
2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Switzerland

Introduction

1. In action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States parties are called upon to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan as well as of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. In accordance with these commitments, Switzerland submits the present report, which complements reports submitted earlier, notably the report contained in document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).

2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Maintaining its integrity is key to international security. All States parties to the Treaty share the responsibility to uphold its credibility.

3. In light of the recent fiftieth anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in view of the challenges of arms control, Switzerland calls for renewed political commitment to the Treaty and its full implementation.

4. The 64 actions contained in the action plan and the practical steps for the Middle East adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, together with the Final Documents of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference, remain valid and form the basis for making further progress in fully implementing the Treaty and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.



Implementation

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Nuclear disarmament

1. Switzerland is of the view that it is difficult to imagine how the use of nuclear weapons could be consistent with the requirements of international law and, in particular, international humanitarian law. It calls upon all possessors of nuclear weapons to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used again.

As an intermediate step, Switzerland calls for a declaratory commitment by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty against the use of nuclear weapons. This can build on the 2021 reaffirmation by the Russian Federation and the United States of the recognition that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. Switzerland also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from adopting postures and/or developing capabilities that enable “nuclear war-fighting” and encourages an exchange among relevant States to move to policies that raise the nuclear threshold.

In line with its long-standing position to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, Switzerland participated in the negotiations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In 2018 and 2019, Switzerland decided not to sign the Treaty at that point in time. This decision was based on the recommendations of an interdepartmental group of experts who had analysed the advantages and disadvantages of the Treaty and had referred to the numerous unclarified issues. In view of strong support for that Treaty in parliament, Switzerland decided to re-evaluate its position by the end of 2020 – five years earlier than originally planned. The postponement of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons led to an adjustment in the timetable for the reassessment of the country’s position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In the interim, Switzerland announced that it would participate in the first Meeting of the States parties to the Treaty as an observer. Irrespective of future decisions, Switzerland advocates the constructive coexistence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and reiterates its support for a verifiable prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons and their elimination.

Switzerland has long supported the view that it will be necessary to find answers to the question of how security and stability can be guaranteed in a world without nuclear weapons. Switzerland participates in the United States initiative, “Creating the Environment on Nuclear Disarmament”. Switzerland is of the view that effective nuclear disarmament cannot be detached from the current security environment and sees this initiative as an opportunity to resume progress on nuclear disarmament.

2. Switzerland has long supported verifiability, irreversibility and transparency as core principles of nuclear disarmament. Switzerland is concerned that some measures undertaken with a view to modernizing nuclear arsenals may not be compatible with the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. The same concern applies to the revision of nuclear postures.
3. Switzerland welcomes the significant reductions in nuclear arsenals since the height of the cold war. At the same time, Switzerland has repeatedly expressed concerns that the disarmament process has slowed down in recent years. Switzerland continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States to redouble efforts for nuclear disarmament, noting that a number of agreed commitments, notably key

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actions of the 2010 action plan, are not yet implemented. Switzerland is concerned by quantitative and qualitative nuclear build-ups by some nuclear-weapon States, notably the development or deployment of new types of nuclear weapons or of new and potentially destabilizing delivery vehicles.

Switzerland underlines the importance of reaffirming the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and their commitment to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

4. Switzerland welcomes the extension of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) and its continued effective implementation, which is a timely encouragement for the tenth Review Conference in an otherwise challenging international context. After the demise of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), the New START Treaty is the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control treaty.

Switzerland welcomes the commencement of a strategic stability dialogue between the Russian Federation and the United States and encourages them to enter into negotiations to achieve deeper cuts on all types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with action 4. Switzerland also calls upon China to engage in nuclear arms control talks, and is of the view that all nuclear-weapon States and other possessors of nuclear weapons ought to participate in such endeavours. With a view to future arms control treaties, Switzerland underlines the importance of the contributions that other nuclear-weapon States can make to lay the ground for next-generation arms control arrangements. Switzerland regrets the end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. For several years, Switzerland had followed with concern the possible violation of the Treaty as a result of the development of new cruise missiles. Switzerland had repeatedly called upon Russia and the United States to clarify these aspects together and to make every effort to preserve the Treaty. Switzerland has called upon the relevant States to refrain from developing and deploying any systems prohibited under the Treaty. It also calls upon both sides to exercise the utmost restraint in order to avoid any further developments that would be detrimental to European security.

5. Switzerland takes a pragmatic and balanced approach to advancing nuclear disarmament.

Switzerland is concerned about the lack of progress on all issues covered by action 5. Action 5, being the principal measure guiding disarmament steps of a practical nature, significant progress in this area, or lack thereof, has a direct impact on the credibility of the so-called step-by-step-process.

Switzerland regrets that there has been no progress since 2010 on diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national military doctrines and that recently issued doctrines seem to be moving in the opposite direction. No progress has materialized either on reducing stockpiles of non-strategic weapons. In this

context, we call upon the nuclear-weapon States to move towards a rapid reduction of the entirety of their arsenals during the next review cycle.

Switzerland calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to discuss and take measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defence policies and to refrain from entering a new arms race.

In the framework of the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, Switzerland is a "champion" for nuclear risk reduction. Switzerland has supported numerous studies and events by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). In addition, Switzerland has supported the CATALINK project of the Institute for Security and Technology, aimed at preventing the onset or escalation of conflict by building a resilient global communications system. Furthermore, Switzerland, in the context of the Stockholm Initiative on Nuclear Disarmament, has developed a nuclear risk reduction package (see [NPT/CONF.2020/WP.9](#)) containing a range of measures, including a proposal for a structured discussion of risk reduction at the Review Conference and beyond, during the next review cycle. In this regard, Switzerland recalls that subparagraphs d, e, and f of action 5 of the 2010 action plan contain pertinent elements that could structure a process aimed at reducing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, whether intentionally, by miscalculation or by accident.

Switzerland has long devoted special attention to reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons and has worked closely with the other members of the "De-alerting Group". De-alerting is an important and urgent interim measure on the path to nuclear disarmament, for which there has been growing support.

6. Switzerland supports the immediate commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament. It regrets that the Conference was unable to take a decision to that effect.
7. Switzerland supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances. It regrets that the Conference was unable to take a decision to that effect.
8. Not applicable.
9. Switzerland has consistently been supportive of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the context of General Assembly resolutions. Switzerland remains concerned by the general lack of progress in this area, including the lack of entry into force of negative security assurances.

Switzerland welcomes the dialogue between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and nuclear-weapon States on the signature by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Switzerland also welcomes the establishment of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the signing by nuclear-weapon States of the protocols to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

Switzerland continues to fully support the implementation of the objective of establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, as affirmed at the Review and Extension Conferences of 1995, 2000 and 2010. At the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, Switzerland abstained from voting on draft decision [A/C.1/73/L.22/Rev.1](#), entitled "Convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction", owing to concerns that the process might not

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- provide for the required inclusiveness, enabling the participation of all States of the region. Switzerland encourages all relevant States to build on efforts undertaken in 2013–2014 in Glion and Geneva, where all relevant States came to the table.
10. Switzerland has repeatedly called for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and encouraged annex 2 countries, including those outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Switzerland is concerned by the limited progress achieved regarding the implementation of this action, as ratification by some nuclear-weapon States remains pending.
 11. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Switzerland calls upon all States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear test explosions.
 12. Switzerland participated actively in the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty held in 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019 and 2021.
 13. Switzerland has repeatedly encouraged States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and in particular calls upon annex 2 States to do so. In 2019, Switzerland celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its ratification of the Treaty. On that occasion, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was received for an official visit to Switzerland, and the Treaty was brought to the attention of a broader public. Switzerland is a co-sponsor of the General Assembly resolution on the Treaty.
 14. Switzerland operates an auxiliary seismic station within the International Monitoring System and actively supports the maintenance and further development of the system through its participation in Working Group B of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.
 15. Switzerland supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It regrets that the Conference was unable to take a decision to that effect. Switzerland welcomes substantive progress in this area in the context of relevant United Nations processes.
 16. Not applicable.
 17. Nothing to report.
 18. Switzerland does not operate any facility that produces fissile material.
 19. Switzerland participated in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and welcomes the Group's report, in which the need for further multilateral work and capacity-building in this area was highlighted. Switzerland also remains actively engaged in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

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20. Switzerland supports efforts aimed at ensuring that States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty provide regular information in the context of the review cycle so that progress in implementation can be assessed. It encourages more standardized information exchange and welcomes relevant proposals.
21. Switzerland encourages nuclear-weapon States to maximize transparency on nuclear disarmament activities. Transparency is important to create confidence. In addition, baseline information about nuclear activities is essential to measure progress towards a world without nuclear weapons.
- Switzerland welcomes the fact that some nuclear-weapon States have stepped up their efforts to increase transparency, including by enabling substantive discussions on their reports by submitting them well in advance of the Review Conference.
22. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).

Nuclear non-proliferation

23. Switzerland supports the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
24. Switzerland has both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place.
25. Switzerland has consistently called upon States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force without delay comprehensive safeguards agreements.
26. Since 2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has concluded on an annual basis that all nuclear material in Switzerland remains in peaceful activities. Globally, the non-proliferation norm continues to be challenged which poses a threat to international peace and security. The international community must therefore redouble its efforts to ensure the ongoing success of this pillar. Switzerland calls upon States that have caused proliferation concerns to address all matters of non-compliance with their safeguards obligations and to fully comply with their non-proliferation obligations. Switzerland is convinced that only a diplomatic approach will lead to a long-term solution acceptable to all sides.
27. Switzerland has followed with concern developments regarding the comprehensive safeguards agreement between IAEA and Iran and supports IAEA in its efforts to seek clarifications to outstanding questions. Switzerland calls upon Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency in this regard.

Switzerland views the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a key agreement of the global non-proliferation regime and considers its preservation to be important for international peace and security. Switzerland therefore encourages all parties involved to fully comply with their obligations under the Plan of Action and to seek to settle disputes through diplomatic solutions within its framework. Switzerland encourages all parties to engage in a meaningful and constructive manner in order to allow for a rapid and full return of all parties to their commitments under the Plan of Action. Switzerland views the full and timely cooperation of Iran with IAEA to be of paramount importance and has full confidence in the independence,

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impartiality and professionalism of IAEA in discharging its monitoring and verification mandate. In order to support the capacity of IAEA to exercise its monitoring and verification role, Switzerland has supported IAEA through extrabudgetary contributions in 2014 (for the Joint Plan of Action) and in 2016.

Switzerland has strongly condemned all nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and calls upon that country to fully comply with all Security Council resolutions as well as with IAEA General Conference resolutions. Switzerland subscribed to the joint statements endorsed by a group of States parties regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the 2017, 2018 and 2019 Preparatory Committee sessions. Switzerland has also co-sponsored the IAEA General Conference resolution.

Switzerland subscribed to the joint statement endorsed by a group of States parties regarding non-compliance by Syria with its safeguards agreement at the 2019 Preparatory Committee session.

As a current member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Switzerland regularly underlines the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations.

28. The additional protocol between Switzerland and IAEA has been in force since 2005.
Switzerland encourages all States parties that have no additional protocol in force – in particular those with significant nuclear activities – to sign an additional protocol as soon as possible and to implement it provisionally pending its entry into force.
29. Switzerland has consistently called upon all States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements. Switzerland considers a comprehensive safeguards agreement combined with an additional protocol to constitute the current safeguards standard and supports the universalization of this standard. Such a high standard is of great relevance, in particular for States with an advanced nuclear programme.
30. Switzerland agrees that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. Meanwhile, a voluntary offer agreement should be as comprehensive as possible in scope and supplemented by an additional protocol.
31. Switzerland welcomes the initiative of the IAEA Director General, in which States with small quantities protocols based on the old standard text are called upon to amend or rescind them.
32. Switzerland continues to support the conceptual efforts of IAEA aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system.
33. Switzerland pays its assessed contribution to the IAEA regular budget on time and in full.
34. Switzerland supports the further development of the international safeguards system through its active participation in several working groups of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. In November

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- 2021, Switzerland became the twenty-first member State to join the Member State Support Programme of IAEA. The Support Programme of Switzerland will contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA nuclear verification system through the transfer of Swiss expertise and experience, support for the development of new equipment, software and technology, and the provision of project-dedicated funds. In this context, Switzerland made an extrabudgetary contribution of €75,000.
35. Switzerland is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and of the Zangger Committee. From June 2017 to June 2018, Switzerland chaired the Group. For further information on the membership of Switzerland in export control regimes, please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
36. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
37. The export control authority of Switzerland takes into account whether a recipient State has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force.
38. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
39. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
40. Switzerland underlines the importance of strengthening nuclear security. Switzerland is a State party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and the amendment thereto. Switzerland is also a State party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and has notified IAEA of its political commitment to implement the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance. Switzerland is a member of the Nuclear Security Contact Group and participated actively in the IAEA International Conferences on Nuclear Security held in 2016 and 2020. Switzerland subscribed to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC/869) in February 2020 and to the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908) in September 2021. While recognizing the fundamental responsibility of States for nuclear security, Switzerland advocates a comprehensive approach to nuclear security, taking into account nuclear material for not only civilian but also military purposes.
- Since 2016, Switzerland has contributed €470,000 to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.
41. Switzerland maintains strong physical protection measures. Switzerland hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in 2018 and encourages all States parties to invite such missions on a regular basis, to implement the recommendations of such missions in a timely manner and to make the results publicly available with due regard to the principle of confidentiality.

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The mission concluded that the nuclear security regime was well established in Switzerland and identified 13 good practices, 9 recommendations and 37 suggestions. The implementation of the recommendations and suggestions is currently under way.

42. Switzerland ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities on 9 January 1987 and the amendment thereto on 15 October 2008. Switzerland welcomes the entry into force of the amendment on 8 May 2016. As designated Co-President of the Review Conference, which is being convened in accordance with article 16 (1) of the Convention, as amended, and is scheduled to be held from 28 March to 1 April 2022, Switzerland has played an active role in the preparatory process.

In December 2019, Switzerland transmitted to the IAEA Director General, in his capacity as the depositary of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, its report pursuant to article 14(1) of the Convention, as amended.

43. Switzerland remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Switzerland has also formally notified IAEA of its political commitment to implementing the supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in 2017. Switzerland has also subscribed to the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (INFCIRC/910).
44. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
45. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
46. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

47. Nuclear power has been and remains an essential pillar of Swiss energy policy. In May 2017, the new Swiss Energy Strategy 2050 was adopted with the aim of reducing energy consumption, improving energy efficiency and promoting the use of renewable energies. While the strategy does not fix a date for the shutdown of existing nuclear power plants as long as they meet the statutory safety requirements, no new plants will be constructed. The strategy has been updated with the adoption of the Energy Perspectives 2050 + action plan.

The strategy does not limit nuclear research. Switzerland will continue to invest in national and international research on nuclear fission and fusion.

48. See action 39.
49. Switzerland supports the efforts of IAEA to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology and participated actively in the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology held in 2018.

Besides paying its assessed contribution to the IAEA regular budget and its target share to the Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time, Switzerland has also provided extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA.

Switzerland also provides support to IAEA in the areas of research, development and training through the Spiez Laboratory and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne which have both been designated as IAEA collaborating centres.

In 2019, Switzerland initiated a project on aquifer vulnerability and recharge forecasting using isotopes, in collaboration with IAEA and the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology. Through the use of tritium isotope data to map groundwater vulnerability, the project supports the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 6 by contributing to the goal of ensuring sustainable water management and securing access to safe water.

50. Extrabudgetary contributions made by Switzerland, inter alia in the framework of the Peaceful Uses Initiative (see response to action 55), such as support to the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy or to the renovation of the IAEA Nuclear Applications Laboratories in Seibersdorf provide direct and tangible benefits, in particular to developing countries.
51. See responses to action 35, 36 and 38.
52. Switzerland continues to fully support the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and considers it important to ensure that the resources available are used effectively to achieve maximum results. Switzerland has participated actively in deliberations of the IAEA policy-making organs in support of more efficient and effective use of the resources made available for technical cooperation.
53. See response to action 52.
54. Switzerland pays its contribution (target share) to the Technical Cooperation Fund on time and in full. Switzerland is the eighteenth largest contributor to the Fund, with a current contribution of roughly €1 million (€992,303 in 2021). In addition, Switzerland provides extrabudgetary resources to IAEA.
55. Between 2015 and 2021, Switzerland has contributed a total of €1,200,000 to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative.
56. In 2020 and 2021, Switzerland provided extrabudgetary contributions totalling €200,000 in support of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme, an initiative launched by the IAEA Director General to encourage and support young women in pursuing a career in the fields of nuclear science, technology, safety, security and non-proliferation. For further information, please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
57. See responses to actions 24, 28, 42 and 59 for information on the comprehensive safeguards agreement, the additional protocol, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and the amendment thereto, and the ratification of other conventions.

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The legal basis for the nuclear energy policy of Switzerland is the Nuclear Energy Act and the Nuclear Energy Ordinance. The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate is the national regulatory body with responsibility for the nuclear safety and security of Swiss nuclear facilities.

Switzerland attaches great importance to the safety standards and nuclear security guidance that are developed within the framework of IAEA. It also encourages States to make use of peer-review missions and the Agency's advisory services. In 2018, Switzerland hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission (see response to action 41). In October 2021, Switzerland hosted an Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission.

58. Switzerland supported the establishment of the low enriched uranium bank by IAEA.
59. Switzerland ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety on 12 September 1996. Since its entry into force, the Convention has undergone various developments with regard to its review process. Following a Swiss initiative to amend the Convention, the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety was adopted by consensus at a diplomatic conference in February 2015.

Switzerland ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident on 31 May 1988.

Switzerland ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency on 31 May 1988.

Switzerland ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management on 5 April 2000. Switzerland will chair the seventh review meeting of the Joint Convention, which is scheduled to be held from 27 June to 8 July 2022.

See responses to actions 42 and 45 for more information on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and the amendment thereto, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

60. International cooperation is a cornerstone of the independent oversight activities of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate and is laid out in a comprehensive strategy for international cooperation. The Inspectorate is extensively involved in European associations of regulators such as the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association, which the Inspectorate chaired from 2011 to 2019. It is also currently co-chairing the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association. Since 2016, the Inspectorate has represented Switzerland on the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards, and the Inspectorate is represented in all IAEA safety standards committees, as well as in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and the Interface Group. Bilateral cooperation agreements exist with Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Poland, the United States of America and the European Union. Switzerland has yearly meetings of its bilateral commissions with its neighbours Austria, France, Germany and Italy. The Inspectorate provided the Vice-President for the seventh Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

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61. Following the shutdown of the research reactor at the University of Basel, approximately 2.2 kg of United States-origin highly enriched uranium was returned to the United States in September 2015 in the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
 62. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
 63. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
 64. Nothing new to report. For further information please refer to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/2](#).
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