

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

23 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 6th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Baali (Algeria)
later: Mr. Niehaus (Vice-President) (Costa Rica)
later: Mr. Baali (President) (Algeria)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting
Committee and the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

Organization of work

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent *within one week of the date of this document* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Jagland** (Norway) stressed that disarmament by nuclear-weapon States was as important as nuclear non-proliferation and reiterated his Government's full support for the goals established at the 1995 Review Conference. The tests carried out by India and Pakistan; the delay in initiating the START II process; the impasse in the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; and the delay in the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) called for fresh impetus and new and concrete non-proliferation and disarmament measures. The growing importance of nuclear weapons in international politics was a trend that must be reversed.

2. The general objectives of the current Conference should be to maintain and build on the results of the 1995 Conference, revitalize and improve working procedures with a view to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty process, and improve the substantive work of the process through initiatives and measures acceptable to both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Of key importance were the development of a programme of action for the coming five-year period, an increased focus on regional issues, and the elaboration of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material.

3. In view of the deficiencies in the strengthened review process and the fact that the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995 remained largely unfulfilled, Norway would be submitting a proposal for a programme of action to the current Conference. The proposed programme of action would call on States parties to follow up the decisions taken by review conferences and, to that end, recommend an increase in the number of annual meetings in the review process from three to four, with a narrower focus on a few specific issues. The programme of action would also contain proposals on developing a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material, including negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes; promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; reviewing information on strategic nuclear arms reductions, including the START process; promoting transparency with regard to tactical nuclear weapons and the destruction of such weapons;

urging States to sign and ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency's new additional protocol on full-scope safeguards; and increasing transparency in nuclear-related export controls.

4. The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 had highlighted the importance of analysing the underlying causes of regional conflict and tension, and of taking into account arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in addressing regional issues. Since the only regional issue before the Conference was the situation in the Middle East, a more ambitious and balanced package of regional issues, including the situation in South Asia, should be dealt with at the annual review meetings. It was also vital to address regional situations where parties to the Treaty failed to comply with their obligations.

5. His delegation would be submitting a proposal for an international framework to deal with fissile material that included a ban on the future production of fissile material for weapons, verification that surplus military stocks of fissile material would not be diverted to weapons programmes, measures for the safety and control of highly enriched uranium produced for non-explosive purposes, and voluntary transparency measures with respect to military inventories of fissile material. Those issues should be addressed either parallel to or independently of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which, regrettably, had not even begun.

6. The nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility to reduce their arsenals and to increase transparency with regard to existing stocks of weapons, intended reductions and nuclear policies. His delegation welcomed the recent decisions of the Russian State Duma on START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement further measures for strategic arms control, in particular, by increasing the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories as agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the 1997 Helsinki Summit. It would be regrettable if current doubts about the viability of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were to aggravate an already difficult situation.

7. Greater attention should be focused on the risks of tactical nuclear weapons, which could be rapidly deployed and play a destabilizing role in conflict areas.

The situation called for increased transparency, a programme of warhead destruction and verification procedures. The 1999 unilateral decisions by the United States and the Russian Federation to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons should be reconfirmed and a time-frame should be established for their implementation. A large number of obsolete and decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines from the former Soviet Union had, over the years, produced huge quantities of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel that were a threat to the environment. Norway had offered to cooperate with the Russian Federation in order to accelerate the construction of an infrastructure for removing and storing those materials. The task, however, was so complicated and costly that nothing short of a broad-based international effort would be required. To that end, Norway had initiated negotiations with the Russian Federation and a number of potential donor countries.

8. *Mr. Niehaus (Costa Rica), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

9. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia) said that, despite the threat of horizontal proliferation and the emergence of new nuclear deterrence, doctrines and strategies that allowed for the use of nuclear weapons, his delegation fully agreed with the President that the international community should avoid yielding to pessimism. It welcomed other, more positive trends, including the reduction of non-strategic nuclear arsenals by the two major nuclear-weapon States, their conclusion of bilateral nuclear arms limitation and reduction agreements and their agreement in principle to further reductions; the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by an overwhelming majority and its ratification by 55 States, including Mongolia; and the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

10. Mongolia also welcomed the recent decision by the Russian State Duma to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and START II and the recent accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nine countries. His delegation attached great importance to the historic 1995 Conference and believed that its decisions should be further strengthened by the current Conference. Generally speaking, his delegation's position on the outcome of the 1995 Conference was reflected in the documents of

the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, including the Final Document of the recent Thirteenth Ministerial Meeting held in Cartagena, Colombia. It believed, in particular, that the two goals of non-proliferation and disarmament must be strictly fulfilled by States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in full compliance with its articles I, II and VI.

11. In response to the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and START II, the United States should ratify the Test-Ban Treaty. Mongolia called on those two countries to consider fully implementing START II and embark on START III negotiations, which should ultimately include the other three nuclear-weapon States as well. The earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the revitalization of the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty were of paramount importance. His delegation also urged the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to elaborate a legally binding international instrument that would provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Stressing the importance of the Treaty's universality, he appealed to India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba to become parties as soon as possible.

12. Mongolia strongly advocated the strengthened safeguards systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and supported the additional protocol designed to improve and strengthen IAEA inspections. It was working with IAEA to conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement; and a group of Mongolian experts would soon visit IAEA headquarters in that connection. Mongolia was also in the process of formalizing its participation in the International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organization. His Government attached great importance to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and therefore welcomed the adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Commission of principles and guidelines on their establishment.

13. Mongolia had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, and General Assembly resolution 53/77 D, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status" had been adopted in 1998 with the support of the international community, including the nuclear-weapon States. That demonstrated that non-proliferation could be strengthened if a State's unilateral action was supported by its immediate neighbours and the

international community. As a further step, in February, the Mongolian Parliament had adopted special legislation on the country's nuclear-weapon-free status, which had been supported by the Secretary-General and by the Non-Aligned Movement at its recent Ministerial Meeting. Together with United Nations bodies, Mongolia was exploring ways and means of addressing some of the issues relating to its broader security concerns in order to reinforce its nuclear-weapon-free status.

14. **Mr. Orhun** (Turkey) said that his delegation subscribed to the statement made on behalf of the European Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential basis for nuclear disarmament. However, unless and until the Treaty enjoyed universal adherence, States parties would continue to be exposed to risks. Turkey, therefore, urged all States which were not yet parties to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible time. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had made a positive contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and strengthening international peace and security. Turkey had signed that Treaty on the day on which it had been opened for signature and had completed the ratification process in February 2000.

15. The inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons was a source of disappointment; his country hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would soon commence negotiations without any pre-conditions. The re-establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate on effective arrangements for security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States would also be an important step. Turkey attached great importance to the commitment by all States parties to fulfil all the obligations undertaken in 1995 and welcomed the unilateral and bilateral efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to comply with the relevant articles of the Treaty. It also welcomed the recent decision to ratify START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the Russian State Duma and hoped that that step would be conducive to the commencement of START III negotiations and have a positive impact on other arms control processes.

16. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements concluded freely between States in their respective regions, would strengthen global as well as regional peace and security. Turkey welcomed the steps taken by States to establish new zones, and fully supported the initiative launched by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 1998 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. His country had repeatedly voiced concerns about the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests conducted in South-East Asia in recent years, which had serious repercussions for regional and global security and stability.

17. In the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed a tangible threat. Turkey had deep-rooted historical ties with the Middle East and maintained cordial relations with all the countries and peoples of the region. It was taking part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse the nuclear threat. The 2000 Conference should include further substantive steps for the next five years and address the objectives that had not been attained since 1995. The "resolution on the Middle East" must be implemented within that context.

18. Turkey firmly believed that the strengthening of safeguards was an important element of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation and was deeply concerned that there were still 54 parties to the Treaty which had not yet brought into force a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. The events following the Gulf War had proved the need for additional safeguards in order to prevent diversion of nuclear materials or equipment, purchased for peaceful purposes, to activities prohibited by the Treaty. His country was preparing to conclude in the near future the additional protocol with IAEA for the application of safeguards.

19. The best means of preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials was to apply measures of physical protection. Turkey hoped that the IAEA international physical protection service would be further strengthened and extended. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee had done valuable work to enhance transparency and foster dialogue and cooperation among all parties; Turkey had joined the Zangger Committee and was in the process of becoming a member of the nuclear suppliers group.

20. **Mr. Calovski** (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that his delegation's views coincided

with those expressed by the representative of Portugal, speaking on behalf of the European Union. In 1995, his country had supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Decision No. 3 of the 1995 Conference was of crucial importance for strengthening the non-proliferation regime. In many regions, the security situation had been threatened more by other negative developments and destructive forces than by non-observance of the non-proliferation regime.

21. The 2000 Conference could be successful if it fully recognized that the international security situation had completely changed since 1990 and was still changing rapidly. The world was entering a period of cooperation and integration, and the forces of globalization would dominate in the years to come. Those forces favoured strict compliance with the non-proliferation regime and arms control; and those who did not grasp that reality would be marginalized. The observance of the Treaty was therefore an important contribution to the overall strengthening of international relations, the enhancement of international cooperation, and the strengthening of multilateralism, in particular the United Nations.

22. His Government's main priority was integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures and membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The observance of the Treaty by his country and the other States of the region was essential in that respect. It was also important that the General Assembly resolutions initiated by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, most recently resolution 54/62, should be fully implemented. The General Assembly had emphasized the importance of regional efforts in South-Eastern Europe on arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures. One of the most important vehicles for achieving those objectives was the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

23. Although the danger of the use of nuclear weapons was diminishing, the threat of their use was not. On the other hand, interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was increasing and should be supported. That factor, together with a greater capability in the field of nuclear technology, would increase the number of countries capable of producing nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation regime must address that danger and the parties to the Treaty must endeavour to prevent such an occurrence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations and

international law. For non-nuclear-weapon States like the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the main interest was to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime and agree on measures that would positively affect the security situation and economic and social development. His delegation stressed the beneficial influence of nuclear disarmament on the mobilization of resources for development in that regard.

24. He emphasized the importance of the accession of nine States to the Treaty since 1995. The Conference should address the necessity that four other States accede to the Treaty. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia maintained excellent relations with all those countries, which, traditionally, had been in favour of full observance of the Charter of the United Nations, a main base for the Treaty. His country had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in March 2000. It was encouraging that so many States had signed and ratified it. The recent ratification by the Russian Federation represented an important incentive for other States, including the United States of America, whose leadership in the adoption of that Treaty had been highly praised.

25. It was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had not started negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. One reason was the Conference's outdated working methods, which were the same as during the cold war. His delegation hoped that the current difficulties would be overcome. In the area of nuclear disarmament, the long-awaited ratification of START II by the Russian Federation was a welcome development which should lead to the commencement of START III negotiations and progress on other issues, including the current state of relations among nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament. So far, the nuclear-weapon States had refused to negotiate with the non-nuclear-weapon States, and it was not realistic to expect that they would change their position. However, that did not mean that the non-nuclear-weapon States should abandon the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. They should strive to achieve that goal, shared also by the nuclear-weapon States, sooner rather than later.

26. The 2000 Conference should reaffirm the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was regrettable that there had been no progress in that regard in the Middle East, as called for

in the 1995 “Resolution on the Middle East”. The Conference also needed to pay particular attention to safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, an area of utmost importance to the majority of States parties. It should insist on full-scope safeguards and greater transparency in nuclear-related export controls and should encourage all parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The efforts to develop new and renewable energy sources should not be an obstacle in that respect. However, the dangers of old nuclear plants should be addressed, on the basis of international cooperation.

27. **Mr. Wisnumurti** (Indonesia) said that the Conference’s task of reviewing the progress made in implementing the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Conference had been rendered more difficult by the failure of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Conference to agree on substantive issues because of the differences between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, there had been progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament. His delegation was encouraged by the increase in the number of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the approval for ratification by the Russian State Duma of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the formulation by the Commission on Disarmament of guidelines on the establishment of new such zones.

28. On the other hand, the credibility of the non-proliferation regime had been gravely undermined by such developments as the conducting of nuclear tests in South Asia. In addition, the CTBT had yet to enter into force, negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices had not begun, and efforts to modernize nuclear arsenals, including through research, development and testing, continued. Plans for the deployment of a missile defence system and the prospect of the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space were further causes for concern. Failure to acknowledge that dismal state of affairs would only deepen frustration.

29. It was critically important to reverse the growing perception that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was of dubious value and had become an instrument for the promotion of the interests of a handful of States. The

Conference must adopt decisions on such issues as security assurances and measures to promote the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and agree on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament. The final document should set out a series of goals to be accomplished by 2005, including ratification of the CTBT by all 44 States identified therein, cessation of sub-critical testing, and conclusion of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable fissile material cut-off convention.

30. The Conference must also reaffirm the integrity and importance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). In order to reduce nuclear danger, nuclear weapons must be de-alerted and nuclear warheads decoupled from their delivery vehicles, tactical nuclear weapons must be eliminated, plans to deploy weapons in outer space must be withdrawn, measures must be adopted to achieve greater transparency in nuclear-related issues, and negotiations must begin on a third strategic arms reduction treaty with a view to achieving significantly deeper reductions. The Conference must ensure that States that had renounced nuclear weapons were not excluded from decision making on nuclear disarmament.

31. The Conference on Disarmament had a unique role to play in that regard. Those were modest, realistic and achievable steps that would preserve the Non-Proliferation Treaty and stop the dangerous arms race that loomed on the horizon. With respect to security assurances, the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States could be addressed only by the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument. Another means of promoting a stable security environment was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation called on the international community to support the establishment of such zones in north and central Asia and in the Middle East.

32. The decision on “Principles and objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” adopted by the 1995 Conference had reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as making the acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards a necessary precondition for the transfer of nuclear materials and technology. Broader participation in the elaboration of nuclear-related export controls would help to dispel the belief that the purpose of such controls went beyond non-

proliferation and that they impinged on the decision-making prerogatives of the recipient countries.

33. He noted with satisfaction that an increasing number of countries were concluding additional protocols to their Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, but was concerned that the Agency lacked funding for its technical cooperation programme. The depositary States, as sponsors of the "Resolution on the Middle East", had a special responsibility for ensuring its implementation. Regrettably, one State in the region had yet to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. His delegation welcomed the establishment of a subsidiary body at the Conference to identify the steps required for the adherence of all States in the Middle East to the Treaty.

34. The Treaty's objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were inseparable. It was not feasible to promote the non-proliferation regime without giving due regard to disarmament. In order to preserve the integrity of the Treaty, there must be significant and irreversible steps towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. In that connection, his delegation strongly supported the proposal by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to establish an open-ended inter-sessional standing committee to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Indonesia stood ready to contribute to that process.

35. **Mr. Al-Nasser** (Qatar) said that the 2000 Conference had inspired great hopes and aspirations that would be fulfilled only through serious and transparent work by the participants in the Conference and total adherence by the States parties to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the package of commitments entered into at the 1995 Conference. Regrettably, the international community was far from having realized the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament set out in the Treaty. As to the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Conference, the objective of universal adherence to the Treaty had not been achieved, negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material had yet to begin, the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had failed to produce any serious recommendations, and, although the Arab States of the Middle East had all acceded to the Treaty, Israel had yet to do so or to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

36. The entire international community knew that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, posing a grave threat to security in the Middle East. Furthermore, there was a real risk of radiological contamination from its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Yet the States parties to the Treaty, particularly some nuclear-weapon States, turned a blind eye to those problems. Israel's intransigence had dealt a severe blow to the efforts to bring peace to the Middle East. Qatar therefore called on all countries to bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty, place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to establish in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

37. The nuclear-weapon States had a moral duty to provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons, pursue negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame, and allow the transfer to developing countries of nuclear technology to assist them in their efforts to achieve prosperity for their peoples. Lastly, his delegation hoped that the Conference would become a milestone on the path to the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, in which humanity could enjoy peace, security and stability.

38. **Mr. Guliyev** (Azerbaijan) said that, with the end of global confrontation and the collapse of totalitarian ideologies, the international community had a unique opportunity to carry forward the process of disarmament and curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There had been remarkable achievements in those areas over the past decade, particularly the conclusion of CTBT and the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

39. The convening of the 2000 Conference demonstrated the continuing commitment of the States parties to the Preamble and provisions of the Treaty. Preserving the integrity of the Treaty was essential for international peace and security; and the attainment of the Treaty's universality was therefore a priority. His delegation called on all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date and without conditions, particularly those States that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Conference should stress that every effort had to be made to curb

the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The cohesive application of a strict export control regime by both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would make a substantial contribution in that area.

40. A commitment to the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons was essential to regional and international security and stability and to achieving the fundamental goals of the Treaty. Azerbaijan therefore welcomed the decision to ratify START II by the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the measures that had been taken by other nuclear-weapon States to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear armaments. It commended Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on their contribution to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and, in particular, their decision to voluntarily withdraw all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories.

41. His country also supported the steps that had been taken since 1995 to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. He recalled in that connection the initiative which the President of Azerbaijan had launched in 1997 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern Caucasus. Given the geostrategic location of that region and the conflicts which it was currently experiencing, the establishment of such a zone would mark an important milestone in the enhancement of security at both the regional and international levels and should therefore be supported by the international community.

42. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, every effort should be made to put in place a legally binding regime of negative security assurances. Azerbaijan welcomed the establishment in March 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances. The Conference should vigorously seek to increase its membership in order to better reflect the changes that had taken place in international relations. IAEA played a crucial role in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and States that had not yet done so should conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency. He emphasized in that connection that nuclear safety was an essential prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

43. Azerbaijan, which regarded combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a

priority of its foreign policy, had signed and ratified major international and legally binding instruments and had contributed to the efforts of the international community in that field. Even though it had no nuclear sites or nuclear material under its jurisdiction, his country had applied for IAEA membership in order to enhance its cooperation with the Agency. Situated as it was at the crossroads of potentially turbulent regions, Azerbaijan took all necessary precautions, including legislative measures, to prevent the transfer through its territory of any components, materials and technology related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

44. **Mr. Al-Sindi** (Yemen) said that, as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime over the previous 30 years, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had benefited all States. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, at which States parties had agreed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty and had adopted a number of Decisions and Resolutions, including the "Resolution on the Middle East", the United States of America and the Russian Federation had committed themselves to reducing their nuclear arsenals. More recently, the State Duma of the Russian Federation had decided to ratify both START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. For its part, the United Arab Emirates had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby bringing the goal of universality one step closer to reality.

45. Notwithstanding those favourable developments, doubts still persisted about the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, since a number of States remained outside its ambit. All the States in the Middle East had acceded to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel, which had given no indication that it intended to do so. The Conference should urge Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all of its nuclear installations under the full-scope IAEA safeguards regime. The sponsors of the "Resolution on the Middle East" should also called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty without delay and to place all of its nuclear installations under the international safeguards regime as an important first step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

46. The Conference should also request the States parties to the Treaty to refrain from the transfer or transport of nuclear equipment, know-how, resources or material. Lastly, his delegation supported the Egyptian proposal for the establishment of a

monitoring system in the Middle East and hoped that, as the new century unfolded, the international community would fully recognize the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as an instrument for the elimination of nuclear weapons based on a specific timetable.

47. **Mr. Cappagli** (Argentina) said that, since the restoration of its democracy, Argentina had taken a series of steps to strengthen its integration with neighbouring countries, intensify the dialogue between the countries of the southern hemisphere, ban weapons of mass destruction and place restrictions on certain types of conventional weapons. It had also participated in efforts to promote international security and stability based on democratic values, the rule of law, human rights and free markets. The nation had been particularly active at the regional level, where, together with its neighbours, it had developed a framework for coexistence based on cooperation, transparency and integration.

48. Argentina reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the international community's objectives of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had contributed to those objectives by the transparency, mutual trust and coordination that had characterized its relations with Brazil in the nuclear field. The two States had established a system of mutual safeguards for their nuclear installations and materials, which was reinforced by their acceptance of IAEA safeguards and their accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

49. Argentina had also signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It welcomed the subsequent accession of Brazil and Chile and urged all States that were not yet parties to accede to the Treaty as early as possible. Given the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty not only to the maintenance of international peace and security but also to the very survival of mankind, States had a moral obligation to comply with its provisions. The balance of obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, however, in no way legitimized the permanent possession of such weapons nor did it release nuclear-weapon States from their obligations in the area of disarmament. Those States should speed up the reduction of their nuclear arsenals with a view to the total elimination of such weapons in the near future.

50. The obligation of the nuclear-weapon States was all the greater as they were also permanent members of the Security Council. The 2000 Review Conference should seek to strengthen certain aspects of the Treaty, such as its provisions concerning Safeguards Agreements, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear export controls. The Conference should also undertake an in-depth review of the Treaty's implementation, identify future steps to be taken and commit the international community to action.

51. The maintenance of international peace and security was becoming increasingly complex and no effort should be spared to avert the danger of a nuclear war and its inescapable consequences. The international strategic situation had deteriorated in recent years with the nuclear tests that had been carried out in South Asia in 1998 and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States towards disarmament. Delegations to the 2000 Conference should therefore show the greatest flexibility so that the Conference could effectively address those concerns.

52. A more positive trend had been noted, however, in the bilateral and/or unilateral reduction by some nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of START II. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty facilitated the process of eliminating nuclear weapons already begun by the nuclear-weapon States and the international community should be kept informed of the interim measures adopted pending the total elimination of those arsenals.

53. In order to advance towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, the international community had elaborated a series of instruments and taken a number of initiatives that together constituted the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The success of that regime was dependent on the support of all States. The signature, ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a start to negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would therefore go a long way towards demonstrating the international community's commitment to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in all their aspects.

54. IAEA safeguards were crucial to ensuring that nuclear materials for peaceful uses were not diverted to other uses. In addition, bilateral and regional safeguards promoted greater transparency and mutual

trust between neighbouring States. The regime of bilateral safeguards developed by Argentina and Brazil, for example, was highly effective and could serve as a model for other regions of the world. Acceptance of IAEA safeguards and a commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a condition for the supply of nuclear materials and technology were becoming the norm. Nuclear export control regimes had an important role to play in promoting cooperation in the nuclear field and should be viewed not as restrictions on legitimate access to nuclear technology but as guidelines for responsible nuclear export policies.

55. The Treaty placed no restrictions on the legitimate and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Indeed, it guaranteed the economic and technological development of the parties through international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the international exchange of equipment and material for the processing, use and production of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Such activities must be carried out in a transparent manner and in compliance with internationally accepted norms for the safety and physical protection of nuclear materials. In that connection, cooperation in the pertinent forums was essential in order to strengthen the norms that regulated the transport by sea of radioactive wastes.

56. Nuclear-weapon-free zones made a significant contribution to international peace and security as areas that were free from the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Argentina hoped that other regions, especially those that were hotbeds of tension, would follow the example of Latin America and the Caribbean and establish similar zones, which significantly promoted development.

57. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee *(continued)*

58. **The President** said that Mr. Koeffler of Austria had been nominated as the second Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee and that, in addition, Greece had been nominated as the sixth member of that Committee.

59. *Mr. Koeffler (Austria) was elected as a Vice-Chairman and Greece was elected as a member of the Credentials Committee.*

Organization of work

60. **The President** said that the General Committee had considered requests from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the League of Arab States and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to make statements in the plenary meeting of the Conference. Since there had been no objection to those requests, he took it that the Conference wished to extend an invitation to OPANAL, the League of Arab States and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials to make statements in a plenary meeting of the Conference.

61. *It was so decided.*

62. **The President** said that, at the same meeting, the General Committee had considered the query by Cuba, an observer to the Conference, as to whether it could circulate its documents as official documents of the Conference. Since the rules of procedure were not clear in that respect and since, at the 1990 Review Conference, several States non-parties to the Treaty had been allowed to circulate their documents as official documents, the General Committee had had no objection to continuing that practice. He therefore took it that the Conference wished to continue to issue documents submitted by observer States as official documents.

63. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.