
**Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction**

17 December 2015

English only

2015 Meeting

Geneva, 14-18 December 2015

Item 8 of the agenda

**Standing agenda item: Review of the developments
in the field of science and technology related
to the Convention**

**Science and technology advances and the application of
“dual use”**

Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

Damocles’ sword of “dual use”

1. Cooperation and assistance under the Convention should also be considered from a humanitarian perspective, by providing capacities for its State Parties to early detection, effective surveillance, prevention and rapid response, including diagnosis and recovery,
2. While certain advances and in biology have potential benefit, it also might embody potential risks; however, leaning fully towards a pessimistic, negative and suspicious approach will indeed end up at the expense of losing the potential benefits. Additionally, it will not only lead up to monopoly and exclusivism, but also goes contrary to the purpose and principles of the Convention as well,
3. The term “dual use” is a broad qualitative term, which is most of the time used as a political tool, unilaterally applied restriction and /or limitations, contrary to the provisions of the Convention, by some against the others in unrealistic and impractical situations. Whilst, most of the identified dual use researches are of vital importance to science, public health and modern agriculture and contribute to the broader base of knowledge that drives the scientific advances and achievements to the benefit of public health.
4. Dual use itself should not provide any justification for prescribing restrictions or denials. However, concern about the dual use nature of some biological advances is an issue that should be dealt with in a proper approach, without over-estimation and exaggeration;
5. Unilateral code of conduct to prevent misuse of science and technology is not a good solution to address the concerns about the actions in contravention of the purposes of the Convention. It may end up to the detriment of attracting the engagement of new genius scientists and inevitably imposing constraints to the advancement of biological science and technology. It will also divide the biological science and technology society to marked and

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unmarked sub-communities and will pose security concerns including kidnapping and murdering of some by criminal and terrorist groups, which we have a bitter experience of it.

A collaborative approach with a monitoring mechanism

6. Collaborative research and development, joint investments in production, research or production facilities sponsored/supervised by the relevant international organizations like the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, or the establishment of multinational companies in specific areas, would contribute to the use of toxin and agents for peaceful purposes, while avoiding any [possible] diversion to activities prohibited under the Convention.

7. International monitoring of the advances in science and technology related to the Convention should be accomplished by an authorized body, which has not been created under this Convention. Such a body could be considered to be established in a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument, with specific mandate and modalities, taking into account lessons learned from the establishment of such body under other relevant international instruments.
