

Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record (partial)* of the 6th meeting

Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Wednesday, 2 August 2023, at 3 p.m.

Chair: Mr. Viinanen. (Finland)

Contents

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory
Committee (*continued*)

* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Saud Badr Al Saud** (Saudi Arabia) said that the full implementation and universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would lead to total disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons, ensuring international peace and security. All States should place their nuclear facilities under a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and also accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

2. The credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty depended on equal respect for its three pillars. His Government was pleased by initiatives undertaken in that regard by IAEA to build its capacity to promote technical cooperation. It also supported IAEA in its role in the verification, monitoring and oversight of national peaceful nuclear programmes. The Agency should have the verification and oversight tools it needed to ensure compliance with the Treaty's provisions. His Government adhered to the highest standards of transparency in its peaceful uses programme and worked closely with the Agency in that area. His Government believed that technical assistance should be provided to all States and should not be subject to conditions outside those provided under the Treaty.

3. Saudi Arabia welcomed the holding of the third session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in line with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. States parties to the Treaty had a collective responsibility to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction in line with that resolution, which was an integral part of the package that led to the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. That decision should remain valid until all their goals had been achieved. It was regrettable that the Conference had not been held in 2012, as originally agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, owing to the persistent refusal by Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place its facilities under IAEA safeguards. His delegation welcomed the efforts of IAEA to address the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and called on that country to respect its obligations under the Treaty, to adhere to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA and to allow the Agency to carry out its full verification and oversight responsibilities.

4. The Treaty review process was key to assessing the Treaty's functioning and ensuring its effectiveness. His delegation hoped that practical steps could be taken during the current review cycle to address the challenges facing the Treaty and to prepare a final document to be adopted at the 2026 Review Conference.

5. **Mr. Mijiddorj** (Mongolia) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and united the States parties in their efforts to maintain peace and security and achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. The missed opportunities of the previous three Review Conferences underscored the complexity of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues and the need for increased dialogue, cooperation and compromise among States. Mongolia hoped for a positive outcome of the 2026 Review Conference, which was of critical importance for shaping global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

6. Mongolia commended the work of IAEA in verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings and in supporting the States parties in fulfilling their right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a catalyst for nuclear disarmament and a strong instrument for non-proliferation. Therefore, it should be brought into force as soon as possible. Mongolia called upon all States that had not done so, in particular the remaining Annex 2 States, to ratify that Treaty.

7. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and his country's own nuclear-weapon-free status, strengthened global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed to regional security by reducing the risk of proliferation, creating zones of peace and stability and fostering peaceful conflict resolution. In that regard, his delegation urged the convening of the fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, which had been planned to be held in 2020, but had been subsequently postponed by the General Assembly. As coordinator of the Conference, Mongolia had organized several informal preparatory meetings during the period 2018–2022.

8. The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security, launched by his Government a decade earlier, was a mechanism for facilitating constructive talks, fostering mutual understanding and building confidence among countries in the region. Mongolia remained committed to the primary goals of the Dialogue, namely, to lay the groundwork for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

9. **Mr. Gómez** (Chile) said that the current review cycle was an opportunity to reaffirm the relevance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and to evaluate its implementation. Although nuclear proliferation had been kept in check, little progress had been made regarding nuclear disarmament. Chile had promoted nuclear disarmament for decades, having participated in the negotiation in 1959 of the Antarctic Treaty and having later signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, and by supporting all international efforts to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. Chile was a firm proponent of general and complete disarmament and strongly believed in the principle of indivisibility of international security and the shared responsibility of all States to contribute to strengthening the international order on the basis of multilateralism, cooperation and international law. In that connection, his delegation noted that the commitments made during previous review cycles remained politically binding.

10. All States had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in line with article I, II, III and IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The implementation of the Treaty should be pursued in a balanced manner across all three of its pillars. It was troubling that some in the international community continued to uphold defence and security doctrines on the basis of nuclear deterrence. Efforts to modernize nuclear weapons programmes should be more transparent. In addition, enhanced verification and irreversibility measures were needed, to increase transparency and reporting on nuclear arsenals.

11. Chile welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The only way to ensure that such weapons were not used again was through their prohibition and total elimination. That Treaty was the first to incorporate a gender perspective into disarmament matters, including innovative obligations on victim assistance and environmental remediation. As such, it represented a pillar of the nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security architecture, serving to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was important for the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to enter into force as soon as possible, which required its signing and ratification by the remaining Annex 2 States. His country supported the proposals for strengthening the role of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in the Review Conference and was deeply

concerned by the statements made by certain countries alluding to the possibility of resuming nuclear tests.

12. Nuclear-weapon-free zones strengthened the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and brought humanity closer to the ideal of a world free of nuclear weapons. More progress was needed regarding the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Negotiations should also begin without delay on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and limiting existing stockpiles of fissile material.

13. Chile was committed to human rights and equality and subscribed to a feminist foreign policy. A critical mass of highly qualified women was needed in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to shape inclusive processes that addressed the needs of the entire international community. The review process should also be inclusive, not only with regard to the gender perspective, but also the participation of civil society, academia and young people. Chile was also committed to the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament and human security and placed people at the centre of its multilateral efforts to promote international peace and security.

14. The current global situation was deeply concerning, given that the possession of nuclear weapons did not guarantee international security, but rather permanently threatened human life and the environment. His delegation shared the concerns of the international community with regard to the nuclear facilities located in Ukraine. Any military activities that could endanger the physical security and integrity of nuclear plants should be avoided. IAEA played a key role in that context. Chile also urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cease its nuclear activities for non-peaceful purposes, accept to be bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and accede to the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

15. **Ms. Faxas** (Dominican Republic) said that her Government supported initiatives aimed at countering the threats posed by nuclear weapons and recognized the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a central pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The complexity and turbulence of the current international context, combined with the failure of the 2020 Review Conference and the recent negotiations in the working group on further strengthening the Treaty review process, highlighted the challenges to the Treaty's implementation. The threats associated with the use of nuclear weapons, the dependence on nuclear deterrence as part of security doctrines, the build-up of nuclear arsenals and the hostile rhetoric employed with regard

to the use of such weapons were of particular concern and should be reflected in the final document of the current session of the Committee. The Committee should also reaffirm the commitments and recommendations of previous Review Conferences, which remained valid, while also exploring tangible measures that promoted the effective and sustainable implementation of the Treaty.

16. The Dominican Republic was a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, all of which complemented the non-proliferation regime. While progress had been made with regard to non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, more balanced implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's three pillars was necessary, with a particular focus on the disarmament pillar on which the least progress had been made. Although considerable efforts had been undertaken by IAEA to promote the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to guarantee a world free of nuclear weapons through the implementation of safeguards, ensuring a world free of nuclear weapons remained a commitment of all its member States, in particular those listed under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in the case of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Annex 2 States.

17. **Mr. Min Thein** (Myanmar) said that full compliance and effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were crucial in view of increasing nuclear risks and growing tensions among global powers. All States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in line with article VI of the Treaty. States parties should also make progress towards effectively implementing the agreements reflected in the final documents adopted at previous Review Conferences. His delegation also recognized the efforts of the working group on further strengthening the review process.

18. Myanmar was committed to the Treaty's ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. At the regional level, together with other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Myanmar was striving to implement the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) and supported other such regional initiatives in line with article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His country had also signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, recognizing that it was complementary to the

Non-Proliferation Treaty. Convinced that the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would greatly benefit from the universalization of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Myanmar called on all Annex 2 States to ratify that treaty.

19. IAEA played a critical role in the areas of nuclear safety, security, safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear science, technology and applications. Myanmar was grateful to the Agency for its assistance through its technical cooperation programme. His country had recently acceded to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

20. **Mr. Martinsen** (Argentina) said that the failure of the 2020 Review Conference to reach consensus, despite the strenuous efforts of several delegations, was frustrating. More than 50 years since the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the threat posed by nuclear weapons persisted, owing to the failure to implement nuclear disarmament commitments. Obligations to reduce nuclear arsenals should be accompanied by risk reduction measures. To that end, it was imperative to bring the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force. His delegation called on the Annex 2 States in particular to ratify that treaty.

21. Political will was necessary to overcoming deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, including through the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material and an instrument on negative security assurances. Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States must be able to contribute to and participate in disarmament and verification processes, in particular under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States must provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, the adoption of an agreement on security assurances should not undermine the assurances already provided by nuclear-weapon States in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, nor the provisions set out in relevant Security Council resolutions or the obligations of States parties under article VI of the Treaty.

22. Argentina supported the establishment and consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were an important source of security for the participating States, and urged nuclear-weapon States to withdraw their interpretative declarations to Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States had the opportunity to demonstrate their support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its ultimate objective of achieving irreversible, transparent and verifiable disarmament by

showing greater commitment to making tangible progress towards disarmament.

23. Argentina remained committed to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and supported the work of IAEA and its implementation of safeguards, which created an environment conducive to cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA safeguards must be implemented in line with article IV of the Treaty and the IAEA statute. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials had contributed significantly to nuclear non-proliferation by collaborating with IAEA to establish a system of safeguards that were even more rigorous than those set out in the Treaty. In addition, Argentina was participating in all existing export control regimes and had presented its fifth report pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Argentina was an active participant in the international nuclear security regime and recognized the central role played by IAEA in strengthening that regime. However, as States parties were responsible for ensuring nuclear security within their sovereign territories, the binding and non-binding measures to counter security threats must be harmonized and aligned with the actual risks faced at the national level.

24. Argentina supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and urged the parties concerned to engage in negotiations. It objected to the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, whose actions ran counter to the principles and obligations set out in the Treaty. The nuclear tests conducted by that country underscored the urgent need for the universalization and the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and for general, verifiable and complete nuclear disarmament in the Korean Peninsula.

25. Argentina had a long history and extensive expertise in the field of nuclear science and technology, becoming a trusted international supplier of research reactors and multifunctional reactors. Its foreign policy in the nuclear field had always been geared towards achieving technological sovereignty and asserting its inalienable right to use nuclear energy. The value of that approach was becoming increasingly clear as nuclear energy emerged as a viable, safe and economical alternative source of energy that could ease the energy transition called for by the climate crisis, as exemplified by the project to build the CAREM small modular reactor.

26. **Mr. Berti Oliva** (Cuba) said that the only guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used was their prohibition and total elimination. Given the

catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament must be prioritized and could not be subject to further postponement and preconditions. Cuba urged all countries to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and to promote its implementation. Moreover, all States must do their utmost to create an atmosphere conducive to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and advancing its objectives.

27. The slow progress towards nuclear disarmament was deeply concerning, as was the lack of progress among nuclear-weapon States towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Given the threat posed by nuclear weapons to humanity, nuclear disarmament must be treated as a priority and non-nuclear-weapon States must be given universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances. Instead, current global military expenditures significantly exceeded those seen during the so-called cold war, with a single nuclear-weapon State accounting for 40 per cent of all spending. Meanwhile, millions of humans were living in poverty, and millions more were still affected by the economic and financial crisis wrought by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. While multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament had stalled, developing countries, for their part, did not possess nor were interested in possessing nuclear weapons.

28. The balanced implementation of the Treaty's three pillars was essential to achieving its objectives. Some nuclear-weapon States engaged in political manipulation of non-proliferation, based on double standards and political expediency, and continued to upgrade their arsenals, while singling out developing countries for alleged violations of their non-proliferation commitments. Such behaviour must cease. All States parties had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, subject to appropriate international verification. The free transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be guaranteed without obstacles or politically motivated exclusions.

29. The Latin American and Caribbean region had significantly contributed to nuclear disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security through the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area with the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace. In that connection, his delegation hoped that the 2026 Review Conference would advance the fulfilment of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

30. **Mr. Alkaabi** (United Arab Emirates) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was crucial for curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, encouraging disarmament, supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and fostering an environment of trust and cooperation among nations. His Government supported the transparent and responsible use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and remained fully committed to developing its peaceful nuclear energy programme in close cooperation with IAEA, while adhering to international best practices. The role of IAEA in providing support to States through technical cooperation projects should be strengthened. His delegation encouraged all countries in the Middle East, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to accede to and abide by the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The prevention of nuclear disasters was of the utmost importance, whether they resulted from direct attacks on nuclear facilities or were the inadvertent consequences of conflict. His Government strongly condemned the violent acts allegedly committed at nuclear facilities in Ukraine. With regard to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, his delegation called for diplomacy, dialogue and the full cooperation of that country with IAEA and with its safeguards obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

31. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons was the only way to ensure that they were not used and to eliminate the threat that they posed. Accordingly, all States, and the Annex 2 States in particular, should ratify the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. His Government called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to adhere to its international obligations and refrain from actions that escalated tensions. The nuclear and ballistic missile activities of that country undermined global non-proliferation efforts and posed a threat to regional and international security. Challenges, such as withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, underscored the need to strengthen that instrument and prevent its misuse.

32. In view of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, and also the repeated calls for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region contained in General Assembly, Security Council and IAEA General Conference resolutions, the failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in 2012 was a disappointment. Nonetheless, the current review cycle was an opportunity for progress to be made towards the establishment of such a zone. His delegation called on Israel to accede promptly to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State

and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

33. **Mr. Ojeda** (Uruguay) said that all States had the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, underpinned by the verifiable application of safeguards, which together contributed to the well-being of humanity and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. IAEA played a critical role in promoting technical cooperation and national capacity-building through the transfer of technologies for peaceful purposes that was vital for non-nuclear-weapon States, even as it also verified the implementation of the safeguards regime with consummate professionalism and transparency.

34. Uruguay applauded the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, which played a fundamental role in preventing nuclear proliferation through its International Monitoring System. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons complemented the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and was fully aligned with purposes of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Uruguay was advancing the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by actively participating in each of those treaties.

35. Uruguay was troubled by the current escalating arms race, its attendant risks, and the accompanying diversion of resources that could be used instead for peaceful purposes or for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

36. Uruguay urged the members of the working group to avoid politicizing its work and called for proposals that had the support of the largest number of the group's members to be put into practice.

37. **Mr. Alfassam** (Kuwait) said that his delegation attached great importance to the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as reflected in its commitment to the relevant international instruments. The best way to remove all risks associated with nuclear weapons was through their total elimination, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. In the meantime, States that had not yet done so, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should ratify the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in order to bring it into force.

38. Kuwait was committed to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and commended the efforts of the Arab countries in that regard, in line with General Assembly decision 73/546. The 1995 resolution on the Middle East would remain valid until all its objectives

were attained. Responsibility for implementing the resolution lay with States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and the three depositary Governments. In addition, Israel should accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime.

39. All States parties had the right to use nuclear technology and to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their legal obligations and their agreements with IAEA. Kuwait commended the Agency for its technical cooperation programmes, its capacity-building efforts in developing countries and its assistance in the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Kuwait called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully abide by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in line with Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), and to ratify and implement the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency. Doing so would enable the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities or material in the Islamic Republic of Iran, confirming its status as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

40. Kuwait welcomed efforts to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. However, while that Treaty reinforced and complemented the disarmament regime, it was not a replacement for it. It should therefore not be incompatible with other legal instruments. Until the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was achieved, the Non-Proliferation Treaty must remain credible and effective. The States parties had a collective responsibility to engage in open, constructive and meaningful dialogue, with a view to maintaining peace, security and stability, building confidence and reducing non-proliferation risks.

41. **Mr. Facetti** (Paraguay) said that the renewed reliance on security models based on nuclear deterrence and the threat of use of nuclear weapons was extremely concerning. For the vast majority of States, deterrence represented a threat to the well-being of current and future generations. The nuclear-weapon States were increasingly engaged in strategic competition and were spending more on modernizing their nuclear arsenals in violation of their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to eliminate them. Paraguay urged those States to renew their disarmament efforts and to invest instead in peaceful uses of nuclear energy that could lead to a more just world.

42. It was regrettable that the 2020 Review Conference had been unable to adopt a consensus final document. Paraguay was unwavering in its support for

strengthening the Treaty, which was the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime, the prerequisite for nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament was a moral imperative, and all nations were jointly responsible for ensuring that it was complete and irreversible. The Treaty must be implemented in a balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner across all of its three pillars, and any States that were not yet parties to the Treaty should accede to it unconditionally without further delay. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was strengthened and complemented by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as by the regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

43. The focus of the current review cycle should be on defending and preserving the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a key multilateral instrument, promoting its universalization and strengthening its implementation. The States parties should implement all their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the final documents of previous Review Conferences. Tangible progress towards the full implementation of article VI was especially important.

44. IAEA played an essential role in nuclear safety, security and verification by implementing its comprehensive safeguards agreements with its member States. The Agency's reports, including its comprehensive report on the safety of the water treated by using the Advanced Liquid Processing System at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, were credible and of high quality. Paraguay welcomed the Agency's tireless efforts to resolve the serious safeguards issues with the Islamic Republic of Iran and encouraged the Director General of IAEA to engage in dialogue with Iranian authorities. Paraguay called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to resume talks with a view to concluding an agreement allowing IAEA inspectors to return and put to rest any concerns about its nuclear programme. For the security of the entire region, it was essential to create the conditions for a peaceful diplomatic solution to enable the eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

45. **Mr. Abubakr Mohammed** (Sudan) said that his delegation reaffirmed the importance of a balanced approach to the implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The elimination of nuclear weapons would build confidence and promote non-proliferation, leading to the universalization of the Treaty. The continued development of peaceful nuclear applications to meet the growing demand for such technology in health care, food production, agriculture and industry was crucial for future development.

46. The failure of the last two Review Conferences had undermined collective efforts to revitalize multilateralism in nuclear disarmament. To move forward, the States parties must, bearing in mind their shared goal of a world free from nuclear weapons and the disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, create a cooperative multilateral environment in which all stakeholders could participate effectively.

47. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2021, which complemented and strengthened the Non-Proliferation Treaty, had brought new hope for disarmament. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East, should be encouraged, as such zones greatly advanced nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and strengthened legally binding security assurances.

48. The 2026 Review Conference should reaffirm the inalienable right of the States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to access nuclear technology, in line with article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was one of the Treaty's main objectives. The Review Conference should therefore support the work of IAEA to build the capacities of the States parties with regard to peaceful uses by providing them with extensive and sustained technical assistance.

49. **Mr. Campuzano Piña** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, said that nuclear weapons constituted a threat to humankind by their mere existence, their possible use and their potential humanitarian impact. They should never be used under any circumstances. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including international humanitarian law, and was a crime against humanity. The only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their prohibition and elimination in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, within clearly established timeframes.

50. The Group condemned the modernization of existing nuclear weapons, the expansion of nuclear arsenals and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, all of which were inconsistent with the obligation to adopt effective measures towards nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States must comply with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the commitments emanating from prior Review Conferences. The Treaty did not give any State the right to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely.

51. Although the 2020 Review Conference had failed despite the delegations' best efforts, the States members of the Group were entering the current review cycle in good faith, with the goal of improving dialogue, transparency and accountability. They were proud to have established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region of the globe, which demonstrated that, even in turbulent times, nuclear weapons could be prohibited through multilateral dialogue and diplomacy. The Group considered nuclear disarmament a priority, and its members would continue to comply with their obligations and commitments as non-nuclear-weapon States parties, including the commitments agreed in the Final Documents of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

52. It was important that the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which contributed directly to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, be able to participate substantively during the current review cycle. The Group called for the adoption of an international, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances and urged the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw their interpretive declarations to Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to respect the denuclearized character of the Latin American and Caribbean region.

53. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons were not declarations of intent. Rather, they established norms of international law which were binding on their States parties and provided a legal basis for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

54. The States members of the Group had ratified the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged all Annex 2 States to ratify it urgently, so that it could enter into force as soon as possible. Until such time, the moratorium on nuclear testing should be strictly maintained.

55. The inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be fully respected. The Group underscored the key role of IAEA in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

56. **Mr. Rutherford** (Observer for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) said that major conflict and tensions between States made pursuing multilateral approaches increasingly difficult. However, the experience of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction had proved them worthwhile. In July 2023,

the last chemical weapon of the 193 States parties had been destroyed. The Organisation was now focusing on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons in the context of rapid scientific and technological developments. Its recently inaugurated Centre for Chemistry and Technology would enhance its verification capacities, further integrate its capacity-building offerings and serve as a hub for relevant scientific knowledge.

57. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention faced similar challenges related to the current international security environment and advances in science and technology. Addressing those challenges required enhanced international cooperation, good faith negotiations and science-based approaches. Even though the most recent Review Conferences of both instruments had been unable to adopt a final document by consensus, future review cycles could draw on them for sound strategic guidance.

58. **Mr. Saraiva Marzo** (Observer for the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) said that his organization ensured that all nuclear material and facilities in Argentina and Brazil were used exclusively for peaceful purposes through near-daily inspections, which were sometimes unannounced. Inspectors from one country inspected the facilities of the other in order to ensure impartiality and independence. Thanks to the continuous political commitment and the technical and financial support of both countries and his organization's operational independence, it had an international reputation for credible, effective and efficient verification. In 1994, Argentina, Brazil, his organization and IAEA had signed a quadripartite cooperation and coordination agreement establishing mechanisms that enabled IAEA to make full use of the organization's findings for safeguards implementation. Highlighting the added value of such a regional approach to non-proliferation, his organization urged the Preparatory Committee to hold up his organization as a model for the development of other regional non-proliferation verification systems.

The discussion covered in the summary record was suspended at 5 p.m. and resumed at 5.45 p.m.

Statements made in exercise of the right of reply

59. **Mr. Hassan** (Egypt), responding to the remarks made by the representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands at an earlier meeting (see [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/SR.4](#)), said that their respective delegations had the shared goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world but differed on how to achieve it. Egypt was proud to be among the overwhelming majority of States

comprising the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the New Agenda Coalition, the Group of Arab States and the Group of African States that held the principled position that extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements hindered global nuclear disarmament. Justifications for the reliance on nuclear weapons in the context of nuclear alliances between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, such as the assertion made by the aforementioned representative that the fundamental purpose of certain nuclear sharing arrangements had always been to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression, could not be in line with the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

60. The claim that certain nuclear sharing arrangements had always been, and continued to be, fully consistent with the Treaty needed to be examined by the Review Conference. Under such arrangements, non-nuclear-weapon States exercised control over the nuclear weapons located in their territories. Even if all operations were carried out under the joint command of the relevant nuclear-weapon States and the host non-nuclear-weapons States, the logical implication of such arrangements was that any non-nuclear-weapon State could host nuclear weapons in its territory as part of an alliance and integrate them into the alliance's war plans and military exercises. According to open-source information and statements made by such alliances, the war planes of the host non-nuclear-weapon States were responsible for delivering the war heads to targets, which indicated that those States had considerable control over nuclear weapons. Such arrangements were not compatible with the Treaty, in particular its articles I and II.

61. The claim that certain nuclear sharing arrangements had been seamlessly integrated into the Treaty and had long been accepted and publicly understood by all States parties to the Treaty required thorough substantiation in the form of documentary evidence, as his delegation had no recollection of its Government's acceptance of such arrangements in the context of the Treaty. The fact that successive Review Conferences had been silent on the matter did not in any way imply that the majority of States parties accepted nuclear sharing arrangements or considered them to be consistent with the Treaty.

62. More than 50 years had passed since the conclusion of the Treaty, yet no meaningful progress had been made towards genuinely delegitimizing and stigmatizing nuclear weapons and achieving their total elimination. Egypt and the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had joined the Treaty on the understanding that it was aimed at achieving a better and

safer future for all humankind, not at maintaining a volatile and discriminatory status quo indefinitely.

63. **Mr. Kondratenkov** (Russian Federation) said that a number of delegations had accused his country of blocking the adoption of the draft final document at the 2020 Review Conference. Indeed, his delegation had been compelled to oppose that document, because a group of States, with the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their allies at the helm, had monopolized the preparation of the draft final document, ignoring many recommendations of other States parties to the Treaty. It had been known well in advance that the wording contained in the draft final document was unacceptable to his delegation and that its adoption would be blocked, so the blame fell squarely on the States that had contributed the objectionable wording. Those same States were already steering the current review process towards failure.

64. The decision of his Government to suspend the implementation of the New START Treaty had been prompted by the sustained efforts of the United States to suffocate the Russian Federation economically, weaken its security through total hybrid warfare and undermine the fundamental principles and understandings that formed the basis for the Treaty. There had also been a substantial breach of the Treaty by the United States. Disregarding the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and missile defence systems recognized in the Treaty, the United States had exceeded the key limits on strategic offensive arms established in the Treaty, undermining its purposes and objectives. The Treaty was also greatly undermined by the provision of military equipment and military intelligence by the United States to the regime in Kyiv, which sought to attack strategic facilities in the Russian Federation covered by the Treaty. As long as the Treaty remained in effect, the Russian Federation would observe the limits on strategic offensive weapons set out in the Treaty to ensure predictability and stability with regard to nuclear arms and missiles. It would also continue to exchange information with the United States on launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as provided in the relevant bilateral agreement of 1988. The decision to suspend the implementation of the New START Treaty could be reversed if the United States demonstrated political will and took the necessary measures towards general de-escalation, addressed its Treaty violations and fostered an environment favourable to a return to the full implementation of the Treaty.

65. His delegation was surprised at the accusations levelled against his country and Belarus by members of the NATO nuclear military bloc for engaging in nuclear

military cooperation. Such outrage was inexplicable, considering that NATO members conducted joint nuclear operations and nuclear weapons belonging to the United States had been placed in five formally non-nuclear-weapon States, threatening a broad range of targets within Russian territory. His Government's repeated suggestions that all nuclear weapons should be located in the national territories of the States to which they belonged had fallen on deaf ears.

66. There was nothing to back the claims that, at the time the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been concluded, some kind of agreements had been reached regarding joint nuclear operations. Although there had been some discussions in that regard, the text of the Treaty contained no closed additional protocols and no agreements in respect of joint nuclear operations.

67. His delegation strenuously rejected the accusations that his Government had engaged in nuclear rhetoric. Aggressive nuclear rhetoric had first been used by the States members of NATO. In view of warlike statements and anti-Russian acts by Western nations, which had contributed to the escalation of the armed conflict in Ukraine, the Russian Federation was compelled to warn of the existence of risks and the possibility of catastrophic consequences if relations between two nuclear States devolved into open military confrontation and called instead for responsible behaviour in that regard. His Government's principled position had remained unchanged: nuclear war could have no winners and should therefore never be fought. The defence doctrine of the Russian Federation provided for the use of nuclear weapons exclusively for defensive purposes and solely under strictly defined conditions where the country was the target of direct military aggression.

68. With regard to the accusations concerning the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, his delegation noted that following a referendum held in September 2022, Zaporizhzhia Province became an administrative entity of the Russian Federation. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant thus became a Russian nuclear facility governed by Russian law. Ukraine and its Western handlers were to blame for the shelling of the plant, which posed a constant threat to the nuclear safety and security of the facility. In fact, Western countries bore most of the responsibility for the criminal acts perpetrated against the plant as they had continued to supply weapons to Ukraine, which was using the weapons as intended by its suppliers. There was thus reason to believe that attacks against the plant were being carried out with the blessing of Western countries.

69. **Ms. Kostenko** (Ukraine), responding to the remarks made by the representative of the Russian Federation regarding her country's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, said that the Russian Federation had established military control over the plant on 4 March 2022, after its Armed Forces shelled the plant's operating reactors and then attacked the facility. The Russian Federation then brutally interfered in the management of the plant, licenced under Ukrainian law and placed under IAEA safeguards.

70. The attempt by the Russian Federation to take possession of the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and to illegally annex the Ukrainian territory in which the plant was located were not recognized and would never be recognized by civilized countries. Having undermined all seven pillars of nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the Russian Federation was certain to continue to do whatever it took to achieve its goals in its war against Ukraine. It was indeed an unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression unleashed by the Russian Federation against sovereign Ukraine, not a mere "conflict in Ukraine". The seizure of the Ukrainian nuclear power plant was the root cause of the current threats to nuclear safety and security there. The only way to address those threats was to make the Russian Federation withdraw all its military and civilian personnel, military equipment and weapons from the plant.

71. **Mr. Gil de la Serna** (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union in its capacity as observer, said that the use of military force and coercion to change borders had no place in the twenty-first century. The international community would never recognize the illegal attempt by the Russian Federation to annex part of the territory of Ukraine, as evidenced by seven General Assembly resolutions. The Russian Federation must stop its war of aggression against Ukraine unconditionally and withdraw its forces and military equipment immediately from the entire territory of Ukraine, whose independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders must be fully respected.

72. The Russian Federation was solely responsible for putting the safety and security of the nuclear facilities of Ukraine at great risk, potentially endangering the people of Ukraine, neighbouring States and other countries. As called for in numerous resolutions of the Board of Governors of IAEA, the Russian Federation should immediately cease all military operations at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, withdraw its troops and military equipment from the plant and return the facility to its rightful owner – Ukraine – so that the competent Ukrainian authorities could regain control

over all nuclear facilities within the country's internationally recognized borders and ensure their safe and secure operation. The international community would hold the Russian Federation accountable for its aggression against Ukraine, including for the nuclear safety and security risks caused by its actions.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.