

Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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I. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

1. The Syrian Arab Republic was one of the first States in the Middle East region to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 1968. It did so because it was convinced that the possession by States of nuclear weapons, or access to such weapons by non-governmental entities or terrorist gangs, posed a threat to regional and international peace and security. It has stressed in all forums that it continues to implement its international obligations under the Treaty, which it regards as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the achievement of total nuclear disarmament, and the international reference that accords the States parties the inalienable right to acquire nuclear technology for use in various peaceful applications.

2. The Syrian Arab Republic recalls that the resolution to extend the Treaty indefinitely, which was adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, would not have been possible had it not been for the understanding reached at that time whereby the nuclear-weapon States committed to a review of the concerns of many States parties in the Middle East region. Such concerns include, in particular, the need for the nuclear States to take genuine and effective measures to pressure Israel – the only party in the region that is in violation of all the authoritative international resolutions – in order to pave the way for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which would mark a fundamental step towards bringing about international and regional peace and security. However, such a review has not happened to date. It should be pointed out that all the Arab States are parties to the Treaty.

3. The Syrian Arab Republic is deeply concerned that the objectives of the Treaty have not been achieved. It hopes that the final document of this first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty will provide for genuine and effective steps with regard to the following issues:

- Achieving the universality and maintaining the credibility of the Treaty
- Treating the issues relating to non-proliferation and comprehensive nuclear disarmament in a balanced manner
- Protecting the established and inalienable right of all States parties to obtain nuclear technology for peaceful applications, without discrimination
- Pressuring Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear party unconditionally and without further delay, and to submit all its nuclear facilities to international



inspection in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

4. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that nuclear-weapon States must comply with their obligations and commitments under article I of the Treaty by not supplying Israel with any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or any direct or indirect control of such weapons or devices, and by not assisting, encouraging or inducing Israel in any way whatsoever to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to gain control over such weapons or explosive devices.

5. The Syrian Arab Republic is deeply concerned that the United States of America and certain nuclear States continue to support Israel, turn a blind eye to its nuclear arsenal, and use the veto to protect it in the Security Council and international forums. That situation endangers the universality and credibility of the Treaty, and negatively affects non-proliferation and full and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The fact that Israel has not acceded to the Treaty or subjected all its facilities to inspection by IAEA undermines the universality of the Treaty and endangers the stability of the region and the world.

II. Nuclear disarmament

6. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes that nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, including the 13 points set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

7. The Syrian Arab Republic is concerned at those States' continued development and proliferation of nuclear warheads, which is contrary to the Treaty and all the General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament, the most recent of which is General Assembly resolution [76/31](#) of 6 December 2021 entitled "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

8. The Syrian Arab Republic remains concerned that the nuclear-weapon States have not fulfilled the commitments agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, namely, to fully eliminate their nuclear arsenals with a view to nuclear disarmament, or to implement the action points agreed at the 2010 Review Conference. Those measures are an integral part of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions on nuclear disarmament, as is stated in General Assembly resolution [77/57](#) of 7 December 2022, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons".

9. The Syrian Arab Republic is deeply concerned at the failure of the 2015 Review Conference. It regrets that the tenth Review Conference, held in August 2022, also failed to reach consensus on a final document addressing essential substantive issues.

10. The Syrian Arab Republic welcomes the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021, and the outcomes of the first Meeting of States Parties to that Treaty held in Vienna from 21 to 23 June 2022. It welcomes the decisions taken on that occasion, particularly the adoption of the declaration entitled "Our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons", and General Assembly resolution [77/54](#) of 7 December 2022, entitled "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons".

11. The Syrian Arab Republic remains disappointed that, despite the efforts made, there has yet to be any progress in holding genuine negotiations for a moratorium on

the production of fissile material used to manufacture nuclear weapons, and no effective measures have been agreed to eliminate the stock of nuclear weapons and fissile material, or to prohibit the production of any fissile material used to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such measures would be a fundamental step towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. They would be consistent with General Assembly resolution 77/67 of 7 December 2022, entitled “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world”.

12. The Syrian Arab Republic urges all States parties to ensure that the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference, to be held from 31 July to 11 August 2023, results in a comprehensive final document taking into consideration all the effective and genuine priorities and discussing the essential substantive issues with a view to comprehensive nuclear disarmament and the establishment of regional and international peace and security, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 77/65 of 7 December 2022, entitled “Nuclear disarmament”.

13. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes that nuclear States must refrain from transferring nuclear materials to non-nuclear States, for instance by equipping submarines with nuclear fuel, as doing so poses a threat to global security, contravenes the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, gives cause for concern regarding the environmental consequences, contributes to the arms race and undermines global stability and prosperity.

14. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that the only way to overcome the dire situation of the international security environment is for all Member States to commit to international law and the Charter of the United Nations in word and deed, and to fulfil their bilateral and multilateral obligations with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation without selectivity or narrow political agendas.

III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

15. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes the need to fulfil the provisions of article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in a balanced and non-selective manner. Under that article, all States have the established and inalienable right to obtain nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In order to preclude any novel interpretations that may conflict with the spirit of the Treaty and undermine its credibility, that established right should be included in the final document to be adopted at the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2023.

16. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms the need to uphold the primary role of IAEA as provided in its Statute, which is to promote the use of nuclear technology, to facilitate the interchange of information, equipment, materials and scientific services, to encourage and assist the States parties in conducting scientific research for peaceful purposes and to provide them with technical assistance.

17. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that political, economic or military restrictions should not be imposed, nor should any other conditions be imposed that conflict with the Statute of IAEA on the cooperation and technical assistance provided by IAEA to States parties, particularly developing States.

18. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms the need to strike a balance between IAEA verification activities and its dissemination of nuclear technology and applications, in order to uphold the provisions of article III of the Treaty. That article stresses that verification under IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements is an indispensable element of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

19. The Syrian Arab Republic supports IAEA and its mandate to carry out its assigned functions within the three main areas of the Treaty, namely, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Syria emphasizes that the three basic pillars of the Treaty are equally important and that its provisions should not be implemented selectively.

IV. Comprehensive safeguards agreement

20. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that IAEA alone is authorized to verify and ensure that States parties comply with the safeguards agreements that have concluded with the Agency. When evaluating the outcome of verification processes, IAEA must rely on documented and corroborated information instead of information obtained from open sources or on assumptions, intelligence information and the like, in order to maintain the neutrality, credibility and professionalism of IAEA.

21. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes that it complies fully with the comprehensive safeguards agreement that it concluded with IAEA in 1992 in accordance with article III of the Treaty. Under that agreement, Syria established a national system to account for and monitor nuclear material, and created the groundwork and facilities necessary to ensure that IAEA inspectors could carry out their work effectively under the agreement. The latter remains effectively in force to date.

22. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms the importance of the comprehensive safeguards agreements. It urges all States that have not yet concluded such an agreement with IAEA to do so promptly in order to universalize the comprehensive safeguards, something that the 2000 Treaty Review Conference set forth as a primary objective in order to consolidate and strengthen verification activities within the non-proliferation regime.

23. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes that IAEA must safeguard the confidentiality of all information collected during its inspections of a State or received from that State.

24. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes the need to maintain the distinction between the legal obligations of States parties and purely voluntary, non-binding confidence-building measures, as provided in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. That document states that accession to an additional protocol is voluntary. Thus, all States should take care to avoid confusing voluntary and mandatory measures, in order to ensure the credibility of international resolutions and preclude the conversion of voluntary commitments into commitments involving legal obligations.

V. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

25. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone is an important disarmament measure and a positive step that would make an effective contribution to the goals of the non-proliferation regime, significantly help consolidate regional and international peace and security, and preserve the credibility of the Treaty.

26. The main reason for the failure to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is the obduracy shown by Israel, which has persistently refrained from acceding to the Treaty as a non-nuclear party, failed to subject all its nuclear facilities

and activities to international inspections by IAEA, and disregarded all relevant international resolutions adopted by IAEA, the Security Council and the General Assembly, the most recent of which are General Assembly resolution 77/38 of 7 December 2022, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”, and General Assembly resolution 77/91 of 7 December 2022, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”.

27. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should in no way be linked to the peace process in the region. It reiterates that any definition of the States of the Middle East developed for that purpose does not in any way constitute a definition of the Middle East region. Rather, such a definition should be used only for the purposes of the Review Conference and its preparatory committees.

28. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes the importance of convening a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, following the first such conference, which was held in New York in 2019 pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546 of 2018 with a view to ending the stalemate in the implementation of the 1995 resolution.

29. Establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would strengthen regional and international peace and security, which remain in jeopardy so long as Israel refuses to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or to the treaties on weapons of mass destruction.

VI. Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

30. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates the need to comply fully with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which was an integral part of a package that included three decisions and a resolution adopted without a vote that contributed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. It is essential to honour the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, which states that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East will remain valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.

31. The Syrian Arab Republic has followed with interest the Secretary-General’s efforts to implement General Assembly decision 73/546 of 2018, which calls for a conference to be convened at United Nations Headquarters in New York to follow up on the matter of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The first and second sessions of the conference were held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 18 to 22 November 2019 and from 29 November to 3 December 2021. The United Nations also convened two workshops, in July 2020 and February 2021. During the workshops, wide-ranging exchanges of experiences and opinions took place, and participants from other nuclear-weapon-free regions shared practices and lessons learned.

VII. Negative security assurances

32. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that the sole guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of such weapons. Moreover, the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 does not in any way imply that the nuclear-weapon States can maintain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely, since such a situation is incompatible with the safety and sustainability of a system that is designed to achieve the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in vertical and horizontal terms, with the goal of maintaining international and regional security and stability.

33. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the final document of the first (2023) session of the 2026 Review Conference must provide for effective international arrangements for arriving at a legally binding international instrument on negative security assurances. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution [77/39](#) of 7 December 2022, entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, the nuclear-weapon States would commit to providing unconditional security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use nuclear weapons.

34. The Syrian Arab Republic again calls for the establishment of a working group to monitor the legally binding negative security assurances of the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty as a prelude to arriving at an international instrument banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution [77/82](#) of 7 December 2022, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”.

35. The Syrian Arab Republic hopes that, at the 2026 Review Conference, the five nuclear States that are permanent members of the Security Council will take the initiative to strengthen the nuclear taboo by jointly declaring that they will abandon the use of nuclear weapons, and by making a legally binding international commitment to refrain from nuclear attacks against States parties to the Treaty.

VIII. Illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials

36. The Syrian Arab Republic, pursuant to its national legislation and regulations, closely monitors land, sea and air border crossings to combat illegal trafficking in radioactive nuclear materials.

37. The Syrian Arab Republic scrupulously upholds all its relevant international commitments. It participates effectively in the review of a number of relevant international conventions and instruments and seeks to extend and strengthen its national legislative frameworks in that regard. The Syrian Arab Republic applies the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and actively participates in a number of meetings that develop guidelines for the importation and exportation of radioactive materials.

IX. Withdrawal from the Treaty

38. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that withdrawal from the Treaty undermines its universality and that any proposal to amend article X would damage the Treaty’s credibility and destroy the entire non-proliferation regime, unless all States parties expressly declare that they intend to be legally bound by the new amendments and to ratify them. Failing that, any amendments would have no basis in international law.