

# 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

22 August 2022

Original: English

---

New York, 1–26 August 2022

## Chair's working paper: Main Committee I

**Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolutions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference**

### Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs

1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting and preserving international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that it is essential for the Treaty to be implemented in all its aspects in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties. The Conference recognizes that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty is a common responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty and remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with all its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

2. The Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, in accordance with article I of the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek nor receive any



assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with article II of the Treaty.

4. The Conference recalls that the non-nuclear-weapon States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, *inter alia*, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.

5. The Conference reaffirms the continued validity of all commitments undertaken by States parties towards the full and effective implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty, through the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, all of which were adopted by consensus.

6. The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of all provisions of the Treaty is central to achieving the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to international peace and security.

7. The Conference recalls the commitment by all States parties to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

8. The Conference emphasizes the importance of promoting the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men in the processes of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

### **Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs**

9. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by all States parties of their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty and the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty.

10. The Conference deeply regrets the lack of tangible progress in the implementation of article VI and related commitments, which, if not addressed, would jeopardize the integrity and credibility of the Treaty.

11. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the importance of the full and effective implementation by all States parties of article VI of the Treaty, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference.

12. The Conference reaffirms the need for the nuclear-weapon States to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and to completely implement their nuclear disarmament commitments, including the 13 practical steps and the plan of action on nuclear disarmament that were adopted by consensus at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty, in order to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. The Conference reaffirms that these are not open-ended commitments, and that concrete and urgent progress towards nuclear disarmament remains essential in maintaining the integrity and credibility of the Treaty.

13. The Conference recalls the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The Conference reaffirms the applicability of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, as well as nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
14. The Conference reaffirms the ultimate goal of States Parties to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
15. The Conference reaffirms the importance of concrete steps to reduce the alert status of nuclear-weapon systems that promote international stability and security, with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
16. The Conference expresses concern at the increase in nuclear rhetoric and nuclear threats, and its impact on international peace and security as well as the integrity and credibility of the Treaty.
17. The Conference recognizes the importance of elaborated measures that can contribute to building confidence and reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, whether intentionally or by miscalculation, accident, miscommunication or misperception, in the context of achieving nuclear disarmament. The Conference reaffirms that the full implementation of the Treaty, including the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI, remains the only way to eliminate nuclear risks.
18. The Conference reaffirms that nuclear risk reduction is an interim measure pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and does not legitimize the continued existence of nuclear weapons. The Conference reiterates that nuclear risk reduction is not a substitute for tangible progress in the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty.
19. The Conference recognizes the importance for all States Parties to report regularly on their implementation of obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference recalls the need for the nuclear-weapon States to continue efforts to agree on a standard reporting form and appropriate reporting intervals.
20. The Conference notes the conferences of the nuclear-weapon States held in Beijing (2019), London (2020) and Paris (2021), which fostered dialogue and common approaches among them to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. The Conference notes the development of a glossary by the nuclear-weapon States, intended to increase mutual understanding and confidence among them and facilitate discussions with the non-nuclear-weapon States.
21. The Conference welcomes the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2020 London and 2021 Paris conferences, on continuing structured efforts to exchange views on concepts, doctrines and policies beyond the current Review Conference, and reiterates the need for reporting on concrete progress in this regard.
22. The Conference welcomes the affirmation by the nuclear-weapon States, through the Joint Leaders' Statement by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races of 3 January 2022 that, inter alia, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The Conference further welcomes the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmation of the importance of addressing nuclear threats and of preserving and complying with their bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control agreements and

commitments. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to these affirmations.

23. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the preservation and continued implementation of bilateral arms control agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference welcomes the extension of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) through 4 February 2026 and reaffirms the importance of further progress, including the negotiation of a successor agreement leading to further reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

24. The Conference reaffirms the urgency of the nuclear-weapon States prompt and sustained engagement with a view to, inter alia, rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, regardless of their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process, and further diminishing and eliminating the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, which would promote international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all.

25. The Conference recognizes the importance of reporting on steps taken by States parties, as a significant transparency and confidence-building measure, towards further diminishing and eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in all their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, whether national or collective.

26. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty have committed to applying the mutually reinforcing principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations and underscores the importance of the nuclear-weapon States strict application of these principles in nuclear weapons reductions.

27. The Conference expresses concern at the qualitative improvement of and quantitative increase in nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, and the low level of transparency surrounding these activities.

28. The Conference recognizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

29. The Conference reiterates its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including any unintentional or accidental nuclear explosion. The Conference reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

30. The Conference acknowledges the devastation that would be visited upon all humankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.

31. The Conference recognizes that the immediate, mid- and long-term consequences of nuclear weapon detonations, inter alia, on health, the environment, biodiversity, infrastructure, food security, climate, development, social cohesion and the global economy are significantly graver than previously understood, are interlinked, and would not be constrained by national borders but have regional or global effects, and could even threaten the survival of humanity.

32. The Conference welcomes the presentation, during the past two review cycles, of findings and evidence on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in fact-based discussions, including at international conferences.

33. The Conference acknowledges that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted on 7 July 2017. It was opened to signature by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 September 2017. The Conference further acknowledges that the Treaty entered into force on 22 January 2021 and held its first Meeting of States Parties from 21 to 23 June 2022, which concluded with the adoption of a declaration and an action plan.

34. The Conference recalls the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996. The Conference notes its finding that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

35. The Conference notes the adoption of General Assembly resolution [75/45](#) on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, in which the Assembly, among others, declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference welcomes the convening of annual meetings of the Assembly to commemorate the International Day.

36. The Conference expresses disappointment at the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, noting that such a treaty could make a substantial and concrete contribution towards nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, ultimately, a nuclear-weapon-free world.

37. The Conference recognizes the 2018 consensus report of the high-level expert preparatory group of the treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and notes that its content will be useful for treaty negotiations.

38. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account the contents of report [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein.

39. The Conference reiterates its encouragement, to all States that have not yet done so, to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

40. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the earliest possible date, recalling the responsibility of all States signatories to promote that Treaty. The Conference welcomes the recent signature (Tuvalu, 2018) and ratifications of the Treaty (Myanmar, 2016; Eswatini, 2016; Thailand, 2018; Zimbabwe, 2019; Comoros, 2021; Cuba, 2021; Dominica, 2022; Gambia, 2022; Timor-Leste, 2022; and Tuvalu, 2022) as a sign of the continuing salience of the Treaty in strengthening international security.

41. The Conference recognizes that the entry into force of the CTBT is of the utmost urgency, as it will provide the global community with a permanent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and legally binding commitment to end any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, as a means to constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which combats nuclear proliferation.

42. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the ratification of the CTBT by nuclear-weapon States which have yet to do so, with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty.

43. The Conference recognizes the need for all States to uphold the existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion and to continue efforts towards the long-overdue entry into force of the CTBT, through advocacy and engagement vis-à-vis the States whose ratification is required for entry into force, as well as political, technical and financial efforts to further strengthen the International Monitoring System and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

44. The Conference acknowledges the progress made to establish the CTBT verification regime, as evidenced by the work of the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre and by the experience gained with on-site inspections. The Conference acknowledges the importance of continued assistance by States parties to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in its work in preparing for the entry into force of the Treaty. This includes the early completion, provisional operation and maintenance of the International Monitoring System, which serves as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory element of the global verification and compliance regime of the Treaty.

45. The Conference expresses its appreciation for the scientific and civil benefits provided by the data gathered by the CTBT verification regime and acknowledges the role that the CTBTO plays in disarmament and non-proliferation education.

46. The Conference recalls the adoption of General Assembly resolution [64/35](#), in which the Assembly, among others, declared 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. The Conference welcomes the convening of annual meetings of the Assembly to commemorate the International Day.

47. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference recalls Security Council resolution [984 \(1995\)](#) noting the unilateral statements by each of the nuclear-weapon States, in which they gave conditional or unconditional security assurances against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, recognizing that treaty-based unconditional and conditional security assurances are available to such zones. The Conference welcomes the reaffirmation of existing negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States in this regard.

48. The Conference reaffirms the importance of full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to their existing obligations and commitments related to security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, including the commitments under the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1994.

49. The Conference notes the urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to consider effective, universal, non-discriminatory, unconditional, legally binding arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument, and recognizes the need to fully honour and uphold all existing security assurances given unilaterally and multilaterally.

50. The Conference reaffirms the importance of effective and credible nuclear disarmament verification in achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons and welcomes ongoing work in this regard aimed at ensuring full compliance and building trust and confidence among the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as the development of appropriate multilateral technical capabilities. Nuclear disarmament verification should conform with international law and the principles laid out in the final document of the first special session devoted to disarmament (1978) and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission principles of verification (1988).

51. The Conference welcomes the work undertaken by the Group of Governmental Experts established under General Assembly resolution 71/67 to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, and the adoption by the Assembly of resolution 74/50, through which it established a group of governmental experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues.

52. The Conference further notes the contributions of activities and initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification, such as those carried out in the framework of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

53. The Conference acknowledges the value of increased and positive interaction with civil society during the review cycle and greater engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty, as well as in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

54. The Conference underscores the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference recognizes the vital role of raising public awareness on disarmament and non-proliferation among members of the global community. The Conference welcomes the joint statement by 90 States parties on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

55. The Conference recalls decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in which it was agreed, inter alia, that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.

56. The Conference recognizes that greater and accelerated efforts are required to implement article VI of the Treaty, paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, the practical steps for achieving nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review Conference, as agreed in the present document:

## **Subsidiary Body 1**

### **Nuclear disarmament and security assurances**

*The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,*

*Mindful of the devastation that would be visited upon all humanity by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,*

*Recalls* that it has been 77 years since the use of nuclear weapons, and affirms that nuclear weapons must never be used again,

*Recognizes* that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is now higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War,

*Reaffirms* that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and notes the 3 January 2022 statement from the leaders of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to this end,

*Expresses* deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and affirms that awareness of these consequences must underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament,

*Reaffirms* the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law,

*Recalls* all States parties obligation to pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the highest disarmament priority and expresses deep concern about the absence of tangible progress since the ninth Review Conference, in 2015,

*Reaffirms* that all States parties have a legal obligation under article VI of the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, stresses that the conclusion of those negotiations is essential to the full and effective implementation of the Treaty, and emphasizes the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States in this regard,

*Reaffirms* the validity of all existing commitments undertaken, including in the outcome documents adopted by the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, especially the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI, and stresses that these commitments are not conditional,

*Reaffirms* the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to implement these commitments in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all,

*Reaffirms* the commitment of all States parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

**Without prejudice to any prior commitments undertaken, in order to avert the danger of nuclear war and to accelerate progress towards the collective goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, the State Parties agree to the following commitments:**

1. States Parties reaffirm the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and urge States not yet party to the Treaty, namely India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without conditions, and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms; particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

2. States parties commit to the strict application of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their disarmament obligations under the Treaty.



3. The nuclear-weapon States commit to pursue immediate reductions or further reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, including through bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations and unilateral initiatives.

4. The Russian Federation and the United States commit to the negotiation in good faith of a successor framework to replace the New START Treaty before its expiration in 2026 in order to achieve deeper, verifiable and irreversible reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

5. All nuclear-weapon States commit to commence a dialogue to establish a multilateral nuclear arms control framework with the goal of achieving reductions in the overall size of nuclear arsenals.

6. The nuclear-weapon States agree to take steps to diminish, with a view to eliminating, the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; for nuclear-weapon States this should include the adoption of no-first use doctrines.

7. The nuclear-weapon States commit to enhanced transparency measures related to, inter alia, their nuclear arsenals, doctrines and postures, as well as to efforts to build mutual confidence.

8. The nuclear-weapon States acknowledge and take into account the grave concerns of non-nuclear weapon States regarding the modernization and expansion of nuclear forces and the development of new types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

9. States Parties call on the Conference on Disarmament to urgently agree on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

10. States Parties call on the Conference on Disarmament to immediately commence and bring to an early conclusion negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with document [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein.

11. Pending the negotiation and entry into force of such a treaty, States Parties call for declaring and upholding an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

12. States Parties commit to the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), urge all States that have yet to ratify the CTBT to do so in all expediency, particularly the remaining eight States listed in its annex 2, and recall the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States in this regard as stipulated in Action 10 of the 2010 Action Plan.

13. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States commit to strictly maintain and enforce their existing moratoriums on explosive nuclear tests and refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.

14. States Parties commit to assist the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in its work in preparing for the entry into force of the Treaty. This includes the early completion, provisional operation and maintenance of the International Monitoring System.

15. States Parties agree that multilateral disarmament verification is a vital component of a world free of nuclear weapons. They commit to strengthening support for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building in support of nuclear disarmament and as an effective step towards the implementation of article VI, and to further conceptual and practical work on nuclear

disarmament verification, taking into account the importance of partnerships between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on this matter.

16. States Parties recognize that further work is required to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and, as a first step, are encouraged to exchange information on how they apply the principles of irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations, in order to build understanding of when and where irreversibility measures can be put into practice in reaching and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons.

17. States Parties agree that nuclear-weapon-free zones established by means of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the respective regions and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, as recognized by the General Assembly, must be respected by all States.

18. The nuclear-weapon States commit to take all measures necessary to bring about the entry into force of the relevant protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones without reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties.

19. States Parties commit to support the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones in all regions of the world, including the Middle East, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

20. States Parties reaffirm the validity of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

21. States Parties recognize that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. States Parties also recognize that strengthening negative security assurances would contribute to building confidence in the non-proliferation regime, progress in nuclear disarmament as well as improving the overall security environment.

22. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as interim measures, the nuclear-weapon States commit:

- (a) To honour and respect all existing security assurances undertaken by them;
- (b) Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty under any circumstances.

23. States Parties call on the United Nations Conference on Disarmament to immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.

24. States Parties acknowledge that as long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear risk will persist and affirm that only their elimination can eliminate all risks associated with nuclear weapons. Efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war are not a substitute or a prerequisite for but rather are complementary to and a catalyst for the accelerated implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI.

25. States Parties also acknowledge that risk reduction measures should be matched with commensurate, concrete measures on the implementation of disarmament commitments.

26. States Parties further acknowledge that, while the avoidance of nuclear war is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have a special

responsibility to reduce nuclear risks and that the implementation of the disarmament obligations in accordance with article VI and of existing commitments can contribute to reducing risks. As these risks directly affect all States, there is a shared interest in risk reduction.

27. For these reasons, and noting that this list is not exhaustive, the nuclear-weapon States commit to the following immediate measures:

(a) To take all necessary measures to reduce the risks that nuclear weapons could be used as a result of miscalculation, misperception, miscommunication or by accident;

(b) To the issuance of political declarations of restraint to increase trust and reassurance;

(c) To refrain from dangerous rhetoric and from directly and indirectly threatening the use of nuclear weapons, inter alia, for military coercion, intimidation and blackmail;

(d) To intensify dialogue among the nuclear-weapon States, bilaterally and with the non-nuclear weapon States on risk perceptions, nuclear doctrines and force postures;

(e) To engage in sustained efforts to enhance transparency on nuclear arsenals;

(f) To reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems or to keep them at the lowest possible level;

(g) To create and enhance effective crisis prevention and management tools, including notification and data exchange agreements, enhanced leader-to-leader and military-to-military contact, the establishment of crisis-proof communication lines and risk reduction centres;

(h) To take steps to better understand and minimize vulnerabilities related to potentially disruptive new technologies and cyber capacities as they pertain to nuclear weapons; and to refrain from any actions related to those technologies and capacities that could increase nuclear risks;

(i) Further investigate practical steps States can take to narrow and, if possible, close off pathways to inadvertent nuclear use, including through sharing of best practices;

(j) To reinforce concepts of safety and security of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material, which complement these risk reduction measures.

28. States Parties commit to:

(a) Reinvigorate and participate in transparency and confidence-building measures and other appropriate measures that can, directly or indirectly, improve predictability in international relations and help to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon use;

(b) Foster forms of dialogue that are aimed at easing international tensions, strengthening trust between States and contributing to the advancement of nuclear disarmament.

29. In order to pursue a credible, result-oriented process for further work related to risk reduction in the context of this Treaty, States Parties commit to:

(a) Include in their national reports on their fulfilment of obligations and commitments under the Treaty information on measures and initiatives in the context of risk reduction during the course of the next and future review cycles;

(b) Devote time to a structured discussion about risk reduction at future sessions of the Preparatory Committee as a specific issue under Cluster 1 and future Review Conferences under a specific agenda item.

30. States Parties stress the necessity of strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. To this end,

(a) Nuclear-weapon States commit to report at every session of the Preparatory Committee and at every Review Conference on the status of their nuclear forces, their nuclear doctrine and the progress on their implementation of the Treaty and of commitments made at previous Review Conferences, in line with Actions 20 and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, in a manner that enables the progress on implementation to be regularly monitored and reviewed over the course of the review cycle, including, inter alia, through the use of benchmarks and targets;

(b) States Parties commit to submit regular reports on implementation of article VI of the Treaty and of commitments made at previous Review Conferences, in line with Action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan;

(c) States Parties commit to devote time at every session of the Preparatory Committee and at every Review Conference to the presentation and discussion of the reports of all nuclear-weapon States and the reports of interested non-nuclear-weapon States.

31. States Parties recognize the vital importance of educating and empowering individuals of all generations irrespective of their gender regarding the dangers of nuclear weapons and the imperative to reach a world without nuclear weapons, including the risks and humanitarian consequences associated with nuclear weapons. States Parties commit to take concrete measures to raise awareness of the public, in particular of younger and future generations, as well as of leaders, disarmament experts and diplomats, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including through interactions with and directly sharing the experiences of the survivors and the communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing, to know their humanitarian and environmental impact.

32. States Parties recognize the importance of, and commit to ensure the equal, full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men in the Treaty implementation and review and to further integrate a gender perspective in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.

33. States Parties commit to empower and enable youth to participate in formal and informal initiatives and in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes.

34. States Parties also commit to promote the participation of civil society, including research centres and academia, in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation decision-making processes and in raising public awareness on the urgency and importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.