Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

6 December 2023

English only

Third Session
Geneva, 4-8 December 2023
Agenda item 6
Identifying, examining and developing specific and effective measures, including possible legally-binding measures, and making recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention in all its aspects within the mandate of the Working Group

Contemporary problems of verification under the BTWC. Historic work experience of the VEREX and the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BTWC

Submitted by the Russian Federation

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

WORKING GROUP ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE BTWC

Problems of BTWC verification at the present stage.

Historical Perspectives of VEREX and the Ad Hoc Group

Dr. Dmitrii Poklonskii

VEREX GROUP, GOAL-SETTING AND WORKING METHODOLOGY

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
Third Review Conference
Convention on the Prohibition
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

(Geneva, 8-27 September 1991)

FINAL DOCUMENT

Geneva, 1992


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«…to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, VEREX, open to all States Parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint…»

1991

Third Review Conference

VEREX 1 30 March-10 April 1992 (Identification of measures)

VEREX 2 23 November-4 December 1992 (Examination of measures)

VEREX 3 24 May-4 June 1993 (Evaluation of measures)

VEREX 4 13-24 September 1993 (Preparation of the report)

Summary report efforts

1993

Evaluation criteria for verification measures

- Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of information they provide and fail to provide
- Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities
- Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance
- Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements
- Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications
- Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation and other permitted activities

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION MEASURES

3

The quality of information on the use of a verification measure may be examined differently. On the one hand, it may simply be the volume of information, while on the other - it may be understood as a quantity measure of information

Prognosis models have to be developed to quantify criteria 5 and 6 on a number of parameters and subjects for prohibition and their scope have to be specified for criteria 2 and 3



Table 1

Examination of verification measures by their cost-effectiveness

Verification measures	Relative VM effectiveness			Relative VM costs		
	R&D evaluation	Prod. facility evaluation	Storage facility evaluation	R&D evaluation	Prod. facility evaluation	Storage facility evaluation
Surveillance of publications	8,2	10,7	8,9	12,6	14,0	14,5
Declarations	7,2	7,4,	9,2	15,5	15,9	16,0
Notifications	8,6	8,5	11,1	15,5	15,8	15,8
Surveillance by satellite	13,4	12,2	11,7	7,2	7,4	7,4
Surveillance by aircraft	13,0	12,0	11,5	9,1	8,5	8,6
Ground-based surveillance	11,3	11,2	11,6	9,3	9,1	9,1
Sampling and identification (off-site)	12,9	11,9	13,1	6,5	6,0	6,7
Observation	12,2	12,2	12,4	10,3	9,7	9,6
Auditing (off-site)	11,2	11,4	12,6	11,3	11,0	11,0
International arrangements	8,8	12,5	12,7	9,4	10,3	9,3
Interviewing	6,1	7,4	7,4	9,5	9,8	9,1
Visual inspection	8,9	7,4	6,0	9,1	8,7	9,7
Identification of key equipment	6,5	5,1	4,4	8,8	8,6	8,5
Auditing (off-site)	4,5	5,1	3,5	7,3	6,7	7,2
Sampling and identification (on-site)	5,4	5,2	4,5	4,0	4,0	3,9
Medical examination	6,8	6,2	8,3	6,8	6,8	6,7
Continuous monitoring by instruments and personnel	5,3	6,1	3,4	1,8	1,4	1,5

Table 2

Swedish experts evaluation
12,8
7,3
-
15,0
15,0
14,8
11,8
14,6
12,3
10,7
5,3
4,7
3,5
5,3
2,8
8,5
8,0

VEREX GROUP, VERIFICATION MEASURES

Off-site

- Information Monitoring
- Data exchange
- Remote sensing
- Sampling and identification

On-site

- Exchange visits
- Inspection
- Auditing on-site

Multilateral information sharing

Surveillance of publications

Surveillance of legislation

Data on transfers, transfer requests and on production

Exchange visits - international arrangements

Declarations

Visual inspection (off-site)

Surveillance by satellite

Observation (off-site)

Sampling and identification (on-site)

Surveillance by aircraft

Ground-based surveillance (off-site)

Interviewing (on-site)

Identification of key equipment (on-site)

Continuous monitoring by instruments (on-site)

Exchange visits (off-site)

Auditing (off-site)

Sampling and identification (off-site)

Medical examination (on-site)

Continuous monitoring

Continuous monitoring by personnel



VEREX GROUP. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF VERIFICATION MEASURES

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

AD HOC GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS TO IDENTIFY AND EXAMINE POTENTIAL VERIFICATION MEASURES FROM A SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL STANDPOINT
BWC/CONF.I 24 September
ORIGINAL: ENGLI
Fourth session
Geneva, 13-24 September 1993

SUMMARY REPORT

INTRODUCTION

1. The Third Review Conference (September 1991) of the Biological Weapons Convention agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, open to all States Parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint.

2. The mandate of the Group was as follows:

"The Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the Convention, decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States Parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint.

"The Group shall meet in Geneva for the period 30 March to 10 April 1992. The Group will hold additional meetings as appropriate to complete its work as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 1992. In accordance with the agreement reached at the Preparatory Committee, the Group shall be chaired by Ambassador Tibor Toth (Hungary) who shall be assisted by two Vice-Chairmen to be elected by the States Parties participating in the first meeting.

"The Group shall seek to identify measures which could determine:

- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes;
- Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

"Such measures could be addressed singly or in combination. Specifically, the Group shall seek to evaluate potential verification resources, taking into account the broad range of types and quantities of microbial and other biological agents and toxins, whether naturally occurring or altered which are capable of being used as means of warfare.

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"To these ends the Group could examine potential verification measures in terms of the following main criteria:

- Their strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and quality of information they provide, and fail to provide;
- Their ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities;
- Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements;
- Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications;
- Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities, and their implications for the confidentiality of commercial proprietary information.

"Aim examining potential verification measures, the Group should take into account data and other information relevant to the Convention provided by the States Parties.

"The Group shall adopt by consensus a report taking into account views expressed in the course of its work. The report of the Group shall be a description of its work on the identification and examination of potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, according to this mandate.

"The report of the Group shall be circulated to all States Parties for their consideration. If a majority of States Parties ask for the convening of a conference to examine the report, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, such a conference will be convened. In such a case the conference shall decide on any further action. The conference shall be preceded by a preparatory committee."

3. The Group held four sessions, from which three Summaries and a Procedural Report were produced and annexed as part of this Summary Report:

- VEREX 1 — 16 March-10 April 1992 (Identification of measures; Annex I);
- VEREX 2 — 23 November-4 December 1992 (Examination of measures; Annex II);
- VEREX 3 — 24 May-4 June 1993 (Evaluation of measures; Annex III);
- VEREX 4 — 13-24 September 1993 (Preparation of the report; Annex IV).

IDENTIFICATION AND EXAMINATION

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page 3

4. During its first session the Group identified in all 21 potential measures suggested by individual delegations under the three broad areas of development, acquisition and production, and stockpiling and retaining, for later examination and evaluation against the mandate criteria. They were included in a list. The inclusion of a measure in this list constituted no judgement by the Group as to the usefulness of the potential measure in relation to the objectives stated in the mandate. None of potential measures included in the list were considered as individual measures which might be applied individually or with other individual measures in each category. Measures were divided as follows: off-site and on-site. They were grouped in a Chairman's paper in seven broad categories for the purpose of later examination and evaluation:

Off-site Measures:

- Information Monitoring:
  - surveillance of publications;
  - surveillance of legislation;
  - data on transfers, transfer requests and production
  - multilateral information sharing.
- Data exchange:
  - declarations;
  - NAMEmbers.
- Remote Sensing:
  - surveillance by satellite;
  - surveillance by aircraft;
  - ground-based surveillance.
- Inspections:
  - sampling and identification;
  - observation;
  - auditing.

On-site Measures:

- Exchange visits:
  - international arrangements.
- Inspections:
  - interviewing;
  - visual inspections;
  - identification of key equipment
  - auditing.

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page 4

  - sampling and identification;
  - medical examination.
- Continuous monitoring:
  - by instruments;
  - by personnel.

5. During the second session, the Group decided to modify the list of measures identified at the first session. The new list agreed upon by consensus is included in Annex II, pages 131-113.

6. Each measure was examined according to the mandate in order to determine: A Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.n. Similarly, measures were examined to determine: A Whether a State Party was developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.L.

7. A methodology for detailed examination of measures was agreed by the Group which included a definition, a description of the characteristics and technologies in terms of the state-of-the-art, the capabilities and limitations, and a discussion of potential interaction with other measures.

8. A number of national and background papers were presented by participants. Each measure was fully described and introduced for group discussion by a rapporteur (Annex II, pages 52-122). In all cases potential interaction with other measures was identified. Moderators (Annex II, pages 127-133) designated by the Chairman, prepared discussion papers in the three broad areas of development, production and stockpiling to assist in the evaluation. The examinations represented a technical summary of the key factors to consider. These discussion summaries discussed extensively by the Group, formed the basis of consolidated texts which could be used as a starting point for evaluation (Annex II, pages 46-148; and Annex III, pages 349-327).

EVALUATION OF MEASURES SINGLY

9. Each potential measure identified in the examination phase was evaluated singly in accordance with the mandate, i.e. its strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and quality of information it provides, and fails to provide; the ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities; the ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance; the technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements; the financial, legal, safety and organizational implications; and the impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities, and the implication on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities, and its implications for the confidentiality of commercial proprietary information. On the basis of the Introduction submitted by the rapporteur, the Group discussed and evaluated the measures at both formal and informal meetings and adopted by consensus an evaluation report on each measure. Summaries of the

Declarations | Multilateral information sharing | Satellite surveillance | Visual inspection

Surveillance of publications | Surveillance of legislation | Data on transfers, transfer requests and production | Multilateral information-sharing | Exchange visits

On-site inspection | Visual inspections | Identification of key equipment | Sampling and identification | Interviewing

Declarations | Multilateral information-sharing | On-site visual inspection

Declarations | Information monitoring

ACTIVITIES OF THE AD HOC GROUP (AHG). REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP

U.S. withdrawal from the negotiation process

1994 — Ad Hoc Conference

2001 — Completion of work

THE ROLE AND OBJECTIVES OF INFORMATION VISITS

Working Paper submitted by the United Kingdom

INTRODUCTION

«Compromise» text version

PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION



Contents





Figure 1: Schematic depicting the multi-layered approach recommended to assess BWC compliance and hinder development of bioweapons. Visualization adapted from Mackay, Ian M «The Swiss Cheese Respiratory Virus Defense.» Virology Down Under, 26 Dec. 2020

BWC/WG/3/WP.13

ACTIVITIES OF THE AD HOC GROUP (AHG). PROJECT OF PROTOCOL

7

Confidence Building Measures (CBM) reports submitted by 2022, total 183 States Parties

Measure	Definition	EVALUATION (Capabilities and Limitations)	
		Criteria 1 - 3	Criteria 4 - 6
Surveillance of publications	Selective scanning and analysis of publicly available printed matter and of the media with special attention to scientific literature related to activities in the biological field. (VEREX/9, Annex II, p.54)	It could provide useful information on relevant activities in State Party, but consistency in quantity and quality may vary. It may help in the selection of sites for inspections and in focussing ongoing inspection activities. The information provides only a partial picture of activities. This focussing could be done by using key identifiers. Not all types of relevant information are necessarily published. (VEREX/9, Annex III, p. 154 etc.)	If focussed this measure need not be very costly. Some personnel with specific expertise and a computer database would be needed. Translation services might be costly. The low level of intrusiveness of this measure is an advantage.
Multilateral information sharing	The use of any voluntary international provision or exchange of information on medical, veterinary, agricultural, environmental safety standards, defence and waste management issues, etc. relating to materials and activities of potential relevance to the BWC. Such information sharing on a voluntary basis may or may not have an agreed standard for the nature of the information to be provided. (VEREX/9, Annex II, p.58)	May well be an effective measure if combined with other measures. May help explain the nature of dual purpose activities and provide indications of non-declared activities. However, this measure depends on the willingness of a State Party to provide information. The information may be inaccurate and generate unwarranted concerns. (VEREX/9, Annex III, p.160 etc.)	If focussed this measure is not very costly. The precise requirements of this measure still need to be determined. A computer/ database is needed. Legal implications and confidentiality concerns need to be considered; access to CPI can be defined.
Surveillance of legislation	Collecting and analyzing of information with regard to legislation that exists in relation to the BWC or other areas of interest. (VEREX/9, Annex II, p. 56)	Could provide information on relevant activities of States Parties. However, the absence of legislation is not an indication of non-compliance. It may help in the selection of sites for inspections and in focussing ongoing inspection activities. The amount of information could be very large and the quantity varies per State. May help explain the nature of dual purpose activities. (VEREX/9, Annex III, p. 156 etc.)	This measure need not be very costly. Although the precise requirements pertaining to this measure still need to be determined, an investment into a computer/ database is needed. Translation costs may be substantial. Limited impact, if any, on permitted activities.

Criteria 1-3: Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of information they provide and fail to provide

Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities.

Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance.

Criteria 4-6 Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements.
Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications.
Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities; and their implications for the confidentiality of CPI.

VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT ARE NOT PARALLEL

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

BWC/WG/3/WP.13

CURRENT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

9

Report
of the Secretary-General

Current developments in science and technology and their impact on international security and disarmament efforts



Additive manufacturing based on 3-D printing technologies

Big data analysis and artificial intelligence technologies

Nanotechnology and materials science

Biological research automation and robotics

NEW TECHNOLOGY PLATFORMS IMPACT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL BWC ARTICLES

Article I	It is necessary to keep track of scientific and technological advances that go far beyond the traditional understanding of biological weapons, but at the same time reduce technical barriers to the development and delivery of BW	Methodological approaches to the formation of equipment lists
Article III	The digitization of biological data and the growing possibilities for DNA sequencing and editing pose serious non-material challenges to existing export control regimes and practices	Terms and definitions
Article IV	A number of new technologies raise serious ethical, biosafety and biosecurity issues. It may be necessary to reassess whether states are actually taking «necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production and stockpiling» of biological weapons	Lists of biological agents and toxins
Article VI	New technologies (big data and DNA sequencing) provide a much wider range of possibilities with which to confirm or refute the validity of alleged violations of the BTWC	
Article VII	New technologies increase the speed and efficiency of response to disease outbreaks and could also be important in helping states at risk from BWC violations	Threshold quantities of biological materials
Article X	Digitizing biological data fundamentally changes the way scientists can share information and collaborate for peaceful purposes	Conducting inspections and audits

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS



AD HOC GROUP OF THE STATES PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION
OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND
STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL
(BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

BWC/AD HOC GROUP/
15 July 1996

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Fourth session
Geneva
15-26 July 1996

WORKING PAPER
submitted by the Russian Federation
(to supplement BWC/AD HOC GROUP/15)

Terms and definitions

The wording of the terms as presented is intended exclusively for the purposes of the verification machinery for the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons.

Protection against biological weapons - measures for the prevention, abatement and elimination of the effects of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons on humans, animals and plants.

Programme of protection against biological weapons - a set of research and development activities directed towards the implementation of measures for the prevention, abatement and elimination of the effects of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons on humans, animals and plants.

Diagnostic facility - an institution (laboratory, centre, institute, hospital, etc.) in which work is carried out using material from the environment, from humans and animals that are ill or suspected to be ill, and from plants that have been or are suspected to have been affected, for the purposes of isolating and identifying microorganisms and toxins in order to plan and conduct epidemiological, therapeutic and preventive measures.

Genetic modification or manipulation - modification of the genetic structure of biological agents, regardless of the means used in such modification.

Presumed use of a biological weapon - a declaration by a State, based on observation of biological agents, means of delivery and their use, to the effect that biological and/or toxin weapons have been used against it.

of a disease - the emergence and spread of an infectious
gin and clinical characteristics fundamentally distinguish it
es that are typical of a specific locality over a lengthy

- Terms related to the entire set of verification measures under the Protocol
- Terms related to the criteria for evaluating declarations
- Operational terms and definitions applicable in the various sections of the Protocol

Protection against biological weapons – measures for the prevention, abatement and elimination of the effects of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons on humans, animals and plants

Program of protection against biological weapons – a set of research and development activities directed towards the implementation of measures for the prevention, abatement and elimination of the effects of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons on humans, animals and plants



Presumed use of a biological weapon – a declaration by a State, based on observation of biological agents, means of delivery and their use, to the effect that biological and/or toxin weapons have been used against it

Unusual outbreak of a disease – the emergence and spread of an infectious disease whose origin and clinical characteristics fundamentally distinguish it from other diseases that are typical of a specific locality over a lengthy period of time

LISTS OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS

Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production. stockpiling and Use of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

December 16, 1971

Insects and arthropods as vectors of infectious diseases

Pests of agricultural structures

Technophilic microorganisms

Illustrative list of biological agents and toxins presented at the second session of the Ad Hoc Group in 1992. The following are biological agents and toxins proposed for inclusion on this List.



AD HOC GROUP OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

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

Article I

Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes

CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF MICROORGANISMS AND TOXINS IN THE LIST

The criteria proposed by the Ad Hoc Group



AD HOC GROUP OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Thirteenth session
Geneva, 4-22 January 1999

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation

EVALUATION OF THE SIN NOMBRE VIRUS, TETRODOTOXIN AND THE DIPHTHERIA TOXIN

INTRODUCTION

Evaluations were carried out on the Sin Nombre virus, tetrodotoxin and the diphtheria toxin from the List of human pathogens.

The results of these evaluations are discussed.

SIN NOMBRE VIRUS

The area of distribution is South and North America. The vectors are rodents, primarily deer or certain hamsters and rats. The virus causes severe sickness, whose principal manifestation is haemorrhagic fever with pulmonary syndrome. Lethality is 47 per cent.

Evaluation according to criteria

1. [Vectors or] Agents known to have been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as weapons	No data
2. Low infection dose or high toxicity	Yes
3. [Short incubation and] High level of morbidity	No
4. High level of contagiousness in population	No
5. Infection or intoxication [by variety of route, especially] by respiratory route	Yes
6. High level of incapacity or mortality	Yes
7. No effective prophylaxis (i.e. immune sera, vaccines, antibiotics) and/or therapy available and widely in use	Yes
8. Stability in the environment	No data

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9. Difficulty of detection or identification [at the

- High levels of morbidity and/or infectiousness
- Infection or intoxication by respiratory route
- Low infection dose or high toxicity
- High level of incapacity or mortality
- No effective prophylaxis and/or therapy available and widely in use
- Stability in the environment
- Difficulty of detection or identification
- Ease of manufacture, ease of storage, and stability of stockpiles
- Psychological consequences of the threat of use or any suspected use
- Means known to have been used as a weapon or assessed as weapon

DEFINING THRESHOLD QUANTITIES OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS

sipri

The quantity of a potential BW agent which could be used as a weapon

Working paper

AHG experts

The quantity of biological in terms of effective doses (LD50, ID50, etc.)

$$M = K.\ LD_{50}/C.500$$

M – amount of biological material, pathogen of a given virulence and contents that can be simultaneously stored at the facility (kg); C – agent concentration (cells/ml).

KEY EQUIPMENT INFORMATION



AD HOC GROUP OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Eighth session
Geneva, 16 September - 3 October 1997

FORMATS FOR MANDATORY DECLARATIONS

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation

The States parties shall submit declarations in accordance with the following formats:

1. Form A

Does a biological weapons protection programme exist?

Yes/No

2. Form B

To be completed for facilities participating in a BW protection programme which are carrying out work with any micro-organisms and toxins, as well as with materials that imitate their properties:

1. Name of facility

2. Location (address and geographical location)

3. Ownership (government department or company)

4. List the biological agents and toxins on which work is being carried out

5. Indicate the main areas of activity in the facility (development of preventive agents and methods, observation, identification; genetic manipulation; microbiology; toxinology; disinfection and other activities related to the purposes of the Convention)

6. Are there areas with a BL-4 containment level?

Yes/No

7. Indicate all equipment present.

-2-

Fermentation equipment

Includes all fermenters, bioreactors, chemostats and continuous-flow fermentation systems suitable for the production of micro-organisms or eukaryotic cells or for the production of toxins.

Equipment for batch fermentation with a capacity of over 300 litres.

YES ...
NO ...

Equipment for continuous fermentation with a capacity of over 90 litres.

YES ...
NO ...

Separators

Centrifugal separators or tanks for continuous or semi-continuous operation with a capacity of over 200 litres per hour.

YES ...
NO ...

Motor continuous-flow centrifuges with a capacity of over 100 litres per hour:

YES ...
NO ...

Filtration equipment

Cross-flow tangential equipment having a filter area of 5 square metres and above:

YES ...
NO ...

Cell disruption equipment

Cell disruption equipment capable of continuous operation WITHOUT the release of aerosols and having a flow rate greater than 10 litres per hour:

YES ...
NO ...

-3-

YES ...
NO ...

Drying equipment

Spray-drying, freeze-drying and other drying equipment with a condenser capacity greater than 5 kg per day:

YES ...
NO ...

Milling equipment

Milling equipment capable of producing grains with a maximum grain size of 10 microns and having a production capacity of over ... kg per hour:

YES ...
NO ...

Aerosol chambers

Various types of aerosol chambers and other equipment for study of characteristics of micro-organism aerosols, their components, including toxins, or other biological materials:

YES ...
NO ...

3. Form C

To be completed for facilities at which work is carried out on biological agents and toxins included in the List (except for diagnostic facilities):

1. Name of facility

2. Location (address and geographical location)

3. Ownership (government department or company)

4. List the biological agents and toxins on which work is being carried out

5. Indicate the main areas of activity in the facility (development of preventive agents and methods, observation, identification; genetic manipulation; microbiology; toxinology; disinfection and other activities related to the purposes of the Convention)

6. Are there premises with a BL-4 level of biosafety?

Yes/No

-4-

7. Indicate all equipment present.

Fermentation equipment

Includes all fermenters, bioreactors, chemostats and continuous-flow fermentation systems suitable for the production of micro-organisms or eukaryotic cells or for the production of toxins.

Equipment for batch fermentation with a capacity of over 300 litres.

YES ...
NO ...

Equipment for continuous fermentation with a capacity of over 90 litres:

YES ...
NO ...

Separators

Centrifugal separators or tanks for continuous or semi-continuous operation with a capacity of over 200 litres per hour:

YES ...
NO ...

Motor continuous-flow centrifuges with a capacity of over 100 litres per hour:

YES ...
NO ...

Filtration equipment

Cross-flow tangential equipment having a filter area of 5 square metres and above:

YES ...
NO ...

Cell disruption equipment

Cell disruption equipment capable of continuous operation without the release of aerosols and having a flow rate greater than 10 litres per hour:

-5-

Drying equipment

Spray-drying, freeze-drying and other drying equipment with a condenser capacity greater than 5 kg per day:

YES ...
NO ...

Milling equipment

Milling equipment capable of producing grains with a maximum grain size of 10 microns and having a production capacity of over ... kg per hour:

YES ...
NO ...

Aerosol chambers

Various types of aerosol chambers and other equipment for study of characteristics of micro-organism aerosols, their components, including toxins, or other biological materials:

YES ...
NO ...

3. Form C

To be completed for facilities at which work is carried out on biological agents and toxins included in the List (except for diagnostic facilities):

1. Name of facility

2. Location (address and geographical location)

3. Ownership (government department or company)

4. List the biological agents and toxins on which work is being carried out

5. Indicate the main areas of activity in the facility (development of preventive agents and methods, observation, identification; genetic manipulation; microbiology; toxinology; disinfection and other activities related to the purposes of the Convention)

6. Are there premises with a BL-4 level of biosafety?

Yes/No

-6-

2. Location (address and geographical location)

3. Ownership

4. Laboratory area with biosafety level 4 (BL-4), in square metres

5. Indicate listed pathogens on which work is being carried out at the facility

6. Indicate the main areas of activity in the facility (development of preventive agents and methods, observation, identification; genetic manipulation; microbiology; toxinology; disinfection and other activities related to the purposes of the Convention).

Synthetic biology methods



Directed synthesis methods

Separators

Fermentation Equipment

Filtration equipment

CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS

Investigation into an alleged breach of obligations under the provisions of the Convention

Investigation into the alleged use of biological weapons

The procedure for filing and considering a complaint (request) has been determined; its contents, as well as the structural elements of the investigation, including specific on-site verification measures, sampling and analysis procedures.

The basic principles and procedures for considering requests related to alleged violations of the BTWC have been defined.

At the same time, emphasis is placed on maximum use of the potential of Articles V and VI of the Convention and specific procedures for their implementation are proposed.





PROTECTING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION DURING INVESTIGATIONS

17



(e) In meeting the requirements to provide access, the receiving State Party shall be under the obligation to provide the greatest degree of access possible, taking into account any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures;

(f) The receiving State Party shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with the Convention and, to this end, to enable the investigation team to fulfil its mandate.

29. The receiving State Party shall have the right to take measures, as it deems necessary, to protect national security and/or to protect confidential information and data (including commercial proprietary information) in accordance with the provisions of this section and taking into account its obligations under this Protocol. Such measures may include but shall not be limited to the following:

(a) Removal of sensitive papers from office spaces and direct view;

(b) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;

(c) Shrouding sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems;

(d) Logging off of computer systems and turning off data indicating devices;

(e) Using random selective access techniques whereby the team is requested to select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to investigate; the same principle can apply to the interior and content(s) of sensitive buildings or documents;

(f) Limiting the number of team members who have access to certain buildings, structures or places within the area specified in paragraphs 36 and 39;

(g) Limiting the viewing angle;

(h) Limiting the time investigation team members may spend in any area or building;

(i) At any time during the investigation, notifying the investigation team of the products and processes that involve national security and/or the protection of confidential information and data (including commercial proprietary information) and its rights to safeguard them. It may request that if a specific piece of information is released to the team, it should be accorded the most stringent protection measures in conformity with the confidentiality provisions of this Protocol.

30. If the receiving State Party provides less than full access to places, activities or information, it shall make every reasonable and feasible effort to provide alternative means to demonstrate compliance and to clarify the possible non-compliance concern that generated the investigation. The nature and extent of access, including any alternative means to demonstrate compliance, provided by the receiving State Party, and the extent to which this

- 61 -

enabled the investigation team to fulfil its mandate, shall be recorded factually in the investigation report.

31. These provisions may not be invoked by the receiving State Party to conceal any evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under the Convention.

32. The investigation plan shall be handled in accordance with Annex B (80) and (149) to (153).

33. The investigation team shall take into consideration suggested modifications of the investigation plan and proposals which may be made by the receiving State Party, at any stage of the investigation, including the pre-investigation briefing, to ensure, *inter alia*, that sensitive equipment, information or places are protected.

34. The investigation team shall conduct the investigation in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely implementation of its mandate. As a rule, it shall begin with the procedures it deems least intrusive and proceed to more intrusive procedures only as required to fulfil its mandate.

35. If the investigation team considers it necessary in order to fulfil its mandate, the investigation team shall have the right to request clarification in connection with ambiguities that may arise during an investigation. Such requests shall be made promptly to, or through the representative of the receiving State Party. The representative shall make every reasonable effort to provide the investigation team with such clarification as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity.

Field investigations

36. The receiving State Party shall provide access within the investigation area within 48 hours after arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry in order to conduct activities in accordance with this Article and Annex B, Parts A and B for the duration of the investigation as specified in Annex B (73).

37. The receiving State Party shall provide access in accordance with paragraph 28 within the investigation area for the sole purpose of enabling the investigation team to conduct specific on-site activities identified in, and in accordance with, Annex B (84) to (111). The extent and nature of access within the investigation area shall be negotiated between the investigation team and the receiving State Party in accordance with paragraphs 28 to 35. Such negotiated access, in accordance with paragraphs 28 to 35, shall allow access to all humans, animals and/or plants that may have been affected by microbial or other biological agents or toxins directly related to the non-compliance concern being investigated.

38. The access provided for in these paragraphs shall not interfere or impede with any national measures taken to deal with the outbreak of disease.

Facility investigations

39. The receiving State Party shall provide access within the requested and, if different, final perimeter as soon as possible but not later than 108 hours after the notification of the receiving State Party of the request for an investigation in accordance with paragraph 20.

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- Shrouding sensitives pieces of equipment such as computers or electronic systems
- Logging off computer systems and turning off data indicating devices
- Using random selective access techniques whereby the team is requested to select a given percentage or number of building of their choice to investigate; the same principle can apply to the interior and content(s) of sensitive building or documents
- Removal of sensitive papers from direct view
- Limiting the time investigation team members may spend in any area or building, while allowing the team to fulfill its mandate

RESULTS OF TWO TRIAL INSPECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH VEREX CRITERIA, RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE EXPERT GROUP



THE NETHERLANDS - CANADA

Bilateral Trial Inspection
in a Large Vaccine Production Facility

A contribution to the evaluation of
potential verification measures

A. INTRODUCTION

he purpose of the two day trial inspection was to evaluate a number of potential verification measures as identified by VEREX



Given the nature of health, safety, environmental protection and other regulations governing the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, demonstrating compliance with Article I of the BWC is relatively straightforward

VISUAL ON-SITE INSPECTION, DATA ON MATERIEL TRANSFERS, TRANSFER REQUESTS, AND PRODUCTIONS

Definition	EVALUATION (Capabilities and Limitations)	
	Criteria 1–3	Criteria 4-6
Aimed at acquiring a general view of the site, facilities, equipment, materials and the degree of protection, safety measures and the peaceful activities which are being carried out. It includes taking note of the specificities and the characteristics of the equipment and the instruments. (VEREX/9, Annex III, p.217)	A large amount of information can be obtained, limited by the degree of access. May provide information on prohibited activities. But the dual-purpose nature of equipment may complicate interpretation of information and ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance. May provide information on production capacity and general capabilities. May provide information on possible undeclared actvities, but it is unlikely to provide information on removed equipment. (VEREX/9, Annex III, p.217 etc.)	It has a low capital investment requirement. The quality of the manpower available is of particular importance. CPI may be disclosed; contamination risk might be a limiting factor. It may cause an interruption of the routine work at the site and commercial confidentiality may be at risk. Inspector training is required and, in some facilities, in some States, may require national legislation.

BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8
Page 10

Attachment to the Summary Report

(Table)

During Verex 3, all 21 potential verification measures, identified during Verex 1 and examined during Verex 2, were evaluated by the Group. To evaluate these measures an agreed methodology was applied based on the 6 sandate criteria. The criteria for evaluating the measures are:

1. Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of information they provide and fail to provide.
2. Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities.
3. Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance.
4. Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements.
5. Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications.
6. Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities; and their implications for the confidentiality of Commercial Proprietary Information (CPI).

The first three criteria mainly represent the effectiveness of individual measures; the second three mainly represent their requirements and their impact. According to these criteria, capabilities and limitations were considered.

A general observation was made that reliance could not be placed on any single measure by itself to differentiate conclusively between prohibited and permitted activity or resolve ambiguities about compliance. The attached table is an extract of the complete evaluations made by rapporteurs during Verex 3, which can be found in Annex II.

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Page 67

EVALUATION OF VISUAL INSPECTION
(Rapporteur: Mr. A.A. Mohammadi)

(BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.165)

Definition

Visual inspection is aimed at acquiring a general view of the site, facilities, equipment, materials and the degree of protection, safety measures and the peaceful activities which are being carried out.

Taking note of the specificities and the characteristics of the equipment and the instruments.

Amount of information

Conducting visual inspection provides considerable amount of information. In case of no access to some equipments on specific areas, the quantity of information is low.

Quality of information

By visual inspection of the equipment and the facilities of the site, any unusual capacity of key equipment or the presence of instruments not related to the activities of the site can be detected. Moreover, any possible undeclared activity and equipment may be determined. The quality of information could be valuable if combined with other measures such as inspection of key equipment, interviewing and on-site sampling and identification.

Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activity and to resolve ambiguities about compliance

Visual inspection could verify facilities not compliance with the objectives of the Convention, but there is the possibility of dual use nature of materials and equipments. In such a case the interpretation of information may become complicated.

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Criteria 1–3 **Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of information they provide and fail to provide**

Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities.

Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance.

Criteria 4-6 **Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements.**
Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications.

Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities; and their implications for the confidentiality of CPI..

SAMPLING AND IDENTIFICATION (ON-SITE)

Definition	EVALUATION (Capabilities and Limitations)	
	Criteria 1–3	Criteria 4-6
The act of taking samples on the inspected site, analyzing these samples either on the site using appropriate methods or to transfer these samples from the site for identification or further investigations in appropriate laboratories. (VEREX/9, Annex III, p.228)	It could provide key information to resolve certain ambiguities about compliance because of the possibility of identifying the nature of an agent. Can provide information of significant quality and quantity, in particular because of the possibility of obtaining an independent confirmation of analytical results in the event that findings are disputed. A negative result does not necessarily rule out prohibited activities and may not resolve all cases of non-compliance ambiguities. The efficiency of this measure would be enhanced from a prior indication of the agents one is looking for. Ambiguous results would be reduced if more than one analytical technique and several samples from the same site were used. There is a need for an environmental profile of the site. Key issues are the chain of custody and the use of good sampling and identification practices (GSIP). (VEREX/9, Annex III, p.228 etc.)	Currently available materials would allow many of the on-site presumptive tests to be performed. There is a need to establish infrastructure for training and deployment of inspectors. Creation and maintenance of a sophisticated field laboratory or an independent laboratory could be very costly. There is a risk of loss of CPI, but the use of equipment and methodology from the site could reduce the costs and protect confidentiality. The need to preserve intellectual, individual and commercial proprietary rights in the case of legitimate activities, means the obligation to use special technical and legal procedures for processing samples, particularly if there are grounds for removing samples from the site for subsequent analysis.

Criteria 1–3 **Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of information they provide and fail to provide**

Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities.

Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance.

Criteria 4-6 **Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements.**
Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications.

Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities; and their implications for the confidentiality of CPI..



BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8
Page 10

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1. Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of information they provide and fail to provide.
2. Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities.
3. Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance.
4. Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements.
5. Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications.
6. Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities; and their implications for the confidentiality of Commercial Proprietary Information (CPI).

The first three criteria mainly represent the effectiveness of individual measures; the second three mainly represent their requirements and their impact. According to these criteria, capabilities and limitations were considered.

A general observation was made that reliance could not be placed on any single measure by itself to differentiate conclusively between prohibited and permitted activity or resolve ambiguities about compliance. The attached table is an extract of the complete evaluations made by rapporteurs during Verex 3, which can be found in Annex III.

- 10 -



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Page 78

EVALUATION
SAMPLING AND IDENTIFICATION (On-Site)
(Rapporteur: Mr. P. Binder)

(BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.144)

Introduction

During VEREX I and II potential measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BWC) were identified and examined. On-site sampling and identification is a part of on-site inspection. Papers about this measure were listed in BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.45/Rev.1. Some additional papers were presented at VEREX III (BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.109, 112, 114, 117, 118, 119, 124, 139, 140, 141). This measure may improve and be improved by other off-site and on-site measures.

Definition

Sampling and identification were defined in BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.45/Rev.1. Briefly, it refers to the act of taking samples on the inspected site, analysing these samples either on the site using appropriate methods or to transfer these samples from the site for identification or further investigations in appropriate laboratories.

Characteristics

This measure is one of the set of on-site inspection measures. It may be an essential component of an inspection process which in some cases would require the results of analyses to support its findings.

The evaluation of this measure should take into account the following considerations:

- the protection of intellectual or commercial proprietary rights must be ensured in carrying out on-site sampling and identification; the inspecting authority is expected to take all appropriate measures to guarantee the confidentiality of the investigation. However, this legitimate concern should not be used as a pretext for concealing prohibited activities;

- the efficiency of this measure would be enhanced if the inspecting authority had a preliminary idea of the agents to search for prior to sampling and analysis, and adapt its equipment accordingly;

- the probability of ambiguous results (e.g. fal or false negative) would be reduced if more analytical technique and several samples from t were used;

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OFF-SITE SAMPLING AND IDENTIFICATION

Definition	EVALUATION (Capabilities and Limitations)	
	Criteria 1–3	Criteria 4–6
To take samples of the area in the vicinity of a declared or undeclared facility without penetrating its boundary. (VEREX/9, Annex II, P-83)	The measure will usually provide information of rather poor quality, as the probability of obtaining a relevant sample is low. Using this measure alone can result in ambiguities, as e.g. the origin of any agent isolated may not be possible to clarify, and the risk of false positive as well as false negative tests may be very high. Different interpretations of the information are possible. Ability to differentiate between permitted and prohibited activities as well as resolving ambiguities is low. Could be of value in connection with open air sites. (VEREX/9, Annex III, p.197 etc.)	The costs will depend on the total number of inspections and subsequent number of samples. Small inspection teams will be required, but the chain of custody and laboratory analysis would be labor intensive. Safety problems for inspectors are generally low, except for open air test sites. Assays for identification are not developed for some agents. Minimal impact on permitted activities and CPI.







BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8
Page 10

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page 38

SAMPLING AND IDENTIFICATION (Off-Site)
(Rapporteur: Mr. Åke Bovallius)
(BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/WP.77/Rev.1)

Definition

Off-site inspections would mean to inspect a declared or undeclared facility without penetrating its boundary.

Off-site was clarified to mean *inter alia* the outer boundary of a facility, e.g. close to a facility or outside a specific building, or collection of samples that might circulate beyond the immediate vicinity on the State Party's territory.

It is essential to chose the most appropriate sampling points and targets which could be:
- air sampling near the facility;
- waste streams near a facility;
- environmental sampling near a facility or a suspected open-air test site or in an area of 100 metres' radius of a site of [UNCERO];
- investigation of uncommon disease outbreaks near facilities which might involve epidemiological studies to include taking body fluids of humans or animals as well as samples of vegetation;

Off-site inspection aims at confirmation of declarations, complaints investigation or other relevant purposes.

Characteristics and technologies

State of the art

Today a number of sampling techniques and methods of identification are available that could be used for off-site sampling and identification in the vicinity of a facility or a field testing site.

Sampling systems based on direct sampling without pretreatment, impaction, impingement as well as different methods for concentration and filtration are available. For taking air samples a number of commercially available apparatus exist that could be used in this connection. There are also well-established methods for taking surface samples.

For the identification of microorganisms and toxins there is a number of available methods. By combining genetic probes under development with the PCR (polymerase chain reaction) it is possible to achieve very good sensitivity and [illegible]. As yet these techniques have not been tested extensively on environmental samples. Immunoassays based on polyclonal and monoclonal antibodies are the next most sensitive identification techniques available. For the ide[illegible]

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Criteria 1–3 **Strengths and weaknesses based on but not limited to the amount and quality of information they provide and fail to provide**

Ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities.

Ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance.

Criteria 4-6 **Their technological, material, manpower and equipment requirements.**
Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications.

Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities; and their implications for the confidentiality of CPI..

DECLARATIONS FORMAT OF ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN FACILITIES



AD HOC GROUP OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Twentieth session
Geneva, 10 July-4 August 2006

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation

DECLARATION FORMAT

Facilities existing on the territory of a State Party but falling under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party/State

States Parties shall submit to the Organization the information at their disposal regarding a facility or facilities existing on their territory but falling under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party to the Protocol/State which meet one or more of the criteria triggering declaration under the Protocol. The information shall be submitted in the prescribed format.

This format may be set out as follows:

1. Name of the State Party on whose territory the facility is situated:

Postal address of the legal authority of the State Party through which communications may be routed:

2. This declaration relates to the calendar year:

3. Name of the facility situated in the territory of the State:

4. Postal address of the declared facility:

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5. Name of the State(s) under whose jurisdiction or control the facility falls:

Name of the department or firm to which the facility belongs:

6. Area occupied by the facility: sq m

including:
Buildings sq m
Laboratories sq m
Production areas sq m
Areas for biological work sq m

7. Criteria triggering the declaration which apply to the facility:
Biological protection (protection against BW) YES/NO
Vaccine production YES/NO
Work with listed agents/toxins YES/NO
Maximum biological containment (BL4) YES/NO
High biological containment (BL3) YES/NO
[Other production facilities] YES/NO
Aerosol tests in the open air YES/NO
Other factors YES/NO

8. Personnel present at the facility:
Military YES/NO
Civilian YES/NO
Recruited from the State where the facility is situated YES/NO

9. List the biological agents/toxins on which work is conducted at the facility:

10. Does the facility use biological agents and toxins which are to be found in the country of location YES/NO
If yes, specify which they are:

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11. Does the facility enlist the services of volunteers drawn from the population of the State Party for the testing of biological agents YES/NO
Indicate the number of volunteers enlisted per year:

12. Does the facility provide vaccinations for the local population:
Living in the vicinity of the facility YES/NO
Recruited to work in the facility YES/NO
Others YES/NO

13. Does the facility process the waste from its biological activities:
In the territory of the facility YES/NO
Outside the territory of the facility YES/NO

14. Is the facility accessible to:
Health and epidemiological monitoring authorities of the State Party whose the facility is situated YES/NO
Other officials of the State Party YES/NO

15. Are yearly reports on the work of the facility submitted to the State Party on whose territory the facility is situated YES/NO

16. Are biological agents and toxins exported to the State under whose jurisdiction or control the facility falls YES/NO
Are the procedures and the quantities of such exports approved by the State Party YES/NO

- Does the facility use biological agents and toxins which are to be found in the country of location?
- Does the facility enlist the services of volunteers drawn from the population of the State Party for the testing of biological agents?
- Does the facility provide vaccinations for the local population?
- Is the facility accessible to health and epidemiological monitoring authorities of the State Party where the facility is situated?
- Are yearly reports on the work of the facility submitted to the State Party on whose territory the facility is situated?
- Are biological agents and toxins exported to the State under whose jurisdiction or control the facility falls?
- Are the procedures and the quantities of such exports approved by the State Party?

PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER UPDATED SCIENTIFIC AND METHODOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS DEVELOPED BY VEREX AND AHG

The draft Protocol, the result of the efforts of the Ad Hoc Group, remains relevant and can serve as the basis for future negotiations

BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/2

Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

4 October 2019

Original: English

2019 Meeting
Geneva, 3-4 December 2019

Meeting of Experts on Institutional Strengthening of the Convention
Geneva, 8 August 2019
Item 5 of the Agenda
Adoption of the factual report reflecting the deliberations of the meeting, including possible outcomes

Report of the 2019 Meeting of Experts on institutional strengthening of the Convention

I. Introduction

1. At the Eighth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC/CONF.VIII/4), States Parties decided to hold annual meetings and that the first such meeting, in December 2017, would seek to make progress on issues of substance and process for the period before the next Review Conference, with a view to reaching consensus on an intersessional process.

2. At the Meeting of States Parties in December 2017, States Parties reached consensus on the following:

"1(a) Reaffirming previous intersessional programmes from 2003-2015 and retaining the previous structures: annual Meetings of States Parties preceded by annual Meetings of Experts.

(b) The purpose of the intersessional programme is to discuss and promote common understanding and effective action on those issues identified for inclusion in the intersessional programme.

(c) Recognizing the need to balance an ambition to improve the intersessional programme within the constraints – both financial and human resources – facing States Parties, twelve days are allocated to the intersessional programme each year from 2018–2020. The work in the intersessional period will be guided by the aim of strengthening the implementation of all articles of the Convention in order to better respond to current challenges. The Meetings of Experts for eight days will be held back to back and at least three months before the annual Meetings of States Parties of four days each. Maximum use would be made of the Sponsorship Programme funded by voluntary contributions in order to facilitate participation of developing States Parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme.

* Any entry listed in this document does not imply the expression of any opinion regarding, and is without prejudice to, the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities.

GE.19-17660(E)

Please recycle

BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/2

Mr. Laurent Masmejean of Switzerland.

16. Under agenda item 4 ("Consideration of the full range of approaches and options to further strengthen the Convention and its functioning through possible additional legal

The consolidated text prepared by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group in 2001 contains a number of conceptual provisions and practical recommendations that could be rethought by States Parties in the light of today's political, scientific and technological realities.

A return to the 1994 mandate, followed by discussions on the establishment of a verification mechanism, would help strengthen the BTWC and increase its institutional capacity.

Specific aspects of the Protocol by the Ad Hoc Group could be reviewed by States Parties in the light of scientific and technological achievements, which would provide a basis for resolving existing differences and resuming further negotiations.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

WORKING GROUP ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE BTWC