

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolutions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference

1. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, noting paragraph 1 of the principles and the elements relevant to article III of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 9–13 and 17–19, and to article VII, in particular paragraphs 5–7. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at that Conference. The Conference also recalls and reaffirms the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs

2. The Conference recognizes the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and an important element in facilitating the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects plays a vital role in promoting international peace and security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

4. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all of its provisions are the best way to achieve the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, to fully comply with the Treaty and not to take any action that can negatively affect prospects for its universality and effective implementation.



5. The Conference notes that nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

6. The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

7. The Conference recalls that non-nuclear-weapon States parties have entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.

8. The Conference emphasizes that measures should be taken to ensure that the rights of all States parties under the provisions of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of those rights in accordance with the Treaty.

9. The Conference emphasizes that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations. The Conference recognizes that breaches of the Treaty's obligations undermine nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Article III and fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article IV and sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs

10. The Conference emphasizes that the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, are essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference considers that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the States parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

11. The Conference reaffirms that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in that regard.

12. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements concluded in connection with the Treaty by States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to

consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. In this regard, the Conference calls upon the States parties to extend their cooperation to the IAEA. The Conference underscores the importance of resolving such matters in a timely manner in full conformity with the Statute of the IAEA and the respective legal obligations of States parties. The Conference further expresses its concern for cases of non-compliance with the Treaty and with safeguards obligations by States parties and calls on States to ensure that they remain in or promptly return to compliance with their obligations.

13. The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and the General Assembly by the IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C. of the Statute of the IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified by the IAEA.

14. The Conference welcomes voluntary measures aimed at facilitating and strengthening the implementation of safeguards and confidence-building, including bilateral and multilateral arrangements for enhanced verification, and notes that such arrangements build greater trust among parties.

15. Bearing in mind the obligation of States to cooperate with the IAEA to facilitate the implementation of safeguards agreements, the Conference emphasizes that there is a distinction between voluntary confidence-building measures and the legal obligations of States.

16. The Conference recalls the importance of the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

17. The Conference welcomes the fact that 179 States parties have in force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and that six additional States have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA since the 2015 Review Conference. The Conference urges the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible and without further delay in order to support the IAEA efforts to universalize the comprehensive safeguards agreement legally required by the Treaty.

18. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by the IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declaration so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

19. The Conference notes that the implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) equips the IAEA with broader information and access so that it can provide increased assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole.

20. The Conference notes that it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation. The Conference underlines that any State applying provisionally the additional protocol must comply with its provisions. The Conference notes that in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty and supplemented by an additional protocol in force, the measures contained in both instruments represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.

21. The Conference welcomes the fact that 138 States parties have brought additional protocols into force and that 14 of these States parties have brought the additional protocol into force since the 2015 Review Conference. A growing number of States implement the comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the additional protocol as an integral part of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol and to support the IAEA efforts to encourage broader adherence to the additional protocol.

22. The Conference notes technological developments in nuclear activities and nuclear-related items especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Conference takes note of the work of the IAEA to keep abreast of these developments and their potential relevance to the strengthened safeguards system.

23. The Conference welcomes the fact that 22 States parties have amended their small quantities protocols since the 2015 Review Conference and that another six States parties have rescinded their small quantities protocols. The Conference notes that it is becoming increasingly challenging for the IAEA to draw a soundly based safeguards conclusion for those States with small quantities protocols based on the original standard text. The Conference calls on all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them as a matter of priority.

24. The Conference encourages the IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties upon request in the conclusion, entry into force and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and amendment or rescission of small quantities protocols and welcomes the efforts of the IAEA Director General in this regard.

25. The Conference recognizes that bilateral and regional safeguards, such as those implemented by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), play an important role in the further promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between States and support the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty.

26. The Conference welcomes the continuing efforts of the IAEA to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards, including through the development and implementation of State-level safeguards approaches in line with States' legal obligations. In this regard, the Conference emphasizes the importance of close consultation and coordination with States as well as the relevant assurances contained in resolutions of the IAEA General Conference. The Conference supports continued engagement in open and active dialogue between States and the IAEA on safeguards matters. The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated, taking into account technological developments and the increasing number of facilities and locations outside facilities under safeguards.

27. The Conference considers that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation, taking into account the need for the IAEA to meet its legal obligations under

safeguards agreements as well as IAEA statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer.

28. The Conference recognizes the IAEA for maintaining high standards of professionalism in ensuring the verification of States' non-proliferation commitments and stresses the importance of continuing to undertake its responsibilities in an effective, transparent, impartial, technically based, non-discriminatory and objective manner.

29. The Conference commends the IAEA for its continued diligent work in implementing safeguards during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic as well as States parties for facilitating the in-field verification activities of the IAEA during this period. The Conference calls upon States parties to continue to cooperate with the IAEA to facilitate the maintenance of high levels of effectiveness in safeguards implementation during adverse conditions.

30. The Conference calls upon States parties to extend their full cooperation to the IAEA in the implementation of safeguards and to ensure that IAEA officials are treated respectfully and able to discharge their safeguards functions under the relevant agreements effectively.

31. The Conference expresses its grave concern for the military activities being conducted near or at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and other facilities and locations within Ukraine, the loss of control by the competent authorities of Ukraine over such locations due to military activities conducted by the Russian Federation and the profound negative impact of these events on safety, security, including physical protection of nuclear material, and safeguards. The Conference further notes that the loss of control over nuclear facilities and other locations by the competent authorities of Ukraine prevents those authorities and the IAEA from ensuring that safeguards activities can be implemented effectively and safely.

32. The Conference expresses its appreciation for the efforts of the Director General of the IAEA to seek access to enable the IAEA to undertake urgent safeguards activities to verify the status of the reactors and inventories of nuclear material at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and other locations in the armed conflict areas in Ukraine and to ensure the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities at those locations.

33. The Conference notes that the use of nuclear material in non-proscribed military activities provided for under comprehensive safeguards agreements, in particular with respect to the topic of naval nuclear propulsion, has generated interest among States parties to the Treaty regarding, inter alia, arrangements to ensure that such nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this regard, the Conference notes the importance of the IAEA consideration, in consultation with the States concerned, of arrangements related to naval nuclear propulsion and for continuing dialogue and transparency in accordance with the rules of the relevant bodies.

34. The Conference calls for the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in non-proliferation and safeguards, through cooperation with the IAEA in its capacity-building activities, through science and technology education, in policy and legal roles, through international partnerships and through participation in activities relevant for safeguards and non-proliferation at the IAEA and related organizations. The Conference underscores its support in this regard for the IAEA Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme, and the aim of increasing the number of women in the nuclear field and supporting an inclusive workforce of both men and women who contribute to and drive global scientific and technological innovation.

35. The Conference welcomes the efforts of the IAEA to assist the States parties, upon request, in strengthening their national legal and regulatory frameworks related to safeguards, including assistance for the establishment and maintenance of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material – in particular the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs (COMPASS) and International SSAC Advisory Services (ISSAS) missions – as well as the IAEA legislative assistance programme. The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue supporting capacity-building in research and development and science and technology related to nuclear verification.

36. The Conference stresses the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements, the Statute of the IAEA and its confidentiality regime. The Conference notes the steps taken by the IAEA Secretariat to protect classified safeguards information and that the Secretariat will continue to review and update the established procedures for the protection of classified safeguards information within the Secretariat.

37. The Conference notes the considerable increase in IAEA safeguards responsibilities and the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards are functioning. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the necessary political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.

38. The Conference welcomes additional technical and financial contributions by States to help the IAEA meet its safeguards responsibilities and to develop and enhance the development and use of safeguards technologies. The Conference welcomes the assistance provided by IAEA Member States and relevant organizations to the IAEA, including through Member State Support Programmes, to facilitate capacity-building, including related research and development, and implementation of safeguards.

39. The Conference reaffirms that nuclear security, including the physical protection of nuclear material, cybersecurity and the protection of nuclear facilities against such acts as theft and sabotage, supports the objectives of the Treaty. The Conference acknowledges existing and emerging nuclear security threats and its States parties commit to addressing such threats. The Conference recognizes that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State.

40. The Conference stresses the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The Conference calls upon all States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well protecting sensitive information. In this regard the Conference encourages all States, in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, to take into account and apply, as appropriate, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications.

41. The Conference takes note of the contributions made by the International Conferences on Nuclear Security in 2013, 2016 and 2020 and their related Ministerial Declarations. The Conference encourages States to support the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025 as well as organization of the International Conferences on Nuclear Security.

42. The Conference encourages States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, where such assistance is needed and requested, including through the relevant IAEA services, such as the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans

(INSSPs), International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions.

43. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, recognizing the importance of its acceptance, approval or ratification by further States, and notes the importance of its full implementation and universalization. The Conference welcomes the outcome of the 2022 Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

44. The Conference stresses the importance of all States parties improving their national capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations. The Conference notes the work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States to combat such trafficking, including IAEA activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its incident and trafficking database. The Conference calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard.

45. The Conference calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations. States parties express concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In this regard, the Conference underscores the essential role played by the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), and recalls the obligation of all States to implement binding provisions of those resolutions.

46. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

47. The Conference recalls that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.

48. The Conference stresses the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and emphasizes the need for the involvement of all States in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner. The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue, in coordination with its Member States, to play a constructive and coordinating role in other nuclear security-related initiatives, within their respective mandates and memberships, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and to work jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

49. The Conference recalls that all States parties have undertaken in article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to the safeguards required by article III of the Treaty. The Conference notes that a number of States parties which are suppliers of material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connection with their exports of certain equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the

processing, use or production of special fissionable material (IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and addenda).

50. The Conference recalls that paragraph 12 of decision 2, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, affirmed that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference reaffirms that supplier arrangements should continue to be transparent and ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties in conformity with the Treaty.

51. The Conference recognizes that there are nuclear-related dual-use items of equipment, technology and materials not identified in article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty that are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the Treaty as a whole. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear-related dual-use items do not assist any nuclear weapons programme. The Conference reiterates that each State party should also ensure that any transfer of such items is in full conformity with the Treaty. The Conference notes that a number of States which are suppliers of material or equipment have adopted guidelines and a control list for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology (IAEA document INFCIRC/254 and addenda).

52. The Conference highlights the aim of export controls to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.

53. The Conference recognizes that sound national laws and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty. In this context, the Conference urges States parties to establish, maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of national laws and regulations for export controls of such items.

54. The Conference welcomes the increasing adherence of States parties to multilaterally negotiated guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls. The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.

55. The Conference encourages all States parties to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.

Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

56. The Conference reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

57. The Conference reaffirms the conviction that the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. The Conference reaffirms its support for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones that are established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, consistent with the principles and guidelines of the Disarmament Commission for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Conference affirms that the extension of the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free zones established in accordance with those guidelines should be further promoted and fostered as building blocks toward the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

58. The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty), as well as the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, are making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference welcomes the parallel declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia on 17 September 2012 concerning the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. The Conference supports the efforts of States parties to enhance the institutionalization, cooperation and consultations among the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia.

59. The Conference urges further progress towards ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. In this regard, the Conference encourages the States concerned to conduct constructive consultations on the outstanding issues related to the signing of the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty with a view to signing and ratifying the Protocol as soon as possible and welcomes their statements of readiness to engage for that purpose. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The Conference stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty.

60. The Conference encourages nuclear-weapon States to review any reservations or interpretative statements made in connection with ratification of the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

61. The Conference calls on nuclear-weapon States to ratify relevant protocols to nuclear weapon-free zone treaties and thereby bring into effect the security assurances provided by them.

62. The Conference underlines the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, especially in the Middle East.

The Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

63. The Conference reaffirms its support for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the previous Review Conferences.

64. The Conference reaffirms that the 1995 resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The 1995 resolution, which was co-sponsored by the three depositary States of the Treaty, is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote.

65. The Conference recalls the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

66. The Conference recalls the reaffirmation by previous Review Conferences of the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty, including in the Middle East.

67. The Conference stresses the necessity of strict adherence by all States Parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference urges all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

68. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, including in the Middle East.

69. The Conference reaffirms the importance of advancing the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

70. The Conference acknowledges developments at the first two sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, convened in November 2019 and November 2021 at the United Nations in New York.

Other regional issues

71. The Conference expresses its unwavering support for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

72. The Conference, stressing that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must abide by its international obligations, and, recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, condemns the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2016 and 2017 and stresses that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must not conduct any further nuclear tests.

73. Recalling that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State pursuant to the Treaty, the Conference calls on it to return without delay to the Treaty and to the application of IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear activities.

74. The Conference further calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete measures as soon as possible to abandon all its nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

75. The Conference encourages the resolution of this issue through negotiations and diplomacy.

76. In this regard, the Conference stresses that all parties concerned should exercise restraint, refrain from escalatory steps, adhere to the general direction of political settlement and resolve their respective concerns through meaningful dialogue in order to promote peace and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

77. The Conference expresses concern about other regions in Asia where nuclear stockpiles pose challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and recalls the reaffirmation by previous Review Conferences of the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. The Conference underlines the importance of concerned States strengthening their non-proliferation export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Forward-looking actions

78. Bearing in mind paragraph 7 of Decision 1 adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which provides that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back and should evaluate the results of the period that they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future, the Conference recommends the following forward-looking actions:

(a) The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty;

(b) The Conference endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty;

(c) The Conference calls upon States parties to take concrete steps to facilitate the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in non-proliferation and safeguards and to foster an inclusive workforce of both men and women who contribute to and drive global scientific and technological innovation;

(d) The Conference, noting that seven States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements required by article III of the Treaty, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay;

(e) The Conference underscores the importance of complying with non-proliferation obligations and addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system;

(f) The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA Statute and the respective legal obligations of States parties. In this regard, the Conference calls upon States parties to extend their cooperation to the Agency;

(g) The Conference calls for the restoration of control by the Russian Federation to the competent Ukrainian authorities of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and other relevant facilities and locations in Ukraine in order to ensure their safety and security, as well as the effective implementation of IAEA verification activities under the comprehensive safeguards agreement of Ukraine;

(h) The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements, pursuant to article III of the Treaty;

(i) The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force;

(j) The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economical and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved;

(k) The Conference calls upon all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them as a matter of priority;

(l) The Conference encourages the IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and amendment or rescission of small quantities protocols;

(m) The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly, including in the light of technological developments and the increasing number of facilities and locations outside facilities under safeguards;

(n) The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the necessary political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty;

(o) The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference;

(p) The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls;

(q) The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions;

(r) The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes;

(s) States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty;

(t) The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of nuclear security, including the physical protection of nuclear materials

and facilities, cybersecurity and the protection of nuclear facilities against such acts as theft and sabotage;

(u) The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date;

(v) The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to become party to the Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and become party to the Amendment as soon as possible;

(w) The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance;

(x) The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations;

(y) The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible;

(z) The Conference encourages the IAEA to continue to assist the States parties, upon request, in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on the regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.
