

**Formal Consultative Meeting of the States Parties  
to the Convention on the Prohibition of the  
Development, Production and Stockpiling  
of Bacteriological (Biological) and  
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

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**2022 Meeting**

**Geneva, 26 August and 5-9 September 2022**

Item 6 of the agenda

**Respective outstanding questions by the Russian Federation  
to the United States and to Ukraine concerning the fulfilment  
of their respective obligations under the Convention in the context  
of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine**

**Statement by Mr. Mehdi Aliabadi, Deputy Permanent  
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the  
United Nations and other international organizations  
in Geneva before the Formal Consultative Meeting of  
the State Parties to the Biological Weapons  
Convention (BWC) Pursuant to Article V**

**Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran**

Mr. Chair,

1. At the outset I would like to thank you, Ambassador Molnar, for taking up responsibility as the Chair of this consultative meeting under Article V of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and thank the ISU for the work undertaken in preparation for this meeting, I assure you of my delegations' full cooperation and support. The convening of this meeting signifies the importance of this convention as the first multilateral legally binding instrument that bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.
2. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention in full, comprehensive and balanced manner is vital and compliance with its provisions by all member states is of outmost importance.
3. My delegation is of the view that under Article V of the BWC, the States Parties have the right to consult one another and to co-operate in order to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention. Accordingly, we support exercising the right to request the convening of this consultative meeting by the Russian Federation. We took note of all information provided under this process and it worth to recall that this is second time that the process of consultation under article V of the Convention has been invoked.
4. We consider Article V within the Convention an important mechanism and in the absence of a verification mechanism, consideration of the procedures of consultation and cooperation pursuant to Article V of the BWC would be beneficial for trust and confidence in implementation of the Convention.



Mr. Chair,

5. Verification for any disarmament agreement is of vital importance. Verification is a means that ensures member states confident that disarmament obligations will be honoured and implemented in good faith.

6. For more than two decades, the BWC States Parties efforts on resumption of the multilateral negotiations for the development of a legally binding instrument on the verification of the Convention, that would address all of the convention's articles in a comprehensive and balanced manner, have regrettably been blocked.

7. Against this backdrop, the issue of U.S. Biological Laboratories outside its national territory is a matter of serious concern, particularly taking into consideration that those Labs are operating and running under the control of the US Ministry of Defense. Some questions and issues have been raised by a state party with respect to the U.S. biological laboratories outside its national territory that remained unresolved. The U.S. should provide clarifications on these unresolved issues in full and transparent manner.

8. Furthermore, the BWC-CBMs Forms that were submitted by the U.S. under the BWC regime do not contain any credible information with respect to those overseas' biological laboratories. Therefore, it is vital that the states parties consider the issue of how to provide information on the biological laboratories and activities outside the national territory of states parties at the upcoming RevCon.

Mr. Chair,

9. In its response dated 22 August, 2022, the U.S. claims that the allegations "comes at a time when the world needs to intensify cooperation on public health to end the COVID-19 pandemic, mitigate current outbreak and prevent future ones". It also recalls the U.S. statement that "the U.S. government believes in power of scientific collaboration and cooperation. Science and public health transcend international politics-or at least they should".

10. My delegation cannot agree more that the international cooperation is vital to end the pandemic. My delegation not only believes that science and public health transcend international politics-or at least they should, but also strongly believes that public health must goes beyond any politics particularly in humanitarian situation. Nonetheless, we recall the fact that U.S. policies during the pandemic proved otherwise by reinforcing the Unilateral Coercive Measures against targeted nations.

Mr. Chair,

11. The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms its unequivocal support for the BTWC as the legally binding global instrument against biological weapons , and given the lack of verification mechanism for it due to the opposition of one State party, once again calls on that State party who oppose the resumption of negotiations on a legally binding protocol including verification mechanism in strengthening the BWC to reconsider its outdated position and respect the legitimate request of other States parties.

I thank you Mr. Chair.

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