car himself. Before leaving their residence they decided to go very slowly and to stop immediately whenever somebody would ask them to stop. They chose the way called the Southern Corniche. Behind the barracks of the Garde Républicaine, suddenly, without any warning, they were shot at with several bursts of a machine pistol from behind. The car was hit by about twenty bullets, and both were immediately wounded. Several bullets hit a residential building, just on the other side, and I may inform you, Mr. Chairman, that several Guinean citizens living in that house were afterwards witness to the following scenes.

Mr. Krebs stopped the car immediately, and both were shouting that they were members of the diplomatic corps, that they were wounded, and that the men who were shooting at them should stop shooting, and that they needed medical help. And those who were shooting replied that they had no doctor and that they could not allow them to turn back -- to turn back would mean to take the shortest way to the

(Mr. Fritsch)

hospital -- Donkan Hospital. So Mr. Fischer, the Commercial Counsellor, was forced to put Mr. Krebs, who was gravely wounded, in the back of the car; and in spite of the fact that the car was destroyed very much, he succeeded in starting the engine, and then he was forced to proceed forward.

I should like to inform you, Mr. Chairman, that the wounds of Dr. Krebs, Second Secretary of the Embassy of the German Democratic Republic, were so serious that he died on the morning of the following day, despite all medical efforts, and in spite of all the help and assistance given by the Guinean authorities.

I should like to say also that I myself was at the embassy building in Conakry all the time. My embassy is situated near the sea. I can see part of the sea near a place which is called Petit Bateau. At 6.55 in the morning I noticed two warships and another ship in the sea near my embassy. Later on a third warship joined those three boats. They were moving in that area for several hours. There were many small boats, or subber boats, which were proceeding from one boat to the other, which were proceeding from the boats to a place to the right of my embassy; but there were buildings in the way, so that I could not see where they were going.

At about 11 o'clock the landing boat was approaching the pier and obviously trying to land there. The landing boat approached the dock to a distance of about twenty yards with the bow open -- meaning that it was ready to embark or disembark someone -- and then withdrew again. I watched the movement of that boat myself from the balcony of my embassy with a pair of binoculars. I could clearly see on the bridge of the boat several people of European appearance. On the deck there were many uniformed men of African appearance.

At noon-time several shots were fired at those boats. We could see the water blowing up, and we could see that that firing was responded to by a gun on one of the boats two or three times.

At about 1.30 we could see that those boats were withdrawing, but the whole afternoon we could also see three or all four boats very far off.

Now I should like, with your permission, to ask Mr. Schmid to report on his arrest by the mercenaries.

Mr. Heiner SCHMID: I left the embassy at 7.25 in the morning on the 22nd to get in connexion with our injured comrades, of whom our Ambassador told you. They were in urgent need of medical treatment. We took the Corniche Road in the opposite direction -- even though it was forbidden to go in that direction -- because on the right side in the town there was gunfire. Before we came to the point where the road turns to the left we saw two armed people walking along the road. We stopped our car and asked them, in French, whether it was possible to pass there. They didn't answer, so I repeated; I asked them if we could pass, and they didn't answer; but they waved us by hand to go ahead and pass.

(Mr. Schmid)

As soon as we turned to the left side we could see on both sides of the road, right and left, about fifteen cars that had been all damaged and destroyed by gunfire -- also a motorcycle -- but nearby one car there was a man lying, perhaps dead.

As soon as we arrived at the first gate of the area of the power station, two people armed with machine-guns came out from the left side, and two others came out from behind a tree on the right side, and forced us to stop the car. We had left the embassy with our embassy driver. He was driving the car and I was sitting on the right side. The car had a diplomatic licence, CD-246. I asked them in French to let us go through, because we needed medical help for two wounded comrades of our embassy; but there was no reply. I repeated that demand, and then they waved us by hand to get out of the car and to go to the gate. Both of us got out of the car; I took my diplomatic card and told them in French that I was a member of the Corps diplomatique and from the embassy of the German Democratic Republic. I told them that we wanted to go to Donka, that we needed medical treatment for two of our wounded comrades from our embassy.

When we arrived at the gate one of the mercenaries ordered me in English: "Hands up". So I answered in English; I told him: "I am a diplomat of the embassy of the German Democratic Republic". I raised my hands, showed him my diplomatic card, and repeated again in English that we needed urgent medical aid for two seriously wounded comrades from our embassy.

They forced us to enter the territory of the power station, and four or five mercenaries pointed their machine-guns at us. A lot of other mercenaries were inside the power station and outside, opposite the power station, on the right side of the road. One of the mercenaries came over to me -- he spoke English -- and with one hand he pushed me, while he had the finger of his other hand on the trigger. In the meantime, of course, I had my hands raised above my head. Then they forced me to get in, and after me my driver got in. Then another mercenary asked me, in English: "What do you want?" I told him again -- and I was very angry -- I told him: "We are in a hurry to bring medical help to two wounded diplomats from our embassy", but they forced us to remain inside the territory of the power station.

(Mr. Schmid)

Both of us had been guarded by four or five mercenaries. After five or six minutes we were forced to proceed inside the power station, in the direction of the main gate, but they forced us, after a few metres, to stop there, and they asked us again, in English: "What do you want in Donka? Who are you?"

Again, after a while, we were forced to proceed further, and we arrived at the entrance, at the main gate -- at the entrance to the office of the power station. There they forced our driver to bring the car inside the power station, and there I asked to get in touch with an officer to explain again that we were diplomats and that we needed urgent aid for our wounded comrades.

After a while, suddenly, someone -- it may be an officer -- arrived at the upstairs door of the main building. He was black and had a thick beard; and he told me -- also in English: "You can go". Once more he told us: "You can go". So we took the car and left the power station enclosure. After fifty metres we were stopped again, but the mercenaries there had got some orders, so we could pass.

After half an hour -- half an hour later -- we arrived at the Donka Hospital, and there we got in touch with one of our doctors; but he told us that it was necessary to bring a second doctor to start the operation on our wounded comrade, Dr. Krebs. So we started again to bring the second doctor to the hospital, but unfortunately we lost half an hour in bringing that help to our wounded friend.

Mr. FRITSCH: Mr. Chairman, I should like to state that during the morning of 22 November I myself had received many eye-witness reports from members of my embassy or from citizens of the German Democratic Republic, who were working in the Republic of Guinea and who were staying in various parts of the city and who could watch movements of boats, and movements of armed forces throughout the morning. If you are interested in written eye-witness reports of such citizens, I can make such reports available to the Commission.

I should like to state that many of these eye-witness reports are connected with statements as to the correct time. Personally, I myself and Mr. Schmid wanted to restrict ourselves to those facts which we have explained to you here.

I thank you very much, and I hope that with my remarks and my statement I have been able to help the Commission in its findings.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you very much, on behalf of the Mission, for your very valuable information.

Please accept our heartfelt condolences on the death of your comrade, and our apologies for any inconvenience we may have caused you, and our deep appreciation for your having come.

A written statement would be very much appreciated if you could send it to the Mission.

Mr. Fritsch, Mr. Fischer and Mr. Schmid withdrew.

STATEMENT BY MR. ERNEST SCHMID (SWITZERLAND)

Mr. SCHMID (interpretation from French): I am the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires, and my name is Ernest Schmid. Would you like me to speak in English or to speak French?

The CHAIRMAN: Whatever you prefer.

Mr. SCHMID: I am fluent in both.

The CHAIRMAN: The Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you would throw some light on the origin and possible motive of the attack by making some brief observations.

Mr. SCHMID: I will stick to the absolute truth, and all I can say is what I have seen and what I have lived through, and nothing else.

We were awakened during the night from Saturday to Sunday at around 3 o'clock by some shooting. At the same time, the lights went out; the air-conditioners stopped. We did not move; we stayed inside, and towards 6 o'clock we turned on the radio to listen to any news that might come over the radio.

There was no news until a little after 8 o'clock when we heard about the attack. We heard shooting going on all the time, and we did not dare go out because we were afraid that it might endanger our lives.

I should add that we lived not right at the beach, but behind another residence, at the side of the Chinese Embassy and the Hungarian Embassy. So we had no view of what was going on on the beach; we did not see any soldiers at all, either Guinean or any others.

At about 10 o'clock or ten thirty, or eleven -- I don't remember exactly -- I went out. There was a lull in the shooting, and I went over to the American Embassy. There I saw some members of the household at the beach. I joined them, and we were looking out to sea. There we could distinguish some boats.

(Mr. Schmid)

It seemed that two were close; and with binoculars I could see that there were two more farther away. I did not see any movement of boats between the beach and those ships, and I could not determine the nationality of any of the boats, or distinguish or any signs or numbers. They were too far away.

So I went back to my residence, and at about mid-day we heard planes -- or a plane, at one time -- flying over the residence, along the beach towards the port; and a few minutes after that I saw a plane turning -- flying back in the other direction a little further away.

That was repeated about three times, I would say -- about two times or three times; I am not definite.

Late in the afternoon I went back to the beach at the American Embassy, and I did not see any more boats. From then on we stayed inside all the time until Monday morning, when I went to my office.

There seems to have been very heavy fighting during almost all day Sunday and the night from Sunday to Monday.

I think that is all I can say. If you have any questions I shall be pleased to answer.

Mr. NWAANGA: Can you possibly tell us the colours of the boats that you saw?

Mr. SCHMID: I would say they were undistinguishable -- rather light in colour -- but I couldn't tell whether they were green or not. They were some light colours; that's all I could say. They were too far away for me to make any distinction.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Can you tell us where the planes were coming from, where they were going -- in what direction -- and whether you were able to see any distinctive markings on them?

Mr. SCHMID: Judging from the location of our Embassy, I would say they were coming from the direction of the airport -- flying towards the airport -- at a very low altitude; I could not distinguish them, even

(Mr. Schmid)

though they flew over the house -- or seemed to, anyway; it was a terrible noise. When I ran out they were gone.

They were each time flying back in the same direction, but further inland; so I could have a view for a short time. They were flying in the direction of the airport.

From the view I had of the plane I would say it was the same plane I had seen flying over the stadium on 14 May, and the same as I had seen yesterday afternoon at the airport.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your co-operation.

Mr. Schmid withdrew.

STATEMENT BY MR. PAUL GREGOIRE (BELGIUM)

The CHAIRMAN: The Mission would like to welcome the distinguished representative of Belgium.

Before we start, however, may I say that we have received various information. To speed up matters, perhaps you could throw some light on the origin and possible motives, and on the identity, of the aggressors in a very brief way. That would help to speed up matters.

Mr. GREGOIRE (interpretation from French): There is not much that I can tell you, but I can speak to you about the four ships. I am sure that every other person must have spoken to you about them. I have seen the four ships. On the morning of the 22nd, at 10:30, I saw two speedboats coming from them in the direction Camayenne and Camp Boiro. Of course, they were too far -- I was too far away to be able to see them well and to identify them in any manner. Afterwards, later on, I saw four ships go away to sea. I was never near enough to be able to identify them or to see the people who were aboard them.

(Mr. Grégoire)

In addition to that, I went by the back of Camp Boiro at 9.30 in the morning. I was coming from the Belgian Embassy. Therefore I was going in the direction of a district called Landrea Dnka. I was going from east to west. Therefore I was going from the back of the Camp -- between the back of the Camp and the sea.

At about twelve o'clock or at twelve fifteen, after the boats had left, I saw two armed soldiers in the Camp.

That is all I can tell you.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your co-operation.

Mr. Grégoire withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. AMADOU LAMINE DIALLO (SENEGAL)

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, we welcome you to this meeting.

The Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack by making some brief observations.

Mr. DIALLO (interpretation from French): My name is Amadou Lamine Diallo, Ambassador of Senegal to the Republic of Guinea.

When the events took place I was not here. I arrived here on Monday, but my councillor lived through them completely and was present at several scenes which he is going to narrate to you.

I have several hypotheses myself, all of which are valid.

There is one hypothesis according to which Portugal started this use of force in order to recover prisoners taken in Guinea (Bissau) by the PAIGC, joining mercenaries from Africa and even from Europe together with traitors to Guinea, thinking that they might be able to start a movement to overthrow the Government of Guinea.

(Mr. Diallo)

I also believe that the attitude of the various Powers in respect of Portugal is an encouragement. For Guinea (Bissau) and for South Africa, the indifference of the non-African Governments is an encouragement to keep up this situation. And it is a mistake to consider that the incident is over. It is very possible that in another form Portugal might try another aggression. It would be a great mistake to consider that the incident is now closed. The seriousness is still the same; the threat is permanent as long as Portugal continues to want to own a part of Africa that does not belong to it; and to the degree that the resistance has some success, Portugal will become even more nervous, and the incidents may multiply.

For the moment, that is all I can say. My councillor is the one who saw the facts, in the presence of other witnesses, and who can make a statement.

Mr. N'DIAYE (interpretation from French): My name is Babacar N'Diaye. I am the counsellor of the Senegal Embassy at Conakry. I live not far from the harbour of Conakry.

On Sunday morning, at about 7 a.m., I saw ships and small landing boats shuttling between the large ships and the shoreline. I counted three large ships and five smaller boats, one of which was very fast. It went back and forth very quickly. They were very easily visible, and I continued seeing them until 9.30 in the morning.

Some time afterwards an aeroplane, which without any doubt was not Guinean, overflew the city several times. I live in a small building -- a four-storey building. On the roof there is a place for washing and another for drying clothes, and that's the point from which I saw all the operations. In the same building there are some United Nations experts who live there; and during one part of my observations I was with an expert from WHO and another one from ILO, who, like me, were present at all these events.

I do not have much to add to what was said by our Ambassador, which is the expression of our point of view, and the point of view of our Government; and I can say that it is also the point of view of any conscientious African.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you very much for your co-operation.

Mr. Diallo and Mr. N'Diaye withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. PETER AFOLABIE (NIGERIA)

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Your Excellency, for your visit to this Mission.

Mr. AFOLABIE: Thank you for giving us this opportunity to say a few things about what we saw.

I am Peter Afolabie, Nigerian Ambassador to Guinea.

On Sunday morning I was on my way to pick up my colleague, the Tanzanian Ambassador, who lives just on the waterfront -- on the Corniche -- when I saw, opposite Donka Hospital, an army vehicle stopped, with about three dead bodies of Guinean soldiers. Opposite it you have the prison, and I saw several prisoners out, in a sitting position, with two guards who gave the impression that perhaps they were guards from the Guinean Gendarmerie. Before I went to the Tanzanian Ambassador's House, I heard sounds of shots and so forth and I was asked to go back. He said that mercenaries were disembarking on the waterfront. So I came back the same way, and nothing happened to me.

That same afternoon I went around and I saw armoured cars on the street. I think they were trying to smoke out mercenaries from Camp Camory in town or the other Camp.

But the most vivid experience I had was the sighting of something which could be conclusively proved as a submarine. I live on Corniche Nord. Palm trees don't grow in the seas anywhere, and it looked like a camouflaged submarine which came up holding a palm tree, somehow. It stopped there for five minutes, possibly taking photographs, and it moved towards the house where Dr. Nkrumah lives, stopped there too, and moved on.

The CHAIRMAN: Would Your Excellency like to make a very brief observation as to the origin and possible motive of that aggression?

Mr. AFOLABIE: Well, I think that that would be saying too much to give you the origin and then the motive, because I haven't cleared what I am saying to you now with my Government. In the first place, I think my Government is entitled to have these statements. In any event, I can tell you briefly that the motive is nothing but to test the capability or incapability of the black man, and the black race; because, in my experience, I have never seen such a bold attempt by foreign troops to enter another country.

As for the origin, I don't want to go into that, but the motive is clear: to assault the Republic of Guinea, because the very way in which the whole thing was conducted was most insulting: they were there from 2 o'clock until about mid-day, you know, just going around nonchalantly, watching to see what Guinea would do. Maybe it was in reprisal for certain things -- I don't know -- but it proved that there was aggression against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Guinea.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Your Excellency, for your co-operation.

Mr. Afolabie withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. ALBERT W. SHERER, JR. (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, for the record, would you care to state your name for the record?

Mr. SHERER: My name is Albert W. Sherer, Jr. I am the American Ambassador here in Conakry.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, the Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our own work we would be grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack by making a very brief observation.

Mr. SHERER: Well, Mr. Chairman, I can tell you what I saw, if that would be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN: That would be welcome.

Mr. SHERER: I was awakened at about 3 o'clock in the morning on Sunday, November 22nd, by the sound of gunfire, which appeared to me to be rifles, machine-gun fire, as well as mortar fire, and some heavier weapons.

I turned on the radio to see if there was any explanation of that on the Voice of the Revolution, but the radio was silent. At about 6.30 in the morning the American Embassy doctor called me to say that the German Ambassador wished him to go to the home of a German Federal Republic technician who had been injured. But just as he was starting to leave his house an American Peace Corps Volunteer walked in, who was also wounded. The doctor asked me for instructions, and I told him to remain at his own home until we had determined how many other persons had been hurt.

At about 8 o'clock in the morning, the Voice of the Revolution came on the air to describe what had happened and what was continuing to happen; and at that time I walked out into my garden, which is adjacent to the beach. I saw there a ship that looked to me like a Second World War LST. That ship was flanked by two white ships a little astern of it, and my first impression was that whatever had caused the firing in the night -- which I assumed was the black ship -- had been captured by the Guinean navy.

I went back upstairs, however, to get my binoculars, and I could then see that the two white ships and the black ship were working in tandem and that the white ships were escorting what appeared to be small motor boats back and forth from the big ship to the shore. Those two white ships were later joined by a third white ship, which also seemed to be operating as a unit with the others.

Those ships remained within my view until about 11 o'clock in the morning, when they disappeared over the horizon, and I myself never saw them again.

There was then a relative calm until approximately 2 p.m., when very heavy firing broke out not far from my residence, and I assumed that that was a fire-fight over the Gendarmerie camp, which, I understand, had been occupied by the invaders some time earlier in the day. That very heavy firing went on until about

(Mr. Sherer)

5 p.m., when there was a lull, until about 8 p.m., when a company of soldiers came into my garden and fired out toward the sea; and that firing kept up from approximately 8 p.m. on the evening of the 22nd until dawn of the 23rd.

After that the American Embassy returned to work, and as far as we were concerned, the one-day war had finished.

Mr. MWAANGA: Mr. Ambassador, is it possible to say whether, in your opinion, there was a foreign element involved in the invasion, or not?

Mr. SHERER: Well, I assumed that there had been foreign participation, because I had never seen that black boat before, and I had never heard that Guinea owned an LST-type vessel. In fact, after I saw them working in tandem, I was quite sure I had never seen the white boats either in Guinean waters in the eight months I had been there.

Mr. Ismael TOURE (interpretation from French): Mr. Ambassador, on behalf of the Guinean side, may I ask you whether you can say whether those ships that you saw were warships -- the black or the white ships?

Mr. SHERER: Well, the black ship, which I have described as an LST, was used during the Second World War in conjunction with naval operations. It was usually a supply ship or a troop ship of some kind. The white boats looked to me like either coastal patrol vessels or even perhaps like rich men's yachts that one might have seen in the 1930s sailing in the Mediterranean -- maybe you still see them today; I haven't been there.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your kind co-operation.

Mr. Sherer withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. HANS CHRISTIAN LANKES (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY)

Mr. LANKES (interpretation from French): I am Hans Christian Lankes, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The CHAIRMAN: We welcome you to this meeting, Your Excellency.

This Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could shed some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack by giving us some brief observations.

Mr. LANKES: Shall I speak French or English?

The CHAIRMAN: Whatever you prefer.

Mr. LANKES: I think it is a little easier for me in English.

You are asking me not about what I have seen and observed, but about what I think; is that right?

The CHAIRMAN: Make your observations brief; you may do whatever you like.

Mr. LANKES: Let me give facts -- things I have experienced myself during these tragic days.

It started, as you certainly know, on Sunday night. I became aware of the unusual situation at about 3.30. One hour later I was informed by telephone that a German family had been badly hurt by what was obviously a bazooka in the La Minière-Bellevue section. A little later I was informed that another compatriot of mine had been found very badly wounded on the street in the same region.

I was occupied during the next hours in bringing assistance, as much as possible, to my compatriots.

I should like to state at this moment that I was greatly helped in this by Guinean doctors, who, amongst other things, put an ambulance at my disposal in order to try to save the life of the second man who had been found on the street.

(Mr. Lankes)

Alas, that help came too late: when I arrived at the house where all these people whom I mentioned had been brought in the meantime with that ambulance, the man who had been found on the street had died.

On my way back and forth from my residence to that house, which is situated in the La Minière quarter, I observed some dead people in uniform on the street. I observed, when I passed between Camp Mamadou Boiro and Donka Hospital in order to enter Donka Hospital with the ambulance with the corpse in it, and on my way back from the hospital -- I observed that the camp gave a very strange aspect: I saw soldiers -- men in uniform -- at the wide-open gate, who, in my opinion, were not Guinean soldiers. Their uniforms were olive-green, as most uniforms are nowadays, but they had some accessories -- some additional -- I don't know what it really was, but they seemed to be -- in my mind they were clearly not Guinean soldiers, at any rate.

When I finally reached my home, which is in Donka, right at the seaside, for the first time I had time to -- if you will excuse me -- to satisfy my curiosity. I could clearly see from my garden at the beach four ships cruising in the bay in front of that stretch of coastline. One of those ships -- I guessed their distance to have been a maximum of two miles -- was, in my opinion, a warship. It was grey-brown and had a long flat fore-deck filled with men. I couldn't make out any number or other marking. I think it was what is called an LST. All -- at least three -- boats were at such a close distance. The other two -- at least one of them -- were white. They looked like passenger boats for river traffic. The fourth was too far for me to be able to make out any details.

Those four boats -- or three, at least -- were shot at by Guinean artillery. I saw the impact in the water -- the resulting fountain -- and each time such a bomb exploded in the water, the ships would change their course. That went on for several hours.

In the mid-afternoon, I would say, on Sunday, the four ships went off. I saw them disappear behind the islands of Tamara Kassa.

For the rest of my observations I think I can be short.

There was very, very heavy fighting in our neighbourhood -- that is to say, in Camp Mamadou Boiro -- until six or seven, maybe, in the evening. Then there was some calm.

(Mr. Lankes)

During that fighting, some men of the police came into our house, and they started out again into the fight; and then during the night there was, all night long, heavy shooting, which continued more or less during the next day -- that is to say, Monday -- and again on the night of Monday-Tuesday, which was filled with shots of all kinds.

I think that's about all I can contribute in the way of facts.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your co-operation.

My friend from Guinea would like to ask you a question.

Mr. Ismael TOURE (interpretation from French): Mr. Ambassador, you stated -- and I should like to ask this for the Guinean side -- you stated before that you had seen soldiers wearing accessories that were not customary Guinean accessories. Can you tell us something more about those accessories?

Mr. LANKES: I am afraid not very much, because, as you will understand, I did not care to stop. In the first place, when I went to the hospital I had a corpse in back of my car. All I wanted was to reach the hospital. He was dead, and in a horrible state. And on my way back from the hospital I passed, as I said, the gate. By the way -- I forgot -- there I saw another dead soldier in front of the gate next to a military car.

But as for your question asking for specification about the accessories, I would say that it was something green -- I don't know the special expression -- they were ornaments -- green arm-bands.

And, Gentlemen, since you want some kind of conclusion from me, it is obvious from everything I have said -- and, naturally, I have heard much more than I have observed myself -- that this attack came from outside of Guinea. I myself have not the slightest doubt that this was an attack based outside Guinean territory.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your co-operation.

Mr. LANKES: Gentlemen, my Italian colleague has asked me to hand over this written statement of his. He had the same intention, but was unable to be here today.

Mr. M'BAYE (interpretation from French): Would it be possible for the letter to be read into the record?

The letter, in French, was read out by the interpreter.

Mr. Lankes withdrew.

STATEMENT BY MR. VASCO CABRAL (PAIGC)

Mr. CABRAL (interpretation from French): My name is Vasco Cabral; I am a member of the Political Bureau of the PAIGC. My comrade to my left Irenio Nascimento Lopes. He is one of the people responsible for our navy.

The other is Comrade Mateus Correira, who is one of the commanders of our navy.

The CHAIRMAN: We welcome you to this meeting, Sir.

This Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack by making some brief observations.

Mr. CABRAL (interpretation from French): First of all, I am very happy to be here and to be able to make a contribution as to the origin of the Portuguese invasion, which was also against our party.

We can tell you that we have here the magnetic tapes that were recorded at the time the Portuguese colonialists were preparing to withdraw. I was with my comrades at the time, and we heard over the radio orders being given in Portuguese. I immediately gave the order to my comrades to tape those messages. Unfortunately, we could not tape everything, but we have a sufficient part to be able to prove to you the participation of Portuguese colonialists, about which we have no doubt. In one of the tapes, only

(Mr. Cabral)

Portuguese is spoken. One of the tapes is exclusively in Portuguese, and we taped it at the time of the aggression; and there is absolutely no question that the whole conversation was in Portuguese.

Now, the other tape we recorded on 25 November. Thanks to our watchful services, they heard these radio messages, and we obtained a tape of them. We even tried to answer those messages, and this part is in French. But we have both tapes in one box, and we have two copies.

(Spoke in English)

It is for you; we give you these two copies.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Mr. CABRAL (interpretation from French): On the other hand, these comrades who are at my side participated directly in the events. Comrade Mateus Correira was at the harbour, and he is the one who directed the group attacking the mercenaries. It would be very good to hear him about the events, since he lived through them; and I shall translate what he says.

Mr. CORREIRA (interpretation from Portuguese): Comrades: On 22 November at two in the morning I was at the port of Boulbinet, and I saw a group of mercenaries disembarking. Another group of mercenaries came at 3.30 in the morning. I saw the boats disembarking them; and afterwards the boats went back. I was watching, and I asked: "Who goes there?" There was no answer.

I gave the order to stop -- in Portuguese -- and they answered in Portuguese. I said: "Where are you going?" They said: "Come on; let's go -- fast!"

I wanted to fire on those invaders, but they mixed in with the fishermen who were present, and therefore I decided not to fire.

After those people had left, I went in search of information, and I approached a person who turned out to be a guard for Radio Guinea; and when I got close to him I saw that he had been wounded in his foot; and I asked him what had happened, and he replied that the aggressors had fired against him and that they were counter-revolutionaries.

(Mr. Correira)

There were thirty-six of us, and when they came towards us, instead of the attackers firing it was the defenders who were firing and we saw that two of them had their hands up, and we managed to take some prisoners. We caught three of them alive, and the others got away. They were already in the water, and were swimming away.

After that I managed to take three prisoners -- the chief, who had this radio-communications apparatus here (indicating) and the G-3 rifle, which is over there in the corner (indicating).

He put the radio-transmitter and the rifle on the ground.

Later, we spoke to our Guinean comrades. We gave them the prisoners. The Guinean soldiers also asked for the weapons, and we said to them: "No, we need these weapons".

We also captured a loaded G-3 rifle. It had its own bullets; there was also a loading gadget, and there were hand grenades.

Then those who were swimming away -- we fired at them and killed several of them.

After that, I spoke to Lieutenant Balla, and I shouted: "Long live the revolution of Guinea! Long live Comrade Sekou Touré!"

Mr. CABRAL (interpretation from French): As to Comrade Irenio Nascimento Lopes, he was on one of our boats in the harbour. The mercenaries approached that boat; the patrols that approached it were silent, and they managed to board our boat and surprise our men, and they killed two of them. He is going to tell you how that happened.

Mr. LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): On that day, early in the morning, it was hot on the ship, and I was on deck. I was sitting on the deck in order to get some fresh air. After some time I saw three boats with silent engines. In those boats there were soldiers wearing olive-green uniforms. They were wearing steel helmets, and the weapons that I saw were A.K. weapons. I thought they were troops from Guinea because the steel helmets are the same; the weapons are the same; the uniforms are the same. They started to get on board -- on deck. But when I saw that one of those had got a bayonet out in order to attack a comrade who was lying on deck, and at the same time I heard them speak Portuguese, I started to think: "Where did those men come from?"

When I got up -- because I was sitting -- one of them shouted, in Portuguese: "Look: there's one of them there"; and then that one shot at me; and at that time we began hearing shots. The comrade who was lying on deck was the pilot, Alexandre. He was killed. After that they killed the Captain, Augusto Costa. But the attack did not last more than ten minutes. At that time they went back to their boats, and their boats left, going away from the shore. At daybreak there was a frigate in the bay. There were also two speedboats and one large landing craft.

That's what happened.

Mr. MWAANGA: Thank you very much indeed. I just want to know if it is possible, from your own knowledge, to identify some of the arms that you captured. Where do you think the arms were manufactured?

Mr. LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): Those weapons -- we who are accustomed to them for a long time know that they are made in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. KULAGA: I should like to ask if there were any markings on the captured arms, and, if so, in what language.

Mr. LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): This at least has something written in Portuguese (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN: Will you identify that for the record, please.

Mr. LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): This is a receiver-transmitter (indicating), and this is a bazooka rocket (indicating). These objects themselves are here to be taken by the Mission.

Mr. CABRAL (interpretation from French): And you may take this (indicating). We would like to keep these objects (indicating). You may take pictures of them, if you wish; you may take down what the inscription reads.

The INTERPRETER: Referring to this transmitter-receiver, here it says: "Canal"; here it says "Puxar e Rodar"; here it says "Ext. o int"; here it says "Vol."

On the other side it says: "Retirar a Pilha"; and under that it says: "Antes de Armazenar".

The CHAIRMAN: The Mission is very grateful for all your co-operation.

Mr. CABRAL (interpretation from French): And we wish you good work and a happy journey.

Mr. Cabral, Mr. Lopes and Mr. Correira withdrew.

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. MOHAMED HASAN ADAMI (INDONESIA)

Mr. ADAMI: First of all, my name is Mohamed Hasan Adami, the First Secretary of the Embassy of Indonesia.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. First Secretary, the Mission has gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack by making some very brief observations.

Mr. ADAMI: Thank you, Sir.

First of all, I want to limit myself to what I experienced myself. I cannot say any more than that.

Most of my delegation -- and I -- live with other Indonesian families in the section where the Catholic mission compound is located. On 22 November, at 2 o'clock in the morning we woke up as usual -- because we are Muslims, you see -- to prepare our dinner, because this is the month of Ramadan.

Suddenly we heard some shooting -- shooting of cannon, or I don't know what kind of shooting, but it was far away from our compound. We had never heard that before in Conakry, so we were surprised by what had happened.

After that, because we did not know what had happened, we shut off our lamps, and then, after finishing our dinner, we stayed up until late in the morning. Then, around 6 o'clock, I saw on the road near our compound, a movement of armed men. We didn't know who they were, but they were armed men, and we wanted to know who they were, so we all waited for the morning radio broadcasts of Radio Guinea.

At 8 o'clock we heard that the radio was functioning normally. Only at 10 o'clock did we know what happened, because on Radio Guinea we found out that there had been a landing on the coast of Guinea. That is all I experienced on that day -- on Sunday.

On Monday we heard only the shooting at night and some shooting during the daytime. All of us at the mission stayed at home at that time, so we don't know what happened in town.

That's all I can tell you.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your co-operation.

Mr. Adami withdrew.

STATEMENT BY MR. MOUZAFFAR KOUBROUSLY (SYRIA)

Mr. KOUBROUSLY (interpretation from French): I am the Minister-Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires of Syria in Conakry.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Counsellor, we in the Mission have gathered a lot of information about the fact that an armed external attack was carried out against the Republic of Guinea; and in order to speed up our work we would be grateful if you could throw some light on the origin and possible motive of that attack by making some very brief observations.

Mr. KOUBROUSLY (interpretation from French): I shall try to brief.

On the night between Saturday and Sunday, at about four in the morning, I was awakened by very strong firearm noise. Of course, I did not know what was happening, and I tried to find out. All I can say is that those firearm shots came from the sea. In the morning, at about 8.30, I listened to radio Conakry, and I learned that it was an imperialist aggression against the Republic of Guinea; that there had been a landing of military Portuguese troops on the shores at Conakry. At eleven -- or a little bit before eleven, to be exact -- I noticed some small boats on board which were armed European military personnel. They were going from the coast towards the sea -- towards the high seas -- to a point where, with my own eyes, I saw four warships.

As to my personal conviction, it was an armed military Portuguese aggression; it was an armed aggression by armed Portuguese Europeans.

That is all.

Mr. MWAANGA: Mr. Minister-Counsellor, you said that you are convinced that this was an armed European Portuguese act of aggression. What makes you feel so convinced about that.

Mr. KOUBROUSLY (interpretation from French): With my own eyes I saw those military personnel in the small boats going back towards the big boats; and I am convinced that it was such an act of aggression.

(Mr. Koubrously)

In addition, I have heard radio Guinea stating that it was an aggression by the Portuguese, and I believe that the official statement of the Government of the Republic of Guinea is a document; it is the truth; it is an axiom that does not need to be demonstrated.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. The Mission is very grateful to you.

Mr. Koubrously withdrew.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): We shall now hear the recording of the communication.

Mr. M'BAYE (interpretation from French): One point of information, please: you have noticed that many Ambassadors were speaking about the same number of boats, and some of the Portuguese from Portuguese Guinea were indicating another number; so I think a clarification is necessary.

This (indicating) is an approximate map of Conakry. Here is the Palais du Peuple, where we are staying, on this side (indicating); here is the Corniche Sud (indicating); the Corniche Nord is on the other side (indicating); and on this side (indicating) is the residential area, where Camp Boiro is located and where the Ambassador of the United States and the Ambassador, I think, of Germany are living; and here (indicating) is the Catholic Mission that Mr. Adami just mentioned, and also the radio station; and this (indicating) is the present Statehouse; and around here (indicating) you have the harbour of Conakry.

So that is why in listening to them you see that the numbers were different; but as far as the Portuguese are concerned, from the numbers indicated you will in any event have a sufficient idea to make an evaluation. But it was necessary to give this clarification in order for you to have a clear picture of the situation.

The INTERPRETER: Could you please draw an arrow to indicate north.

Mr. M'BAYE (interpretation from French): I did that: Corniche Nord; Corniche Sud (indicating).

The INTERPRETER: He means that Conakry is a peninsula.

The CHAIRMAN: We can make a copy of this in New York.

Mr. DE BRITO: Here it is impossible to get the exact contents

The CHAIRMAN: What shall we do next, then?

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Your Excellencies, I believe we have finished the first part. What I regret is that everyone is probably terribly hungry now. Unfortunately, we had expected to finish somewhat earlier than this, and had planned a meal at Kindia; and I believe it would be advantageous if we made haste and got there as soon as possible. We believe that in an hour and a half we could be there. As soon as we get there we shall have a meal, before we go on to the second phase. We have already made a telephone call, so the authorities there can put at our disposal people whom we can hear quickly; after which we shall come immediately to Conakry.

I wish you lots of courage to get over the difficulties of this day.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Your Excellency, for your apologies, but I can assure you that we do not feel that tired.

The meeting rose at 4:40 p.m.

Eighth meeting, held at Camp Kémé Bouréma, Kindia,
on Friday, 27 November 1970, at 8 p.m.

Persons heard:

Mr. Sékou Cherif, Minister Delegate of Basse Guinée
Mr. João Januario Lopes
Mr. Mario Dias
Mr. Pinto Oliveira Sa
Mr. José C6
Mr. José Bubacar Embalo
Mr. Francisco José Miguel Sampaio
Mr. Djalo Adama

Mr. Sékou CHERIF (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman of the Mission, distinguished representatives of the United Nations Special Mission: It is a real pleasure for me, on behalf of the Government and of the party, to welcome you to Kindia. As you know, and as is known everywhere in the world, an event has just taken place in Guinea -- an event without any precedent in contemporary history. Our country has just been the victim of an aggression from the Government of Portugal -- the imperialist Government of Portugal -- which had trained mercenaries outside the territory of Guinea in order to carry out this attack against the Republic of Guinea.

Our Government found it necessary to send an appeal to the Security Council, which, in turn, appointed this Mission to come here to see and hear the irrefutable evidence of that aggression. We therefore count upon your objectivity, Gentlemen, in the fulfilment of your Mission.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to thank you for the very cordial hospitality you have accorded to all of us. I can assure you that our method will always be objective.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Excellencies, you are here, as you know, as I told you at Conakry before we left there, in order to continue the work that you started this morning. You have already heard most of the witnesses -- mainly diplomats -- and all that is left now is the hearing of the prisoners in order for you to have complete information. You know that it is late and that we all want to get back to Conakry tonight. Therefore, in view of the fact that we also know how long it takes to interview even one witness, we have asked the authorities here to send us a limited number of prisoners.

Your Mission, after that, we hope, will have received all the clarification it may need.

We also have here to our left an ad hoc interpreter who will interpret from Portuguese-Creole. That is to say, if any of the prisoners speak Portuguese in its literary form, your interpreter will take care of interpreting his statements. Otherwise, if they should speak Portuguese-Creole, then the other, ad hoc, interpreter will take care of that.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Your Excellency for the statement you have made, and we think a limited number of witnesses would be enough in order to fulfil our Mission.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Because there are more than sixty -- up to seventy -- if we hear them all, we shall be here until tomorrow evening.

TESTIMONY OF JOÃO JANUARIO LOPES AND MARIO DIAS

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): My name is João Januario Lopes. I was born on 5 December 1945 at Bissau. On 5 May 1966 I entered the Practical School of Cavalry at Santaren. I was a recruit in that school. After three months I went to the Sergeants Training Centre at Tavira, Portugal. I was a recruit in Santaren for nine months.

After nine months of instruction, I was mobilized by the regiment -- Regiment No. 15 at Tavira. I was there until 26 April 1967. On that date I embarked to come to Guinea. The journey lasted five days. On May 1st we arrived in Bissau, but my battalion only disembarked on May 2nd. After that we were in barracks at Bra, and we were part of a force which is under the Chief of the armed forces of Guinea. We then went to Mansoa in order to complete the operational phase; and after one month and fifteen days we went back to Bissau, from where we departed to the sector of Teixeira Pinto.

When we arrived at Teixeira Pinto, the battalion had to wait; but since I belonged to an operational company, I was transferred to the following three places in succession: Pelundo, Jol and Co.

After that, our mission was almost completed, but an additional effort was required of us: they had to open the road between Mansaba and Farim, and three combat groups from our battalion were sent there for that purpose.

After my stay in Mansaba I went back to Bissau, where, because I had already served the maximum time, I went back to my battalion among my comrades. After that, our commander invited us to serve an additional period.

(Prisoner Lopes)

That time, that additional period of time, is the period that I am now serving; but because I had a fever and I was tired, I spent some time on the continent -- in Portugal; and on the 21st of last month -- of October -- I went back to Bissau.

After spending two days in Bissau I was asked to wait for transportation at Bafata. There we received a note which said that we must have our company ready for a possible departure. When we were at Bafata we were waiting. We were ready to leave the camp, and we waited for a week. After three or four days a note arrived that stated that the personnel had to be ready to leave for Enchale. That trip took place, and we went to that place for a period of ten days.

Our activity during the ten days was patrolling. After those ten days we went back to Fa. We led a normal life in that place, and in view of the fact that the commander was not there and the major was not there, I was the person with the highest rank. There was no commander and no major. We waited for awhile, and one day a note came which said: "Prepare the group; prepare automobiles in order to receive forty men who are coming from Bissau".

The group arrived at our place. There was a major, a captain, and twenty-eight men. The major and the captain congratulated me. They said "There are no problems", and the personnel was reinforced. The commandant said: "We are going to prepare this" -- that is to say, the company; but I didn't know what to do. Then they said: "You must get ready; get the people ready". And I asked: "For how many days?" They said: "We are going to be out for ten or fifteen days", and I asked them to prepare the clothing necessary to be out for fifteen days -- to be out where, though, we did not know.

This happened on Friday, and on Monday we left. We left from Fa Mandinga to Babadinca. We left Fa at 3 a.m.

Then we got to Chim, and we had to wait for half an hour. Therefore, an L.D.G came -- a military launch.

(Prisoner Lopes)

After Chim, this L.D.G transported us to an island called Suga. The trip lasted six or seven hours, and we arrived the next morning. The boat reached that place, but we didn't disembark. The island was on the left side. A message arrived by radio saying that the personnel which was on board couldn't land and that the personnel that was on land had no permission to contact the people on board.

Then there was great confusion among our people, because everyone was asking: "Where are we going?" and the people would answer: "I don't know". The commandant himself said, "I don't know", and our spirits started to decrease, because they didn't tell us what was going to happen; we didn't know with any certainty what was going to happen, so the confusion grew.

There were theories that we were going to go to Como; others said we were going to Cape Verde. Still others said we were going to Teixeira Pinto.

When one day was left before we had to go we received an order. We had been at sea for four days. The order was to land and leave our weapons and uniforms there because they were going to give us others.

I was the first one to land, and I saw many people join; so I began to mistrust the situation. I was wondering: where are they from? And I didn't know. But I met a young boy who told me that Conakry was their land, and I said: "Are we going to take them there?" And he said: "Yes, you will take them there and they will stay there".

When I was back on board I told my comrades what had happened -- what I had found out. I asked them: "Do you know where we're going?" And they said: "We're going to Conakry; we're going to take these people there. Would you agree to this?"

I wouldn't, and they all answered: "No, we're not in agreement". The sergeant didn't agree; the soldiers didn't agree. Even a major, who was there, didn't agree.

And then a commandant came -- his name is Commander Galvao -- and he had the major imprisoned because he was insubordinate, and he had him taken to Bissau.

(Prisoner Lopes)

After the major was away for one day, he returned with a general and with Galvao, and they told us: "Look, we aren't going to remain there; all we're going to do is take these people over there. We leave them; we go back. The company, of course, is capable of doing this. Those of you who refuse will be put in gaol for two years".

Then we started thinking of our families. We told the officers: "But listen: If we go there and we attack the Republic of Guinea, then they would be entitled to do the same thing to us. They might want to come back and to kill our relatives. Then would you be happy with that?" I myself have no mother, but I have an old father, and I have a three-month-old son, and my whole family is there, and we were all asking about these things.

There was more confusion, and the officers tried to convince the men. They said: "These people that you are going to take there, they're the owners of the land; they have arranged things with the others who are already there. There will be no problems, and this is the only solution to the Guinea war".

The general assured us that our families would not be forgotten -- that they would be very well treated if anyone had a stroke of bad luck. As for me, I said: "I can't have this stroke of bad luck, because I have a brother in Guinea, and if things turn for the worse, I'll stay in Guinea".

(Prisoner Lopes)

They said: "No, of course there won't be any problem. All you have to do is take these people there. The operation can even be cancelled if it should not be successful". They themselves counted on 95 per cent of success. Therefore we came.

When we saw that there was no other way out, we had to take a chance, and we came. The forces that called themselves of the Republic of Guinea and which we call of the Republic of Guinea were made up of 150 men, approximately. They were the people we were going to bring here. My company was also made up of 150 men, and the detachment of special marines was made up of 80 men.

These forces were sub-divided into small groups. Each group was assigned to a boat. There were six boats.

As I was saying, we were divided into small groups, and we each took one ship. The ship I was on -- I believe, but I'm not sure -- left first. Each boat left at a different time. Now, we left there at eight in the evening and we arrived here at ten on the next evening -- that is, more than twenty-four hours later.

When we arrived and we began seeing the lights of Conakry, a strange thing happened: many of the people didn't know where we were going; others didn't believe that we were coming here; and they began to judge that we were going towards Cape Verde and that the lights we were seeing were the lights of Cape Verde; and I thought to myself: "Oh, if you only knew where we are, instead of in Cape Verde".

When we came within sight of the red light which indicates that land is there, they came to call us. At least they came to call me, because I travel by sea with difficulty: I vomited very much during that trip, and Captain Morais came to see me.

He had dyed his skin black. Then he told us: "You're going to jump to shore"; and I said: "What do you mean, jump to shore? We were told that it's the others who'll go to shore". And he said: "We can't do otherwise; those are the orders we have".

There were six small boats on board. They were thrown overboard into the sea. The men were divided into small groups -- one small group to each of the six boats. I myself did not have a group; I was going as an assistant to the Captain. The Captain was in a boat which was in front, and I was in a boat which was in the rear.

(Prisoner Lopes)

When we got into these boats we went towards the land, and when we were near land, we saw two small boats which I assumed were fishing boats, and I spoke to the Captain -- Captain Morais -- and I said: "Look, these people will give the alarm", and he said to me: "Don't worry; don't be afraid"; and I said: "I'm not afraid. If you're a man, I'm a man, too". That was the conversation with Captain Morais of the paratroopers.

When we got to shore we disembarked, and we were then told that our mission was to attack the airport and to destroy the MIGs. They told us that Commander Galvao had to destroy the headquarters of PAIGC; that another group was going to destroy the post office; another group was going to destroy the broadcasting station; and others were going to places that I don't know.

We were left by a wall. We climbed the wall, and then I saw the airport, and I stopped and made a signal for my people to stop. The Captain who was with me was in front of me. He went on, and he didn't notice that we had stopped, and he lost liaison with us; and I said to the soldiers: "Is this what we are going to destroy" -- showing them the airport -- "which we ourselves have built -- which our brothers have built? I'm not attacking. Anybody who doesn't wish to attack, stay with me"; and there were twenty-four men with me, and no one wanted to attack, and they stayed with me.

All the soldiers accepted my decision. I said: "Let's go down towards the beach. I myself don't want to go back to Guinea, where I'll spend two years in prison. Those of you who so wish may go back". So we went to the beach, and we saw that there were no boats left. I said: "Let's stay here until the morning. Then we can present ourselves to the Chief of the Republic of Guinea".

All the other men said that they agreed, and I asked them to put down their weapons. Then, in the morning, I saw a young man who seemed to be a civilian, and I told him I wanted to go to the -- I don't know whether I went to what you call here the popular militia or the guards, but I went and I explained to them. I said: "I came on this invasion; I didn't obey my orders. I want to stay here. Do with me what you like".

(Prisoner Lopes)

And they came, and I surrendered the weapons, and all of my comrades showed that they hadn't shot any of the firearms. They could see from our ammunition that we hadn't shot at all; and that's how we are here now.

All these statements have been stated by myself and by God. If I haven't said anything else, it's because I don't know anything else.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to ask the witness how many went with the Captain to the airfield; because he said he stayed there with twenty-four men, and that the Captain had gone ahead.

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): The Captain went on. All of our men -- those who were with me -- stayed with me -- all twenty-four. But he continued because he also had brought with him some men from the Republic of Guinea, and he went on with the men of the Republic of Guinea, and also he took with him -- he was accompanied by a second lieutenant and a sergeant.

The CHAIRMAN: How many went with him?

The INTERPRETER: He does not know how many there were, but they were all from the Republic of Guinea.

The CHAIRMAN: Did the witness see the Captain again after that?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): Never again.

The CHAIRMAN: The witness stated he had been in Portugal. What contacts did he have there? Would he like to tell us how he spent his days in Portugal?

The INTERPRETER: He began by answering the question he thought you had put to him. He said that he was there first as a student, and that he and other students would get together and go out on excursions, and that then he was there later when he was in the army.

The witness said he went back when he was sick; and he says that then he was under medical treatment and that during the time he was very unhappy.

Mr. M'BAYE (interpretation from French): What did he do while he was a student?

The INTERPRETER: He answered: he used to go out on excursions.

Mr. M'BAYE (interpretation from French): But he didn't finish.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to know whether the witness knows who was the commander of the whole operation, because somebody must have given him instructions before they embarked. I should like to know the name, if he can tell us.

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): Commander Galvao.

The CHAIRMAN: What nationality is he?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): He's Portuguese.

Mr. MWAANGA: You said that there was another force of 150 citizens of the Republic of Guinea -- that is, dissidents from the Republic of Guinea.

When they got on the boats to come to Conakry, did they communicate with these people on the way? What was the relationship between the 150 men who were in his company and the 150 other men whom you say had come from the Republic of Guinea?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): Yes, we did have some communication when we were on the boats: we spoke to each other, and we found out that many of them were like us: they didn't know what they were going to do. Others said: "We're going there in order to stay".

There's one man that I think must have known. He was Lieutenant Boiro. He pointed to another man and said the other man was a major in the colonial forces -- I presume, in the time of the French. He was a Guinean citizen.

Mr. MWAANGA: Did those dissident Guineans indicate where they had received their training in the course of the conversations which were held on board the boat?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): They answered that question; they said it was on the island of Suga.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Now, from your answers -- from your statements -- we can reach many conclusions, and we also have many questions to ask, but I am going to ask only a few.

(Mr. Kulaga)

Can you tell us, of the regular Portuguese forces that participated in that attack against the Republic of Guinea, how many of the 230 Portuguese whom you have enumerated -- since you said that twenty-four had stayed with you, and then there were people who went with the Captain -- can you tell us, I say, how many of those 230 Portuguese regular forces participated directly in the attack against the Republic of Guinea?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): Of the people belonging to the regular Portuguese army, the following got to Guinean soil: 150, plus eighty -- because the eighty was the detachment with Galvao of the marines. Now, all of these disembarked -- landed -- but not all of them participated in the action, since, for instance the twenty-four who were with me, and myself -- we didn't participate in the action.

The meeting was suspended at 10 p.m. and resumed at 10.20 p.m.

Mr. JAKOBSON: I should like to ask a few questions to clarify the situation with regard to the boats.

If I understood the prisoner correctly, he was on a troop transport ship with about 330 troops and, I suppose, in addition, some crew; and they were then taken to land in six small boats which had been carried by that ship.

Did the witness see any other ships which accompanied that troop transport ship?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): There were two large ships. One was called Montante and the other was called Bombarda. Then there were four patrol boats, two launches and several smaller boats.

Mr. MWAANGA: I should like to know from the prisoner whether he has personally taken part in activities directed against the PAIGC; and, if so, whether he himself is against the PAIGC, or whether he was forced to be against the PAIGC by the authorities in so-called Portuguese Guinea.

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): Yes, several times. I had to participate in fighting against the PAIGC. That was not because of my own will. I'm in the army; I received orders, and I must obey orders. It's not because I'm against the PAIGC.

Mr. MWAANGA: Was the prisoner paid any special allowance or any special amount of money for participating in that operation? And, from the contacts that he had with the dissident Guinean citizens who were with him on the boat, did he gain the impression that they had been paid any special amount of money to participate in that activity, or did they say they had been paid?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): I can say for myself that I haven't received any amount, and no one in my company has received any amount of money. We didn't even know where we were going.

Now, as to the others, I suppose that they didn't receive any money. Had they had plenty of money, we might have seen some manifestations of this possession of extra money. I'm not sure, but I think that they didn't receive any amounts.

Now, as to ourselves, I assume that they would have given more money to myself than to the other members of my company, who are very poor. They haven't received any amounts.

Mr. JAKOBSON: Were there any European non-Portuguese mercenaries aboard those ships that participated in the attack.

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): There were none at all. All of the officers were Portuguese. The only thing, that seemed strange to me is that they had made us exchange these weapons, put down ours and take up the other weapons. Now, everything else was Portuguese.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): One more question in order to clarify something: The prisoner spoke of the presence of a general at the time he was receiving information on his mission. Can he give some additional data on that?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): The general was on board when the ships were about to leave. Afterwards, he went down to the

(Prisoner Lopes)

land and he was not on board when they left. His name is General Antonio Sebastiao Ribeiro de Spinola. He is the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief there.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, with your authorization, the Guinean delegation would like to ask some questions.

The CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to know from the prisoner what his citizenship is.

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): I was born in Bissau. I am a Portuguese citizen; I have a Portuguese passport. I am going to be twenty-five years of age on 5 December.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to know from the prisoner whether he can read and write.

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): Yes.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can he tell us his general level of education?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): I have studied for five years in Guinea (Bissau) -- that is elementary school. Afterwards, I went to Portugal, and I wanted to study to become an industrial technician; but instead of that, I went into the army.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): A moment ago the prisoner gave us some names of villages or of cities, such as Enchale and Fa. Can he tell us whether those are villages or cities?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): They're villages.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): The prisoner has told us that he received no money; but could he tell us what his rank was before he went into combat, and what his rank was at the time he embarked?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): It was lieutenant; and I am a lieutenant.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): This is the last question.

The prisoner has stated that there were on board 150 men, plus 80 marines, for a total of 230; and then he said that there were 150 others who had been taken elsewhere. Can he tell us what countries those others were citizens of?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): I was referring to men from Guinea -- from the Republic of Guinea. In conversations on board, I managed to find out that some of them were coming from Gambia. Others had been outside of the Republic of Guinea for a long time.

Now, that is my impression. Of course, I only met them one day before, and I didn't have conversations with many of them.

Mr. MWAANGA: I should like to ask one question in connexion with the uniforms which those men were wearing.

The witness says that there was that other group of 230 who had obviously come from so-called Portuguese Guinea, and that there was another group, of 150, who he says were dissident Guineans.

Now, were the uniforms that were worn by the 230 men identical with those worn by the 150 men, or not?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): The uniforms were the same, and all of those men were wearing green arm-bands.

Mr. MWAANGA: Is that the uniform which the Portuguese army uses, or was that a uniform which was just improvised for the purpose of that occasion? And what sort of colour -- can the witness give us a description of the colour of the uniform?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): The uniforms that the Portuguese forces employ usually are camouflaged uniforms, while these were green uniforms.

They also asked us not only to take off the camouflaged uniforms, but to leave there our money, tobacco and love letters.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to put two further questions to the prisoner.

First of all, he said before that some people had come from other countries. How did he know they had come from other countries?

The second question is: how did he manage to speak to people whom he said were coming from Guinea?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): These people spoke French among themselves, and they understood each other. I found out that several of them had been away from Guinea for thirteen years; others for five years, and so on.

Now, we spoke to each other in Creole. Some of them knew how to speak Portuguese-Creole. When they spoke French to me slowly, I understood; but I cannot speak French.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Another question to the prisoner: He has stated that they had to change their weapons and that they received new ones. Can he tell us the characteristics of the old ones and of the new ones? What was the difference between them?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): Our weapons were G-3s, and we exchanged them for weapons called "Calachinico". Those are the rifles.

Then there were some mortars No. 32; but we had no grenades for them, so we brought our normal mortars -- which are No. 31. We also brought the grenades No. 31, which can be used with the mortars No. 32.

Now, the grenades No. 31 which we brought have an inscription in Portuguese on them. The mortars were No. 32; the grenades were No. 31. On the grenades you could see Portuguese inscriptions. We also brought hand-grenades with Portuguese inscriptions on them, and we brought rocket-launchers RPG-2.

These grenades No. 31 to be used with mortars No. 32 -- we never fired them; we surrendered them.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): The prisoner told us the names of two of the ships. He told us that there were six ships. Can he tell us the names of the other four?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): The names are: Hdra, Cassiopeia, Dragão and Orion.

The CHAIRMAN: Could the witness please tell us about his comrade -- what group he is with and what his role was.

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): He was a soldier in my company. When there was the sub-division, he was put into another group. They took him to another mission, towards the lower parts of the city; and that's where he was taken prisoner.

The CHAIRMAN: Can the witness identify his name, rank and briefly tell us how he surrendered? That is, can his comrade tell us, briefly?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): My name is Mario Dias. I was born in Biombo, which is in the province of Bissau. I was in a group whose mission was to go against the Presidential Palace. I'm a soldier.

We didn't carry out fully our mission, because the guide didn't recognize the Palace. When they opened fire on us, I went toward the sea. I threw away my weapon; I took off my clothes and started swimming. They stopped me in the island of Kassa.

I was taken prisoner on that island, where I spent three days, after which they brought me to Conakry, to prison, where I met my comrades from the same company.

Mr. MWAANGA: The prisoner mentioned that the mission was not carried out because the guide did not recognize the Palace.

Who was the guide in that particular case, and how many people were with him at the time they were planning to attack the Presidential Palace?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): The guide -- I don't know his name -- but he spoke French. There were, in all, in the group, twelve people who were French-speaking; and five of ours were with them, and two more of ours were slightly behind. I assume that the guide was from Guinea. I assume that the twelve who spoke French were from Guinea -- from the Republic of Guinea.

Mr. MWAANGA: What was the precise mission of that prisoner's particular group? Was it merely to attack the Palace, or was it to kill the President of the Republic of Guinea?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): Our corporal in charge told us that he had received the order to arrest the President of the Republic.

The CHAIRMAN: Could the witness give us the name of his group commander from whom he received that order?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): Corporal Talabiu Djalo.

The CHAIRMAN: What was the nationality of that corporal?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): He was from Portuguese Guinea.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can the prisoner tell us whether among that group there were any white persons?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): There was no white person in our group; and our group belonged to the third wave of landing forces.

Mr. MWAANGA: Maybe the Lieutenant, who is very well informed, could offer us some clarification on the various reports we have gathered since we have been here; and this is in connexion with the possibility that there may have been some submarines involved.

To the best of his knowledge, does he know whether there were any other additional ships, apart from the six he mentioned -- the two big ones and the two small ones and the landing craft -- whether there were any signs of the presence of submarines in the area?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): I believe that there were no submarines. I even asked that question when we were coming here. I said: "What happens if the Republic of Guinea should attack us with a submarine?" And they replied: "They cannot do that, because they don't have a submarine, and that's why we ourselves have no submarines here".

Mr. MWAANGA: Do the Portuguese have submarines in Guinea (Bissau)?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): As far as I know, no. They have in Lisbon. They don't have them in Bissau.

Mr. MWAANGA: Did the soldier believe that such a small force of the number he mentioned would be able to get into the Presidential Palace and arrest the President, or did the people he was with believe that that could be accomplished?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): I myself, of course, did not think it possible, because I believe that a man who is in his own home, even if he doesn't have any weapons, is very hard to get and to arrest.

Now, our group wasn't homogeneous. You remember, it was made up of other people and of five of us.

Now, those five, I know. Not one of them believed that it was possible. As to the others, I don't know.

Mr. MWAANGA: One last question: What were the instructions, as far as the action after the arrest of the President was concerned? Where were you supposed to take the President after his arrest?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): They didn't tell us where the President was supposed to be taken after his arrest; they only told us to go and do that mission.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to ask the prisoner the following question: After having fulfilled that mission, in what direction were you going to go? To what place were you going to go?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): We were supposed to go and join our company and then go to Fa Mandinga in Guinea (Bissau). They even told us that if everything came out all right we would stay here one day and would go back to Guinea (Bissau).

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to know from the soldier: After they had fulfilled their mission, where was their group going to go with their prisoners?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): They didn't tell us where we had to take the President if we could arrest him. They told us to keep him under guard, and I don't know whether afterwards they wanted to take him to our boat, kill him there, or kill him elsewhere.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): To keep him under guard where? Did his group have a radio-transmitter? Were they linked to some other group? Did they have a Chief outside their group?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): Our group had at its command a second lieutenant who had three radios. The makes of the radios were: Sharpe, AVP-1 and Onkio; and he was in contact by radio with his Chief. I don't know the name of his Chief. My second lieutenant spoke to me, in French, over the radio, and my second lieutenant was a citizen of the Republic of Guinea.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can the prisoner tell us the name of his second lieutenant, whom he says was a citizen of the Republic of Guinea?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): I don't know his name, because it was the first time I saw him, and it was at night.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can the prisoner tell us what amount he as a soldier received before embarking?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): I didn't receive anything.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): How much did they promise you?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): I was promised nothing.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): The lieutenant who was taken prisoner told us that he had been told that the mission was to disembark the Guineans who were with them. Did he find out later what the general objectives of his mission were and what the main objectives of his mission were?

Prisoner LOPES (interpretation from Portuguese): When we came in sight of the light that indicates the land, Morais told us that we were going to disembark. Then I said: "Then, it's not true that we came only to disembark the people from the Republic of Guinea"; and he said: "No, we have other objectives. We ourselves are going to the airport. Other groups will be going to the post office and to the electric power station and to PAIGC".

(Prisoner Lopes)

At that moment, in view of the fact that I was already thinking of running away, I didn't investigate any further.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can the soldier who was taken prisoner tell us how long he had been in the army, whether he was a volunteer or whether they had recruited him by force?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): I had been in the army for eleven months, because I was recruited on 2 January 1970.

During that period, twice I had contacts with the enemy. Service in the Portuguese army is compulsory; you just have to go.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): He tells us that he had contact with the enemy twice. Where, and when?

Prisoner DIAS (interpretation from Creole): The enemy was the PAIGC. I had my contact with it in Portuguese Guinea at Chim in June, and at Madina in October.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that we can excuse these two witnesses.

The prisoners withdrew.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, would you like some more prisoners to come in?

The CHAIRMAN: Very well.

TESTIMONY OF PINTO OLIVEIRA SA AND JOSÉ CÔ

The CHAIRMAN: Could each of the witnesses give us his name, rank, number, if any, and tell us to which group he belonged, the name of the unit, and in which unit he was during this operation.

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): Pinto Oliveira Sa. I am a soldier; my number is 820124-69. I am from Bissau; I don't know the number of my company or of my battalion, but it was that company which was stationed at Fa Mandinga.

The CHAIRMAN: Could he tell us in which group he was when he disembarked?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): When I landed, I was in the company of Lieutenant Januario.

The CHAIRMAN: I want to know in which group the witness disembarked. Did he disembark with Lieutenant Januario, or did his group have another group commander?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): Yes, Lieutenant Januario was the commander of our unit.

The CHAIRMAN: Let us hear from him what orders the Lieutenant gave him after the debarkation.

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): When I left Bissau I didn't know anything about where I was going, until we came and we saw the light here and we took to the boats. When we left we had been told to change our clothes and to change to the G-3 weapon -- to give up our G-3 weapon, I mean.

The CHAIRMAN: My question is: What did Lieutenant Januario order him to do, and what did he do after that? What assignment did he have?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): Our mission was to go to the airport and set the airport on fire; but Lieutenant Januario told us that he didn't want us to do that. He said: "This airport has been built by our African brothers".

Then we heard some shots and he told us: "Let's go back to the harbour"; and we remained there so that we could surrender.

The CHAIRMAN: So these people did not fire a shot?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): As I received the weapon, it was new; and I surrendered the weapon in the same condition to the authorities of the Republic of Guinea. I didn't fire a single shot.

The CHAIRMAN: Was the other man also in the same group under the command of Lieutenant Januario?

Prisoner CO (interpretation from Creole): Yes, the same group.

The CHAIRMAN: And you also agree with what the other soldier says?

Prisoner CO (interpretation from Creole): Yes, I agree with his statement. Lieutenant Januario asked us not to shoot; and I had not shot either.

The CHAIRMAN: Will he give us his name and number, please.

Prisoner CO (interpretation from Creole): My name is José C6; I am a soldier; my number is 821706-70. I was born in Biombo and belonged to the same company stationed at Fa Mandinga.

Mr. ESPINOSA: I should like to know the age of the soldiers and when they entered the army. Was it because of the draft?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): I am nineteen. They took me by force on 2 January 1970; they made me go to the camp at Fa.

Prisoner CO (interpretation from Creole): I am twenty-two; they also took me by force. They made me go to the army camp on the same date: 2 January 1970 -- same camp: Fa.

Mr. MWAANGA: I have one very simple question: In the Portuguese army which is based in Guinea (Bissau), who is regarded as the greatest enemy?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): We consider the PAIGC as the greatest enemy.

Prisoner CO (interpretation from Creole): The PAIGC.

Mr. MWAANGA: Did your authorities say anything to you about the Republic of Guinea? Did they consider the Republic of Guinea as being hostile to them? What is the attitude of the Portuguese authorities in Guinea (Bissau) towards the Republic of Guinea?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): I had never heard any mention of the Republic of Guinea.

Prisoner CO (interpretation from Creole): I had never heard any mention of the Republic of Guinea before, either. Only when I arrived here did I realize that they were also blacks and my brothers.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Only one brief question: Had the second prisoner participated in any combat before this last one?

Prisoner CO (interpretation from Creole): Never before.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to know from these two soldiers what their salaries in the Portuguese army were.

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): We receive 960 escudos every month.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to know from the two soldiers how much they received before the landing in Guinea.

The INTERPRETER: Both of them said they had received nothing before. The first of these witnesses said, in addition, that their money had been taken away from them and that they were made to leave it there. They said they could not come here with that money.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Did their Chief gather them together before the operation and tell them that if the operation was successful they would have some improvement in their situation, or an increase in salary, or a better rank?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): No, they didn't tell us anything of that kind. Even our families don't know. They're in Bissau. We didn't know where we were going. The only thing they did before we came was to gather us together and distribute bread and meat before embarkation at Fa.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): In addition to that meat ration, did you receive alcoholic beverages -- gin -- or special cigarettes?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): We received only one can of fruit for every five soldiers.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Was that ration your customary ration -- the bread and the meat? Was it customary to give you such bread and meat, or was it a special ration?

Prisoner SA (interpretation from Creole): It's not customary to give us such rations. It was only on that day that they did so.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can you tell us what the customary ration of the soldier is?

Prisoner CO (interpretation from Creole): Usually, when we are going into combat they give us what's called a combat ration -- combat ration No. 20, which is for three days. The rest of the time we usually receive rice, and sometimes potatoes.

The prisoners withdrew;

TESTIMONY OF JOSÉ BUBACAR EMBALO AND FRANCISCO JOSÉ MIGUEL SAMPAIO

The CHAIRMAN: Would the prisoners please identify themselves: name, number, unit and commander.

Prisoner EMBALO (interpretation from Creole): My name is José Bubacar Embalo, number 821456-70. I am a soldier, nineteen years old, in the first company of the African Command. My Captain is Joao Bacar Djalo, and I was recruited on 2 January 1970, and I was at the camp at Fa.

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): I am a Chief Corporal. My number is 820459-69. My name is Francisco José Miguel Sampaio. I am of the First Company of the African Command. I entered the service on 28 July 1969. I am twenty-one, and my Captain is also Joao Bacar Djalo.

The CHAIRMAN: Would the Corporal tell us how much and what kind of training he has had and how he got his promotion?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): I had studied four years in elementary school, and I had five more years of secondary education, when I was called to arms. That's the reason they made me follow a course for sergeants.

After I finished that course they made me a Corporal, after which they gave me another course for commandos -- six months -- and then another four months of courses, after which they made me Chief Corporal in the First Company.

The CHAIRMAN: Has the witness seen action during his service?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): Yes -- many times.

The CHAIRMAN: Against whom?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): Against terrorists.

The CHAIRMAN: How did you come to be in this operation, and how did you become a prisoner?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): We were at the camp at Fa. A major came and said: "Prepare yourselves for a large-scale operation". He did not say where we were going to go. We boarded the ship at 8 o'clock on, I believe it was a Monday, at Chim. Then we went on board an LDG whose name was Bombarda, and some people were saying that we were going to Teixera Pinto.

After we went past Bissau and we continued towards the south, we decided that this could not be. We started to try to figure out where we were going. Some people said: "Maybe we're going to Como." At any rate, the next day we found

(Prisoner Sampaio)

ourselves at sea next to the islands called dos Bijagos, and one of which is called Suga. They told us that on those islands there was preparation for special troops. They told us that it was called the centre for special operations.

But we stayed on board; they didn't give us permission to get off. We had to wait, they said, for another two or three ships.

We stayed for four days. Each day, we saw more boats -- more warships. Four of them were patrol ships, and two were LDGs. We were on one of those. The other one -- I don't remember the name.

The other ship's name was Montante. It was also an LDG. We were not allowed to have contact with the island until the last day. Then the last day, when we left there, we were asked to go there and take off our uniforms -- which were camouflaged -- and our boots, and to change our weapons. They gave us everything different which afterwards we saw was similar to what is worn here. We asked then: "why do we do this?" and they told us: "We will tell you". Then we divided according to where we were going to disembark, in different ships.

When we were on the ship, they told us that we were coming to attack Conakry. We were given ammunition; we were told that we had to attack the airport; and when we arrived, we saw some boats.

We went on a patrol boat called Hidra. After the boat had left there were on the boat six sailors and ourselves. After we arrived, we disembarked at the place of attack, and we went towards the place of attack. We were under the command of Lieutenant João Januario Lopes. He said: "Let's not attack; let's go back to the beach; we can wait until tomorrow morning and then we can surrender to the PAIGC".

(Prisoner Sampaio)

And we agreed with him, because we believed that this was no way to treat men. They had treated us like little dogs. They had brought us to this land; they wanted us to attack a strange land. So he gave the order: "Don't attack"; and, since with us there were four European Portuguese, we allowed our column to be cut, and then we went toward the beach. When the boat came to get us, we didn't get on board; we waited until the morning, when we wanted to go the headquarters of PAIGC. But as we were waiting we were surprised by six guards. They said they wanted to take us to prison. Right away we gave them our arms, since we had planned to surrender, and we asked them to take us to the PAIGC. They didn't want to do so; they took us to prison, where we were punished, as you see us here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN: Where is the witness' commanding officer now -- Lieutenant Lopes?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): He's in prison.

The CHAIRMAN: And can you tell us about the Portuguese sailors? Did they disembark, or did you disembark while they went out?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): The sailors, when they came with us, didn't disembark: they stayed on board the boats. The idea was that they would go back with the boats and then come again in order to fetch us. But when they came they couldn't fetch us, because we were hidden, and the only people they took on board were the captain from the paratroopers and a sergeant from Special Operations, and also a paratrooper, and also the second lieutenant and three or four soldiers who were there and were taken aboard by that boat.

The CHAIRMAN: What were the nationalities of that captain, the sergeant, and the other people who went back?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): The captain, the sergeant and the others who went back were European Portuguese. The three or four soldiers who went back were African Portuguese.

Mr. MWAANGA: I should like to ask two or three very brief questions.

First of all, how many boats did the prisoners see?

Secondly, the witness mentioned in his statement that he had been involved in combat before, and that this action had been directed mainly against what he described as terrorists. Who are those terrorists, and where do they come from?

Thirdly, how many white Portuguese did he see in his particular group of invaders who came to the Republic of Guinea?

Fourthly -- and lastly -- the witness did say that when they arrived at the destination in the vicinity of the attack, they decided that they were going to cut themselves off from the other group composed of the captain, whose name he mentioned. What is the site? What were they supposed to attack? What was the assignment of their particular group?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): As to the number of boats, I came in a patrol boat; and from that, six boats left. I don't know how many smaller boats came from the larger boat -- the other large boat. But from my large boat, six small boats came.

As to who were the terrorists, they were the fighters for liberation of Cabral. The Portuguese call them terrorists.

Where do they come from? I don't know. As to the number of white Portuguese in the group of invaders of the Republic of Guinea, in my own group there were eight. Of course, on the big ships there were many more, since the sailors were white Portuguese.

Now, after the eight who came in my group, four went down to the beach, and the others remained on board in order to take the boats back.

The place we were going to attack was the airport.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): I believe the chief corporal had as a mission to go to the airport, destroy the airport, go back to the beach, and then go on board, back to the larger ships.

I should like confirmation of that.

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): Yes, indeed, the mission that we had was to attack the airport to destroy as many things as we could there, including the airplanes, to see to it that the airplanes could not take off. Then we had to go back to the boats.

Of course, we had the possibility of doing this because there were no defences at the airport. But we did not do it, because we received the order from our commander not to do it. He said: "Let's not do it", and we didn't do it.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to know from the chief corporal whether he is a mestizo, and, if so, where his parents are.

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): I'm from Cabo Verde, and my parents are in Guinea (Bissau).

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): There seems to have been some confusion from the start. It was said that it was the first company of commandos.

Is it "commandos", or is it "command"? There is a distinction to be made.

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): Yes, we were commandos. It's a word of Italian origin that has gone through the United States, and it means special forces.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): There is a possibility of a second point of confusion. You spoke of your captain, and I believe I had heard that your captain's name was Captain Joao Bacar Djalo.

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): Yes, that's so. My captain is João Bacar Djalo.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): And who was the major? What was his name?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): Francisco -- the complete, full name of the major is Francisco Manuel Marques Leal de Almeida.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to ask the chief corporal, who is now a prisoner, and who was a Portuguese soldier: What was the salary that he was receiving?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): I have received only once the salary of a chief corporal, because I had just become a chief corporal. That time they didn't give me full salary because I had borrowed money. They gave me 2,800 escudos. The full salary would have been 5,247.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Did the Portuguese chief corporal receive a special amount before he embarked on this commando operation?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): We didn't receive any additional amount, and we didn't expect any. They didn't speak to us about a special reward.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Had you received a special ration of alcohol or tobacco before the operation?

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): During the eight days that we were on the ship, we were not given that, and we even suffered from hunger. All the troops were dissatisfied because they were so hungry, and they were also angered by the fact that they were launching us on this operation of attacking a foreign land, and we were still hungry.

The CHAIRMAN: We have no more questions; I think we can excuse the witnesses and adjourn the meeting.

Mr. MWAANGA: I'm sorry; I have just one final question.

I should like to get confirmation from the chief corporal of my understanding that all the marines were white Portuguese and that the sailors were white Portuguese.

Prisoner SAMPAIO (interpretation from Portuguese): The marines were all Africans, except their commanders, who were Europeans. The sailors were all white, with very few exceptions. For instance, there was the cook, who wasn't.

Mr. MWAANGA: I should like to compare the answers of the two witnesses. I should like this same question to be answered by the other prisoner.

Prisoner EMBALO (interpretation from Creole): The sailors were all white, except the cook. The marines were all African, except their commanders.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I should like to know from the other prisoner, the soldier, Jose Bubacar Embalo, whether he has any other details to add -- something that the chief corporal might have forgotten.

Prisoner EMBALO (interpretation from Creole): The only thing I wish to add is that we were forced to come on this mission; every single soldier was most unhappy about it. Our lieutenant here suggested that we should not participate in it, and we didn't participate in it; and the lieutenant also said that he had a brother here at PAIGC, and that we would go to that PAIGC.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): One last question, if I may: Did the prisoners notice whether or not the white military personnel who disembarked in Guinea had dyed their faces or their arms?

The INTERPRETER: Both of them answered: "Yes, we have seen some who dyed their faces and arms. They did that in the hold of the ship. We had surprised some of them who were doing that".

The prisoners withdrew.

TESTIMONY OF DJALO ADAMA

The CHAIRMAN: Would the prisoner start by identifying himself: his name, number, regiment, commander and his nationality.

Prisoner ADAMA (interpretation from Mandinga): My name is Djalo Adama. I was born in Bandjam, in the Gambia. I was a stone-mason at Bandjam.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Bandjam is the same as Bathurst.

Prisoner ADAMA (interpretation from Mandinga): I was at Bandjam; I had not done my military service there. Then one day a relative of mine came there and told me that if I had no work there as a stone-mason I should go to Bissau, because there I would find work. So I went there in order to work, because I could not find any work at Bandjam; and as soon as I arrived in Bissau they forced me into the army, which I did not leave until I came here on this operation.

Then months ago they forced me into the army and my number is 62. I had not finished ten months of service.

The CHAIRMAN: Can the witness tell us the name of his commander and what task the commander gave to him when he disembarked?

Prisoner ADAMA (interpretation from Mandinga): At first I was asked by the chief, who was a white man by the name of Galvao, not to leave my big ship; but after a while there was a chief corporal by the name of Tcham, who said to us that we had to go to Conakry. There were about ten of us, and we were asked to go and to do some sabotage at the electric station.

When the chief corporal Tcham gave the order, we cut the wires at the station. Then we stayed there until three in the afternoon. At that time some armoured cars came, and then they killed three of the people who were among us. In the group of ten people, four had said that they were Guineans.

After that we went to hide, and we were hiding in the bushes. After some time three of the four Guineans went away, and this man was left with only one Guinean; and finally he was left alone in the bushes hiding.

I remained in hiding until the next day -- which was Monday -- when I wanted to seek some food; and at that time they caught me. Military men of the Guinean army caught me.

After the Guineans seized me, they asked me where my comrades were, and I said that all of them had run away.

I have nothing else to add.

Mr. MWAANGA: The prisoner said that his original home was Gambia.

How did he travel from Gambia to Guinea (Bissau)?

Second, I should like to know whether he was recruited while he was in the Gambia to go and join the Portuguese army, or whether he merely went there to look for employment.

Now that that offensive has obviously misfired, how does he feel, as a human being? What does his conscience tell him now that the events are over?

Prisoner ADAMA (interpretation from Mandinga): I was never in the military service in Gambia; I was a stone-mason.. Then I had no work. I went to a small village in Gambia called Bedjilo, where I met a sergeant of the Republic of Guinea, who invited me to go to Guinea (Bissau). He said that I could find work there as a stone-mason for 2,000 escudos, which are 10,000 francs CFA.

(Prisoner Adama)

When I got there I thought there was going to be more work; but instead they put me into the army, and they took me to a place far from the capital. I went from the village of Bedjilo to Bissau by small boat -- a rowboat.

Now that the hostilities are over and I realize what has happened to me, I regret very much that I ever left the Gambia. Had I known what would have happened, I would not have gone looking for a job elsewhere than in the Gambia. And now I am here, and I have entrusted my head in the hands of the Guinean authorities.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French). Is the prisoner a citizen of the Gambia?

Prisoner ADAMA (interpretation from Mandinga). There is no citizenship in Gambia, but I was born in the capital of Gambia.

(Spoke in English)

I am a citizen of Gambia, too. I was in the capital of Gambia -- Peel St. No. 6.

Mr. KULAGA (interpretation from French): Is it true that despite your Gambian citizenship, you were recruited into the Portuguese army?

Prisoner ADAMA (interpretation from Mandinga): The Portuguese knew that I was from the Gambia, because I showed all of my identity papers.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): I am going to ask a few questions to the prisoner, and would suggest that these questions be put to him in English, without translation.

Can he tell us his number in the army?

Do you know your number in the Portuguese army?

Prisoner ADAMA: Yes. My number is 62.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Second question:
Can the soldier, who is a prisoner, tell us who recruited him -- the name?

Prisoner ADAMA: Yes, because if you don't know something, you
must --

The INTERPRETER: Do you know the name of the person who recruited
you?

Prisoner ADAMA: Yes, because they came to the army.

The INTERPRETER: What is the name of the person who recruited you?

Prisoner ADAMA: Huh?

The INTERPRETER: The name of the person.

Prisoner ADAMA: The person --

The INTERPRETER: The name of the person who recruited you.

Prisoner ADAMA: His name was Djalo; he is a prisoner now in the
Gambia.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can the soldier
tell us of what sergeant he was speaking? Is it a sergeant of the regular
army of Guinea, or is it a sergeant of the French colonial army?

Prisoner ADAMA: This man who took me there?

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes.

Prisoner ADAMA: He was in the French army at the time of the
colonial.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can the prisoner tell us how much his salary was as a stone-mason?

Prisoner ADAMA: I --

The INTERPRETER: How much money did you make when you worked as a stone-mason?

Prisoner ADAMA: Sometimes I have six shillings and ten pence a day, if I work for somebody.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can the soldier tell us if he knows how to read and write English?

Prisoner ADAMA: No -- just write French.

The INTERPRETER: You can write French?

Prisoner ADAMA: No.

The INTERPRETER: You cannot write French?

Prisoner ADAMA: Even English I can't write.

The INTERPRETER: You cannot write English?

Prisoner ADAMA: No.

The INTERPRETER: Can you read English?

Prisoner ADAMA: No.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French). Can the soldier tell us what salaries he had received before coming on this expedition?

Prisoner ADAMA: In that time when we were coming here?

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes.

Prisoner ADAMA: They said we would get 60,000 francs.

The INTERPRETER: They said you would get 60,000 francs?

Prisoner ADAMA: Yes -- when we have finished our job.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Who was going to give you that money?

Prisoner ADAMA: In that time, the leader of that army is called Commander Djalo Thierno.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can you tell us, when there was fighting at the electric station, how many dead there were on the Guinean side?

Prisoner ADAMA (interpretation from Mandinga): About those who were on the Guinean side, I don't know; I only know that three on our side had been killed. After the armoured cars came, we ran away.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Last question: How many other men like you from Gambia went to Bissau?

Prisoner ADAMA: Not many Gambians. We were two.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Do you know whether there are people from a country other than Gambia -- not Gambia -- who were taken, like you, to Bissau?

Prisoner ADAMA: Yes, some others there. They was come from Dakar or Freetown. That's all I know.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Can you tell us how many? 100? 200? 50? 20?

Prisoner ADAMA: We are 159; we are all of them. They were recruited like me.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): You said that the man who recruited you is now in prison in Gambia?

Prisoner ADAMA: Yes.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French). How do you know?

Prisoner ADAMA: I hear that at the time we're at Bissau.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Why were you in prison? Did you steal?

Prisoner ADAMA: The only reason is that they recruited people, without nothing.

The prisoner withdrew.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): I should like, on behalf of the Guinean delegation, to thank the United Nations Mission for the great effort it had to make in order to fulfil the task given it. We know that you have carried out this mission in record time and in conditions that were particularly difficult.

As for ourselves, I can assure you that we have done everything possible to alleviate your task. We nevertheless believe that the results are conclusive and that you have had the opportunity to have everything that can help you find the truth.

We are sorry to have imposed this journey upon you, but I believe you will understand that the prisoners were in Conakry and that it was for reasons of security that we have evacuated them towards the interior.

Now, since it is late, we shall be able to adjourn the meeting and prepare our return to Conakry. In the morning we shall meet again, before your departure.

We are going to put at your disposal all the evidence we can gather. We shall do that tomorrow, including the photographic documents. That may be useful in order to complete all of your notes taken yesterday and today. We do not know yet what time your plane will come. We believe that we shall have enough time to meet again and settle all this.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the United Nations Mission, I should like to thank your Excellency and all the members of your delegation who have participated. You have all done everything possible to make our stay as comfortable as possible, compatible with the work we have had to do. We understand that you have extended all facilities to us and have shown us all possible courtesy in a mission of this kind. We are very grateful to you; we appreciate all your efforts.

The meeting rose on Saturday, 28 November, at 2.45 a.m.

Ninth meeting, held at Hotel Gbessia, Conakry,
on Saturday, 28 November 1970, at 12.35 p.m.

Persons heard:

Mr. Damantang Camara, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Guinea

Mr. Omar M'Baye, Director of the Department of Economic Affairs

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): Excellencies, I hope you have had time to have at least a little rest after the harrassing day and night that we have spent.

When we parted this morning I thought we had finished our meetings, but circumstances compel us to ask you for this interview in order to give you some supplementary information useful for the fulfilment of your Mission.

At the time we were interrogating the prisoners at Kindia, we suffered a new aggression -- by land this time.

We do not doubt that you are now convinced as to the attack perpetrated by Portugal, which has now been identified in the eyes of everyone. The new aggression of last night will not require a mission of inquiry, because it took place at the border between Guinea and Guinea (Bissau). I wanted to report this to you, and I shall give the floor to comrade M'Baye, who will give you the details.

Mr. M'BAYE (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I am authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to submit this information to you before you leave this country so that you can fulfil completely the mandate you have received from the Security Council.

We have heard from Radio Mauritania a communiqué from the Government of Liberia, in which it was stated that a man -- a white man -- a Portuguese by the name of Francisco Lopes -- who belongs to the first company, third section, of the African Commandos -- and therefore to the regular Portuguese forces -- and who received special training for nine months at Bafata under Lieutenant Galvao -- was found at sea by a Dutch ship. From the Dutch ship he was delivered to Liberia.

He stated that they had definite instructions to disembark in Guinea and carry out an armed aggression.

Another piece of information which has been mentioned by the Minister is the fact that Portugal has perpetrated an armed aggression at the border between Guinea and Portuguese Guinea and Senegal, at a place called Koundara.

We had already known, the day before yesterday, that there had been incursions by Portuguese elements starting from Koundara. Since then the incursions have increased. When those forces reached a certain point they were surrounded by our armed forces, and a battle ensued immediately, and the fighting is continuing at present. They have suffered heavy losses.

(Mr. M'Baye)

In any case, we are going to keep you informed of developments in this situation. We thought we should let you have this information in order to enrich the report that you are to present to the Security Council.

That is the information that we had to give you.

(Spoke in English)

If you have any questions I would be happy to answer them.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellencies, the Mission is very grateful for this added information you have just given us, and the Mission thinks that it will be very valuable in our deliberations in the Security Council itself.

As we are concluding our meetings with the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Guinea, I should like to state that we are very grateful for the full co-operation and assistance that has been extended to us by the Government of the Republic of Guinea, which has made it possible for us to complete this phase of our work.

We are also very grateful for the courteous and generous hospitality that the Special Mission has received during its brief stay in your great country.

Mr. Damantang CAMARA (interpretation from French): We now want to wish you a happy journey back, and we hope to see you again some day in Guinea -- not as envoys on a mission of inquiry, but as tourists during a friendly visit.

If we have expressed an opinion which was somewhat critical of the manner in which the United Nations replied to our appeal, it was not because we did not wish to have an inquiry carried on in our country. On the contrary, we have been pleased to give you information because we want world opinion to be clarified about what happened here.

We have done all we could in order to give you guidance during your stay, and we ourselves feel completely satisfied, because we have the conviction that we do not need to give you any additional evidence; everything that you have seen and that you have received should be sufficient for you to support the statement made at the beginning by the President of the Republic and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Guinea.

I thank you for the patience that you have shown; and, in the name of the Government, I wish to express the hope that the United Nations will be able to draw the appropriate lesson from these facts.

(Mr. Camara)

We are placing at your disposal the documents of which we have spoken to you, which include tapes, and photographs of places that have been destroyed. We are now waiting for our Ambassador, who is in consultation with our Government at present, to come here. At that time we shall put those documents at your disposal.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much once again, Your Excellency. I should like to assure you that the Mission understands and respects your sentiments.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

Tenth meeting, held at the Hotel Gbessia, Conakry,
on Saturday, 28 November 1970, at 3.45 p.m.

Persons heard:

H.E. Abdoulaye Touré, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary: Permanent
Representative of Guinea to the
United Nations

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (interpretation from French): Excellencies, I have been charged by the Government of Guinea, and on behalf of the delegation that has met with you, to let you know that the President of the Republic wishes to extend the following message which he gave me personally after receiving you, despite his many duties in this difficult hour.

The President stated that he is sorry not to be able to shake hands with you before you go, but he wants to state that we in Guinea have great hope and trust in the United Nations. If we had not trusted it, we would have had recourse to the international Organization during this difficult hour.

The President of the Republic has also asked me to transmit to you a copy of a cable which he has addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency U Thant. It reads as follows:

"Government Republic Guinea informs you of following: at time when U.N. Observer Mission was questioning Portuguese mercenaries taken prisoner during Conakry battle as consequence aggression Portuguese army 22, 23 and 24 November Portuguese aggressors started second attack on night 27-28 November violating land frontier north Joundara region STOP Battle continues in Guinean territory to push back this second aggression whose cite leaves no doubt as to responsibility of Portuguese colonial troops STOP We ask you to examine new situation thus created STOP Highest regards President Ahmed Sékou Touré".

The President of the Republic, who bears the supreme responsibility for the army and for our revolutionary, has also asked me to state that we have that total trust in the United Nations as an institution that has ideals, but that trust would be tragically shaken in the face of such flagrant aims by Portugal, supported, no doubt, by its ally, international imperialism, it did not take the most appropriate means in accordance with the universal conscience. In that case we would have grave fears as to the future of the Organization.

(Mr. Abdoulaye Touré)

Our Head of State had also asked me to let you know that this new aggression carried out during your presence on Guinean soil actually is addressed to each State that you represent in the international Organization, because we know that you have been appointed by your respective States, although you have been sent by the Organization itself; and the fact that they have chosen this period of time when you have been present here on our soil for their second aggression shows that that is the intention.

We therefore wish to transmit to you, on behalf of the Government of Guinea, a copy of the message that was sent to U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The supreme Head of State of Guinea, responsible for the army and for the revolution, has also asked me to extend his friendship to all the peaceful States that you represent in the United Nations; he would like me to say that, if it were not for the circumstances, he would have liked to share with you the legendary hospitality of Guinea and to have you partake of it fully and cordially. Please forgive us for whatever deficiencies there might have been, and which are not the normal thing in Guinea, whose hospitality, which is also part of African hospitality, is well known. Therefore, if there have been some small difficulties, we hope that they will soon disappear from your memory.

My President has also asked me to wish you a good journey and a good debate in the Security Council.

We have also been asked to transmit to you six tapes of the statements made by the witnesses that you have heard at the hearings held by you. We also have here sets of photographs. The latest are not ready yet, but these show the damage caused to the villas at Bellevue -- villas where we usually house our important guests -- and these are also added to the record. We hope that you will be able to utilize them well.

We expect the other photographs at any moment. You realize, we are a developing country and we do not have the facilities such as would be available in a developed country in order to develop photographs in record time. I hope you will forgive us for that.

(Mr. Abdoulaye Touré)

We wish you a very happy journey and a safe return to New York.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellency, the Mission was very touched at the kindness shown by His Excellency President Sekou Touré, and we are very grateful for his message of good will. We realize the implications he has made as regards the incident that has occurred, and its handling by the United Nations. As representatives of our respective countries, we are all appreciative of how highly he considers the friendship of each of our nations.

We, of course, knew of the traditional hospitality of Africa, and I can assure Your Excellency that we have not been disappointed, even in this hard time of crisis. All of the members, as well as the Secretariat staff, were very well looked after -- the very best that could have been done under the circumstances. We are very grateful to you for your help and co-operation in the discharge of the mandate given to us, because without your active participation we would not have been able to do anything substantial. Thank you very much.

We also wish you the best of luck, and I might say au revoir.

The meeting rose at 4.05 p.m.

Annex II

WRITTEN STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

STATEMENT BY THE HEAD OF STATE, SUPREME LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES,
PRESIDENT AHMED SÉKOU TOURÉ, BROADCAST ON THE VOIX DE LA REVOLUTION
RADIO STATION ON WEDNESDAY, 25 NOVEMBER 1970

[Original: French]

Following the appeal made by the Government of the REPUBLIC OF GUINEA to the United Nations a United Nations delegation is expected today, 25 November 1970, at Conakry.

The arrival of this delegation does not, of course, entirely meet our request, which was for the immediate dispatch of airborne troops to remove once and for all the threat constituted by the presence of foreign vessels in Guinean territorial waters. In the view of the Government of the Republic of Guinea, however, it provides an opportunity to demonstrate irrefutably the total guilt of the Portuguese Government in its unspeakable criminal aggression against the sovereign people of Guinea. For that reason the Guinean Government is appealing in advance to the members of the diplomatic corps here in Conakry.

We know that they all have been able to follow step by step the reckless attempts of the aggressors in their concerted action against the vital centres of the capital and against our gallant people. We know that they have observed with their own eyes small vessels, manned by white Portuguese mercenaries and filled with uniformed aggressors, shuttling back and forth between our coast and the open sea. All of them have been able to see their fighter planes operating in the sky above our capital. We know, too, that friendly countries have suffered directly in the person of their experts, some of whom have been injured or treacherously murdered.

These events are all the more serious inasmuch as the foreign vessels, with the support of submarines, are still manoeuvring offshore, with the obvious intention of pursuing a war of attrition against the Guinean nation.

Accordingly, we have appealed to all fellow freedom-loving African States, desirous as they are of preserving African independence and dignity, to supply practical help, of an appropriate kind and at the earliest possible moment, to our country, threatened as it is by Portuguese colonialism and international imperialist reaction.

Today we are also making this same appeal to all friendly countries outside the African continent, especially to all those which /have supported us/ by their vote in the Security Council or by their Government's unequivocal condemnation of the criminal aggression, to come to our assistance, too, in whatever way they think to be immediately feasible.

The people of Guinea and the Government of the Republic of Guinea await practical evidence of their solidarity in the coming hours and days.

Our sincere thanks go out to the African, Asian and Arab peoples and Governments which have already discharged their duty of solidarity.

Long live free, independent, sovereign and honoured Africa!

LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION!

NOTE DATED 25 NOVEMBER 1970 FROM
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

/Original: French/

The Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the diplomatic, consular and trade missions accredited to the Guinean Government and has the honour, following the statement broadcast today, 25 November 1970, on the Voix de la Révolution radio station by the Head of State of Guinea and Supreme Leader of the Revolution, President Ahmed Sekou TOURE, to inform them that the assistance which they may wish to give to the Guinean Government, as it meets the aggression being committed against it by Portugal, may take any form, including any factual testimony they can offer to the United Nations Mission, which is expected at Conakry today, concerning what they have actually experienced and seen of this aggression.

The Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs knows beforehand that the diplomatic, consular and trade missions accredited to the Guinean Government will discharge this duty and it takes the opportunity to renew the assurances of its highest consideration.

DIPLOMATIC, CONSULAR
AND TRADE MISSIONS
IN GUINEA, CONAKRY

THE MINISTER OF STATE
(Signed) SAIFOULAYE DIALLO

STATEMENT OF THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TO GUINEA IN CONNEXION WITH THE
ARMED AGGRESSION BY MERCENARIES AGAINST THE CAPITAL OF GUINEA

[Original: French]

I must first of all express my condolences to the Government of Guinea on the deaths and injuries which have occurred, not only among members of the army and the popular militia, but also among the civilian population of the capital as a result of the armed aggression perpetrated by mercenaries in the capital, which we have witnessed.

As a result of this aggression, an Italian expert was seriously injured on Sunday night at his home, which was partly demolished by a grenade. The mercenaries obviously had no scruples about killing and destroying everything in their path or about injuring civilians, including women and children, living near their targets.

The victim was Mr. Aldo BONACCI, a typographical expert engaged by the Guinean and Italian Governments to conduct vocational training courses in typography and graphic arts at the School of Applied Arts in Belle-vue. Mr. BONACCI is the father of four children and when he was injured, at four a.m., my wife and I tried to give any help possible, with the assistance of a doctor and a surgeon, who performed an emergency operation on him at the "Ignace Deen" hospital with such equipment as was to hand, without electricity and at a time of great danger, since a furious battle was going on in the district between the invaders and the popular forces of Guinea.

I take this opportunity sincerely to thank the Guinean authorities, the doctors and the Guinean friends of the BONACCI family, who helped us to give first aid to this injured Italian national, who will be flown to Italy on Friday morning for complete treatment.

I know that there have been other innocent victims and that a number of killings have been most cynically perpetrated among the civilian population, including, among others, several European experts who had been sent to Guinea in order to put at the disposal of that country their experience and competence in various spheres and thus to accelerate the economic development of the Republic of Guinea.

The Government and people of Italy firmly believe in this form of co-operation and are happy to give every support to Guinea and other developing countries, in accordance with the principles of international solidarity and of close and fraternal collaboration, the only means of achieving the supreme goal of peace and social justice.

The Italian Government, faithful to the principles of peace and international co-operation, vigorously condemns all armed aggression, and firmly believes that the sovereignty of free and independent countries is sacred and cannot be overthrown or attacked by military intervention by any country on any pretext whatsoever.

I congratulate the people of Guinea, however, on the courage, firmness and determination it has shown in repelling, unaided, the aggression we have witnessed and I sincerely wish every happiness and prosperity to the Republic of Guinea, to which Italy desires to give every support and to contribute its experience, particularly in the technical and industrial spheres, in the mutual interest of our two peoples, and in the interest of peace and international security.

LETTER DATED 27 NOVEMBER 1970 FROM THE AMBASSADOR
OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO GUINEA
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MISSION

/Original: French/

Further to the offer which I made during my statement before the United Nations Special Mission to Guinea in my capacity as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Democratic Republic to the Republic of Guinea and which was accepted by you, concerning eye-witness reports on the events of 22 November 1970 given by nationals of the German Democratic Republic at present working in the Republic of Guinea, I have the honour to transmit to you the following material:

- an eye-witness report by Mr. Lothar Franze and Mr. Georg Gotter, who are at present residents of Conakry, Republic of Guinea;

- two maps showing the observations made by Mr. Franze and Mr. Gotter on 22 November 1970, including the information derived from my observations of vessel movements opposite the Embassy of the German Democratic Republic on 22 November 1970, which I had the honour to report orally on 27 November 1970 before the United Nations Special Mission to Guinea.

I hope that my statement, which was made with the agreement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, and the attached material will be of assistance to the United Nations Special Mission to Guinea.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

REPORTS OF EYE-WITNESSES

We, Mr. Lothar Franze, born on 17 November 1939, telecommunications engineer and Mr. Georg Gotter, born on 27 March 1931, electrotechnical engineer, are citizens of the German Democratic Republic. Mr. Lothar Franze works with P. and T. at Conakry as a telecommunications expert. Mr. Georg Gotter works at the C.E.R. "2 août" at Donka as a professor of electrotechniques. At present we have two apartments on the tenth floor of the "Boulbinet A" building (see point "A" on the map).^{a/}

At 3.15 a.m. on 22 November 1970 we were both awakened by the noise of small-arms fire. Then Mr. Franze and Mr. Gotter uninterruptedly observed the following incidents from the balconies of the Franze family:

From the front balcony we had a view, to the left, of the coast road, in an easterly direction and, to the right, of the sea, as far as the Los islands in a north-easterly direction. From the back balcony we could observe Conakry I with the harbour waters (see attached map).^{a/}

Towards 3.20 a.m. we observed that the current had been cut from one district to another (totally at Conakry I, partially at Conakry II). From 3.15 a.m. onwards we heard small-arms fire in the direction to the east of the coast road, in the direction west of the Hotel de France and in the direction of the Presidential Palace.

Towards 4 a.m. we saw from the back balcony a fire near the Hotel Camayenne. At 4.40 a.m. we saw a black object at sea (see attached map,^{a/} position 1, the boats shown in red). Towards 5 a.m. we heard the noise of engines running, round about the black object - position 2, shown in green. Towards 5.30 a.m. we were able to see that the object consisted of two parts. At dawn, at about 6 a.m., we were able to identify these objects as ships, one of them was no doubt a landing craft. At 6.20 a.m. the landing craft started to move out to sea - see the series of broken lines, in red. At 6.30 a.m. two launches from the two ships moved towards the coast - see the green lines with the arrow (3).

When the launches had covered half the distance towards the coast - see the curved green lines - we heard loud bursts of machine-gun fire and we noticed the points of impact in the direction of the ships. The launches turned at once and went towards the second ship, which had not moved and which we had identified as a warship of unknown nationality.

^{a/} The maps referred to in the present report have been deposited in the archives of the United Nations Secretariat, where they are available for consultation.

A fierce fight then broke out in the peninsula in front of our house - point A. At 6.35 a.m. the warship also started to move out to sea. About an hour later the two ships disappeared behind the island of Kassa.

The fighting in the peninsula went on. At 7.10 a.m. we saw several men fleeing in the water and they were fired upon from the coast. The fleeing men were swimming in the direction of the island of Kassa. After some time we could just observe two swimmers until we lost sight of them.

The first prisoners captured in the peninsula passed by our house at 7.30 a.m. There were about eight of them. They were wearing olive green uniforms with a green armband and some of them had sand or orange-coloured soft hats.

At about 8.30 a.m., we saw from the back balcony, in the direction of the harbour and of the Hotel Camayenne - see map^{a/} - a landing craft and three warships of the same type that we knew from our observations from the front balcony. The ships were moving and between the ships and the shore we saw some small ships, obviously launches, which were going here and there. At about 11 a.m. the ships were fired on, obviously with tank guns. Between midday and 1 p.m. the ships moved away, accompanied by a few launches, in the direction of the island of Tamara - see map.^{a/} They were still to be seen late in the afternoon.

Throughout this period we heard the noise of fighting in different parts. At dusk, at about 7 p.m., violent barrage fire started from the shore out to sea.

At 8.25 p.m. we noticed two lights in the direction in which the ships were going in the evening. A little while later there were four at equal distances. The lights (they were obviously ships) were slowly moving away towards the north and north-east. At about 1.30 a.m. a ship moved rapidly towards the south and disappeared within half an hour. The three other lights disappeared suddenly at about 3.15 a.m.

With regard to the incidents of 22 and 23 November 1970, we had noticed the following things:

Some days before 22 November, a ship drew near to the coast to the south of Conakry, in a direction which is not usually followed by ordinary ships and it moored near the coast at the latitude of the île des musées - position I. On the following day this ship

left its moorings and dropped anchor near the entrance to the harbour - position II. During the Sunday, the ship again left its moorings and took up a position some 300 to 400 metres from the harbour lighthouse - position III. It remained there, despite fierce gunfire, until Tuesday, 24 November 1970, when it went out to sea without having reached the harbour.

Conakry, 27 November 1970
(Signed) Lothar FRANZE

(Signed) Georg GOTTER

The Embassy of the German Democratic Republic certifies that the above are the signatures of Mr. Lothar Franze and Mr. Georg Gotter.

Conakry, 27 November 1970
No. 33/70

(Signed) Gunther FRITSCH
Ambassador

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