

Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

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Working Material

Of the Secretariat of the Collective Security Treaty Organization for the 2023 Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on The Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction

Submitted by the Russian Federation

1. Joint actions of the CSTO Member States aimed at strengthening and complying with the regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) constitute one of the most important goals of foreign policy interaction of the CSTO Member States for a strategic perspective in the development of the collective security system.
2. The CSTO Member States reaffirm the importance of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction as one of the pillars of the international security architecture. Now, as in 1975, its goal is still relevant: to completely eliminate the possibility of using biological agents as weapons.
3. The Parties emphasize the need to comply with and strengthen the BTWC, including through the institutionalization and adoption of a legally binding Protocol to the Convention, which provides, inter alia, an effective mechanism for verifying compliance with the BTWC, as well as regular consultations and cooperation in resolving any issues related to the implementation of the Convention.
4. The CSTO Member States consider it unacceptable to create international mechanisms that duplicate the functions of the BTWC and bypass the UN Security Council. In particular, they oppose attempts to use so-called "voluntary assessment visits" to dual-use microbiological facilities as an alternative to verification under the BTWC, as well as the creation of a structural unit in the UN Secretariat to conduct investigations into the alleged use of biological weapons. In order to establish a mechanism within the BTWC for investigating the alleged use of biological weapons, they call on States Parties to the Convention to develop parameters for its operation in combination with technical guidelines and procedures.
5. The CSTO member states express regret that for recent 20 years the BTWC Member States, contrary to the wishes of the overwhelming majority, have not been able to reach agreement on the resumption of multilateral negotiations on the development of a Protocol to the Convention, suspended in 2001. As a result, as well as rapid progress in the fields of science and technology with dual-use potential, the risk of using biological agents as weapons has increased.



6. The Parties call on the BTWC participating States to continue their joint efforts leading to the achievement of the goal of strengthening the Convention on a reliable, legally binding basis. Express their support for the initiatives presented in this regard. At the same time, they advocate the adoption of supportive measures aimed at improving the implementation of the Convention already at this stage.

7. The implementation of the proposal to create mobile biomedical units within the framework of the Convention to provide assistance in the case of the use of biological weapons, their investigation and assistance in combating epidemics of various origins would contribute to strengthening the institutional foundations of the BTWC. This proposal represents a new approach to improving the implementation of the Convention at the international level, harmoniously combining the principles of ensuring collective security and developing cooperation for peaceful purposes.

8. The Parties emphasize that the rapid development of science and technology in areas related to the BTWC requires increased attention from the States Parties to the Convention. It is necessary to raise awareness of the risks associated with conducting dual-use research, and at the same time promote the full use of the latest achievements of biotechnology for peaceful purposes. In this context, the Parties support the idea of creating a Scientific Advisory Committee in the BTWC format to analyze scientific and technical achievements related to the Convention and provide its States Parties with appropriate recommendations.

9. The CSTO member states note the importance of improving confidence-building measures implemented within the framework of the BTWC, including information on military biological activities of the States parties to the Convention abroad in the reporting form.

10. The CSTO member States are ready to consider any proposals that can strengthen the Convention and improve its implementation on a non-discriminatory basis. We call on all Participating States to take a constructive approach so that the decisions taken work in the interests of strengthening the BTWC regime.
