

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

16 May 2000

Original: English

New York, 24 April-19 May 2000

Report of Main Committee II

Establishment and terms of reference

1. Under rule 34 of its rules of procedure, the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons established Main Committee II as one of its three Main Committees and decided to allocate to it the following items for its consideration (see NPT/CONF.2000/1 and Corr.1, annex VIII):

Item 16. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

- (c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:
 - (i) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;
 - (ii) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;
 - (iii) Article VII.
- (e) Other provisions of the Treaty.

Item 17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

2. Also pursuant to rule 34 of its rules of procedure, the Conference approved the establishment of Subsidiary Body 2 under Main Committee II. The Conference decided that Subsidiary Body 2 would examine regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. It

further decided that the Subsidiary Body would be open-ended, and that the meetings of the Subsidiary Body would be held in private. The Conference decided that Subsidiary Body 2 would hold four meetings within the overall time allocated to Main Committee II, and that the outcome of the work of the Subsidiary Body would be reflected in the report of Main Committee II to the Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/DEC.1).

Officers of the Committee

3. The Conference unanimously elected Ambassador Adam Kobieracki (Poland) as the Chairman of the Committee and Ambassador Dae-won Suh (Republic of Korea) and Yaw Odei Osei (Ghana) as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.
4. The Conference also unanimously elected Ambassador Christopher Westdal (Canada) as Chairman of Subsidiary Body 2.

Documents before the Committee

5. The Committee had before it the following documents:

- (a) Background documents

NPT/CONF.2000/1 and Corr.1	Final Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2000/3	Implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: developments since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference: background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat
NPT/CONF.2000/5	Implementation of article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: developments since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference: background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat
NPT/CONF.2000/7	Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat
NPT/CONF.2000/8	Realization of the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in various regions of the World: background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat

NPT/CONF.2000/9	Activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency relevant to article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: background paper prepared by the secretariat of IAEA
NPT/CONF.2000/12	Memorandum from the General Secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean prepared for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2000/13	Memorandum on activities relating to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty: submitted by the secretariat of the South Pacific Forum
NPT/CONF.2000/14	Memorandum on activities relating to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty): submitted by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity
NPT/CONF.2000/15	Memorandum on activities relating to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok): submitted by the depositary of the Treaty of Bangkok
NPT/CONF.2000/16	Letter dated 2 March 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Provisional Secretary-General of the Conference (transmitting the Law of Mongolia on the nuclear-weapon-free status and the parliamentary resolution)
NPT/CONF.2000/17	Multilateral nuclear supply principles of the Zangger Committee: working paper submitted by members of the Zangger Committee
NPT/CONF.2000/18	Letter dated 20 April 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, (in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Disarmament, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), addressed to the Provisional Secretary-General of the Review Conference (transmitting a working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)

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| NPT/CONF.2000/19 | Note verbale dated 25 April 2000 from the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the secretariat of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (transmitting a document entitled "Council common position of 13 April 2000 relating to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons") |
| NPT/CONF.2000/20 | Letter dated 28 April 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations (in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of April 2000 and on behalf of States Members of the League of Arab States) addressed to the President of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (transmitting a working paper on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995) |
| NPT/CONF.2000/WP.1 | Further measures to be taken for the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Japan and Australia |
| (b) Documents submitted and introduced in Main Committee II | |
| (i) Working papers | |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1 | Safeguards: working paper submitted by South Africa |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2 | Introduction: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3 | Safeguards: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.4 | Export controls: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden |

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| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5 | Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States and States with unsafeguarded inventories: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.6 | Resources for safeguards: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.7 | Plutonium and highly enriched uranium management: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.8 | Physical protection, illicit trafficking: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.9 and Rev.1 | Implementation of the resolution of 1995 on the Middle East: working paper submitted by Egypt |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.10 | Working paper submitted by Portugal on behalf of the European Union |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.11 | Working paper submitted by China |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.12 | Working paper submitted by Norway |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.13 | Nuclear-weapon-free zones: working paper submitted by Mongolia |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14 | Safeguards and export controls: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.15 | Article VII: working paper submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.16 | Nuclear-weapon-free zones: working paper submitted by Belarus |
| (ii) Conference room papers | |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.1 | Draft indicative schedule of work of Main Committee II |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.2 | Proposal by Ireland on working paper 6 |
| NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.3 | Proposal by Greece on working paper 3 |

- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.4 Proposal submitted by the United States of America
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.5 Statement made by Yuji Ikeda, Representative of Japan, on safeguards
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.6 Proposed amendments on the Chairman's draft report: working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.7 Proposed language: working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.8 Preliminary comments on Main Committee II Chairman's draft: working paper submitted by the United States of America
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.9 Proposed language for the Chairman's draft report: working paper submitted by Japan
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.10 Proposal submitted by Germany
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.11 Conference room paper submitted by Japan
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.12 Conference room paper submitted by China
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.13 Draft report of Main Committee II: and Rev.1 Chairman's revised draft

(c) Documents submitted to and introduced in Main Committee II, Subsidiary Body 2

(i) Working papers

- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/WP.1 Draft text of Subsidiary Body 2: and Rev.1 and 2 submitted by the Chairman

(ii) Conference room papers

- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.1 Draft indicative schedule of work of Main Committee II, Subsidiary Body 2
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.2 Proposed language submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.3 Conference room paper submitted by Egypt
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.4 Statement by the representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding its safeguards and verification activities in Iraq

NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.5	Conference room paper submitted by the Arab Group
NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.6	Conference room paper submitted by South Africa
NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.7	Conference room paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.8	Conference room paper submitted by the United States of America
NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.9	Comments by Iraq on the statement of the representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Work of the Committee

6. The Committee held seven plenary meetings between 26 April and 12 May 2000. An account of the discussion is contained in the relevant summary records (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SR.1-7). Subsidiary Body 2 of Main Committee II held its meetings between 1 and 11 May. As the meetings of Subsidiary Body 2 were closed, there are no official records of those meetings. Main Committee II and Subsidiary Body 2 also held informal meetings and consultations during that period. The Chairman of Main Committee II was assisted by the Vice-Chairmen in coordinating the informal consultations convened to examine various proposals and documents submitted to the Committee. After an item-by-item consideration of the agenda items allocated to it, the Committee, both at its formal and informal meetings, proceeded to a detailed discussion of the proposals and documents before it; the results of the discussion are outlined in paragraphs 7 and 8 below. The various views expressed and proposals made are reflected in the summary records of the Committee and in the working papers submitted to it. Those summary records and working papers form an integral part of the report of the Committee to the Conference.

Conclusions and recommendations

7. At the seventh meeting of Main Committee II, on 12 May 2000, the Committee took note of the report submitted to it by the Chairman of Main Committee II. With the exception of the texts indicated in boldface type, which require further work as they did not enjoy consensus at the time the report was taken note of, the Committee agreed on the following formulations for the final document of the Conference:

1. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", noting paragraph 1 of the principles and objectives and the elements relevant to article III of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 9-13 and 17-19, and to article VII of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 5-7. It also recalls and reaffirms the resolution on the Middle East adopted by that Conference.

2. The Conference notes that recommendations made at previous conferences for the future implementation of article III provide a helpful basis for States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings.

3. The States parties urge the international community to enhance cooperation in the field of non-proliferation issues and to seek solutions to all concerns or issues related to non-proliferation in accordance with the obligations, procedures and mechanisms established by the relevant international legal instruments.

4. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vital in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in providing significant security benefits. The parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty can achieve this goal, and they urge all four States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it unconditionally and without delay, and to bring into force the required safeguards agreements.

5. The Conference reaffirms the fundamental importance of full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements. *(Explanatory note: content acceptable; placement to be decided)*

6. The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and nuclear cooperation.

7. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

8. Measures should be taken to ensure that the rights of all States parties under the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of these rights in accordance with the Treaty on the basis of allegations of non-compliance not verified by IAEA.

9. The Conference notes with concern that IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in that country. *(Explanatory note: content acceptable; placement to be decided)*

10. The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and General Assembly by IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C of the Statute of IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), and also emphasizes the vital role of the Security Council in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations reported to it by IAEA.

11. The Conference considers that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings under relevant safeguards agreements and assist States to demonstrate this compliance.

12. The Conference stresses that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are also essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. Comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. In the meantime, the Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States under the relevant voluntary-offer safeguards agreements in the most economical and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources.

14. The Conference reiterates the call by previous conferences of the States parties for the application of IAEA safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty. The Conference notes with satisfaction that, since 1995, 28 States have concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA in compliance with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty, 25 of which have brought the agreements into force.¹

15. The Conference looks forward to the fulfilment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its stated intention to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA, which remains binding and in force. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea preserving and making available to IAEA all information needed to verify its initial declaration.

16. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

17. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and

¹ Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Namibia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Slovenia, Ukraine and Zimbabwe.

completeness of a State's declaration so that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

18. The Conference notes the measures endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors in June 1995 for strengthening and making more efficient the safeguards system and notes also that these measures are being implemented pursuant to the existing legal authority conferred upon IAEA by comprehensive safeguards agreements.

19. The Conference also fully endorses the measures contained in the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997. The safeguards-strengthening measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol will provide IAEA with, *inter alia*, enhanced information about a State's nuclear activities and complementary access to locations within a State.

20. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on document INFCIRC/153 have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference notes that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol will foster, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures are now being introduced as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system. The Conference notes, in particular, the relationship between the additional protocol and the safeguards agreement between IAEA and a State party as set out in article 1 of the Model Additional Protocol. In this regard, it recalls the interpretation provided by IAEA secretariat on 31 January 1997 and set out in document GOV/2914 of 10 April 1997 that, once concluded, the two agreements had to be read and interpreted as one agreement.

21. The Conference notes the high priority that IAEA attaches, in the context of furthering the development of the strengthened safeguards system, to integrating traditional nuclear-material verification activities with the new strengthening measures and looks forward to an expeditious conclusion of this work. It recognizes that the aim of these efforts is to optimize the combination of all safeguards measures available to IAEA in order to meet the Agency's safeguards objectives with maximum effectiveness and efficiency and within available resources. Furthermore, the Conference notes that credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, notably those related to enrichment and reprocessing, in a State as a whole could permit a corresponding reduction in the level of traditional verification efforts with respect to declared nuclear material in that State, which is less sensitive from the point of view of non-proliferation. The Conference notes the important work being undertaken by IAEA in the conceptualization and development of integrated safeguards approaches, and encourages continuing work by IAEA in further developing and implementing these approaches on a high-priority basis.

22. The Conference recognizes that strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system with a view to providing credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities must be implemented rapidly by all nuclear States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference also recognizes that the interests of nuclear non-proliferation will be effectively served by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards strengthening measures by States with item-specific safeguards agreements. The Conference welcomes the additional protocol concluded by Cuba and urges it also to bring the protocol into force as soon as possible.

23. The Conference notes that bilateral and regional safeguards play a key role in the promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between neighbouring States, and that they also provide assurances concerning nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference considers that bilateral or regional safeguards could be useful in regions interested in building confidence among its member States and in contributing effectively to the non-proliferation regime.

24. The Conference recalls the commitment of nuclear-weapon States in article I of the Treaty to not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to not enter into any kind of nuclear technical cooperation or assistance with States not party to the Treaty.

25. The Conference stresses the need to respect the letter and the spirit of the Treaty with respect to technical cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

26. The Conference recognizes that nuclear material supplied to the nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should not be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and should be, if required by the supplier, subject to appropriate IAEA safeguards agreements.

27. The Conference notes that all nuclear-weapon States have now concluded additional protocols to their voluntary-offer safeguards agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and is consistent with that State's obligations under article I of the Treaty. The Conference invites such States to keep the scope of those additional protocols under review.

28. The Conference commends IAEA for making its experience in the verification of nuclear non-proliferation available to the Conference on Disarmament in connection with the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

29. The Conference takes note of the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996, including in relation to the safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, and the initiatives stemming from it.

30. The Conference underlines the importance of international verification of nuclear weapon material no longer required for military programmes that has been irreversibly transferred to peaceful purposes. The Conference supports recent unilateral offers and mutual initiatives to place excess material under appropriate IAEA verification arrangements. Fissile materials designated by each of the nuclear-weapon States as no longer required for military purposes should as soon as practicable be placed under the IAEA or other relevant verification programme.

31. The Conference notes the considerable increase in the Agency's safeguards responsibilities since 1995. It further notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system is functioning and calls upon all States parties, including, in particular, nuclear-weapon States, to continue their political, technical and financial support of IAEA in order to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its safeguards responsibilities.

32. The Conference welcomes the significant contributions by States parties through their support programmes to the development of technology and techniques that facilitate and assist the application of safeguards.

33. The Conference considers that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. The allocation of resources should take into account all of the Agency's statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer.

34. The Conference recognizes that the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices should be consistent with States' obligations under the Treaty.

35. The States parties remain concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain nuclear material and the technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources and devices and the extension of assistance to States not party to the Treaty without exception in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields which may enable them to produce or develop nuclear-weapon capabilities.

36. The Conference reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has undertaken not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by article III of the Treaty.

37. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production capacity and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

38. The Conference reaffirms paragraph 12 of decision 2 (Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

39. The Conference recognizes that there are nuclear dual-use items of equipment, technology and materials not identified in article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty that are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the Treaty as a whole. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear dual-use items to States not party to the Treaty do not assist any nuclear-weapons programme. The Conference reiterates that each State party should also ensure that any transfer of such items is in full conformity with the Treaty.

40. The Conference encourages the States parties to ensure, within their national rules and regulations, that the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States will be used only for peaceful purposes in accordance with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

41. The Conference notes that a number of States parties engaged in the supply of nuclear material and equipment have met regularly as an informal group known as the Zangger Committee in order to coordinate their implementation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. To this end, these States have adopted certain understandings, including a list of items triggering IAEA safeguards, for their export to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as amended.

42. The Conference takes note of the two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation, held in 1997 in Vienna and 1999 in New York, organized by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and designed to contribute to transparency as called for in paragraph 17 of decision 2 (Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament) adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

43. The Conference recognizes the particular requirement for safeguards on unirradiated direct-use nuclear material, and notes the projections by IAEA that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful purposes is expected to increase over the next several years. The Conference recognizes the non-proliferation benefits of the conversion of civilian research reactors to low

enriched uranium fuel. The Conference notes with appreciation that many research reactors are discontinuing the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in favour of low-enriched uranium fuel as a result of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Programme. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing, to the storage of separated plutonium and to uranium enrichment.

44. The Conference welcomes the additional transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium resulting from the establishment, in 1997, of Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549), setting out the policies that several States, including the nuclear-weapon States, have decided to adopt.

45. The Conference notes the announcement made by some nuclear-weapon States that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and urges those that have not done so to make a similar announcement.

46. The Conference notes the conclusion drawn by the Board of Governors of IAEA that the proliferation risk with regard to neptunium is considerably lower than that with regard to uranium or plutonium and that at present there is practically no proliferation risk with regard to americium. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the recent decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors, which enabled IAEA to enter into exchanges of letters with States, on a voluntary basis, to ensure the regular and timely receipt of information as well as the application of measures required for efficient implementation of certain monitoring tasks regarding the production and transfer of separated neptunium, and which requested the Director General of IAEA to report to the Board when appropriate with respect to the availability of separated americium, using relevant information available through the conduct of regular IAEA activities and any additional information provided by States on a voluntary basis.

47. The Conference notes the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials. The Conference notes the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection. In this regard, the Conference notes that 63 States have become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

48. Expressing concern about the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Conference urges all States to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the security of such material. The Conference welcomes the activities in the fields of prevention, detection and response being undertaken by IAEA in support of efforts against illicit trafficking. The Conference acknowledges the Agency's efforts to assist member States in strengthening their regulatory control on the applications of radioactive materials, including its ongoing work on a registry of sealed sources. It also welcomes the Agency's activities undertaken to provide for the enhanced exchange of information among its member States, including the continued maintenance of the illicit trafficking database. The Conference recognizes the importance of enhancing cooperation and coordination among

States and among international organizations in preventing, detecting and responding to the illegal use of nuclear and other radioactive material.

49. The Conference stresses the need for the rapid conclusion of the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

50. The Conference welcomes and supports the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

51. The Conference supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia.

52. The Conference welcomes and supports the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, and takes note of the recent adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining that status as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation and a practical contribution to promoting political stability and predictability in the region.

53. The Conference further welcomes the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and urges its rapid implementation.

54. The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, particularly in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and towards keeping the areas covered by these treaties free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with international law. In this context, the Conference welcomes the vigorous efforts being made among States parties and signatories to those treaties in order to promote their common objectives.

55. The Conference stresses the importance of signature and ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties, recognizing that security assurances are available to States parties to those treaties. In this context, the Conference takes note of the statement of the five nuclear-weapon States that internal processes are under way to secure the few lacking ratifications to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba, and that consultations with the States parties to the Treaty of Bangkok have been accelerated, paving the way for adherence by the five nuclear-weapon States to the protocol to that Treaty.

56. The Conference welcomes the consensus reached in the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. It urges Israel, the only State in the region that is not

party to the Treaty, to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981), and to take the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a first step towards the establishment in the same region of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. The Conference calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The Conference also invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories or territories under their control of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices.

57. The Conference further welcomes the report on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 April 1999.

58. The Conference regards the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones as a matter of priority, and in this respect supports the intention and commitment of the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region, welcomes the practical steps they have taken towards implementation of their initiative and notes with satisfaction the substantial progress they have made in drawing up and agreeing on a draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

59. The Conference strongly believes that the international community should continue to promote the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the globe and welcomes the efforts and initiatives of the States parties on the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, including the initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe proposed by Belarus.

60. The Conference notes with concern that 51 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive agreements,² and urges them to do

² *Version 1:* In Europe: Andorra, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan; in Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Uganda, Seychelles, United Republic of Tanzania; in Asia and the Pacific: Lao People's Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Palau, Vanuatu; in Latin America and the Caribbean: Haiti; in the Middle East: Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

Version 2: Andorra, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Niger, Oman, Palau, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen.

so as soon as possible. This includes States parties without substantial nuclear activities. The Conference notes that in the case of States without substantial nuclear activities, the conclusion of safeguards agreements involves simplified procedures. The Conference recommends that the Director General of IAEA continue his efforts to further facilitate and assist those States parties in the conclusion and the entry into force of such agreements.

61. The Conference welcomes the fact that since May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements with 43 States and that 10 of those additional protocols are currently being implemented. The Conference encourages all States parties, in particular those States parties with substantial nuclear programmes, to conclude additional protocols as soon as possible and to bring them into force or provisionally apply them as soon as possible.

62. The Conference invites States parties to consider at the next Review Conference the possibility of establishing an additional protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) as constituting an element of the IAEA full-scope safeguards referred to in paragraph 12 of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference.

63. The Conference urges IAEA to continue implementing strengthened safeguards measures as broadly as possible, and further urges all States with safeguards agreements to cooperate fully with IAEA in the implementation of those measures.

64. The Conference recommends that the Director General of IAEA and the IAEA member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including, for example, specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement the legal requirements.

65. The Conference calls upon all States parties to give their full and continuing support to the IAEA safeguards system.

66. The Conference recognizes the agreement under which the United States is purchasing low enriched uranium blended down from high enriched uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons and the purchase of 80 tons of such material to date. The Conference also recognizes the affirmation, by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in the Moscow Statement of 1998, of the intention of the Russian Federation and the United States to remove approximately 50 tons of plutonium from their nuclear weapons and to convert it so that it can never again be used in nuclear weapons. The Conference further recognizes the measures taken to implement this commitment.

67. The Conference calls upon all four States not yet party to the Treaty, **namely, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan**, particularly those three which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to become parties to the Treaty without delay and without conditions, and to conclude without delay comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and additional protocols consistent with the Model contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

68. The Conference requests that IAEA continue to identify the financial and human resources needed to meet effectively and efficiently all of its responsibilities, including its safeguards verification responsibilities. It strongly urges all States to ensure that IAEA is provided with these resources.

69. The Conference invites all States to adopt the understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with any nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty.

70. The Conference recommends that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2, be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity and changes in procurement practices.

71. The Conference notes that a number of States parties also cooperate on a voluntary basis through guidelines for their nuclear-related exports, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/254 as amended.

72. The Conference requests that the Zangger Committee and any other supplier arrangements should be transparent and that appropriate measures should continue to be taken to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV.

73. The Conference invites coordination of national policies among all interested States parties to the extent possible, including through IAEA, in a manner that would contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty and facilitate transparency and participation of all interested States parties in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

74. The Conference recommends that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty.

75. The Conference encourages all other States that separate, hold, process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those which have been adopted by the participants in the Plutonium Management Guidelines (INFCIRC/549). Furthermore, the Conference encourages the States concerned to consider similar policies for the management of highly enriched uranium used for peaceful purposes.

76. The Conference urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on the earliest possible date and to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) and in other relevant guidelines. It welcomes the ongoing informal discussions among legal and technical experts, under the aegis of IAEA, to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

8. At the seventh meeting of Main Committee II, on 12 May 2000, the Committee took note of the following report submitted to it by the Chairman of Subsidiary

Body 2. Some elements of that report do not enjoy consensus. The Main Committee nonetheless considered that the report provided a good basis for further consultations. For purposes of these consultations, the attention of the Conference is drawn to the following documents:

- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.2 Proposed language submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to Subsidiary Body 2
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.3 Conference room paper submitted to Subsidiary Body 2 by Egypt
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.5 Conference room paper submitted to Subsidiary Body 2 by Tunisia on behalf of the Group of Arab States
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.6 Conference room paper submitted to Subsidiary Body 2 by the Islamic Republic of Iran
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.7 Conference room paper submitted to Subsidiary Body 2 by South Africa
- NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.8 Conference room paper submitted to Subsidiary Body 2 by the United States of America

“With respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East:

“1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognizes that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.

“2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, *inter alia*, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

“3. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty. In this regard, the Conference welcomes all new accessions since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

“4. The Conference notes that, with these accessions, all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference calls on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

“5. The Conference reaffirms the need for all States in the Middle East to accept forthwith the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear activities, in accordance with article III of the Treaty, and as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as an enhancement of peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Conference notes the concern raised in paragraph 56 of the report of Main Committee II, which indicates that, *inter alia*, nine States parties in the Middle East have yet to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. The Conference urges those States to bring these agreements into force as soon as possible.

“6. The Conference welcomes the additional protocol concluded by Jordan and urges its early entry into force. The Conference encourages all other States in the Middle East that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force additional protocols as positive steps towards achieving universal application of the IAEA safeguards system. When fully in force, that system will constitute a major contribution towards the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

“7. The Conference reiterates the call on all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, *inter alia*, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective. In this regard, the Conference notes with satisfaction the adoption without a vote by the General Assembly, for the twentieth consecutive year, of a resolution proposing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

“8. The Conference encourages States in the Middle East to consider appropriate interim steps of a practical nature pending the full realization of the goals of the resolution on the Middle East. Such steps could begin with confidence-building measures with respect to fissile material production and accounting, nuclear safeguards and unilateral declarations.

“9. To facilitate the early establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, the Conference encourages all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

“10. The Conference notes the unanimous adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, at its 1999 session, of guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The Conference notes that the Disarmament Commission’s guidelines encouraged the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as the development of zones free from all weapons of mass destruction.

“11. The Conference reiterates the call on all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery

systems. The Conference notes with satisfaction the statement by the five nuclear-weapon States reaffirming their commitment to the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995.

“12. The Conference recognizes the need to monitor the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East on an ongoing basis. In this regard, the Conference agrees that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings and Review Conferences for that purpose.

“13. The Conference remains convinced that compliance by all parties with all the provisions of the Treaty is a prerequisite to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

“14. The Conference notes the statement of the representative of IAEA of 9 May 2000, provided during its deliberations, that the Agency is unable “to provide assurance that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations, that is to say that there is no diversion of declared nuclear material and no presence of undeclared nuclear material”. The Conference further notes that, in his letter of 10 April 2000 to the President of the Security Council (S/2000/300), the Director General of IAEA stated that the Agency is “unable to provide any measure of assurance with regard to Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions”. The Conference calls on Iraq to comply fully with its obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement and its obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1284 (1994).

“With respect to South Asia and other regional issues:

“15. The Conference emphasizes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing.

“16. The Conference notes that the nuclear explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in May 1998 were a cause of deep international concern and calls upon both countries to take all of the measures set out in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). In accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, notwithstanding their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States.

“17. The Conference calls on India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and urges both States to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The Conference further calls on both States to strengthen their non-proliferation export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

“18. The Conference notes that India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Conference calls on both States to sign the Treaty, in accordance with their pledges to do so.

“19. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the willingness expressed by India and Pakistan to participate in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a

legal instrument, the Conference calls on both countries to observe a moratorium on the production of such material. The Conference appeals to them to join other countries in actively seeking an early commencement of negotiations on this issue, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, with a view to reaching early agreement.

“20. The Conference notes with concern that, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains a Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Conference looks forward to the fulfilment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its stated intention to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA, which remains binding and in force. The Conference emphasizes the importance of action by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to preserve and make available to IAEA all information needed to verify its initial inventory.”
