

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People's Republic of China

Report submitted by China

1. As called for in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as “the Non-Proliferation Treaty”), the five nuclear-weapon States Parties to that Treaty met in Beijing on 30 January 2019 and in London on 13 February 2020, and agreed to continue to follow the common framework agreed in 2013 for the submission of national reports to the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to Non-Proliferation Treaty. That framework, used by the five nuclear powers to draft their national reports, provides common headings and presents pertinent information on that basis, while covering the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
2. China attaches great importance to the cornerstone status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the fields of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and has made unremitting efforts to achieve the three major goals of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, advancing the nuclear disarmament process and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China is committed to the path of peaceful development and actively promotes the building of a community of common destiny for humanity. In this spirit, China will continue to take practical action to implement a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable concept of global security while firmly upholding the authority, effectiveness and universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so as to make its due contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.
3. In accordance with the relevant requirements of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Government of the People's Republic of China hereby provides the following account of its implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty:

I. National measures relating to nuclear disarmament

4. China has unswervingly pursued a defensive nuclear strategy, demonstrated maximum transparency in its nuclear strategy and policy, exercised great restraint in the development of its nuclear forces, and adopted an extremely cautious approach to



the use of nuclear weapons. From the day it came into possession of such weapons, China has advocated their complete prohibition and thorough destruction, and has maintained its nuclear forces at the minimum level required for its own national security. From the beginning, it has abided by a policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and alone among the five nuclear-weapon States, has made a clear and unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China will continue to make its due contribution to achieving the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

A. National security policies, doctrines and activities concerning nuclear weapons

5. “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” From the perspective of the future destiny of the human race, nuclear war is the ultimate baseline that cannot be crossed. Nuclear war has no final victor, only great disaster for humankind. China was compelled to develop nuclear weapons during a particular time in its history, in order to deal with the nuclear threat, break the nuclear monopoly and prevent nuclear war. It developed nuclear weapons not for the purpose of threatening other countries, but to defend itself and maintain its national security. On the day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government issued a solemn call to convene a summit of world leaders to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; in a speech at United Nations headquarters in Geneva in January 2017, President Xi Jinping said that nuclear weapons are a “sword of Damocles” hanging over humanity and should be totally banned, and ultimately completely destroyed, in order to achieve a nuclear-free world.

6. From the beginning, China has remained committed to the non-first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It has steadily honoured this commitment throughout the decades that it has possessed nuclear weapons, whether facing nuclear threats and blackmail during the Cold War or the dramatic changes in the international security environment during the post-Cold War era, and will not change it in the future. This, in and of itself, is a practical step toward the goal of nuclear disarmament.

7. China has also unconditionally promised not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In April 1995, it reiterated its unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and its promise to provide positive security assurances to those States. In 2000, China joined other nuclear-weapon States in reaffirming the security assurance commitments they had made in United Nations Security Council resolution [984 \(1995\)](#). At the request of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the Chinese Government issued statements offering security assurances to the two countries in December 1994 and February 1995 respectively. China advocates the early negotiation and conclusion by the international community of an international legal instrument on unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and supports the early commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in this regard.

8. China adheres to a nuclear strategy of self-defence aimed at deterring others from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against it. Accordingly, China has defined basic policies on the role, use and alert status of its nuclear weapons, the scale of its nuclear forces, and nuclear arms control that are commensurate with this purpose. In particular, China has consistently maintained its nuclear forces at the lowest level necessary for its national security, and has never competed with other

countries in terms of nuclear investment, numbers or scale, participated in any form of arms race, provided a nuclear umbrella for other countries, or deployed nuclear weapons in other countries. Its nuclear weapons are exclusively strategic, and it takes an extremely cautious approach to their use.

9. Maintaining global and regional strategic balance and stability will help reduce the risk of nuclear war, and China advocates joint efforts by nuclear-weapon States to this end. First, we should advocate common security and clarify strategic stability objectives. To effectively reduce the risk of nuclear war, nuclear-weapon States should abandon the Cold War mentality and zero-sum thinking, renounce nuclear-deterrence policies centred on the first use of nuclear weapons, curb the impulse to engage in nuclear-arms competition, and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies. Secondly, we should continue to enhance mutual trust and build a solid foundation for strategic stability. Nuclear-weapon States should strengthen dialogue on nuclear strategy and policy, treat each other's strategic intentions objectively, stop exaggerating strategic competition and confrontation among major powers, substantively respect each other's security concerns, cease developing and deploying global anti-missile systems and other actions that undermine strategic stability, properly manage differences to prevent strategic miscalculations from triggering accidents and crises, and prevent major power competition from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Third, we should strictly abide by our international obligations and commitments and maintain a framework of strategic stability. China encourages the United States and the Russian Federation to substantively fulfil their special and priority responsibility for nuclear disarmament and continue to further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner, so as to create conditions for the eventual realization of general and complete nuclear disarmament. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States should strengthen communication and cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon States, jointly uphold the authority, effectiveness and universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and adhere to the principle of gradual and orderly nuclear disarmament. Fourth, we should strengthen communication and exchange and build consensus on strategic stability. Nuclear-weapon States should discuss the connotations and key elements of strategic stability from the perspectives of strategic strength, policy orientation and strategic mutual trust in an orderly, step-by-step manner, gradually building consensus and expanding the convergence of interests.

B. Nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control (including nuclear disarmament) and verification

10. China has built its strategic nuclear forces in accordance with the principle of competence and effectiveness, adapting to developing trends in military science and technology to ensure its protective, rapid-reaction, penetration defence and destructive capabilities, ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons, ensure its capacities for strategic deterrence and nuclear countermeasures, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against it. The modernization of nuclear weapons undertaken by China is aimed solely at ensuring the safety and security, reliability and effectiveness of those weapons. The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force is currently the core force of Chinese strategic deterrence and is equipped with the Dongfeng series of ballistic missiles.

11. China has scaled back its nuclear weapons development and production base. As early as the 1980s, China took the initiative to shut down the "816" Nuclear Military Plant in the city of Chongqing. Excavated deep in the mountains at a total cost of 746 million yuan, the base was 85 per cent completed when construction was halted, demonstrating the country's determination to take the initiative in restraining

the development of its nuclear forces, as well as its principled non-pursuit of a nuclear arms race under any circumstances. In 1987, the Chinese Government also made the decision to withdraw from its nuclear weapons development, testing and production base in Qinghai. After comprehensive rehabilitation, the entire base was handed over to the local government to arrange other uses for it. The sites of both these bases are now open to the public.

12. China has always attached great importance to the effective control of its nuclear weapons as well as to their safe management and use. From the day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China has actively taken a series of practical and effective measures to ensure that its numerically limited nuclear forces are maintained in a state of absolute safety and reliability, and has implemented a rigorous regime of laws, regulations and reliable technical means for the safety management at every stage of nuclear weapons storage, transportation and training processes. To prevent unauthorized and accidental launches of nuclear missiles, China has adopted many special technical safety measures in the area of equipment technology, in addition to clear provisions in its regulatory system and its hierarchy of operational readiness priorities. China values building a culture of nuclear safety in its nuclear-related departments, institutions and forces, and constantly strengthens the nuclear safety awareness and sense of responsibility of nuclear-related personnel. No safety or security problems involving nuclear weapons have ever occurred in China.

13. The command of nuclear forces in China is highly centralized. Unit operations must be carried out with extreme rigour and precision in accordance with the orders of the Central Military Commission. Chinese nuclear forces are kept in a state of moderate readiness in peacetime; in the event of a nuclear threat to the country, however, they would be put on heightened alert in preparation for a nuclear counter-attack at the order of the Central Military Commission, as a deterrent against enemy use of nuclear weapons against China. In the event of an actual nuclear attack on the country, a resolute counter-attack would be mounted against the enemy.

14. China has consistently practiced great restraint with regard to the scale and development of its nuclear weapons. As for the actual use of nuclear forces, its long-standing unconditional commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not only helps to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war as well as prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but is also an important step towards general and complete nuclear disarmament and the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons.

15. An active participant in international nuclear arms-control efforts, China has steadfastly advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and holds that all nuclear-weapon States should earnestly fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual and balanced reduction. States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and overarching responsibilities with regard to nuclear disarmament, and should continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals significantly and substantially in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner in order to create conditions for the ultimate realization of general and complete nuclear disarmament. When conditions are ripe, all nuclear-weapon States should join the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation process.

16. Over the years, China has voted in favour of important resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly regarding nuclear disarmament, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the conclusion of effective international arrangements to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened to be used against non-nuclear-weapon States.

17. China has actively promoted the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, submitted a draft treaty on non-first-use of nuclear weapons to the other four nuclear-weapon States in January 1994, and has actively promoted the commitment to mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons by other nuclear-weapon States on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

18. China supports the conclusion of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the commencement of substantive work on such important issues as nuclear disarmament, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

19. China firmly supports the objectives and goals of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and has made significant progress in its domestic preparations for the implementation of that Treaty. China has always honoured its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing, and has supported the early entry into force of that Treaty and the various international efforts in that regard, including through participation in successive conferences on facilitating its entry into force, as well as through active support of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. In January 2018, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated the firm commitment of China to that Treaty in a meeting in Beijing with visiting Executive Secretary Zerbo of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). China has consistently paid its contributions to the Preparatory Commission in full and on time, and has been the second largest contributor since 2020.

20. In recent years, a significant number of nuclear test-ban monitoring stations have been accepted for certification in China, constituting a highlight in building the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. China has undertaken the construction of eleven monitoring stations and one radionuclide laboratory, all of which have been built to date except for an infrasound station in Beijing, selection of the site for which is still in process. Beginning in December 2016, radionuclide stations in Lanzhou, Beijing and Guangzhou, along with basic seismic stations in Hailar and Lanzhou, were successively accepted for certification and simultaneously began transmitting data on 19 August 2019. The acceptance for certification of that group of stations in China and their commencing data transmission was a significant milestone, reflecting firm Chinese support for the preparation of a verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. China is currently working with the Provisional Technical Secretariat to advance the accreditation process of an infrasound station in Kunming.

21. China actively supports and participates in the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat, attends all meetings of the Commission and its subsidiary working groups, participates fully in the negotiation of such guidance documents as those concerning the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Centre (IDC) and on-site inspection operations manuals, and takes an active part in various international activities organized or supported by the Provisional Technical Secretariat aimed at improving the monitoring capacity of the IMS and promoting the capacities of signatory States to comply with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, contributing Chinese wisdom to building the verification regime for that Treaty with a view to safeguarding its gravity and impartiality.

22. China maintains good cooperation with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission Provisional Technical Secretariat. In May 2016, the two sides jointly convened the fourth East Asia Regional National Data Center Workshop in Beijing, and co-hosted a seminar on banning nuclear tests for scientists in Beijing in October of that year. The Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory took part in international sample comparisons and related technical seminars organized by the Provisional Technical Secretariat, which actively promoted the certification process for the Laboratory. China attaches great importance to building the capacities of developing countries to comply with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and has made several donations to the Provisional Technical Secretariat since 2008 to support the participation of experts from developing countries in the activities of the Preparatory Commission.

23. Following the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 6 January and 9 September 2016 and 3 September 2017, the Lanzhou and Hailar Basic Seismic Stations and the Beijing, Guangzhou and Lanzhou Radionuclide Stations in China provided relevant monitoring data to the IDC in a timely manner.

24. China has always taken a favourable attitude towards a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (a "fissile material cut-off treaty"), and believes that the negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of the Shannon report ([CD/1299](#)) and with the participation of all parties concerned will foster the nuclear disarmament process, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and maintain international peace and security. As the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the Conference is the only appropriate venue for negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty. China supports the conclusion of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work for the Conference, so that substantive work, including negotiations on such a treaty, can be carried out accordingly.

25. China has actively participated in the useful discussions held by the relevant subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament on issues related to a fissile material cut-off treaty, believing that this will also lay a foundation for revitalizing the future work of the Conference. China has constructively participated in the United Nations preparatory group of high-level experts on such a treaty, and has contributed to promoting the work of that group as mandated by applicable resolutions as well as to reaching consensus on a report. The group has fulfilled its mandate and the relevant discussions should return to the Conference on Disarmament and focus on pertinent technical issues through the establishment of a subsidiary body.

26. China attaches importance to and actively conducts nuclear arms control verification research, constructively participating in the work of two sessions of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification established pursuant to General Assembly resolutions [71/67](#) and [74/50](#), as well as supporting the work that the Group carried out in strict compliance with the mandate of those resolutions, and contributing to the consensus for adoption of the first report on the work of the Group. China believes that adequate and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures are an important technical guarantee for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and are of great importance in ensuring that a treaty on nuclear disarmament would be implemented effectively, thereby building mutual trust among the parties and enhancing the reliability of such a treaty. At the same time, it should be noted that nuclear disarmament verification is sensitive and complex, with many factors requiring attention, and must be considered in conjunction with an actual nuclear disarmament treaty in order to be meaningful.

C. Transparency and confidence-building measures

27. Having always believed that transparency of intentions and policies has the greatest practical meaning, China is firmly committed to the path of peaceful development, pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defence, and will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. No country will be threatened by Chinese nuclear weapons as long as it does not use nuclear weapons against China. This is the most practical kind of transparency. Nuclear transparency should adhere to the important principles of undiminished security for all countries and conduciveness to enhancing strategic mutual trust, and should be implemented voluntarily by each country according to its own national conditions, taking into full consideration the security environment faced by each country. With regard to nuclear transparency measures, States must fully consider the differences among the nuclear-weapon States in the sizes of their nuclear forces, their basic nuclear strategies and policies, and their strategic security environments, and accept the resulting differences in transparency and focus. China will continue to take necessary initiatives on nuclear transparency in line with the aforementioned principles, including maintaining dialogue with the other four nuclear-weapon States in this regard.

28. China issued three white papers on its arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation policies and measures, and its arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in 1995, 2003 and 2005 respectively, seven white papers on its national defence between 1998 and 2010, and a white paper on the diversification of its armed forces in 2013. These were followed by a white paper on its military strategy in 2015 and one on national defence in the new era in 2019. In these documents, China has provided a clear exposition of its nuclear strategy, the role of its nuclear weapons, its policies regarding their use, the development and the command and control of its nuclear force, and the alert status of its nuclear weapons.

29. China has taken a series of actions in the area of confidence-building measures, and actively seeks to ensure that nuclear-weapon States do not target each other with their nuclear weapons. In September 1994, China and the Russian Federation signed a joint statement declaring that they would not target each other with strategic nuclear weapons, and in June 1998, the heads of State of China and the United States declared that they would not target each other with the strategic nuclear weapons under their respective control. In May 2000, the five nuclear-weapon States – China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States – issued a joint declaration that they would not target any country with their nuclear weapons. In a joint statement in 2009, the heads of State of China and the United States reaffirmed their commitment not to target each other with their nuclear weapons, and in the same year, China and the Russian Federation signed an agreement on mutual notification of ballistic-missile and space-vehicle launches, which has been performing favourably since that time. In June 2016, the heads of State of China and the Russian Federation issued a joint statement in Beijing on strengthening global strategic stability, and signed a joint statement on strengthening contemporary global strategic stability in Moscow in June 2019. On 15 December 2020, China and the Russian Federation signed a protocol extending their 2009 agreement on mutual notification of ballistic-missile and space-vehicle launches by ten years. In June of 2021, China and the Russian Federation issued a joint statement on the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, stressing that “nuclear war cannot be won, cannot be fought, and should never be launched”.

30. Since 2015, China has held arms control and non-proliferation consultations with Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel, as

well as with such international and regional organizations as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to introduce Chinese policies, positions and practices regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation issues, and to exchange views on international security and non-proliferation issues of common concern, including the review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

31. China attaches great importance to the cooperation regime among the five nuclear powers, and maintains dialogue and consultations with the other four nuclear powers on such issues as confidence-building measures and the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. China took over as coordinator of the cooperation regime in July 2018 and has worked to promote the revitalization of cooperation among the five nuclear powers, successfully convening the annual formal Conference of those States in Beijing on 30 January 2019. In the intervals between formal meetings, China has also held public activities in which representatives of the five nuclear powers who had attended the meetings participated, together with representatives of academic institutions and news organizations, to promote mutual understanding and trust. Moreover, in its capacity as coordinator, China has taken the lead in organising dialogues between the five nuclear powers and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative.

32. The 2019 Beijing P5 Conference focused on the theme of “Strengthening P5 Coordination, Safeguarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime”. Following frank and in-depth exchanges on nuclear policy, strategy, disarmament and non-proliferation, consensus was achieved on a number of important issues. The five nuclear powers committed to sharing international peace and security responsibilities. All five powers recognized that the current international security environment is facing severe challenges, and that maintaining good relations among major powers is crucial to resolving global strategic problems. They agreed to treat each other’s strategic intentions objectively, strengthen exchanges on nuclear policy and strategy, enhance strategic mutual trust and maintain common security, and make every effort to prevent nuclear risks arising from misunderstandings and misjudgments. The five nuclear powers also pledged to maintain the existing international arms-control regime and abide by all international arms-control agreements, and reiterated their commitment to non-nuclear security, including positive and negative security assurances.

33. The five nuclear powers pledged to work together to safeguard the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Emphasizing that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and an important component of the international security architecture, the five nuclear powers committed to the full and complete implementation of the Treaty and to promoting its universality. They vowed to follow the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and of undiminished security for all countries, and to promote greater progress towards nuclear disarmament and the gradual achievement of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The five nuclear powers confirmed that they would address the issue of nuclear non-proliferation through political and diplomatic means, promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and support the efforts of countries in South-East Asia and the Middle East to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. The five nuclear powers also agreed to submit national reports to the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to work together to promote the success of that Conference.

34. The five nuclear powers committed to continuing to use the platform for cooperation among themselves to maintain dialogue and coordination. Given the complex and profound ways in which the current international security situation is evolving, interactions among the major powers have an impact on the international

security environment, the direction of the international order and the confidence of the international community. The five nuclear powers agreed to maintain strategic dialogue, strengthen exchanges on nuclear policy and strategy, enhance coordination in the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, and support China to lead the second phase of the P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. The five nuclear powers actively promote open and constructive dialogue in the international community.

35. As permanent members of the Security Council and nuclear-weapon States designated under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the five nuclear powers conduct in-depth exchanges in a spirit of mutual respect, honesty and pragmatism, achieve consensus on a number of issues and make clear the direction of their cooperation, reflecting the positive attitude of the major powers in coordinating and cooperating to address international security challenges, thereby enhancing the confidence of the international community in the international security environment. Such exchanges and cooperation are also conducive to promoting consensus-building among the five nuclear powers in the field of strategic security, replacing great-power competition with great-power coordination, and replacing zero-sum games with win-win cooperation, thus making a positive contribution to the promotion of world peace and stability.

36. On 31 January 2019, the five nuclear powers held a dialogue session in Beijing with international academic institutions, news media and officials from the embassies of some non-nuclear-weapon States in China to inform all parties about the Beijing P5 Conference. China also briefed all parties at the Conference on Disarmament regarding the Beijing conference.

37. The five nuclear powers established the P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms in 2011, which, under Chinese leadership and coordination, conducted in-depth discussions on key terms and definitions in the fields of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Group officially issued the *P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms* in New York during the Ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2015. One of the consensus points of the January 2019 P5 Conference in Beijing had been unanimous support for continued Chinese leadership as the second phase of the Working Group was launched, and China has already hosted three second-phase meetings of the Working Group in Beijing in February, August and December 2019 to discuss the list of nuclear terms; the Working Group held a fourth meeting in London in February 2020 to clarify the basic content of the second phase of the *Glossary* and agreed to publish the new results before the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

38. The discussion of nuclear terms by the five nuclear powers is by no means simply a technical issue. Rather, its significance lies in the fact that it is through just such discussion that consensus is enhanced, misunderstandings are eliminated, mutual trust is increased and miscalculations are prevented. It is thus also a nuclear policy transparency measure and an important practical initiative of the five nuclear powers to implement the outcomes of the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, fully reflecting the political will of the five nuclear powers to advance the review process of that Treaty and fulfil their obligations under it. As the lead country, China attaches great importance to the work of the P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, and has made unremitting efforts to promote the outcomes of that work.

39. Since the February 2020 P5 Process meeting in London, China has actively promoted the process of cooperation among the five nuclear powers and achieved a series of important results. On the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 2020, the five nuclear powers issued a joint

statement reaffirming their political support for it. The second phase of the China-led P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms is nearing completion and a new version of the *Glossary* will be submitted to the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. China actively promoted the issuance of a joint statement by the five nuclear powers on preventing nuclear war, reaffirming the concept that “nuclear war cannot be won, nor can it be fought” and sending a positive signal with regard to their advancement of global strategic stability and maintenance of international peace and security. China also actively participated in the dialogue and cooperation among the five nuclear powers on such issues as nuclear strategy and policy, nuclear risk reduction, a fissile material cut-off treaty, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and is committed to promoting the submission of practical outcomes by the five nuclear powers to the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

D. Other related issues

40. The anti-missile issue has an impact on global strategic balance and stability, and is closely tied to the nuclear disarmament process. China believes in embracing a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable concept of global security, halting the unhelpful development and deployment of global anti-missile defence systems, creating the necessary conditions for advancing the international arms control and disarmament process, and making its due contribution to maintaining global strategic stability.

41. China firmly opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and opposes the withdrawal of the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and its forward missile deployment on the pretext of the so-called “missile threat”. China urges the United States to abide by its responsibilities as a major power, comply in good faith with international law and fulfil its non-proliferation obligations, thoroughly abandon its plans to deploy land-based intermediate missiles in the Asia-Pacific region, stop proliferating missiles and their technology to its allies, and uphold international and regional peace and stability.

42. China unswervingly pursues a defensive policy of national defence and has always kept its military development at a reasonable level. All of its missile forces are deployed on its own territory, for the purpose of safeguarding its national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and do not pose a threat to any country. There is therefore no justification for blowing a “Chinese threat” out of all proportion and using that as a pretext for pushing the forward deployment of intermediate-range missiles.

43. China insists on the peaceful use of outer space, actively advocates the prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, and actively promotes a multilateral approach to outer space arms control. In the Conference on Disarmament in February 2008, China and the Russian Federation jointly and formally submitted a draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects ([CD/1839](#)), and actively promoted discussion of this issue in the Conference. In June 2014, China and the Russian Federation jointly submitted an updated version of that draft treaty to the Conference on Disarmament ([CD/1985](#)), and in 2017, China and the Russian Federation promoted the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution to establish the Group of Governmental Experts on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, to discuss the substantive elements of an international legal instrument on preventing the weaponization of outer space so that the relevant negotiations could get an early start in the Conference on Disarmament.

China deeply regrets that an individual country has taken it upon itself alone to block the report adopted by the Group of Governmental Experts. China supports transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space, and as a co-sponsor of related General Assembly resolutions, it was able to make positive contributions to the report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space in 2013.

II. National measures relating to non-proliferation

44. China firmly opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and advocates the full, faithful and balanced fulfilment of all obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the strengthening of the authority and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, of which that Treaty is the cornerstone. China has always strictly fulfilled its international nuclear non-proliferation obligations, fully and completely implemented pertinent Security Council resolutions, and actively participated in international non-proliferation cooperation. Over the years, it has taken a highly responsible approach to gradually establishing a sound non-proliferation and export control regime. To ensure the effective implementation of related laws and regulations, the Chinese Government has adopted strict measures with regard to both domestic management and export control, and made important contributions to the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. China actively participates in the process of political settlement of regional hotspot nuclear issues and plays its due role in promoting international and regional peace and security.

A. Safeguards

45. An important function of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the implementation of safeguards, which are of great significance in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China values the role of safeguards in ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and supports the enhancement of the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards work carried out by the Agency. At the same time, China believes that guaranteeing the impartiality and objectivity of the safeguards regime should be its operative prerequisite.

46. China joined the Agency in 1984 with a clear commitment to fulfil its safeguards obligations under the Statute of the Agency. In 1985, it announced that it would voluntarily submit some of its civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. In 1988, China signed the Agreement of 20 September 1988 Between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China, and in December of that year it signed a Protocol Additional to that Agreement strengthening IAEA safeguards. China became the first nuclear-weapon State to implement the Protocol Additional upon formally completing the domestic legal procedures for its entry into force in March 2002.

47. China actively supports and cooperates with the implementation of pertinent IAEA safeguards. At present, it has submitted 26 candidate nuclear facilities for safeguards, including such facilities as pressurized water reactors, heavy water reactors, research reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, uranium enrichment plants, and nuclear fuel-element production lines. In 2017, after the Agency chose to implement safeguards on a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor demonstration project under construction, China and the Agency worked together to study and develop safeguards implementation plans for this new commercial reactor type, providing a powerful impetus for upgrading IAEA safeguards technology.

48. In 2007, China joined the IAEA Member State Support Programme on nuclear safeguards, formally undertaking research and development work on safeguards verification means and methods for the Agency, supporting Agency research and development projects on safeguards concepts, and recommending experts to provide services to the Agency free of charge. Upon joining the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories, it actively undertook sample analysis tasks, providing strong support for the safeguards activities of the Agency.

49. China attaches great importance to the development of professional human resources in the safeguards field. The China Atomic Energy Authority has joined the Agency in setting up a Training Centre on Nuclear Safeguards and Security to organize training activities in such areas as safeguards verification and nuclear material accounting and control. It actively organized experts to attend and give academic presentations at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards in 2018, and in April 2019, it organized a special domestic academic seminar on nuclear safeguards with a view to guaranteeing and enhancing the pool of pertinent human resources and their technical level.

B. Export controls

50. China strictly controls and manages its nuclear exports, and has formulated three clear principles in this regard: such exports are to be used for peaceful purposes only, must comply with IAEA safeguards, and may not be transferred to any third party without the prior consent of China.

51. In line with the principle of the rule of law, the Chinese Government has continuously endeavoured to improve and strengthen the legal regime of nuclear export control, and has intensified efforts to ensure the effective enforcement of its non-proliferation policies. Since the mid-1990s, China has progressively put in place a comprehensive system of laws and regulations covering the export of sensitive nuclear, missile, biological and chemical items and technologies, as well as of all military matériel, promulgating and implementing such laws and regulations as the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Materials, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Export, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export, and the Provisions on the Administration of Safeguards and Supervision of Nuclear Import & Export and Foreign Nuclear Cooperation. The Nuclear Export Control List and the Dual-Use Nuclear Goods and Related Technologies Export Control List are updated in a timely manner, and a series of supporting documents such as the Measures for the Administration of Government Commitments on Nuclear Imports have been formulated, ensuring that nuclear import and export activities are effectively controlled.

52. The Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China officially came into effect in December 2020, further raising the level of Chinese non-proliferation export control legislation, as well as increasing its comprehensiveness and strengthening its regulatory capacity.

53. China exercises strict control over nuclear and dual-use nuclear items, following internationally accepted regimes of export management registration, licence management, and end-user and end-use certification, wherein the approval principle, list control approach and comprehensive control principle take the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation as the fundamental starting point, thus achieving integration with international practices.

54. China values the important role played by existing multinational export-control regimes in the field of non-proliferation, especially in preventing the proliferation of

nuclear weapons. China joined the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1997 and 2004 respectively, and maintained contacts and exchanges with the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Chinese Nuclear Export Control List and Dual-Use Nuclear Products and Related Technologies Export Control List cover all items and technologies in the control lists of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The control list associated with the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies is basically consistent with the Annex to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

55. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, China actively participates in the pertinent work of the Group and resolutely upholds the effectiveness, integrity and authority of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Chinese delegations actively participate in plenary meetings of the Group, as well as informal meetings of its Consultative Group and meetings of its Technical Expert Group, dealing constructively with the issue of accession to the Group by States non-Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since 2016, China has actively participated in discussions on related issues under the topic of “technical, legal and political aspects of the accession to the Group by States non-Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty” as authorized by the Plenary. China supports the continuation of the “two-step” mandate to first establish non-discriminatory criteria for accession by States non-Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, before the accession applications of specific countries are examined.

C. Nuclear security

56. With the goal of building a world of lasting peace and universal security, the Chinese Government actively practices a rational, coordinated and progressive view of nuclear security. As it continues to strengthen its own nuclear security capacity-building, political commitment and national responsibility, China also actively engages in international cooperation on nuclear security and promotes the building of a fair, cooperative and mutually beneficial international nuclear security system.

57. China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1989 and ratified the amended Convention in 2008, improving its national nuclear security regime in accordance with the requirements of the Convention and its Amendment. China participated in the drafting of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, strictly implements the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and effectively prevents non-State entities from acquiring sensitive nuclear materials. It actively supports and participates in international efforts to strengthen the management of radioactive sources and is committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

58. China emphasizes its national nuclear security responsibilities, and has established a national nuclear security legislative regime that is commensurate with the development of its nuclear industry. China vigorously promotes nuclear security capacity-building, including upgrading the physical protection systems of old nuclear facilities, carrying out nuclear material accounting and tackling key technical issues of nuclear security, organizing nuclear security actual-combat drills, strengthening nuclear security supervision and inspection, establishing a national online control centre for nuclear material and nuclear facility security, and setting up the State Nuclear Security Technology Centre. In 2017, the Agency was invited to conduct an International Physical Protection Advisory Service review in China, and an IAEA international expert group gave highly positive assessment of the Chinese national nuclear security regulatory regime and the nuclear security technical measures for

nuclear facilities. These measures have provided a strong guarantee of improvement in Chinese nuclear security capabilities.

59. China actively participates in the work of the Nuclear Security Contact Group, serving as the lead country for the Group's regional capacity-building and cooperation, in which it will continue to play a leading role in strengthening nuclear security capacity-building and promoting international capacity-building cooperation. As a founding partner of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, China will rely on such platforms as the Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence at the State Nuclear Security Technology Centre and the China Customs Radiation Detection Training Centre to assist partner countries in improving their anti-nuclear terrorism capabilities and continue to participate in the work of the Global Initiative.

60. China actively promotes bilateral nuclear security cooperation. In September 2015, the Heads of State of China and the United States announced the establishment of an annual nuclear security dialogue regime, under which three dialogues were held in 2016, 2017 and 2018. In March 2016, the Heads of State of China and the United States issued the United States–China Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation, followed in October of that year and in November 2017 by two successful dialogues on combating nuclear smuggling. In July 2018, the two countries jointly organized a regional seminar on combating nuclear smuggling for Central Asian countries and Mongolia at the Chinese Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence. China is also actively exploring nuclear security exchanges and cooperation with other countries, holding its first nuclear security dialogue with the Russian Federation in February 2018.

61. China actively provides technical assistance on nuclear security to developing countries. Since 2019, it has worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency to set up IAEA Collaborating Centres on nuclear security technology and on capacity-building for front line nuclear security officers in China, and has signed numerous instruments on cooperation in such fields as nuclear forensics and nuclear security for large public events. China applies the advantages of its domestic resource platform in working with the Agency to organize annual training courses and seminars on a variety of topics in nuclear security, as well as share best practices in nuclear security and provide technical support and assistance to the limits of its capabilities to countries in the region via technical exchanges and personnel training. For ten consecutive years, China has contributed to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund to support nuclear security capacity-building in countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and has donated nuclear security equipment of its own design and development to the Agency on numerous occasions.

62. China actively fulfils its political commitment to reduce the use of high enriched uranium, and supports countries minimizing the use of high enriched uranium according to their own needs and when economic and technical conditions permit. In March 2016, it successfully completed the conversion of a high enriched uranium microreactor at the China Institute of Atomic Energy to low enriched uranium. Within the IAEA Country Programme Frameworks and in cooperation with Ghana and Nigeria, China completed the conversion of high enriched uranium microreactors in those countries to low enriched uranium in August 2017 and December 2018. These technical modifications reduced the proliferation risks of the microreactors while enhancing their safety, thereby contributing to the better development of peaceful nuclear energy activities in those countries. Based on successful existing models like these, China stands ready to continue assisting other countries to carry out low enriched uranium conversion work.

D. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

63. China believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is of great importance for promoting nuclear disarmament, preventing nuclear proliferation, and promoting regional and world peace and security. It has always supported the establishment of such zones by non-nuclear-weapon States on the basis of self-initiated consultations and voluntary agreements in line with prevailing conditions in their regions, and has abided by its unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

64. China has signed and ratified all the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties that have been opened for signature, including Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Protocols 2 and 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. China has also acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

65. In February 2017, China sent a delegation to attend the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, thus reasserting its determination to abide by its commitments and strictly fulfil its relevant obligations. In December 2019 and September 2021, China participated as an observer State in the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh regular sessions of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, reaffirming Chinese support for the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and introducing its policy of advocating support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the upholding of that Treaty.

66. China has always firmly supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and completed the ratification and deposit of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in April 2015. China is willing to continuously deepen cooperation on this issue with the countries concerned, jointly safeguard the objectives and goals of that Treaty and its Protocol, and promote peace and security in the Central Asian region and the world.

67. China has consistently supported the construction of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. In October 2021, it attended the fifth Conference of the Parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and reaffirmed that it would, as always, faithfully discharge its obligations under the Additional Protocol to that Treaty and actively support the cause of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Africa.

68. China supported the efforts of the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, and has played a constructive role in promoting consensus between the Association and the five nuclear powers on issues related to the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Southeast Asia. China and the Association have now resolved all remaining issues with regard to the Protocol to that Treaty; at the P5 Conference in Beijing on 30 January 2019, all parties had agreed that China would take the lead in communicating with the Association countries with a view to getting consultations on the Protocol restarted and the Protocol signed at an early date. China actively

communicated and coordinated with the Association countries and the other four nuclear powers to this end.

69. China supports the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and fully understands the legitimate concerns of Arab countries in this regard. In the current environment, the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East would help prevent the proliferation of such weapons, easing tensions in the Middle East and enhancing regional and global peace and security. China voted in favour of the decision adopted by the General Assembly in 2018 to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (decision 73/546), supported the successful convening of the conference and its progress, and made active efforts to this end. In November 2019, China took part in the first Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. That conference opened the process of international discussions on the establishment of such a zone, with positive significance for the early realization of the goal of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. China calls on all parties concerned to step up diplomatic coordination and take realistic measures to reach agreement as soon as possible on arrangements for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and stands ready to continue contributing positively to this end.

70. China respects the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, and supported relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its previous sessions. In 2000, China and the other four nuclear-weapon States jointly pledged to provide security assurances to Mongolia as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In 2012, China and the other four nuclear-weapon States reiterated their support for the nuclear-weapon-free status of and security assurances for Mongolia. China stands ready to continue working with all parties to maintain the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia.

E. Compliance and other related issues

71. China has always strictly fulfilled its international obligations and responsibilities in non-proliferation-related fields. It abides by the rules and resolutions on compliance with non-proliferation obligations adopted by such relevant international bodies as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council.

72. China attaches importance to the cornerstone role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and calls on States that have not yet acceded to that Treaty to do so in their capacity as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible. It also supports the efforts of the international community to refine measures for addressing withdrawal from that Treaty and to appropriately raise the threshold for withdrawal, on the basis of the appropriate handling of differences.

73. China believes that the decision by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia to cooperate on nuclear-powered submarines undermines regional peace and stability and poses a serious risk of nuclear proliferation, in contravention of the goals and purposes of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. China expresses its serious concern and firm opposition to this decision. The current IAEA safeguards regime cannot be effectively applied to the power reactors and related nuclear materials on board the nuclear submarines to be transferred from the United States and the United Kingdom to Australia, and therefore cannot ensure that the nuclear materials concerned will not be diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices in Australia. The issue of safeguards for the power reactors and related nuclear material

on board the nuclear submarines of non-nuclear-weapon States has an impact on the integrity and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and touches upon the interests of all States members of the Agency, which should discuss it jointly with a view to finding a solution acceptable to all parties. To this end, China proposes that the Agency establish a special committee, open to all IAEA member States, specifically to discuss the political, legal and technical issues involved in the application of safeguards to the power reactors and related nuclear materials on board the nuclear-powered submarines of non-nuclear-weapon States, and submit a report to the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference. Pending the adoption of the report suggested above, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia should refrain from engaging in cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines, nor should the IAEA Secretariat negotiate with the three countries on safeguards arrangements for cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines among the three countries.

F. Other contributions to non-proliferation

74. From the beginning, China has dealt with non-proliferation issues in a highly responsible manner, taken active part in international cooperation on non-proliferation and made positive efforts to promote the resolution of nuclear issues in the regions involved. It advocates that all countries should abandon zero-sum games and the Cold War mentality, fully respect the legitimate security concerns of all countries and eliminate the root causes of nuclear weapons proliferation. All countries should commit to safeguarding the authority and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, abandon expediency and double standards, and peacefully address nuclear weapons proliferation concerns through political and diplomatic means within the framework of existing international law.

75. With regard to the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, China has always insisted that the Peninsula should be denuclearized, that the peace and stability of the Peninsula should be maintained, and that the nuclear issue should be resolved through dialogue and consultation. With the joint efforts of China and all parties concerned, the situation on the Peninsula has been generally stable in recent years, and remains on track for a political solution. At the same time, the main sticking point of the prolonged stalemate in Peninsula peace negotiations has been that the legitimate and reasonable concerns of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have not been given due attention and response. Under the new conditions, China hopes that all parties concerned will be cautious in their words and actions, do more to maintain the peace and stability on the Peninsula, create conditions for building mutual trust and restarting dialogue, and explore effective ways to address the concerns of all parties in a balanced manner in accordance with the "dual-track" concept and the principle of a phased and simultaneous approach. China will, as always, make unremitting efforts to achieve long-term peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

76. On the Iranian nuclear issue, China has from the beginning been committed to promoting dialogue and negotiation, and to seeking solutions conducive to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to peace and stability in the Middle East. China, the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the European Union reached a comprehensive agreement with Iran on the Iranian nuclear issue in Vienna in July 2015. President Xi Jinping attended a meeting of the leaders of the six countries on the Iranian nuclear issue in Washington in 2016 and profoundly summarized the inspiration provided to the international community by the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear agreement. China has been deeply involved in the process of implementing the comprehensive agreement, including taking the lead in promoting the remarkable progress of the Arak heavy water reactor

conversion project. China actively supports the International Atomic Energy Agency's upholding of the principles of objectivity, impartiality and neutrality as it strictly carries out supervision and verification in Iran on the basis of its mandate, and has contributed a total of 12.7 million yuan to relevant activities of the Agency. After the United States withdrew from the comprehensive agreement in 2018, China actively urged all parties to work together to maintain and implement the comprehensive agreement with the overall situation and the long term in mind. State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended four physical or video conferences of foreign ministers on the Iranian nuclear issue in July and September 2018, September 2019 and December 2020, putting forward a series of ideas on maintaining and implementing the comprehensive agreement, and emphasizing that all parties should adhere to the fundamental principle of upholding multilateralism, the solemn commitment of fulfilling the comprehensive agreement, the correct resolution of differences through consultation, and the basic direction of promoting regional peace. Since April 2021, the parties to the comprehensive agreement and the United States have been engaged in intensive negotiations in Vienna on the resumption of US and Iranian compliance with the comprehensive agreement, with China playing a constructive role by actively advocating for peace and promoting negotiations. Upholding the comprehensive agreement means upholding multilateralism, the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the international order based on international law. China calls on all parties concerned to have firm confidence, show political resolve, flexibly and pragmatically promote the resumption of compliance negotiations, and push for the early return of the comprehensive agreement to the right track. China will continue to objectively, impartially and responsibly uphold and implement the comprehensive agreement, and promote the political and diplomatic settlement process of the Iranian nuclear issue, while firmly safeguarding its own legitimate rights and interests.

III. National measures relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy

77. China supports the right of all countries, especially developing countries, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and believes that non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to undermine this right of all countries. China values the role of nuclear energy in promoting social and economic development, promotes technological research on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their application to industrial development, actively participates in and supports international cooperation to promote the global development and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and fulfils its relevant international obligations.

A. Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy

78. China is committed to building a harmonious and beautiful country, and promoting nuclear energy plays a positive role in building a beautiful China. Over more than half a century, China has been developing a nuclear industry regime that accords with its own national conditions, enabling the wide use of nuclear energy in the fields of energy, medicine, industry and public safety, and promoting social and economic development.

79. As a clean, green and low-carbon energy source, nuclear power plays an important role in efforts by China to build a clean and efficient energy regime, meet the challenges of climate change and achieve the goal of achieving peak carbon neutrality. China advocates the active and orderly development of nuclear power, premised on ensuring safety. As of the end of August 2021, there were 51 nuclear

power units in commercial operation in mainland China, with an operational installed capacity of 53 million kilowatts, and 21 nuclear power units under construction, with an installed capacity of 21 million kilowatts. China is currently building nuclear power on a larger scale and developing it at a higher speed than any other country. It was also the first country to achieve mass commercial operation of third-generation nuclear power units, playing an important role in the global recovery of nuclear energy.

80. China is committed to the “closed-cycle” development route for nuclear fuel and has basically created a complete nuclear fuel cycle regime; its supply of nuclear fuel is sufficient for the needs of the nuclear power plants already in operation. Construction of three near-surface disposal sites for medium- and low-level radioactive waste has been completed, and work is under way on deep geological disposal facilities for high-level radioactive waste.

81. China has accumulated rich experience and technology in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power, and actively promotes research on, and development and application of, safer and more advanced nuclear energy technologies on that foundation. A “Hualong One”-type reactor, the first autonomous third-generation nuclear-power technology reactor in China or abroad, has been successfully connected to the grid for power generation. In 2017, China set up a special working group on the Hualong One under the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme organized by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to share relevant experience among international peers. The world’s first high-temperature gas-cooled reactor demonstration project with fourth-generation advanced nuclear energy system characteristics has also successfully achieved criticality and will soon be connected to the grid. Demonstration verification of a pool-type low-temperature heating reactor has been completed, research and development of an experimental fusion-engineering reactor is being actively pursued, and the construction of a demonstration fast reactor project is progressing smoothly.

82. China actively promotes the development and application of nuclear technology and has evolved a relatively complete industrial regime, with an annual output value of over 300 billion yuan and an annual growth rate of around 20 per cent. Nuclear technology has come into wide use in such fields as industry, agriculture, medicine, environmental protection, public health and public security. In agriculture and food safety, the mutated plant species cultivated by Chinese scientists constitute nearly a quarter of the world total, and nearly 200,000 tonnes of agricultural products undergo irradiation processing in China. Nuclear science and technology have become an important means of transforming and revolutionizing traditional agriculture and promoting agricultural modernization. In the area of life and health, the China Atomic Energy Authority, the Ministry of Science and Technology and seven other Government departments have jointly issued the Medium and Long-term Development Plan for Medical Isotopes (2021–2035) to accelerate the research and development of key core medical-isotope technologies. Medical linear accelerators are coming into broad application in China, with nearly 2,000 units currently in use, and nuclear medicine imaging methods are rapidly developing. In the field of public safety, detection technology has come into broad use for air, rail, sea and highway cargo safety inspections. Since the outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in 2020, China has used nuclear technology to sterilize medical protective gear, dispose of medical wastewater and waste, and virally disinfect external packaging of cold-chain foodstuffs, providing green, environmentally friendly and efficient solutions for epidemic prevention and control.

83. China values sharing its experience with countries working to develop nuclear energy under the premise of nuclear non-proliferation. It has signed

intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy with more than thirty countries, with which it has carried out extensive exchanges and cooperation on this basis, including personnel visits, equipment and technology imports and economic and trade exchanges, achieving mutual benefits and win-win results.

84. The Chinese Government actively supports multilateral cooperation and exchanges to promote the development of nuclear technology and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China is a member of the Generation IV International Forum on nuclear energy systems and the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization, has signed a “Joint Declaration on Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” with the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, and actively participates in such regional cooperation regimes as the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia.

85. China has actively provided an exchange platform for international nuclear energy cooperation and has held many international conferences on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since 2015, it has successfully hosted a world forum on nuclear energy development, the Women in Nuclear Global Conference, the International Conference on Nuclear Engineering and the International Conference on Nuclear Power Plant Operation and Maintenance, and organizes and hosts many seminars, training courses and technical meetings within the IAEA framework every year.

86. China submitted a draft resolution on “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security”, co-sponsored by twenty-six countries, to the First Committee of the General Assembly during its seventy-sixth session. The resolution was finally adopted with seventy-five countries voting in favour, and reaffirms the consensus of the international community on non-proliferation and stresses the importance of upholding the right of all countries to peaceful uses, and particularly the importance of peaceful uses for the development of developing countries and the need for international exchange and cooperation in this regard, including on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Under the resolution, it was decided that the issue of promotion of international cooperation in the field of international security for peaceful uses should be included on the agenda of the General Assembly, and requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek the views of all Member States on the issues concerned and to submit a report to the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly.

B. Technical assistance to other Member States through the International Atomic Energy Agency

87. China supports and actively participates in the technical cooperation activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency within the framework of the IAEA Statute, and has expanded its support and technical assistance to other developing countries through IAEA technical cooperation channels. As of September 2021, China had contributed a total of US\$80.24 million to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund for that purpose, received more than 4,000 visits by scholars from other countries for scientific research and training in China, and sent experts to provide services in developing countries in more than 3,000 instances.

88. China has become the second largest donor to the Technical Cooperation Fund itself, contributing €10.35 million, or 11.55 per cent, to the Fund in 2021. It also takes an active role in nuclear science and technology exchanges and cooperation within the framework of the Asia-Pacific Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology, providing an annual contribution of US\$110,000 to support Asia-Pacific regional cooperation projects in the field of nuclear technology applications. China also actively supports

the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories project, providing a cumulative extrabudgetary contribution of 2 million euros, along with a piece of irradiation equipment worth US\$2.5 million, for laboratory infrastructure, equipment renewal and technical services to help developing member States raise the level of their nuclear technology applications and capabilities. China has responded positively to the IAEA cooperation initiative on using nuclear and nuclear-derived technologies to provide assistance to developing countries in combating COVID-19 by donating roughly US\$2 million in testing equipment and materials to countries severely affected by the epidemic through a tripartite structure comprising China, the Agency and the recipient countries.

89. Continuously deepening its cooperation with the Agency, China has set up such domestic platforms as an international training centre on nuclear power plant construction, a capacity-building centre for nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness and response, and collaborative centres for geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste, nuclear agronomy, insect sterilization through nuclear technology, and the production and application of radioactive drugs and isotopes. China is willing to give full play to the role of these platforms and provide a full gamut of support for the peaceful use and safe development of nuclear energy in emerging and developing countries through cooperation in technology research and development, experience sharing and personnel training.

90. As the world's largest developing country, China attaches great importance to cooperation with other developing countries and is committed to providing assistance, within its capabilities, to other emerging nuclear energy countries and countries interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Chinese Government has set up an Atomic Energy Scholarship programme to recruit master's and doctoral students in nuclear engineering and technology from other developing countries each year, actively promoting the development of talent for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in other countries.

C. Nuclear safety and civil nuclear liability

91. Nuclear energy development in China has always been guided by the principle of "safety first, quality first", adopting rigorous and effective safety measures, establishing impeccable and effective nuclear-safety regulation, supervision and emergency response regimes, and strengthening infrastructure construction. It has maintained a good nuclear safety record over the long term; its nuclear power safety operation indicators rank among the best in the world, the safety level of the nuclear technology in use in China is continuously improving, and public health and environmental safety are fully guaranteed. In September 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted a comprehensive follow-up assessment of Chinese nuclear and radiation safety supervision and found that the Chinese head of State attached great importance to nuclear safety and had made a political commitment to it, and that the National Nuclear Safety Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment was an effective and reliable nuclear and radiation safety regulator.

92. China has established a comprehensively systematic regime of nuclear safety regulations and standards. To date, it has promulgated and implemented the Nuclear Safety Law of the People's Republic of China, the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Supervision and Management of Civilian Nuclear Safety Equipment, and the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Supervision and Management of Civilian Nuclear Facilities Safety. Moreover, China is actively pursuing the drafting of an Atomic Energy Law.

93. China has consistently attached importance to nuclear emergency management. It has promulgated such regulations and departmental rules as the Regulations on the Management of Nuclear Accident Emergencies in Nuclear Power Plants, the National Nuclear Emergency Plan, and the Provisions for Conducting Nuclear Accident Emergency Response Exercises in Nuclear Power Plants, and issued a revised version of the National Nuclear Emergency Plan in June 2013. At present, China has set up a professional technical support centre for nuclear emergencies and a national-level professional rescue team for nuclear emergencies.

94. The Chinese Government takes the management of radioactive waste extremely seriously. It has issued such legal instruments as the Regulations on the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste, and is continuously improving top-level design and the general legal framework. The Chinese Government is embracing a new concept of safe development and continuously strengthening radioactive waste management. While ensuring the safe and stable operation of existing low and medium-level radioactive waste disposal sites, it is also actively promoting the selection and construction of new disposal locations. Construction of the first underground laboratory project in China for the geological disposal of high level radioactive waste was officially begun in June 2021. The overall safety of radioactive waste in China is under control, ensuring public health, environmental safety and the sustainable development of the nuclear industry.

95. China emphasizes the improvement of the public's scientific understanding of nuclear energy. The Chinese Government and enterprises actively publicize information on nuclear energy safety, nuclear emergency policies and regulations, and basic knowledge of nuclear science and technology, enhancing public confidence in the safety of nuclear energy. Disclosure of the relevant information is made even more open and transparent through such means as press conferences, platforms for disseminating nuclear safety information, enterprise environmental sustainability reports, safety-development white papers and institutional open houses. A white paper entitled "Nuclear Safety in China", released in 2019, comprehensively outlined the progress of Chinese nuclear safety development, set forth its basic principles and policy propositions, shared the concepts and practices of nuclear safety regulation, and elucidated Chinese determination to advance the global nuclear safety governance process and the actions it is taking to that end.

96. China has been continuously striving to promote the establishment of an institutional nuclear damage compensation system. The newly implemented Law of the People's Republic of China on Nuclear Safety has for the first time clearly stipulated legal compensation for nuclear damages, fully reflecting the people-oriented governing philosophy of the Chinese Government and the great importance it attaches to the issue of liability for nuclear damage.

97. China believes that the peaceful use of nuclear energy should serve to build a community of life for human beings and nature, without sacrificing the natural environment or human health. The Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan was one of the most serious nuclear accidents in human history. The disposal of water contaminated in that accident will affect the global marine ecological environment and the health of people all over the world. When the Japanese Government unilaterally announced its decision to discharge nuclear-contaminated water from Fukushima into the ocean in April 2021, China firmly opposed that decision because in taking it, the Japanese Government failed to exhaust the available means of safe disposal, failed to fully disclose relevant information, failed to consult with neighbouring countries and other stakeholders, and failed to come up with arrangements that could be effectively monitored and verified. China expects the IAEA Task Force to play its proper role of assessment, monitoring and verification before, during and after the disposal of the contaminated water at Fukushima, so as

to ensure that such disposal is carried out with absolute safety. China urges Japan to respond earnestly to the calls of its neighbours and the international community, revoke its mistaken decision to discharge nuclear-contaminated water into the sea, and refrain from initiating such unauthorized discharge of nuclear-contaminated water without full consultation and consensus having been reached with stakeholders and relevant international agencies.
