

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Chile

Introduction

1. Pursuant to action 20 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and with a view to underscoring the importance of transparency and confidence-building, Chile hereby submits its national report.
2. The present report sets out the activities that Chile, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, has carried out since the 2015 Review Conference in order to contribute to the three pillars of the Treaty: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology. As it has reiterated in all relevant multilateral bodies and forums, Chile believes that the three pillars of this essential treaty are of equal importance and must be addressed in a balanced manner.

Pillar I: Disarmament

(Actions 1 and 2)

3. Chile recognizes and supports the Treaty as a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has demonstrated its firm commitment to the principle of complete, irreversible and verifiable disarmament, in order to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.
4. We have thus consistently stressed that nuclear-weapon States should apply that principle to all their nuclear disarmament measures. The more information there is on the ways in which States are fulfilling their binding commitments under the Treaty, in particular the commitment to nuclear disarmament under article VI, the more confidence the international community will have in the regime. Confidence-building measures are undeniably essential to the development of sustainable and lasting disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Chile will continue to encourage nuclear-weapon States to take practical steps to improve transparency in relation to their nuclear weapons and the management of their arsenals.



5. During the present review period, Chile, as a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, co-sponsored working papers relating to transparency (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17) and action to strengthen the review process (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.24).

6. Because it recognizes the value of and takes part in the global effort to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, Chile has signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, in the firm belief that that Treaty complements existing international agreements relating to nuclear weapons.

(Actions 3 and 4)

7. Chile is genuinely and unequivocally committed to fulfilling the obligations set forth in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have thus consistently called on nuclear-weapon States to engage in enhanced dialogue in order to build mutual trust, strengthen transparency and reduce risk, and thus help to create an environment that is more conducive to nuclear disarmament.

8. We believe that the right way to achieve disarmament is through multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and its specialized forums. We are also firmly committed to the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament, which has been focused on raising global awareness not only of the horrific humanitarian consequences of the intentional or accidental use of atomic weapons, but also of the radical incompatibility of the possession and use of such weapons with the general norms of international humanitarian law and the international human rights system. Thus, in 2015, together with many other countries, we initiated a multilateral process to create opportunities for discussion and analysis, in order to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Chile participated actively in the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in Oslo, Nayarit (Mexico) and Vienna, which showed that the world is not prepared to respond appropriately to a nuclear explosion. Countries are therefore continuing the work under the auspices of the United Nations that led to the establishment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a binding, verifiable, irreversible and universal instrument that prohibits nuclear weapons. Chile has signed that Treaty and calls on nuclear-weapon States to view it as complementary to the current legal framework on nuclear disarmament, aimed at achieving a world free of atomic weapons.

(Action 5)

9. Nuclear deterrence and high-alert nuclear weapons are based on an international environment that no longer exists. Therefore, Chile considers that the maintenance of nearly 2,000 nuclear warheads in high-alert status is fundamentally incompatible with the commitments of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to diminish the role of atomic weapons in the security doctrines and policies of States, and to take concrete steps to gradually eliminate such weapons, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. Since 2007, Chile has been working with other countries to identify ways to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems. In December 2014, the General Assembly adopted, by 166 votes, resolution [69/42](#) on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, better known as the “de-alerting resolution”.

10. Together with Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland, Chile is a member of the De-Alerting Group, which aims to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems and to remove such weapons from high-alert status. Chile believes that this is a basic step towards building confidence, as reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems would demonstrate a commitment to diminishing the role of such weapons in defence and security doctrines.

11. For the present review cycle, Chile, as a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, drafted working paper [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.31](#) and, as a member of the De-Alerting Group, co-sponsored working paper [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.23](#).

(Actions 7 and 8)

12. In relevant forums, particularly the Conference on Disarmament, Chile has supported the resumption of substantive discussions on negative security assurances, with a view to developing recommendations on all aspects of the matter, not excluding an international legally binding instrument. During the present review period, Chile, as a member of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties, co-sponsored working papers [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.25](#), [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.22](#) and [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.15](#).

13. Chile presided over the Conference on Disarmament in August and September 2021, facilitating the adoption of the related resolution, which was presented to the General Assembly in October 2021.

(Action 9)

14. Chile is proud to be part of the historic milestone of the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area of the world which, 50 years since its inception, continues to uphold the uncontested objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the regional and global levels. The creation of that zone has been essential to fostering trust and establishing the region as an area of harmonious coexistence and peace.

15. We believe that it is important to highlight the contribution of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The establishment of internationally recognized and verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions is a political and legal commitment of a number of States, including Chile, that have pledged to each other and the international community to remain free of nuclear weapons. Chile therefore attaches the utmost importance to the treaties establishing such zones in Latin America and the Caribbean (1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)), the South Pacific (1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)), South-East Asia (1995 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)), Africa (1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)) and Central Asia (2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk)).

16. In accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and relevant General Assembly resolutions, our own experience has led us to support global efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East region. We have thus consistently supported the convening of a conference on the matter. In the light of the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Chile will continue to support efforts to create a conducive environment for, and an inclusive process leading to, the establishment of such a zone.

17. During the present review period, Chile, as a member of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties, co-sponsored working papers [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.19](#), [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.19](#) and [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.13](#).

(Actions 10–14)

18. Chile believes that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an essential part of the disarmament and non-proliferation system. During the present review

period, Chile has promoted the swift entry into force of that Treaty, calling on all States that have not yet done so, in particular the eight remaining States listed in annex 2, to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay. Chile has also encouraged all States to respect the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.

19. Chile actively participated in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held at United Nations headquarters on 23 September 2021, with an address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who called on all States that had not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular the eight remaining States listed in annex 2, to do so without further delay.

20. The nuclear tests performed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the present review period once again demonstrate the urgent need to complete the implementation of the verification mechanisms provided for in the Treaty as a means of strengthening the legal authority and technical efficacy of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

21. The Treaty will undeniably bolster efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to limit the upgrading and development of existing nuclear arsenals. In that regard, Chile has contributed, through monitoring stations on its mainland territory and offshore islands, using the four technologies used to detect nuclear tests. The monitoring stations operating on our territory are as follows: four certified stations, plus an additional station still to be certified, on Easter Island, one station on Robinson Crusoe Island, one station on Juan Fernández Island, one station at Limón Verde, Calama, and one station in Punta Arenas. Those efforts reflect the importance that Chile attaches to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

22. At meetings of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, Chile, together with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, made recommendations to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.3](#)). More recently, Chile participated in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 23 September 2021 in New York and organized by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

(Actions 15–18)

23. Efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be based on practical, meaningful and tangible contributions. In that regard, it must be noted that fissile material is an essential component in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Chile has consistently called for the urgent initiation of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, and taking into account current stockpiles, as a critical means of achieving disarmament and non-proliferation.

24. Chile believes that the establishment of such a treaty is necessary for the development of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We therefore voted in favour of General Assembly resolution [67/53](#), and will support the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which should provide technical support to the Conference on Disarmament. This issue is undeniably critical for the success of future efforts to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

25. Chile supported the establishment in 2014 of the Group of Governmental Experts, and subsequently the adoption of General Assembly resolution [71/259](#),

providing for the establishment of a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group. Both groups have worked hard to gather the views of all countries with regard to the main points that should be included in such a treaty.

26. We welcome the final report of the Group of Governmental Experts of May 2015, which clearly demonstrated that, while considerable differences of opinion remain, the various perspectives of States on a treaty should not be a significant obstacle to commencement of negotiations and could be overcome if there is adequate political will to do so.

27. As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Chile co-sponsored a working paper setting out practical steps to move towards the implementation of a fissile material cut-off treaty ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.6](#)). Chile also promoted the inclusion of that issue in the working paper of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) on elements proposed for the 2020 Review Conference.

(Action 19)

28. Chile co-sponsored General Assembly resolution [71/67](#), entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”, in which the Assembly called for the development of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures as an essential aspect of ensuring compliance with disarmament obligations and of building confidence between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

29. Chile was among the initial sponsors of the General Assembly resolution that established the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, and one of its nationals was a member of the Group. Chile later co-sponsored the report of the Group ([A/74/90](#)).

30. Chile is also a member of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which brings together nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon countries in order to identify challenges related to disarmament verification and to develop procedures and technology to address those challenges. Chile recently participated in a panel of the Partnership by delivering a presentation on verification from the perspective of the global South.

(Action 21)

31. Chile actively encourages transparency and reporting by States through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a ministerial-level group of 12 States within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty whose purpose is to advance the consensual outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference and to jointly promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as mutually reinforcing processes. As a member of the Initiative, Chile contributed to a number of working papers on the importance of transparency and reporting, in particular by nuclear-weapon States, for the present review cycle. Those papers include recommendations on the need for a more thorough discussion of national reports at meetings of the review process ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17](#), [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.24](#) and [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26](#)). The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative held transparency-related side events at the 2017 and 2018 sessions of the Preparatory Committee, and has conducted a number of consultations with nuclear-weapon States on the matter.

(Action 22)

32. With regard to disarmament and non-proliferation education, Chile, together with the Netherlands, hosted a regional dialogue seminar entitled “Towards PrepCom

2017” in order to foster consensus among the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in preparation for the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. During that event, the Netherlands, as Chair of the first Preparatory Committee for the present review cycle, gathered regional perspectives in order to facilitate the discussion. Moreover, in January 2015, Chile hosted an international seminar under the theme “Roads to nuclear disarmament: a case of convergence in diversity”, with the participation of a number of international experts and authorities with long-standing experience in the area of nuclear disarmament. The goal of the seminar was to provide a forum for the consideration of issues such as the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and the promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in preparation for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 2019, Chile, together with the non-governmental organization Red de Seguridad Humana en Latinoamérica y el Caribe, held a discussion on the theme “The risk of the use of nuclear weapons: how to stop this threat”, which brought together a number of international experts and authorities in order to consider the importance of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that could result from a detonation, and the value of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Lastly, the annual training programmes for Chilean foreign service officials include courses on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

33. During the present review period, Chile, together with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted working paper [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.16](#).

34. As a member of OPANAL, Chile supported draft resolutions CG/L.04/2021/Rev, entitled “Courses on disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” and CG/L.03/2021, entitled “Internship Programme at the Secretariat”, promoting the courses offered by the Summer School on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, hosted annually by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, OPANAL and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Pillar II: Non-proliferation

(Action 23)

35. Chile has continued to highlight the role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In that regard, it actively promotes the universalization of the Treaty.

36. Chile, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, remains firmly committed to the provisions of article II of the Treaty, and therefore will not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Consistent with the provisions of articles I and II of the Treaty, Chile is a party to all regional and universal instruments aimed at abolishing nuclear weapons and their proliferation, namely, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Similarly, Chile has always promoted, and continues to promote, this objective in all disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control forums and regimes: OPANAL, the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

(Actions 24–34)

37. Chile, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, has pledged to comply with the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Our country has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement, supplemented by the Protocol

Additional to the Agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards (INFCIRC/540). This combination is the Agency's current verification standard, which Chile considers optimal. We strongly support the Agency's comprehensive verification regime, which we consider to be a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and indispensable to the implementation of the Treaty (in particular its article III).

38. Chile and IAEA have developed and implemented all the technical measures necessary to demonstrate that there is no diversion or misuse of nuclear material or of the various nuclear facilities. We remain committed to further developing and improving the implementation of these agreements, in order to assure other States that our country uses nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.

39. The results obtained by Chile in the application of safeguards, as well as its provision and updating of information in accordance with the Additional Protocol, have been satisfactory to date. Chile has complied as quickly and professionally as possible with all requests for information and cooperation, as well as the periodic reviews that IAEA conducts and has requested of the country.

40. Chile encourages and is available to provide technical support for the implementation of the safeguards and the Additional Protocol in other States that are interested in implementing and bringing into force these agreements with IAEA. The Additional Protocol is an irreplaceable verification instrument and is currently the most comprehensive verification regime available to the Agency, and therefore to its member countries; and Chile has adhered to it from its inception.

41. As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Chile has contributed on several occasions to the submission of various documents aimed at demonstrating the importance of nuclear safeguards to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, in which nuclear energy is used only for peaceful purposes.

42. We believe that it is necessary for those States that use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to establish the safeguards agreed upon with IAEA, and to adopt the Additional Protocol.

43. At the multilateral level, during the present review cycle Chile co-sponsored the March 2020 declaration of the Group of Friends of the Additional Protocol. In this connection, efforts have been made to explain the benefits of adopting the Additional Protocol. Our country therefore urges those States that have not yet concluded such safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible. Chile also promotes the universalization of the Additional Protocol as the international standard on safeguards.

(Actions 35–39)

44. Since 2011, Chile has been pursuing an active regional agenda through the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) specialized working group on illicit traffic in nuclear and/or radioactive material. This entails building prevention, detection and response capacity, and providing training in situations of radioactive risk, particularly at border control points. Border control points have been categorized by risk, in order to ensure more effective monitoring and control of source materials entering or leaving Chile. On this point we can also report that, each year, with international assistance and independently, Chile develops a plan to provide training to the agencies responsible for terrestrial and maritime border security in different parts of the country on the identification and prohibition of strategic materials, weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

45. Through IAEA and other organizations, our country is participating in projects designed to enhance border security, and is developing and taking part in related

binational exercises. In this connection, Chile has a policy and specific measures in place for the control of exports and imports of nuclear material covered by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

46. Nuclear material accountancy is especially important for nuclear security. To that end, Chile has had a system of accounting for such materials for more than 20 years, based on the recommendations of IAEA. Also, it has acceded to, signed and ultimately ratified, through its National Congress, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

47. Chile carries out post-export verifications and reports the findings under the Additional Protocol. In addition, Chile participates in the meetings of the Nuclear Security Contact Group and in the meetings of the States subscribers to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

(Actions 40–44)

48. Chile is always working to strengthen the physical protection of its nuclear facilities. These facilities are designated, by law, as areas of interest for national security, meaning that the military police of the national army is responsible for their continuous surveillance.

49. In addition to the above, improvements in this area have been strongly supported by international cooperation with IAEA, and with the Department of Energy of the United States of America through the former Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which has been renamed the Office of Radiological Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

50. Chile transports nuclear materials infrequently, in coordination with all the relevant response agencies, in accordance with a physical protection and emergency response plan.

51. Our country is particularly concerned about the safe transportation of radioactive waste and materials. As a coastal state, Chile requires advance notification of shipments of this type, and of the liability agreements covering such shipments in the event of accident. For this reason, Chile participates in the meetings of the informal Coastal State-Shipping State Dialogue.

52. In 2012, under the auspices of IAEA, Chile made a commitment to strengthening its national nuclear and radiological security by implementing an integrated nuclear and radiological security support plan, which is currently being developed. In 2018, IAEA carried out a mission to update the plan, incorporating new commitments to be fulfilled over the four-year period from 2019 to 2022; the plan has been in the implementation phase since last year.

53. Chile is currently modernizing the physical protection system at one of the two research reactors in the country with a view to increasing surveillance in key sectors of the facility and updating the system with new technology.

54. Our country has made use of the support mechanisms of IAEA and other bodies, such as the international support and assistance missions for the review of national nuclear physical security infrastructure and the evaluation of systems for the physical protection of civil nuclear materials and facilities. In this regard, Chile has benefited from the international support provided by IAEA through missions of the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service.

55. In 2015, Chile established the Radiological Emergencies Security Commission, which is responsible for “providing guidance and support to enhance the prevention and response capacity of the agencies tasked with the management of nuclear and radiological events that might affect public security, human safety or the

environment”. Chile attaches importance to the efforts of the Security Commission to prevent, or rapidly and effectively resolve, a radiological emergency in the country, whether caused by a technical accident or an illegal and intentional act. Should such acts occur, adequate coordination among all the relevant agencies, as well as the reinforcement of technical capacity in their different areas of responsibility, will be necessary in order to satisfactorily address these events.

56. Since the establishment of the Security Commission, Chile has periodically recorded and analysed radiological incidents that occur in the country, on the basis of the information contained in the notifications of radiological incidents issued by the regulatory authorities, which has allowed the country to consolidate information and create a national radiological incidents database. By analysing the incidents that have occurred and been reported to IAEA via the Incident and Trafficking Database, Chile has raised awareness of the importance of the matter among the various relevant agencies of the Security Commission. We hope that such awareness will lead to the establishment of, or agreement on, new ways of preventing or responding more rapidly to such incidents. In addition, this coordination mechanism has enhanced the training facilitated and organized by the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy, which has been possible mainly as a result of international cooperation provided by IAEA and the United States Department of Energy.

57. At the multilateral level, during the present review cycle Chile co-sponsored the declaration on radiation and nuclear safety at the 62nd regular session of the IAEA General Conference in 2018, and the declaration on nuclear security at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in 2020.

(Actions 45–46)

58. Chile has been a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism since 2010. In 2017, Chile and Argentina conducted a radiological emergency management exercise called “Paihuén II” in Bariloche, Argentina, under the auspices of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The goals of the exercise were to strengthen neighbourly relations with Argentina in the field of nuclear and radiological security; reinforce cooperation links between the Chilean and Argentine agencies responsible for nuclear and radiological security, as well as between the two countries’ civil security and protection agencies; and share experiences and good practices in relation to the activation of national and binational communication mechanisms for the joint prevention of and response to radiological emergencies that could have a transboundary impact, whether caused by accidents or by intentional acts.

59. The exercise illustrated the need for a national inter-institutional coordination protocol for responding to nuclear security incidents, as well as the need to expand basic technical capabilities to all the regions of the country. The exercise made it possible to definitively assess the two countries’ capacity to coordinate and respond to cross-border events, and to exchange best practices.

60. Another new development for the country is that the Security Commission has begun to establish nuclear security measures for large public events. In 2019, the country welcomed an IAEA mission to support the implementation of a nuclear security plan for large-scale public events. The mission continues to work to develop nuclear security measures for future national events.

Pillar III: Peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear technology**(Action 47)**

61. Chile exercises the inalienable right, under article IV of the Treaty, to pursue nuclear energy research, production and use for peaceful purposes, in conformity with articles I, II and III, while respecting the corresponding rights of other States.

62. We recognize the many benefits that nuclear technology offers us in various fields; however, its use also entails a weighty commitment. Each State party is ultimately responsible for maintaining and strengthening the security of its facilities, ensuring the proper handling of radioactive materials, as well as helping to reinforce the global nuclear security regime.

63. We strongly support the efforts of IAEA in this area. The right to use nuclear energy, science and technology for peaceful purposes should be exercised in conformity with the highest standards in safeguards, technological security and nuclear security. Chile attaches the utmost importance to those standards, as it systematically recalled in its recent capacity as a member of the IAEA Board of Governors.

64. During the present review cycle, Chile, as a member of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, co-sponsored the following working papers submitted by the Group: [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.20](#); [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.20](#); and [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.18](#).

(Action 48)

65. We are convinced that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation regime have enabled successful international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, science and technology, which has significantly expanded access to various beneficial applications in areas such as medicine, industry, agriculture, the environment, mining and science.

66. Chile is an active participant in the programmes and projects developed by IAEA. Chile has received undeniable benefits from technical cooperation, including education and training for professionals working in areas in which nuclear applications are used, among the most important of which are medicine and health, agriculture and food, and environmental conservation. Such benefits have helped it to strengthen its development and to address the challenges it faces.

67. During the present review cycle, the member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, including Chile, submitted the following working papers on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy: [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.26](#) and [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.22](#).

(Actions 52–54)

68. Chile believes that IAEA plays a central role in guaranteeing that countries exercise their right under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in accordance with the highest security and non-proliferation standards. In that regard, Chile is an active participant in the international programmes and projects developed by IAEA.

69. The benefits it has received and continues to receive as a member State of IAEA, through technical cooperation and thanks to its political and diplomatic representation in the organization, have contributed significantly to the country's development and to the training and capacity-building of professionals from other countries.

70. Through its ongoing financial contribution, Chile fulfils its responsibility to ensure the continuity of activities and enhance the impact of nuclear and radiological applications in member States.

(Action 56)

71. Through the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy, the country has worked continuously to train the workforce on the different aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through collaboration agreements, notably with universities and research centres, other public and private organizations that use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as public security, customs, border control and emergency response agencies.

(Action 57)

72. Although Chile does not currently have plans to introduce nuclear power, it conducts ongoing evaluations to determine the requirements and implications of adopting such technology to ensure that any future steps taken in that regard are compliant with the highest security standards and relevant international commitments. Chile relies on the IAEA guidelines and recommendations as its primary road map for all aspects entailed in the adoption of a nuclear power programme.

(Action 59)

73. Chile ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in 2005, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in 2005, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2012, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2010, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in 1994 and its Amendment in 2009. Chile consistently encourages all States to become parties to this set of legal instruments on nuclear security.

(Action 60)

74. Our country is an active participant in activities aimed at building emergency preparedness and response capacity to address the risk of nuclear or radiological incidents. In particular, it participates in activities under the auspices of IAEA relating to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, to which Chile is a party.

75. Along these lines, the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy routinely participates in ConvEx exercises organized by the Incident and Emergency Centre of IAEA in order to test national emergency preparedness and response capabilities, as well as the procedure for requesting international assistance, if needed.

76. As a regulatory body, the Commission also fosters and promotes a culture of technological and physical security in the nuclear and radiological industry, which it is legally responsible for regulating and overseeing. It also encourages the exchange of best practices in nuclear security through its participation in the Ibero-American Forum of Radiation and Nuclear Safety Regulatory Agencies.

(Action 61)

77. With regard to the country's two research reactors, the RECH-1 reactor has been operating since 2006 with low-enriched fuel. In 2011, all the high-enriched material

that existed in the country, from both reactors, was sent to the United States. The RECH-2 reactor is in an extended shutdown, meaning that only the minimum necessary maintenance is performed to avoid the degradation of its systems, structures and components. The RECH-2 reactor has no nuclear fuel inside it. Therefore, the enrichment of the uranium was reduced to less than 20 per cent, and Chile has no high-enriched nuclear fuel.

78. Our country does not consider the separation of plutonium as part of the activities in its fuel cycle. As a matter of principle, unused nuclear materials are sent to be processed as waste. Lastly, in principle, all research and development initiatives do not involve the use of highly enriched uranium.

79. We find remarkable the progress that many countries have made in reducing the availability of high-enriched uranium and disposing of all unnecessary nuclear material. For that purpose, we keep in force our agreement with the United States and IAEA to establish a mechanism to facilitate the exchange of high-enriched uranium for low-enriched uranium.

(Action 62)

80. It is of the utmost importance to Chile to establish an international instrument on the maritime transport of nuclear material that is binding on shipping, receiving and coastal States, in order to ensure that such transport is completely regulated. We have enhanced training and awareness-building initiatives on the regular transport of radioactive material and the transport of material requiring high levels of physical protection for regulatory bodies, operators, shippers of radioactive material and response agencies. This has been possible thanks to support from IAEA and the United States Department of Energy.
