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# Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## First session

2-12 May 2017

## Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at the Vienna International Centre, Vienna, on Wednesday, 3 May 2017, at 10 a.m.

*Chair:* Mr. van der Kwast . . . . . (Netherlands)

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General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory  
Committee (*continued*)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.*

**General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (continued)**

1. **Mr. Marafi** (Kuwait), speaking on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council, said that the possession, acquisition and development of nuclear weapons would not achieve the goal of regional peace and security. It would only serve to aggravate a state of instability. The only guarantee against the threat posed by nuclear weapons was their complete elimination.

2. The member States of the Council called on all States to consider measures to overcome the general deadlock in the disarmament machinery of the United Nations. The credibility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular, depended on the balanced implementation of its three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The purposes and objectives of the Treaty would also not be achieved fully without its universal implementation, including through the accession of States not parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. That included Israel.

3. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must fully comply with its obligations pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions, cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in implementing its safeguards agreements and resolve all outstanding issues.

4. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had the right to make their own decisions with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA played a central role in enhancing international cooperation in that area, especially on matters related to technical cooperation, and IAEA safeguards also provided the international community with an important reassurance about the peaceful nature of nuclear activities. Full compliance with safeguards agreements by all was essential. The presence in the Middle East of nuclear programmes and facilities that were not subject to comprehensive safeguards was a matter of concern.

5. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would bolster regional security and stability. The responsibility for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the responsibility of the three depositary States of the Treaty. In that regard, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States should abide by the implementation mechanism for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all

other weapons of mass destruction, as set out in the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The member States of the Council supported the convening of a conference under the auspices of the United Nations that would guarantee the participation of all States from the region.

6. Those States that had not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially nuclear-weapon-States, were urged to do so in order to bring that Treaty into force.

7. The member States of the Council had supported the holding of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. Such an instrument would bolster the existing disarmament regime and should help to achieve the primary objective of ridding the world of the danger posed by nuclear weapons. All States, especially nuclear-weapon States, should participate actively in those negotiations.

8. The accession of the State of Palestine to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its request to sign a comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement provided a clear indication of the commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security shared by all Arab States.

9. **Ms. Guitton** (France) said that her country had continued to fully implement its commitments with regard to the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained a crucial instrument for international peace and security. France was deeply committed to non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of the irresponsible and provocative strategy pursued by North Korea, France had supported Security Council resolutions and European Union decisions that had substantially strengthened the sanctions regime against that country. France had also welcomed the entry into force of the joint comprehensive plan of action agreed with Iran and had participated in its strict enforcement from the very beginning. The conclusion of that agreement demonstrated that the international community could achieve diplomatic and peaceful solutions to proliferation crises.

10. There was a collective responsibility to preserve and strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Activities by the North Korean leadership had demonstrated a determination to acquire an operational nuclear weapon, in complete violation of several Security Council resolutions. The repeated violations of the

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) in Syria were also unacceptable and weakened the international non-proliferation regime. Moreover, the lack of cooperation between the Syrian authorities and IAEA had prevented the international community from resolving all outstanding issues on that country's past and current nuclear activities. In the same region, the pursuit of a ballistic missile programme by Iran was undermining regional stability and preventing confidence from being restored.

11. France had also noted with concern the emergence of initiatives that were dividing States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In contrast, France reaffirmed its support for a gradual and pragmatic approach to nuclear disarmament pursuant to article VI of the Treaty. Progress in nuclear disarmament required everyone to undertake the necessary efforts to reinforce regional and international stability, taking into account the principle of undiminished security for all. In line with that gradual approach, France had sponsored Security Council resolution [2310 \(2016\)](#), which endorsed the moratorium on nuclear tests of the five nuclear-weapon States and reaffirmed that their simulation programmes were in line with the fundamental obligations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The resolution had also recalled the negative security assurances granted in 1995 to non-nuclear-weapon States that were in compliance with their non-proliferation commitments.

12. During the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, France had supported concrete and pragmatic initiatives related to a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and also related to nuclear disarmament verification. In line with the aim of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, France supported building trust among States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty through discussions between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on nuclear disarmament verification. France had also pursued dialogue and cooperation with nuclear-weapon States to strengthen mutual trust, including, for the first time, discussions on doctrines and strategic stability.

13. The Non-Proliferation Treaty could only be strengthened by concrete and realistic measures undertaken through a balanced approach to its three pillars. To preserve the international security architecture, States parties should adopt a firm and determined response to all proliferation crises. They

must therefore act before the Democratic People's Republic of Korea acquired an operational nuclear weapon, something which could happen during the current review cycle. For its part, Iran should implement the joint comprehensive plan of action with the utmost rigour and transparency. France attached particular importance to the ongoing strengthening of IAEA safeguards and called on all States that had not yet done so to conclude additional protocols.

14. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would be crucial for any concrete progress to be made towards a world without nuclear weapons. Another priority in the area of disarmament was the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. All States that had not yet done so should therefore sign and ratify that Treaty. Moreover, as the United States and the Russian Federation still possessed 90 percent of the world's nuclear arsenals, both countries should continue their reduction efforts following the expiry in 2021 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty).

15. France had continued the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the areas of industry, research and training. Similarly, all States parties should continue to promote the responsible and sustainable development of nuclear energy, which should take place under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions and be respectful of the environment.

16. **Mr. Fertekligil** (Turkey) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. As a State party to all major international non-proliferation instruments and regimes, Turkey remained committed to the full implementation of the Treaty and the further strengthening of its three pillars. At the start of a new review cycle, the priority for Turkey was to uphold the Treaty as a major instrument for reinforcing international peace, security and stability and to promote its universalization. All States parties had an obligation to deliver on the main goals identified in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and all States outside the Treaty should accede to it without conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States.

17. Turkey supported systematic, progressive, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament and encouraged all nuclear-weapon States to take further steps in that direction. The world had been waiting for substantial reductions and limitations since the entry

into force of the New START Treaty in 2011. However, a world without nuclear weapons could not be achieved without taking legitimate security concerns into consideration. To that end, incremental steps should be taken to produce concrete results. The Treaty should not be undermined by efforts undertaken elsewhere.

18. The cessation of all nuclear weapons tests was an important step towards both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that regard, all States should maintain the moratoria on nuclear weapons tests and any other nuclear explosions and also bring about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible.

19. Another essential step was the commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. Turkey therefore welcomed the establishment of a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group and called for the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament so that it could assume substantive work and negotiations in that regard.

20. Turkey also welcomed the establishment of a group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/67. Multilateral nuclear verification capabilities were necessary to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. In that connection, IAEA safeguards and additional protocols were essential tools for establishing a solid verification standard. All States that had not yet done so should conclude both instruments without further delay.

21. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important non-proliferation and disarmament measure. Turkey therefore reaffirmed its commitment to the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, which would be a critical element of the current review cycle.

22. Turkey condemned the nuclear tests and missile launches carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of Security Council resolutions, and called upon that country to return to the Treaty, to resume compliance with IAEA safeguards, to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to refrain from any actions that exacerbated regional tensions.

23. The agreement reached with Iran on the joint comprehensive plan of action was an important achievement for regional and global peace and stability that testified to the continued relevance of the Non-

Proliferation Treaty. Full and transparent implementation of the plan of action would strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Turkey acknowledged and supported the key role played by IAEA in its implementation.

24. The risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists, must not be underestimated. Turkey attached great importance to international cooperation in that area, particularly through Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), complemented by Security Council resolution 2325 (2016).

25. Turkey strongly supported the inalienable rights of States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that regard, it strongly supported the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. The maintenance of a high level of safety and security with respect to nuclear facilities and materials would also be conducive to extending the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology globally.

26. **Mr. Molnár** (Hungary) said that the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Hungary attached equal importance to the balanced implementation of all three pillars. In that regard, States parties should recommit themselves to fulfilling the objectives of the Treaty and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference.

27. Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provided the fundamental framework to achieve the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. However, that goal could only be achieved through a gradual approach that fully engaged nuclear-weapon States and promoted international security and stability. To that end, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should take practical steps aimed at bringing about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and making progress on nuclear disarmament verification and transparency measures. However, simply negotiating and concluding a new treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, without taking into account the global security context or involving nuclear-weapon States, would not eliminate a single nuclear warhead and might lead to the erosion of the Treaty regime.

28. The proliferation of nuclear weapons posed one of the gravest threats to regional and international peace and security. In that context, the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea constituted a serious challenge.

Horizontal and vertical proliferation risks must be addressed effectively to preserve the credibility of the Treaty. The role of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system was crucial in that field.

29. Violation of article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could also undermine its integrity. Hungary therefore supported the idea of principles being developed regarding the right of withdrawal from the Treaty.

30. Hungary was in favour of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and supported efforts to create the conditions for that process to be launched at a conference to be attended by all States of the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by them.

31. The joint comprehensive plan of action provided a positive example of how to resolve controversial issues within the broader framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The continued fulfilment of obligations by all sides would remain crucial throughout the implementation of the plan of action.

32. Hungary recognized that all States had an inalienable right to enjoy the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, all actors must maintain the highest possible standards in all aspects of nuclear safety and security. Hungary supported the central role played by IAEA in that regard.

33. **Mr. Stadler** (Switzerland) said that the failure of the 2015 Review Conference had demonstrated how difficult it was to find common ground. That underlined the importance of the first session of the Preparatory Committee, which must set the stage for a review cycle that would yield positive results.

34. There had already been some positive developments in the field of non-proliferation since 2015, including the constructive implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action and the progress achieved on implementing the non-proliferation measures adopted by the 2010 Review Conference. Nonetheless, a number of key concerns remained. In particular, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had compounded continuous violations of Security Council resolutions by accelerating its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes. Switzerland condemned such behaviour, which constituted a grave threat to peace and security, and urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon State. Diplomacy was the only solution to the crisis.

35. The ongoing challenge from North Korea to the international norm of non-testing must be met by renewed efforts for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In that regard, Switzerland wished to recall that all nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to ratify that Treaty with expediency in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Switzerland therefore called upon all the remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

36. In recent months there had been an alarming increase in official statements and announcements that ran counter to core principles and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Certain nuclear-weapon States had referred to their nuclear capabilities in the context of tensions and others had seemed to encourage non-nuclear-weapon States to develop nuclear capabilities in response to regional challenges. For Switzerland, any ambiguous message about the fundamental principles and objectives of the Treaty was unacceptable. Every effort must be made to avoid a world where the number of States possessing nuclear weapons would grow. Strong reassurances were therefore needed about the centrality, validity and sustainability of the Treaty.

37. In that regard, the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference remained a key instrument to take forward the implementation of the commitments related to three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty over the course of the current cycle. In order to accelerate the implementation of the action plan, ambitious but realistic benchmarks must be set. In that context, it was a matter of concern that implementation across the three pillars of the Treaty had advanced rather unequally. While important efforts were being made to reduce nuclear weapons, more significant progress would be necessary in the area of nuclear disarmament in order to sustain the Treaty and the credibility of its grand bargain. That was all the more essential since expectations of a world without nuclear weapons had increased after the acknowledgement of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.

38. A new legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons would be adopted during the current review cycle. It would be crucial to ensure that such a prohibition treaty complemented and strengthened both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and in no way undermined the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. All States parties had a shared interest in overcoming the current polarization on the issue of a

prohibition treaty. They must therefore work to ensure that the prohibition treaty complemented and did not negatively affect the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

39. **Ms. Buenrostro Massieu** (Mexico) said that the new review cycle was beginning in a context marked by tensions, antagonism and uncertainty. However, current instability should not be used as a pretext to justify any lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, the worrying international context highlighted the very need to avoid procrastination and to make substantive steps forward as soon as possible. Moreover, it was not a lack of favourable conditions but rather insufficient political will on the part of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that was preventing decisive action from being taken to eliminate nuclear weapons.

40. As the cornerstone of the international legal framework, the Treaty should act as a beacon guiding the way towards peaceful and constructive international relations. A clear link existed between the three pillars of the Treaty, on the one hand, and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, on the other. There was therefore a close and irrefutable relationship between the Treaty and the highest values and aspirations of the peoples of the world. In view of the importance of universality of the Treaty, those States outside that instrument should accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. All States had a duty to contribute towards the effectiveness of the Treaty regime as a whole.

41. While progress had undoubtedly been achieved under the Treaty in the areas of non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it remained unacceptable that 15,000 nuclear weapons remained in the possession of a few States. It was untrue to assert that such weapons, which posed an existential threat to everyone and everything on the planet, provided any stability. It should be recalled that, in the first preambular paragraph of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, States parties had referred to “the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples”. They had also noted that “the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war”.

42. For its part, Mexico would continue to advocate for a safer world based on international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. To that end, it was in favour of the progressive development of a prohibition on nuclear weapons.

43. **Mr. Bugajski** (Poland) said that challenges had always confronted the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the current review cycle was no exception. A successful cycle would depend on achieving a compromise between ambitions and realities on the ground. States parties should make full use of all opportunities to review the implementation of all articles of the Treaty as well as the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Discussions held during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee could play a useful role in testing ideas with a view to overcoming differences.

44. His country was fully committed to effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament. However, that goal would only be achieved if all States worked in unison and were convinced that doing so strengthened their security. A progressive approach to nuclear disarmament fulfilled those conditions. As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Poland had also been advocating for greater transparency of nuclear weapons arsenals.

45. Poland was focused on preserving the Treaty as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation system and would work to bring about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. It also strongly supported all initiatives aimed at providing IAEA with the instruments it needed to carry out its important mandate. All countries should cooperate with the Agency, including through the introduction of additional protocols to their safeguards agreements.

46. In view of the threat posed by terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction and related material and technology, Polish research reactors had been converted to use only low-enriched uranium as fuel. Poland was committed to attaining the highest levels of global, regional and national nuclear security and also supported the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy worldwide.

47. **Mr. Saicheua** (Thailand) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone of the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Thailand supported universal adherence to the Treaty and the strengthening of its three mutually reinforcing pillars in a balanced manner.

48. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were shared global responsibilities for all countries. Amid continuing calls from the international community for the prompt and effective implementation in good faith of article VI of the Treaty, Thailand had participated in the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons,

leading towards their total elimination. It encouraged all stakeholders to participate in that endeavour constructively and in an inclusive manner. His country also appreciated the efforts being made to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty, marked by the convening of a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group. As part of the disarmament process, Thailand welcomed transparency and confidence-building measures from nuclear-weapon States concerning their stockpiles and encouraged additional efforts in that regard.

49. Cooperation among the different nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important confidence-building measure that contributed significantly to strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As the depositary State of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), Thailand supported the establishment of more such zones in all regions of the world. It therefore urged all parties concerned to fully support early discussions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as mandated by the 1995 resolution.

50. Gravely concerned by the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Thailand called for the effective implementation of all relevant Security Council resolution, discouraged that country from taking any further provocative or destabilizing actions and expressed its unequivocal support for political and diplomatic means to resolve the issue peacefully.

51. The inalienable right of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop and use nuclear energy in a safe, secure and peaceful manner was well recognized in the Treaty and must be fully respected. The IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme played an important role in that regard and Thailand would continue to cooperate closely with IAEA to promote and utilize nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in order to increase prosperity for all. At the same time, verifiable and efficient safeguards were an important tool to ensure that nuclear technology was indeed being used for peaceful purposes. In that respect, the Agency should be empowered to further strengthen its safeguards and verification mechanisms.

52. States parties should remain committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and withdrawal from it should be allowed only in extraordinary circumstances and under strict conditions.

53. The lack of progress in implementing the outcomes of previous Review Conferences had affected the credibility of the Treaty. It was important to learn from the failure of the 2015 Review

Conference and to produce a substantive, meaningful, comprehensive and actionable outcome document in 2020. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty must also be involved in disarmament and non-proliferation discussions through other channels, such as IAEA programmes, the Nuclear Security Contact Group and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

54. There was a need to increase awareness and understanding of some crucial issues related to the Treaty, particularly among the younger generation. That included not only highlighting the danger of nuclear weapons and their catastrophic humanitarian consequences, but also correcting certain fears and misconceptions concerning peaceful nuclear applications. In that regard, Thailand acknowledged and welcomed the continued participation of civil society and academia in mobilizing public support and in shaping public perceptions.

55. **Mr. Dehghani** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the Treaty had been relatively successful in preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, that had only been achieved because the non-nuclear-weapon-States parties to the Treaty had acted responsibly by complying with their non-proliferation obligations in good faith. The primary failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was non-compliance by nuclear-weapon States with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and the respective commitments that they had undertaken at previous Review Conferences. The achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world was the main objective that required special attention during the current review process. The persistent lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and on issues such as vertical proliferation, including the modernization and miniaturization of nuclear weapons, would certainly deepen the existing frustration of non-nuclear-weapon States parties and challenge the very survival, relevance and integrity of the Treaty.

56. His country fully supported the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The negotiations under way in that context should be considered a collective protest by a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States parties that were frustrated by 47 years of non-compliance by nuclear-weapon States with their nuclear disarmament obligations. That alarming situation could not continue indefinitely and addressing it should be the highest priority at the 2020 Review Conference. The end result should be a legally binding and time-bound action plan



that ensured the transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide.

57. While the increase in the number of States parties to the Treaty was a great achievement, the failure to gain universal implementation of that instrument remained a serious challenge to its effectiveness. As zero was the only safe number of nuclear weapons on the planet, zero was the only acceptable number of countries outside the Treaty. That was particularly true in such a volatile region as the Middle East, where the nuclear weapons and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and activities of the Israeli regime continued to threaten the peace and security of the region and beyond. That approach had been acknowledged by the 2000 Review Conference when it had reaffirmed the importance of accession by Israel to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The 2010 Review Conference had reaffirmed that approach. The 2020 Review Conference should therefore prioritize that issue.

58. No one could deny the large increase in the use of nuclear energy worldwide. However, that was not solely due to the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty. In that regard, and stressing the important role played by IAEA in supporting the use of nuclear energy by developing countries, his delegation wished to draw attention to the limitations imposed by many developed countries, under so-called export control regimes, on the transfer of nuclear know-how, technology, equipment and material to developing States parties, in full contradiction with the provisions of the Treaty. Such restrictions violated the inalienable rights of developing States parties and hampered their economic and technological development. They must therefore come to an end. Taking into account the importance of the full realization of the inherent right of States parties under article IV, the 2020 Review Conference must examine that issue and take concrete decisions to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

59. As had been clarified during the course of negotiations on the joint comprehensive plan of action and thereafter, the nuclear programme of Iran had been for peaceful activities pursuant to article IV of the Treaty. There had never been any proliferation challenge whatsoever and the crisis had been manufactured. Henceforth, all parties must remain committed to their undertakings under the deal. In an earlier general statement, the Observer for the European Union had made a rather confusing reference

to the joint comprehensive plan of action and to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). His delegation wished to clarify that neither document had anything to do with either the prompt ratification of an additional protocol by Iran or with missile testing by Iran, something which was a completely legitimate defensive exercise.

60. **Mr. Sabbagh** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Treaty, as the foundation for nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, was the cornerstone of the international security regime. The Syrian Arab Republic had been one of the first States to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty because of its conviction that the possession of nuclear weapons was a threat to international peace and security. His country remained committed to its international obligations pursuant to the Treaty.

61. In view of the equal importance of the three pillars of the Treaty, all parties must continue to enjoy the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes enshrined in article IV of the Treaty. The facilitation role of IAEA in that regard must also be maintained and any technical assistance or cooperation provided by the Agency must not be subject to any conditions that ran counter to the IAEA statute. In implementing the provisions of article III of the Treaty, a fair balance must be reached between IAEA oversight and activities related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Syrian Arab Republic was committed to fulfilling the obligations arising from its IAEA safeguards agreement and continued to cooperate fully with the Agency. It rejected the politicization and double standards employed by certain States and stressed that voluntary measures must not be confused with legal obligations. Progress was needed towards full and comprehensive nuclear disarmament in a manner that enhanced the international peace and security system.

62. The resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was an inseparable part of a package deal that had led to the indefinite extension of the Treaty and must therefore be implemented. At the time of the adoption of the 1995 resolution, all countries of the Middle East had expressed their readiness to take practical measures to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, Israel, relying on its allies, had continued to challenge the international community by refusing to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. The conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (Helsinki



conference) had unfortunately also not been convened because certain sponsor States had adopted a policy of procrastination and maneuvering in order to appease Israel. That policy had been clearly demonstrated when three States had obstructed the adoption of a draft outcome document for the 2015 Review Conference. Such action had dealt a strong blow to international efforts to enhance the non-proliferation system and to remove nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East. However, that setback must not be allowed to affect the collective determination to fulfil the objectives of the Treaty and rid the world of nuclear weapons. In the light of the failure to adopt a final document at the 2015 Review Conference, the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference continued to be in effect and must therefore be implemented.

63. It was highly regrettable that time and effort spent during the Preparatory Committee was wasted at the Review Conference because of the political positions of certain States. Such behavior did not serve to strengthen the Treaty or enhance the non-proliferation regime. Using the Review Conference as a political tool to practice blackmail and exert pressure was unacceptable. His delegation called instead for an objective and balanced approach that was free of double standards.

64. Lastly, he wished to remind the representative of France that the current meeting was being held to discuss the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, not the prohibition of chemical weapons. Both matters had their own separate legal frameworks and appropriate forums where they should be discussed.

65. **Mr. Sembayev** (Kazakhstan) said that, as one of the cornerstones of international peace and security, the Treaty played a crucial role in advancing nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Preparatory Committee must consolidate collective efforts for the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, elaborate an effective mechanism against the withdrawal of States from the Treaty and ensure the unconditional implementation of all multilateral agreements negotiated within its framework, including the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Concerted action was therefore needed to strengthen and fully implement the Treaty. Kazakhstan would be working in particular to strengthen nuclear security and the nuclear non-proliferation regime during the course of its work as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the period 2017-2018.

66. As nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty that demanded immediate attention, it would be necessary to make progress on them both concurrently through collective efforts and in a spirit of multilateralism. However, in view of the thousands of remaining nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament still remained an aspiration. Kazakhstan therefore called upon the nuclear Powers to make sincere and practical efforts to eliminate their nuclear weapons, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty.

67. While voluntary moratoria on nuclear tests were an important factor for nuclear security, they could not serve as an alternative to a legally binding instrument in the form of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Its swift entry into force would also be essential for the effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that regard, Kazakhstan called on the remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible.

68. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a step towards a safer world. Such initiatives should be encouraged by providing their members with unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. While nuclear-weapon-free zones now covered over half the world, most protocols that contained negative security assurances for their members had not been ratified by all nuclear-weapon States, including the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk). Notwithstanding the need for such assurances, it should also be recalled that they could not be a substitute for universal and legally binding agreements.

69. During the current review cycle, new challenges facing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would need to be addressed. Increased attention should be paid to the possible emergence of new energy-producing countries, growing nuclear energy consumption and the need to ensure an adequate level of nuclear safety. The development of nuclear energy must exclude any risk of diversion for military purposes.

70. Since renouncing nuclear weapons in 1991, Kazakhstan had remained faithful to that commitment and had also accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear materials and facilities. As the world's largest supplier of uranium products, Kazakhstan had supported the initiative to establish a low-enriched uranium bank on its territory under IAEA auspices.

71. **Mr. Biato** (Brazil) said that the grand bargain that had opened the door to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 was supposed to have

renewed the commitment of States parties to the balanced implementation of all three pillars of the Treaty. Unfortunately, progress had been especially dismal on the nuclear disarmament front. Taking the lead from Latin America which had established the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the first nuclear-weapon-free-zone, States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be actively encouraging an ever expanding process of denuclearization. However, that had not happened. Indeed, nuclear-weapon States had ignored the calls to remove reservations and unilateral interpretations that weakened the effectiveness of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

72. Other commitments made at past Review Conferences were also long overdue, including the convening of the Helsinki conference. Just as worrisome, the development of nuclear weapons had occurred in breach of the Treaty and some States were actively promoting the inclusion of nuclear-weapon States into such entities as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group without agreed criteria and on a case-by-case basis. That sent mixed signals, to say the least, as it facilitated access to nuclear supplies for countries not bound by the Treaty or by treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The result was unsettling because it produced regime incoherence and increased nuclear insecurity for non-nuclear-weapon States.

73. Throughout the history of the Treaty, geopolitical considerations centred on nuclear deterrence had overshadowed core principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law which had declared nuclear weapons to be unacceptable and ultimately illegal. The vast majority of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States had sought to reverse that trend by highlighting the grave humanitarian consequences of detonating nuclear weapons, whether by accident or by design. The conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had confirmed that the mere existence of nuclear weapons was the greatest hazard to world peace and security.

74. A new tipping point had now been reached in the history of the nuclear arms race. The Treaty had proven successful in preventing non-nuclear-weapon States from developing nuclear arms. Unfortunately it had not been effective in curbing the modernization of existing nuclear arsenals and the world order had not become safer or more predictable thanks to nuclear weapons. In suggesting the possible use of nuclear weapons pre-emptively or in response to political tensions in certain situations, nuclear-armed countries and their

allies sought to dictate the pace of progress on nuclear disarmament. The greatest drivers of proliferation were reliance on nuclear weapons for national or regional security and the belief that such weapons were a means to superpower status. As long as nuclear arsenals existed and were vaunted as the ultimate symbol of power, some States or non-State actors would be tempted to obtain and use them in acts that would quickly dispel any illusions of peace and security built on nuclear deterrence.

75. Nuclear disarmament could no longer wait. A legally binding treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination, would strengthen and complement existing obligations, in particular article VI of the Treaty. All those genuinely interested in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should therefore participate in the negotiating process for the adoption of such a prohibition treaty.

76. A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing was more crucial than ever at a time when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was recklessly defying collective efforts. Regrettably, the lack of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the eight remaining Annex 2 States made its entry into force elusive. Moreover, a ban on testing would only be effective if it encompassed subcritical and computer simulated experiments.

77. Over the past five years there had of course been achievements, most notably the joint comprehensive plan of action. However, at the start of a new review cycle, the main challenge was to avoid any backtracking on Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations and on existing commitments undertaken at previous Review Conferences.

78. **Mr. Istrate** (Romania) said that, since its entry into force, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. While much had been done to implement the Treaty, all States parties had a genuine interest in strengthening its three pillars and much remained to be done in that respect. At the start of a new review cycle, the only realistic way forward was to encourage a positive dynamic and apply constructive approaches on which consensus could be built.

79. The common goal of total nuclear disarmament must be addressed collectively in a step-by-step manner, bearing in mind the prevailing international security environment. All nuclear disarmament efforts must be considered within the framework of the Treaty and any unrealistic expectations must be avoided as they would only jeopardize the non-proliferation regime and undermine the credibility of the Treaty.

80. In order to advance towards the shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons common ground must be found. In that regard, the focus should be placed on making progress on the negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, on nuclear disarmament verification and on the urgent entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The entry into force of the latter, in particular, would contribute effectively to non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and thereby enhance international peace and security.

81. States parties shared a responsibility to reinforce the global non-proliferation regime, particularly to overcome the challenges posed by a few countries that had violated their international obligations. Common security would be profoundly affected if additional countries crossed the nuclear threshold.

82. His delegation welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action and said that Romania had made a voluntary contribution to fund the IAEA verification activities required to monitor continued compliance.

83. Drawing on the lessons learned from the previous review cycle, constructive and united efforts would be needed to achieve the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

84. Romania supported the universal adoption and implementation of additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements as the verification standard that strengthened the Agency's capabilities to detect and respond to suspicions of non-compliance.

85. There was no room for complacency in the field of nuclear security. Against a backdrop of growing global, regional and national security threats, especially the challenge posed by nuclear terrorism, ever more concerted actions were required. It was therefore imperative that all aspects of nuclear security, including cyber security and nuclear forensics, received equal attention and appropriate funding. For its part, Romania was fully participating in international efforts for the prevention of nuclear terrorism, including through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

86. Romania had established itself as a responsible actor which used nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. It had a tradition of proactive commitments to international cooperation projects and had become one of the main regional providers of training on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

87. **Mr. Rowland** (United Kingdom) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was vitally important for the

United Kingdom and for the international community as a whole. Having played an unparalleled role in curtailing the nuclear arms race and in keeping the world safe, the Treaty was at the centre of international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to create a world without such weapons and to enable access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

88. All three pillars of the Treaty were mutually reinforcing and complementary. Their implementation should therefore be pursued together, systematically and with equal determination by all States parties, which should also fully implement the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. The Treaty continued to make a significant contribution to the strategic stability required by the international community, which must uphold and strengthen that instrument because of, not despite, the complex security challenges that it faced. Accordingly, the Treaty remained the right framework for progress on all three pillars, including disarmament. The current review cycle provided an opportunity to collectively reaffirm commitments to the primacy of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

89. Pursuant to Security Council resolution [1887 \(2009\)](#), the United Kingdom continued to urge States that were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. His country continued to work to bring those States closer to the international non-proliferation mainstream and had consistently been at the forefront of international efforts to tackle proliferation. It was important for the international community to work together to ensure that all States parties fulfilled their non-proliferation obligations.

90. The United Kingdom condemned in the strongest possible terms the continued development by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes, in direct violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. Those activities must be abandoned in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and concrete and credible steps must be taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to re-engage with the international community and to prioritize the well-being of its own people over its illegal programmes.

91. The joint comprehensive plan of action was an important contribution to the non-proliferation regime. The United Kingdom remained absolutely committed to its full and robust implementation and welcomed the

latest IAEA report confirming that Iran was in compliance with its nuclear-related commitments.

92. The United Kingdom supported a universal and strengthened safeguards system, with the evolution of safeguards implementation to a State-level concept. As part of its commitment to the Treaty, his delegation also supported the principle of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to enhance regional and international security.

93. The United Kingdom reaffirmed its commitment to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and remained prepared to actively support and facilitate renewed regional dialogue aimed at bridging differing views on the arrangements for a conference. It was encouraging the regional States to consider what practical steps they might take to build confidence and promote an inclusive, balanced and results-oriented engagement.

94. The United Kingdom had a strong record on disarmament, having reduced its own nuclear forces by over half from their Cold War peak in the late 1970s. Of the recognized nuclear-weapon States, it possessed only approximately 1 per cent of the total global stockpile of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom remained firmly committed to step-by-step disarmament and to its obligations under article VI of the Treaty. In January 2015, his Government had announced that submarines on patrol would carry only 40 nuclear warheads and no more than eight operational missiles. That took the total number of operationally available warheads to no more than 120. The current Government remained committed to reducing the overall stockpile of nuclear weapons to no more than 180 warheads by the mid-2020s, as set out in its Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.

95. Productive results on nuclear disarmament could only be achieved through a consensus-based approach that took account of the global security context. Negotiating an international ban on nuclear weapons would not bring the international community closer to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. That approach would neither improve the international security environment nor increase trust and transparency. It would also fail to address the technical and procedural challenges of nuclear disarmament verification. The most realistic and effective route towards a world without nuclear weapons involved pursuing a consensus-based step-by-step approach to multilateral disarmament that built the necessary trust between States, and putting into place the key international architecture to help build the conditions for further disarmament. That goal was one of the

fundamental aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Any initiative that set up an alternative process risked undermining or weakening the Treaty and impacting negatively on international peace and security.

96. Global energy demand was increasing and the world was increasingly looking to nuclear technology to play a role in securing a better quality and duration of life for many more people. The Treaty was therefore playing an increasingly important role in promoting what nuclear technologies could offer in a safe, secure, safeguarded and sustainable way. The United Kingdom looked to the future as a committed global partner in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

97. As a responsible nuclear-weapon State, the United Kingdom was committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons and believed that the Treaty offered the right framework to achieve that outcome. The United Kingdom recognized its obligations under all three pillars of the Treaty and would continue to work with its international partners to tackle proliferation, to make progress on multilateral disarmament and to encourage the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

98. **Mr. Zaroug** (the Sudan) said that, following the failure of the 2015 Review Conference, all States parties must work together to ensure a successful outcome to the 2020 Review Conference. For its part, the Sudan had been actively involved in international disarmament efforts. For example, the Sudan was one of the first countries to have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; it had promoted and signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba); it had acceded to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2004; and it had hosted the First Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa in 2003.

99. His delegation reaffirmed the importance of a balanced approach to the implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the need to promote confidence-building with a view to universalization of the Treaty. The development of peaceful nuclear applications was particularly valuable, given the growing demand for nuclear technology in such fields as health, food production, agriculture and industry. Moreover, all such applications could contribute to the achievement of sustainable development.

100. The use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes was a legitimate and inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty and an integral part of their sovereignty. In view of the increasing

importance of nuclear energy as an efficient and clean source of power, full access to it, particularly for developing countries, was crucial. The IAEA statute acknowledged that the Agency's role was to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world, and also to facilitate the exchange of technical and scientific information concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Accordingly, any undue constraints that had been placed on the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technology related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be removed.

101. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important practical step to achieve non-proliferation. It was also an effective means to promote regional and global security. The failure to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East must be remedied by implementing both the agreed action plan of the 2010 Review Conference and the 1995 resolution. Furthermore, all nuclear facilities in the Middle East must be subject to IAEA safeguards. The only means to promote international security was to reactivate multilateral channels.

102. The disarmament provisions in Article VI of the Treaty had still not been implemented, almost half a century after its entry into force. Achieving a legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons must therefore be prioritized, given the international security situation and the existential threat posed by such weapons.

103. **Mr. Viinanen** (Finland) said that the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and a key component of the rules-based international security architecture. The three pillars of the Treaty were equally important and interrelated.

104. Nuclear weapons must be eliminated because, as long as they continued to exist, there was a risk of an immeasurable humanitarian catastrophe. However, a gradual, unified and inclusive approach would be needed to achieve that outcome. Nuclear disarmament would take place only if the countries possessing nuclear weapons were involved, whether or not they were States parties to the Treaty. Increased transparency, enhanced verification, de-alerting, negative security assurances and a "no first use" policy were among the first steps that could be taken to alleviate the threat posed by nuclear weapons, paving the way towards nuclear disarmament. It was also high time to address the normative gap whereby non-strategic nuclear weapons were not covered by any

legally binding international arrangement. Finland had therefore commissioned a study by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on arms control possibilities concerning non-strategic nuclear weapons.

105. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remained a priority, even though the de facto moratorium on nuclear weapon tests was nearly universal, with the unacceptable exception of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Finland condemned the nuclear and missile tests of that country and called for an immediate end to its illegal programmes as well as its adherence to universally accepted international norms and Security Council resolutions.

106. The establishment of a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group had been an encouraging development and his delegation supported efforts to launch negotiations for a treaty covering the production and stockpiling of fissile material.

107. The proliferation of nuclear weapons continued to pose a serious threat to international peace and security. All States parties that had not yet done so, without delay, should therefore conclude IAEA safeguards agreements together with additional protocols, which constituted the current non-proliferation verification standard.

108. Finland reiterated its full support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Middle East. Active engagement should continue among the States of the Middle East, supported by the international community, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the sponsors of the 1995 resolution, for a conference to be convened to achieve that outcome.

109. The agreement reached with Iran on the joint comprehensive plan of action was encouraging. All parties involved should continue to implement that agreement in full.

110. All States must work together to eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism. For its part, Finland had consistently supported the implementation of Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), complemented by Security Council resolution [2325 \(2016\)](#). It had also hosted a plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2015.

111. Finland had been the first country to agree on a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA and had produced nuclear energy safely and reliably for almost 40 years. One third of electricity in Finland was now produced by nuclear power. Finnish companies

already operated four nuclear reactors and two additional reactors were currently being built.

112. His country attached great importance to nuclear safety and had consistently supported IAEA activities in that area. It was essential for countries using nuclear power to have a sound legislative and regulatory framework on nuclear and radiation safety. The responsible use of nuclear energy also included effective control of the fuel cycle and a nuclear waste management strategy.

113. The Non-Proliferation Treaty provided a global framework for reliable cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to ensure the enjoyment of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology worldwide, the application of IAEA safety standards and security guidance was a basic requirement.

114. **Ms. Cesniece** (Latvia) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Latvia was strongly committed to the full implementation of the Treaty and welcomed the substantial progress made under its three mutually reinforcing pillars.

115. Latvia shared the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, there could be no shortcuts to the achievement of effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament. In that respect, it was important to be cautious and to refrain from creating parallel processes that might diminish the strategic importance of Treaty. Furthermore, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would need to be included in any nuclear disarmament negotiations.

116. Finding the right balance between strengthening the Treaty and preserving the international order would be of the utmost importance. The building blocks outlined in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference were the key to achieving progress in nuclear disarmament efforts. Latvia supported their continued, full and substantive step-by-step implementation.

117. Latvia welcomed the establishment of a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group and called for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. It also welcomed the establishment of a group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament.

118. The prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was important. Recent nuclear tests carried out by the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea were serious reminders why work towards the entry into force of that Treaty should be high on the agenda. Latvia strongly condemned the illegal nuclear tests and launches of ballistic missiles conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and urged it to refrain from any further actions that might increase tensions.

119. Latvia welcomed the successful implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action. Its continued full implementation would strengthen long-term global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. In contrast, Latvia was deeply concerned that one party had violated the core provisions of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum). Such actions significantly eroded levels of trust and undermined nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

120. It was of paramount importance that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties were honoured. In that regard, Latvia called on all parties to ensure the full and verifiable implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty).

121. Lastly, IAEA safeguards played an essential role in the implementation of non-proliferation obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Agency's contribution in ensuring the highest levels of safety and security to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy should also be underlined.

122. **Ms. Collinson** (Philippines) said that her country was strongly committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty of Bangkok, to which the Philippines was a party, was proof of the viability of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The principles of consensus, goodwill and cooperation, which had contributed to the success of that zone in Southeast Asia, could serve as examples for future such arrangements.

123. While consensus had not been achieved at the 2015 Review Conference, her delegation remained convinced that balanced and effective implementation of commitments across all three pillars of the Treaty would take the international community closer to its nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. There was an opportunity to preserve the gains of the 2010 Review Conference by revisiting its Final



Document and action plan. To produce a positive outcome in 2020, States parties should take stock of the factors that had led to the failure of the 2015 Review Conference and build upon the achievements of other successful Review Conferences.

124. The continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments was a major source of concern, particularly with regard to actions 3 and 5 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. In that context, the Philippines supported the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. A future treaty banning nuclear weapons would not supplant, but rather reinforce, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly its nuclear disarmament pillar.

125. The Philippines called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and all other parties to take the necessary steps to de-escalate the heightened tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must also return immediately to the Treaty and implement its earlier IAEA safeguards agreement. In addition, the Philippines called on all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and to conclude comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements.

126. Her delegation strongly supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and urged all concerned parties to take concrete steps for the Helsinki conference to be convened as soon as possible.

127. The Philippines attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the leading role of IAEA in that regard, particularly through its Technical Cooperation Programme.

128. Lastly, the Philippines wished to voice its continued concerns over the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and called on all States parties to the Treaty to be mindful that under no circumstances should they consider using nuclear technology for anything other than for peaceful purposes.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*