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Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**Distr.: General  
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**Report submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20, and 21  
of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of  
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons**

1. As provided in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Governments of the five Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon States, or “P5”, are working to implement action 5 to “further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence” and to make national reports on our action 5 and other undertakings to the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee under a common framework, consistent with actions 20 and 21.
2. Action 21 states that “as a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.” The framework we use for our national reports includes common categories of topics under which relevant information is reported, and it addresses all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
3. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with action 20, to make similar reports.

**Section I: Reporting on national measures relating  
to disarmament**

4. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland considers the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be the cornerstone of global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and we are committed to the step-by-step process agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference and reaffirmed at the 2010 Review Conference.



## **I. National security policies, doctrine, and activities associated with nuclear weapons**

### **Nuclear doctrine**

5. The 2006 white paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent”,<sup>1</sup> as amended by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review,<sup>2</sup> provides our current policy on nuclear deterrence, our capability and force structure. It makes clear that we will maintain only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent, under full political control, in the form of continuous-at-sea patrols of a Vanguard-class submarine carrying Trident ballistic missiles with the fewest warheads since the introduction of our nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine capability in the 1960s.

6. We believe we already have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads among the recognized nuclear-weapon States, and are the only one to have reduced to a single deterrent system since the withdrawal of our air component in the late 1990s.

### **Operational policy**

7. The United Kingdom has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. While we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use, we have provided some parameters.

8. In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the United Kingdom strengthened its negative security assurance to state that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In giving this assurance, we emphasized the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty, and noted that this assurance would not apply to any State in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. We also noted that while there is currently no direct threat to the United Kingdom or its vital interests from States developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.

9. In the interests of international security and stability, the United Kingdom has taken steps to lower the operational status of our deterrent system. United Kingdom nuclear weapons are not on high alert, nor are they on “launch on warning” status. The patrol submarine operates routinely at a “notice to fire” measured in days rather than minutes as it did throughout the Cold War. The missiles are no longer targeted at any country (they have been de-targeted since 1994). This position was considered and reaffirmed during the work in the 2006 White Paper. We believe that a nuclear attack on the United Kingdom’s vital interests is deterred by demonstrating our capability to respond under any circumstances, rather than just by

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<sup>1</sup> Available from [www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-of-the-united-kingdoms-nuclear-deterrent-defence-white-paper-2006-cm-6994](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-of-the-united-kingdoms-nuclear-deterrent-defence-white-paper-2006-cm-6994).

<sup>2</sup> Available from [www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty).

an ability for a rapid response. There is no immediacy of launch in our normal operating posture.

10. The security and safety of our nuclear weapons is given the very highest priority and is entirely consistent with our obligations under non-proliferation agreements. Robust arrangements are in place for the political control of the United Kingdom's strategic nuclear deterrent. There are a number of technological and procedural safeguards built into the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent to prevent an unauthorized launch of its Trident missiles.

11. Finally, the United Kingdom has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions since 1991.

## **II. Nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control (including nuclear disarmament) and verification**

### **Stockpile size**

12. The United Kingdom has achieved substantial reductions in its nuclear-weapon stockpile. In the late 1970s, when the United Kingdom's stockpile was at its highest, the United Kingdom had more than 400 warheads in-service across 5 types. Since the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference the United Kingdom has unilaterally decided to cut our stockpile of nuclear warheads, as outlined in the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Today we have fewer than 225 warheads, all of a single type. We have committed to reducing this maximum stockpile to no more than 180 by the mid-2020s, with the requirement for operationally available warheads at no more than 120, a target that the United Kingdom is steadily working towards. All nuclear material no longer deemed necessary for military purposes has been placed under international safeguards. We have also committed to reducing the number of deployed warheads from 48 down to 40 per nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine. In conjunction, each submarine will then field eight operational Trident ballistic missiles.

### **Verification**

13. Developing and agreeing effective measures for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads will be an important precondition for fulfilling the goals of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United Kingdom-Norway Initiative is an example of the world-leading research the United Kingdom is undertaking to address some of the technical and procedural challenges posed by effective verification of warhead dismantlement. In 2012, the United Kingdom hosted a P5 expert-level meeting on verification to discuss lessons learned from United Kingdom-Norway Initiative to date.

14. We are in our second decade of an active partnership with the United States of America in monitoring and verification research. Our joint technical cooperation programme allows us to apply policy, technology and programme expertise to develop and evaluate targeted approaches for transparent reductions and monitoring of nuclear warheads, fissile material and associated facilities for potential disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. Technical experts conduct activities and share information to explore and address essential and difficult monitoring and verification challenges, working to integrate potential approaches for arms control

monitoring and transparency. Additionally, the United Kingdom and China have conducted two technical exchange visits and will continue to explore collaborative exchanges into arms control and verification research.

### **III. Transparency and confidence-building measures**

15. Through the Strategic Defence and Security Review and other documents, the United Kingdom has voluntarily declared its maximum warhead stockpile numbers and operational warhead numbers.

16. We have also expressed our unconditional support for the 2010 action plan at numerous forums. In line with this support, the United Kingdom actively participates in regular working level meetings of the P5 nuclear-weapon States that advance our collective dialogue on disarmament and review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The United Kingdom held the first P5 Conference in 2009, and looks forward to starting the second cycle of Conferences before the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2015.

17. The United Kingdom actively promotes its work on the United Kingdom-Norway Initiative to non-nuclear-weapon States. This has included hosting a joint United Kingdom-Norway workshop for 12 non-nuclear-weapon States in December 2011 and side events at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences and the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees. Another side event will be held at the 2014 Preparatory Committee.

#### **Nuclear glossary**

18. The P5 are, under China's leadership, developing a glossary of nuclear terms to aid understanding between States in discussing related matters. The United Kingdom has strongly supported the authoring of this glossary and looks forward to using this multilingual handbook in future work.

### **IV. Other related issues**

#### **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

19. The United Kingdom recognizes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a key element of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and provides extensive technical and political support to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's Preparatory Commission. The United Kingdom maintains the United Kingdom National Data Centre, Eskdalemuir Seismometer Array, a number of other international monitoring system stations throughout United Kingdom territories and one of 16 global radionuclide laboratories that provide analytical support to the international monitoring system. These facilities are backed up by enduring research in a number of areas, notably through the Atomic Weapons Establishment's Forensic Seismology Team. In addition, the United Kingdom is heavily involved in preparations for Integrated Field Exercise 2014 which will evaluate the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization's on-site inspection capability.

20. The United Kingdom is active in the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization's working groups in Vienna and provides funding for Sir Michael Weston to chair the finance-focused Advisory Group. Our work ensures that the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization has the necessary funding and working time to build and maintain an effective monitoring regime.

#### **Fissile material cut-off treaty**

21. Since the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, the United Kingdom has upheld a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the United Kingdom has been conducted under international safeguards. We are committed to the pursuit of an international treaty that would put an end to the future production of fissile material for such purposes. We made a commitment in the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty action plan to begin negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

22. The United Kingdom supported the resolution in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 2012 to create a fissile material cut-off treaty Group of Government Experts. We hope that the fissile material cut-off treaty Group of Government Experts, in which we are pleased to have a United Kingdom expert participating, will complement existing efforts to find a positive way forward on the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the first session of the Group of Government Experts, held from 31 March to 11 April, made a strong and constructive start to the process.

## **Section II: Reporting on national measures relating to non-proliferation**

### **I. Safeguards**

23. All civil nuclear material in the United Kingdom is subject to Euratom safeguards and to the terms of the United Kingdom/European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)/International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tripartite safeguards agreement under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Euratom safeguards obligations stem from chapter VII ( articles 77-85) of the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, which requires the European Commission, inter alia, to satisfy itself that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by users. This is achieved through:

- A requirement that all operators of nuclear installations provide the Commission with basic technical characteristics describing the location and intended activities of their installation;
- A requirement that operators keep and report nuclear material accountancy records;
- Provision for the Commission to inspect installations and records;

- Provision for the imposition of sanctions by the Commission in the event of infringement of the treaty safeguards obligations. These sanctions can range from a published written warning to withdrawal of the nuclear material concerned.

24. The various reporting requirements are amplified in Commission regulation (Euratom) 302/05. Euratom safeguards do not apply to nuclear material intended to meet defence requirements.

#### **Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement**

25. The United Kingdom Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement with IAEA and Euratom came into force in 1978. The agreement allows for the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in facilities or parts thereof within the United Kingdom, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Nuclear materials accountancy reports on all civil nuclear material in facilities is provided to IAEA by Euratom, and IAEA may “designate” any facility, or part thereof, for inspection. Currently, some of the plutonium stores at Sellafield and the gas centrifuge enrichment facilities at Capenhurst are designated for IAEA inspection. The agreement gives the United Kingdom the right to remove facilities and/or withdraw nuclear material from the scope of the agreement for reasons of national security. However, as part of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the United Kingdom agreed that any future withdrawals from safeguards would “be limited to small quantities of nuclear materials not suitable for explosive purposes” and undertook to publish information on any such withdrawals.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Additional Protocol**

26. The United Kingdom Additional Protocol to the voluntary offer safeguards agreement is based on the model agreement (INFCIRC/540 corr.), and contains measures aimed at the primary objectives of Additional Protocols — to increase IAEA capability to detect any undeclared nuclear material and activities in non-nuclear-weapon States or to increase the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. Information, and associated access, is therefore provided on all Protocol-relevant activities that are done in collaboration with or are otherwise relevant to a non-nuclear-weapon State, or where the information would improve the effectiveness or efficiency of IAEA safeguards in the United Kingdom.

## **II. Export controls**

#### **Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)**

27. The United Kingdom has worked hard to fully implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) since its unanimous adoption in 2004. As one of the vice-chairs of the 1540 Committee, the United Kingdom works with United Nations Member States to strengthen efforts to promote universal implementation of the resolution. We work with and through international organizations and initiatives, including IAEA and the G8 Global Partnership, to provide technical and financial support to deliver concrete improvements in the security of materials, knowledge and know-how in partner countries; facilitate debate and deliver training to help

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/safeguards/withdrawals.htm>.

build partners' engagement and capacities; and maintain domestic technical and scientific expertise in counter proliferation, arms control and chemical, biological and nuclear security. United Kingdom export controls and enforcement capability enable us to maintain a robust and effective national export control regime, and to strengthen international export controls.

### **Nuclear Suppliers Group**

28. By fulfilling its obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, the United Kingdom contributes to minimizing nuclear proliferation while ensuring that eligible States are able to access nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The United Kingdom implements effective strategic export controls in regards to its nuclear transfers in line with the National Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee control lists. Relevant exports are assessed against the Consolidated European Union and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and stated United Kingdom Government export control policies. A robust enforcement system, underpinned by the Export Control Order 2008, operates to deter attempts to breach the controls and help facilitate legitimate transfers.

29. The United Kingdom also actively supports the work of the National Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. The United Kingdom contributed extensive technical expertise to the National Supplier Group's recent three-year-long fundamental review of its control lists, and continues this through the newly established Technical Experts Group, ensuring that the National Supplier Group's control lists reflect changing proliferation threats. We also share licensing and enforcement information with fellow participating Governments, both ad hoc and at the Licensing and Enforcement and Information Exchange Meetings.

30. In 2013 the United Kingdom authored a paper entitled "Good practices for corporate standards to support the efforts of the international community in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". It was agreed at the thirty-first Consultative Group meeting and posted on the National Suppliers Group public website shortly thereafter. The paper recognizes the important role that the diverse commercial sector can play in assisting multilateral efforts in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United Kingdom has supported National Suppliers Group outreach activities with emerging technology holders.

## **III. Nuclear security**

31. The United Kingdom's security regime for the civil nuclear industry is robust and effective and fully meets international standards. Security arrangements are based on the principles of the graded approach and defence in depth and are kept under constant review.

32. In 2010 the United Kingdom deposited its instruments of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Although the 2005 amendment has not yet entered into force the United Kingdom has in place legislation which implements it.

33. In 2013 the United Kingdom extended the scope of its security regulation to cover civil nuclear sites under construction in order to take account of the United Kingdom's new nuclear build programme. The legislation had previously regulated

operating civil nuclear sites. Revised guidance was issued to the industry by the United Kingdom's nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, in October 2012, which is a key step towards an increasingly more outcome-focused regulatory regime for security in the civil nuclear industry. By the end of January 2014 all nuclear premises regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation Civil Nuclear Security now have National Objectives Requirements Model Standards (NORMS)-compliant approved nuclear site security plans.

#### **Nuclear information security**

34. The United Kingdom has promoted the need to secure sensitive nuclear information within the framework of the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Partnership and IAEA.

#### **Key attributes of an excellent nuclear security culture**

35. In 2012 a tripartite subgroup was established (with representatives from the regulator, industry and government) to develop a better understanding of the attributes of an excellent security culture, and for this to be captured and codified. The output of this work is a guidance document<sup>4</sup> which was published in June 2013. The guide sets out key attributes deemed necessary for an excellent security culture and then sets out for each one what is required to achieve this. The implementation of the recommendations in the guide is not compulsory, but is intended to inform and enhance understanding of how all parties (regulator, industry and government) can deliver to meet the objective.

#### **International Physical Protection Advisory Service**

36. The United Kingdom was the first nuclear-weapon State to welcome an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. A mission team visited the Sellafield civil nuclear site and Barrow port in October 2011, and concluded that the state of civil nuclear security is robust. The team identified many examples of good practice within the civil nuclear security regime and made a number of valuable recommendations. In March 2014 the United Kingdom Government invited IAEA to send a follow up IPPAS mission to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom provides security experts who participate in a number of outward IPPAS missions.

### **IV. Nuclear-weapon-free zones**

37. The United Kingdom continues to support the principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones. As previously stated in 1995 and 2010, we recognize the role that negative security assurances can play in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security.

#### **Existing zones**

38. To date, the United Kingdom has signed and ratified Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), the Treaty of Rarotonga (South

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.nuclear.nacademy.co.uk/system/files/0034%20Spooner%20Security%20Culture%20Leaflet.pdf>.

Pacific), and the Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa): 74 States, therefore, already have in place protocols that provide legally binding negative security assurances from the United Kingdom. We also support the parallel political declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia concerning that country's nuclear-weapon-free status.

#### **Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone**

39. We will continue to pursue signing protocols to existing nuclear-weapon-free zones as a practical way of strengthening our existing negative security assurances. The United Kingdom therefore welcomes the forthcoming signature by the nuclear-weapon States of a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ). Under this Protocol, the nuclear-weapon States will extend legally binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any party to the CANWFZ Treaty and not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the CANWFZ Treaty or its Protocol. The United Kingdom hopes to ratify the Protocol by the end of 2014.

#### **South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone**

40. In conjunction with other nuclear-weapon States, the United Kingdom will continue to engage with the States parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in order to allow signature of a Protocol to that Treaty in the near future.

#### **Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction**

41. The United Kingdom remains committed to the implementation of the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty resolution on the Middle East and, as one of the co-sponsors of that resolution, is working hard to deliver against the practical steps agreed in 2010. We look forward to convening an inclusive conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as soon as the practical arrangements for that conference are agreed by the States of the region. We will continue to work with all the States of the region, our fellow co-conveners and the Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to encourage progress towards this common goal.

## **V. Compliance and other related issues/concerns**

#### **Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

42. The United Kingdom has been fully supportive of all United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the presidential statement of 16 April 2012, made in the wake of the satellite launch of 13 April 2012. We continue to support the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in its work, and have reported violations of that country's sanctions to the Panel. Our work to raise awareness of existing Democratic People's Republic of Korea sanctions and to encourage ongoing implementation.. The United Kingdom has funded the International Institute of Strategic Studies to run workshops in partnership with the Panel of Experts to raise awareness of Democratic People's Republic of Korea sanctions and encourage implementation in both the public and private sectors. In 2013 workshops were held

in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Hong Kong. We plan to continue this work.

43. The United Kingdom is not a member of the Six-Party Talks, nor are we seeking involvement in discussions. However, given the risk of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to international security, we are maintaining close contact with all sides. We have made clear to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that if it carries out any further provocations the international community will respond robustly. However, we have also been clear that if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea takes concrete steps to resolve the nuclear issue there will be a positive response.

## **VI. Other contributions to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

### **Islamic Republic of Iran**

44. The United Kingdom remains concerned about the nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. However, we are committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The United Kingdom has adopted a dual track strategy of pressure and engagement. We have supported six Security Council resolutions which prohibit the Islamic Republic of Iran from all reprocessing, heavy water and enrichment-related activity, most recently Security Council resolution 1929 (2010), adopted in June 2010. We continue to call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully comply with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, and to call upon all United Nations Member States to implement Security Council resolutions fully. We actively support the work of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Islamic Republic of Iran. We have also implemented European Union sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran which go beyond these measures. In addition, the United Kingdom has played an active role in P5+1 negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and we welcome the agreement of the Joint Plan of Action between the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran in November 2013, as well as that country's substantive engagement in talks to reach a comprehensive agreement.

45. The United Kingdom shares the "serious concerns" of IAEA about the possible military dimensions to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme due to the credible information available to it which indicates that that country had carried out activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear device". As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, the United Kingdom has supported two IAEA Board resolutions in 2011 and 2012 which stress that it is essential for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue to resolve all outstanding substantive issues. We continue to support IAEA in its tireless efforts to address these issues. We welcome the agreement of a joint statement on a framework for cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in November 2013, in which the Islamic Republic of Iran has agreed to resolve all outstanding issues with the Agency. We continue to call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to address fully the substance of all of the Agency's outstanding concerns, including by granting access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested.

### **Global Partnership**

46. The United Kingdom makes a major contribution to the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and, as part of the United Kingdom's G8 Presidency in 2013, held the Chair of the Global Partnership. Under the United Kingdom Presidency, the Global Partnership established mechanisms to better match its partners' funds and expertise with specific security requirements, and improve project coordination and implementation. We also held an outreach event with 1540 Committee experts to encourage universal reporting by States (in line with resolution obligations). From 2002 to 2012, the United Kingdom committed over £350 million of funding to Global Partnership projects.

47. The United Kingdom's largest contribution to the Global Partnership is through the Global Threat Reduction Programme. We are working on global threat reduction programmes that aim to:

- Improve the security of fissile materials;
- Reduce the number of sites containing sensitive nuclear and radiological material and improve security of remaining sites;
- Reduce the risks in the proliferation of biological expertise and materials; and
- Prevent terrorists acquiring proliferation-relevant information and expertise.

### **Academic Technology Approval Scheme**

48. In the United Kingdom the Academic Technology Approval Scheme is responsible for stopping the spread of knowledge and skills from academic programmes that could be used in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

49. Academic institutions have a mandatory obligation to comply with United Kingdom visa requirements. Obtaining a certificate under the scheme is a requirement for all students applying for student visas and intending to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for more than six months to undertake post-graduate studies or research in certain designated subjects.

## **Section III: Reporting on national measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy**

### **I. Promoting peaceful uses**

50. The United Kingdom fully supports the inalienable right of all state parties to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy under the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a culture of openness, transparency and confidence and believes in the responsible, safe and secure access to civil nuclear energy worldwide, subject to the State being in conformity with the non-proliferation requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

51. We note the increasing demand for civil nuclear energy and stress its potential in addressing climate change and in providing energy security. Furthermore, we support the work of IAEA in facilitating achievement of the Millennium

Development Goals and sustainable development and in addressing vital non-power applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture and industry.

#### **Developments in civil nuclear energy**

52. The United Kingdom recognizes the importance of civil nuclear energy, not least as civil nuclear power facilities need to sit alongside other low carbon forms of electricity generation. The United Kingdom has been clear that civil nuclear energy will be a key part of our future low carbon energy mix. It also offers us a cost-effective pathway to meet our legally binding carbon targets. The United Kingdom's commitment to civil nuclear power is evident in the steps which have been taken in the last year in relation to the new build programme in the United Kingdom. This is being done without subsidy from the Government, but work is being done to secure the long-term commercial investment needed.

#### **Nuclear industrial strategy**

53. The United Kingdom has taken several steps over the past year to continue our efforts in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We published the Nuclear Industrial Strategy in March 2013, which identified priorities for Government and industry to work together in a long-term partnership. It aims to provide more opportunities for economic growth and create jobs through an increased share of all aspects of the civil nuclear market. One of the main points in the strategy was the creation of the Nuclear Industry Council, which brings together all the key players across the civil nuclear supply chain. The Council will be looking at a number of issues essential to the success of our civil nuclear sector in the future: skills, trade and investment, business capability and how the public perceives the civil nuclear industry.

#### **Energy Act**

54. The United Kingdom Government also recognizes the importance of an independent and robust regulatory regime and is committed to creating the highest standards of civil nuclear regulation. To that end, it has embarked on steps to enhance the United Kingdom's civil nuclear regulatory framework, to ensure it remains world class and has the flexibility to be able to address future challenges. The Energy Act, which gained Royal Assent in December 2013, includes provisions to establish the Office for Nuclear Regulation (created in 2011) as a statutory, independent regulator. The Office brings together the functions of civil nuclear safety, security, safeguards implementation, radioactive materials transport, and health and safety on civil nuclear sites. The Office for Nuclear Regulation began operating as a statutory body on 1 April 2014.

#### **Memorandums of understanding**

55. The Government of the United Kingdom is keen to enhance the links between the United Kingdom and other countries around the world with the view of enhancing civil nuclear energy cooperation. We made several high-profile announcements in this regard last year. These include the signing of memorandums of understanding with various countries focusing on, inter alia, setting the strategic framework for collaboration on investment, technology, construction and expertise in civil nuclear energy, and exploring bilateral cooperation opportunities.

56. The United Kingdom Government has several mechanisms through which civil nuclear energy cooperation is enabled, including nuclear cooperation agreements and memorandums of understanding. In addition to bilateral agreements, we are also party to Euratom cooperation agreements. Our activities in this area indicate a clear intent for the United Kingdom to work with various countries across a range of relevant civil nuclear energy-related activities, and we are in discussion with several other States regarding how civil nuclear energy cooperation can be enhanced bilaterally.

#### **Nuclear fuel assurance**

57. The United Kingdom fully supports moves to create a menu of viable and credible assurances of fuel supply, which would enable a new nuclear State to avoid the need to develop expensive and complex indigenous enrichment technologies. The United Kingdom's Nuclear Fuel Assurance proposal, a response to the IAEA request for multilateral nuclear approaches, was adopted at the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2011. This is one practical approach ensures that States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have access to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy, while upholding high standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The United Kingdom views all multilateral nuclear approach proposals as complementary, and hopes that States are able to select proposals which contribute best to their energy mix.

## **II. Technical assistance through the International Atomic Energy Agency to its member States**

58. The United Kingdom is committed to supporting the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and demonstrates this by paying our contributions to the technical cooperation fund promptly and in full on an annual basis. We are involved in the ongoing discussions regarding the Technical Cooperation Programme and are keen to ensure that it continues to improve, fulfil its potential and provide the vital work that it undertakes.

59. The United Kingdom is very supportive of the contribution that the Technical Cooperation Programme makes towards the Millennium Development Goals. The good work that the Programme can achieve should not be underestimated and it has made numerous, positive contributions to the peaceful uses of nuclear-related technologies in many countries around the world.

60. The United Kingdom is encouraging IAEA to continue to ensure results-based management and "sustainable" outcomes, accountability, transparency and synergies in the Technical Cooperation Programme.

## **III. Nuclear safety and civil nuclear liability**

61. The United Kingdom is a strong supporter of coordinated international efforts towards the continuous improvement of nuclear safety across the globe. As part of our commitment to achieving high nuclear safety standards the United Kingdom aims to show a leadership role in meeting its obligations as a contracting party to relevant international nuclear safety instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear

Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste. In particular we are playing a leading role in proposing possible measures to strengthen the Convention on Nuclear Safety peer review processes.

62. In addition, the United Kingdom has been a contracting party to the Paris Convention on nuclear third-party liability and the Brussels Supplementary Convention since the 1960s. The Paris and Brussels Conventions were revised by amending Protocols in 2004. The United Kingdom is committed to implementing the changes and plans to lay legislation in 2014.

63. The United Kingdom actively encourages all States with civil nuclear programmes, or those thinking about developing one, to join a nuclear liability regime and to become contracting parties to the relevant international instruments and in particular the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention.

#### **IV. Other related issues**

64. No additional material.

#### **Any other actions taken to implement and/or strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty**

65. No additional material.

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