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**Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian  
Federation, Director of the Department for  
Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, M. I. Uliyanov, at  
the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the  
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on measures taken  
by the Russian Federation as regards Actions 5, 20 and 21  
contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review  
Conference**

**Report submitted by the Russian Federation**

1. As provided in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, or “P5”, are working to implement Action 5 to “further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence” and to prepare national reports on Action 5 and other obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons within a unified framework consistent with Actions 20 and 21. Action 21 states, “As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.” The framework which we use for our national reports includes common categories of topics under which relevant information is reported, addressing all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We encourage all States parties to the Treaty to submit similar reports, consistent with Action 20.



## **Section I: Measures Relating to Disarmament**

### **i. National Security Policies, Doctrine, and Activities Associated with Nuclear Weapons**

2. In accordance with the provisions of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation valid until 2020,<sup>1</sup> the main focal points of national security in the Russian Federation are strategic national priorities which determine the objectives of major social, political and economic transformations to create a safe environment for the realization of the constitutional rights and freedoms of Russian citizens, to bring about the sustainable development of the country, and to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State. One of the top priorities is national defence, the improvement of which has the strategic goals of preventing global and regional wars and conflicts and exercising strategic deterrence in order to ensure the country's military security.

3. The Russian Federation ensures the nation's defence based on the principles of reasonable sufficiency and effectiveness, including by means of non-military response, mechanisms of public diplomacy and peacekeeping, and international military cooperation. Military security is ensured by developing and improving the military organization and defensive potential of the State, as well as by allocating sufficient financial, material and other resources to this end.

4. In accordance with the 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,<sup>2</sup> prevention of a nuclear military conflict as well as any other military conflicts is Russia's priority objective. Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against Russia and/or its allies, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons where the very existence of the State is placed under threat.

5. The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation.

### **ii. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Arms Control (including Nuclear Disarmament) and Verification**

6. Russia fully complies with its international nuclear disarmament obligations. Up to the present time, the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation have concluded a number of treaties and agreements upon which policy in the area of nuclear disarmament and the promotion of strategic stability is based.

7. The first step toward actual nuclear disarmament was made on December 8, 1987 when the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty) was signed. The INF Treaty made it possible to eliminate an entire class of nuclear-missile weapons. In accordance with its provisions, 1,846 ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges (1,000-5,500 km) and shorter ranges (500-1,000 km) and 825 launchers for such missiles were fully destroyed. In all, over 3,000 nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> [www.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/424](http://www.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/424).

<sup>2</sup> [www.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/461](http://www.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461).

warheads with a total yield of over 500,000 kilotons have been deactivated. The Treaty remains in force to date.

8. The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (hereinafter referred to as the START I Treaty) which was signed on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994 marked a new phase of coordinated and verifiable reductions of Russian and US strategic offensive arms.

9. Under the START I Treaty, the Russian Federation was obligated to reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles to no more than 1,600 and the number of warheads attributed to them to no more than 6,000. These obligations were met in full and ahead of schedule. By the verification date of December 5, 2001, the aggregate number of deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers) had actually been reduced to 1,136 and the number of warheads attributed to them to 5,518.

10. The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, which was concluded in 2002, was yet another Russian contribution to nuclear disarmament. Under its provisions, by December 31, 2012 Russia and the USA had to reduce the levels of their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200, i.e. to approximately a third of the limit established by the START I Treaty. These obligations were met.

11. Along with strategic nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation has reduced substantially, by a multiple factor, the quantity of its non-strategic nuclear weapons. Currently, Russia's non-strategic nuclear capability is no more than 25 per cent of the level of capability which the USSR possessed in 1991. In addition, all of Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons have been transferred to the non-deployed category. They are located exclusively within national territorial boundaries and are concentrated at centralized storage bases, where a maximum-level security regime is assured, preventing the theft of and any accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

12. We would stress that these steps by the Russian Federation have also served as a very important practical measure for "de-alerting" nuclear weapons.

13. We have repeatedly called upon other countries to follow the example of the Russian Federation and to return non-strategic nuclear weapons to the territory of those States to which they belong, and to eliminate all infrastructure abroad providing for the rapid deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons outside the national territory. Such measures would help to strengthen international security and stability, and would also promote the further reduction and limitation of nuclear arsenals.

14. Russian nuclear weapons are under reliable control. The effectiveness of this control is enhanced by both organizational and technical measures. In particular, since 1991, the total number of nuclear weapons storage facilities has been reduced fourfold. Russia has developed and implemented a range of measures to counter terrorist acts, and comprehensive security inspections of all nuclear- and radiation-hazardous facilities and of their readiness to prevent terrorist acts are conducted regularly.

15. The signing of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (hereinafter – the New START Treaty) in Prague, on April 8, 2010, was an extremely important event in the field of nuclear disarmament. This New START Treaty supersedes both the START I Treaty, which expired on 4 December 2009, and the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002. The provisions of the New START Treaty stipulate that each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- 700 for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers;
- 1,550 for the warheads on them;
- 800 for deployed and non-deployed launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

16. Russia is thus continuing to take practical steps toward large-scale strategic offensive arms reductions.

17. Currently, Russia and the USA are working methodically on the Treaty's implementation.

18. Since the Treaty came into force, the Parties have used the established annual quotas for inspection activities (18 inspections each) fully and organized a number of exhibitions provided for under the Treaty. Type One inspections (10 inspections per year) are conducted to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms; the number of warheads located on such deployed items; to provide assurance that items converted to non-nuclear have not been converted back. Type Two inspections (8 inspections per year) are conducted to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive arms; to confirm that items have been converted or eliminated; to confirm that formerly declared facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.

19. Data, information, and materials are exchanged through national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, as well as through diplomatic channels. The number of notifications transferred by the Parties since the signing of the Treaty has been approximately 6,000. The Parties exchange around 2,000 notifications during a year.

20. In the course of the scheduled exchange (twice a year), data is transferred on aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms, the number of deployed and non-deployed SOA items and of warheads on deployed SOA items, as well as data on facilities linked to strategic offensive arms.

21. During the current exchange, data is updated if it changes. The Treaty provides for 7 formats of notifications regarding data pertaining to strategic offensive arms; 6 formats regarding the movement of strategic offensive arms; 6 formats regarding launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the exchange of telemetric information; 4 formats regarding the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms; 13 formats regarding inspection activities; and 6 formats regarding the activity of the Bilateral Consultative Commission and additional messages.

22. Since the Treaty came into force, there have been seven sessions of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, established by Russia and the USA to promote implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty.

### **iii. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures**

23. During the previous sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Russia held briefings on implementation of the US-Russian START Treaty that entered into force on February 5, 2011.

### **iv. Other Issues**

24. The efforts of Russia and the USA are no longer sufficient for further progress towards nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, it will remain difficult to attain the goals of the comprehensive and complete elimination of nuclear weapons if the process is confined only to those States which fall within the P-5.

25. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and is of vital importance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

26. We reaffirm our country's fundamental commitment to fully supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Russia ratified the Treaty in 2000. The Russian Federation has not conducted any nuclear explosions since 1991 and it is determined to continue refraining from doing so.

27. It is our intention to continue working to develop a firm understanding of the need for the Treaty to be transformed into an effective international legal instrument as soon as possible. We will strive to achieve this in multilateral formats, at regional and interparliamentary fora and in our bilateral contacts.

28. A major Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty-related event that took place in 2013 was the Eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It reaffirmed the status of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as an instrument of prime importance for limiting nuclear arms and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia supported the Final Declaration of the Conference and the list of measures it contained to promote the entry into force of the Treaty. We stand ready to play an active part in implementing them in practice.

29. Russia supports the efforts of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to establish the Treaty verification mechanism and takes an active part in this work. Tangible progress has been made in this area. Currently, over 86 per cent of all the facilities of the International Monitoring System provided for under the Treaty have been certified. Incomplete as it is, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification mechanism has repeatedly demonstrated its capability and effectiveness.

30. Preparations for the second large-scale integrated field exercise to simulate on-site inspections that will take place in November and December 2014 in Jordan are without doubt today's top priority in terms of establishing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification mechanism. This exercise will allow the operational readiness of this vital element of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty control mechanism to be reviewed in practice. Russia has been actively involved in preparations for this exercise and intends to send both senior observers and qualified technical experts to take part in the integrated field exercise.

31. We are satisfied with the level of cooperation that has been established with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission in regard to the construction and commissioning of Russian International Monitoring System facilities, over 70 per cent of which have already been certified and are functioning successfully. We expect this fruitful cooperation to continue. We are making every effort to fulfil the objectives of putting the remaining facilities into service on time and ensuring that they are of the required standard.

32. We actively supported the initiative to establish a “Group of Eminent Persons” to promote the Treaty put forward by L. Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs I. C. Ivanov represents Russia in this Group. The Group is intended to carry out focused work, primarily with representatives of the remaining 8 Annex 2 States on which the future fate of the Treaty depends, in order to convince them to accede to the Treaty. We hope that the work of the “Group of Eminent Persons” will underpin our common efforts to transform the Treaty into an effective international legal instrument as soon as possible.

33. We would like to renew our call to the States that have not yet signed and/or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (especially the Annex 2 States) to do so without further delay and without any preconditions. We believe that in this matter it is essential to be guided in one’s actions by one’s own national interests and not by the opinions of others. It is important to recognize that the signing and ratification of the Treaty is a global “best practice” which has become an imperative at this juncture in international relations. It allows a State to become directly involved in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, of which the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a key element, rather than remaining on the margins of this process or confining itself to the role of a mere observer.

34. In recent time we have seen an increase in conflict potential in the world, which has distracted attention away from addressing pressing issues of strengthening international stability and creating a favourable basis for cohesive steps in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

35. Nuclear disarmament is impossible without taking into account current trends in the sphere of strategic defence weapons. The build-up of missile defences in Europe and around the world is damaging strategic stability. Russia views the establishment of a global missile defence system primarily in the context of ensuring national security, bearing in mind that strategic defensive and offensive arms are inextricably linked in the maintenance of strategic stability. We believe that unilateral development of the European segment of the global missile defence system constitutes a violation of one of the fundamental principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, according to which a State cannot strengthen its own security at the cost of the security of other States.

36. The maintenance of peace and stability calls for carefully considered collective actions based on the principles of equal and indivisible security for all States without exception. Other approaches may be detrimental to the strengthening of

both European and global security. In the context of the strategic situation in the world in general and the objectives of universal disarmament, the significance not just of nuclear weapons but also of advanced non-nuclear weapon systems under development is becoming critical, as these pose no less a threat to strategic stability.

37. The issue of preventing the placement of weapons in outer space occupies a special place among the disarmament issues. The Russian Federation has consistently opposed the placement of any types of weapons in outer space.

38. The presence of weapons in outer space would signify not only a broadening of the areas of military rivalry, but also a qualitative leap fraught with unpredictable consequences for the entire arms control process, strategic stability and international security as a whole. It is essential to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space. This is one of the prerequisites for making nuclear disarmament possible.

39. A solution should be found that will work to strengthen international security and stability. The Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space is an effective and realistic way of achieving this objective.

40. Russia stands ready to continue moving toward verifiable and irreversible reductions of nuclear weapons in accordance with its obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, such measures should be implemented as part of a step-by-step process with the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. This goal can be achieved only if a comprehensive approach is adopted, while at the same time maintaining strategic stability, respecting the principle of equal and indivisible security for all and ensuring, *inter alia*, that the following international conditions are met:

continuation of the process of nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-capable States and their gradual joining with efforts already undertaken in this area by Russia and the USA;

prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space;

provision of guarantees that States have no “nuclear upload potential”;

inadmissibility of the build-up of conventionally-armed strategic offensive weapons (creation of the so-called “compensatory potential”);

renunciation of the unilateral development of anti-ballistic missile defence systems;

elimination of quantitative and qualitative imbalances in relation to conventional arms in conjunction with the simultaneous resolution of other international problems, including the settlement of regional conflicts;

acceleration of the process of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

firm guarantee of the viability of key multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments.

41. The listed facts and practical steps that the Russian Federation has taken to fulfil its obligations demonstrate a genuine determination to strive towards nuclear arms reduction and disarmament. To date, the Russian Federation has taken all currently possible and necessary steps to ensure continued progress while bearing in mind that the pace of movement towards nuclear disarmament should be matched by

the establishment of an effective system of global and regional security, as well as by the building of mutual confidence between countries.

## **Section II: National Measures Relating to Non-Proliferation**

### **i. Safeguards**

42. We believe that the main work to strengthen the regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is done at the local level in the States parties themselves. At the same time the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an extremely important role in this process, facilitating the smooth functioning of the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime.

43. The Russian Federation has consistently supported the activities of the IAEA, advocating further strengthening of the Agency's capacity, including through the provision of adequate resources for it to carry out its work, in view of the wide range of tasks relating to the peaceful use of atomic energy that it has been charged with.

44. In accordance with the IAEA's Statute, the main objective of the Agency is to assist the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, while providing reliable safeguards for it not to be diverted for military purposes. The non-proliferation aspect of the Agency's work is a kind of key opening the door to the benefits of peaceful atomic energy to the non-nuclear States. Nuclear non proliferation goes hand in hand with the acquisition of nuclear technologies and is a guarantee that States will be able to advance as far as possible along the path of developing nuclear science and energy production.

45. From the point of view of nuclear non-proliferation, we believe that it is important to ensure progressive enhancement of the IAEA safeguards system and universalization of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which, together with the Safeguards Agreement, is intended to become a generally recognized standard for verifying States' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

46. The Russian Federation has been actively cooperating with the IAEA to enhance the safeguards system by providing financial and technical assistance through implementation of a national scientific and technical program to uphold the safeguards. For the more than 30 years it has been in existence, much work has been done to strengthen the technical base of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, and to provide it with new measurement methods, samples of materials and sources, as well as staff training.

47. Under this program, Russia provides the IAEA with assistance in analysing environmental samples obtained by the Agency during inspection activities and, develops new technologies to detect evidence of undeclared materials and activities. We place great emphasis on the training of the Agency's inspectors, which goes beyond individual methods of measuring nuclear materials (for example, non-destructive control methods) to include the entire set of actions necessary to carry out inspections, for instance at isotopic uranium enrichment facilities. Particular attention is given to the provision of training at Russia's specialized institutions for personnel from IAEA Member States in accounting for and controlling nuclear materials.



48. Russia is actively participating in deliberations on the safeguards system reform being developed by the IAEA Secretariat. We believe that the Secretariat of the Agency should, under these new approaches, be guided solely by objective and technically sound criteria for the assessment of States, with the list of such criteria having to be approved by the Agency's decision-making bodies. We insist that States should be subjected solely to those measures and procedures aimed at verifying nuclear activities that have been envisaged by the safeguards agreements. We stress that the IAEA Secretariat, in its conclusions on the application of safeguards, should rely only on information whose accuracy it is ready to defend in open debate.

49. We expect a comprehensive report from the IAEA's Director General with details on the concept of State-level safeguards currently under development within the Agency's Secretariat. We would stress that, without approval of this report by the IAEA's policy-making bodies, implementation of the new approaches to the application of safeguards is inadmissible.

## **ii. Export controls**

50. Nuclear export controls play a crucial role in maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In our view, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has firmly established itself as a leading multilateral mechanism with regard to the identification of materials, equipment and technologies that are sensitive in terms of nuclear weapons production, as well as the development of procedures for the control of their transfers. Russia is an active participant of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We have consistently advocated the involvement in the Group's work of States which have significant industrial and export potential and are capable of making a tangible contribution to fulfilment of the Group's tasks. We assume that international non-proliferation efforts should not lead to unreasonable restrictions on legitimate trade in dual-use goods and technologies and on civil cooperation in the areas of science and technology.

51. We strive for continuous improvement of all aspects of the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. There is an evident interrelationship between non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the modern world. Nuclear energy is actually becoming a resource for ensuring national energy security. At the same time, as the challenge of fully exploiting the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy is faced, so the risks associated with the potential proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies are also growing proportionately. We believe that the Group is quite capable of making a tangible contribution to reducing such risks.

52. We note the achievements of the Zangger Committee as an important instrument for ensuring the sustainability of the non-proliferation regime. The Committee continues to perform its functions in relation to the identification of nuclear materials and equipment, as well as the development of nuclear export control regulations in accordance with Article III (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

53. We call on all States to consistently implement the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, co-sponsored by the Russian Federation in 2004. This resolution creates the international legal framework for countering the threat of the emergence of materials which can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and preventing such weapons, related materials, technologies and their means of delivery from falling into the hands of non-State actors, in particular terrorist organizations.

**iii. Nuclear security**

54. Russia attaches great importance to maintenance of nuclear security around the globe at the highest level.

55. We greatly appreciate the results of the Nuclear Security Summits in Washington, Seoul and the Hague.

56. We are guided by the fundamental principle according to which the responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear security regime within a State rests entirely with that State.

57. Russia is a party to all the main international legal instruments in the field of nuclear security, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment. We believe that the universalization of these legal instruments is an integral part of the strengthening of nuclear security worldwide. We call upon all States to accede to them.

58. We note that the non-participation in these fundamental international legal instruments of a number of States which possess significant stockpiles of nuclear material impedes further steps toward the elaboration and adoption of new international legal instruments and political commitments in the field of international cooperation on nuclear security.

59. Russia supports the work of the IAEA in the field of international cooperation aimed at strengthening nuclear security worldwide. We take note of the assistance that the Agency provides to its member States in strengthening their national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials and radioactive substances and their nuclear safety and security systems.

60. Russia has been making voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since 2010.

61. We believe that the IAEA will continue to play a leading role in establishing cooperation between States and sharing experience regarding nuclear security and prevention of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

62. It is our view that the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security held in July 2013 provided an opportunity for reviewing the experience and achievements of the international community in strengthening nuclear security and acquiring a deeper understanding of existing approaches to ensuring such security worldwide, as well as for identifying future priorities in this area.

63. Russia welcomes the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan for 2014–2017 approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency, that focusses on strengthening the IAEA's coordinating role in ensuring nuclear security, the wide use of information technologies and state-of-the-art developments and the delivery of relevant assistance to countries at their request.

64. We believe that strengthening the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, as well as ensuring that nuclear material is accounted for and controlled, is one of the most important elements of ensuring nuclear security.

65. All nuclear materials, their storage sites and corresponding facilities in the territory of Russia, as well as the transportation of nuclear materials, are provided

with the necessary security measures, including physical protection, at least to the levels recommended by the IAEA in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Our regulations in the area of nuclear security are continuously being improved.

66. There are no nuclear materials and facilities on Russian territory whose level of physical protection gives cause for concern. An effective system of nuclear security regulation has been established and is maintained in Russia. The status of accounting for and control of nuclear materials, the physical inventory of nuclear materials and the effectiveness of their physical protection are regularly checked by the security regulatory authority and by the authorities regulating nuclear energy use.

67. Russia is constantly developing new and updating existing statutes and regulations with regard to physical protection, accounting for and control of nuclear materials and radioactive substances, taking into account its own national experience and the experience of other States and international organizations, including the IAEA. Inter alia, in 2012 a new version of the federal standards and rules “The Basic Rules of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control” was approved, establishing more specific and detailed accounting and control requirements depending on the category of nuclear material.

68. For more than 15 years, Russia has been using a methodology for checking the movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials across its borders. We are ready to provide support in utilizing this technology to other interested States.

69. The equipping of border checkpoints with fixed systems for implementing such control has been completed. We are now introducing a national automated information system created to monitor the movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials across State borders. In 2013, the Federal Customs Service of Russia organized jointly with the IAEA two international training courses on “Radiation Detection Techniques” for instructors of customs services and other law enforcement agencies from 15 IAEA member States.

70. Russia is in the process of establishing an automated system for the safe transportation of nuclear and other radioactive materials, making it possible to determine the location of vehicles carrying nuclear materials and their physical protection status in real time. Use of the system has significantly reduced the risk of theft of nuclear materials during transportation.

71. Russia is constantly working to improve the culture of nuclear security. In 2012, methodological recommendations for organizing and carrying out work pertaining to the nuclear security culture were developed.

72. In November 2012 and December 2013, as a “gift” to the Nuclear Security Summit, Russia, jointly with the IAEA, conducted seminars on nuclear security culture, primarily for specialists in countries operating, building or planning to install nuclear power reactors developed in Russia.

73. Russia maintains its interest in cooperation to support and strengthen the capacities of third countries in the field of nuclear security. We provide countries that have embarked on a path toward using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with assistance in improving the level of their nuclear security. We continue to conduct courses and seminars on physical protection at the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Institute of the National Research Nuclear University (MEPhI) in the city of Obninsk and at Tomsk Polytechnic University. International seminars and

conferences, and training courses on nuclear materials control and accounting, are regularly held at the Russian Methodological and Training Centre on Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting in Obninsk. Russian experts are actively engaged in developing and improving the IAEA's international documents on nuclear security, and in conducting IAEA training courses in this field.

74. We recognize the importance of international cooperation in the field of nuclear security, subject to compliance with the requirements of national legislation, while ensuring that information is kept confidential and is prevented from falling into the wrong hands. It is in this context that we view the development of cooperation on this issue between industrial organizations of different countries working on peaceful uses of nuclear energy as they play an important role in ensuring nuclear security.

75. The Russian Federation attaches great importance to coordinating international efforts to reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism.

76. Given the cross-border nature of the threat of terrorism, we consider it necessary to strengthen multilateral and bilateral mechanisms for cooperation to address that threat, taking into account the need to maintain the confidentiality of information relating to nuclear security issues.

77. We welcome international efforts and initiatives that can contribute to countering nuclear terrorism and drawing international attention to the issues of strengthening nuclear security. We view the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which was launched by Russia and the USA in 2006 and which over time has become an effective instrument of cooperation and best practice exchange for countering the threat of nuclear terrorism and strengthening nuclear security worldwide as a model of such cooperation. The Initiative makes a considerable contribution to the establishment of broad consensus on the most technically complex and sensitive aspects of international cooperation on nuclear security. To date, 85 States have joined the Initiative.

78. Within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, "Strazh-2012" [Guardian-2012], demonstration exercises on countering nuclear terrorism were conducted in the Moscow region in September 2012. These involved the use of Russian instrumentation and equipment for the detection of nuclear materials. Experts from more than 50 countries attended the exercises.

79. In addition to measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances at the State border, Russia is working to establish a State System to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials on Russian territory. Technical implementation of the project is underway in the Murmansk, Kaliningrad and Sverdlovsk areas.

80. We support the IAEA programme to create and maintain a database on illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances. We actively participate in working group meetings aimed at building the capacity of the database and in exchanging information, and we provide relevant information on a regular basis. A system of laboratories to identify nuclear materials, radioactive substances, and radioactive waste obtained from illicit trafficking is being developed in Russia.

81. Aware of the danger that un-controlled radioactive sources can pose, Russia is taking measures to improve systems for their accounting, control and physical

protection. Russia adheres strictly to the IAEA's recommendations contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and in the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

82. Laws and regulations on accounting for and control and physical protection of radioactive sources and radioactive materials are constantly being improved in the light of both national experience in this area and the experience of foreign States and international organizations, including the IAEA. Thus, in 2012 a new version of the federal standards and rules "The Basic Rules of Accounting for and Control of Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste in Organizations" was approved that establishes requirements for the provision of accounting and control, taking into account the potential risk categories of radioactive sources; in 2014, a new version of the federal standards and rules "Rules for the Physical Protection of Radioactive Substances, Radiation Sources and Storage Facilities" was approved.

83. The register of radioactive sources is being maintained and improved.

84. In the context of the persistent terrorist threat, we consider it highly important to maintain vigilance and to improve the level of security of information regarding the system of physical protection of nuclear materials and relevant facilities, as well as to improve the degree of protection of the automated control systems impacting on the provision of security at facilities using nuclear power.

85. Russia supports international efforts aimed at providing protection measures for sensitive information including cyber-security measures at nuclear facilities, taking into account the sensitivity of such information. In particular, Russia conducts on an annual basis training and methodological seminars on "Information protection issues in automated physical protection systems".

#### **iv. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones**

86. We consider the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones to be an important instrument for enhancing the level of regional and international security and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The geographical expansion of such zones is important from the point of view of non-nuclear-weapon States wishing to obtain legally binding security assurances.

87. We welcome the efforts of the Central Asian countries and the P5 that opened the way to the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

88. The internal procedures that are required for the signing of the Protocol have been launched in Russia. As far as we know, similar work is also being carried out by the other P5 countries. Upon their completion we will be ready to sign the relevant Protocol without delay, thereby finalizing the establishment under international law of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. We expect this to take place during the current session of the Preparatory Committee.

89. We are satisfied that regarding formalization of the status of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, we have successfully embarked on the final stage of the work. The P5 has played its part and done its utmost to ensure that the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South-East Asia will be signed at the earliest possible opportunity.

90. The Russian side plans to express traditional reservations when signing the Protocol to the Treaties on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in Central Asia and in South-East Asia that will not affect the interests of States wishing to comply strictly with their obligations under the Treaty.

91. We believe that the wary attitude of some countries in the South-East Asian region towards the reservations of the nuclear-weapon States is groundless. Such reservations are a common, it might even be said, routine practice. For instance, with regard to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, they apply without prejudice to the security of that region's countries. We can state with certainty that the same will also happen in relation to the countries of South-East Asia. Nuclear-weapon States cannot abstain from expressing reservations, out of consideration for their own security.

92. In accordance with the 2010 Action Plan, which was adopted by consensus, one of the key issues of the current review cycle is to commence implementation of the idea of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

93. We express our support for the efforts of the Special Coordinator of the Conference, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, J. Laajava, and welcome the recent positive developments noted regarding convening the event. We greatly value the active and representative participation of the countries of the Middle East in the multilateral consultations initiated by the co-sponsors of the Conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Three rounds of consultations have taken place in Switzerland. We believe that such a direct dialogue between the countries in the region is the best way forward. We support the continuation of this process.

94. As regards a date for holding the Conference, we believe it is possible to agree upon one even at this stage and have proposed, for example, November, or December of this year. There is reason to believe that by this time the countries of the region will be able to agree upon the fundamental positions. It is important to understand that the emergence in the region of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery belongs to the future. Nevertheless, the very fact that this process has started is of the utmost importance to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

**v. Compliance with the Provisions of the Treaty and Other Issues/Concerns**

95. In our opinion, the settlement of regional challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is possible only through political and diplomatic means on the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and supported by the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. There is no alternative to this approach. The fact that over the past year significant progress has been achieved in resolving the situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear program is confirmation of this. At present, implementation of the Joint Plan of Action of the E3+3 and Iran of 24 November 2013 is moving forward steadily. This agreement is based on the concept formulated by the President of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin. The essence of it is the recognition of Iran's unconditional right to develop a peaceful nuclear programme, including its right to enrich uranium, coupled with the placement of this program is put under strict international control and the lifting of all existing sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including unilateral sanctions, the legitimacy of which

we did not and do not recognize. The Geneva agreement is based on the principles of gradualism and reciprocity, which were first put forward by us and eventually received universal recognition and support.

96. At the same time, cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to resolving all the Agency's outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme, including those that may be related to the military nuclear dimension of "alleged studies", is now fully under way.

97. We are sure that the unprecedented constructive engagement of Iran with the IAEA as well as with the E3+3 group of international mediators gives reasons to expect a successful conclusion to the process of negotiations on a comprehensive resolution to the Iranian nuclear programme within the timeframe specified in the Geneva agreements – by 20 July 2014. In this regard, we call upon all parties to intensify common efforts to explore specific outcomes and conclusions in order to arrive at a definitive solution to the problem.

98. Vigorous steps are needed to start moving toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Continued failure to resume the negotiation process will only exacerbate the current situation. That would be a serious blow to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that the parties concerned should make every possible effort to ensure the renewal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's full membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the application of the IAEA safeguards on its territory.

**vi. Other Contributions to Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime**

99. Russia supports the beginning of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva within the framework of a balanced Programme of Work acceptable to all, that takes into account the differing interests and priorities of all the Conference participants and on the basis of the so-called "Shannon Mandate", which provides for the conduct of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (document CD/1299 of 24 March 1995). For us, this wording clearly defines the scope and parameters of a possible treaty as a further multilateral measure to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

100. For many years, Russia has been taking and continues to take practical steps to achieve a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

101. As far back as 1989, our country ceased to produce highly enriched uranium for the purposes of producing nuclear weapons. Russia has not produced plutonium for nuclear weapons since 1994. The last reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium was halted in the middle of 2010.

102. In 2009, in order to reach a universally acceptable compromise at the Conference on Disarmament, we showed considerable flexibility by agreeing to a negotiating mandate on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to a mere discussion mandate on the space issue, which is a priority for us.

103. Subsequently, Russia undertook vigorous diplomatic efforts to bring about a consensus on a program of work for the Conference. Unfortunately, this work was not successful, but we are ready, together with other delegations, to proceed with efforts in this direction.

104. On the whole, we see the main objective of developing a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices as being to provide a reliable guarantee that fissile material for nuclear weapons will not be produced globally. Only in this case will compliance with the principle of equal security for all be ensured. We therefore believe that entry of the treaty into force must be made conditional upon it being ratified by all *de jure* and *de facto* nuclear-weapon States as well as by all States that have considerable potential in the field of fissile material production for the purposes of producing nuclear explosive devices and that have sensitive nuclear installations, primarily for uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. Of course, as the experience of banning nuclear tests shows, such a scheme does not lead one to expect that this treaty will enter into force rapidly, but it will ensure the necessary effectiveness and non-discriminatory nature of any future agreement on a ban on the production of fissile materials, as provided for by the Shannon Mandate.

105. We consider the work on returning fresh and spent highly enriched uranium fuel from research reactors of Russian and American design from third countries to the country of origin to be an important area of cooperation aimed at nuclear non-proliferation and improving the level of nuclear security. Russia and the USA are carrying out this work with the participation of the IAEA, and this was reflected in the Joint Statement by the Presidents of Russia and the USA on Nuclear Cooperation of 6 July 2009.

106. Since 2002, we have been implementing the Programme to return highly enriched uranium (both fresh and irradiated) from nuclear research reactors of Russian design to the Russian Federation; this is being accompanied by conversion of the active zones of these reactors from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium or by their complete shutdown (decommissioning).

107. To date, Russia has completely removed highly enriched uranium fuel from 9 countries – Bulgaria, Latvia, Libya, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Vietnam and Hungary.

108. Highly enriched uranium fuel has been partially removed from 5 countries – Germany, Poland, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

109. In total, since the existence of the program, 790 kg of fresh (hereinafter, the data refers to uranium) and 1,269 kg of irradiated highly enriched uranium fuel have been removed from 14 countries.

110. The removal of fuel from Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Poland is scheduled.

111. We have assessed and confirmed the technical feasibility of converting six nuclear research reactors from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. Efforts are currently focused on the development and certification of new high-density low-enriched uranium fuel required for the conversion of relevant reactors in Tomsk and at the National Research Centre “Kurchatov Institute”. The decision



on the actual conversion will be taken after additional evaluation of the economic consequences.

### **Section III: National Measures Relating to Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

#### **i. Promoting peaceful uses**

112. An objective development trend in the modern world is the growing interest in peaceful nuclear energy. The Russian Federation believes that in the immediate future there is no alternative to the further development and expansion of the use of civilian nuclear energy around the world. This is confirmed by the findings of the IAEA International Ministerial Conference “Nuclear Power in the 21st century” that took place in Russia in June 2013.

113. More than 500 representatives from 87 countries participated in the Conference that has become an important milestone in the shaping of approaches on which the development of nuclear power will be based in coming decades. As the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin stressed in his address to the Conference: “We are ready to work together, ready to make a serious and substantial contribution to shaping a global strategy for the development of nuclear power in the 21st century”.

114. In the Conference outcome document, an important direction of development for the IAEA member States was determined. We are satisfied with the finding of the Conference that for many countries nuclear power is a proven, clean, safe, and economical technology that will play an important role in achieving energy security and sustainable development goals in the 21st century and beyond.

115. Russia is one of many countries developing nuclear energy. In Russia, 33 nuclear power-generating units are in operation. In 2013, they produced more than 171.6 billion kWh. 10 new units are being built, including the first-of-its-kind floating nuclear power plant “Akademik Lomonosov” construction of which is scheduled to be completed by 2016. Two targeted federal programmes covering the key directions of development of the nuclear-power sector have been developed and approved in Russia.

116. Alongside with large-scale construction of nuclear power plants with thermal reactors, Russia is working on creating a new generation of closed-nuclear-fuel-cycle technologies and fourth-generation fast-neutron reactors. In the long term, Russia associates nuclear power development with this type of reactor and with a closed nuclear fuel cycle.

117. Russia is the only country in the world where a 600 MW fast-neutron reactor (BN-600) has been operating successfully for many years; we have also completed construction of an 800 MW reactor (BN-800). Physical start-up of the reactor is now underway. An experimental fast-neutron reactor built using Russian technology and with Russian assistance is operating in China.

118. At the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dimitrovgrad, a project is being implemented to construct a new multipurpose fast research reactor intended to replace the only BOR-60 sodium-cooled fast-neutron research reactor in operation

there. We are planning to create an international research centre at the site of the multipurpose fast research reactor.

119. In 2014, we celebrate 60 years since the launch of the world's first nuclear power plant in this country. On 27 June 1954 a nuclear power plant located at Obninsk near Moscow with an "AM-1" (abbreviation of Russian words meaning "peaceful atom") 5 MW reactor generated industrial electricity and paved the way to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The plant operated successfully for 48 years.

120. The Russian Federation consistently advocates broader access of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and promotes international cooperation in this sphere.

121. The further development of nuclear energy and its large-scale use for the purposes of economic development require joint efforts by the countries concerned to implement a systemic approach to tackling the complex tasks associated with such development. Russia was an initiator of the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and remains its leading sponsor.

122. The Russian Federation notes with satisfaction the decision of the IAEA Director General Y. Amano to convert the INPRO project into a fully-fledged section within the Department of Nuclear Energy as of January 2014.

123. INPRO has become a fully-fledged mechanism and advanced centre for the comprehensive analysis of proposed and planned nuclear power systems, which examines, inter alia, such factors as infrastructure, security, minimization of radioactive waste and protection of the environment. Thanks to this intellectual platform, the understanding of technological innovations and institutional features that facilitate the transition to sustainable nuclear power systems is improving among member States. The number of countries participating in INPRO has reached 40.

124. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project is yet another example of the Russian Federation's successful contribution to multilateral cooperation regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We invite member States to take part in the 25th anniversary Fusion Energy Conference, organized by the IAEA with support from the Government of the Russian Federation, to be held in Saint Petersburg from 13 to 18 October 2014.

125. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have, under Article IV of the Treaty, the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It appears that one of the possible scenarios for exercising this right is participation in international centres providing nuclear fuel cycle services.

126. One such centre is the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk. This centre, established jointly with the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2007 under an Initiative by the President of the Russian Federation, fulfils a practical function as a supplier of nuclear products and services. Nuclear materials at its site have been subject to IAEA safeguards since 1 July 2010.

127. In addition to the International Uranium Enrichment Centre, the world's first safeguarded reserve of low-enriched uranium was established at the site of the Centre in 2010, based on a Russian Federation initiative and an agreement with the IAEA. It has a capacity to hold 120 tons of low-enriched uranium enriched up to

5 per cent. This reserve is intended to ensure guaranteed supplies of low-enriched uranium by IAEA decision. Its cost stands at approximately 185 million US dollars. At the same time, the Russian Federation is bearing all the expenses associated with storage, maintenance, ensuring the reserve's nuclear safety and security, as well as the application of safeguards.

128. We deem it an important task to provide reliable access to the benefits of nuclear energy for all interested countries, with due respect for the requirements of the non-proliferation regime. We confirm our unfailing support for the IAEA project to establish its own low-enriched uranium bank, initiated with the participation of, among others, the Russian Federation. We welcome the consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the decision by the Agency on the choice of the specific site where the low-enriched uranium bank will be located in that country.

## **ii. Technical Assistance through the IAEA to its Member States**

129. Russia recognizes the importance of the IAEA technical cooperation programme. The Russian Federation makes and intends to continue to make full voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. We are in favour of retaining the existing funding mechanism, through assessments of member States in their national currency in an amount determined by the United Nations scale of assessments in accordance with established practice. Through this Fund, the Russian Federation is assisting developing countries that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in building accelerators and neutron generators; it also supplies ionizing radiation sources, neutron radiography units, gamma-ray treatment equipment, liquid nitrogen production units, and other equipment.

130. In 2013, 228 Russian experts took part in technical meetings within the framework of the technical cooperation programme (113 as experts and 115 as participants), 28 specialists participated in various Agency training activities and internships.

131. In Russian enterprises, internships for 9 foreign specialists and 51 scientific visits were organized, and 68 foreign specialists participated in training courses. 120 foreign experts participated in technical meetings organized in the Russian Federation through the IAEA's technical cooperation programme.

132. We actively promote cooperation with participating States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in relation to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We implement regional projects to enhance the skills of medical physicists from participating States of the CIS in the field of radiation oncology. Together with the IAEA, we establish projects training specialists in the recultivation of areas affected by uranium mining, as well as projects on climate change.

133. In 2012, the Russian Federation launched a new regional project to train experts from the participating States of the CIS in the recultivation of areas affected by uranium mining, which has been included in the technical cooperation programme for the new 2014–2015 cycle (decision of the IAEA Board of Governors of 28 November 2013).

## **iii. Nuclear Safety and Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage**

134. The use of atomic energy necessitates attention to nuclear safety issues. It is essential to take all measures necessary to prevent any future recurrence of disasters

similar to those of Chernobyl and Fukushima. Since the end of the 1980s, the Russian Federation has been implementing a large-scale programme of modernization of its nuclear reactor fleet with the aim of improving their safety. The stable operation of Russian nuclear power plants is evidence of the success that has been achieved in this area. Modern Russian nuclear reactors, particularly those constructed under the “AES 2006” project, meet the very highest international requirements in terms of nuclear safety.

135. Monitoring of compliance with the safety requirements during the construction, operation and decommissioning of Russian nuclear power plants is carried out by an independent supervisory body – the Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service.

136. Russia is party to the main international legal instruments in the area of nuclear safety – the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

137. We note the success of the sixth meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety held in Vienna from 24 March to 4 April 2014. The meeting adopted a number of amendments to the procedural documents of the Convention aimed at taking account of the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Such amendments also included Russian proposals concerning reassessment of the existing design requirements for nuclear power installations to take into account the adverse effects of natural and man-made factors, the establishment of adequate infrastructure in countries planning to construct their first NPP, and the development of regulations governing joint actions by government bodies and institutions responsible for the operation of nuclear facilities with the aim of ensuring effective nuclear accident management.

138. Non-discriminatory and equitable international legal mechanisms for regulating issues of liability for nuclear damage are an important factor affecting international cooperation with regard to nuclear energy. Russia is a Party to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. We call upon those States which have not yet done so to accede to one of the existing international nuclear liability mechanisms.

#### **iv. Other Issues**

139. National nuclear programmes cannot be developed without the establishment of competent staff. We pay particular attention to training and knowledge retention. We have set up an International Staff Training Centre where specialists from Vietnam, Turkey, Belarus and other countries undergo training.

140. The Russian National Research Nuclear University “MEPhI” not only trains personnel for the Russian nuclear energy sector and industry, but also admits students and specialists from IAEA member States for training national personnel in nuclear power programmes. For example, students from Turkey and Vietnam undergo training at the “MEPhI” University.

141. For many years, Russia has, in pursuance of Article IV paragraph 2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, been engaged in active cooperation with States parties to the Treaty in constructing and operating nuclear power plants, supplying nuclear

fuel, equipment and nuclear materials, ensuring nuclear safety, managing irradiated nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, and training nuclear scientists.

142. We offer our partners nuclear power plant construction on a “turnkey” and “build-own-operate” basis. We are thus ready to adapt flexibly to the needs of a particular customer. In addition, such an approach completely removes all concerns both with regard to ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and with regard to the safe operation of nuclear power plants and management of spent nuclear fuel.

143. We attach particular importance to the latter aspect – tackling the problems of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management. Russia has ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

144. Russia stands ready to continue working with the States parties to the Treaty. Our vision of cooperation is to achieve the goals of developing and expanding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while simultaneously strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in which the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a key element and a kind of guarantee of constantly expanding international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

## **OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT AND/OR STRENGTHEN THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

145. In 2010-2013, Russia, thanks to the activities of its academic and non-governmental organizations, fully complied with its obligations under paragraph 22 of the Action Plan adopted on the basis of the findings of the 2010 Treaty Review Conference.

146. In May 2010, Russia – alone among the nuclear-weapon States – signed the Joint Statement on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. This event reflects the success achieved by organizations from Russia in the development of education regarding non-proliferation, as well as new plans to support training initiatives regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, programmes for in-depth study of these issues, and information and education-based promotion of these issues among the general public.

147. Recognizing the great responsibility with which our country has been entrusted as depositary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we consider the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty to be an important one. We believe that any decisions in this respect should not lead to a revision of Article X, reopening of the text of the Treaty or undermining of one of the fundamental principles of a State’s sovereign right to withdraw from an international agreement. However, we support the need for a constructive exchange of views on the defining of agreed recommendations regarding the procedures for and consequences of a possible withdrawal from the Treaty. We believe that making States more accountable for a decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in accordance with Article X thereof could be one of the ways to strengthen the Treaty.

148. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and all current challenges in this regard can and should be

addressed on the basis of the Treaty, while ensuring the full inviolability of its provisions, complying strictly with the norms of international law, and taking due account taken of the legitimate security and development interests of all States. Strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation. We intend to do our utmost to make the current Non-Proliferation Treaty review process as effective as possible. Our overriding priority is to ensure proper functioning of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, so that we can progress towards our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

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