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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS
(for the period 2 June 1970 to 1 December 1970)

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	3
I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS	4
A. Composition and deployment	4
B. Function and guiding principles	7
C. Relations with the Government and with the Turkish Cypriot leadership	8
D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force	8
II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER	9
A. Military situation	9
(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP	9
(a) Government armed forces	9
(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements	9
(c) Greek and Turkish National Contingents	9
(d) Cyprus police arms	10
(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting	12

	<u>Page</u>
B. Specific developments and action by UNFICYP	13
(i) Observance of the cease-fire	13
(ii) Trikomo incident	15
(iii) Detention of members of the National Guard by Turkish Cypriot armed elements	19
(iv) Limnitis	20
(v) Limassol	21
(vi) Alaminos	22
(vii) Ayios Evstathios	22
C. Developments relating to the maintenance of law and order . . .	24
III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS	26
IV. INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS	33
V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL	37
VI. MEDIATION EFFORT	38
VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS	39
VIII. OBSERVATIONS	41
MAP - DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP IN DECEMBER 1970	

INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 2 June 1970 to 1 December 1970 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.
2. The situation in the last six months has remained generally calm but sporadic acts of violence and a somewhat large number of incidents have tended to increase tension and distrust between the two communities.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 2,969 military personnel and 175 civilian police (S/9814, para. 3). On 1 December 1970, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>			<u>Total</u>
Austria	- HQ UNFICYP	1	
	- Field hospital	<u>54</u>	55
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	46	
	- Battalion	<u>531</u>	577
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	23	
	- Battalion	<u>273</u>	296
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	9	
	- Battalion	<u>279</u>	288
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	10	
	- Battalion	<u>418</u>	428
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	10	
	- Battalion	<u>275</u>	285
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	148	
	- Battalion	605	
	- Reconnaissance Squadron	124	
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	151	
	- Helicopter support	46	
	- Contingent HQ	<u>4</u>	<u>1,078</u>
	Total military personnel		3,007

Total

Civilian police

Australia	50	
Austria	45	
Denmark	40	
Sweden	<u>40</u>	
Total civilian police		<u>175</u>
TOTAL UNFICYP		<u>3,182</u>

4. The following changes took place during the period covered by this report:

- (a) Austria: A partial rotation was carried out.
- (b) Canada: The 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, replaced the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment.
- (c) Denmark: The 14th Battalion replaced the 13th Battalion.
- (d) Finland: A partial rotation took place. The incoming troops form part of the 14th Finnish Battalion.
- (e) Ireland: The 19th Infantry Group replaced the 18th Infantry Group.
- (f) Sweden: The 45th Battalion replaced the 44th Battalion.
- (g) United Kingdom: The 3rd Battalion, The Royal Green Jackets, replaced the 3rd Battalion, The Light Infantry. C Squadron, The Royal Scots Greys, replaced B Squadron, The Royal Scots Greys. 60 Squadron, Royal Corps of Transport, replaced 65 Squadron, The Royal Corps of Transport.

5. It has been found possible to reduce the number of manned military observation posts (OPs) sometimes referred to as static posts, from fifty-nine to fifty-six. The tasks of these newly unmanned OPs have been taken over by patrols. In addition, in order to improve command and control, certain minor alterations have been made to the operational boundaries between Nicosia and Kyrenia Districts.

6. The Force is now deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNCIVPOL

Combined staff

Force Reserve (British Reconnaissance Squadron)

Austrian Field Hospital

Nicosia District

Canadian Contingent

Danish Civilian Police

Famagusta District

Swedish Contingent

Swedish Civilian Police

Larnaca District

Irish Contingent

Australian Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent

Australian Civilian Police

Lefka District

Danish Contingent

Austrian Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Finnish Contingent

Austrian Civilian Police

7. The reviews of certain aspects of the Force to make a more economical use of manpower and administrative effort referred to in my last report (S/9814, para. 7) have now been completed. As a result, certain reductions have been achieved in the number of locally employed civilians and in vehicle holdings.

8. The number of UNCIVPOL police stations and sub-stations has remained unchanged during the period covered by this report. However, Australian Civilian Police took over the Larnaca District from the Swedish Civilian Police to achieve a more equitable distribution of the workload.

9. The Force remains under the command of Major General D. Prem Chand. My Special Representative in Cyprus continues to be Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall.

B. Function and guiding principles

10. The function of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

11. That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964; 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965; 16 March, 16 June and 15 December 1966; 19 June and 22 December 1967; 18 March, 18 June and 10 December 1968; 10 June and 11 December 1969, and 9 June 1970.

12. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties of UNCIVPOL are as outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4).

13. The Political Liaison Committee continues to meet, as a rule, every two weeks to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relationships between the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot Community. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, the Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the Force Economics Officer meet separately with Liaison Officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot Leadership. Between 2 June 1970 and 1 December 1970 the Committee held twelve meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and ten with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

Casualties

14. During the period under review, UNFICYP has suffered no casualties in connexion with **intercommunal** incidents. One Danish officer died as a result of a road accident; one Canadian soldier died by drowning, and another in a road crash.

Discipline

15. The over-all discipline and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force have continued to be of a high order, and reflect credit on the Contingent Commanders, their staffs and the armed forces of the contributing countries.

C. Relations with the Government and with
the Turkish Cypriot leadership

16. UNFICYP has maintained close liaison with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and kept good working relations with both Government and Turkish Cypriot forces.

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

17. Since my last report, there have been seven instances in which UNFICYP has been denied freedom of movement by Turkish Cypriot fighters. Four of these incidents were caused by ignorance or misunderstanding of orders and three by fighters acting in disobedience of instructions issued by their local leadership. On three occasions, UNFICYP patrols were stopped by National Guardsmen but were eventually allowed to proceed on their intended route after the Guardsmen had referred the matter to their superiors.

18. The number of restricted areas remains unchanged and is as outlined in my report of 11 June 1968 (S/8622, para. 15).

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF
FIGHTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION
AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(1) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

19. There has been no significant change in the overall strength, organization and deployment of the National Guard during the past six months. The call-up of the second half of the 1952 age-group took place in July 1970, while the second half of the 1950 age-group was demobilized.

20. Training activity has remained at the same level and UNFICYP has been notified in advance of field exercises and live range firing. As in the past, summer training camps were established by the National Guard on the east and west coasts.

21. The Commander of the National Guard was changed in July 1970.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

22. There has been no significant change in the over-all strength or deployment of the fighter units, but the changeover to a more conventional command structure referred to in the last reports (S/9521, para. 21 and S/9814, para. 22) has now been completed.

23. Training activity has continued at a higher level than in the past, and UNFICYP has been given advance notice of all field exercises and live firing.

24. It has been noted that most fighters, in all parts of the Island, appear more uniformly dressed when on duty and that special attention is being given to their bearing and turn-out.

(c) Greek and Turkish National Contingents

25. The two National Contingents have remained in the locations occupied by them since 1963 (S/5950, para. 26), and their strengths are unchanged. A partial rotation of the Greek National Contingent took place on 3/4 July 1970. UNFICYP was given advance notice of this rotation and was advised of the quantities and

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types of military stores brought in. Further notifications of the arrival of certain military stores for the Contingent were subsequently received, and an UNFICYP representative was invited to be present at the unloading.

26. Half of the Turkish National Contingent was rotated on 28 September 1970. The quantity of ammunition and stores imported by the incoming troops was negotiated with the Government of Cyprus through UNFICYP's good offices. UNFICYP provided escorts, observers and transport facilities. No incidents occurred, but the Cyprus Government complained that three destroyers escorting the ship carrying the Turkish troops came within 3 miles of Famagusta Harbour in violation of the 12-mile territorial waters limit claimed by Cyprus.

(d) Cyprus Police arms

27. As will be recalled, the Government notified the Force Commander in April 1968 that it intended to distribute gradually, between July and December of that year, all of the light arms in store from the consignment of weapons imported in December 1966. At the same time, the Government undertook to give the Secretary-General further notice of the date on which this gradual distribution would begin and to keep UNFICYP informed of the process of distribution (S/8622, paras. 30 and 31). It was thus expected that after 1968 the arms remaining in storage under the control of the Cyprus Government and subject to periodic inspections by the Force Commander would consist of all the heavy machine guns, automatic rocket launchers and mortars in the original consignment. However, except for 44 7.62 mm sub-machine guns which were issued to the Cyprus Police immediately after the assassination attempt on President Makarios (S/9814, para. 34), no distribution of light arms took place at the time, as ascertained by the periodic inspections carried out by the Force Commander.

28. In a letter dated 18 June 1970, the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that it had become necessary, in order to render the Cyprus Police force more effective in its functions, to distribute all the light weapons from the 1966 consignment. The Secretary-General's reply dated 30 July 1970 stated, inter alia, that he assumed, in accordance with the President's undertaking of 13 January 1967, reaffirmed since by the Government, that all remaining weapons from the said consignment, namely the

heavy machine guns, automatic rocket launchers and mortars, as well as ammunition for them would continue to be kept in storage and that the Commander of UNFICYP would effect, as in the past, periodic inspections to ascertain that there had been no distribution. Such an inspection took place on 19 November. It showed that there were still some light weapons in store awaiting distribution. As regards the heavy weapons, there had been no change in the types and quantities of arms in storage, as verified at previous inspections (S/8914, para. 21).

Access to Limassol Docks

29. On 13 June 1970, an UNCIVPOL patrol was refused access to the Limassol Docks where military stores were being unloaded. Not since 1967 had UNCIVPOL been prevented from entering the harbour; nor would it appear, as far as UNFICYP is aware, that any sizable shipment of military stores arrived at that port in 1968 or in 1969.

30. The Government's attention was drawn to this new restriction on UNCIVPOL's freedom of movement, which was considered contrary to an oral agreement concluded in September 1964 providing for UNFICYP to be given advance notification of the arrival at Limassol of ships carrying military stores and for members of the United Nations Force to be admitted to the docks at the time of unloading.

31. As stated in previous reports (S/8286, paras. 28 to 30, S/7969, para. 26, and S/7611, para. 27), difficulties over the implementation of this agreement had arisen in the past. In the course of recent discussions with the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, the Government took the position, which was subsequently set forth in an aide-memoire dated 9 November 1970, that the 1964 agreement related only to military personnel but not to stores, arriving in chartered boats in Limassol port. According to the Government, the duty of the members of UNCIVPOL had all along been confined to looking and satisfying themselves that there was no arrival of military personnel in excess of the number provided for the Greek National Contingent in Cyprus (para. 25 above), but they had no authority for any investigation as to the amount and kind of military equipment imported.

32. The Government maintains that as a question of principle it is its prerogative to import any military equipment which it thinks necessary for the country's defence, and since such equipment is a military secret, it should not be known outside Government circles, UNFICYP not excluded.

33. Further discussions will be held by UNFICYP with the Government on this question. Experience has shown that any sizable shipment of military stores through the ports of Cyprus is easily detected even if the docks are sealed off. Exaggerated reports about such shipments tend to raise unnecessary fears and suspicion and exacerbate intercommunal distrust.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

34. The UNFICYP District Commanders have taken, with considerable success, special precautions to prevent incidents which may lead to a recurrence of fighting. However, regrettably, in spite of the continuing efforts of UNFICYP, there has been no progress in bringing about some degree of military disengagement. The disposition of the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters in sensitive areas, such as the Green Line in Nicosia, Artemis Road in Larnaca and at Limnitis and Kokkina, remains unchanged. UNFICYP continues to hold the view that along the Nicosia Green Line, it should be possible to carry out simultaneous relocations of National Guard and fighter elements so that they will not be in full view of each other; they could be replaced by Cyprus Police and Turkish Cypriot police elements respectively. As previously stated (S/8446, paras. 56 to 58), serious consideration ought to be given to making similar arrangements on Artemis Road where, although both sides have maintained a defensive posture, confrontation is dangerously and unnecessarily close. The Turkish Cypriot leadership continues to stress, however, that their military deployment is designed for purely defensive purposes in the face of the much greater strength of the National Guard, and that no appreciable change can be envisaged in the deployment of its fighters until an atmosphere of trust and confidence has been created.

35. While, as already stated, the military situation has remained generally calm, certain acts of violence and incidents have occurred which, even though they have not seriously endangered the peace, have tended to augment tension and to add to the sense of mutual distrust. Some of these incidents, particularly the fatal shooting of a Turkish Cypriot civilian and the wounding of two others at a National Guard summer camp near Trikomo, are described in some detail below (paras. 37 to 62 below).

B. Specific developments and action by UNFICYP

(i) Observance of the cease-fire

36. There were twelve shooting incidents confirmed by UNFICYP during the period under review. After investigation by UNFICYP, five of these were attributed to the Government security forces and seven to Turkish Cypriot fighters. In four cases the shooting could be considered to be violations of the cease-fire, the remainder being caused by careless or negligent handling of weapons. In addition to the eight shooting incidents recorded in the summary for Nicosia District, a considerable number of shots were reported which could have been caused by individuals shooting on ranges or hunting.

Summary of shooting incidents

	2 Jun 70 to 1 Dec 70	2 Dec 69 to 1 Jun 70	3 Jun 69 to 1 Dec 69	3 Dec 68 to 2 Jun 69	8 Jun 68 to 2 Dec 68	8 Mar 68 to 7 Jun 68	7 Dec 67 to 7 Mar 68
Nicosia District (from 23 Feb 70)	8	5	10	5	16	6	8
Famagusta Zone (until 28 Feb 70)	-	3	6	1	1	3	5
Famagusta District (from 1 Mar 70)	3	2	-	-	-	-	-
Larnaca District (from 9 Mar 70)	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Limassol Zone (less Kophinou Dist. from 9 Mar 70)	1	3	5	7	4	1	6
Lefka District	-	-	3	7	11	8	23
Kyrenia District	-	2	6	5	33	21	25
TOTAL	12	16	30	25	65	39	67

(ii) Trikomo incident

37. Shortly before midnight on 5 August 1970, three Turkish Cypriots, who were travelling in a motor car from the village of Galatia to Famagusta, stopped just off the public road, within a militarily restricted area and quite close to a National Guard summer camp. They were taken into custody by a sentry who escorted them to the main entrance of the camp. Then followed a series of incidents in which one of the Turkish Cypriots was fatally shot, another seriously wounded, and a third slightly injured.

38. Approximately one hour later, a Turkish Cypriot-owned motor car was travelling along that same road coming from Famagusta. When it passed near the camp, a National Guardsman fired an automatic weapon at the car, which was penetrated by five bullets. All seven occupants, who escaped injury, were detained at the camp for some hours.

39. On 6 August, the Government Public Information Office issued a press release stating that an incident had taken place in an area near Trikomo due to the suspicious approach towards a National Guard Camp by unknown persons. The suspects, not having obeyed repeated calls by the camp security organs to stop, and having tried to escape, had been fired at with the result that one of them was killed and two injured, one seriously. The release specified that only later was it found that they were Turkish Cypriots.

40. The following day, the Cyprus Turkish Information Centre branded the Government version as an attempt to minimize the seriousness of this attack on innocent Turkish Cypriot civilians, who, it was stated, had been shot in cold blood and without any justification.

41. One of the two surviving Turkish Cypriots involved in the first incident, Mr. Hassan, made a statement to the Cyprus Police, of which UNFICYP was given a copy. It is understood that the other survivor, Mr. Feysi, also made a statement, but UNFICYP is not in possession of that particular document. Mr. Hassan said, inter alia:

"At Trikomo T-junction, we decided to stop again in order to consume some brandy drinks at a nearby bar. As there were no people there, we changed mind, and continued our way to Famagusta. When we had just passed the said bar, there is on the left-hand side of the road a village track road where my friend, Feysi, drove the car into this road. We covered some

about 50 yards of this village road, and we stopped our car very near to the seashore. All of us remained into the car for fresh air. Five minutes later a Greek Cypriot National Guard reached my side and he asked me in Greek language what we were doing here. I said to him in English that we stopped here for fresh air, but he did not understand what I said to him.... Then the soldier ordered all of us to be alighted from the car and we did so. He then ordered us to pull up our hands and we did so, and then he made us run to the nearby military camp. Outside the gate of the camp, we stopped and we were surrounded by another 5-6 soldiers with guns. One of these soldiers, who were all unknown to me, ordered us to in line, and he started kicking us. At this particular time, I heard a shot and in the meantime I saw an officer coming from the camp along the gate. After the shot, I saw my friend Fevsi lying on the ground and Mustafa started running away where the soldiers opened fire against him. At this stage, I got afraid and run away and I was shot as well and I was wounded on my right hand. I succeeded to arrive on the Risso Famagusta road, and the soldiers running after me but not shooting."

42. On 11 August, the Attorney-General of the Republic advised that no criminal responsibility arose and that the matter should be examined from the angle of whether any disciplinary offences had been committed contrary to the National Guard disciplinary regulations. The finding of the investigation stated, inter alia, that the three Turkish Cypriots left the main road and drove, with lights off, on a track leading to the sea. In this way, they drove for 55-65 yards, arriving finally near the seashore, where they stopped and alighted from the car. After that, they moved on foot towards the south-west approach of the camp, which is situated within a prohibited area. Both the movement of the car and the movement on foot of the aforementioned persons were noticed, and, naturally, were taken as very suspicious by the sentry of the camp who, unnoticed by them, watched the approach of the unknown persons. When the Turkish Cypriots reached a point about 15 yards from the sentry's position, the latter ordered them to stop, to raise their hands up and then, without delay and without any search, ordered them to proceed, one after another, towards the central gate of the camp as it was his duty to do under the regulations in force.
43. The statement went on to say that near the gate, two other sentries were present. While the Turkish Cypriots were being questioned as to their identity, one of them lowered his arms, which was interpreted as a suspicious move, and the first-mentioned sentry fired a warning shot in the air. The three men tried to flee in different directions and shooting followed in which one man was

seriously wounded and immediately arrested. Another was slightly wounded and captured shortly thereafter, while the third escaped. Later, at the arrival of the commanding officer, a patrol was organized to trace and arrest the escapee. This patrol located him and challenged him to surrender. However, he attempted to run away again and was fired upon, with shots allegedly aimed at his legs, but due to the various prevailing conditions, he was fatally wounded.

44. It was further stated that at about this time another sentry, who considered the movement of a motor car as suspicious because of its low speed, challenged the approaching vehicle. The driver did not obey and increased his speed. The sentry fired a warning burst at the vehicle which subsequently was brought to a stop. The occupants were led to the camp but, upon notification, the commanding officer arranged their immediate release. The statement continued by saying that responsibility arose as follows:

"(a) The three Turkish Cypriots who, irrespective of motive which could not be established, violated the law by entering into a prohibited area and moving in a suspicious way towards the camp of a National Guard unit, despite the challenge to stop, which they did not obey, with the result of their being shot at, in consequence of which the one was killed and the two others were wounded.

"(b) The sentry, who considered the movement of one of the three Turkish Cypriots as threatening and fired in confusion and unnecessarily a warning shot, thus causing the Turkish Cypriots to escape, is sentenced to forty (40) days' confinement.

"(c) The sentry who ordered a motor vehicle unknown to him and driven on the road near the Camp to stop because he considered it suspicious and in consequence firing at its tyres because it did not obey his order with the intention to immobilize it thus putting in danger the life of its passengers is sentenced to two months' confinement.

"(d) The member of the National Guard in charge of the patrol who acted wrongly by leading seven (7) Turkish Cypriots to the Camp for checking is sentenced to two months' confinement."

45. The Government later announced its intention to hold an inquest and also to pay compensation. The amount of this compensation was set at £14,000 to the seriously wounded man, who is now said to be probably permanently incapacitated; at £8,000 to the dependents of the deceased; and at £300 to the slightly wounded man. At the inquest, which was held between 28 August and 12 September 1970

in the presence of Turkish Cypriot lawyers representing the victims, the Coroner also found that no criminal responsibility was involved on the part of those who fired the shots.

46. The Turkish Cypriot leadership challenged both the findings of the Attorney-General and the Coroner's verdict. It stated that the Attorney-General's findings were not the outcome of an impartial judicial inquiry carried out by a properly constituted, independent investigating body or tribunal, such as a board of inquiry consisting of a Greek or Turkish Cypriot judge, together with a member of UNFICYP, which had been suggested by the leadership but rejected by the other side; it was merely the result of some so-called inquiries carried out behind closed doors by the Greek side which was deeply involved in the matter. They could not, therefore, be accepted as fair, or as representing the true facts surrounding the incidents; they were rather a further effort to extenuate the criminal responsibility of the National Guardsmen involved in the incidents and to reduce it to one of trivial infringement of some military rules, completely ignoring, however, the grave consequences of their violent action. The statement went on to say that the Attorney-General's ruling, which had been given before an inquest had been carried out, or before a Judicial Commission of Inquiry under the relevant legislation in force (as requested by Turkish side) had been published, was contrary to any legal concept as well as the long established legal procedure in Cyprus.

47. On 14 September, the Cyprus Turkish Information Centre commented on the inquest's verdict, stating among others that the inquest was held in contravention of the constitutional requirements, in that it was held before a Greek judge who had no locus standi in a case of this kind; it was furthermore considered that the findings of the Coroner that the area in which the incident had occurred was a prohibited area, and that the deceased was killed "while escaping from lawful custody", were wholly untenable. Even assuming that no controversy existed as to the legality of declaring areas as "prohibited", the emptying of a magazine full of bullets into an unarmed private citizen, who had already submitted to the so-called arrest and was still in virtual custody, could find no justification whatsoever in any country where law and justice prevailed.

48. Similar views were expressed on behalf of the Turkish Government. Its Foreign Minister, Mr. Ihsan Sabri Chaglayangil, declared, among other things, that this "one-sided inquiry, which not only acquitted those responsible for the attack but rewarded and encouraged the assailants", justified, when reviewed together with the Greek Cypriots' past attitudes, the anxieties of the Turkish Cypriot community for their future.

49. Alluding to these criticisms, Archbishop Makarios, in reply to a question put to him by the press, said that while he was greatly grieved over the unfortunate incident, he did not think this sad occurrence should be politically exploited to such an extent; it was considered an isolated event and the Greek Cypriots would never stop making sincere efforts for the restoration of conditions of normality and peaceful co-existence with the Turkish Cypriots. But response from the Turkish side was needed to this effect, and statements containing threats and creating tension were not constructive at all.

50. UNFICYP was not able to carry out a thorough enquiry into this most regrettable intercommunal incident. This was primarily due to the fact that the shooting occurred at a National Guard Camp which UNCIVPOL was not able to enter. For this reason, its investigations were confined in the main to securing, where possible, relevant statements and other pertinent information as well as attending the Coroner's inquest as observers. Despite the limited scope of its inquiries, it would appear to UNFICYP that, while it was unwise for the three Turkish Cypriots involved to enter the militarily restricted area late at night in the manner in which they did, the force used by the National Guardsmen in their endeavour to hold the men in custody was obviously excessive, especially as the Turkish Cypriots were unarmed and surrounded by at least an equal number of trained and armed sentries. It is also questionable whether the behaviour of the three men that night could be considered as constituting a threat to the security of the camp.

(iii) Detention of members of National Guard by Turkish Cypriot armed elements

51. Since August 1970, there have been a number of cases of National Guardsmen being detained by Turkish Cypriot armed elements, when mounted patrols and single vehicles have crossed into Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. On three occasions

within one fortnight in late October and early November, National Guardsmen, both on foot and in vehicles, crossed the Nicosia Green Line, carrying arms and ammunition. Each time, the National Guardsmen were readily released upon UNFICYP intervention; however, the Turkish Cypriots have refused to return their arms and ammunition, apparently in retaliation for the arrest by the Cyprus Police of three Turkish Cypriots near Polis on 22 September 1970 and for the confiscation of a Browning machine gun which was concealed in their car.

52. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has expressed considerable concern at these crossings by National Guardsmen, which they consider to be highly provocative and a cause of tension and anxiety. While these incidents appear to have been entirely accidental, there is little doubt that sudden crossings of military demarcation lines by armed members of security forces can easily lead to situations fraught with danger, especially if those involved do not show restraint. Measures have now been taken by the National Guard to prevent such crossings in the future.

(iv) Limnitis

53. In October 1970, tension rose in the Limnitis area. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots lodged a number of complaints with UNFICYP. While the main grievances of the local Greek Cypriots related to restrictions on their freedom of movement by night on the public highway to Nicosia which passes through a Turkish Cypriot-controlled area, the Turkish Cypriots were concerned over the difficulties and delays they encountered in securing water and electricity, in harvesting their crops in militarily restricted areas, and in removing considerable quantities of valuable dead wood from their lands located near National Guard posts. The situation was aggravated by an incident on 27 September when a school master from the nearby Greek Cypriot village of Kato Pyrgos missed a special United Nations convoy through Limnitis which had been arranged to leave around midnight that day. He asked an UNFICYP guard to take him to a Turkish Cypriot post, where a heated exchange of words quickly ensued. At one point, the Greek Cypriot was manhandled by three or four fighters before the UNFICYP soldier could intervene effectively and stop the affray. This incident led to renewed strong representations by the Government for the improvement of the situation at Kato Pyrgos. The main road through that village is barred in the westerly direction by the Turkish Cypriots

in Kokkina, while in the easterly direction it is closed at night, except for emergency cases, by the Turkish Cypriots in Limnitis enclave.

54. These complaints have been discussed by UNFICYP with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, both locally and in Nicosia. As a result, an UNFICYP post has been re-established near Kato Pyrgos with a view to facilitating civilian Greek Cypriot traffic through Limnitis during the hours of darkness. In this connexion, UNFICYP has been assured by the Turkish Cypriots that there is no objection to its escorting Greek Cypriots travelling at night for legitimate purposes. At the same time, the Government was asked by UNFICYP to assist in expediting, wherever possible, solutions to the economic problems facing the Turkish Cypriots in the area.

(v) Limassol

55. Although the situation in Limassol has by and large remained calm, there have been complaints by the Government authorities and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Among others, the appearance of uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters in public has been protested by the Government, and strong exception was taken to the carriage of arms in the streets of Limassol by a fighter detachment during the Turkish National Day celebrations on 29 October 1970. The Government's concern was heightened by the display, on the same day, of a large number of armed Turkish Cypriot fighters in the nearby mixed village of Episkopi.

56. The Government authorities have also taken exception to certain obstacles which remain on Lycourgos Street in Limassol, preventing free passage. Following UNFICYP intervention, a wall built by Turkish Cypriots across this street in May of this year was removed, together with some barbed wire. However, the Turkish Cypriots have refused to take away a rattan (bamboo type) fence on the same site, on the grounds that it had been in this position for a number of years. Lycourgos Street has been a particularly sensitive area as it borders upon a Turkish Cypriot fighter compound.

57. The Turkish Cypriot grievances relate primarily to the use of the Greek Orthodox Church of Ayios Antonios, situated in a quarter of Limassol inhabited by Turkish Cypriots. This Church had been closed for many years but was reopened in 1969 when intercommunal relations improved. However, since then, the Turkish Cypriots have insisted that the services should be limited to one a month with

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an additional one on the Church's Name Day, that the attendance at the regular services should not exceed five or six persons, and that the Church should not be cleaned every day. While the Government authorities have not been prepared to be formally bound by such limitations, services have as a rule been held only once a month with small congregations. However, there have been exceptions when special services have been held without advance notice and when the attendance has been high. As this is a matter which involves freedom of worship in a particularly sensitive area of the town, UNFICYP has appealed to both sides for tolerance, understanding and mutual forbearance.

(vi) Alaminos

58. Since my last report (S/9814, para. 28), the situation in Alaminos has remained calm but the Government has repeatedly expressed concern over the display of arms by Turkish Cypriot fighters. It has drawn UNFICYP's attention to the dangers inherent in members of one community of a mixed village carrying weapons by day and night. UNFICYP has been patrolling Alaminos regularly and has noted a considerable improvement in recent months. Generally, it can be said that arms are no longer conspicuous at any time; only when tension rose throughout the island in August, following the serious incident in Trikomo (para. 37), was it necessary for UNFICYP patrols to intervene when armed sentries were observed after dark.

(vii) Ayios Evstathios

59. On 7 October 1970, a Turkish Cypriot fighter stopped two members of the Cyprus Police riding a motorcycle who had entered the Turkish Cypriot hamlet of Ayios Evstathios in Famagusta District (GR/WD 9216). Some two weeks later, while on his way to the nearby mixed village of Komi Kebir, the fighter concerned was recognized and arrested by the Cyprus Police, taken to Court and fined £20 for having "obstructed a police officer in the lawful discharge of his duties". The Turkish Cypriot leadership took strong exception to the arrest and sentence since, as they stated, the fighter had acted under orders from his superiors; they expressed grave concern over this development which, they feared, created a new and dangerous precedent.

60. When subsequently the Turkish Cypriots of Ayios Evstathios were told by the Cyprus police that one of its patrols would come to the village on 30 October,

they let it be known that no Cyprus police member would be allowed to approach the locality. UNFICYP then initiated urgent discussions, both with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. It appeared from its consultations and also from records held by UNCIVPOL that a distinction had to be made between the freedom of movement of the Cyprus police along public roads in the vicinity of Ayios Evstathios, and actual visits by the Cyprus Police within the village itself. Arrangements were made for the Cyprus Police to pass by the village on 30 October without entering it. Both on that day and on 3 November the Cyprus Police came near the village without interference. In order to keep a close watch over the situation, a temporary UNFICYP OP was established near the village on 30 October.

61. It soon became apparent that both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership attached great importance to the events in Ayios Evstathios, although its inhabitants number less than 80; both seemed to feel that this controversy was an ominous symptom of a new trend in intercommunal relations. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, for its part, was concerned over increased activity of the Cyprus Police in and around Turkish Cypriot localities in all parts of the Island in an attempt to impose Government authority. The leadership claimed that this was contrary to article 132 of the 1960 Constitution which provides:

"... (Security) Forces which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited in a proportion approaching one hundred per centum only by members of one community shall belong to that community".

As to the Government, it saw in the interference with the Cyprus Police patrols and the appearance of armed fighters an indication that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was attempting to establish new "enclaves" or "pockets" under its exclusive control, changing the status quo in its favour.

62. As far as Ayios Evstathios is concerned, the information available to UNFICYP suggests that the Cyprus Police intensified in 1970 its activities in and around the village. In an effort to ease matters, UNFICYP has therefore sought and obtained the assurances of both sides that the status quo ante 1970 would be restored. Although no further difficulties are anticipated, UNFICYP will maintain a presence in the area for the time being.

C. Developments relating to the maintenance
of law and order

63. The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) has continued to contribute to the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus. Its responsibilities include investigations of criminal matters of an intercommunal nature, the patrolling and maintenance of posts in sensitive areas, joint patrols with the Cyprus Police, and the marshalling and escorting of the Kyrenia road convoys.

64. UNCIVPOL has maintained close liaison with the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police elements. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have continued to place trust in the members of UNCIVPOL, which has greatly facilitated the performance of their tasks.

65. During the period under review, UNCIVPOL has conducted about 700 investigations. Inquiries covered several deaths from different causes, accidents, serious assaults, the straying or theft of livestock, illegal cultivation of land, damage to crops and property, shop and housebreaking, as well as unlawful digging for antiquities in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas.

66. In addition, some 200 investigations were carried out by UNCIVPOL in support of other branches of UNFICYP, e.g. in the fields of agriculture and public services (paras. 76-80 below).

67. There have been no further acts of intracommunal terrorism during the period covered by this report (see S/9814, paras. 39 and 40).

68. The trial of the six Greek Cypriots accused of conspiring to overthrow the Government and to assassinate President Makarios began on 28 September 1970 before the Assize Court in Nicosia. Two of the accused, including a police constable, were acquitted and discharged during the trial. On 19 November, the remaining four men were sentenced to eight and fourteen years imprisonment, to run concurrently, after being found guilty of conspiracy and of the attempt to kill President Makarios. Both the Assize and the Supreme Court rejected the application by the family of the late P. Georghadjis, former Minister of the Interior, to call witnesses to defend his name which was mentioned during the proceedings.

69. The Coroner's inquiry into the cause of Mr. Georghadjis' death (S/9814, para. 36) was concluded with a verdict that "the accused died of wounds inflicted

by pistol and automatic weapon bullets shot by unknown persons under conditions amounting to premeditated murder."

70. The preliminary inquiry against 21 Greek Cypriots detained in connexion with the raid on the Limassol town central police station on 23 May (S/9814, para. 40) was held in Nicosia in July and August, and they were committed for trial which commenced on 23 November.

71. There have been no further public announcements regarding the recovery of illegally held weapons (S/9814, para. 41).

III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

72. Since my last report (S/9814), the situation with regard to a return to normal conditions has not changed significantly, although there have been some encouraging developments, particularly in the field of public services. Closer co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots has also been evident in a number of semi-autonomous and non-governmental institutions.

73. In the economic field, the trend towards separate economic development has not been reversed, although the growth in trading and industrial activity has brought about a further increase in contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, mainly in the private sector. Many more Turkish Cypriots have found employment in government-controlled areas. Since shortages of skilled labour have persisted throughout the Island, various seminars and training programmes which are also open to Turkish Cypriots have been conducted by the Cyprus Productivity Centre. In June 1970, a seminar on management was held by the Centre in the Turkish sector of Nicosia which was opened by Dr. Kuchuk and attended by more than sixty Turkish Cypriot businessmen. Arrangements have been made to enable Turkish Cypriots to follow a number of other technical courses organized by the same Centre. Turkish Cypriots have also shown more interest in the Higher Technical Institute and the Hotel and Catering Institute, sponsored by the Government with the assistance of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) respectively.

74. Among other encouraging signs worth mentioning are the return of Turkish Cypriot representatives to the Grain and Loan Commissions, the participation of Turkish Cypriots in the newly established Labour Advisory Board, their co-operation with marketing boards for various agricultural products and with improvement boards in some mixed villages.

75. The need for intercommunal economic co-operation which, as previously stated by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders (S/9521, para. 40), could greatly contribute to reducing and even overcoming political differences, has again been stressed in many quarters. Despite undoubted progress in intercommunal relations in such areas as employment, training and commerce, no rapprochement has been apparent on such basic issues as investments and economic policy. The Turkish

Cypriot leadership continues to hold the position that, pending a solution of the basic political problems, it remains responsible for the development of areas under its control, and it has reaffirmed its determination to bring, with the financial aid of Turkey, the community's economic conditions to a level which will permit it to play its own part in the economic progress of the Island. The Government, which recognizes the existence of great economic inequality between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, has expressed its willingness to help to raise the latter's living standard, but it is only prepared to allocate funds for investment projects in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas if it has the over-all supervision and financial control over such projects. At the same time, the Government has again criticized Turkish Cypriot endeavours to develop their community into a separate economic entity. Since a new Five-Year Development Plan is being prepared, it has also been suggested that a new attempt at some form of intercommunal co-operation in the economic field would be particularly beneficial at this juncture in order to ensure a rational utilization of all available means and recourses (S/9814, para. 44).

76. Agriculture has been afflicted by a severe drought which has cut grain and olive crop yields by half in comparison with a normal year. Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers and cattle breeders from stricken areas are to receive financial assistance from the Government valued at about £C500,000 and a total of 3,000 tons of free barley, on the basis of surveys conducted at the request of villages. In addition, the Government, with assistance from the World Food Programme, has distributed food (flour, coffee and seed oil) valued at about £C300,000 to Greek and Turkish Cypriot villages, and UNFICYP has assisted in its distribution.

77. In some ways drought conditions have led to closer co-operation between farmers of both communities. Harvesting of various crops, even in sensitive areas, passed without any major incidents, and a number of complaints in regard to unauthorized grazing and cultivation, cutting of trees etc. have been dealt with promptly and in most cases been resolved locally with the assistance of UNFICYP.

78. Continued interest has been displayed by Turkish Cypriot farmers in projects undertaken by the Government with the assistance of the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), such as mixed farming (S/9814, para. 47), soil conservation and afforestation (S/9814, para. 46) and strengthening

of veterinary services. However, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has again expressed concern about the low percentage of Turkish Cypriot farmers participating in the various schemes. In reply, the Government has reiterated that applications have been examined without discrimination and that the major causes of failure to qualify for assistance has been the inability of applicants to meet technical requirements. The situation has improved however, and it is estimated that in 1970, Turkish Cypriot participation in the mixed farming and soil conservation projects has doubled compared to 1969.

79. Further encouraging progress towards a return to normal conditions has been made in the field of public services. With the assistance of UNFICYP, arrangements have been worked out between the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) and the Turkish Cypriot leadership for providing electricity to Turkish Cypriot villages. EAC teams have been given easy access to Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas for inspecting or improving electrical installations, replacing damaged or outdated meters, wiring and transformers. Discussions for normalizing electricity service in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia have been initiated through UNFICYP's good offices.

80. Water supply, especially during the drought, has been a major problem. UNFICYP has been involved almost daily in disputes over interference with the water system, damage to water pipelines and rationing of water. Most of these matters have been resolved at the local level, while others, such as the installation of new water systems for Turkish Cypriot villages, have been pursued with the Water Development Department (S/9814, para. 49).

81. On the subject of social insurance (S/9814, para. 53), discussions have been held between the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance and the Chairman of the Cyprus Turkish Trade Unions Federation (CTTUF). A preliminary agreement has emerged providing for the reintegration of the Turkish Cypriots into the Social Insurance Scheme on the following conditions: (a) arrangements are to be made for the collective payment of all contributions due to the Fund by Turkish Cypriot employees, and certain of the benefits payable under the Fund are to be made retrospectively, and (b) satisfactory arrangements are to be made for free and continuous inspection in all areas as stipulated by the Social Insurance Law.

82. In order to facilitate this reintegration, a census was conducted in July. The operation covered all Turkish Cypriots salaried or self-employed at any time during the period from 1 January 1964 to 30 June 1970. Further discussions between the representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and CTTUF are now under way. It may be mentioned in this context that the representative of CTTUF joined an official of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance and a representative of the Greek Cypriot Trade Union (SEK) in visiting the United Kingdom on a two-week study tour of industrial relations.

83. No significant progress has been noted in regard to the return of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons to their former houses (S/9814, paras. 56-58). Only a few families have returned to their villages, in particular at Ayia Anna (Larnaca District), Nissou and Skylloura (Nicosia District). The Turkish Cypriots have again charged that the Government, contrary to its repeated statements favouring the return of displaced persons and expressing readiness to rebuild their houses and assist them financially, has failed, on various pretexts, to take effective measures, thus allowing this problem to continue to mar the political atmosphere and hamper efforts for normalization. The Government has countered these criticisms, pointing out that some 350 houses belonging to Turkish Cypriots have been repaired or rebuilt so far, but that, in most cases, the owners have not moved in at the instigation of the Turkish Cypriot leadership which, it says, is exploiting this issue for the promotion of its political plans and for military reasons.

84. It is quite apparent that political considerations, fed by deep-rooted suspicion and distrust, have continued to impede progress. Turkish Cypriot displaced persons seem to be mainly interested - they say for security reasons only - in returning to villages which are situated in or near areas inhabited predominantly by Turkish Cypriots. For its part, the Government appears to favour the return of such persons to areas or former mixed villages where the Greek Cypriot element is well represented. For similar considerations of a political and military nature, the situation in the Nicosia suburbs of Omorphita and Neapolis, which adjoin the Turkish Cypriot sector, has remained unchanged (S/9521, para. 53). With some goodwill it should be possible to approach the whole problem, which affects thousands of Turkish Cypriots, from a humanitarian rather than from a

political point of view. At meetings with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in late November, my Special Representative and the Force Commander received encouraging indications that the resettlement of displaced persons might soon be accelerated. As stated in previous reports (S/9521, para. 50), UNFICYP is prepared to assist in any scheme conducive to the rehabilitation of displaced persons; the World Food Programme might also be in a position to help.

85. Regrettably, the situation concerning freedom of movement has remained unchanged (S/9814, para. 59). This long-standing anomaly has again given rise to a number of incidents. In October, tension increased particularly in the Limnitis area (paras. 53-54). The Government has on many occasions expressed concern and disappointment that Greek Cypriots were still being denied the use of a number of public roads. It has also protested to UNFICYP when Greek Cypriots who strayed into Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas were detained and questioned. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has given no indication that it is prepared to change its policy in this respect; it continues to hold that the movement of Greek Cypriots through Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas remains closely linked with the security of its community and with other aspects of the Cyprus problem, such as the judiciary and police, on which agreement has to be reached first.

86. While in most cases it has been possible for UNFICYP to minimize, at the local level, undesirable repercussions of incidents involving restrictions on the freedom of movement, renewed efforts ought to be made to normalize the situation in the interest of maintaining peaceful conditions. As suggested in earlier reports (S/9814, para. 59), it should be possible to devise arrangements which would allow civilian traffic at least on some of the Republic's main highways passing through Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, such as the Limnitis-Pyrgos-Kokkina-Polis and Famagusta-Chatos-Nicosia roads. The intercommunal talks may provide a framework for the consideration of such arrangements.

87. On 29 June 1970, President Makarios announced certain changes in the Council of Ministers. Only three out of nine Ministers - Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior - retained their portfolios.

88. At the same time, it was also officially announced that President Makarios had appointed Dr. Ihsan Ali, a Turkish Cypriot, as his personal adviser.

89. Commenting on these new appointments, the Turkish Cypriot spokesman stated that this was another attempt by the "Greek Cypriot Administration" to deprive the Turkish Cypriot community of all its vested rights. He noted that the Constitution provided for such appointments to be made jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. As this mandatory requirement had not been complied with, and as some of the appointments involved Ministries "allocated to the Turkish Cypriot community", all such appointments in the Turkish Cypriot view now were null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever.

90. As for the appointment of Dr. Ihsan Ali as personal adviser to the Head of State, the Turkish Cypriot spokesman stated that this action was viewed by his community as a deliberate provocation.

91. The post of Minister of Health, which since the disturbances had been held concomitantly - despite Turkish Cypriot protests - first by the Minister of Justice and then by the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance, was filled on 5 October 1970 by a Greek Cypriot. This appointment was challenged by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, who described it as a violation of article 46 of the Constitution.

92. On 5 July 1970, pursuant to an earlier decision of the Council of Ministers (S/9814, para. 60), parliamentary elections were held, the first since independence was achieved in 1960. One hundred seventeen Greek Cypriot candidates from five political parties and eighteen independents contested thirty-five of the fifty seats in the House of Representatives, fifteen being filled by Turkish Cypriots under article 62 of the 1960 Constitution. Out of 263,217 registered Greek Cypriot voters, 200,141 cast their ballots. The Unified Party obtained fifteen seats, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) nine, the Progressive Front, seven, the Democratic Center Union, two, and independent candidates, two. One party, the Democratic National Party (DEK), did not get any candidate elected. The new House re-elected the leader of the Unified Party, Mr. Clerides, as its President (Speaker).

93. Turkish Cypriots also went to the polls on 5 July to elect their Representatives to the House (S/9814, para. 60), as well as Members of the Turkish Communal Chamber, under article 86 of the 1960 Constitution. Forty-three candidates stood for fifteen seats in the House and fifty-nine for the Communal

Chamber. All these candidates supported a National Solidarity Programme presented by Mr. Denktash on 29 May at a meeting attended by various Turkish Cypriot organizations. Of 63,500 Turkish Cypriots registered by their Chief Returning Officer, approximately 72.5 per cent cast their votes. The result amounted to a complete victory for the National Solidarity Programme.

94. The Turkish Cypriot Members of the House of Representatives and the Members of the Communal Chamber held their first meeting on 18 July and re-elected Mr. Denktash as President of the Communal Chamber and Dr. Unel as "Vice-President of the House of Representatives" respectively. Asked to comment on President Makarios' statement to a newspaper correspondent that "the elections of the Turkish Cypriot community have no element of legality or validity warranting recognition of their results", the Vice-President, Dr. Kuchuk, said inter alia that these elections were held within the framework of the 1960 Constitution and in accordance with an agreement reached at the intercommunal talks, and that their results were as legal and valid as those of the Greek Cypriot elections. The fact that the Turkish Cypriot elections were not conducted under the supervision and control of Greek Cypriot District Officers, and that the elected Turkish Cypriot Members of the House of Representatives would not be able to assume their duties in a joint Assembly, were the direct results of the present de facto situation.

95. The Turkish Cypriot leadership took exception to the subsequent election of a Greek Cypriot to the post of "Deputy President" of the House of Representatives. In this regard, it was claimed that in effect he replaced the "Vice-President" of the House in violation of article 72 of the 1960 Constitution.

96. In a letter dated 5 September 1970 addressed to the Secretary-General, Dr. Kuchuk took strong exception to a newly enacted Immovable Property (Transitional Provisions) Law, claiming that the law contravened articles 56, 57, 73 and 76 of the Constitution, and that its whole purpose was to prevent members of his community from acquiring immovable property. According to the letter, a campaign of buying land from Turkish Cypriots at exorbitant prices had been afoot prior to enactment of the law, with a view to dispossessing the Turkish Cypriots of their land. The representative of the Government at the Political Liaison Committee explained that this law, apart from security reasons, was intended to protect the interests of owners of immovable property, the value of which had been adversely affected by the circumstances created as from December 1963.

IV. INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

97. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have continued to meet in private. From 1 June to 17 August 1970 they held a total of ten meetings during which they jointly prepared and initialled a document showing the points of agreement and disagreement on all issues examined by them so far (S/9814, para. 65). Before the summer recess, Mr. Denktash handed over to Mr. Clerides some supplementary papers relating to compensation to be paid to Turkish Cypriots for losses caused by the intercommunal disturbances, and also documents dealing with political and financial matters.

98. On 21 September, the two interlocutors began the fourth phase of their talks. They let it be known that there would be no time-limit to the talks and that they would henceforth meet every fortnight instead of holding weekly meetings, in order to have more time to consult their respective sides. On 5 October, both Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash indicated to press correspondents that the question of "local government", with which they had dealt almost exclusively during 1969, would be discussed first in the current phase of the talks.

99. The interlocutors did not meet again until 16 November when, as was announced, they re-examined the "local government" issue in conjunction with differences on other matters. This six-week recess had become necessary as during most of that period Mr. Clerides was Acting President of the Republic while Archbishop Makarios attended the commemorative session of the United Nations General Assembly, followed by his official visit to Japan. Mr. Denktash also visited United Nations Headquarters in October.

100. The two sub-committees which were set up on 4 March 1969 (S/9814, para. 66) did not meet during the period under review. In answer to a question put to him by the press, Mr. Clerides stated, in the presence of Mr. Denktash, that the sub-committees had suggested some time ago that certain matters should be reconsidered and if possible new terms of reference given to them. However, as he and Mr. Denktash were preoccupied with the substance of the talks, they had not as yet managed to study in detail the suggestions made by the sub-committees.

In their frequent statements to the press, both Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have stressed that despite divergent views about major points, the

local talks provided the only course for solving differences and reaching eventual over-all agreement. As a result of these talks, Mr. Denktash emphasized, the political crisis had considerably abated, tension had lessened and daily work was being conducted in an easier atmosphere. While common ground had been found on some issues, there was still, according to Mr. Clerides, a fundamental disagreement on "local government" which prevented substantive progress, the present Turkish Cypriot proposals being unacceptable. Asked to comment in this context on a statement by Archbishop Makarios that the Turkish Cypriot attitude was hardening and the margins of optimism about the talks were narrowing, Mr. Denktash said that he did not think his side had changed its attitude since the beginning. The Turkish Cypriots had been very frank; they had said what they could give provided they received certain things from the other side. No bargaining policy had been followed; therefore if the margin of optimism or the probabilities of reaching an agreement had been reduced, this was not due to them.

102. President Makarios, in addressing the General Assembly on 23 October 1970, stressed that his Government's policy -- in keeping with its overriding commitment to the United Nations and its Charter -- was to seek a just and democratic solution based on the free will of the people of Cyprus in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. His concern was to have a settlement within the positive framework of unity, since divisive arrangements, both in their psychological and material effect, would invariably lead to self-defeating antagonism and friction. The implementation of the principles of the Charter and of the resolutions of the United Nations offered the answer to the Cyprus problem.

103. In interviews, the Archbishop indicated that the greatest obstacle in the local talks was the claim by Turkish Cypriots for local autonomy of such an extent and nature as to create a state within a state. Acceptance of the Turkish Cypriot demands on this issue would result in geographical partition and administrative trichotomy. It was, however, gratifying, his Beatitude said, that both the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus were determined to solve their differences at the conference table. As far as the Greek Cypriot side was concerned, it did not intend to use force for the solution of its divergencies with the Turkish Cypriot community. The same thoughts were voiced by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, in

his address to the Commonwealth Press Union on 28 September when he underlined that his Government would spare no effort to keep the peace and find a solution. 104. For his part, Vice-President Kuchuk stated that it was his earnest hope that the talks would eventually achieve a positive result and that a solution would be devised envisaging a system of administration based on partnership, which took into consideration the existence of two ethnic communities in Cyprus with their national identities and communal interests and also fulfilled the security conditions of his community. It was the intransigent attitude of the Greek Cypriot side, he said, and its insistence on unreasonable proposals, aimed at divesting the Turkish Cypriot community of its basic rights and status under the 1960 Constitution, with a view to ultimately paving the way for the union of Cyprus with Greece, which had prevented tangible progress.

105. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash continued to brief the Greek and Turkish Governments respectively on the progress of the talks. Similarly, the President of the Republic and his Foreign Minister have had consultations with the Greek Government. When they met in mid-September 1970 with the Premier and Foreign Minister of Greece, Mr. George Papadopoulos, it was officially stated, inter alia, that "after a thorough analysis of the results of the intercommunal talks so far, it was established that the continuation of the effort for an auspicious outcome of the talks, based on the predetermined framework of an independent and unitary state, was indicated, a climate of détente and peace in the Island being at the same time consolidated".

106. The Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Suleyman Demirel, recalling that the Cyprus issue had passed through several dangerous stages in the past, stated that from the experience and developments of the past seven years, it was possible to create a work which would be for the benefit of all. He also emphasized that the Republic of Cyprus was established on the basis of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot ethnic communities taking part in the activities of the State in a balanced way, and that an independent Cyprus could achieve a healthy structure only through respect for the rights of the two communities recognized by the 1960 Constitution. Turkey, he said, would not spare any effort or sacrifice for the achievement of a peaceful, just and balanced solution to the Cyprus problem. In addressing the General Assembly, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Chaglayangil, and later the Permanent

Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, Mr. Bayülken, both stressed that the Turkish Cypriot community was one of the partners in the State of Cyprus and in its independence and sovereignty. Cyprus, they said, was the homeland of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and not an extension of another country; it was a unity where the two communities could continue to live with each other within their traditional and constitutional personalities.

V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

107. As in the past, the good offices exercised on my behalf by my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, have, during the period covered by this report, continued to be available to the parties directly concerned. He has maintained close contact with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and has continued to be informed by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, whom he has met regularly, of the substance and prospects of their discussions.

VI. MEDIATION EFFORT

108. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

109. The costs to be borne by the Organization for the operation of UNFICYP for the period from its inception on 27 March 1964 to 15 December 1970 are estimated at \$122,605,000. This total does not include the amounts which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs.

110. As at 30 November 1970, payments and pledges of voluntary contributions received from forty-eight Member States and four non-member Governments to cover those costs total the equivalent of \$115,609,291. To the above may be added \$992,000 which have been received as at 31 October 1970 from interest earned on investment of temporarily surplus funds, public contributions, gains on exchange and other miscellaneous income.

111. Accordingly, unless additional contributions are received, there will be a deficit on 15 December 1970 in the amount of approximately \$6,004,000, on the assumption that all pledges will be paid in full. It is necessary to point out, however, that the pledges which are so far unpaid include \$12,000,000 of United States pledges, the payment of which would appear to be dependent on the receipt of additional contributions from other Governments.

112. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 December 1970 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, including the amount of \$450,000 as the cost of final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs and assuming continuance of present reimbursement commitments, would be as follows:

UNFICYP cost estimates by major categories of expense

(in thousands of US dollars)

1. <u>Operation costs incurred by the United Nations</u>	
Movement of contingents	439
Operational expenses	534
Rental of premises	96
Rations	360
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	755
Miscellaneous and contingencies	205
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Total, Part I	2,389

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II. Reimbursement of extra costs to Governments providing contingents

Pay and allowances	3,600
Contingent-owned equipment	320
Death and disability warrds	50

Total, Part II 3,970

Grand Total: Parts I and II 6,359

113. The above estimates do not reflect the full cost of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States, since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which Governments would absorb at their own expense for an additional six-month period, if the mandate of UNFICYP is extended and the Governments concerned agree to continue the present arrangements, are as follows: Australia \$212,464, Austria \$160,000, Canada^{1/} \$846,819, Denmark \$230,000, Sweden \$485,000 and United Kingdom \$780,000. Finland and Ireland are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense.

114. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 December 1970 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive contributions totalling \$12,363,000, on the assumption that all pledges made so far will be paid in full.

^{1/} Exclusive of the cost of normal pay and allowances.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

115. The record of the past six months shows neither progress toward further normalization and deconfrontation nor a return to the tense and explosive situation which existed prior to the commencement of the intercommunal talks in June 1968. The situation now prevailing in Cyprus is one of "negative stability", quiet on the surface, but strained, abnormal and fraught with the serious danger inherent in the continuing close confrontation of well armed and trained forces. With the passing of time, this situation is threatening to become the way of life of all Cypriots, thus perpetuating the need for UNFICYP's presence in the Island.

116. It is with regret that I have once again to voice my disappointment that, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of my representatives in Cyprus, no significant advance has been made toward a return to normal conditions, especially to freedom of movement along all roads for unarmed citizens. Furthermore, the parties continue to be disinclined to a greater or lesser degree to respond positively to the repeated urgings of my Special Representative and the Force Commander to reduce, if not altogether eliminate, close and dangerous military confrontations in several sensitive areas of the Island, as described in detail in the body of the present report. I remain convinced, however, that there are a number of helpful measures which both sides could take without endangering their political and security positions. For instance, a number of suggestions have been made to the Turkish Cypriot leadership which, if agreed to, could, at minimum risk to them, help to generate an atmosphere of increased mutual confidence and contribute significantly to the improvement in the living conditions of their community. On the Government side, I would welcome a determined move to solve the long-outstanding problem of displaced persons and their rehabilitation. This is a humanitarian problem which involves the alleviation of the hardship of several thousand needy people.

117. An encouraging exception to the present immobility is the increased co-operation between the two communities in the economic field. It is significant that a recent severe drought brought the farmers of both communities in the stricken area closer together. This seems to indicate that with goodwill and when their common interests are involved a "rapprochement" between the communities is

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definitely possible. It is my earnest hope that further progress along that road can be made through the establishment of a number of common services and mixed institutions whose main objective would be to serve the people of Cyprus as a whole.

118. Two and one-half years have passed since the intercommunal talks began. Unhappily there is, as yet, no real prospect of a long-term settlement. The expectations repeatedly voiced by the Security Council have so far failed to materialize, and the talks themselves have yet to produce any significant agreement on fundamental questions.

119. Despite all the difficulties, it is essential that the intercommunal talks should continue. In the present circumstances they not only remain the sole available method to achieve agreement between the communities, but also provide a useful means for dissipating existing suspicions and tensions. However, what is sorely needed is a new dynamism and direction in the negotiations between the two main parties concerned. There is no road to a settlement other than the arduous one of negotiations steadfastly and honestly pursued with the aim of achieving a reasonable and workable compromise, which would be neither a victory nor a defeat for either side.


120. I believe that both communities in Cyprus now realize that the Cyprus problem cannot be solved by resorting to force and that any attempt to revert to the use of force would only worsen the conflict and prove catastrophic for all on the Island and perhaps beyond. The two sides have also indicated that a settlement can be worked out on the basis of an independent, sovereign and unitary state of Cyprus in which the two communities participate. This limited consensus indicates that there is a basis for at least some kind of accommodation. Obviously, in the prevailing circumstances, more than goodwill and exhortations is required to reach a reasonable and just agreement. However, as I said in my report of 1 June 1970, I believe that the elements necessary for a political settlement in Cyprus do exist and that a compromise solution could be worked out, including the crucial issue of local government.

121. In view of the situation prevailing in Cyprus, I have no doubt that the presence of the Force in the Island continues to be necessary and that its withdrawal would involve an acute risk of a return to the pattern of intercommunal

violence. In the circumstances, I see no alternative but to recommend to the Security Council the extension of UNFICYP's mandate for another period of six months. The Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece and Turkey have informed me of their agreement to the proposed extension.

122. In recommending a further extension of the UNFICYP mandate, I must once again draw attention to the serious situation concerning the financing of the operation. The deficit in the UNFICYP budget remains high and, as indicated in the body of this report (para. 113), a slight reduction in the over-all deficit is in fact likely to be nullified by certain problems relating to the payment of the pledges of one Government. This makes it all the more necessary for Governments to give adequate financial support to this important United Nations peace-keeping effort. At the same time, I must again point out that this situation is obviously related to the unsatisfactory method of financing UNFICYP by voluntary contributions.

123. Before concluding, I wish once more to place on record my gratitude to the Governments providing contingents to UNFICYP and to those Governments - all too few - which have made voluntary contributions for its maintenance. Without that generous help it would not have been possible to carry on this vital peace-keeping operation for nearly seven years. I wish also to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, the Commander of the Force, and its officers and men, as well as the UNFICYP civilian staff, for the exemplary manner in which they have performed their important and difficult tasks.



CYPRUS DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP DECEMBER 1970

UNFICYP operational boundaries

- District boundary
- Road
- Airfield, airstrip
- Sovereign Base Area
- Contour line (in feet)

0 10 20 30
MILES
0 10 20 30
KILOMETRES

The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.