

Second Review Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction

FINAL DOCUMENT

Geneva, 1986

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

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Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction

The Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
consists of four parts and two Annexes as follows:

- I. Organization and Work of the Conference (BWC/CONF.II/13/I)
 - II. Final Declaration (BWC/CONF.II/13/II)
 - III. Report of the Committee of the Whole (BWC/CONF.II/13/III)
 - IV. Summary Records of Plenary Meetings (BWC/CONF.II/13/IV)
- Annex I: List of Documents
- Annex II: List of Participants

Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
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Final Document

PART I

Organization and Work of the Conference

FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO
THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION
AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

I. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

Introduction

1. The Final Declaration of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, in the section dealing with the review of article XII of the Convention, contained the following decision:

"The Conference decides that a second Review Conference shall be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States Parties not earlier than 1985 and, in any case, not later than 1990". 1/

2. By resolution 39/65 D, adopted on 12 December 1984, the General Assembly, bearing in mind the above-mentioned decision of the Review Conference, noted that, at the request of a majority of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, a second Review Conference to the Parties to the Convention would be held in 1986, and that, following appropriate consultations, a Preparatory Committee was to be established prior to the holding of the Review Conference.

3. Following such consultations, it was agreed that a Preparatory Committee, open to all States Parties to the Convention, would convene at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 28 April 1986.

4. The Preparatory Committee held one session at Geneva from 28 April to 2 May 1986. The following States Parties to the Convention participated in the Preparatory Committee: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

5. At its 6th meeting on 1 May 1986, the Committee agreed that its Bureau would be composed of Mr. F. Gajda (Hungary), Ambassador A.S. Gonsalves (India) and Ambassador M. Huslid (Norway) and that each member of the Bureau would

chair the meetings of the Preparatory Committee in rotation. The Committee authorized the Bureau to handle technical and other matters in the period before the Review Conference was convened.

6. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was represented by Mr. Árpád Prandler, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, who opened the session of the Preparatory Committee. Ms. Aida Luisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Committee.

7. The Committee decided to take its decisions by consensus.

8. The Committee, taking note of their written requests, decided to invite the representatives of two States Signatories of the Convention, Egypt and Morocco, to participate in its discussions without the right to take part in the making of decisions.

9. In the course of its session the Committee considered the following questions relating to the organization of the Review Conference:

- (a) Date and duration
- (b) Provisional agenda
- (c) Draft rules of procedure
- (d) Background documentation
- (e) Final document(s)

10. At its last meeting, on 2 May 1986, the Preparatory Committee adopted its report, which was issued as a pre-session document of the Conference (BWC/CONF.II/1). The report contained, inter alia, the Provisional Agenda and the Provisional Rules of Procedure for the Conference (Annexes I and II, respectively).

11. Pursuant to the request of the Preparatory Committee, the following background documents were also issued as pre-session documentation for the Conference:

- (1) 1980-1983 reports of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons of the Committee on Disarmament and 1984-1986 reports of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament (BWC/CONF.II/2 and Add.1-6),
- (2) Background document on compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC/CONF.II/3 and Add.1-5),
- (3) Background document on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC/CONF.II/4 and Add.1 and 2).

12. The Committee also had before it a revised estimate of the cost of the Conference reflecting the actual cost of the session of the Preparatory Committee (BWC/CONF.II/5).

Organization of the Conference

13. In accordance with the decision of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference was convened on 8 September 1986 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva for a period of three weeks.

14. At its 1st meeting on 8 September, the Conference elected by acclamation Ambassador Winfried Lang (Austria) as its President.

15. At the same meeting, a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was read out by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs.

16. The Conference adopted its agenda as recommended by the Preparatory Committee (BWC/CONF.II/1, Annex I).

17. The Conference took note with appreciation of the Report of the Preparatory Committee (BWC/CONF.II/1).

18. The Conference adopted its Rules of Procedure as recommended by the Preparatory Committee (BWC/CONF.II/1, Annex II). The Rules of Procedure provided for (a) a General Committee, chaired by the President of the Conference and composed of the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, the Chairman of the Credentials Committee, as well as the 20 Vice-Presidents of the Conference; (b) a Committee of the Whole; (c) a Drafting Committee, composed of representatives of the same 24 States Parties represented on the General Committee; and (d) a Credentials Committee, composed of a Chairman and Vice-Chairman elected by the Conference, and five other members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President.

19. The Conference elected by acclamation 20 Vice-Presidents from the following States Parties: Bhutan, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. The Conference also elected by acclamation the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, as follows:

Committee of the Whole:	Chairman	Ambassador M. Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia)
	Vice-Chairman	Ambassador M.A. Cámpora (Argentina)
	Vice-Chairman	Ambassador C. Clerckx (Belgium)

Drafting Committee	Chairman	Ambassador R. Butler (Australia)
	Vice-Chairman	Ambassador B. Konstantinov (Bulgaria)
Credentials Committee	Chairman	Ambassador D.D. Afande (Kenya)
	Vice-Chairman	Ambassador J.M. Lacleta (Spain)

The Conference also appointed the following five States Parties as members of the Credentials Committee: Cyprus, Jordan, New Zealand, Switzerland and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

20. The Conference confirmed by acclamation the nomination of Ms. Aida Luisa Levin as Secretary-General of the Conference. The nomination had been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following an invitation by the Preparatory Committee.

Participation at the Conference

21. Sixty-three States Parties to the Convention participated in the Conference as follows: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

22. In addition, four States which have signed the Treaty but have not yet ratified it participated in the Conference, without taking part in its decisions, as provided for in Rule 44, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure: Egypt, Iraq, Morocco and Sri Lanka.

23. One additional State, Algeria, neither a Party to nor a Signatory of the Convention, was granted Observer status in accordance with Rule 44, paragraph 2.

24. Three non-governmental organizations attended the Conference under Rule 44, paragraph 5.

25. A list of all delegations to the Conference, including States Parties, Signatories, Observer State and non-governmental organizations is contained in Annex II.

26. The Credentials Committee met on 24 September and reported on the credentials of the States Parties and Signatories (BWC/CONF.II/10 and Corr.1 and Add.1). At its 10th plenary meeting on 26 September the Conference took note of the report.

Work of the Conference

27. The Conference held 10 plenary meetings between 8 and 26 September when it concluded its work.

28. The general debate, in which 45 States Parties and one Signatory made statements, took place at the 3rd to 8th plenary meetings held from 9 to 15 September.

29. The General Committee, at its 1st meeting on 10 September, considered item 10 of the Agenda entitled "Programme of work" and decided, inter alia, to make the following recommendations to the Conference:

- (1) The Committee of the Whole should undertake the review of the various articles and provisions of the Convention under agenda items 10 (b), 10 (c) and 11.
- (2) The Drafting Committee should undertake the task of preparing and submitting to the plenary the draft Final Document of the Conference, including the Final Declaration.

30. At its 7th plenary meeting on 15 September, the Conference adopted the above recommendations of the General Committee.

31. The Committee of the Whole held eight meetings between 16 and 22 September, during which it reviewed the provisions of the Convention, article by article, followed by consideration of the Preamble and purposes of the Convention. Its report (BWC/CONF.II/9 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1) was submitted to the Conference on 22 September. The Conference, at its 9th plenary meeting on 22 September, took note of the report. The report of the Committee of the Whole is attached.

32. The Drafting Committee met between 22 and 26 September and submitted its report to the Conference on 26 September (BWC/CONF.II/11). The Conference at its 10th plenary meeting on 26 September, took note of the report.

Documentation

33. A list of the documents of the Conference is attached as Annex I.

Conclusion of the Conference

34. At its 10th and final plenary meeting on 26 September, the Conference adopted by consensus its Final Document as recommended by the Drafting Committee in document BWC/CONF.II/11. The Final Document consists of four parts: I. Organization and work of the Conference; II. Final Declaration; III. Report of the Committee of the Whole; and IV. Summary Records of Plenary Meetings of the Conference.

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Final Document

PART II

Final Declaration

II. FINAL DECLARATION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, having met in Geneva 8-26 September 1986 in accordance with a decision by the First Review Conference 1980 and at the request of a majority of States Parties to the Convention, to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Convention are being realized;

Reaffirming their determination to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the continuing importance of the Convention and its objectives and the common interest of mankind in the elimination of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons,

Affirming their belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security, would not hamper economic or technological development and, further, would facilitate the wider exchange of information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents for peaceful purposes,

Confirming the common interest in strengthening the authority and the effectiveness of the Convention, to promote confidence and co-operation among States Parties,

Affirming the importance of strengthening international co-operation in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the said principles and objectives,

Recognizing the importance of achieving as a matter of high priority an international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction,

Noting the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Appealing to all States to refrain from any action which might place the Convention or any of its provisions in jeopardy,

Declare their strong determination, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of microbial, or other biological agents, or toxins being used as weapons and reaffirm their strong support for the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their legal obligation under international law to implement and strictly comply with its provisions.

ARTICLE I

The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the Article which defines the scope of the Convention and reaffirms its support for the provisions of this Article.

The Conference concludes that the scope of Article I covers scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

The Conference notes statements by some States Parties that compliance with Articles I, II and III was, in their view, subject to grave doubt in some cases and that efforts to resolve those concerns had not been successful. The Conference notes the statements by other States Parties that such a doubt was unfounded and, in their view, not in accordance with the Convention. The Conference agrees that the application by States Parties of a positive approach in questions of compliance in accordance with the provisions of the Convention was in the interest of all States Parties and that this would serve to promote confidence among States Parties.

The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.

The Conference reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production. Consequently, toxins (both proteinaceous and non-proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically produced analogues are covered.

ARTICLE II

The Conference notes the importance of Article II and welcomes the statements made by States which have become Parties to the Convention since the First Review Conference that they do not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery referred to in Article I of the Convention. The Conference believes that such statements enhance confidence in the Convention.

The Conference stresses that States which become Parties to the Convention, in implementing the provisions of this Article, shall observe all necessary safety precautions to protect populations and the environment.

ARTICLE III

The Conference notes the importance of Article III and welcomes the statements which States that have acceded to the Convention have made to the effect that they have not transferred agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery, specified in Article I of the Convention, to any recipient whatsoever and have not furnished assistance, encouragement or inducement to any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire them. The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive so as to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national or sub-national levels.

The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials to States Parties.

ARTICLE IV

The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any acts or actions which would contravene the Convention.

The Conference calls upon all States Parties which have not yet taken any necessary measures in accordance with their constitutional processes, as required by the Article, to do so immediately.

The Conference notes that States Parties, as requested by the First Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs information on and the texts of specific legislation enacted or other regulatory measures taken by them, relevant to this Article. The Conference invites States Parties to continue to provide such information and texts to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs for purposes of consultation.

The Conference notes the importance of

- legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Convention within the territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party,
- legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and removal of pathogenic or toxic material, and
- inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol

and believes that such measures which States might undertake in accordance with their constitutional process would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention.

ARTICLE V

The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation assumed by States Parties to consult and co-operate with one another in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

The Conference reaffirms that consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Conference confirms the conclusion in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference that these procedures include, inter alia, the right of any State Party to request that a consultative meeting open to all States Parties be convened at expert level.

The Conference stresses the need for all States to deal seriously with compliance issues and emphasizes that the failure to do so undermines the Convention and the arms control process in general.

The Conference appeals to States Parties to make all possible efforts to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention with a view towards encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to. The Conference further requests that information on such efforts be provided to the Third Review Conference.

The Conference, taking into account views expressed concerning the need to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Article V, has agreed:

- that a consultative meeting shall be promptly convened when requested by a State Party,
- that a consultative meeting may consider any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, suggest ways and means for further clarifying, inter alia, with assistance of technical experts, any matter considered ambiguous or unresolved, as well as initiate appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter,
- that the consultative meeting, or any State Party, may request specialized assistance in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention, through, inter alia, appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter,

- the Conference considers that States Parties shall co-operate with the consultative meeting in its consideration of any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, and in clarifying ambiguous and unresolved matters, as well as co-operate in appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Conference, mindful of the provisions of Article V and Article X, and determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence in the implementation of its provisions, agrees that the States Parties are to implement, on the basis of mutual co-operation, the following measures, in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities:

1. Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention.
2. Exchange of information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence. If possible, the information provided would include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area affected, and number of cases.
3. Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States Parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge gained in this research.
4. Active promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges for joint research on a mutually agreed basis.

The Conference decides to hold an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from States Parties to finalize the modalities for the exchange of information and data by working out, inter alia, appropriate forms to be used by States Parties for the exchange of information agreed to in this Final Declaration, thus enabling States Parties to follow a standardized procedure. The group shall meet in Geneva for the period 31 March-15 April 1987 and shall communicate the results of the work to the States Parties immediately thereafter.

Pending the results of this meeting, the Conference urges States Parties , to promptly apply these measures and report the data agreed upon to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

The Conference requests the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs to make available the information received to all States Parties.

ARTICLE VI

The Conference also notes the importance of Article VI, which in addition to the procedures contained in Article V, provides for any State Party, which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention, to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council and under which each State Party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

The Conference notes the need to further improve and strengthen this and other procedures to enhance greater confidence in the Convention. The Conference considers that the Security Council may, if it deems it necessary, request the advice of the World Health Organization in carrying out any investigation of complaints lodged with the Council.

ARTICLE VII

The Conference notes that these provisions have not been invoked.

ARTICLE VIII

The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VIII and stresses the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

The Conference reaffirms that nothing contained in the Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. Noting the report of the Security Council (S/17911), the Conference appeals to all States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to fulfil their obligations assumed under that Protocol and urges all States not yet Parties to the said Protocol to adhere to it at the earliest possible date.

ARTICLE IX

The Conference reaffirms the obligation assumed by States Parties to continue negotiations in good faith towards an early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

All States Parties participating in the Conference reiterate their strong commitment to this important goal.

The Conference notes with satisfaction the substantial progress made in the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament during the period under review. The Conference also takes note of the bilateral talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on all aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Conference nevertheless deeply regrets that an agreement on a convention on chemical weapons has not yet been reached.

The Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament to exert all possible efforts to conclude an agreement on a total ban of chemical weapons with effective verification provisions by the earliest possible date.

ARTICLE X

The Conference emphasizes the increasing importance of the provisions of Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful applications, which have vastly increased the potential for co-operation between States to help promote economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress, particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with their interests, needs and priorities.

The Conference, while acknowledging what has already been done towards this end, notes with concern the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas. The Conference accordingly urges States Parties to provide wider access to and share their scientific and technological knowledge in this field, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind.

The Conference urges that States Parties take specific measures within their competence for the promotion of the fullest possible international co-operation in this field through their active intervention. Such measures could include, inter alia:

- transfer and exchange of information concerning research programmes in bio-sciences,
- wider transfer and exchange of information, materials and equipment among States on a systematic and long-term basis,
- active promotion of contacts between scientists and technical personnel on a reciprocal basis, in relevant fields,
- increased technical co-operation, including training opportunities to developing countries in the use of bio-sciences and genetic engineering for peaceful purposes,
- facilitating the conclusion of bilateral, regional and multiregional agreements providing on a mutually advantageous, equal and non-discriminatory basis, for their participation in the development and application of biotechnology,
- encouraging the co-ordination of national and regional programmes and working out in an appropriate manner the ways and means of co-operation in this field.

The Conference calls for greater co-operation in international public health and disease control.

The Conference urges that co-operation under Article X should be actively pursued both within the bilateral and the multilateral framework and further urges the use of existing institutional means within the United Nations system and the full utilization of the possibilities provided by the specialized agencies and other international organizations.

The Conference, noting that co-operation would be best initiated by improved institutionalized direction and co-ordination, recommends that measures to ensure co-operation on such a basis be pursued within the existing means of the United Nations system. Accordingly, the Conference requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to propose for inclusion on the agenda of a relevant United Nations body a discussion and examination of the means for improving institutional mechanisms in order to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. The Conference recommends that invitations to participate in this discussion and examination should be extended to all States Parties, whether or not they are members of the United Nations and concerned specialized agencies.

The Conference requests the States Parties and the United Nations Secretariat to include in the document materials prepared for the above-mentioned discussion of States Parties, information and suggestions on the implementation of Article X, taking into account the preceding paragraphs. Furthermore, it urges the specialized agencies, inter alia, FAO, WHO, UNESCO, WIPO and UNIDO, to participate in this discussion and fully co-operate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and requests the Secretary-General to send all relevant information of this Conference to these agencies.

The Conference, referring to paragraph 35 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, stresses the importance of the obligations under Article X in promoting economic and social development of developing countries, particularly in the light of the United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, for the States participating therein, scheduled for 1987.

The Conference, to ensure compliance with Article X, also requests States Parties and the United Nations Secretariat to provide information relevant to the implementation of the Article for examination by the next conference of States Parties.

The Conference upholds that the above-mentioned measures would positively strengthen the Convention.

ARTICLE XI

The Conference notes the importance of Article XI and that since the entry into force of the Convention the provisions of the Article have not been invoked.

ARTICLE XII

The Conference decides that a Third Review Conference shall be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States Parties not later than 1991.

The Conference, noting the differing views with regard to verification, decides that the Third Review Conference shall consider, inter alia:

- the impact of scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention,
- the relevance for effective implementation of the Convention of the results achieved in the negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons,
- the effectiveness of the provisions in Article V for consultation and co-operation and of the co-operative measures agreed in this Final Declaration, and
- in the light of these considerations and of the provisions of Article XI, whether or not further actions are called for to create further co-operative measures in the context of Article V, or legally binding improvements to the Convention, or a combination of both.

ARTICLE XIII

The Conference notes the provisions of Article XIII and expresses its satisfaction that no State Party to the Convention has exercised its right to withdraw from the Convention.

ARTICLE XIV

The Conference notes with satisfaction that a significant number of States have ratified or acceded to the Convention since the First Review Conference and that there are now more than 100 States Parties to the Convention, including all the permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Conference calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to join the States Parties thereto thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.

The Conference makes an urgent appeal to all States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which did not participate in its work, to give their effective co-operation and take part more actively in the common endeavour of all the Contracting Parties to strengthen the objectives and purposes of the Convention. In this connection, the Conference urges all States Parties that were absent to take part in the future work envisaged in this Final Declaration.

ARTICLE XV

The Conference notes the provisions of Article XV.

The following proposals were submitted to the Conference and considered by it, their full text is reproduced in the Final Document of the Review Conference.

Preamble - Cuba
Bulgaria
Finland
German Democratic Republic
Sweden

Article

I China
I German Democratic Republic and Hungary
I Ireland
I Sweden
I-III Bulgaria and German Democratic Republic
I-IV United States of America
III Argentina
III Finland
IV German Democratic Republic
V Argentina
V Australia, Netherlands and New Zealand
V Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Norway, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom
V Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, and the United States of America
V Finland
V Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom
V Australia, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United States of America
V Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Turkey and the United States of America
V German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V Ireland
V Sweden
V-VI Pakistan
V-VI Germany, Federal Republic of and United Kingdom
V-VI German Democratic Republic
V-VI Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VI Colombia
VI Colombia
VI France
VI Nigeria
VI Nigeria
VI United States of America

Article

- IX Poland, Bulgaria and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
- IX Sweden
- IX Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- X Argentina
- X Bulgaria
- X Czechoslovakia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- X Czechoslovakia and Poland
- X Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- X Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)
- X India
- X Hungary, Mongolia, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- X Pakistan
- X Peru
- X Poland
- X German Democratic Republic, Poland and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
- XI Ireland
- XI Sweden
- XII Sweden
- XIV Hungary

Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction

Final Document

PART III

Report of the Committee of the Whole

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

BWC/CONF.II/9/Corr.2
30 September 1986

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Corrigendum

On page 17 of the Annex, under ARTICLE V, "Proposal by Australia and New Zealand" should read "Proposal by Australia, Netherlands and New Zealand".

The table of contents of the Annex, on page 9, should be amended accordingly.

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
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BWC/CONF.II/9
22 September 1986

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

1. At its first plenary meeting on 8 September, the Review Conference decided, in accordance with rule 35 of its Rules of Procedure, to establish a Committee of the Whole to consider in detail the substantive issues relevant to the Convention with a view to facilitating the work of the Conference.
2. At its second meeting, the Conference elected by acclamation Ambassador Milos Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia) as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and Ambassador Mario Cámpora (Argentina) and Ambassador Constant Clerckx (Belgium) as Vice-Chairmen.
3. At its seventh plenary meeting on 15 September, on the recommendation of the General Committee, the Conference decided that the Committee of the Whole should undertake the review of the various articles and provisions of the Convention under agenda items 10 (b), 10 (c) and 11.
4. The Committee of the Whole held eight meetings during the period from 16 to 22 September.
5. At its first meeting on 16 September, the Committee of the Whole adopted its programme of work, providing for the consideration of the various provisions of the Convention under agenda items 10 (b), 10 (c) and 11, as follows: Articles I-IV; Articles V-VII; Articles VIII-IX; Articles X-XI; and Articles XII, XIII, XIV, Preamble and other matters, including the question of future review of the Convention.
6. In the course of the work of the Committee a number of proposals were presented on the Preamble and the Articles of the Convention. These proposals appear in the Annex to this report.
7. The following is a summary of the various views expressed during the deliberations of the Committee.

Preamble

8. Some delegations referred to the preambular paragraphs relating to the purposes and objectives of the Convention and several proposals for inclusion in the relevant section of the Final Declaration were put forward.

Articles I-IV

9. Participants reaffirmed their commitments to, and the importance to all States Parties of, the obligations assumed under these Articles and the norm which they established.

10. The fundamental importance of Article I, which defines the scope of the Convention, was recognized and support for its provisions was reaffirmed. It was unanimously agreed that the scope of Article I covers scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Nevertheless, the view was expressed that problems might emerge if there were to be misuse of scientific advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering relevant to the Convention. It was agreed that the obligations assumed under Article I applied to all such developments without reservation. In that context, one delegation suggested that it was necessary to examine and, if need be, supplement the definition of toxins and made a proposal to that effect. The idea of elaborating a definition of toxins was supported by several delegations, while others recalled the understanding that the formulation in Article I "whatever their origin or method of production" covered any toxin.

11. In connection with Article II, it was noted with satisfaction that States which had acceded to the Convention since the First Review Conference had made statements to the effect that they did not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

12. Some delegations made a proposal concerning declarations regarding previous possession or non-possession of agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery and measures for their destruction as well as facilities designed and used for activities prohibited by the Convention; it was noted that similar language had been included in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference. Other delegations maintained that such declarations did not fall within the purview of the Convention. Proposals were made to the effect that the Conference would welcome statements by States Parties that they do not conduct research with a view to creating and perfecting bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and would consider such statements as strengthening confidence in the Convention.

13. Many delegations underlined the importance of Article III. It was reaffirmed that this Article covered any recipient whatsoever, whether at the international, national or sub-national level. Several delegations stressed that the provisions of this Article should not be used to impose restrictions on the transfer for peaceful uses of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials to States Parties. Some delegations suggested that States Parties to the Convention should, as a confidence-building measure, make statements regarding non-development of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons on the territory of other States, non-transfer of any information relating to their development and manufacture and non-participation in agreements in that respect.

14. With regard to Article IV, several delegations noted the information provided by States Parties to the United Nations as requested by the First Review Conference. A proposal was made concerning the enactment of national legislation pursuant to this Article and the provision of information thereon.

15. Some States Parties stated that they had concluded that Articles I and III had been violated by other States Parties and one State Party noted that its concerns also related to Article II. That State Party underlined that no satisfactory answer had been given to its repeated requests for clarification on the basis of the provisions of Article V. The States concerned

categorically rejected these accusations as completely unfounded, stressed that all questions had been answered, and noted that no complaint had been lodged with the Security Council of the United Nations under the Convention.

Articles V-VII

16. Delegations reaffirmed the importance of Articles V, VI and VII. Most delegations agreed that the verification of compliance and complaints procedures required improvement. It was generally recognized that improved complaints and verification procedures and the application by States Parties of a positive approach towards demonstrating compliance in accordance with the provisions of the Convention were in the interest of all States Parties and that this would serve to promote confidence among States Parties in the provisions of the Convention. Some delegations considered that the establishment of flexible, objective and non-discriminatory procedures for the verification of compliance was of fundamental importance in strengthening confidence in and respect for the Convention. In the view of some delegations the complaints and verification procedures should be strengthened to ensure that any doubts and suspicions regarding compliance were satisfactorily resolved. Several delegations held that recent advances in biological science and technology which may have military implications were increasingly difficult to verify. Several delegations said that there were problems related to recent developments in biotechnology as well as to uncertainties connected with allegations of non-compliance that had not been resolved to their satisfaction. Other delegations said that these allegations were unfounded and that any unfounded allegations undermined the Convention and were not in accordance with the provisions of Article V.

17. A considerable number of proposals were put forward with respect to various aspects of Article V with a view to improving consultation and co-operation procedures to resolve problems related to the implementation of the Convention, promoting confidence and increasing openness and exchanges of information.

18. As regards the provisions of Article V concerning consultation and co-operation procedures, it was generally agreed that the Conference should confirm the statement included in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference on the right of any State Party to request that a consultative meeting open to all States Parties be convened at expert level. Some delegations proposed that this statement should be developed further and put forward proposals to this effect, including: that such a meeting could be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that it may consider complaints and suggest ways and means for clarifying any matter considered ambiguous or unresolved, that States Parties should agree to co-operate with a consultative meeting and that it may ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the assistance of qualified experts, to ascertain the facts of an unresolved matter, following procedures available to him. Other delegations, in objecting to some elements of these proposals, underlined the necessity of convening consultative meetings on an expert level in order to increase the effectiveness of the existing mechanisms under the Convention.

19. Some delegations held the view that the provisions of Article V included the right of any State Party to request the Secretary-General of the

United Nations to conduct a timely fact-finding inquiry into compliance concerns. They recalled that the Secretary-General, on previous occasions, had carried out investigations with regard to alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and expressed the view that similar procedures could be applied in cases when the Secretary-General, for example, acting on a request by a consultative meeting, ascertained the facts of an unresolved matter and that such procedures would fall within Article V, which constitutes a legally binding provision. They proposed that States Parties should undertake to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the conduct of such an inquiry. Some delegations were of the opinion that an inquiry could also be carried out through the procedures established under United Nations General Assembly resolutions 37/98 D and 39/65 E. Other delegations referred to their proposal to the effect that further consideration and action should be initiated to perfect the existing procedures under Articles V and VI or to create new ones. In connection with the procedures established by resolutions 37/98 D and 39/65 E, other delegations stressed that these are of a controversial character and could not serve as a basis for the effective improvement of the mechanism of the Convention. They further held that the inclusion in the Final Declaration of proposals which were different in legal nature from the provisions of the Convention raised problems of international law; new procedures would require the adoption of additional legal measures and to that effect further consideration and action should be initiated to perfect the existing procedures under Articles V and VI or to create new ones, taking into account all proposals submitted to the Review Conference. This approach was supported by some delegations.

20. In connection with Article V, some delegations proposed various politically binding measures to strengthen the Convention and increase trust among States Parties. Other delegations, while agreeing to some politically binding measures, underlined that priority should be given to legally binding ones. The view was also expressed that voluntary measures of this nature could be taken at the national level. There were various proposals for promotion of contacts between scientists, including visits to facilities and for increased information on activities related to protection against biological or toxin weapons, declarations on relevant facilities, information on unusual, abnormal or large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins, as well as information, *inter alia*, on the orientation of research programmes and on the inoculation programmes of armed forces. Several delegations believed that such measures would lead to more transparency of activities pertaining to the use of biological agents or toxins for permitted purposes. One delegation proposed that States Parties should elaborate a set of procedures to facilitate the collection, collation and dissemination of data relevant to the Convention and, in this connection, to seek the views of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the most appropriate means by which this data exchange might be facilitated. Until new procedures were elaborated, exchanges of data should continue under the auspices of the United Nations. Some delegations said they supported these proposals. Other delegations stated that confidence-building measures were important and deserved serious consideration. In their view, some of these measures could be adopted, after they were clarified with respect to such questions as the nature, quantity standards and other parameters of information to be submitted, on its intended recipients, and on the procedures to be followed. They stressed their readiness to co-operate with the authors of various proposals to elaborate mutually acceptable procedures aimed at enhancing confidence in compliance with the Convention.

21. It was stated that no State Party had invoked the provisions of Article VI. Some delegations expressed concern over the possibility of misuse of the veto in the Security Council and called for measures against such misuse to be included in an additional protocol. One delegation proposed that note be taken of the need for an effective arrangement that would separate the fact-finding stage of the complaints procedure from the stage of political consideration and decision by the United Nations Security Council. That delegation, therefore, proposed that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be empowered to initiate investigations through a consultative committee of experts before consideration and decision by the Security Council. Several delegations commended this proposal. Another delegation proposed that the States Parties, in the framework of an inquiry, should provide information on vaccinations administered to their military forces or laboratory staff and should co-operate in supplying the appropriate evidence. Another delegation proposed that Article VI be supplemented by provisions empowering the World Health Organization to assume a role in the investigation of violations of the Convention, whether directly or at a request of the United Nations Security Council, and in the prevention of such violations. The same delegation underlined that the Charter of the United Nations envisaged the co-operation of the specialized agencies with the organs of the United Nations and that the proposed role of the World Health Organization was particularly necessary for countries which did not have the technical or the financial means to undertake the necessary investigations on their own. Some delegations expressed their willingness to consider that proposal.

22. Some delegations proposed that the Conference, taking into account the general agreement among the States participating in the Conference concerning the need to strengthen and effectively implement the provisions of the Convention, as well as the need to specify ways of achieving this end, should decide to prepare an additional protocol to the Convention providing for measures to strengthen the system of verification of compliance with the Convention. In their view, the required preparatory work would be carried out in a form acceptable to States Parties to the Convention. In that connection, they proposed the convening of a special conference to work out concrete measures, acceptable to all, on this particular subject, for subsequent inclusion in an additional protocol. Some delegations suggested that such a conference could be held as early as 1987. One delegation warned that fixing such a date and taking into account the experience gained in this area in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as had been suggested, could lead to the undesirable fact of holding two competing conferences of similar nature at the same time. This and other delegations believed that another Review Conference could take place soon after agreement on a chemical weapons convention to consider whether the Biological Weapons Convention should be strengthened by supplementary legal obligations in the light of what is agreed in the chemical weapons convention. One delegation proposed that a special conference of all States Parties should be held to establish flexible, objective and non-discriminatory procedures to deal with issues concerning compliance with the Convention. Some delegations were of the opinion that strengthening of procedures for verification of compliance did not require elaboration of amendments or of an additional protocol and could be achieved within the framework of the Convention. Some delegations were of the view that there was no need to adopt new legally binding obligations, but to comply fully with the provisions

contained in the Convention. Several delegations considered that the elaboration of new obligations and the adoption by the Review Conference of interim measures based on the existing provisions of the Convention should be regarded as complementary and not mutually exclusive. Views on this subject were also expressed in connection with Article XI.

23. There were no proposals regarding Article VII.

Article VIII

24. The validity of Article VIII was reaffirmed and the importance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was stressed. The view was held that the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol supplemented each other. In that connection, several delegations reiterated that States Parties which have not yet done so should consider becoming parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

25. Some delegations complained that certain States Parties and Signatories had violated the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and drew attention to the report of the Security Council (S/17911). The States concerned categorically rejected these accusations.

Article IX

26. As regards Article IX, the obligation assumed by States Parties to continue negotiations in good faith, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction was reaffirmed. The unanimous view was expressed that States Parties should reiterate their strong commitment to this important goal.

27. The current Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament, (Ambassador R.I.T. Cromartie), gave a report on the state of the negotiations. He drew attention to the considerable progress made recently in many important areas of the draft convention as recorded in the Ad Hoc Committee's latest report in document CD/727. Several delegations welcomed the information given to the Committee of the Whole about the state of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention on chemical weapons. The Conference took note of the bilateral USSR/USA talks on all aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

28. Many delegations regretted that an agreement on a convention on chemical weapons had not yet been reached. However, they welcomed the fact that during the last several months considerable progress had been made in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament, as reflected in the draft convention under negotiation. They urged the Conference on Disarmament to make the utmost efforts to speedily conclude the negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons. Some delegations proposed that a commitment by States Parties to finalize the convention on chemical weapons by the end of 1987 be included in the Final Declaration of the Conference. Some delegations reiterated their proposals for the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in their respective regions.

29. The view was expressed by some delegations that, pending the conclusion of the convention, States Parties should avoid any action which might, directly or indirectly, hinder or otherwise negatively influence the successful conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

Article X

30. Many delegations stressed the increasing importance of the provisions of Article X, especially in light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biological agents and toxins with peaceful applications. They urged the adoption of specific measures for the promotion of the fullest possible international co-operation in this field, through the active intervention of the States Parties to the Convention. In their view, these measures should include a wider exchange of equipment, materials and information among States, increased technical assistance to the developing countries in the use of toxin and microbial agents for peaceful purposes, the establishment of adequate institutional means within the United Nations system and the full utilization of the possibilities of the specialized agencies and other international organizations. In that connection, various proposals were made.

31. The view was expressed that there was a need to refrain from any discriminatory practices which could hamper international peaceful co-operation among States Parties in scientific and technical developments in related areas, as well as in international trade in related goods and equipment.

32. Some delegations, advanced in the peaceful application of toxins and microbial agents, referred to their active engagement with developing countries in peaceful co-operation in this field, both through the United Nations specialized agencies and other international bodies, and through bilateral collaboration.

33. Several delegations suggested that international co-operation should be widened in the field of the development of biology and of its utilization for socio-economic, scientific and technological progress. They noted that the main fields of such co-operation could be biotechnology, genetic engineering, development of effective means for the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases and for control of plant pests. The same delegations put forward concrete proposals concerning the main directions, ways and means of such co-operation.

34. Some delegations, referring to the contribution of disarmament to development, stressed the importance of the provisions of this Article for promoting economic and social development, particularly in light of the holding of the United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development scheduled for 1987.

Article XI

35. With regard to this Article, differing views were expressed mainly in the context of the consideration of Article V and VI. Some delegations considered that in order to strengthen the Convention, it was necessary to devise legally binding measures, which could be elaborated at a special

conference of the States Parties to the Convention. Several of these delegations proposed that such measures be included in an additional protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. Some delegations maintained that, without prejudice to the possible elaboration of amendments to the Convention, existing provisions of the Convention could be improved upon through the adoption of certain interim measures. Some delegations believed that possible new legal undertakings in relation to the Convention could only be undertaken after the successful conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons. A proposal was made that after the negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons have been successfully concluded, a conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons should be held in order to review the Convention in light of the convention on chemical weapons, and that such a conference could decide to launch a preparatory procedure, with a view to holding a special conference to consider legally binding improvements to the Convention. In the meantime, they believed that suitable measures designed to strengthen the authority of the Convention would increase the confidence necessary for a successful outcome of such a review. Other delegations expressed the view that they could not agree to amendments to the Convention at this Review Conference or at any subsequent meeting to amend it. Some delegations stated that appropriate measures could be agreed upon at the Review Conference and implemented without delay.

Article XII

36. Delegations that referred to this Article reiterated the importance of reviewing the rapid scientific and technological developments occurring in the field and the operation of the Convention in the light of these developments. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Various delegations proposed that a third review conference should be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States Parties not later than 1991.

Article XIII

37. No proposals were put forward in relation to this Article.

Article XIV

38. In connection with this Article, many delegations re-emphasized the significance of universal adherence to the Convention. They expressed satisfaction at the number of States that had become Parties to the Convention since the First Review Conference. In addition, some delegations noted with satisfaction that all five permanent members of the Security Council were now Parties to the Convention. Some delegations felt strongly that an appeal should be included in the Final Declaration urging States that had not yet adhered to the Convention to do so. Some participants re-emphasized that meaningful progress in other disarmament negotiations, especially those on the prohibition of the production, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons, would encourage universal adherence to the Convention.

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Original: ENGLISH

PREAMBLE

Proposal by Bulgaria

Recognizing the continued importance of the Convention and its objectives and the common interest of mankind in the prevention of an arms race with bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons on the basis of new scientific and technological developments, as well as the importance of its strengthening,

Original: ENGLISH

PREAMBLE

Proposal by Finland

Convinced that the objective of the Convention would be further served by strengthening traditional openness in the field of bacteriological (biological) research,

Original: ENGLISH

PREAMBLE

Proposal by the German Democratic Republic

Reaffirming their determination to achieve effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, the most important and urgent aim of which is to free the world by the end of this century from the threat posed by the means of mass annihilation - nuclear, chemical and space weapons,

Stressing their intention to further strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention, to promote confidence and co-operation among States Parties and to perfect procedures existing to this effect and initiate the process of establishing new ones,

Original: ENGLISH

PREAMBLE

Proposal by Sweden

FINAL DECLARATION

The States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their destruction, having met in Geneva 8-26 September 1986 in accordance with a decision by the First Review Conference 1980 and at the request of a majority of States Parties to the

Convention, to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention are being realized;

Reaffirming their determination to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the continuing importance of the Convention, its objectives as well as its provisions,

Affirming their belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security, would not hamper economic or technological development, and further, would facilitate the wider exchange of information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents for peaceful purposes,

Confirming the common interest in strengthening the authority of the Convention,

Affirming the importance of strengthening international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the said principles and objectives,

Recognizing the importance of achieving as a matter of high priority an international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction,

Noting the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament,

Appealing to all States to refrain from any action which might place the Convention or any of its provisions in jeopardy,

Declare their strong determination for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons and their firm commitment to the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE I

Proposal by China

The Conference agrees that toxin refers to proteinaceous, non-proteinaceous and lower-molecular-weight toxic substance produced either by living organisms or by chemical synthesis.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE I

Proposal by German Democratic Republic and Hungary

Proposed text to be included in the appropriate part of the Final Declaration

State Parties reaffirm their commitment to their obligations assumed under the Convention and their determination to use the latest results of science and technology exclusively for purposes consistent with the aims and provisions of the Convention.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE I

Proposal by Ireland

Proposal for language on Article I

Article I

The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the article which defines the scope of the Convention and reaffirms its support for the provisions of this Article.

The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently comprehensive to have covered recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

The Conference recognizes that certain scientific and technological developments in fields relevant to the Convention are open to the possibility of misuse. The conference reaffirms that the undertaking given in Article I applies to all such developments.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE I

Proposal by Sweden

The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the Article which defines the scope of the Convention and reaffirms its support for the provisions of this Article.

The Conference concludes that the scope of Article I covers scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLES I-III

Proposal by Bulgaria and German Democratic Republic

Article I

1. The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the article which defines the scope of the Convention and considers that its provisions retain their validity in the prevention and use of bacteriological (biological) agents or toxins as weapons. The Conference reaffirms its support for the provisions of this article.
2. The Conference while noting the apprehensions arising from the fact that progress in the field of microbiology, genetics, gene engineering and biotechnology may lead to the creation of new pathogenic microorganisms and toxins which could be regarded as potential agents with military application considers that Article I along with other provisions of the Convention is sufficiently wide in its scope to cover scientific and technical advances relevant to the Convention.
3. The Conference reaffirms that the Convention unconditionally covers all natural or artificially created pathogenic microorganisms and toxins of a microbial, animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically produced analogues.
4. The Conference welcomes the statements by States Parties to the Convention to the effect that they do not conduct research with a view to creating and perfecting bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and considers such statements as strengthening higher confidence in the Convention.

Article II

1. The Conference notes the importance of Article II and welcomes statements by States which have acceded to the Convention that they do not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or delivery vehicles referred to in Article I of the Convention. The Conference believes that such statements enhance higher confidence in the Convention.

2. The Conference believes that States which become parties to the Convention shall while implementing the provision of Article II observe all the necessary precautionary measures with a view to protecting the population and environment.

Article III

The Conference notes the importance of Article III and welcomes this statement by the States which have acceded to the Convention to the effect that they have not transferred agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention to any recipient whatsoever and have not furnished assistance, encouragement or inducement to any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire them.

The Conference suggests that States Parties to the Convention should as a confidence building measure, make statements regarding the non-development on the territory of other States, non-transfer of any information relating to development and manufacture of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on non-participation in agreements in that respect.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLES I-IV

Proposal by the United States of America

STRENGTHENING/SUPPORTING MEASURES

The United States is interested in enhancing the norm of the Convention with strengthening/supporting measures and we would support the following language to this end in the final document.

- The Conference reaffirms its belief that declarations regarding previous possession or non-possession of biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention contribute to increased confidence in the Convention. The Conference agrees that States Parties not already having done so should declare either that they have never possessed such items, or having possessed them they have destroyed them or diverted them to peaceful purposes. The Conference further agrees that information should be provided on the measures taken for such destruction or diversion.
- The Conference agrees that States Parties should declare whether or not they possessed, at any time during the 10 years prior to the entry into force of the Convention for them, any facility designed and used for activities prohibited by the Convention and, if so, the current status of the facility.

- The Conference agrees that States Parties should disseminate information on the 1925 Geneva Protocol and on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in medical, scientific and especially military educational programmes. The Conference also agrees that States Parties should conduct a legal review of all weapons purchased for their armed forces to ensure compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Original: SPANISH

ARTICLE III

Proposal by Argentina

"The Conference takes note that the provisions of this article should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for peaceful uses of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials to States Parties."

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE III

Proposal by Finland

A paragraph to be inserted under Article III:

"The Conference notes the importance of the provisions of Article III which proscribes the transfer of agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention to any recipient whatsoever and the furnishing of assistance, encouragement or inducement to any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire them. The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever, whether at international, national or subnational level."

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE IV

Proposal by German Democratic Republic

The Conference notes the provisions of Article IV, which requires each State Party to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere, and calls upon all States Parties which have not yet taken any necessary measures in accordance with their constitutional processes to do so immediately.

The Conference takes note of the information sent by States Parties to the United Nations Department for Disarmament, concerning the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph.

It takes also note of the proposals made with respect to:

legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Convention within the territory, under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party,

legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent the unauthorized use of dangerous biological material or toxins, and

the inclusion in textbooks of passages dealing with the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

The Conference invites States Parties which have found it necessary to enact specific legislation or take other regulatory measures relevant to this Article to make available the appropriate text to the United Nations Department for Disarmament for the purpose of consultation.

Original: SPANISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Argentina

- (1) "The Conference considers that consultation and co-operation constitute effective methods to promote international confidence."
- (2) "Compliance with the provisions of the Convention is a question of interest to all States Parties to the Convention and therefore the procedures for clarification should be open to the participation of all States Parties."

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Australia and New Zealand

The Conference agreed that States Parties should:

- (a) elaborate a set of procedures to facilitate the collection, collation and dissemination of data relevant to the Convention,
- (b) seek the views of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the most appropriate means by which this data exchange might be facilitated. Such means might include:
 - existing United Nations machinery such as the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General (as in the case of procedures established under Resolution 37/98 D),

- the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs,
- the United Nations Office at Geneva, or
- a small secretariat under United Nations auspices.

It was also agreed that, until new procedures have been elaborated, exchanges of data should continue under the auspices of the United Nations.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of,
Norway, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom

"The Conference recalls that the provisions in Article V concerning consultations and co-operation on any problems which may arise in relation to the objective, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, enables interested States Parties to use various international procedures which would make it possible to ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the provisions of the Convention.

The Conference reaffirms that these provisions include, inter alia the right of any State Party to request that a consultative meeting open to all States Parties be convened at expert level. The Conference agrees that a request for such a consultative meeting should be conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It stresses the obligation of the most directly concerned State Party or States Parties to respond positively to such a request, through participation in the consultative meeting with a view to resolving the problems which have led to a request for a consultative meeting."

Original: FRENCH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of,
France and the United States of America

The Conference recalls that the provisions in article V concerning consultations and co-operation on any problems which may arise in relation to the objective, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, enables interested States Parties to use various international procedures.

The Conference considers that these procedures include, inter alia, the right of any State Party to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to conduct a timely fact-finding inquiry into compliance concerns and stresses the obligation of States Parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the conduct of such an inquiry. The Conference considers that the inquiries carried out by the Secretary-General in 1984, 1985 and 1986

with respect to allegations of use of chemical weapons provide an appropriate model. An inquiry could also be carried out under procedures established under United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 37/98 D and 39/65 E.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Finland

The Conference recommends that States Parties provide information on the inoculation programmes of their armed forces, for example as regards any smallpox vaccinations that may be part of such programmes."

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom

The Conference agrees that States Parties should declare the number, location, functions and protective measures of all facilities meeting the maximum containment standard as described by the WHO (documents: Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 1983, CDS/SMM/79.11 and CDS/SMM/80.17).

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Australia, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United States of America

The Conference agrees that increased information on activities related to protection against biological or toxin weapons could promote confidence among State Parties. The Conference agrees that States Parties conducting such activities should:

(a) declare the name and location of each facility assigned to these activities, and provide a short description of the work conducted at the facility,

(b) encourage publication of the results of such research in the open literature which is available internationally,

(c) invite scientists from other countries to visit the declared facilities,

(d) provide appropriate access to the declared facilities for foreign representatives;

(e) promote use for civil public health purposes of the knowledge gained in these activities.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Turkey and the
United States of America

The Conference requests States Parties to provide without delay detailed information to other States Parties of unusual abnormal large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins. Such exchange of information should include description of the diseases and the control measures undertaken.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Ireland

The Conference notes the importance of Article V which contains the undertaking of States Parties to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

The Conference confirms that this confers the right on any State Party to request that a consultative meeting open to all States Parties be convened at expert level.

The Conference considers that there are various international procedures which would make it possible to ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the provisions of the Convention and recommends that the States Parties should hold a special conference to establish flexible, objective and non-discriminatory procedures to deal with issues concerning compliance with the Convention.

The Conference also considers that various voluntary measures undertaken at national level would serve to improve the adequacy of Article V by reducing the possibility of problems arising in relation to the objectives, or in the application of the provisions, of the Convention, and, in so doing, would serve to reinforce the authority and effectiveness of the Convention. These measures could include:

- a declaration, by a State Party, of the number and location of any high containment laboratories under its jurisdiction
- ...

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by Sweden

The Conference reaffirms the obligation under Article V for States Parties to consult and co-operate with one another in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

The Conference reaffirms that consultation and co-operation may be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Conference confirms the conclusion in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference that these procedures include, inter alia, the right of any State Party to request that a consultative meeting open to all State Parties be convened at expert level.

The Conference, taking into account concerns and views expressed concerning the need to ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the provisions of Article V, has agreed:

- that a Consultative Meeting could, inter alia, be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the request of a State Party,
- that a Consultative Meeting shall be promptly convened when requested by a State Party and that, reflecting the flexibility of the provisions, such a meeting does not necessarily have to be preceded by a process of bilateral or other consultations,
- that a Consultative Meeting may consider complaints and suggest ways and means for further clarifying any matter considered ambiguous or unresolved,
- that State Parties shall co-operate with the Consultative Meeting in its considerations and in clarifying ambiguous and unresolved matters,
- that the Consultative Meeting may bring to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations information concerning acts that may constitute a breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention, and may ask him, with the assistance of qualified experts, to ascertain the facts of an unresolved matter, following procedures available to him, and
- that State Parties shall co-operate with the Secretary-General in carrying out such investigations.

The Conference recognizes that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has the right and ability to carry out investigations of alleged use of, inter alia, bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

Considering that confirmed use of biological weapons would imply a violation of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conference urges all States Parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in carrying out such investigations.

The Conference agrees to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to report to the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, should any such investigation confirm that use of biological weapons has taken place.

The Conference, determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence in the implementation of its objectives and its provisions, considers that the following measures would serve, inter alia, to prevent or reduce the occurrence of unnecessary ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and urges States Parties to apply them:

1. Declarations of the locations and operating authorities of all high-containment laboratories. Expansion of such laboratories as well as modernization of their equipment should also be reported.
2. Declaration of the locations of all proving or testing grounds used for biological weapons before the entry into force of the Convention, as well as the proving or testing grounds that are still in use, or planned, for purposes not prohibited by the Convention.
3. Information concerning the orientation of relevant research programmes in bioscience.
4. Active promotion of contacts between scientists in relevant fields, including visits to laboratories and other facilities.
5. Rapid information on unusual outbreaks of diseases, as well as epidemics occurring in the vicinity of high-containment facilities.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLES V AND VI

Proposal by Pakistan

ARTICLE-V

The Conference noted the concern expressed by several State Parties over the inadequacy of the verification and complaints provisions of the Convention. It therefore recognized that an effective verification and complaints procedure which is flexible, objective and non-discriminatory and is based on a combination of national and international means, is of fundamental importance in strengthening confidence in and respect for the Convention. After considering the various proposals, the Conference recommended that an Additional Protocol should be concluded providing for the establishment of an international fact-finding machinery to examine and report on all allegations of violations of the Convention.

2. As interim confidence-building measures, the Conference called upon State Parties to:

(a) make voluntary declarations on all their research and other activities in the field of biological agents not prohibited under Article-I, such information should include information on the purposes of such activities and on their locations, and

(b) open all their establishments engaged in research in biological agents to interested scientists.

ARTICLE-VI

The Conference noted the concerns expressed over the possibility of a misuse of the veto power which would render the Security Council incapable of carrying out its functions and responsibilities under this Article. It therefore recommended that measures to guard against the misuse of the veto power should be included in the proposed Additional Protocol.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLES V AND VI

Proposal by Germany, Federal Republic of, and the United Kingdom

The Conference agrees on the need for strengthening the verification of compliance with the norm established by this Convention.

We do expect that the Final Document will give due expression to this concern and thus create a basis for further efforts in this field.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLES V AND VI

Proposal by the German Democratic Republic

Article V contains the undertaking of States Parties to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

In addition to the procedures contained in Article V, Article VI provides for any State Party, which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention, to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council, and under which each State Party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

No State Party has invoked these provisions.

The flexibility of the provisions concerning consultations and co-operation on any problems which may arise in relation to the objective, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention, enables interested States Parties to use various international procedures which would make it possible to ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the Convention provisions taking into account the concern expressed by the Conference participants.

These procedures include, inter alia, the right of any State Party subsequently to request that a consultative meeting open to all States Parties be convened at expert level.

Because of the concerns expressed and the proposals made by participants in the Conference, further consideration and action should be initiated to ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the Convention.

Further steps, including legally binding measures, should be taken to promote confidence-building, consultation and co-operation in solving any problems among States Parties, to perfect the procedures existing for this purpose and to create new ones, with a view to strengthening the Convention, taking account of latest developments in biological sciences and precluding unfounded accusations.

An additional protocol should be adopted as soon as possible in which the States Parties undertake obligations to this effect, in addition to the obligations contained in the provisions of the Convention.

Original: RUSSIAN

ARTICLES V AND VI

Proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Conference, taking into account the unanimity among the States participating in the Conference concerning the need to strengthen and effectively implement the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, as well as the need to specify ways of achieving this end, decides to prepare an additional protocol to the Convention providing for measures to strengthen the system of verification of compliance with the Convention. The required preparatory work will be carried out in the form acceptable to the States Parties to the Convention.

The Conference decides that, after the necessary preparations, a Conference of the States Parties to the Convention should be held for the purpose of drafting and adopting an additional protocol to the Convention.

Original: SPANISH

ARTICLE VI

Proposal by Colombia

PROPOSED ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPHS TO ARTICLE VI OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

(3) The investigations required to obtain evidence of a breach of this Convention may be entrusted to the World Health Organization by the State party lodging the complaint where that State does not possess the necessary means to carry them out. The Security Council of the United Nations may also entrust the World Health Organization with investigations designed to evaluate the evidence for complaints lodged by States Parties.

(4) The States Parties shall provide the World Health Organization with an up-to-date list of the names and locations of all public and private facilities existing in their countries for the development, production or stockpiling of any types of bacteriological or toxin agents capable of being used directly or indirectly as weapons prohibited by this Convention. They shall also immediately inform that Organization of any fact constituting an amendment or addition to this list.

Original: FRENCH

ARTICLE VI

Proposal by France

The Conference agrees that, within the framework of an enquiry into an unusual and dubious situation or an alleged use, the States Parties shall provide information on the vaccinations undergone by their military personnel or laboratory staff in the region in question. The State to which the request is addressed shall co-operate fully in supplying the appropriate evidence.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE VI

Proposal by Nigeria

The Conference recognizes the importance of an effective compliance procedure of the Biological Weapons Convention and the need for such a procedure to attract greater confidence and eliminate possible political controversy on its application.

The Conference notes the views expressed by States Parties of the need for an effective arrangement that would separate the fact-finding stage of the complaints procedure from the stage of political consideration and decision by the Security Council.

The Conference therefore agrees that complaints of violations should be lodged with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who should be empowered to initiate investigations through a Consultative Committee of Experts to be appointed by him. The result of such investigations should be conveyed to States Parties and to the Security Council for consideration and decision.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE VI

Proposal by the United States of America

Article VI (1) permits lodging a complaint with UNSC: "may lodge" are the operative words.

Article VI (2) calls for a mandatory undertaking by each State Party to co-operate in any UNSC investigation. Some delegations have noted that Article VI has not been invoked. This step, of course, is an option that remains open. I think, however, the political realities are recognized by all. The distinguished representative of Nigeria touched upon some of them in his statement on 15 September. One has to be somewhat sceptical about the utility of taking such an issue to the Security Council.

Original: RUSSIAN

ARTICLE IX

Proposal by Bulgaria, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Conference stresses the importance of the provisions of Article IX and of the preambular paragraphs concerning the commitments of States Parties to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

The Conference notes with satisfaction the substantial progress reached in the elaboration of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament since the First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on biological weapons and underlines the urgency of reaching such an agreement as a matter of high priority.

Reaffirming the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Convention on negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Conference urges all members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to exert all possible efforts and goodwill to conclude the negotiations on the earliest possible date, that is by the end of 1987.

The Conference takes note of the bilateral USSR-USA talks on all aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the Conference notes the proposals and ideas put forward for the establishment of chemical weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

The Conference urges States Parties to avoid any action which may, directly or indirectly, hinder or otherwise negatively influence the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In this connection, the Conference appeals to States Parties to refrain from producing new types of chemical weapons and from deploying chemical weapons on the territory of other States.

The Conference considers the early achievement of the Convention on chemical weapons to be a single most important instrument in strengthening the Convention on biological weapons and in greatly improving the confidence in its full implementation. The Conference believes the two legal instruments will have mutually reinforcing and positive effect in elimination, once and for all, of these horrible means of mass destruction.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE IX

Proposal by Sweden

The Conference reaffirms the obligation assumed by States Parties to continue negotiations in good faith towards an early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

All States Parties participating in the Conference reiterate their strong commitment to this important goal.

The Conference welcomes that, during the period under review, considerable progress has been made in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the Conference on Disarmament, reflected in the draft convention under negotiation (BWC/CONF.II/2/Add.6).

The Conference deeply regrets that an agreement on a Convention on Chemical Weapons has not yet been reached.

The Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament to make the utmost efforts speedily to conclude the negotiations on a Convention on Chemical Weapons.

Original: RUSSIAN

ARTICLE IX

Proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

"The Conference calls on States to refrain from the production or deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapon, as well as from the stationing of chemical weapons on the territory of other States."

Original: SPANISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Argentina

1. "The Conference stressed the need to strengthen the undertaking to facilitate and implement the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes."
2. "The Conference recognized that the strengthening of the provisions of article X is becoming increasingly important with the continuous advance of biotechnology, and stressed the need for broad and non-discriminatory access to research results so that all States Parties have the possibility of increasing their scientific and technological capacity in that area, thus enabling them to respond adequately to economic and social development needs in keeping with the priority requirements and interests of each State Party."

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Bulgaria

The Conference encouraged increased international co-operation in the area of new biologically active substances and pharmaceuticals which can be used to enhance the early diagnosis and the curing of grave diseases, including infectious and viral diseases.

The Conference also concluded that special attention should be paid to the training of bioengineers and other specialists, for example by organizing post-graduate courses at an international level.

Original: RUSSIAN

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Czechoslovakia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Proposals for inclusion in the final declaration

1. The Conference calls on all States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons to do everything possible to promote extension of international co-operation in the peaceful development of biological science and the application of its achievements in the interests of social, economic, scientific and technological progress.
2. The Conference regards as promising areas for such co-operation the fields of biotechnology and gene engineering and the development of effective means for the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases and for the control of plant pests.

Original: RUSSIAN

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Czechoslovakia and Poland

1. With a view to the practical implementation of the provisions of Article X on the full exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, the Conference calls on States Parties to conclude bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements providing, on a mutually advantageous, equal and non-discriminatory basis, for participation in the development and application of biotechnology, co-ordination of relevant national and regional programmes, provision of assistance, joint development work, holding of scientific meetings and conferences, training of national personnel, and so forth.

Original: RUSSIAN

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Specific directions and areas for the co-ordination of efforts of States Parties to the Convention and the development of co-operation among them on an equal and mutually advantageous basis in the development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology):

1. New biologically active substances and medicinal preparations for drugs (interferon, insulin, human growth hormones, monoclonal antibodies, etc.),
2. Microbiological means of plant protection against diseases and pests, bacterial fertilizers, plant growth regulators, new highly productive varieties and hybrids of agricultural plants that are resistant to the adverse factors of the environment and are obtained by genetic and cellular engineering methods,
3. Valuable feed additives and biologically active substances (feed protein, amino acids, enzymes, vitamins, veterinary preparations, etc.) for raising the productivity of cattle-breeding, new methods of bioengineering for the effective treatment, diagnosis and therapy of the main diseases of agricultural animals,
4. New biotechnologies for obtaining economically valuable products for use in the food, chemical, microbiological and other branches of industry,
5. Biotechnologies for intensive and effective processing of agricultural, industrial and urban waste, utilization of sewage and gas discharges for the production of biogas and high-quality fertilizers.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Hungary on behalf of a group of Socialist States

The Conference notes the increasing importance of the provisions of Article X and confirms that the States Parties carry out effective co-operation in the field of peaceful development of biological science and the use of its achievements for the benefit of socio-economic and scientific and technological progress. Such co-operation include, inter alia, the transfer and exchange of information, training of personnel and transfer of materials and equipment.

States Parties express their conviction that closer scientific and economic relations, increased exchange of information in the peaceful use of biology and biotechnology is the best way to strengthen the foundations of the Convention and they reiterate their readiness to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of biotechnology with a view and in a way as to increase confidence among nations.

The Conference calls upon States Parties to increase individually, or together with other States or intergovernmental or non-governmental international organizations and United Nations specialized agencies, their scientific and technological co-operation, particularly with developing countries, in the peaceful uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins.

Furthermore, the Conference notes with satisfaction that the implementation of the Convention has not hampered the economic and technological development of States Parties.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by India

The Conference notes that in the absence of an institutional mechanism, States Parties to the Convention have not been able to systematically facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. The Conference calls upon all States Parties to the Convention, particularly those of developed countries, to take positive steps to bridge the growing gap between the developed and developing countries on the use of advanced biotechnology and thereby promote international co-operation in peaceful activities in such areas as medicine, public health and agriculture.

The Conference calls upon all States Parties to the Convention, especially the developed countries, to strengthen through their active intervention co-operation between States Parties in contributing individually

or together with other States or international organizations in the peaceful uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins. Such co-operation should include, inter alia, the transfer of equipment and material on a more systematic or institutionalized manner, the transfer and exchange of information, training of personnel and co-operation with international organizations such as the WHO and the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Hungary, Mongolia, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1. The Conference considers as an important purpose the development and expansion of the areas of mutually beneficial co-operation between States Parties to the Convention and scientific and technical assistance to the developing countries.
2. The Conference calls upon all States Parties to co-ordinate on an equal and mutually acceptable basis the efforts, aimed at the development of biotechnology, including in the framework of the programme of international scientific-technical co-operation.
3. The Conference is convinced that it is necessary to give global character to the international scientific-technical co-operation and appeals to States Parties to make worthy contribution to the elaboration and implementation of a common global programme in this field.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Pakistan

The Conference noted that recent scientific and technological developments have vastly increased the potential for the peaceful applications of biological agents and toxins and urged all States Parties to share this technology, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind, both bilaterally and under multilateral auspices. While reiterating its call upon States Parties to expand their scientific and technological co-operation in these areas, the Conference recommended that a conference of States Parties and relevant specialized agencies be convened by the United Nations to propose measures for the establishment of adequate institutional means within the United Nations system in order to facilitate and promote such co-operation.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Peru

The Conference should make a reference to the contribution of disarmament, as already initiated in the field of biological weapons, in the light of its relationship to development and with a view to the holding of the Conference on Disarmament and Development scheduled for 1987.

The Conference should establish machinery to promote and implement international co-operation in the peaceful uses envisaged by the Convention.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by Poland

The Conference calls on all States Parties to refrain from any discriminatory practices which could hamper the international peaceful co-operation in biosciences and related basic and applied research and development, as well as in the international trade in related goods and equipment.

The Conference believes that such a wide scientific and technical co-operation, while strengthening the confidence of States Parties in full implementation of the Convention, is also of great importance for the successful economic and social development of States.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE X

Proposal by the German Democratic Republic, Poland and
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

The principal objectives of co-operation in the field of biotechnology:

- prevention and effective curing of grave diseases of the population,
- sharp increase of the food resources,
- improvement in the utilization of the natural resources,
- the mastering of the new easily renewable energy sources,
- the development of low-waste production,
- the reduction of the harmful effects on the environment,

- the development of fundamental research in the whole complex of biological sciences and other fields of natural sciences directly connected with the study of physical and chemical foundations of biophenomena.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE XI

Proposal by Sweden

The Conference notes the importance of the provisions of Article XI and that since the entry into force of the Convention these provisions have not been invoked.

The Conference considers that the Convention could at an appropriate time be improved upon by some new provision and legal undertakings, the form of which, be it additional protocols or annexes to the Convention, would depend upon the substance of the changes or additions. The Conference is aware that possible new legal undertakings related to the strengthening of verification of compliance could be dealt with in a comprehensive way only after the conclusion of a Convention of Chemical Weapons.

The Conference believes that shortly after the negotiations on a Convention on Chemical Weapons have been successfully concluded, a Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons should be held in order to review the Convention in the light of the Convention on Chemical Weapons. This Conference could decide to launch a preparatory procedure, including the establishment of an Ad Hoc Expert Group open to all States Parties, with a view to holding a Special Conference to consider legally binding improvements of the Convention while taking fully into account the outcome of the negotiations on the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE XII

Proposal by Sweden

The Conference decides that a third Review Conference shall be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States Parties not later than 1991.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE XIV

Proposal by Hungary

The Conference notes with satisfaction that ... States have ratified the Convention or acceded thereto since the first Review Conference. There are ... States Parties to the Convention, including all the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations and a further ... States which have signed but have yet to ratify it. The Conference expresses its satisfaction over the ever widening adherence of States to the Convention which is considered as an evidence of its effectiveness and the continuing international support to it. The Conference therefore calls upon all signatory States which have not ratified the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to join the States Parties thereto thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.

**SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

**BWC/CONF.II/9/Add.1
29 September 1986**

Original: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Addendum

ANNEX
PROPOSALS

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Preamble - Cuba

Article

- | | |
|----|--|
| V | German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| VI | Colombia
Nigeria |
| XI | Ireland |

Original: ENGLISH

PREAMBLE

Proposal by Cuba

Reaffirming also the principle that the adoption of effective measures of disarmament must contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security, to putting an end to the arms race, in particular to all weapons of mass destruction, and to reallocating resources for economic and social development, especially of the developing countries,

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE V

Proposal by the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The States represented at the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Bacteriological Weapons Convention have unequivocally pronounced themselves for the comprehensive strengthening and effective implementation of the provisions of the Convention. The final document of the Conference should reflect this important aspect and point out concrete ways to this end.

On the basis of the numerous proposals which have been submitted during the Conference and which require close study, including at the level of experts, it is suggested that a consultative meeting at expert level, open to all States Parties to the Convention, should be convened in Geneva in March 1987, with the aim of working out and agreeing on decisions and recommendations concerning the following:

1. Establishment of a group of scientific experts to study latest biological developments of relevance to compliance with the Convention.
2. Exchange of data on biological research centres and epidemic diseases, and exchange of other information, with a view to strengthening the mechanism of compliance with the Convention.
3. Broader co-operation among States in the peaceful development and uses of biosciences for the purpose of furthering socio-economic and scientific-technological advances.
4. Preparatory work for a special conference of the States Parties to the Convention to draw up and adopt an additional protocol to the Convention, with that protocol providing for measures to strengthen the system of verification of compliance with the Convention.

The States Parties attending the consultative meeting should elect a chairman and two vice-chairmen of the consultative meeting for a one-year term each.

The consultative meeting may decide to convene, if necessary, for additional sessions to discharge its tasks under items 1 to 4.

The decisions and recommendations which will be adopted at the consultative meeting in conformity with the procedures of the Second Review Conference should be forwarded by the depositaries of the Convention to all States Parties to the Convention.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE VI

Proposal by Colombia

Any State Party should have the right to request the World Health Organization to investigate a breach of the Convention.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE VI

Proposal by Nigeria

The Conference recognizes the importance of effective compliance procedure of the Biological Weapons Convention and the need for such a procedure to attract greater confidence and eliminate possible political controversy on its application.

The Conference further notes the views expressed by States Parties of the need for an effective arrangement that would separate the fact-finding stage of the complaints procedure from the stage of political consideration and decision by the Security Council and that members of the Security Council may agree to consider the initiation of an investigation of a complaint received by the Council as a procedural matter in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Original: ENGLISH

ARTICLE XI

Proposal by Ireland

The Conference considers that the Convention can be improved upon through further legally binding provisions, notably on the question of verification of compliance. The form of these provisions, be they an additional protocol or other appropriate instrument, would depend upon their substance.

The Conference believes that a Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons should be held in order to consider the establishment of a preparatory procedure, including the establishment of a Preparatory Committee open to all States Parties, with a view to holding a Special Conference to consider legally binding improvements to the Convention while taking fully into account the outcome of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons.

Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction

Final Document

PART IV

Summary Records of Plenary Meetings

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SUMMARY RECORDS OF PLENARY MEETINGS

1st meeting

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Election of the President

Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations

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Adoption of the Rules of Procedure

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General

Election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference and Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

2nd meeting

Election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference and Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee

Programme of work

3rd meeting

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its Article XII

(a) General debate

Granting of observer status to Algeria

4th meeting

Programme of work (continued)

Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (continued)

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its Article XII

(a) General debate (continued)

Election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference and Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (continued)

5th meeting

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its Article XII

(a) General debate (continued)

6th meeting

Election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference and Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (concluded)

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its Article XII

(a) General debate (continued)

7th meeting

Programme of work (continued)

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its Article XII

(a) General debate (continued)

8th meeting

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its Article XII

(a) General debate (concluded)

9th meeting

Report of the Committee of the Whole

Other matters, including the question of future review of the Convention

10th meeting

Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee

Report of the Drafting Committee

Preparation and adoption of the Final Document

**SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

Distr.
GENERAL

BWC/CONF.II/SR.1-10/Corrigendum
4 December 1986

ENGLISH

**SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND
STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN
WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

(Geneva, 8-26 September 1986)

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 10th MEETINGS

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 8 to 26 September 1986

Corrigendum

The present document contains the corrections received from delegations and from the secretariat applying to the English text of the summary records of the meetings of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction (BWC/CONF.II/SR.1-10).

With the issuance of this corrigendum, the summary records of the above-mentioned meetings are to be considered as final.

1st meeting

Cover page

In the contents, after "Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee", insert "Submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee", which follows "Adoption of the Agenda".

Page 2

Immediately above paragraph 1 insert "SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (item 4 of the provisional agenda)".

Page 5

Immediately above paragraph 18 delete "SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 4)".

Paragraph 22

In the third sentence, delete "Louisa" and insert "Luisa".

3rd meeting

Paragraph 21

Replace "in that country" by "in Sverdlovsk".

Paragraph 22

In the second sentence, after "in 1984" insert "by U.S. Vice President Bush".

Paragraph 23

After "to facilitate the" insert "fullest possible".

Paragraph 24

In the last sentence, after "provisions" delete the full stop and add "so that full compliance with the Convention would lead to the realization of its important purposes."

Paragraph 25

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. von STULPNAGEL".

6th meeting

Cover page

Under agenda item "Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its article XII", delete "(b) Articles I-XV" and "(c) Preambular paragraphs and purposes of the Convention".

Paragraph 43

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. KOTCHUBEY".

7th meeting

Paragraph 66

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. Ter HORST".

8th meeting

Paragraph 17

After the first sentence, replace the remainder of the paragraph by the following:

It was important to protect the paramount legal achievement represented by this convention, by being clearly aware of the decisive nature of the question of respect of its basic interdictions and the question of confidence in this regard. That confidence was indispensable. If it was found to be eroded, that had to be put right. It was obvious that allegations of violation which had been left without a conclusive answer had a negative effect on confidence. It was important to ensure that, should that kind of situation recur in the future, effective measures would be taken so as to avoid prolonged uncertainty with regard to compliance with the basic commitments. Whether recent developments in biology had made bacteriological weapons less hypothetical than it had appeared 14 years ago was a question which had to be examined carefully. The practical requirements of confidence also had to be related to the interests of security.

Paragraph 18

In the first sentence, delete the words "In that context," and begin the sentence with "The Conference ...".

In the third sentence, insert "disarmament" between "dependable" and "agreements".

Delete the last sentence and replace by the following text:

Above all, his delegation hoped that the negotiations on banning chemical weapons taking place at Geneva in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament would lead in the near future to a new international instrument embodying an effective verification system, which might have positive implications for the future of the present convention, particularly because of the link established between chemical and bacteriological arms by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibited their use.

Paragraph 19

Replace the paragraph by the following text:

Despite the importance of verification, however, it should not be forgotten that whatever the imperfections revealed by experience in the modalities agreed upon at the conclusion of the current convention, effective renunciation of bacteriological weapons was and continued to be fully required from all States parties. The rule had to be upheld categorically, whatever the system of verification in force.

Paragraph 20

In the fourth sentence, delete "had fully observed" and insert "continued to fully observe".

Paragraph 39

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. NGO HAC TEAM".

Paragraph 43

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. KAZEMI KAMYAB".

Paragraphs 54 and 56

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. SHAFII".

10th meeting

Paragraph 5

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. NGO HAC TEAM".

Paragraph 22

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. FAN Guoxiang".

Paragraph 27

The name of the speaker should read "Mr. SHAFII".

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Distr.
GENERAL

BWC/CONF.II/SR.1
8 September 1986

Original: ENGLISH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 8 September 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

<u>Temporary President:</u>	Mr. MEISZTER	(Hungary)
<u>President:</u>	Mr. LANG	(Austria)

CONTENTS

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee

Election of the President

Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Adoption of the Agenda

Submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee

Adoption of the rules of procedure

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General

Election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference and Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

This record is subject to correction.

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Any corrections to the records of the meetings of this conference will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the session.

The meeting was called to order at 11 a.m.

OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (item 1 of the provisional agenda)

1. Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary), speaking on behalf of the Bureau of the Preparatory Committee, declared open the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction and welcomed all delegations participating in the Conference.

2. Introducing the report of the Preparatory Committee (BWC/CONF.II/1) which was the subject of item 4 of the provisional agenda, he said it was a matter of great satisfaction that all the Committee's decisions and recommendations had been adopted by consensus thanks to the exemplary spirit of goodwill and co-operation displayed by all delegations. He also wished to express the Bureau's appreciation of the assistance the Secretary-General had given to the Committee under General Assembly resolution 39/65 D and especially of the effective co-operation received from the Secretary-General's Special Representative and his staff.

3. He drew attention to the other documentation before the Conference, prepared at the request of the Preparatory Committee, and explained that, owing to delays in the submission of material by States Parties not all documents were available in all the official languages of the Conference.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT (item 2 of the provisional agenda)

4. Mr. TEJA (India), speaking on behalf of the Group of non-aligned, neutral and other States, nominated Mr. Lang (Austria) for the office of President.

5. Mr. KRISTVIK (Norway) and Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic) supported the nomination.

6. Mr. Lang (Austria) was elected President by acclamation.

7. Mr. Lang (Austria) took the Chair.

8. The PRESIDENT said that although he would do everything possible to ensure the successful completion of the work of the Conference, success also required the support of delegations and their willingness to co-operate. The short time allotted to the Conference imposed the duty to leave aside matters not really at the core of the Convention. The useful work done by the Preparatory Committee had made it possible to begin a constructive debate immediately, leading to a final document that would confirm and reaffirm the commitment of all States Parties to the Convention.

9. The purpose of the Conference was to review the operation of the Convention, to ensure that its purposes and provisions were realized and to take into account relevant new scientific and technological developments. Recent treaty-making efforts related to environmental protection or to the security of certain means of energy production bore witness to the constant need to keep scientific and technological progress under control in order to protect future generations. Thus one of the main functions to be performed by the Conference was a close examination of actual developments against the background of existing treaty provisions.

10. If the Conference addressed itself honestly to all the questions which had been raised in recent years, it could in itself become a confidence-strengthening exercise. Many were aware that confidence in the Convention was apparently being slowly eroded. Doubts had emerged as to its applicability to certain results of genetic engineering; those views would have to be examined bearing in mind the statement of the First Review Conference that article I had proved sufficiently comprehensive to cover recent scientific and technological developments. Allegations of non-compliance might be viewed in the light of the declaration adopted in 1980, namely that the adequacy of article V should be further considered at an appropriate time. Impatience had also been growing at the slow progress of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in spite of the strong appeal addressed to the Committee on Disarmament six years earlier. Recent progress, however, gave reason for hope.

11. In addition, the general international climate had not been favourable to a build-up of trust among the States Parties. The chief task before the Conference, therefore, was to clarify existing uncertainties and to strengthen confidence in the Convention as a reliable instrument which had effectively eliminated the possibility of an arms race in at least one important area.

12. Finally, the Conference should not overlook the peaceful uses of the biosciences, their role in relation to human health and the environment, and the need for international co-operation for the benefit, in particular, of developing countries. Such co-operation should include the transfer and exchange of information, the training of personnel and the transfer of materials and equipment on a more systematic and long-term basis.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

13. The PRESIDENT invited the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to make a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General.

14. Mr. MARTENSON (Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs) read out the following message to the Review Conference from the Secretary-General:

"It gives me great pleasure to extend my greetings and best wishes to all delegations participating in the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. This important Review Conference is taking place at a crucial time for the destiny of humankind. Unless agreements are evolved in the not too distant future for proceeding with genuine arms limitation and disarmament, the arms race will continue to imperil peace and jeopardize the future of the global community.

"The biological weapons Convention constitutes the first and, so far, the only international legally binding instrument by which States Parties have undertaken to prohibit and prevent the development, production and stockpiling of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Most importantly, they have also undertaken the obligation to destroy them, or divert them to peaceful purposes. The Convention has, therefore, aptly been called the world's first disarmament treaty.

It continues to serve as a guide to the international community in its efforts to achieve genuine disarmament measures regarding other types of weapons and their systems. It furnishes an example of how mutually acceptable solutions can be found to most intricate international problems if States bring the requisite political will to the effort.

"Since the First Review Conference, the Convention has gained new States Parties, bringing the total number to over 100, including the militarily most significant Powers. This is encouraging and there is no doubt that universal adherence to the Convention would help strengthen international peace and security.

"Besides focusing on realizing the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, the Second Review Conference is called upon to take into account new and relevant scientific and technological developments. It is important to ensure that the Convention is not outpaced by scientific and technological advances and remains a solid shield against the advent of any new varieties of weapons in the category it seeks to outlaw.

"The Convention also embodies the affirmation by the States Parties of the objective of an effective prohibition of chemical weapons and the undertaking of them to continue negotiations on that question. This has assumed added importance in view of the heightened international awareness about the use of chemical weapons. Initiatives taken recently to accelerate negotiations towards concluding an effective, verifiable and comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction are most timely and require to be sustained until this very important objective is achieved. Apart from its intrinsic value, such an agreement would increase mutual trust and confidence and be an important step towards disarmament in other areas.

"This Convention was one in a series of multilateral agreements on partial measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament that were concluded in the past two decades. Each of these agreements was meant to be a step towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Limitation, reduction and eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction, of which biological and toxin weapons are only one category, is to be regarded as an imperative. But there can be no progress in that direction unless the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, is arrested. Meanwhile, the international community should take every opportunity to reaffirm and strengthen existing agreements.

"I trust that your review of the Convention will serve that high purpose and thus help lend substance to the disarmament process. The States Parties to the Convention have an important task before them and I wish the Conference every success in its endeavours."

15. The PRESIDENT thanked the Special Representative for his statement on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (item 3 of the provisional agenda)

16. The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the Conference to the provisional agenda that the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend to the Conference (BWC/CONF/II/1, annex I).

17. The agenda was adopted.

SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 4)

18. The PRESIDENT suggested that as an expression of gratitude to the members of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference should take note with appreciation of the Committee's report (BWC/CONF/II/1).

19. It was so agreed.

ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (agenda item 5)

20. The PRESIDENT drew attention to the provisional rules of procedure recommended by the Preparatory Committee (BWC/CONF/II/1, annex II).

21. The rules of procedure were adopted.

CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (agenda item 8)

22. The PRESIDENT noted that rule 10 of the rules of procedure provided for a Secretary-General of the Conference. In paragraph 22 of its report, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act on behalf of the Committee as provisional Secretary-General of the Review Conference. The Secretary-General of the United Nations had nominated Miss Aida Louisa Levin, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs. In the absence of any objections, he would take it that the Conference wished to confirm Miss Levin as Secretary-General of the Conference.

23. It was so agreed.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE CONFERENCE AND CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 6)

24. The PRESIDENT said that under rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference had to elect 20 Vice-Presidents. Agreement had been reached in the Preparatory Committee that three posts should be allotted to Africa, four each to Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, and five to Western Europe and other States. The Preparatory Committee had also agreed that the Committee of the Whole would be chaired by Mr. Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, that the Drafting Committee would be chaired by a representative of Western countries, and that the Credentials Committee would be chaired by a representative of the non-aligned, neutral and other States. Further consultations were, however, needed within and among the regional groups concerning agenda item 6, and he therefore suggested that the meeting should be adjourned to allow time for those consultations to be completed.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

**SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

Distr.
GENERAL

BWC/CONF.II/SR.2
16 September 1986

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 8 September 1986, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. LANG (Austria)

CONTENTS

Election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference and Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee

Programme of work

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The meeting was called to order at 3.55 p.m.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE CONFERENCE AND CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 6)

1. The PRESIDENT said that under rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference was required to elect, in addition to its President, 20 Vice-Presidents, a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen for the Committee of the Whole, a Chairman and Vice-Chairman for the Drafting Committee and a Chairman and Vice-Chairman for the Credentials Committee. Rule 8 provided that the General Committee should be composed of the President of the Conference, who would act as Chairman, 20 Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee and the Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

2. It had been agreed in the Preparatory Committee that the 20 posts of Vice-President should be distributed as follows: three for Africa, four for Asia, four for Eastern Europe, four for Latin America and five for Western Europe and other States. Following consultations in the various regional groups, the following candidates had been proposed: for Africa, Ghana and Nigeria; for Eastern Europe, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the USSR; for Latin America, Costa Rica and Chile, for Western Europe and other States, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The regional groups concerned would make known the remaining candidates (four from Asia, two from Africa and two from Latin America) as soon as possible.

3. The States Parties named were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

4. The PRESIDENT said that, according to an understanding reached in the Preparatory Committee and reported in paragraph 4 of the Committee's report (BWC/CONF.II/1), the Committee of the Whole would be chaired by Mr. Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia), the Drafting Committee by a representative of Western countries and the Credentials Committee by a representative of the non-aligned, neutral and other States. The Western States had nominated Mr. Butler (Australia) as Chairman of the Drafting Committee and the Group of Non-Aligned, Neutral and other States had nominated Mr. Afande (Kenya) as Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

5. Messrs Vejvoda, Butler and Afande were elected Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee respectively, by acclamation.

6. The PRESIDENT, after congratulating Messrs Vejvoda, Butler and Afande, said that it had been agreed to nominate Messrs. Campora (Argentina) and Clerckx (Belgium) as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, Mr. Konstantinov (Bulgaria) as Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee and Mr. Lacleta (Spain) as Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

7. Messrs. Campora, Clerckx, Konstantinov and Lacleta were elected by acclamation.

8. The PRESIDENT, after congratulating Messrs Campora, Clerckx, Konstantinov, and Lacleta, said that the Conference had thus completed its consideration of agenda item 6.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 7)

(a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

9. The PRESIDENT said that, under rule 3 of the rules of procedure, in addition to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee just elected, the Conference must appoint five further members of the Committee on the proposal of the President. On the basis of consultations, he proposed the appointment of representatives of the following three States: Cyprus, Switzerland and the Ukrainian SSR. Two members remained to be nominated.

10. As he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to appoint the three States he had nominated to the Credentials Committee.

11. It was so decided.

12. The PRESIDENT called on those delegations which had not already done so to present their credentials to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 9)

13. The PRESIDENT suggested that, on the following day, after the election of the remaining members, the General Committee should examine the Conference's programme of work and make recommendations on it. For the moment, the general debate could be expected to take place on Tuesday, 9, Wednesday, 10 and Monday, 15 September, Thursday, 11 and Friday, 12 being local holidays.

14. It was so decided.

15. The PRESIDENT requested those delegations which had not already done so to inscribe their names as soon as possible on the list of speakers for the general debate.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.

**SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

Distr.
GENERAL

BWC/CONF.II/SR.3
18 September 1986

Original: ENGLISH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 9 September 1986, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. LANG (Austria)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its article XII

General debate

Granting of observer status to Algeria

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE XII
(agenda item 10)

GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the Twelve member States of the European Community, observed that the Convention was unique and the only arms control agreement in force which required the eradication of an entire category of weapons from the arsenals of States. The Twelve were encouraged by the fact that 103 States had become parties to the Convention and committed themselves to working to ensure that such weapons were not used or developed. The widest possible membership for the Convention was an important factor in creating confidence that that common objective would be realized.

2. The use of biological weapons was prohibited under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, while the Biological Weapons Convention prohibited their development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention by other means. Taken together, the two agreements were intended to rid mankind of the fear of an unspeakable method of warfare. The Twelve reaffirmed their support for the objective of outlawing biological weapons and for the Convention as an international norm against biological and toxin weapons, deserving the support of the entire international community. Wider adherence to the Convention would enhance its authority.

3. The Twelve believed the Review Conference had an important task of strengthening the general consensus in favour of the Convention's underlying aims as well as the general consensus that arms control and disarmament measures must be complemented by measures to encourage confidence and trust between the parties to them.

4. At the last Review Conference a number of delegations had expressed doubts about the compliance mechanisms and regrettably those doubts had not been stilled with the passage of time. The Twelve believed that the question of assurance of compliance was a crucial element for creating confidence in the Convention and strengthening its authority. If an incident occurred which could give rise to doubts about compliance, it was, they considered, incumbent on the Party concerned to take all steps necessary to clarify it. They also believed that it was necessary to reduce the grounds for lack of confidence in the efficacy of the Convention. They recognized that no single system of verification could be applied to every arms control or disarmament situation. The pace of scientific and technological development over the previous six years had been rapid. Techniques legitimately developed for civil purposes could, if abused, have repercussions for the Biological Weapons Convention. The Conference must draw the appropriate conclusions from those developments and consider what new arrangements might be made to increase confidence that any evasion by a State Party would be rapidly detected.

5. The Twelve recognized that amendment of the Convention would not be within the competence of a Review Conference under article XII of the Convention. Although decisions on new measures could not be taken, it was

important that the Conference should consider the question of strengthening confidence in the Convention. The Conference should record clearly the determination of all States to co-operate in doing so.

6. The Twelve attached much importance to article X of the Convention on the exchange of information on the peaceful development of microbiology. The spread of disease was not constrained by national boundaries and the same should be true of information about causes and cures. The Twelve were ready to collaborate in a constructive and realistic manner in dealing with all the issues confronting the Convention.

7. As leader of the United Kingdom delegation, he remarked that his country had always taken a particular interest in the Convention and agreed, as the USSR had stated in 1984, that the efforts of all States Parties should be concentrated on further strengthening the Convention, increasing its authority and widening the circle of Parties.

8. His Government had given much thought to means of enhancing the authority of the Convention and believed that one of the best ways of doing so would be by increasing confidence in compliance through adequate provisions for verification. Reassurance in the efficacy of the Convention was only possible if all States Parties were willing to respond openly and fully to requests for information.

9. As a specific contribution to that process, his Government was making available to other Parties a paper by the Chemical Defence Establishment on the contamination of Gruinard Island off the Scottish coast by anthrax spores during Second World War trials to assess the threat posed by biological warfare.

10. The signature of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 had been an important step forward made possible by the separation of biological and chemical weapons. Since then a parallel agreement to abolish chemical weapons had been pursued, thus responding to the obligations assumed under article IX of the Biological Weapons Convention, and efforts to finalize that agreement should be continued. He welcomed the consensus reflected in the Final Declaration of the 1980 Review Conference that the Convention covered any possible gap between the two fields and considered that the lessons to be learned from the current negotiations on chemical weapons might eventually be profitably applied to the steps already taken on biological weapons.

11. When the Biological Weapons Convention had been signed in 1972, crucial arms control agreements in other fields had also been in the process of conclusion. Fourteen years later progress could be seen at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament and it was legitimate to look forward to the early achievement of a chemical weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament. All delegations attached the highest importance to the bilateral negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and defence issues and earnestly hoped for their success and for further meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to give a decisive impetus to that process.

12. Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America) said that his delegation believed the Conference should be used for a thorough and productive assessment of how

the Convention was operating. While the United States had signed and ratified the Convention in the hope of eliminating a broad range of dangerous and morally repugnant weapons, toxins had unfortunately been used for hostile purposes since that time and his Government had concluded that there had been instances of non-compliance with the Convention.

13. His delegation stressed that States Parties had an obligation to resolve concerns raised about their activities and that other parties to such a multilateral agreement had the obligation to investigate questions raised with respect to compliance. To date, the United States had not received satisfaction in that regard and investigations mandated by the General Assembly on the use of toxins had been blocked. Despite the lack of stringent verification provisions the United States had been able to determine in some cases that the Convention had been violated.

14. Advances in biotechnology had increased man's ability to design new substances, modify known substances and produce such materials. It had become possible to manufacture biological or toxin agents in much smaller facilities than in the past. Those developments had brought about capabilities which, if misused, could pose a significant biological and toxin weapons threat and had further complicated verification of compliance with the Convention.

15. His delegation believed that, in the course of the review of the Convention, measures could be adopted to help provide assurance that permitted activities were not being used as a cover for prohibited activities. Such measures could be embodied in the Final Document.

16. As regarded the purposes set out in the preamble, the United States continued to attach great importance to effective progress towards general and complete disarmament and to strict compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Since the use of biological and toxin weapons was repugnant to mankind, no effort should be spared towards the objective of completely excluding the possibility of such use. The United States would continue to abide by the provisions of the Convention.

17. With regard to article I, the United States was in full compliance with its obligations, but it believed that the Soviet Union had continued to maintain an offensive biological warfare programme and capability and had been involved in the production and use of toxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

18. In accordance with article II, the United States had destroyed all existing stocks of biological and toxin weapons and means of delivery prior to the deadline stipulated by the Convention.

19. With regard to article III, the United States had never transferred to any State biological or toxin weapons. It believed, however, that the Soviet Union had been involved in the transfer of toxin weapons to Laos and Viet Nam.

20. With regard to article IV, the United States had taken action to preclude domestic activities contrary to the Convention. The action included certification by all federal agencies that they were in compliance, enactment

of legislation to control biological development and production activities, and continuing review of existing United States laws and regulations.

21. The United States had sought to make use of the consultative process provided for in article V with the Soviet Union concerning the 1979 outbreak of anthrax in that country, Soviet involvement in the production, transfer and use of mycotoxins, and the Soviet Union's maintenance of an offensive biological warfare programme.

22. Under article IX of the Convention, the United States was honouring its commitment to continue negotiations towards the effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The comprehensive draft convention put forward in the Conference on Disarmament in 1984 remained a model for an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Since that time the United States had continued to negotiate seriously in the Conference on Disarmament and in the bilateral discussions on chemical weapons with the Soviet Union.

23. In accordance with article X, the United States had initiated and participated in many activities to facilitate the exchange of scientific information and technology for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

24. The United States was committed to supporting and strengthening the norm established by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The United States had not developed nor would it develop such a weapons capability. The Convention was a valid international agreement and all States Parties had a solemn legal obligation to uphold its provisions.

25. Mr. STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany) said that an important disarmament aim had been achieved with the conclusion of the 1972 Convention. The roots of the Federal Republic's commitment to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons reached far back. Germany had acceded to the 1925 Protocol without a formal reservation and in 1955 the Federal Republic had made an unconditionally legal binding pledge to refrain from producing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

26. The Convention's major deficiency was the lack of verification provisions. Mutual trust in the adherence of all Parties to the Convention could only be achieved if there was a high degree of visible compliance. Efforts, which the Federal Government fully supported, had been made to improve verification, notably in the Final Document of the 1980 Review Conference and General Assembly resolution 37/98 B. Although the Conference had no mandate to negotiate additional contractual obligations his delegation believed that the final document should give due expression to a common concern.

27. It was important to create more confidence through appropriate measures and it was undoubtedly in the interest of all Parties that doubts with regard to full compliance with the Convention should be clarified. The Conference should seek to agree on a set of generally-accepted rules of conduct with regard to biological organisms and substances coming under the Convention. The Conference would have achieved a notable success if it agreed on a final document giving proof of general acceptance of such procedures.

28. Consideration might usefully be given to such measures as strict adherence to the international obligation to report outbreaks of epidemics, information on special security measures taken in facilities normally subject to a lower level of security precautions, information on extensive vaccination programmes for the general public or special groups, particularly non-routine programmes, information on mass casualties with communicable diseases caused by accidents in laboratories or production plants, and exchange of vaccines, strains of infectious agents, toxins and chemotherapeutic substances. It was encouraging that, as shown by a recent serious accident affecting much of Europe, it seemed possible to reach agreement on a system of undelayed and thorough exchange of information providing a basis for common co-operative efforts.

29. Co-operation was one of the important elements of the Convention as was clear from the provisions of article X. One result of such co-operation was the world-wide eradication of smallpox.

30. Important research into biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes was being undertaken in the Federal Republic and his Government attached great importance to bilateral and multilateral co-operation in that area, especially with countries still developing their own research capacities, particularly with regard to human and animal health care and food production. The fact that scientific problems were not confined to individual countries and the increasing complexity and cost of research underlined the need for joint endeavours in the quest for solutions. The exchange of scientists was particularly important and in the Federal Republic scientists from foreign countries had free access to publicly-assisted research establishments to the extent that reciprocal provisions applied.

31. His Government considered also that efforts should be increased to achieve the early fulfilment of the obligation under the Convention to conclude an agreement banning chemical weapons.

32. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the Convention was the first measure of real disarmament and an integral part of a set of treaties and agreements limiting the arms race. It was the duty of all States, above all those bearing the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, to preserve and build upon the Convention. In his delegation's view, the main purpose of the Conference was to reinforce the Convention and the effective implementation of all its provisions. In its final document, the Conference should indicate specific ways of achieving that objective.

33. It was difficult to over-estimate the importance of the Convention. It prohibited an entire class of highly dangerous weapons of mass destruction, which, if used anywhere, would lead to unpredictable consequences for all mankind. In view of the latest achievements in microbiology, it would be considerably cheaper to produce bacteriological, than chemical or nuclear, weapons. Any country with microbiological institutions would basically be able to stockpile such weapons. That possibility had been blocked by the timely conclusion of the Convention. In addition, the Convention offered an example of the successful solution of complicated security problems and bore testimony to the fact that real disarmament, resulting in the removal of entire categories of weapons from State arsenals, was not an idealistic fancy

but a perfectly attainable objective. As the first step on the road towards general and complete disarmament, the Convention had great mobilizing potential provided that all States had the will to proceed.

34. The fact that over 100 States were currently parties to the Convention constituted a recognition of its effectiveness and its contribution to disarmament. His delegation noted with satisfaction that in the period following the First Review Conference, all the permanent members of the Security Council which had not done so earlier, had adhered to the Convention. In its final document, the Conference should call on all signatory States to complete the ratification process so that the Convention became a truly universal international instrument.

35. His country had ratified the Convention by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 11 February 1975 and compliance with its provisions was guaranteed by the relevant State institutions in accordance with Soviet legislation and practice. The Soviet Union scrupulously observed its obligations under articles I, II, III and IV of the Convention. It did not possess any bacteriological agents or toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery. It had never transferred such weapons to allied States or third countries nor provided information concerning their development. It had no stockpiles of weapons of that kind outside its territory and did not carry out any development of such weapons on the territories of other States.

36. Research and development employing micro-organisms and toxins were carried out in the Soviet Union only for peaceful ends. The Soviet microbiological industry specialized in products used in agriculture such as plant protection agents and bacterial fertilizers, medical preparations, bioreagents for scientific research and products for use in the textile, food processing, chemical and other industries. Genetic engineering had made a substantial contribution to the production of medical products and antigens for various viruses.

37. The Soviet Union opposed attempts to undermine the Convention on various pretexts. It maintained that the efforts of all States Parties should be concentrated on strengthening the Convention and was prepared to co-operate constructively with all countries interested in increasing its effectiveness. A number of delegations had made specific proposals, some of which seemed to be sound. As General Secretary Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed, the Soviet Union attributed great importance to the problem of control since it was interested in scrupulous observance of agreements. The Soviet Union was no less, indeed rather more, concerned about verification of over compliance with the Convention than other countries. In a recent interview, Mr. Gorbachev had made it clear that the Soviet Union had the same attitude towards verification in connection with proposals for the prohibition of nuclear weapon testing.

38. The Soviet Union had been one of the authors of the reference document presented to the First Review Conference on new scientific and technological achievements relating to the Convention (BWC/CONF.I/5). That document had concluded that such achievements had not given rise to new possibilities of violating the provisions of the Convention. The Soviet Union had provided updated reference material on the subject for the present Conference (BWC/CONF.II/3/Add.1) which reached the conclusion that the provisions of the

Convention covered all micro-organisms and toxins both of natural and artificial origin which could be used for military purposes, including those toxins which could also be used in chemical weapons.

39. His delegation considered that the Convention should be effectively strengthened by broad co-operation in the peaceful development of biological science in the interests of socio-economic, scientific and technological progress. The Soviet Union maintained wide international relations in those fields through trade and various forms of multilateral and bilateral co-operation and technical assistance particularly with the Comecon countries but also with other countries, including negotiations with firms in a number of Western countries.

40. Increased international co-operation with regard to biotechnology and genetic engineering for preventive measures and the cure of infectious diseases and for pest control were in the interests of all States, particularly all developing countries.

41. In compliance with the provisions of article IX of the Convention, the Soviet Union was in favour of the intensification of negotiations to conclude an effective and verifiable convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. At the end of April 1986, the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament had put forward new proposals on the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, including systematic international on-site inspection. Negotiations had entered a decisive phase. Progress had been made on many aspects of a draft convention. It was true that the results could have been greater if a readiness to compromise had been shown at the appropriate time by the Western side. However, the final draft of the convention on chemical weapons was within sight and it was of crucial importance that all States should abstain from actions that might impede negotiations, particularly the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons and the stationing of such weapons in other countries. The Conference should support energetic measures to ensure compliance by the States Parties to the Convention on Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons with their obligations to continue negotiations for the early conclusions of a convention on chemical weapons.

42. The Soviet delegation would do its utmost to create an atmosphere conducive to the success of the Conference. He appealed for co-operation in the quest for mutually acceptable solutions, particularly on the part of Western countries which appeared to have adopted an attitude of confrontation as was shown by their refusal to agree to the nomination of the representative of a socialist country as President of the Conference and the intervention just made by the United States representative.

43. Mr. KHERAD (Afghanistan), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the United States representative's reference to Afghanistan was without foundation. Similar references had been made by the United States delegation in other United Nations forums. It was a reprehensible practice but it was not difficult to understand the reason for it.

GRANTING OF OBSERVER STATUS TO ALGERIA

44. The PRESIDENT announced that Algeria had applied for observer status in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2 of the rules of procedure. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to accede to that request.

45. It was so decided.

46. The PRESIDENT invited the Algerian delegation to take its place.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

BWC/CONF.II/SR.4
17 September 1986

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 9 September 1986, at 3.00 p.m.

President: Mr. LANG (Austria)

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of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials
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the session.

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 9) (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT suggested that, in addition to the two meetings on 9 September, the meetings on Wednesday 10 September and Monday 15 September should be devoted to the general debate. He also suggested that the speakers' list for the general debate should be closed on Wednesday 10 September at noon.
2. It was so decided.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 7)

(a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (continued)

3. The PRESIDENT recalled that, at the end of the Conference's second meeting, two members of the Credentials Committee remained to be appointed. Since then there had been two nominations, the first, that of Jordan, by the Group of Non-aligned, Neutral and Other States, and the second, that of New Zealand, by the Group of Western and Other States. If there was no objection, he would take it that those two States Parties were appointed by the Conference as members of the Credentials Committee.
4. It was so decided.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE XII (agenda item 10)

(a) GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

5. Mr. DESPRES (Canada) said that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction was the first multilateral agreement aimed at the complete elimination of a whole category of weapons. Strict observance of the Convention by all the States Parties and universal accession to it were therefore of special importance. At the time of its conclusion the Convention had also been seen as a major step towards the effective prohibition of chemical weapons, as was clear from the preamble and article IX. Negotiations to that end had been held at the recent session of the Conference on Disarmament and the current Review Conference should urge the continuation and intensification of those negotiations. In his delegation's view, the participants in the Conference had a dual task: to examine impartially the implementation of the Convention since its entry into force and to consider means of strengthening it.
6. Arms control and disarmament implied in all fields a race between the never-ending advances of science and technology and the means available to statesmen and legislators to ensure that those advances were used to strengthen international peace and security. In the field of biotechnology, the problem was particularly acute. Since the entry into force of the Convention, an even since the First Review Conference, major advances had been made in various branches of biotechnology. Although such progress could be of inestimable value in enhancing the health, well-being and security of peoples throughout the world, it was nevertheless also true that it could be misused

for other than peaceful purposes and that it made verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention, which many regarded as vital to an agreement on arms control and disarmament, increasingly difficult.

7. Since the First Review Conference, there had been several allegations of serious violations of the Convention. Canada had carried out investigations into the question of the alleged use of toxin weapons in Southeast Asia. Those investigations, which had formed the basis of three separate reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, did not in themselves provide conclusive proof but nor did they refute the allegations of violations to which he had been referred. They showed that the abnormal epidemiological phenomena occurring in Southeast Asia at the beginning of the 1980s remained without adequate explanation. They pointed to the absolute necessity of full, prompt and unreserved co-operation among all the parties directly concerned. Such co-operation had been lacking in the case of the investigations carried out by the Canadian Government, and in the case of the expert team sent to the region by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1981. Similarly, uncertainties regarding other presumed violations of the Convention had not been resolved. The situation was neither satisfactory nor acceptable.

8. Given that state of affairs, it would be only too easy to slip into an attitude of passive despair but such a defeatist approach could only weaken the stand that had been taken against biological weapons, the best expression of which was the Convention, which was still a legal instrument binding on all the States Parties. The Canadian Government considered that the Conference should seek to strengthen the application of the Convention in a realistic and practical spirit. It hoped that the Conference would result in an agreement on a number of measures that could be set forth in a final document adopted by consensus and implying a political commitment. In particular, Canada deemed it highly desirable to build upon the results obtained at the First Review Conference by reaffirming the right, under article V of the Convention, to request the organization of consultations at the expert level open to all States Parties and setting forth the corresponding obligation of all States Parties directly concerned to respond favourably to such requests, to participate in the consultations and to co-operate to the full in resolving any problem relating to compliance with the Convention. The Canadian delegation was also ready to give favourable consideration to any other measure likely to further the hope of seeing the ban on biological weapons complied with and all States Parties truly complying with the legal obligations imposed upon them by the Convention.

9. Canada had never possessed any biological weapons and it continued to observe all its obligations under the Convention to the full and in all respects. In the hope of encouraging a freer exchange of information on biotechnological research and development among the States Parties, his delegation had given the Conference secretariat a paper describing the general character and scope of biotechnological activities in Canada, and the role played in that field by the Canadian Government, and requested its circulation as an official Conference document.

10. Mr. KRISTVIK (Norway) said that the entry into force, of the Biological Weapons Convention in March 1975 had been a major event in the disarmament field. It had been the first - and was still the only - multilateral agreement to contain provisions for concrete disarmament. In providing for

the destruction of existing weapons and the banning of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction, the Convention had been seen as a model for multilateral disarmament agreements.

11. Norway, which had been one of the first countries to sign the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, was pleased to note that 16 additional States had acceded to the Convention since the First Review Conference. Although it now had more than 100 States Parties, the Convention was however, far from being universal. The current Review Conference should urge the remaining signatory States and those which were not parties to adhere to the Convention at the earliest possible date.

12. Although the Convention stipulated the holding of a review conference five years after its entry into force (article XII) it contained no provision for further regular reviews. In its Final Declaration, the First Review Conference in 1980 had expressed the belief that such conferences constituted an effective method of reviewing the operation of the Convention and had decided that a second Review Conference should be held at Geneva at the request of a majority of States Parties not earlier than 1985 and, in any case, not later than 1990. On the basis of that decision, the Norwegian Government had approached the Depositary Governments in 1984 with a proposal that a second Review Conference should be convened in 1986. At the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, a draft resolution to that effect had been introduced by Norway on behalf of 42 countries from all regional groups and had been adopted without vote on 12 December 1984. His delegation hoped that the current Conference would decide to convene a third Review Conference after an appropriate period.

13. Every effort should be made at the current Review Conference to adopt a Final Declaration in which the States Parties would, inter alia, affirm their dedication to the principles and objectives of the Convention and their commitment to implement its provisions effectively. In his delegation's view, the scope of application of article I of the Convention was sufficiently clear and comprehensive. The rapid developments in biotechnology, especially in the area of genetic engineering, had caused concern that that new technology might be misused for weapons purposes. His delegation believed that the provisions of article I of the Convention clearly banned any such misuse. The First Review Conference had welcomed the declarations of several States Parties confirming their implementation of and compliance with the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. Norway had been among the States Parties to make such a declaration in 1980. In preparation for the current Conference, it had submitted a statement to the Secretary-General confirming that its position in that regard was unchanged.

14. Norway had never developed, produced or stockpiled any biological or toxin weapons. To fulfil its obligations under article IV, it had included the main part of article I of the Convention in the Norwegian Penal Code. In Norway, all research in micro-organisms and toxins was directed solely towards the epidemiology of infectious disease, medical treatment and prophylaxis. In accordance with the substance and the spirit of article X of the Convention, the research was unclassified and the results were published in the scientific literature.

15. At the First Review Conference, much attention had been devoted to the provisions of the Convention concerning verification and complaints procedure. In his delegation's opinion, the verification provisions were inadequate and recent scientific and technological developments had made their inadequacy all the more apparent. The complaints procedure was another weak point in the Convention. The current Review Conference should therefore issue a reminder that the provisions of article V concerning consultation and co-operation enabled interested States Parties to use various international procedures which would make it possible to ensure effectively and adequately the implementation of the Convention provisions. The Conference should reaffirm that those provisions included, inter alia, the right of any State Party to request the convening at the expert level of a consultative meeting open to all States Parties.

16. Norway hoped that all States Parties would agree that any report of non-compliance should be taken seriously. The Final Declaration of the current Review Conference should therefore state that alleged violations of the Convention should be investigated without delay and in a proper manner.

17. The First Review Conference had called for strict compliance with the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. According to documented reports, chemical weapons had been used repeatedly in the war between Iran and Iraq, in violation of the Protocol. Norway had expressed grave concern over those violations and strongly condemned the use of such weapons. The fact that such weapons were still being produced and used was a timely reminder of the urgent need to conclude a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. The States Parties to the Convention had committed themselves under article IX to negotiate an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. After 14 years, negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, had still not produced such an agreement. Considerable progress had been made, however, during the last few years. The draft text resulting from the 1986 session covered all the major areas of the Convention, except procedures for requesting a fact-finding mission. That gap reflected the disagreement concerning on-site inspection on challenge. Norway, which had played an active part in the work of the Conference on Disarmament for several years, was of the opinion that the negotiations should be intensified with a view to reaching an agreement in 1987. It was vital to mankind that chemical weapons should be eliminated as soon as possible.

18. Norway was confident that the deliberations of the current Conference would demonstrate the importance of the Biological Weapons Convention. It would like to see the Conference become a constructive tool in the effort to uphold the authority of the Convention. It would be useful in that connection if all the States Parties to the Convention would reaffirm their commitment to it in the Final Declaration.

19. Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary) said that the Hungarian People's Republic had always attached the greatest importance to the prohibition and destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, particularly means of chemical and bacteriological warfare. That was why as early as 1966, at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, it had submitted a draft resolution which, in parallel with the strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, aimed at the complete prohibition of the development,

production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. It had also been one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Convention, which was currently an organic part of national legislation, in compliance with article IV of the Convention. Lastly, the Hungarian People's Republic had strictly complied with all the provisions of the Convention and was determined to continue to do so in the future. It had never possessed biological or toxin weapons and had no intention of acquiring them.

20. In the view of the Hungarian Government, the Convention, which had more than 100 States Parties, had contributed greatly to the strengthening of international security and to the promotion of mutual trust and co-operation. Its importance did not stop there, however. It had in fact been followed by further agreements on arms control and disarmament. Just as the elaboration of the Biological Weapons Convention had been influenced by previous accords, it in its turn had had an impact on subsequent arms control and disarmament activities. There was a close organic interrelationship, the importance of which could hardly be over-estimated. It was important, therefore, to utilize the accumulated experience when working out new international legal instruments on disarmament. Only an international legal régime based on respect for existing agreements and ever-increasing international co-operation could effectively guarantee the security of all nations.

21. In his Government's view, the Biological Weapons Convention, which had been in force for more than 10 years, had played a positive role in limiting the arms race by outlawing an entire class of deadly weapons of mass destruction. Events had moreover clearly confirmed the validity and timeliness of banning a type of weapon the use of which at any point in the world could entail unimaginable consequences for mankind as a whole.

22. At the time of the adoption of the Convention banning biological and toxin weapons, such means of warfare had been considered to have comparatively low military value given the level of science and technology. Since then microbiology had made great advances and without the Convention the new discoveries in the field of genetic engineering might have changed that situation. The new progress made in biology was included in the scope of the Convention. If the Convention's provisions were strictly complied with in future, it would be possible to ensure that the findings of biotechnology would not be used to develop new biological or toxin weapons or to make existing agents more effective in military terms.

23. At the First Review Conference, the Hungarian delegation had expressed the view that the provisions of the Convention had been properly complied with and that no violation of obligations had taken place. In its opinion that was a proof of the effectiveness of the Convention and it hoped that States Parties would continue to respect their obligations. It should be noted that during the 10 years the Convention had been in force no State Party had felt it necessary to set in motion the procedure provided in articles V (calling for consultations to resolve problems) and VI (dealing with complaints concerning violations of obligations).

24. Under article IX each State Party had undertaken to continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of

the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction. Negotiations to achieve such a treaty had recently been accelerated in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and substantial results had been achieved. Nevertheless, much remained to be done and increased efforts and flexibility would be required from the participants in the negotiations. His delegation was convinced that given the necessary political will to agree and unremitting efforts on the part of the negotiators an agreement on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, drawing on the experience accumulated since the conclusion of the Convention, might be within reach in the foreseeable future. There was, as he had already mentioned, a close, organic interrelationship among existing treaties on disarmament. Early conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty was desirable in order to cover whatever grey areas might lie between biological and chemical weapons. The successful outcome of the current Review Conference would undoubtedly improve the prospects of the early conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty.

25. Article XII of the Convention provided that the Review Conference should take into account all achievements of science and technology relevant to the Convention. The papers prepared by the Depositary States and other States Parties provided a satisfactory summary of those developments. His delegation agreed with the conclusion that the Convention covered all the results of scientific and technical development relevant to the weapons it was intended to ban and considered that obligations assumed under the Convention did not impede scientific progress for peaceful purposes. His delegation considered it to be of the utmost importance that States Parties should increase their co-operation in compliance with article X and was convinced that the stronger scientific and economic relations became, and the livelier the exchange of information in the peaceful uses of biology and biotechnology, the stronger would be the foundations of the Convention and the more possibilities there would be of dispelling unfounded suspicions.

26. His Government did its utmost to that end. It was a matter for regret however that some of its initiatives in other international forums to foster peaceful co-operation in the field of biotechnology had not been to the liking of some States, most of them Parties to the Convention.

27. His delegation would participate in the proceedings of the Second Review Conference with the firm determination to contribute to its success, to achieve a final declaration which would incontrovertibly further strengthen the Convention in all its aspects. For that purpose it was desirable in his delegation's view that States Parties should reaffirm their commitment to the obligations assumed under the Convention and their determination to prevent misuse of the latest results of science and technology as well as their readiness to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of biotechnology with a view to increasing confidence among nations. It was essential to urge States that had not yet done so to accede to the Convention in order to achieve universal adherence as soon as possible. His delegation would take part in the proceedings of the Conference in that spirit.

28. Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic) said that the Convention banned a whole class of weapons and thus furnished practical proof of the view that means of mass destruction could be eliminated and the human race freed from the threats to its survival. Attempts to undermine or weaken multilateral agreements such as the Convention on the pretext of revising them should be

vigorously opposed. Delegations to the Second Review Conference should use the review process to give fresh impetus to disarmament in a genuine spirit of co-operation.

29. The socialist countries had recently presented new and far-reaching initiatives, the centrepiece being the Soviet proposal aimed at ridding the world of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. A few weeks earlier, the Soviet Union had extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests to 1 January 1987. After those initiatives the ball was in the other court. It was incumbent on the other side to remove the obstacles preventing the cessation of the arms race and further agreements in all disarmament fields.

30. It was legitimate to ask whether the rapid development of the biological sciences did not make the abuse of scientific findings for military purposes more likely. That was particularly true of new pathogens, the modification of existing micro-organisms with enhanced multiplication capacity or the creation of new ones, increases in the drug resistance of such organisms by genetic engineering, the application of novel techniques to develop vaccines and the artificial production of toxins. In the light of those risks, it should be unambiguously affirmed that article I of the Convention was perfectly adequate to cover all situations and could cover every new development.

31. The concern that biological discoveries with military potential might possibly pose a threat to the Convention had given rise to a discussion about the verification procedures laid down. In that connection he pointed out that participants had expressly recognized that articles V and VI set out flexible international procedures, including the convening of consultative meetings at the expert level by States parties. To date no one had ever invoked those procedures. He deplored the attitude of countries which, whenever they were about to increase their outlays on military biology research and development, levelled accusations at other States Parties. Instead of undermining the Convention in that way, it would be better to consider what measures which would effectively enhance confidence in compliance might be envisaged on the basis of the present text. His delegation would welcome a frank and constructive discussion on that subject.

32. The development of peaceful international co-operation to take advantage of new biological findings, as called for under article X, was certainly an essential means of strengthening the Convention. In recent years, conferences, seminars and training courses had been organized in the German Democratic Republic and contacts had been promoted between research institutions in the Republic and their counterparts in Sweden, Finland, India, the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and other countries. His country also co-operated closely with the other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In the medical field, his country was working together with other countries, primarily under WHO programmes, on the use of bacterial and viral strains for vaccination purposes, and the development of immune toxins for tumour therapy.

33. Pursuant to article IX, his country, together with other socialist countries and other States, had made great efforts at both the global and regional levels to bring about an early and comprehensive chemical weapons

ban. It welcomed the progress achieved in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. The object should be to conclude the negotiations so that a draft convention could be submitted to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-second session. That effort should not be hampered by plans for the production of a new generation of chemical arms, the binary weapons.

24. In 1986 his country and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had submitted to the Federal Republic of Germany broad lines for negotiations on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe. His country believed that that initiative would have a favourable impact on the negotiations and the implementation of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

35. The Second Conference would help to strengthen the Convention if the final declaration underlined the undiminished significance of the treaty, reaffirmed the Parties' support for the principles and objectives of the Convention and their commitment to strict observance of its provisions, called on all other States to accede to the Convention, demanded an intensification of international disarmament negotiations, especially the speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty and set forth generally acceptable measures to strengthen the régime of the Convention. His delegation was prepared to do its best to achieve those goals.

36. Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan) said that the Convention had been described as the first internationally negotiated genuine disarmament measure which outlawed an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Concluded in 1972, the Convention had entered into force three years' later and the First Review Conference, held in 1980, had helped to strengthen the régime established by the Convention. Several States Parties had called for the revision of some provisions and the First Conference had regretted the lack of progress in negotiating an agreement on chemical weapons.

37. Since then strict compliance with the Convention and strengthening of its provisions where appropriate, had been called for by the international community through the General Assembly, in particular in resolution 37/98, of which his country had been a co-sponsor. The great strides recently made in the area of biotechnology and genetic engineering had increased the potential for the development of even more destructive weapons. At the same time new and more efficient techniques could be used to produce vaccines to protect the aggressor's forces. It was well known that biological weapons had seldom been used in the past because potential users were afraid of the danger to their own forces and populations. Should those limiting factors be eliminated as a result of breakthroughs in biotechnology, the risk that such weapons might be used would be greatly increased.

38. In those circumstances there was urgent need to review the operation of the Convention and to strengthen the régime established by it and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In that connection it was gratifying that the number of States Parties had increased from 87 at the last Review Conference to 103. Moreover States which had not yet acceded to the Convention were nevertheless committed under the 1925 Protocol. It was to be hoped that those States would soon ratify the Convention, and that the aim of universal adherence would be realized in the near future.

39. His delegation noted with satisfaction that no State had resorted to the complaints procedure provided in article VI. There had been allegations of infringements but in the absence of adequate verification mechanisms it had not been possible to come to any conclusive finding, a situation that once more underlined the need for strengthening the Convention. In his country's view efforts to strengthen the Convention should concentrate on three areas, improved procedures for verification of compliance and settlement of complaints, greater openness and transparency of research in biological agents, enhanced co-operation between States in the peaceful application of biological sciences.

40. The Final Document of the First Review Conference reflected the concern of a large number of delegations concerning the inadequacy of article V. Since then the General Assembly had also stressed the need for a more effective verification procedure in resolution 37/98 C. There were precedents that could serve as a model for a more reliable verification system. His delegation considered it completely inconsistent that some countries which approved the IAEA inspection system under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were now opposed to strengthening the verification procedure under the Convention.

41. The revised verification system should provide for the establishment of fact-finding machinery to examine complaints made under the Convention. The machinery should make use of technical experts who should carry out their task in an impartial, non-political way. Provision should also be made to guard against misuse of the veto power in the Security Council when the procedure laid down in article VI was applied. With regard to the time and modalities for carrying out the necessary revisions in the verification machinery, his delegation felt that they should be the subject of consultations between interested countries.

42. Article I of the Convention prohibited the development, production etc. of biological agents of types and in quantities that had no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. The types of agents and quantities were not defined and there was considerable scope for abuse. There was a very fine line dividing research for peaceful purposes from research for military purposes. In order to eliminate misunderstandings there should be greater transparency in research on biological agents. Countries engaged in such research should so inform the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and open their laboratories to interested scientists.

43. With regard to article X, a number of delegations at the First Review Conference, including his own, had made concrete suggestions to increase co-operation between the developing and developed countries in regard to the peaceful uses of biological agents and toxins. The Final Document of that Conference reflected those concerns. Unfortunately co-operation remained insignificant and the background papers produced for the Conference contained scanty information on the subject. His delegation hoped that the current Conference would take concrete steps towards the establishment of adequate institutional means within the United Nations system to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.

44. His delegation regretted that 15 years after the conclusion of the Convention and despite the commitment stated in the preamble and article IX, a ban on chemical weapons had still not been achieved. That was principally due to the fact that the outstanding issues were viewed in an East-West context. The Parties currently engaged in the negotiations in that field should intensify their efforts to reach final agreement in 1987. His delegation hoped that review conferences would continue to be held, preferably at five year intervals.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE CONFERENCE AND CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 6) (continued)

45. The PRESIDENT said that candidates had been proposed for the remaining posts of Vice-President of the African Group, which proposed Ethiopia and the Latin American Group, which proposed Cuba and Peru. The Asian Group stated that it would inform him of its candidates as soon as possible. In the absence of objection he would take it that the Conference appointed Cuba, Ethiopia, and Peru as Vice-Presidents.

46. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.

**SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

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19 September 1986

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 10 September 1986, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. LANG (Austria)

CONTENTS

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its article XII

(a) General debate (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE XII
(agenda item 10)

(a) GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that many delegations had requested clarification of the information his delegation had provided on new scientific and technological developments relative to the Convention (BWC/CONF.II/4/Add.1) and also on the position of the Soviet Union with regard to questions of compliance with the provisions of the Convention. In order to save the Conference's time, he would not make a special statement but had arranged for Professor Antonov, the principal expert of the Soviet Ministry of Health on the subject, to introduce the Soviet background material and answer questions following the close of the afternoon meeting.

2. Mr. LINEHAM (New Zealand) said that the 1972 Convention represented a significant achievement in disarmament and arms control. There were now 104 States Parties to the Convention, a welcome increase from the 87 States Parties at the time of the First Review Conference. The fact that so many countries had pledged to reject biological and toxin weapons had greatly reduced the prospect of any biological arms race.

3. The Convention remained the only comprehensive ban on a whole category of weapons, a fact that emphasized its significance and should encourage greater efforts to achieve the successful negotiation of agreements in other areas of arms control and disarmament. The Convention's significance had further increased with modern biotechnological developments because it reduced the risk of misuse of those developments to produce new and more threatening weapons. That was another reason for maintaining the authority of the Convention.

4. New Zealand strongly supported the principles and objectives of the Convention and was committed to the process of disarmament and arms control negotiations. The review conferences were an important part of that process and helped to ensure that the prohibitions and controls of the agreements achieved continued to be effective and realistic in the light of scientific advances.

5. New Zealand had complied with all the provisions of the Convention. It did not possess any of the weapons covered by the provisions of article I. Its Government was satisfied that none of the activities prohibited by the Convention was being conducted in New Zealand and furthermore, that existing legislation contained the necessary measures to control such activities, as required under article IV. Compliance with the Convention would be further strengthened by the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control legislation at present before the New Zealand Parliament, which would prohibit the manufacture, stationing, acquisition or possession of any biological weapons as defined by the Convention.

6. In his delegation's view, the Conference was in a position to take some steps to strengthen the authority and effectiveness of the Convention. In the first place, the adequacy of article V on consultation and co-operation should

be considered further, as indicated in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference. The proposal for convening a consultative meeting open to all States Parties at expert level also deserved further consideration.

7. New Zealand shared some of the concerns expressed regarding the scope and effectiveness of some provisions of the Convention. In particular, ways should be sought of improving the adequacy and effectiveness of verification procedures. The successful operation of any disarmament and arms control agreement depended on confidence that its provisions were being complied with. It was an important - if not actually the central - task of the Conference to consider ways in which that confidence could be maintained and strengthened.

8. The 1972 Convention had served the international community well. It had been the major inhibitor of a biological arms race. It was, however, vital that any shortcomings in its operation should be recognized, as well as the mutual interest in ensuring that it should operate as well as it possibly could.

9. Article VIII of the Convention stated that it in no way limited or detracted from the obligations assumed by any State under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In recent years, reports on the use of chemical weapons had, however, been confirmed by teams of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In view of that serious development, it was essential that the Conference should reaffirm article VIII as well as the adherence of States Parties to the principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol.

10. The link between biological and toxin weapons on the one hand and chemical weapons on the other was widely recognized and was becoming increasingly significant with new developments in biotechnology. The preamble to the Convention recognized the link and noted that the Convention represented a first step towards the achievement of a ban on chemical weapons. Under article IX of the Convention States Parties had a duty to continue negotiations on effective measures for the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The Conference should reaffirm that high priority must be placed on bringing the chemical weapon negotiations to a successful and early conclusion.

11. The First Review Conference had drawn attention to the importance of co-operation and the exchange of equipment, materials and technology in the peaceful uses of bacteriological agents and toxins under article X. In New Zealand, Government research institutions, semi-governmental institutions, universities and the private sector regularly made services available to other countries, particularly developing countries of the South Pacific, and exchanged information on materials and technology with them. The Conference might well consider how the Convention could be made more effective by encouraging greater exchanges of information, materials and technology for peaceful purposes.

12. The Convention did not specifically provide for its continuing review. Since biotechnological and related developments could be expected to continue, periodic reviews constituted a suitable mechanism for ascertaining whether the Convention remained appropriate to the tasks set for it and whether it needed

strengthening further in any respect. The Conference should therefore consider a further review of the Convention at approximately the same interval as in the past.

13. Mr. KEISALO (Finland) said that his country highly valued the Convention and had been among the first States to sign it.

14. The Convention was important in its own right since it committed the States Parties to abstention from an entire category of particularly heinous weapons of mass destruction. It was also the first, and so far the only, disarmament treaty which, not only prohibited the development and possession of certain weapons or potential weapons but also provided for the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of existing stockpiles.

15. The Convention was also important as a complement to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons but did not prohibit their development, production or acquisition. Moreover, a number of militarily important States Parties had attached reservations under which they retained the right to retaliate in kind if such weapons were used against them. Although the Protocol remained the most widely accepted instrument of international law in its field, its limitations had therefore to be recognized. In contrast the Convention unequivocally committed States Parties never under any circumstances to produce or retain biological weapons for hostile purposes. Finland saw the Convention as a step towards the complete elimination of an even more threatening means of mass destruction, chemical weapons.

16. Turning to the key articles of the Convention, he said that his delegation viewed allegations of non-compliance with great concern. Although allegations had not been brought before the United Nations Security Council for action under article VI, they threatened to undermine confidence in the adherence of States Parties to their commitments under the Convention. Full use should be made of the procedures outlined in article V to examine such allegations with the seriousness they deserved. As the First Review Conference had noted in its Final Declaration, the procedures included the right of any State Party to request the convening of a consultative meeting at expert level open to all States Parties.

17. Recent rapid developments in biotechnology, including genetic engineering, had led some experts to consider that biological weapons could now be used in tactical situations and special operations and not simply as weapons of mass destruction with uncontrollable effects. Others considered that the potential for misuse of biotechnology was no greater than that of standard microbiological techniques. In any case, the phrase "whatever their origin or method of production" in article I clearly covered any and all new techniques in the field of biotechnology, including any applications of genetic engineering. Even if biological agents could be more easily turned into weapons of greater military utility than hitherto, such activities would still constitute a flagrant violation of the Convention. The Conference should emphatically and explicitly reaffirm that the scope of article I banned any applications whatsoever of biotechnology for hostile purposes.

18. The Conference could strengthen confidence in the continued efficacy of the ban on biological weapons by expressing support for the traditional

standards of openness in scientific research, including research in technology. Such openness was particularly important because certain types of biotechnological research seemed to require very strict security and safety measures which might give rise to suspicions of clandestine activity in contravention of the Convention. There was a good deal of merit in the recommendation made by many scientists that States Parties should declare the number and location of any high-containment laboratories under their jurisdiction such as those suitable for use with highly virulent microbes. A recommendation on those lines might usefully be included in the final declaration.

19. As another confidence-building measure, the Conference might recommend that States Parties provide information on the inoculation programmes of their armed forces. The continued vaccination of military personnel against smallpox could give rise to suspicion since vaccination had been discontinued in most countries following the WHO's official certification that the smallpox microbe had been eradicated. Such confidence-building measures would strengthen the commitment of States Parties under article X to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of information for peaceful purposes.

20. Article III had given rise to little discussion. However, it should be noted that it listed only States, groups of States and international organizations as bodies which must not be assisted by States Parties to manufacture or acquire biological weapons. In view of the growth of terrorism, it would be appropriate for the Conference to affirm that the prohibition in article III covered any help whatsoever by States Parties to any recipient whatsoever, whether at the international, national or sub-national level.

21. With regard to article IV, Finland had taken the necessary measures to incorporate its commitments under article I into its national legislation and urged all other States Parties which had not yet done so to do likewise.

22. Articles V, VI, and VII did not really fulfil the exacting standards for verification which were being sought, for example, in the negotiations on chemical weapons. His delegation felt that the concern expressed over the inadequacy of those provisions was justified and was prepared to consider any suggestions which might strengthen them. However, as the First Review Conference had rightly pointed out, the provisions of article V provided a good deal of flexibility in dealing with any problems of compliance and it was significant that during the 11 years in which the Convention had been in force, no State Party had had recourse to the complaints procedure under article VI.

23. In spite of the clear commitment under article IX, negotiations on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons had still not borne fruit. Meanwhile, there was increasing interest in new forms of chemical weapons and more States possessed the technological capacity to produce such weapons. Furthermore, in spite of existing legal obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol a United Nations team of experts had found that such weapons had been used on a number of occasions in the Iran-Iraq war. Those ominous developments indicated that the world was living on borrowed time as far as banning chemical weapons was concerned and his delegation hoped that the Conference on Disarmament could overcome the remaining obstacles to the conclusion of a convention on the subject. Such a convention in conjunction

with the Biological Weapons Convention would constitute an all inclusive ban which would allay the concern of those States which considered that the dividing line between biological and chemical weapons was arbitrary and had consequently chosen not to become parties to the 1972 Convention.

24. His delegation welcomed the fact that a majority of the members of the international community were currently bound by the Convention, a number of States, including several with considerable biotechnological capability, having become parties since the First Review Conference. The Conference might encourage those States which continued to stay outside the Convention to reconsider their position and also urge signatory States to ratify it at an early date.

25. Mr. GROOT (Denmark) said that his delegation fully endorsed the views expressed at the third meeting by the United Kingdom representative speaking on behalf of the member States of the European Community. In particular, his delegation agreed that in case of doubts regarding compliance all necessary steps should be taken by the Parties concerned to clarify the matter.

26. As was stated in the Danish reply (BWC/CONF.II/3) to the Secretary-General's questionnaire all the requirements set forth in the Convention were implemented in Danish law and practice. Prior to the ratification of the Convention, the Danish Government departments concerned had ascertained that no new legislation, amendments of existing national law or other measures would be necessary in order to secure compliance with the obligations of the Convention. As a party to the Convention and a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol Denmark continued to comply fully with the obligations of the Convention.

27. The Conference was called upon to review the operation of all provisions of the Convention including those concerning negotiations on chemical weapons. The negotiations at the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament had been constructive and, although difficult problems such as questions of verification remained, it should be possible to agree upon a draft convention for adoption at the forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly.

28. His delegation hoped the Conference would be able to agree upon a final document which reaffirmed the commitments undertaken by the States Parties to the Convention. It also hoped that the States Parties would be able to elaborate a set of model procedures for facilities conducting biological defence work, designed to increase the transparency of such activities.

29. His country had continued its traditional participation in international public health efforts, including co-operative scientific programmes in the field of microbiology and related sciences. Denmark was the host of several WHO reference centres and had in recent years concluded a number of bilateral health agreements, including agreements for the exchange of students.

30. His country reaffirmed its recognition of the importance of periodic reviews of all new scientific technical developments relevant to the Convention. The Convention represented an important contribution to the implementation of the goal of complete and general disarmament and had outlawed a complete generation of weapon systems. It was to be hoped that the

strong support the Convention had so far received would be reaffirmed by the Conference and that the Conference would strengthen the movement towards universal adherence to the Convention.

31. Mr. BIRBAUM (Austria) stressed that the practice of review conferences reflected the fundamentally dynamic character of arms control régimes, which needed to be continuously adapted to technological developments, changes in military-strategic thinking and the evolving political scene. That dynamic aspect was stressed by the provisions of article XII of the Convention. In that connection, he wished to pay tribute to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the team that had put together its newest book on the subject of biological weapons, which constituted an important contribution to the work of the Conference.

32. At the time of the conclusion of the Convention, the general conviction had been that biological weapons were militarily useless, difficult to handle, slow in action, hard to control once used and therefore hazardous to one's own troops and population, as well as being barbaric and amoral instruments of war. In view of those generally held opinions, detailed verification mechanisms had not then appeared indispensable. The situation had since changed. Peaceful research activities had resulted in new technologies, some of which would appear to be of potential military interest. The view of knowledgeable observers that the military usefulness of biological weapons might have to be reassessed was one that the Review Conference could not ignore. The Conference should clearly state that it upheld and reaffirmed the provisions and objectives of the Convention.

33. Since the Second Review Conference, the world had been horrified by the repeated use of chemical weapons in flagrant violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It was worth noting that use of chemical weapons had occurred outside the two main military alliances. The relative inexpensiveness of both chemical and biological weapons could be an element tempting governments to acquire them.

34. According to most indications, however, the barrier against biological weapons was still holding. Although serious allegations of non-compliance with treaty obligations had been made, no fully conclusive evidence had been internationally presented and the procedure provided for by article VI had not been resorted to. There was, however, a widespread feeling that the treaty régime needed to be strengthened in order to dissuade those who doubted its viability from engaging in the build-up of a biological weapons capability. The Convention and its modalities, and not the acquisition of a deterrent in kind, must remain the means of keeping the world free from biological weapons.

35. Measures should be sought to strengthen the authority of the Convention. His delegation would consider any proposals to that end pragmatically and with an open mind.

36. Biological weapons were historically and intrinsically linked to chemical weapons. It was a matter for regret that the production and possession of chemical weapons were still not outlawed. He welcomed, however, the renewed vigour in the ongoing multilateral negotiations on the subject and the fact that, in the area of verification, there appeared to be a hopeful movement towards accommodation of the opposing views.

37. It should also be noted that in resolution 37/98D the United Nations General Assembly had established a framework to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Austria had actively participated in the follow-up to that resolution.

38. When a convention came to be concluded on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it would represent quite a different legal technique from the 1972 Convention. The areas regulated by the two instruments would, however, be related and might even overlap. Since the convention on chemical weapons would in all probability contain stringent verification machinery, there might be an inducement to evade that machinery by moving to the area of biological weapons. That point would have to be kept in mind when endeavouring to strengthen the régime of the prohibition of biological weapons.

39. As far as Austrian implementation of the Convention was concerned, his country had been bound by hard and fast international obligations which antedated the Convention and which obliged it not to produce, acquire or possess either biological or chemical weapons. Austria had therefore a great interest in seeing that no such weapons appeared in the region and that those which were there were eliminated.

40. With regard to article X, Austria continued to be interested in furthering peaceful co-operation. It looked forward to an opportunity to discuss the matter when the conference on the subject which was to have been held earlier in 1986 was convened.

41. Finally, there were still too many countries which had not yet joined the 1972 Convention. It was important that the régime on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons should become genuinely universal. Every State which was not a party to the 1972 Convention was in a way weakening it. The Conference should appeal to all States still outside the Convention to reconsider their position.

42. The Conference was fortunately taking place at a time when the international climate appeared to be again improving. The Geneva summit meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States had resulted in positive impulses, especially in the field of disarmament. His delegation hoped that those impulses would be felt at the present Conference.

43. Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) said that biological weapons were detested by the people of all countries and that the prohibition of such weapons was in accordance with the general desire and interest of peoples throughout the world. Between its signature in 1972 and the end of 1985, 102 States had acceded to the Convention. It thus commanded the endorsement and support of the majority of States and peoples and helped to maintain world peace and international security. The Convention was the positive outcome of many years of multilateral effort in the field of disarmament and would help to promote further measures of disarmament. It should therefore be strictly complied with by all States Parties.

44. The Convention had, however, certain drawbacks. Provisions for effective monitoring and verification measures were absent and there were inadequacies in the complaints procedure. A number of delegations had already referred to the need to strengthen the Convention. In his delegation's view, all those

issues could be resolved through consultations aimed at perfecting the Convention. Such efforts could also have a positive bearing on the current negotiations for a convention on chemical weapons.

45. Since the First Review Conference, the development of science and technology had resulted in new achievements in biological research and advances in biotechnology. Such scientific and technological development had contributed greatly to the treatment of disease and the enhancement of health, and to social and economic progress. At the same time, a potential for the development of new types of biological weapons was inherent in the new biotechnology. Against the background of an intensifying arms race between the super-Powers, that potential danger was attracting greater attention. His delegation believed that current technological achievements still fell within the scope of the Convention's provisions and that the Convention could therefore cover the development of modern science and technology.

46. China had always been opposed to the development, production and use of biological weapons. Although it had itself been a victim of bacteriological weapons, it had never produced or possessed such weapons nor would it ever do so in the future. The fundamental spirit of the Convention was in full accordance with China's consistent position in that regard. On 20 September 1984, therefore, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China had decided to accede to the Convention, and on 15 November 1984 instruments of accession had been deposited with the Depository Governments. It should be noted that the signing of the Convention on 10 April 1972 by the Taiwan authorities usurping the name of China, as well as its ratification on 9 February 1973, had been illegal and accordingly null and void.

47. As the Government had stated in its report on China's observance of the Convention to the Preparatory Committee for the Conference (BWC/CONF.II/3), the People's Republic of China had always been opposed to biological weapons and had strictly observed the Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Since it was not in possession of the biological agents or means of delivery specified in article I, the question of destroying them or diverting them to peaceful purposes or transferring them in any form did not arise. China had never in any way assisted, encouraged or induced any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents or means of delivery specified in article I. China abided strictly by the Convention and would, together with other States Parties, firmly oppose any act that contravened it.

48. China attached great importance to the use of biotechnology for peaceful purposes, and for solving problems relating to medicine, health and economic progress in China, for the benefit not only of the Chinese people but of people all over the world. Despite its late start in biotechnology, China had in recent years achieved certain results in laboratory research. It was currently playing an active role in international scientific and technological exchanges on the use of biological agents (including toxins) for the prevention and treatment of infectious disease and for other peaceful purposes. Remarkable successes had already been achieved in co-operation and exchanges with international organizations such as WHO and UNICEF and with other countries in the fields of medicine and public health. Through those activities, it was complying fully with the provisions of article X of the Convention.

49. In his delegation's view, the chief purpose of article X was to promote rather than hamper the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins. The exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information in the field of biotechnology should therefore be promoted. In particular, those countries which possessed advanced biotechnology should intensify their exchanges with other countries, especially the developing countries, in order to enhance their capabilities in regard to biotechnological research and development and thus enable them to make their due contribution to the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins.

50. With regard to article IX and the obligation to work for early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, China had participated actively in the negotiations on a convention and had put forward a series of proposals. During the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations had moved forward and the prospect had become more promising. A great deal remained to be done, however. Differences in regard to verification and other outstanding issues still required further efforts from various sides. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the declared intention of the two countries which possessed the largest arsenals of chemical weapons to accelerate the negotiations and hoped that their sincerity would be demonstrated by deeds.

51. The people of all countries were united in their desire to oppose the arms race and to safeguard world peace. The Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons should be fully observed and further strengthened and the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons should be facilitated. His delegation would continue to direct its efforts to that end.

52. Mr. ter HAAR (Netherlands) said that the 1972 Convention was still very much alive. If the current Review Conference was to be brought to a successful conclusion, however, a sense of the Convention's place in history was needed, as well as of the place that the Conference itself could occupy. As long as wars had been fought, weapons had been used to kill or disable the enemy. Until well into the nineteenth century, however, the greatest devastation had been wrought not by weapons but indirectly by the diseases that broke out in societies that were disrupted by war. In the last century and a half, most of those diseases had been mastered, but the first step had also been taken towards using those diseases for purposes of war. The 1925 Geneva Protocol recognized that fact when it prohibited the use not only of chemical but also of biological weapons, although the military use of such weapons was then little more than a remote possibility. About the time of the Second World War, several nations had actually developed and produced biological weapons. The existence of such arsenals threatened to undermine the purposes of the Geneva Protocol and in 1972, in order to counter them, it had been agreed to prohibit altogether the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons.

53. The Convention undoubtedly constituted a major step in the history of war and disease. Nevertheless, work must continue in order to keep the scientific and technological powers mankind had developed under control. Biological science and biotechnology had never moved as fast as in the years since the signing of the Convention and the pace of development was still not slowing down. The world could well be on the brink of a period marked by innovations

in biotechnology. New measures were therefore needed to respond to the challenge and to strengthen existing prohibitions on the misuse of man's new powers.

54. At the First Review Conference, it had been agreed that the scope of the Convention was sufficiently broad to deal with new technological developments. Although that conclusion was still valid, the recent advances of biotechnology posed potential problems. Some Parties to the Convention might begin to believe that other Parties were in a position to develop new and effective biological weapons. Over the past six years, doubts had undoubtedly grown about compliance, doubts which had not yet been resolved. The Conference must give priority to finding ways and means of strengthening the provisions of articles V and VI.

55. There were several ways in which that could be done. In the short term, certain confidence-building measures could play a useful role. In the longer term, a more formal strengthening of the provisions relating to compliance procedures might prove necessary. Several useful ideas had already been put forward, including the exchange of information on biological facilities handling particularly dangerous biological materials, greater openness in work on protection against biological weapons and prophylaxis, and the exchange of information on unusual or large-scale outbreaks of disease. It was to be hoped that those ideas could be developed in detail during the Conference.

56. Although articles V and VI should be central to the review process, other articles must not be disregarded. It would be unwise to concentrate exclusively on the question of compliance at the expense of others that were equally important. For example, article IV required each State Party to take any necessary measures to implement its provisions. In the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, those States Parties which had found it necessary to implement such measures had been invited to make the relevant texts available to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. In accordance with that requirement, his Government had enacted regulations for the implementation of article IV and had communicated the text to the United Nations. Such openness about implementation could play a useful role in building confidence about compliance.

57. In order to strengthen the Convention the Conference must identify and deal with the Convention's weaknesses. In his delegation's view, the serious doubts that had arisen about compliance were the most threatening of those weaknesses. The Conference's primary objective should therefore be to strengthen the existing procedures for verifying compliance. Confidence-building measures would be necessary to that end and his delegation would concentrate on and work towards promoting them. Otherwise, confidence would be eroded and in the long run the Convention itself might be undermined.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 10 September 1986, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. LANG (Austria)

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Election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference and Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (concluded)

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its article XII

- (a) General debate (continued)
- (b) Articles I-XV
- (c) Preambular paragraphs and purposes of the Convention

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE CONFERENCE AND CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 6) (concluded)

1. The PRESIDENT said that the Asian Group had nominated the representatives of Bhutan, China, Iran and Japan for election to the four vacant posts of Vice-President. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to elect those representatives as Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

2. It was so decided.

3. The PRESIDENT noted that the Conference had completed its consideration of agenda item 6.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE XII (agenda item 10) (continued)

(a) GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

4. Mr. KONSTANTINOV (Bulgaria) observed that the Second Review Conference was being held at a time when there were calls on all sides from the international community urging with increasing insistence the banning of all types of weapons of mass destruction, the strengthening of the peace and security of peoples and the establishment of multilateral co-operation in which States would participate on a footing of equality. In the circumstances, it was essential that all existing disarmament agreements, including the Convention under review, should be respected and strengthened.

5. The Conference's first task was to confirm the effectiveness of the Convention and to enhance the implementation of all its provisions. The Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, for its part, had always scrupulously fulfilled all the obligations arising from the provisions of the Convention, especially those of article I. The principles enshrined in the Convention had been incorporated into its national legislation and had been reaffirmed by Mr. T. Jirkov, General-Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of State.

6. The Bulgarian Government noted with satisfaction that the Convention had fully attained its objective. Scientific and technical advances since its entry into force had not created any new threats to security and not a single instance of violation of the provisions of the Convention had been recorded. He rejected as entirely without foundation the doubts which had been expressed in certain quarters regarding the satisfactory application of the Convention. One delegation had actually alleged that violations had been committed, while admitting that it was not in a position to adduce any evidence in support of its allegations. It had also been suggested in some quarters that the recent advances of biotechnology and genetic engineering had already made the Convention pointless. Such manoeuvres were bound to impair the authority of the Convention although the situation demanded that all States should concentrate their efforts on strengthening it and increasing the number of States Parties.

7. Turning to the provisions of articles V, VI and VII relating to the settlement of problems that might arise with regard to the application of the Convention, he pointed out that so far no State Party had invoked the procedures provided, a fact which was in itself an indication that the Parties had had no reason to complain of violations of the provisions of the Convention. His Government considered that the procedures for consultation, complaints and assistance established by articles V, VI and VII were broadly sufficient, but was prepared to examine any constructive proposals directed towards providing additional forms of co-operation in the matter of controls likely to strengthen the confidence of Parties in the observance of the Convention.

8. The Review Conference should also endeavour to broaden international co-operation for the application of the biological sciences, in particular biotechnology and genetic engineering, in the interests of the socio-economic and scientific development of all peoples. Bulgaria, for its part, had made full use of the resources available to it to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information as provided in article X. The activities in question had been undertaken for purely peaceful purposes, principally through participation in co-operative programmes with the more advanced countries in that field, particularly in the framework of the CMEA. His country was interested primarily in the application to agriculture and pharmacology of discoveries in the field of bacteriology. One of its priority objectives in that respect was to create its own infrastructure for the production of equipment for biotechnology. Bulgarian experts had already participated in a seminar on biotechnology and the chemical industry recently organized at Varna by the Economic Commission for Europe. The seminar had reviewed the situation in that field in Europe and had examined the role biotechnology could play in the socio-economic development of the region.

9. The Second Review Conference should give the necessary impetus to the conclusion of other agreements in the field of disarmament, in particular an agreement banning chemical weapons. Referring to the provisions of article IX of the Convention, he drew attention to the important developments which had taken place since the First Review Conference in the negotiations for an agreement on effective measures to ban such weapons. The concrete negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament at its 1986 session had been increasingly directed towards the final objective of formulating a complete draft convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. In that connection, the concrete initiatives taken by the Soviet Union and the statement made on 15 January 1986 by Mr. Gorbachev were highly important. Negotiations had reached a critical phase and all States should show the political will to abstain from any action which might prevent the speedy attainment of the desired objective. In particular, it was essential to eschew the production and deployment of binary and other types of chemical weapons. Bulgaria had made its own modest contribution to the progress of the negotiations and to the achievement of the final objective by joining with Romania in proposing the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the region to all the Balkan countries.

10. In conclusion, he assured the President of the Conference that his delegation would spare no effort to ensure that the work of the Conference proceeded in a constructive climate.

11. Mr. LACLETA (Spain) associated himself with the statement made by the United Kingdom representative on behalf of the European Economic Community, of which Spain was a member. He noted that the Convention was still the only disarmament agreement in force which prohibited the production of a whole category of weapons and provided for the destruction of existing weapons. The 1925 Protocol had prohibited only certain weapons and the Parties had reserved the option to use them in retaliation if attacked by an enemy using such weapons. The Protocol did not prohibit either production or stockpiling.

12. In view of the more comprehensive character of the Convention, a Party which scrupulously observed it might unfortunately find itself at the mercy of a State violating its provisions. It was therefore highly important to strengthen the Convention and ensure its rigorous application so as to remove any doubts that might arise. In his Government's view the Convention's weak point was that it was very difficult to verify its application because of the progress of biotechnology and genetic engineering.

13. The complaints procedure provided in article VI had not been used but, as other delegations had pointed out, there might have been instances of non-observance of the Convention. If violations were found to have actually taken place, a resumption of the arms race and a spiral of accusations and further violations might well ensue. Those dangers could only be averted by co-operation in good faith between all the States Parties on the basis of strict application of article V. His delegation would carefully consider any proposals for measures to strengthen the Convention and enhance confidence in it. Approval of a final document embodying such measures would, he believed, seal the success of the Conference.

14. Mr. ANDRES (Switzerland) said that his country's policy and actions had continued to be in conformity with the obligations it had assumed in ratifying the Convention. Switzerland did not possess or produce biological weapons and it conducted no research in that field. The Swiss army's specialized biological laboratories were concerned solely with the defence of the population. All the research on micro-organisms and toxins undertaken by the Swiss chemical industry was solely directed towards problems connected with therapeutic, prophylactic and other peaceful purposes.

15. His Government was gratified by the substantial increase in the number of States Parties to the Convention and hoped that all members of the international community would ratify it soon. The background papers prepared by the Secretariat showed that although not perfect, the Convention had proved useful in practice. The fact remained, however, that as it did not provide for genuine international control procedures each Party had to rely on the assurances of the others regarding observance of the Convention. According to experts, however, there were many possibilities for clandestine violations on a small scale and present trends in scientific and technical development were bound to increase them. The satisfactory operation of the Convention accordingly rested essentially on a climate of mutual trust. In that connection, review conferences were of crucial importance and should be convened at regular intervals. It was desirable that any problems concerning observance of the provisions of the Convention should be discussed frankly and that there should be the broadest possible exchange of views to ascertain whether allegations by States Parties were well-founded. Scientific and

technical developments and their impact on the Convention should also be discussed openly because secrecy and the monopolization of discoveries were not calculated to create a climate of mutual confidence. His delegation also believed the Conference should consider the possibility of instituting measures capable of gradually dispelling any doubts and suspicions that might exist in some quarters. His Government did not believe there was any need to amend the Convention. In the present circumstances revision would inevitably weaken its authority.

16. Chemical weapons were particularly odious and the fact that they appeared to have been used in recent conflicts was a matter of concern to the Swiss Government. The 1925 Geneva Protocol retained all its force and it was important that its provisions should be scrupulously observed by all States.

17. His Government also attached much importance to the conclusion of a Convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and hoped that the current negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament would soon be crowned with success. Such a Convention would not, however, be acceptable without an effective international control system and safeguards against the breach of commercial and industrial secrets. Costly precautionary measures to provide protection against chemical weapons would otherwise continue to be necessary and would be more difficult to justify to the public because of the false sense of security created by a ban. There would also be a strong temptation to stay outside an imperfect convention in order to maintain the option of retaining chemical weapons for defensive purposes. It was desirable also that the new convention should establish the same rights and obligations for all States. The principle of the equality of States should be observed in the field of disarmament. In the case of chemical weapons there would be no justification for the discrimination among States embodied in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

18. It should be noted that the Swiss chemical industry did not manufacture chemical weapons, that Switzerland did not possess any such weapons and that the Swiss army's equipment would be used only to protect the country against the effects of toxic chemical substances if they were used in the event of a conflict.

19. He hoped that the Review Conference would proceed in a constructive atmosphere and would produce concrete results that would strengthen the authority of the Convention in a realistic but effective manner.

20. Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) said that his country attached great importance to the Convention as a first stage in the elimination of a whole category of weapons which, by their very nature, were primarily targeted at civilian populations. The Convention was the first instrument to contain a genuine element of disarmament, since in addition to the prohibition on the development and production of bacteriological and toxin weapons it provided for the destruction of existing stocks. It ought also to facilitate the realization of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. His Government had always believed that chemical, bacteriological and toxin weapons should be regarded as a single category.

21. The current Conference should evaluate objectively the way in which the States Parties had complied with all their obligations under the Convention and indicate any measures that might be necessary to ensure more scrupulous and effective respect for both the letter and the spirit of those obligations. The Conference also provided an opportunity to determine whether the implementation of the Convention had played an effective role in halting the arms race or whether, on the contrary, the current unsatisfactory position in regard to disarmament made the full and complete implementation of the Convention's provisions more difficult.

22. It should be noted that, in its Final Declaration, the First Review Conference had concluded that the provisions of article I of the Convention had proved sufficiently comprehensive to cover recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. In his delegation's view, the latest developments on the international scene had reaffirmed that conclusion, but it considered that it would nevertheless be advisable to develop a strictly impartial, objective and international method of verification which would guarantee the equal rights and obligations of all States Parties as well as their right to participate. National and international measures would have to be combined and problems solved at the appropriate level, with a view to avoiding any political clash between States. That was the only way it would be possible to move forward any preliminary investigations that proved necessary without a permanent member of the Security Council being able to use its right of veto to prevent investigation of a complaint against it or one of its allies.

23. However, it would not be enough simply to develop detailed verification and control procedures. Efforts must also be made to facilitate the widest possible exchange of scientific and technical equipment, raw materials and information. The best means of building international confidence in that field, as in others relating to high technology, would be to set up a dynamic and non-discriminatory system of exchanges of scientific and technological information and to promote international co-operation. In the field of biotechnology which, by its very nature, influenced all the other sectors, increasingly rapid scientific and technological advances made it necessary to have wider access to the results of research. States would not otherwise be able to strengthen their technological capacity and answer the needs arising in the fields of health and food production, both of which were priority areas for the developing countries.

24. Bacteriology and microbiology had both peaceful and military applications, a duality inherent in any technology. The possibility of military applications must not be allowed to serve as a pretext for restrictions that would hamper the transfer of technology and international co-operation in that field. It would be inappropriate to place obstacles in the way of using a technology that was capable of promoting economic and social development in accordance with the needs, priorities and interests of each State. His delegation hoped that, in its Final Declaration, the Second Review Conference would recognize the urgent need to set up a system of co-operation that would enable all States to profit from the application of scientific progress, on an equal footing and with no monopolistic or protectionist restrictions, and that would facilitate the transfer of information, equipment, raw materials and knowledge to the benefit of the developing countries.

25. Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland) said that his delegation expected a great deal from the Conference, which it hoped would be the occasion of a constructive discussion and result in strengthening the Convention. It was, however, concerned by the discriminatory attitude adopted by the Western countries towards the socialist countries, an attitude that had been demonstrated at the first few meetings over the question of the just and equitable distribution of posts at the Conference. Nor could it be indifferent to the attempts of certain delegations to raise the question of alleged violations of the Convention. The allegations were totally groundless, based as they were on hearsay and antiquated and unconfirmed reports. He recalled that very detailed explanations had been given at the time in that respect. Such allegations could only be intended to undermine confidence in the Convention, thus jeopardizing its effectiveness. The Conference must eschew any action that might prevent it from being a success.

26. The Conference's main task was to strengthen and confirm the continued viability of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. As the first real disarmament measure, it was a great achievement of the world community and a reason for special satisfaction on the part of Poland. It had been Poland which, during the drafting of the Geneva Protocol in 1925, had proposed that the list of the forbidden means of war should include bacteriological weapons. As a result of that initiative, the Geneva Protocol included such a specific prohibition. During the post-war period, Poland had taken an active part in all multilateral negotiations aimed at the elimination of bacteriological and chemical weapons. In 1968, it had suggested that a report should be prepared under United Nations auspices on the consequences of the possible use of such weapons. That report, presented by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1969, had shown that bacteriological and chemical weapons were among the most abominable instruments of war. It had been favourably received in what was then the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and in the United Nations General Assembly, as a significant contribution to the negotiations for a complete ban on those weapons.

27. The 1972 Convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons was a logical continuation of the work begun with the Geneva Protocol and constituted a second important stage. Poland unreservedly supported the Convention while at the same time being actively engaged in the search for an agreement on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, thus completing the process initiated 60 years earlier by the Geneva Protocol.

28. Poland noted with satisfaction the States Parties reaffirmation of their endorsement of the Convention and their intention to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used for weapons purposes. It also welcomed the assurances given or repeated by a number of Governments regarding their compliance with the provisions of the Convention. Such statements contributed greatly to confidence-building among the States Parties. Poland for its part had complied fully with the spirit and the letter of the Convention. It had never possessed and had no intention of acquiring any bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons. Its legislation was in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention. It had taken part in and was ready to participate further in the development of mutually advantageous co-operation directed towards the peaceful application of the achievements of the biological sciences.

29. Since the First Review Conference, the number of States Parties to the Convention had increased substantially and currently included all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, during the 11 years of the Convention's existence as an international instrument with binding force, no Party had found it necessary to set in motion the procedures in article VI concerning complaints by a State Party regarding violations by another Party of obligations under the Convention. Those two circumstances should be welcomed.

30. His delegation had studied with interest the background papers submitted by the Depository and other Governments on new scientific and technological developments relating to biological and toxin weapons. It shared their common conclusion that although the potential to produce biological agents and toxins for military purposes had increased, the Convention adequately covered all recent advances in science and technology with possible military applications and remained an effective and reliable barrier to the misuse of those achievements for military purposes.

31. Poland welcomed the recent progress in negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and noted in particular the proposals of the Soviet Union, which had contributed significantly to the acceleration of those negotiations. It associated itself with those speakers who had expressed the hope that agreement would ultimately be reached on that topic. It would be an important step that would contribute to the full implementation and strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention. In sum, Poland considered that, since its entry into force, the Convention had served its essential purposes well: it had prohibited the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and it had helped greatly to stimulate the negotiations that should lead to the banning of chemical weapons.

32. Nevertheless, his delegation shared some of the concern that had been expressed by other delegations and it hoped that the current Conference would give rise to a constructive exchange of views and that it would adopt a final document aimed at enhancing the Convention. One of the first things that should be done was to call upon all States which were not yet parties to the Convention and the Geneva Protocol to accede to those instruments. The Conference might also clearly reaffirm that the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons in the Convention applied to all bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins currently being produced or to be developed in the future which could be used for hostile purposes. It should also be stressed and generally accepted that recent achievements in genetics, molecular biology and biotechnology not only did not undermine the comprehensive prohibitions in the Convention but on the contrary further enhanced their general value and importance. At the national level, adequate domestic legislation and regulatory measures should be adopted to prevent the misuse of bacteriological agents by individuals, groups or organizations. It would perhaps be advisable to include a warning in textbooks on genetics, microbiology and related sciences that the production and possession of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for any warlike purpose was a violation of international and domestic law and liable to lead to prosecution. Such a measure would promote the purposes of the Convention and would contribute to United Nations efforts on behalf of education for peace. There was also a need to reflect seriously on the risks inherent in the

current stage of development of the biological sciences and to define the necessary safeguards and guidelines for biological research in order to prevent possible accidents. Lastly, agreement should be reached on ways and means of international co-operation if there should be an accident.

33. International co-operation in the field of the biological sciences was still far from satisfactory. The exchange of information amongst States Parties should be facilitated, there should be more tangible and direct co-operation, free from any political or protectionist restrictions, and technical assistance should be expanded, especially to developing countries. It would then be seen that, in addition to its undeniable positive impact on international security, the Convention could also serve to promote development and contribute to the increase of agricultural production as well as improved health protection and nutrition in many parts of the world.

34. In his delegation's opinion, the machinery for consultation and co-operation among the States Parties provided for in article V was sufficiently flexible to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention. Poland was, however, ready to consider any realistic and constructive ideas based on the existing text of the Convention which would lead to the improvement of that machinery, although it emphasized that one of the best means of eliminating suspicion and ensuring that all States Parties complied with their obligations under the Convention would be the further development of scientific and technological co-operation among States.

35. The Review Conference also provided a useful opportunity for reflection on the meaning of the Convention. The Convention was a significant achievement, which had proved first of all that multilateral efforts based on real political will could lead to genuine disarmament measures. It proved also that such measures did increase the security of each and every nation. Nobody could deny that all States would feel less secure if the Convention had not been signed. The present generation could be proud of great scientific achievements. It was, however, the duty of disarmament negotiators to make every effort to prevent the use of those achievements for hostile purposes. What society most needed was the demilitarization of science. That was essential if the development of civilization was not to lead to its destruction.

36. Unfortunately there was a growing trend towards use of the basic and applied sciences for military purposes, as was shown by the growth of the military share in research and development expenditure. The Convention proved however that the misuse of scientific advances could be restrained and confirmed the wisdom of preventive action in that respect. The Convention was a good example which should be followed in other scientific fields, on earth and in outer space.

37. Finally, despite the commitment of States Parties under the preamble to achieve effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, the Convention was still one of the very few multilateral arms limitation agreements concluded over the last 15 years. That was a sad fact which should be pondered by participants in the Conference.

38. Mr. HAYES (Ireland) said that the Convention was the first real measure of disarmament to have been negotiated by the community of nations. It was the only agreement in force in which the Parties were required to forego possession as well as use of an entire category of weapons. The Convention had been subscribed to by 103 nations and his Government urged other nations to do so.

39. During the six years since the First Review Conference, there had been rapid technological and scientific developments. The Conference should therefore carefully and objectively examine how to promote improved implementation of all the provisions of the Convention in a new context. In that connection the United Kingdom representative had already outlined the general principles underlying the attitudes of the 12 member States of the European Community at the Conference. He endorsed the United Kingdom representative's remarks and wished to focus on a few issues of particular concern to his country.

40. He pointed out that article I permitted the development, production and stockpiling of biological agents or toxins for "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes". The Convention had, however, been drawn up before the development of genetic engineering, a field in which advances had been unexpectedly rapid. Although his Government believed that recent developments in that field continued to fall within the scope of article I, it recognized that they had led to fears of misuse which, whether justified or not, must be taken into consideration by the Conference.

41. Moreover, over a number of years, allegations of non-compliance had raised serious doubts about the credibility of the Convention. His delegation believed that unless means were found to deal objectively with such allegations, erosion of the authority of the Convention might well be inevitable. It would be recalled that at the First Review Conference much attention had been paid to the question of better compliance measures in the Convention. The measures considered included possible amendments such as the establishment of a consultative committee that might undertake on-site inspections. With other countries Ireland had in the past advocated a special conference to establish flexible, objective and non-discriminatory procedures to deal with issues concerning compliance. The Second Review Conference was not the forum to amend the convention but it might pave the way towards a special conference at which such issues could be addressed.

42. Among the valuable suggestions already made regarding ways of restoring confidence in the Convention and ensuring compliance, one deserving special attention was the proposal that all States Parties should declare the number and location of high-containment laboratories under their jurisdiction, such as those working with highly virulent microbes. Other suggestions made by delegations or by interested non-governmental organizations also deserved the most careful consideration. He hoped that the Conference's final declaration would not only reaffirm the Convention's validity but would also reflect the States Parties common commitment to undertake measures to promote confidence in the application of its provisions.

43. Mr. KOCHUBEI (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Convention had operated with success for over 10 years. It was an important multilateral agreement and a barrier to bacteriological warfare. It was thus

the first genuine measure of disarmament in history. The Convention proved that disarmament was possible provided States had the political will to achieve it. The Convention was in itself the product of the efforts of progressive forces.

44. The initiative taken by the USSR and the other socialist States to promote disarmament within the United Nations, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament, should be recalled. On 15 January 1986 the USSR had introduced a declaration directed towards ridding the planet of weapons of massive destruction by the year 2000. On 18 August 1986, Mr. Gorbachev had also proposed to extend his country's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests until 1 January 1987. Those actions were proof of the seriousness and sincerity of the USSR's efforts to achieve disarmament. It was therefore the more regrettable that the United States did not follow that example. By continuing tests in Nevada the United States was preventing progress in disarmament in the realm of deeds rather than of propaganda. At the forty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the USSR was going to present a global programme for international security with the support of the other socialist States. The programme would be designed to realize humanity's age-old dream of beating swords into ploughshares.

45. Since its entry into force, the Convention had shown itself to be a viable agreement. During the years that had elapsed since the First Review Conference, there had been 16 new accessions, bringing the total number of States Parties to 103. The new accessions included those of permanent members of the Security Council. In its final document, the Second Conference should appeal to other countries to accede to the Convention.

46. His delegation noted with satisfaction that no State had invoked the complaints procedure provided in the Convention. For its part his country fully respected its commitments. In particular, in accordance with article X, it was participating in the application of biology for peaceful purposes, in industry, agriculture, animal husbandry, environmental protection etc. A scientific programme initiated in Ukraine by the Institute of Microbiology and Virology of the Academy of Sciences dealt with the contamination of foodstuffs and animal feed. Since 1981 his country had organized seminars on the peaceful applications of biology for foreign students under programmes sponsored by UNDP, FAO and WHO. His country was anxious that the Second Conference should facilitate the expansion of co-operation between States in the peaceful uses of biology.

47. Article IX called for negotiations with a view to prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The socialist countries had always called for the prohibition of such weapons and had supported a programme for their elimination by the end of the present century. More recently, on 24 April 1986 the USSR had proposed a programme of control measures concerning the destruction of chemical weapons and the installations in which they were made. In an interview on 8 September 1986, with the Czech newspaper Rude Pravo, Mr. Gorbachev had expressed the hope that an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons would be concluded at an early date. Unfortunately, the United States was simultaneously intensifying its chemical weapons programme, notably by developing binary weapons, an action completely contrary to the content of the Geneva agreements

between the Soviet Union and United States of America. In that context he expressed the hope that the final document of the Second Conference would urge States to abstain from any act hampering the preparation and ratification of a convention banning chemical weapons.

48. He deplored the allegations made by certain States parties concerning alleged violations of the Convention. Such allegations were made solely for propaganda purposes. They weakened the Convention and were a regrettable example of the policy of confrontation followed by the Western countries. In a complex international situation, everything should be done to strengthen the authority of the Convention. For its part his Government would contribute constructively to the achievement of the Convention's goals and to the success of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 15 September 1986, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. LANG (Austria)

CONTENTS

Programme of work

Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its article XII

(a) General debate (continued)

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GE.86-64224/4420E

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 9)

1. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee recommended that the Committee of the Whole should review the various articles and provisions of the Convention under agenda items 10 (b), 10 (c) and 11. The Drafting Committee should undertake the task of preparing the draft final document of the Conference including the final declaration for submission to the plenary. The General Committee further recommended that the Committee of the Whole should make every effort to conclude its work on Friday 19 September and adopt at least some parts of its report by that date. At the latest, the Committee of the Whole should meet early on the morning of Monday 22 September to complete its work and adopt the remaining parts of its report. The Drafting Committee should begin its work at 3 p.m. on Monday 22 September and conclude it by the end of the morning of Thursday 25 September at the latest. A plenary meeting of the Conference would be held on Tuesday 23 September to take note of the report of the Committee of the Whole. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt those recommendations.

2. It was so decided.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE XII
(agenda item 10)

(a) GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

3. Mr. EKEUS (Sweden) said that the adoption of the Convention had coincided with a turning point in biological science, marked by, among other things, the introduction of genetic engineering. Since then, newly developed technologies had created a number of technical possibilities for a new and potent generation of biological and toxin weapons. At the same time, owing in part to the inadequacy of the control procedures in the Convention, confidence that such capabilities would not be developed or introduced into the arsenals of nations had tended to be eroded. His Government's detailed views on those technological developments had been forwarded to the Secretary-General and were available to delegations in document BWC/CONF.II/4.

4. Those developments underlined the validity and importance of the Convention and pointed to the urgency of continued commitment to its provisions, as well as the need to enhance its implementation and strengthen its authority. The Conference's final declaration should contain clear undertakings to that effect. It was essential also that the Conference should express an understanding that the technical developments that had taken place since the First Review Conference still fell within the scope of the Convention.

5. Rapid technological development would undoubtedly continue and would need careful monitoring. The Convention should, therefore, continue to be periodically reviewed at fairly short intervals. The obvious need to strengthen the Convention, not least in respect of the verification and complaints procedures, also made it necessary to continue to review the Convention's operation. The Final Declaration should, therefore, contain a clear commitment to hold a third review conference.

6. Progress in biology and biotechnology also pointed to the importance of article X of the Convention and the commitment by States Parties to facilitate international co-operation for peaceful purposes. His Government was actively sponsoring biotechnological research and co-operation in several developing countries, with a focus on the improvement of agricultural production and health care. It was also taking part in international programmes in those areas through a number of international organizations.

7. The close relationship between biological and chemical weapons was recognized in the preamble to the Convention and further underlined in article IX. His delegation was gratified that considerable progress had been made in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and that it now appeared realistic to envisage the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention before too long. It was urgent, therefore, that the final declaration should strongly reiterate the commitment of the States Parties to negotiate in good faith and to reach early agreement on a convention on chemical weapons.

8. In order to limit the risk of rapid technological development creating uncertainties about the adequacy of the Convention or compliance with it, various strengthening measures should be agreed to in the final declaration. Measures to enhance the exchange of information concerning activities not prohibited by the Convention could serve to prevent unnecessary doubts and suspicions which might undermine the Convention's authority. Such measures could include declarations of the location and operating authorities of all high-containment laboratories. The expansion of such laboratories as well as the modernization of their equipment might also be reported. The location of all proving or testing grounds used for biological weapons before the entry into force of the Convention could be declared, as well as proving or testing grounds still in use, or planned, for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Information could be provided concerning the orientation of relevant research programmes in bio-science. There should be active promotion of contact between scientists in relevant fields, including visits to laboratories and other facilities. Information should be provided speedily on unusual outbreaks of disease as well as epidemics occurring in the vicinity of high-containment facilities.

9. The inclusion of such voluntary measures in the final declaration would strengthen the Convention's authority and their application would help to build confidence among the States Parties. Their adoption would also make it possible to test what might become elements of a future more developed and systematic form of data exchange. Since militarily significant quantities tended to grow ever smaller, future measures for the exchange of information ought to cover both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of possible biological weapon agents.

10. Although data exchange might prevent or minimize misconceptions and ambiguities, only well-functioning procedures for consultations and complaints could ensure confidence once doubts and suspicions had actually arisen. During the negotiation of the Convention, Sweden and many other States had expressed concern about the consultation and complaints procedures and Sweden's delay in signing and ratifying the Convention had largely been caused by doubts regarding the viability of those procedures. Since then, in particular at the First Review Conference, his delegation had stressed the unsatisfactory nature of the relevant provisions. Together with other

delegations, it had proposed at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly (in resolution 37/98 C) that a special conference should be convened to create a flexible, objective and non-discriminatory procedure to deal with issues relating to compliance with the Convention. Unfortunately, no such conference had yet taken place, but his delegation welcomed the opportunity provided by the current Conference to consider those questions.

11. Currently, under article VI, a State Party was entitled to lodge complaints about breaches of the Convention with the Security Council of the United Nations. Notwithstanding the possibility of consultations under article V, only the Security Council had a clearly expressed right to initiate investigations into alleged breaches. The permanent members of the Council might, however, seek to veto inquiries concerning the nature of suspected activities. It was important, therefore, that States Parties should make a serious effort to reach an understanding on concrete procedures that could be applied under article V to make co-operation between States with regard to fact-finding and control more effective. One possibility that should be further explored was that of employing the services of the Secretary-General. Another way to enhance existing procedures would be for the Conference to address the question of more specific tasks for the consultative meeting that had been agreed upon at the First Review Conference.

12. Under article V, States Parties undertook to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems in relation to the application of the Convention and its objectives. As stated in the preamble, the Convention's objectives included the complete elimination of the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons. The preamble also contained references to the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. A clear link was thus established between the consultation provisions of article V and the objective of the non-use of biological weapons. The confirmed use of biological weapons would be a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and would also violate the Convention since it would be contrary to its objectives and since the use of such weapons would necessarily imply a violation of the ban on developing, producing, stockpiling or otherwise acquiring or retaining them.

13. A procedure had been set up within the United Nations which could permit the Secretary-General to investigate alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol. A simple machinery had been established under General Assembly resolutions 37/98 B and 39/65 E, based upon lists of qualified experts and laboratories available to the Secretary-General for such investigations. A technical procedure had also been worked out by a group of qualified experts.

14. His delegation recognized that the resolutions in question had not been wholly non-controversial. It believed, however, that the procedures outlined in them were helpful and would, if applied, support and strengthen the control procedures of the Convention. In the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Secretary-General had carried out investigations at the request of one of the parties to the conflict regarding the alleged, and subsequently confirmed, use of chemical weapons without invoking the machinery in the resolutions. Thus, in case of a request for investigation, the Secretary-General could choose between two slightly different procedures, both of which gave him a vital role in matters of compliance in connection with biological weapons. The important

conclusion was that it was recognized that the Secretary-General had the right and the ability to carry out investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons as well as biological weapons. The Conference could agree in its final declaration that, if a violation of the prohibition of the use of biological weapons was confirmed through an investigation on the initiative of the Secretary-General, he should report to the States Parties. Such a procedure would be consistent with the provisions of article V.

15. At the First Review Conference, the States Parties had agreed that the provisions of article V included the right of any State Party to request the convening of a consultative meeting at the expert level. That had been a step in the right direction and it should be possible to develop that understanding further at the current Conference. First, it should be confirmed in the final declaration that such a consultative meeting could also be convened by the Secretary-General on the request of a State Party. It should also be clearly stated that the meeting could consider complaints and suggest ways and means for further clarifying any matter regarded as ambiguous or unresolved. Each State Party should undertake to co-operate with the consultative meeting in considering complaints and clarifying ambiguous and unresolved matters. The convening of a consultative meeting should not necessarily need to be preceded by bilateral consultations. Lastly, an understanding should be reached and registered in the final declaration that the consultative meeting should be free to bring to the Secretary-General's attention information concerning acts that might constitute a breach of the obligations deriving from the convention and to ask him, with the assistance of experts, to ascertain the facts following the procedures available to him. The States Parties should undertake to co-operate with him in such investigations.

16. Those ideas were solidly based on the provisions of article V and the considerations in respect of that article in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference. They did not preclude improving the Convention through amendments. They did, however, constitute some practical steps that could be taken within the framework of the existing régime and, in his delegation's opinion, should be adopted by the current Review Conference. They could then be tried out, while at the same time States Parties could consider how the shortcomings of the Convention could be dealt with more thoroughly. Some new provisions and legal undertakings could be contemplated, their form depending on the substance of the changes or additions. Their preparation could be a task for a special conference or a future review conference preceded by detailed preparatory work. Such work could take place in a series of preparatory committees at the expert level or in a committee of experts. In that context, the development of the negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons should be kept in view. More detailed and legally binding improvements of the Convention should probably await the outcome of those negotiations. However, a forward-looking formulation in the final declaration was already called for. Pending actual reform, the Convention could be strengthened and its implementation enhanced through informal undertakings of the kind proposed.

17. Mr. BAYART (Mongolian People's Republic) said that in the system of treaties connected with disarmament the Convention took pride of place. It had removed a whole category of one of the most perilous types of weapon from possible use and was the first real disarmament measure, proving that world disarmament was fully realizable. A number of speakers had already expressed

satisfaction at the implementation of the Convention and spoken in favour of further strengthening it. Since its entry into force, no State Party had resorted to the complaints procedure and the number of adherents had expanded to over 100, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Such support showed that the Convention was being strictly observed and that it was capable of continuing to contribute to the cause of peace and international security. His delegation welcomed all the new adherents and appealed to those States which had not yet done so to accede to the Convention as soon as possible.

18. His country had consistently supported a system of universal international treaties for curbing the arms race, and in particular banning nuclear weapons. It had been active at the First Review Conference, had contributed to the preparation of the Convention itself, and had been one of the first States to sign and ratify it. The Mongolian People's Republic had never produced or acquired biological weapons and possessed none of the means referred to in article I of the Convention nor was it engaged in any research which might be directed towards their creation.

19. He reaffirmed his delegation's support for the principles and purposes of the Convention and urged that the final declaration of the Second Review Conference should call on all States Parties to continue to fulfil the obligations they had assumed under it. The Conference should aim at strengthening the Convention further and enhancing its prestige and in particular it should seek to build confidence among the States Parties. The assertions of one delegation in regard to alleged breaches of the Convention were completely at variance with that purpose. Such groundless accusations were designed to cast a shadow on the Convention rather than to strengthen its effectiveness and prestige.

20. His delegation attached great importance to the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. The negotiations on such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament had reached a decisive stage. The prohibition of such weapons was recognized as an objective of the Convention in article IX and that goal had been repeatedly reaffirmed in resolutions of the regular sessions of the General Assembly and at the first Special Session on Disarmament. It was the duty of the current Review Conference to speak out in favour of the early conclusion of the negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons.

21. The Convention left no loopholes for the use of the advances of biological science for other than peaceful purposes. Its faithful implementation would guarantee the successful development of international co-operation for the promotion of peaceful uses. In that way, the current advances of science and technology would be fully directed to the cause of peace and progress throughout the world.

22. Mr. IMAI (Japan) said that the Convention was an important link in the world's overall disarmament régime and a major contribution in the field of non-nuclear disarmament. As well as prohibiting the retention of all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery, the Convention required their destruction. That was a notable achievement and the validity of the Convention on that point, as well as trust in it, should be maintained for a long time.

23. Remarkable progress had been achieved in recent years in biotechnology, in particular genetic engineering. However, serious questions of ethics arose with the development of such new technology and it was the responsibility of mankind not to subject the new capabilities to random use and manipulation but to ensure that they were used exclusively for the good of the world.

24. It was in that perspective that the Conference should reconfirm and build upon the results of the First Review Conference and, through a forward-looking examination of the issues, reach agreement on the measures needed to maintain and strengthen the Convention. If the Convention could be improved as a result of the second review process it would give additional impetus to the negotiations on the closely related and very important subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons, on which much hard work had already been done, in particular in the Conference on Disarmament.

25. Japan had ratified the Convention in June 1982. It had developed a high level of expertise in biotechnology but it was at the same time solemnly committed to utilizing those capabilities solely for peaceful purposes.

26. In his delegation's view, the provisions of article I, defining the scope of the prohibition, were sufficiently comprehensive to cover recent rapid advances in biotechnology. Regarding article IV on implementing measures, he noted that Japan had enacted implementing legislation when it ratified the Convention in 1982 and had every intention of abiding by its obligations. Article V was extremely important for ensuring the effective implementation of the Convention. Further consideration should be given to that issue, therefore, on the basis of the results of the First Review Conference. It was conceivable, for instance, that research and experiments in biology could be conducted in facilities that did not meet the standards defined by WHO, or that the use of equivalent facilities might not be limited to biological research purposes. It was important to note that the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference had recognized the right of any State Party to request that a consultative meeting should be convened at the expert level as one of the appropriate international procedures referred to in article V. The matter should be further explored so that a procedure could be worked out for convening such consultative meetings, which would then become part of the practical arrangements for implementation.

27. While there should be a full examination of the various articles in order to strengthen the Convention, at the same time some basic confidence-building measures should be contemplated in order to enhance trust among the States Parties. It was often said that advances in biotechnology had made the verification of compliance with the Convention increasingly complicated and technically difficult. That being so, it was imperative not to jeopardize the basic trust among the States Parties. His delegation would make active efforts to that end so that the Conference could achieve concrete and effective results.

28. There were more than 100 States Parties to the Convention, somewhat fewer than in the case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, but on a par with the other major agreement in the field of non-nuclear disarmament, the 1925 Geneva Protocol. He welcomed the recent adherence of China and France to the Convention and called on all States not yet parties to it to accede to the Convention so that it could be universally accepted.

29. Biological weapons systems had long been regarded as a rather subsidiary issue when compared with some others. However, given the recent rapid advances in science and technology, they would be increasingly important in the future. Those States which had the requisite scientific and technological capabilities should take particular heed of that aspect so that the purposes of the Convention could be effectively fulfilled. That was especially true of the Soviet Union and the United States, which together possessed the majority of nuclear weapons as well as overwhelming superiority in the field of non-nuclear weapons. They had special responsibilities, therefore, and a particularly important role to play. He noted in conclusion that it was only on the basis of serious and unquestionable records of the implementation by them of all the Convention's provisions that the world would be able to realize the full potential embodied in that instrument.

30. Mr. PESHKOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics) said that in the present critical phase in the history of mankind, the political will of all countries was required to exclude any possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction. On 15 January 1986, the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had approved principles for the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security covering the destruction of all such weapons by the year 2000. The socialist countries had proposed that the forty-first session of the General Assembly should consider the creation of such a system - a suggestion which was widely supported by public opinion in all countries.

31. The Biological Weapons Convention provided a model for the solution of practical problems in the field of disarmament. The Conference's main task was to strengthen the Convention by increasing the number of States Parties to it and by ensuring strict observance of its provisions. In that connection, articles III and IV, concerning the relationship of States Parties with third countries, constituted crucial safeguards against covert infractions of the Convention.

32. There had been many references to the usefulness of article X in harnessing the advances in the biological sciences for economic and social progress in all countries, including the developing countries. In that connection, his delegation deplored the fabrication of allegations regarding the possible misuse of international co-operation. Such rumours were designed to undermine the Convention.

33. With regard to the implementation of article IX, the Soviet Union had recently made specific proposals at the Conference on Disarmament which should make it possible for a convention on chemical weapons to be signed by early 1987.

34. In its final document, the Conference should affirm the purposes of the Convention and reiterate the determination of States parties faithfully to observe the commitments they had undertaken, with which his own country for its part, fully complied. All countries should appreciate the Convention's contribution to international security both at the present time and in the future.

35. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia) recalled that his country had co-sponsored the draft Convention on Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1971.

36. The timely adoption of the Convention constituted a solid guarantee that advances in the biological sciences were used solely for peaceful purposes. The Conference's main purpose was to ensure that it would continue to do so. The twenty-first century might well come to be called the century of biology in view of the many applications of the biological sciences for medical purposes. All Czechoslovak research activities in that field were in full compliance with the Convention, one of their aims being the prevention of infectious diseases. His country did not possess facilities for producing and maintaining highly infectious agents and toxins on a large scale nor did it engage in gene manipulations to render current biological agents more effective for military use. It had never possessed biological or toxin weapons and had no intention of developing or acquiring them. Strict compliance with the Convention was assured by appropriate legislation. The increasing number of States becoming Parties to the Convention and the fact that no Party had had recourse to the complaints procedure contained in article VI were proof of the Convention's viability. Giving a number of examples of Czechoslovakia's participation on both a bilateral and multilateral basis in co-operation in peaceful uses of biological sciences in accordance with article X of the Convention. He said that the wide development of such co-operation could contribute towards further strengthening the Convention. It was true that new methods of turning non-pathogenic bacteria into virulent agents were open to the danger of misuse for military purposes but in his delegation's view the Convention covered all the achievements of recent scientific and technological progress.

37. His delegation did not share the preoccupations of some delegations with regard to compliance. Czechoslovak experts had found the materials submitted in that regard far from convincing and his delegation considered that the spreading of unsubstantiated rumours was harmful to the authority of the Convention. His delegation believe the Convention had been fully complied with and favoured preserving the existing procedure for ensuring compliance. Although articles V and VI were sufficiently flexible to resolve any issues which might arise, his delegation was ready to consider constructively any proposals to reinforce the control mechanism of the Convention. The only criterion Czechoslovakia would apply in judging specific proposals was whether they could contribute effectively to ensuring compliance with all the provisions of the Convention in the spirit of confidence and mutual co-operation between States Parties.

38. His delegation fully subscribed to the general opinion that the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention would have a positive effect on the functioning of the Convention. Czechoslovakia was actively participating in the work of the ad hoc Committee for Chemical Weapons and was also prepared to undertake regional measures which could assist in the achievement of global chemical disarmament. His country welcomed the recent constructive proposals advanced in the Conference on Disarmament by the Soviet delegation.

39. In conclusion, he noted with satisfaction that over 100 countries were States Parties to the Convention and expressed the hope that other countries would adhere to it.

40. Mr. KHERAD (Afghanistan) hoped the Conference would encourage States which had not yet adhered to the Convention to do so without delay. That would make a significant contribution to reinforcing it, since every new Party to the Convention decreased the chances of its being violated and thus promoted international détente. The Convention was the logical outcome of the work begun by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and had contributed to the general disarmament process by its timely prohibition of the development of a heinous category of weapons.

41. Since its adoption, the Convention had indisputably operated effectively as was proved by the fact that so far 103 States had adhered to the Convention while no State had ever invoked its right to withdraw under article XIII. The Conference could put on record that the basic provisions of the Convention had been faithfully observed and that no event had occurred from which it could be concluded that its provisions had been violated. The fact that there had been no complaint about the use of biological weapons was evidence of the Convention's validity. At the same time, the Convention in no way constituted a brake on advances of the biological sciences for peaceful purposes. There was an intensive exchange of information in that field which might be expected to increase. Such activity had not provided an opportunity for violating or circumventing the Convention. In view of the well balanced provisions on obligations and control procedures, it was unnecessary to consider any supplementary measures or modification of the Convention which would simply serve to undermine it as did certain unfounded allegations which the Conference should condemn for that reason.

42. Another positive element of the Convention was the commitment under article IX to the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was more urgent than ever. Negotiations on the subject should soon be crowned with success if there was the requisite political will.

43. His country was committed to the promotion of peace and security for all States, general disarmament and international co-operation and accordingly attached great importance to all practical proposals, including those of the Soviet Union, aimed at halting the arms race. Afghanistan strictly observed the obligations it had assumed under the Convention. The only rational way of conducting world affairs was to advance along the road to détente and disarmament and the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems. The current deterioration of the international situation made it increasingly important to find effective ways of limiting the arms race by categorically banning weapons of mass destruction.

44. Finally, with regard to a further review conference, his delegation considered that such conferences could be useful and was prepared to examine any constructive proposal on that subject.

45. Mr. POSAYANOND (Thailand) said that his country had become a State Party to the Convention in 1975 and continued to place the highest value upon it. More recently, his delegation had sponsored General Assembly resolution 39/65 D, calling for the convening of a preparatory committee to prepare the current Second Review Conference. It believed that the Convention was the first real measure of disarmament to be negotiated internationally and that it had made and continued to make an important contribution to

international security and to the strengthening of mutual trust among nations. It also provided a standard by which the actions of alleged violators of the Convention could be judged and condemned. It further committed the States Parties not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire such agents in quantities not justified by peaceful purposes.

46. His delegation believed that the Convention could be made more effective by increased support for information sharing and for speedy on-site international investigations of allegations of the improper use of toxic agents. As a neighbour of Kampuchea, Thailand was deeply concerned that the deployment of biological or chemical weapons in the conflict there might directly threaten its own security and also pose a threat to the lives and livelihood of a large number of Indo-Chinese refugees and Thai civilians living near the border. It was also deeply concerned lest additional countries might be contemplating the development of biological weapons programmes, perhaps in part owing to the lack of international concern about alleged violations.

47. His delegation urged all States Parties to adhere strictly to the letter and spirit of the Convention and to work towards complete disarmament under effective international control. Although there were already more than 100 States Parties to the Convention, it could be made more universal. All countries which had not yet become parties to the Convention should be urged to take immediate action to accede to it and thereby enhance its value and strength still further. The Convention should be taken as an example and a guide in the current negotiations on a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, thus helping to bring them to a successful and speedy conclusion.

48. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) observed that, whatever its imperfections, the Convention was the first international instrument of real disarmament in that its objective was the total elimination of biological and toxin weapons. In its final declaration, the Conference should unequivocally reaffirm the obligations contracted under the convention. It should also encourage all States to become parties in accordance with article XIV, paragraph 1.

49. He noted that the recent publication of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) entitled "Biological and Toxic Weapons of Today" concluded that since it was difficult to amend a multinational convention and in the case under consideration it was not desirable to blur the clarity of the comprehensive basic prohibition, the main hope lay in informal measures taken by the States Parties by consensus or even unilaterally. For example the Soviet Union might be more flexible, open and persuasive in order to re-establish confidence and the United States might be more careful about accusations of violations by other States Parties and with regard to its own militarily financed programme of secret research. There should be a distinction between unofficial accusations appearing in the media and the official sponsorship of such accusations. The promulgation of domestic legislation in accordance with article IV would also be a sign of renewed commitment to the Convention. Finally, the conclusion of a parallel convention on chemical weapons would be useful. As it had made clear, both at the time it signed the Convention and at the First Review Conference, the Mexican Government fully endorsed that last recommendation, in respect of

article IX. Although progress had been made in the negotiations, particularly on technical aspects, some basic problems, mostly of a political nature, still remained with regard to decision-making and verification procedures. While acknowledging the complexity of the subject, his delegation could not refrain from voicing its impatience at the failure to comply with an obligation contracted over a decade ago. It again exhorted the negotiating parties, particularly the main possessors of chemical weapons, to demonstrate the necessary political will to achieve an agreement that would strengthen the Convention under review.

50. Mr. TEJA (India) recalled that India, which had never possessed bacteriological or toxin weapons, had ratified the Convention in 1974. It would continue to observe both the letter and spirit of the instrument. The unique importance of the Convention was universally acknowledged and India looked upon it as a step towards disarmament measures relating to nuclear weapons, which were even more dangerous and morally repugnant.

51. With regard to article I, the Convention had so far fulfilled its purpose. It should be regarded in conjunction with, and as an extension of, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the absence in it of a specific prohibition in it of the use of biological and toxin weapons was covered by the prohibition in that Protocol. It was recognized that the relatively quick adoption of the Convention had been partly due to the limitation at that time on the military utility of such methods of warfare. The situation had since changed considerably and problems might emerge from the misuse of recent scientific advances in genetic engineering and from research on quick-acting agents which were similar in their effect to conventional weapons. The danger of dual-purpose use was therefore likely to persist in the future, based on the fear that the distinction between research and development was rather tenuous. India would be against any attempt by a State Party to interpret the provisions of the Convention narrowly and to pursue offensive military research in the guise of peaceful research and development. However, it believed that article I was comprehensive enough to cover recent scientific and technological developments.

52. With regard to the concern expressed by many representatives about the inadequacy of the compliance and verification machinery, his delegation would support a practical, non-discriminatory and universally applicable system which might be agreed by consensus for strengthening the existing machinery.

53. Regarding article IX, it was a matter for regret that chemical weapons were still included in the arsenals of some countries and had been used on a large scale in warfare in the past two decades. Fortunately, there had been some promising developments in the efforts to reach agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament. It was to be hoped that those efforts would lead to the early conclusion of a convention on the banning of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Special responsibility in that regard rested with States which had amassed large quantities of such weapons.

54. His delegation had carefully studied the reports by States Parties on compliance with their obligations under the Convention. In that connection, he stressed that the gap between the developed and developing countries in the

availability of information on the use of biotechnology and genetic engineering for peaceful purposes had further widened since 1980. A routine call for the free flow of information and transfer of technology would not result in any improvement of the implementation of article X. Most of the scientific and technological information in the area was in private hands and would be transferred only for profit, if at all. Ongoing researches in those areas were highly classified industrial secrets. Institutional ways and means should therefore be sought of assuring co-operation between the developed and developing countries through the intervention of the States Parties to the Convention. In that connection, he referred to the setting up of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology in New Delhi and Trieste. States Parties to the Convention should associate themselves actively with those institutions.

55. His delegation wished to reiterate its understanding that the objective of the Convention was to eliminate biological and toxin weapons, thereby excluding completely the possibility of their use. Exemptions in regard to biological agents or toxins permitted for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes should not create a loophole regarding the production or retention of biological and toxin weapons. In the final declaration, his delegation wished to see the 1925 Geneva Protocol safeguarded and the inseparable link maintained between the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons. His delegation hoped that the Conference would help to ensure that scientific and technological advances were used exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind.

56. Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted with satisfaction that all the delegations participating in the discussion had agreed on the vital need to strengthen the 1972 Convention and to implement the States Parties' obligation to achieve an effective ban on chemical weapons in the near future.

57. Unfortunately, there had also been echoes during the discussion of a certain unfounded "concern" regarding compliance with the Convention, although only the United States delegation had spoken more or less specifically on that point. The reference was to allegations of Soviet Union involvement in a programme of offensive bacteriological weapons - allegations which were mere inventions from beginning to end. Had the United States had any serious doubts as to compliance with the Convention the United States delegation would have shown some interest in the Soviet Union's readiness to give appropriate explanations at the meeting held on 10 September 1986 with a Soviet expert. His delegation shared the view expressed by many other delegations that unfounded statements directly impaired the authority of the Convention.

58. The view had been expressed by numerous delegations that the Convention was not endowed with sufficiently reliable control mechanisms. The Soviet Union delegation, for its part, was prepared to join in the search for a mutually acceptable compromise on the whole set of problems discussed at the present Conference, including the issue of controls.

59. Concrete proposals on that point had been put forward by many delegations and deserved careful examination. Some of them called for the assumption of additional international legal obligations by the States Parties. On that

point the Soviet Union had initiated a formal proposal to work out and adopt a supplementary protocol to the Convention which would contain measures to strengthen the control machinery. Obviously, preparatory work would be needed and his delegation was prepared to join in that task.

60. His delegation concurred with the Swedish proposal for the holding of a conference at an appropriate time.

61. In conclusion, he felt certain that all those delegations really interested in enhancing the Convention and in strengthening its verification mechanisms would support his delegation's proposal.

62. Mr. BASSOY (Turkey) said that Turkey had become a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol as early as 1929 and had become a party to the 1972 Convention in 1974. His delegation welcomed the unqualified declarations of States Parties to the Convention concerning their full compliance with articles I, II and III. Turkey for its part had never disposed of, produced, developed or stockpiled any biological or toxin weapons or ever transferred any such weapons to a third party. All research in micro-organisms and toxins conducted in Turkey was directed towards medical therapy and disease prevention.

63. Certain reports or allegations about violations of the provisions of the Convention which would, if founded, contravene the undertakings of the parties to the Convention, provided further proof of the need for an adequate mechanism through which such complaints could be investigated. Another disturbing fact was the non-accession to the Convention of countries located in the so-called "tension areas". He would accordingly urge such countries to accede to the Convention as soon as practicable. It should be borne in mind that the decontamination process of a biological weapons test area used in the years of the Second World War had yet to be completed.

64. His delegation was committed to a successful Review Conference and would do its best to work out a consensus on a final declaration that was satisfactory to all the parties and answered the expectations of public opinion.

65. Lastly, his delegation would support any proposals seeking some kind of institutionalization of co-operation and technical assistance in the peaceful uses of biotechnology within the United Nations system.

66. Mr. ter HORST (Venezuela) said that his Government attached the greatest importance to the 1972 Convention which represented the only genuine and effective disarmament measure so far adopted. The Convention served to avoid the re-introduction of biological weapons into military arsenals as well as the diversion to military purposes of the results of scientific and technological progress. His delegation considered that the Convention had not constituted, and did not constitute, any obstacle to the scientific progress of mankind. There had been no shortage of scientific and technological advances since 1972. As far as Venezuela was concerned, they had all been intended for peaceful purposes.

67. The development of new techniques in genetic engineering had revolutionized the search for solutions to the many problems faced by modern society. Venezuela attached the greatest importance to the enhancement of international co-operation for peaceful ends in those fields. While it was true that some of the technological developments in the matter were capable of utilization for military purposes, there had so far been no clear evidence of such misuse. The broad and general character of the Convention enabled it to cover fully the new biological agents and toxins which had been discovered recently.

68. His delegation agreed on the need to continue to monitor compliance with the Convention. In that connection, he reiterated his delegation's view, expressed at the First Review Conference, that article VI of the Convention needed to be supplemented with a mechanism to facilitate consultation and co-operation among the States Parties, and to provide for the speedy investigation of any situations or problems which might arise regarding compliance with the Convention.

69. He had heard with interest the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union delegation and looked forward to a more detailed explanation.

70. His delegation shared the concern of other delegations regarding the inadequacy of the complaints procedure under the Convention. The Conference should consider the possibility of improving the procedure in the light of the provisions of other international instruments.

71. He gave an assurance that Venezuela was not carrying out any activity contrary to the Convention. His country did not possess, and had no intention of acquiring, any of the weapons or materials mentioned in the Convention. Research in the field of biology and bacteriology by Venezuelan scientific institutions was directed exclusively to peaceful purposes.

72. With regard to article IX, his delegation welcomed the progress being made in the Conference on Disarmament. Negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons showed that there was a general desire to conclude a convention on a chemical weapons ban and his delegation hoped that that objective would soon be attained.

73. Turning to the Centre for Genetic Engineering, with the setting up of which Venezuela had been closely associated, he said that the Centre would serve as a base for the training of qualified scientists whose future work would be of particular value to the developing world. The Centre could also serve to promote the formulation of international standards on the management and utilization of genetic engineering and biotechnology at the international level. His delegation hoped that all the signatories of the Statute of the Centre would ratify it as soon as possible.

74. Lastly, his delegation expressed its satisfaction at the fact that all the permanent members of the Security Council were now participating in the Convention and at the further growth in the number of State Parties to it.

75. Mr. TONWE (Nigeria) said that the 1972 Convention occupied a significant place in history. It was the first and, so far, the only international instrument of a legally binding nature which outlawed the acquisition of an

entire category of weapons of mass destruction. It had also strengthened the contribution made by the 1925 Geneva Protocol to man's efforts to control the means of waging warfare.

76. Nigeria, which had been among the first 20 States to ratify the Convention, did not possess biological weapons and did not intend to acquire any. It had therefore nothing to destroy under article II of the Convention and was not in a position to transfer any such weapons to other States.

77. The concerns expressed by Nigeria and other States Parties at the First Review Conference in 1980 remained unresolved. Allegations of violations had been made and some clauses of the Convention were gravely deficient, leaving dangerous loopholes. Above all, scientific and technological advances had outpaced the Convention.

78. Serious attention would therefore have to be given to finding ways of strengthening the Convention, especially in areas where gross deficiencies had been detected. In that connection, articles II, IV, VI and X should receive priority attention.

79. For article II to be credible, it was absolutely necessary to adopt concrete measures to provide for effective verification of the destruction of stockpiles or their diversion to peaceful purposes.

80. With regard to article IV, he welcomed the fact that some States Parties had already promulgated national legislation to ensure compliance. In his own country the production of biological weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was prohibited. He appealed to all States Parties which had not yet done so to adopt without delay the necessary national legislation to ensure compliance with the Convention.

81. His delegation was dissatisfied with the complaints procedure in article VI, under which only the Security Council had the right to initiate an investigation. The political and practical difficulties involved were obvious and his delegation would like to see an arrangement that would separate the fact-finding stage of the complaints procedure from the stage of political consideration and decision by the Security Council.

82. With regard to co-operation in the peaceful uses of biological agents, greater efforts were needed to implement article X because of the pressing health needs of the developing countries.

83. Turning to article IX he expressed regret at the fact that 14 years after the conclusion of the Convention, there was still no agreement on the banning of chemical weapons despite the series of General Assembly resolutions stressing the importance of such a ban. The slow progress in the Conference on Disarmament had not been due to any lack of effort on the part of a large majority of its members but rather to the lack of political will on the part of some militarily significant States. His delegation urged those States to overcome their fears and distrust in order to facilitate the early conclusion of the Convention.

84. Lastly, he expressed his delegation's concern at reports from usually reliable sources according to which the South African régime was engaged in activities in the field of genetic engineering intended to strengthen its racist policies. The international community must stop those activities before they did irreparable damage to Africa and to humanity as a whole.

85. Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary) introduced a paper (BWC/CONF.II/7) submitted by a group of socialist States participating in the Conference. The delegations on whose behalf he was speaking, had attached special importance in their statements to the question of international co-operation in peaceful bacteriorological (biological) activities in all fields covered by article X.

86. In December 1985 the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) had approved a programme of scientific and technological progress up to the year 2000. The paper submitted to the Conference contained a chapter on the accelerated development of biotechnology which related directly to the matters considered by the Conference under article X.

87. The document explained the main fields of planned CMEA activities and testified to the readiness of its member States to co-operate on a mutually advantageous basis with all interested States in that field.

88. Mr. CHARRY SAMPER (Colombia) said that the effectiveness of the Convention depended primarily on the mutual confidence existing between the parties. In the present instance, as in all matters relating to arms control, the text of agreements was ineffective without the goodwill of the parties.

89. Colombia was a peaceful developing country without military arsenals that might threaten its neighbours. It believed that international security could only be ensured by compliance with international law, the observance of treaties, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. His country therefore worked for the strengthening of multilateralism and a fairer international economic order as a basis for the establishment of an international order free from threats, violence and war.

90. It was not easy to separate the question of the observance of one arms control agreement from that of another. All the relevant instruments formed an interrelated network and failure to observe one of them would affect all. Unfortunately, the proliferation of meetings in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere had no power to arrest the arms race. There was a dramatic divorce between statements and texts on the one hand and the uncontrollable expansion of arms expenditures on the other. Apart from the danger of mass destruction through nuclear warfare, the conventional weapons build-up represented an equally grave danger. As was well known, since the Second World War, conflicts with conventional weapons had taken place almost entirely in the Third World. As a result of technical and scientific advances, the difference between nuclear and conventional weapons was rapidly narrowing. The means of control in that respect were becoming increasingly inadequate and it was worth noting in that regard that the centres of research and production of the weapons in question were far removed from such developing countries as Colombia.

91. Colombia wished to reiterate its support for the Convention but noted some of the difficulties which had occurred in its application. For one thing, the new science of genetic engineering had been virtually non-existent in 1972. The advances since made in molecular biology had not been foreseen in 1972 and the provisions concerning stockpiling and verification had become inadequate.

92. Moreover complaints regarding the use of weapons prohibited by the 1972 Convention had been made in the United Nations. In the circumstances, his delegation urged the Conference to seek a consensus on steps to strengthen the Convention and bring it into consonance with technical and scientific progress, while at the same time improving its verification mechanisms.

93. The Conference should encourage the work being conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament. His delegation welcomed the progress made in that Committee.

94. Colombia was gravely concerned at the doubts which had been expressed regarding observance of the Convention as well as at the limitations which existed with regard to verification. It was also concerned at the fact that technical and scientific advances had opened the door to a threat of bacteriological extermination, which was no less alarming than the nuclear menace. It had to be recognized that the first part of article VI was inadequate since the vast majority of States were not in a position to furnish evidence to the Security Council of possible violations by another State Party. For that reason, his delegation would welcome negotiations to expand and strengthen the article. His delegation proposed that WHO, as an impartial and objective entity, should be entrusted with the power of verification at the request of any State Party to the Convention, and without need for Security Council action.

95. His delegation urged that every effort should be made, pursuant to article X of the Convention, to bring about a ban on chemical weapons.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 15 September 1986, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. LANG (Austria)

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Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its article XII

(a) General debate (concluded)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE XII
(agenda item 10)

(a) GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. FRANCESCHI (Italy) said that the United Kingdom representative had already expressed the common views of the 12 member States of the European Economic Community, including Italy. His country considered the adoption of the Convention one of the most significant achievements in the field of disarmament, together with the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1969. His Government noted the intensity of the present international dialogue on disarmament issues, which created a favourable context and was fully determined to make a positive contribution to the success of the Second Review Conference as well as to the strengthening of the Convention.

2. Italy had fully abided by the provisions of the Convention. It possessed no bacteriological or toxin weapons and had not assisted any other State to acquire them. His Government believed that in the present circumstances declarations alone were not enough to guarantee that the Convention was fully respected. It was true, as the United Kingdom representative had acknowledged, that a review conference could not amend the Convention or establish new obligations. The problem of assurance of compliance, however, did concern the Conference. The problem was the more relevant because the Convention did not at present provide for verification mechanisms capable of eliminating the doubts which had arisen regarding effective compliance with its provisions. The Conference should therefore encourage greater transparency regarding all activities relevant to the Convention, as well as a more general acceptance of updated and effective verification mechanisms. The need for adequate guarantees regarding compliance with the Convention and for devising verification mechanisms agreed upon in a spirit of mutual understanding was increased by recent scientific advances in the field of biology which might enlarge the risk of violations. Every possible effort should be made to increase the effectiveness of the ban on biological weapons and enhance the credibility of the Convention.

3. A number of concrete confidence-building measures might be considered, among them procedures for the notification of outbreaks of disease or of accidents in laboratories or production plants, the exchange of information on research in the field of biotechnology and on facilities requiring special safety measures, wider participation in the investigation of outbreaks of disease and international exchanges of scientists and experts engaged in biotechnology, including visits to research laboratories. His Government's "open laboratories" proposal was particularly relevant to the field of application of the Convention.

4. He hoped those suggestions would be reflected in the final document of the Conference. He hoped also that other participants would be as willing as Italy to accept the immediate adoption of confidence-building measures and effective verification mechanisms. If that were done, new impetus would be given to the disarmament process and in particular the early conclusion of an international convention banning chemical weapons.

5. Mr. MORELLI PANDO (Peru) said that Peru, which had ratified the Convention on 5 June 1985, earnestly hoped that a convention providing for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing chemical weapons would be speedily adopted.

6. For a number of years, the 1972 Convention had been weakened by various ambiguities and its application had been jeopardized by the development of biological agents and toxins capable of being used for military purposes. It was of the utmost importance therefore to avoid any weakening of mutual confidence among the parties at the Conference. Confidence should, on the contrary, be strengthened, which could be done by adopting appropriate arrangements, without necessarily modifying article V. Under such arrangements the scientifically advanced countries would declare the number and location of facilities engaged in research on microbiol agents, other biological agents and toxins for prophylactic and peaceful purposes and would accept visits by scientists from other States Parties. In that context, it might be possible to revive the idea of setting up a permanent consultative committee of States Parties with a membership of qualified experts to dissuade States from secretly possessing or using biological weapons.

7. In the light of reports concerning the use of chemical weapons in warfare, it was evident that the implementation of article VIII demanded major commitment on the part of the Contracting Parties with a view to strict compliance with the 1925 Protocol. Article IX called for the adoption of a convention on chemical weapons and his delegation hoped that that would be achieved in 1987. Pursuant to article X, early steps should be taken to encourage a broad exchange of information and materials among the States Parties for the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins. In his view, the developing countries should enjoy preferential treatment in such broad exchanges between the parties. In addition, biological disarmament by the more developed countries would release resources the final use of which must be compatible with the interests of an international community endowed with a greater sense of fairness and solidarity.

8. Mr. BUTLER (Australia) said that, as was indicated in the Australian reply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, his country was in full compliance with the provisions of the Convention. That instrument was unique among modern disarmament agreements in that, together with the 1925 Protocol, it established an important norm of international behaviour, namely that States should not possess or use biological agents or toxins as weapons. Those important principles were reflected in the preamble to the Convention.

9. Eleven years after its adoption, the Convention was in basically good shape. There were at present 103 States Parties, and none had withdrawn. Since the First Review Conference, however, the Convention had been placed at risk by new developments in biotechnology and allegations of non-compliance. The verification provisions had been increasingly recognized as inadequate by present-day standards and advances in biology had made biological weapons a more attractive option to military planners.

10. There had been considerable debate about the military implications of genetic engineering. In particular, it had been postulated that genetic engineering techniques might make it possible to produce highly virulent bacteria resistant to antibiotics but against which the aggressor's forces could be protected by vaccines. It had even been suggested that it might be

possible to engineer bacteria that were preferentially effective against certain ethnic groups. Activities of that kind were not proscribed by the Convention, although the stockpiling of large quantities of biological agents was prohibited. But if appropriate facilities existed, it might be possible to produce tonne amounts from seed material within weeks. The risks were greater in that there was an overlap, or at least a grey area, between "defensive" and "offensive" research. Thus, research for peaceful or prophylactic purposes could produce information that could be used to develop biological warfare agents with novel immunological or pathogenic characteristics.

11. Two events had occurred since the entry into force of the Convention that had focused attention on its effectiveness. The first was the outbreak of anthrax among people living near Sverdlovsk, in the USSR, in 1979. Allegations had been made that the outbreak had been caused by a release of bacteria from a biological weapons research and production facility at Sverdlovsk and that the quantities involved demonstrated a clear breach of the Convention. Those charges had been denied by the Soviet Union but appropriate steps that would have enabled the facts of the situation to be established had not been taken. The second event involved allegations that toxin weapons had been used against civilians and resistance fighters in Laos and Cambodia. Those charges had also been denied but a team of experts sent by the United Nations in 1981 and 1982 had not been allowed into the area where the alleged breaches had taken place. Australia had discussed those allegations in an informal manner with a number of States Parties.

12. In order to dispel doubts and enhance confidence, States should be prepared to assume an obligation to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of the Convention when challenged. In a general way, States Parties should show greater openness with regard to their activities of relevance to the Convention. With those considerations in mind, Australia would support any call for a strengthening of the verification mechanisms and would favour the convening of a special conference, if necessary, to strengthen the Convention itself.

13. Australia already provided a great deal of information on epidemics in its territory. It reported annually on a wide range of diseases to FAO and to the Office International des Epizooties (OIE). As a member of OIE, Australia was required to notify the agency of suspicion or confirmation of outbreaks of the most serious diseases by telegram or telex within 24 hours. In addition, it reported annually to WHO on the national status of 46 communicable diseases ranging from anthrax to yellow fever. The Recombinant DNA Monitoring Committee administered by the Australian Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce had produced guidelines on DNA recombinant research and the environmental release of recombinant DNA products. Australia's experience showed that a great deal of information on communicable diseases, animal and human, could be made public on a routine basis without jeopardizing any national security interests.

14. His delegation urged all States Parties to make full use of the international reporting and control mechanisms existing under, for instance, FAO and WHO. It also favoured greater information exchanges among Parties as to the nature, purpose and extent of biological research programmes, the reporting of unusual or prolonged outbreaks of diseases, the declaration of

high containment facilities engaged in biological research; greater exchanges of scientists; facilitation of the publication and the dissemination of research into biotechnology; timely investigation of alleged violations of the Convention. Until more permanent measures were agreed, verification of alleged uses of biological weapons could be made on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 37/98 D and 39/65 E.

15. The Conference should consider further the means by which data exchanges could be facilitated. A number of possibilities existed. Existing United Nations machinery such as the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, the Department for Disarmament Affairs or the United Nations Office at Geneva might be used. Another possibility might be to involve one or more of the Depositary Powers which would undertake the task using its own resources. Alternatively a small secretariat might be established under United Nations auspices. His Government would prefer to see data exchanges take place under United Nations auspices.

16. His delegation would give serious consideration to the suggestions of other delegations for strengthening the Convention. His Government attached high priority to the rapid conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. The Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons had achieved considerable progress in 1986 and it was important that the momentum should be sustained. It was important also that the close interrelationship between the two conventions should be recognized. His delegation would do everything possible to ensure that the Conference strengthened the Convention and upheld its authority.

17. Mr. CLERCKX (Belgium), after associating himself with the statement made by the United Kingdom representative on behalf of the European Community, said it was regrettable that the confidence originally placed in the Convention had been to some extent eroded. When the Convention had been adopted, the state of international relations had been such as to inspire a strong presumption of compliance and biological weapons had been considered to have little or no military value. Unfortunately, the original presumption of good faith had been weakened by allegations which had not been conclusively disproved. Steps should be taken to ensure that effective measures were taken in such situations to avoid persistent uncertainty regarding compliance with fundamental commitments. In addition, there were grounds for believing that the use of biological weapons had become less unlikely than it had been 14 years earlier as a result of the development of applications of biology.

18. In that context, the Conference should strengthen confidence in the Convention by appropriate decisions taking into account the changed situation. Belgium for its part was ready on a basis of reciprocity to adopt any measure calculated to promote confidence. It welcomed the growing consensus which was emerging in favour of international on-site verification and hoped that concrete and dependable agreements would soon be reached. His delegation also hoped that the negotiations on banning chemical weapons taking place at Geneva in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament would lead in the near future to a new international instrument embodying an effective verification system.

19. It should perhaps be emphasized that the Convention was not a non-proliferation agreement. All States Parties were required to renounce bacteriological weapons. The prohibition of the development, production

and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons was a logical extension of the 1925 Protocol and the process begun by the Protocol should be completed by organizing the concerted, reciprocal and effective renunciation of the development and possession of biological weapons on a basis of universality. The negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons were directed towards a similar goal.

20. Belgium had associated itself with the universal condemnation of the recent violations of the 1925 Protocol in the Iraq-Iran conflict. At an earlier stage it had been concerned by previous allegations of violations and at the second special session of the General Assembly had accordingly made a proposal to ensure control of the ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Belgium had also been a co-sponsor of General Assembly resolution 37/98 D. Belgium had never possessed bacteriological weapons and had fully observed its obligations under the Convention. It had, moreover, participated actively in international exchanges to promote the peaceful applications of biology and hoped that that type of co-operation would be strengthened in accordance with the provisions of article X. He trusted that the substantive issues would be examined in a constructive spirit and that the Conference would reach a consensus on a significant final document that would enhance the prestige of the Convention.

21. Mr. JESSEL (France) observed that the risks of erosion to which the Convention had been exposed over the years were matters for serious concern. They were of two kinds, technical and political. So far as the former were concerned, some key ideas of the Convention were now manifestly obsolete. For instance, the notion that a country would have to stockpile large quantities of prohibited agents in order to acquire an offensive capability no longer squared with the facts. In the present state of the art, a country in that position could be expected to defer large-scale production as long as possible and most of the research carried out for an illegitimate purpose would involve only very small quantities of agents. In addition, the appearance of new techniques had tended to blur the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate activities, since the difference between the two was now not one of nature but of purpose.

22. The major cause of the erosion of confidence was, however, political behaviour at variance with the spirit of the Convention rather than technical factors. France could not ignore allegations of the use of prohibited weapons in South East Asia, or for that matter in Afghanistan, any more than it could ignore certain ambiguous aspects of the outbreak of anthrax reported in 1979 at Sverdlovsk. In all those cases, the parties concerned did not seem to have done everything in their power to demonstrate their good faith. However regrettable that attitude might be, it had to be recognized that the Convention laid down no procedure which would help to resolve the problem in such situations.

23. The effectiveness of the Convention should be strengthened, particularly with regard to verification machinery. Since, however, a review conference did not have the power to amend the Convention, more limited and pragmatic solutions must be sought. His Government had noted with interest the suggestions made by various countries and welcomed the fact that the idea of establishing control mechanisms had not been opposed. For its part, it proposed the reporting of high containment facilities (civil or military)

of the P3 and P4 types under WHO standards, with the indication of their location and a short description of their activities; the immediate reporting of all unusual events such as outbreaks of disease, mass poisoning or accidents occurring in facilities and involving many casualties; and the reporting of vaccination campaigns. Countries might perhaps be invited to supply proof that the staff of high containment facilities and military personnel were not vaccinated against presumed biological warfare agents. Consideration might be given to the introduction of international fact-finding procedures based on General Assembly resolutions 37/98 D and 39/35 E concerning the 1925 Geneva Protocol. By proposing those measures, France hoped to contribute to the success of the Conference.

24. Mr. NICOLAIDES (Cyprus) said that the Convention remained the only real international arms control agreement. It required the total elimination of such weapons of mass destruction as biological and toxin agents and constituted a prelude to the banning of chemical weapons. It was part of a series of agreements which would hopefully lead to the final objective of general and complete disarmament. It was for that reason of high value.

25. The Second Review Conference acquired added importance from the fact that biological research activities, in particular recent progress in genetic engineering, provided totally new possibilities not only for the welfare of man but also for his potential mass annihilation. At the same time, the increased interest of the military in biological and toxin agents coupled with allegations of violations of the Convention, were a matter of great concern. In that connection, he paid tribute to all the non-governmental organizations whose activities had created a widespread awareness of the dangers inherent in the situation.

26. In the circumstances, it was important that the Conference should make a substantive contribution in strengthening the régime established by the Convention. In particular, it should endorse the viability and importance of the Convention and urge all States that had not yet acceded to it to do so without delay. It was also necessary to enhance confidence among States Parties and to strengthen their ties of co-operation.

27. There was no doubt that increased transparency as far as peaceful research activities in the field of biology were concerned would contribute substantially to enhanced confidence among States. Even more important than openness in that respect, however, was the existence of effective machinery to verify compliance with obligations undertaken under the Convention. Verification procedures were a key element in the implementation of any agreement, particularly in the field of disarmament. The complaints procedure provided for in article VI of the Convention did not seem to be an entirely satisfactory solution. Not only did it fall short of the needs, but verification procedures dependent on action through the United Nations Security Council did not seem suitable to ensuring implementation of obligations undertaken by sovereign States as equal parties. Steps should be taken to remedy the situation, the more so as the international community appeared to be willing to accept more concrete and practical forms of verification, including on-site inspection.

28. Increasing distrust among States Parties to the Convention could not but detract from the expansion of the international co-operation activities provided for in article X of the Convention. Under article X States were not

merely encouraged to exchange equipment, materials and scientific and technological information related to the use of bacteriological agents for peaceful purposes, but they had a duty to do so. It was important that there should be more tangible co-operation in the interests of mankind.

29. Turning to article IX relating to the negotiation of an agreement on the complete banning of chemical weapons, he welcomed the real progress made in that direction in the present year within the Conference on Disarmament and expressed the hope that the negotiations for the conclusion of a Convention would be intensified in the months to come.

30. His delegation believed that the system of review conferences served a very useful purpose. The conferences provided an opportunity for thorough discussion of the operation of the agreements, for focusing on possible loopholes, for exchanging views and information and for ensuring that the agreements continued to be relevant to present-day realities. The unceasing progress of science and technology, as well as international political developments, amply warranted the periodic convening of review conferences.

31. Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) said that the Second Review Conference was being held at a time when the international situation was particularly tense and the arms race reaching unprecedented heights that threatened the very survival of humanity. Only genuine disarmament measures could improve the situation. He stressed the importance his country attached to the prohibition and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological or any other kind.

32. It was with a view to complete and general disarmament that Romania wished to approach the question of the implementation and effectiveness of the Convention. The Convention was a unique instrument, in the sense that it was the first multilateral agreement aimed at the complete elimination of a whole category of weapons and that it was, according to its own definition, a first stage towards the realization of an agreement banning chemical weapons. In acceding to it the States Parties had actually assumed a legal obligation to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching such an agreement. Nevertheless, although the Convention's entry into force in 1975 had had positive effects in respect of détente and confidence among States, it had not so far been followed by other disarmament measures.

33. However, the most recent session of the Conference on Disarmament offered some hope in that connection. After seven years of labour, a consensus appeared to have emerged on the vital necessity of concluding a multilateral convention aimed at prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and at their destruction. The documents of the Conference on Disarmament that had been transmitted to the Second Review Conference gave some idea of the efforts that had been made to that end and bore witness to the progress achieved. In that connection, he evoked the Declaration and Appeal of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria regarding the establishment of a chemical weapons-free zone in the Balkan region. Romania would support the creation of such zones elsewhere in Europe, and on other continents, in the belief that they would make a concrete contribution to the process of eliminating those dangerous and inhuman weapons.

34. In his view, the final document of the Review Conference should urge the Conference on Disarmament to move forward generally in the implementation of its mandate and in particular to speed up its work on the preparation of the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which could, he hoped, be presented to the forty-second session of the General Assembly.

35. With regard to the effectiveness of the Convention, he noted with satisfaction that, since the First Review Conference in 1980, the number of States Parties had risen from 87 to 103 and now included all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The Conference should make another appeal to all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Convention as soon as possible.

36. The documents submitted to the Conference by the secretariat gave the impression that, generally speaking, the Convention was being duly implemented. His delegation joined with the delegations which had stressed the need for full compliance with the Convention's provisions, on the grounds that such behaviour was a factor in building confidence among States. It also considered that the Conference should explicitly reaffirm that the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons applied without any limitation to all existing and future bacteriological agents or toxins that could be used for hostile purposes. Recent advances in genetics, microbiology and biotechnology were not such as to affect the Convention adversely. On the contrary, they enhanced its value.

37. Regarding article X of the Convention and international co-operation in the use of bacteriological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, he considered that it would be appropriate to remind all States Parties explicitly of their obligations in that respect and to request those of them in a position to do so to take the necessary bilateral and multilateral steps to eliminate all obstacles to such co-operation and to expand it and make it more effective.

38. In conclusion, he stressed his delegation's readiness to examine any constructive proposal aimed at reaffirming the full validity of the Convention and assured the President of its wholehearted co-operation.

39. Mr. Hac Team NGO (Democratic Kampuchea) recalled that Democratic Kampuchea had ratified the Convention on 4 February 1983, thus showing, at a time when its very survival was at stake, how great was its faith in international solidarity and how sincerely it was attached to respect for the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. For almost eight years his country had experienced the horrors of war, with Kampuchean continuing to be the victims of flagrant violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Convention on Biological Weapons.

40. The use of toxin weapons in Kampuchea by the Vietnamese occupying forces had been established. During every dry season since 1979, the occupying forces had resorted to the spraying of toxic chemicals from MIG aircraft, the firing of poison gas shells and the contamination of foodstuffs and water sources. Almost all the provinces of Kampuchea had been affected. Most recently, on 17 July 1986, in the town of Kampot in southern Kampuchea, 50 inhabitants had died and 140 others had been poisoned through the contamination of foodstuffs. On 27 February 1986, in the district of Sisophon, in western Kampuchea, the occupying forces had poisoned the

springs. Ten inhabitants had died and 169 others had been poisoned. In February 1986, in Pailin, again in western Kampuchea, the occupying forces had fired poison gas shells. On several occasions, the Kampuchean resistance forces had succeeded in capturing members of the occupying forces equipped with gasmasks. He said that photographs and a video tape by a Japanese journalist who had accompanied the Kampuchean forces were available to interested delegations in support of his allegations, and he also quoted extracts from a communication dated 5 April 1983 of the Minister in Charge of the Co-ordinating Committee for Public Health on the syndromes presented by the persons poisoned. There were also cases of indirect poisoning through contagion and of "residual contamination" in which women had given birth to children with serious birth defects. Given the formidable effects of those chemical and bacteriological substances, Kampuchean doctors were of the opinion that they could not have been manufactured by a poor country such as Viet Nam but only by a large country possessing an advanced biotechnological arsenal.

41. Of course, the perpetrators of those barbaric acts and their protectors sought to deny the facts. He wished to make it clear that his country wanted only friendly relations with all the countries of the world, including the Soviet Union, and all that it asked was that the Soviet Union should cease to support Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea. He thanked the States participating in the Review Conference in advance for all that they were ready to do to help to put an end to those crimes and acts of injustice against the Kampuchean people. He urged the whole international community to appeal for an end to those barbaric acts. The ending of those injustices through a peaceful and equitable settlement would undoubtedly be a positive factor in building international confidence and a concrete contribution to respect for the Convention. It must not be forgotten that what was happening today in Kampuchea could happen anywhere.

42. In conclusion, he requested the secretariat to circulate as an official document of the Review Conference the full text of the report on the use of toxins in Kampuchea which he had referred to in his intervention.

43. Mr. KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran) said, after recalling the principles and objectives of the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, as well as the undertakings entered into by States which had acceded to those instruments, that the world had changed since the First Review Conference. In recent years, the Geneva Protocol had been violated on several occasions by one of the States Parties, namely Iraq, whose use of chemical weapons had been confirmed by the reports of the teams of investigators sent to Iran by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in March 1984 (S/16433), April 1985 (S/17127) and February 1986 (S/17911). Mustard gas bombs and nerve agent bombs had been used by the Iraqi forces against Iranian positions, injuring many civilians and military personnel. The inadequacy of the international reaction to those violations and the absence of any provisions for collective action against the violator had encouraged Iraq to continue to flout the fundamental principle underlying international law in cases of armed conflict. On 8 September 1986, actually during the inauguration of the Second Review Conference, Iraq had still been using chemical weapons in the Sheik Salah Javanmard area and in the Bemou Heights. Thus, 61 years after the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which declared the use of chemical weapons to be inhumane and immoral, Iraq was still repeatedly resorting to those weapons in violation of the Protocol.

44. His delegation considered the Second Review Conference to be a good opportunity to emphasize the need to respect the Geneva Protocol. It should set up machinery through which compliance could be assured and guaranteed. It should also press Iraq to commit itself not to repeat the use of chemical and toxin weapons and it should once again condemn the use of chemical weapons as a war crime. Lastly, the Conference should call for a total ban on the export to Iraq of chemical substances and related technology that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons.

45. It was, nevertheless, encouraging to note that the number of States Parties to the Convention had risen from 87 to 103 and now included all the permanent members of the Security Council. It was to be hoped that those States which had not yet signed and ratified the Convention would do so and that its universal acceptability would thus be enhanced.

46. Mr. AL-KADHI (Iraq) said that the Iraqi Government had signed the Convention on Biological Weapons in 1975 and was making arrangements to ratify it. Iraq complied with all the commitments deriving from the Convention and from the 1925 Geneva Protocol to which it was also a party. In his delegation's view, the best way of preventing recourse to bacteriological and nuclear weapons was to prevent armed conflict between peoples. If, on the other hand, the international community accepted wars and the escalation of violence, the countries and peoples threatened must defend themselves by all the means at their disposal. To attain the Convention's objectives it was the responsibility of all States to prevent conflicts. The responsibility of the nuclear Powers, which had failed to arrive at a complete agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and tests, should also be stressed. In the absence of such agreement, the Convention could not be fully implemented. Disarmament should lead to global conventions.

47. Given the repeated allegations of the representative of Iran, his delegation was obliged to demonstrate that Iran had violated the Convention repeatedly whereas Iraq had complied to the full with the obligations under it. First of all, Iran had tried to occupy Iraqi territory by force, but when that attempt failed the Iranian Government had drawn up a plan for resort to chemical weapons. At the present moment, the Iranian leaders were striving to put that plan into effect. Thus, on 27 February 1986, at Geneva, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs had said: "We have produced chemical weapons but we are not going to use them". That statement had been published in the Journal de Genève of 28 February 1986. Why produce chemical weapons if they were not going to be used? The Iranian Prime Minister had made a similar declaration on Iranian television on 28 August 1986. Only a few days ago, Iraq had been accused by the Iranian news media of resorting to chemical weapons. Through those allegations, the Iranian authorities were aiming at a number of objectives: to use chemical weapons in the new offensive which Iran was preparing against Iraq, to demonstrate to the current Review Conference that Iran was not taking any reprehensible measures, and lastly to justify attacks on civilian objectives such as those which it had recently launched.

48. That dangerous plan should be brought to the international community's attention. In fact, Iran was using the Conference, and other international meetings, to continue its aggression against a sovereign State. It should be remembered that international law was an indivisible whole. If one of its aspects was to be stressed, the rest must also be taken into account. Iran only took from international law what was in line with its régime and its

interests. Iraq possessed the right to self-defence, the right to defend its people and its territory. It would use every means to that end, because it was forced to do so by Iran.

49. Mrs. GARCIA DONOSO (Ecuador) said that her Government had always supported the efforts of the international community to bring about general and complete disarmament. That had always been its position in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the First Committee. It must not be forgotten that there was a close link between disarmament and development, since general disarmament would free resources that could be used for the economic and social advancement of the developing countries.

50. Ecuador complied with the multilateral agreements on halting the arms race and on disarmament, in particular the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972). Ecuador was, moreover, one of the sponsors of General Assembly resolution 37/98 C on a procedure for enhancing compliance with the Convention and of resolution 37/98 D on procedures to uphold the authority of the Protocol because it regarded them as two important instruments in the service of the objective of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. The use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was as atrocious as that of nuclear weapons.

51. Her delegation attached great importance to the current Review Conference as providing States Parties with an opportunity not only to reaffirm their devotion to the principles and objectives of the Convention but also to review the effectiveness of its provisions and the compliance of States Parties. In that connection, she believed that arrangements should be made to review the Convention every five years, as an appropriate means of pursuing the Convention's objectives.

52. Some articles of the Convention merited the Conference's particular attention. Examples were article VI (on complaints in cases of a State Party's breach of its obligations and the investigations that could be carried out following such complaints) and article VII (on assistance of a State Party to any other Party exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention). Close attention should also be paid, however, to article IX, which recognized the effective prohibition of chemical weapons as an important objective, since, unfortunately, no agreement had yet been reached on an effective and total ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Regarding article X, Ecuador wished to reaffirm that it was in favour of greater international co-operation in all aspects of the peaceful use of bacteriological agents and toxins (transfer and exchange of information, training of personnel, etc.).

53. Ecuador had always faithfully complied with the obligations laid down in article I of the Convention. It did not possess, had never possessed, and had no intention of possessing or utilizing, microbiological or other biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes. It would support all efforts to strengthen the Convention and give favourable consideration to any proposal to that end. Such efforts would enhance confidence among nations and improve the international atmosphere. If all States Parties, in particular the great

Powers, demonstrated the political will to eliminate arsenals of chemical and bacteriological agents, through effective measures, the work of the Review Conference would be an important contribution to the celebration of the World Year of Peace.

54. Mr. SHAFI (Islamic Republic of Iran), exercising his right of reply, said that the statement of the representative of Iraq contained false allegations regarding the war that had been forced on the Islamic Republic of Iran by Iraq, and he drew attention to a number of untruths. For example, Iraq denied having used chemical weapons, although such use had been confirmed by the reports of the Security Council to which Mr. Kamyab had referred. That showed the gap between Iraq's words, in particular those of its representative at the current Conference, and its acts. Furthermore, the representative of Iraq was contradicting himself. In fact, while denying that Iraq had used chemical weapons, he declared that threatened countries and peoples must defend themselves by all the means available to them. By such a statement, the Iraqi Government was clearly rejecting the law and humanitarian principles that governed armed conflict. His delegation considered those two examples sufficient to place the participants in the Conference in a position to judge the truthfulness of the Iraqi representative's statements.

55. Mr. AL HADDAWI (Iraq), exercising his right of reply, said that the remarks of the representative of Iran consisted of lying statements and fallacious allegations, many of which were only too familiar. For his own part, he could only reaffirm the position of his Government and his country, Iraq possessed no chemical or bacteriological weapons, was not producing or stockpiling any, and was not using any. Iraq had already made peace proposals to Iran, and had accepted all the initiatives in that sense, not only those coming from the United Nations but those from other organizations such as the recent appeals of the Movement of Non-aligned Countries or the Islamic Conference. The Iraqi Government had recently called on the Iranian leaders to accept peace, to conclude a non-aggression pact with Iraq and to establish good-neighbourly relations between the two countries that would be conducive to peace in the region and to development. His delegation urged the Conference to persuade Iran to accept the Iraqi peace initiative and to listen to the voice of reason, failing which the current Conference would lead to nothing but a set of resolutions leaving the chief cause of war untouched.

56. Mr. SHAFI (Islamic Republic of Iran), exercising his right of reply, said that he would not revert to the question of the use of chemical weapons, a matter on which he had already made his position known. On the other hand, as far as the peaceful sentiments so eloquently expressed by Iraq at the current Conference and at other meetings were concerned, it should be remembered that six years earlier, on 22 September 1980, the Iraqi régime had launched a war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran by crossing the Iranian frontier over its length of 1,352 kilometres and penetrating 80 kilometres into Iranian territory. As for the desire for peace supposedly inspiring the Iraqi leaders, he would simply recall that according to an Associated Press report of 25 December 1980, the Iraqi President had said at a Cabinet meeting that all the regions occupied by Iraqi troops in the Iranian province of Khuzestan or to the west of it would remain under Iraqi domination and would be annexed to the map of Iraq. According to another report from the same agency, dated 18 January 1981, the Iraqi Minister of Information had said "Iraq has now reached its frontier with Iran and will never withdraw from the position it occupies, even if its armed forces must stay on the present front

line for another 10 years. How, in those circumstances, could the Iraqi régime claim that it wanted peace while all the time engaging in the massive and generalized use of chemical weapons, contrary to all humanitarian laws and international conventions? Not wishing to cite other examples, he believed that mere reference to those violations would be enough to demonstrate the real nature of the Iraqi régime.

57. The PRESIDENT said that the Conference had thus concluded its general debate on the operation of the Convention. The wide-ranging discussion had been extremely useful and much common ground had emerged. Despite a few references to cases of violations of obligations under the Convention, it had been generally felt that the Convention had stood the test of time well and had even gained in importance. Several proposals regarding institutional arrangements, supplementary instruments and unilateral undertakings for ensuring greater transparency and thus strengthening confidence had already been formulated. The general debate had also shown that the Convention was attracting much more attention than at the First Review Conference in 1980. In conclusion, he expressed pleasure at the spirit of goodwill and co-operation that had marked the first part of the Conference's work.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Distr.
GENERAL

BWC/CONF.II/SR.9
22 September 1986

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 22 September 1986, at 5.15 p.m.

President:

Mr. W. LANG

(Austria)

CONTENTS

Report of the Committee of the Whole

Other matters, including the question of future review of the Convention

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.6108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

Any corrections to the records of the meetings of this session will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the session.

The meeting was called to order at 5.15 p.m.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE AS A WHOLE (agenda item 12) (BWC/CONF.II/9)

1. Mr. VEJVODA (Chairman of the Committee of the Whole) introduced the report of the Committee of the Whole which had been formally adopted by the Committee that afternoon.
2. As requested by the Conference, the Committee of the Whole had considered the Convention article by article, in an efficient and practical way, with delegations expressing their views on the individual provisions of the Convention and putting forward specific proposals. The Committee's deliberations were faithfully reflected in the report and the draft proposals, in the annex attached thereto.
3. It was apparent from the Committee's work that participants regarded the Convention as a useful international instrument which continued to function as an effective barrier against the misuse of biology for military purposes. It had likewise been generally agreed that the Convention also applied to the latest developments in the biological sciences.
4. Many participants had taken the view that, in the light of rapid advances in the biological sciences, the verification procedures should be strengthened and the machinery for ensuring compliance with the Convention should be improved through the adoption of various additional measures, including confidence-building measures, but there had been no unanimity on the specific measures to be taken for that purpose. It nevertheless seemed that there were several areas on which agreement could be reached at the present Conference, although other proposals would have to be considered in greater detail and decisions on them could be taken at a later stage. He hoped that the Drafting Committee would be able to draw up some more definite conclusions and recommendations.
5. He thanked the two Vice-Chairmen of the Committee of the Whole and all the members of the Secretariat who had spared no effort to ensure that the report would be ready in time.
6. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the report of the Committee of the Whole and to annex it to the final document of the Conference.
7. It was so decided.

OTHER MATTERS, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF FUTURE REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION
(agenda item 11)

Proposal submitted by the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the USSR

8. Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic) said that, as the Conference began the final stage in its work, it was apparent that all participants were in favour of strengthening the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. The main goal was to enhance confidence in the Convention and to ensure its more effective implementation. A number of

proposals had already been submitted for that purpose. In his delegation's view, carefully thought-out measures should be taken as soon as possible. The German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had therefore drawn up a proposal which might help the Conference arrive at a decision and whose text he read out.

9. According to the proposal, the States represented at the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction had unequivocally pronounced themselves in favour of the comprehensive strengthening and effective implementation of the provisions of the Convention. The final document of the Conference should reflect that important aspect and indicate specific ways and means of achieving that end.

10. On the basis of the numerous proposals which had been submitted during the Conference and which required close study, including at the expert level, it was suggested that a consultative meeting at expert level, open to all States Parties to the Convention should be convened in Geneva in March 1987 with the aim of working out and agreeing on decisions and recommendations concerning: (1) The establishment of a group of scientific experts to study the latest biological developments of relevance to compliance with the Convention; (2) exchanges of data on biological research centres and epidemic diseases and exchanges of other information, with a view to strengthening the mechanism of compliance with the Convention; (3) broader co-operation among States in the peaceful development and uses of biosciences for the purpose of furthering socio-economic, scientific and technological advances; (4) preparatory work for a special conference of the States Parties to the Convention to draw up and adopt an additional protocol which would provide for measures to strengthen the system of verification of compliance with the Convention.

11. The States Parties attending the consultative meeting should elect a chairman and two vice-chairmen, each for a one-year term. The consultative meeting might, if necessary, decide to convene additional sessions to discharge its tasks under items (1) to (4). The decisions and recommendations which would be adopted at the consultative meeting in conformity with the procedures of the Second Review Conference should be forwarded by the depositaries of the Convention to all States Parties to the Convention.

12. He trusted that the proposal would meet with a constructive response.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING
OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND
TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Distr.
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BWC/CONF.II/SR.10
1 October 1986

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday 26 September 1986, at 10 p.m.

President: Mr. LANG (Austria)

CONTENTS

Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee

Report of the Drafting Committee

Preparation and adoption of the final document

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.6108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 p.m.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE

(b) REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (BWC/CONF.II/10 and Add.1 and Corr.1)

1. The PRESIDENT invited Mr. Afande (Kenya), Chairman of the Credentials Committee, to introduce the Committee's report (BWC/CONF.II/10 and Add.1 and Corr.1).
2. Mr. AFANDE (Kenya), Chairman of the Credentials Committee, said that the Committee had accepted the credentials of the representatives of the participating States referred to in the Secretary-General's memorandum of 23 September 1986 subject to the reservation expressed in paragraph 6 of document BWC/CONF.II/10. The report of the Credentials Committee (BWC/CONF.II/10 and Add.1 and Corr.1) had been unanimously adopted. He thanked the members of the Committee and Secretariat who had assisted in its preparation.
3. The PRESIDENT thanked the Chairman of the Credentials Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference took note of the Committee's report.
4. It was so decided.
5. Mr. Hac Team NGO (Democratic Kampuchea), speaking with reference to his delegation's representation, said that one delegation's view as referred to in paragraph 6 of the report of the Credentials Committee (BWC/CONF.II/10) represented a serious and arrogant challenge to General Assembly resolution 40/7 concerning Kampuchea. In that resolution, which had had the support of 114 countries, the General Assembly called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea, while at the same time taking note of the legality and legitimacy of the coalition Government in Democratic Kampuchea, and of its effectiveness throughout the country.

REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE (agenda item 13)

PREPARATION AND ADOPTION OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT (agenda item 14)
(BWC/CONF.II/11)

6. The PRESIDENT said that, owing to lack of time, the report of the Drafting Committee (BWC/CONF.II/11) had been issued in English only. He invited Mr. Butler (Australia), Chairman of the Drafting Committee, to introduce the report.
7. Mr. BUTLER (Australia), Chairman of the Drafting Committee, said that the adoption of the Committee's report had been the outcome of detailed and exhaustive consultations during which delegations had made clear their commitment to the objectives of the Convention and their determination to ensure its implementation and strengthening. The following working method had been adopted: three consultative groups had been convened under the chairmanship of the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Norway and Sweden respectively. Of all those who had taken part in the preparation of the report, which represented a major achievement, he wished in particular to thank the representative of Sweden, and the representative of Bulgaria who

had acted as Vice-Chairman of the Committee. The Drafting Committee's report having been adopted by consensus that afternoon, he trusted that the Conference would swiftly proceed to its final adoption.

8. The PRESIDENT, thanking the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, said that the Final Document, a draft of which was attached to the Committee's report, would consist of four parts: part I: organization and work of the Conference; part II: Final Declaration; part III: Report of the Committee of the Whole; and part IV: summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference. He invited the Conference to take note of the report of the Drafting Committee (BWC/CONF.II/11) and then to consider the draft Final Document attached thereto.

9. It was so decided.

10. The PRESIDENT, said that, as stated in paragraph 34 of the draft Final Document annexed to the Drafting Committee's report (BWC/CONF.II/11), the summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference would be contained in part IV of that Document. Any delegations wishing to make corrections to the summary records should send them to the Official Records Editing Section, as indicated on the cover page, for inclusion in the Final Document.

11. The draft Final Declaration contained in part II was a compromise text which had been agreed on after arduous negotiations. It had been issued in English only; the other language versions would be issued in the course of the following week. Delegations wishing to make corrections to the Final Declaration in the other working languages should communicate them in writing to the Secretariat.

12. He invited the Conference to consider part I of the draft Final Document entitled "Organization and work of the Conference". Noting that there were no comments on part I, he suggested that the Conference should adopt it.

13. It was so decided.

14. The PRESIDENT invited the Conference to consider part II entitled "Draft Final Declaration". At the end of part II, reference was made to a list of the proposals submitted to the Conference. That list had not in fact been reproduced in the annex to the Drafting Committee's report, but had recently been circulated on a separate sheet without a symbol. Noting that there were no comments on part II, he suggested that the Conference should adopt it.

15. It was so decided.

16. The PRESIDENT said that, if there was no comment, he would take it that the Conference formally adopted the Final Document, the text of which was annexed to the Drafting Committee's report (BWC/CONF.II/11).

17. It was so decided.

18. The PRESIDENT gave the floor to delegations wishing to speak after the adoption of the Final Document.

19. Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the Second Review Conference had proved that the Convention was still an effective arms limitation instrument. The Conference had displayed a constructive spirit, despite certain moves prompted by a desire for confrontation. Many proposals had been submitted, over one third of them by socialist countries. The majority of those proposals were designed to strengthen the Convention and, in particular, its verification mechanism. Rapid effect must now be given to the constructive ideas put forward during the Conference, particularly regarding the appointment of a group of technical experts and the organization of a special conference on verification mechanism. Such mechanism should in his delegation's view be combined with international legal obligations. In that connection, it was a matter of regret to him that States which claimed to be the champions of verification had not agreed that a special conference should be convened with a view to the adoption of a protocol on the question.

20. The unanimous adoption of the Final Document was, however, a positive achievement and the USSR, for its part, was ready to co-operate with all countries that were genuinely determined to strengthen the Convention and to take action to that end rather than being content with mere words. Specifically, it would co-operate with all the other depositary States with a view to the adoption of practical and relevant measures.

21. He expressed appreciation in particular to the President for his conduct of the work of the Conference and to Mr. Butler and Mr. Afande, chairmen of the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee respectively. He also thanked Miss Levin, the Secretary-General of the Conference, and the other members of the Secretariat, as well as all his colleagues who had worked for the success of the Conference.

22. Mr. FAN Gaoxiang (China) said that the Second Review Conference had again considered matters of crucial interest for the whole of mankind. At times the discussion had been bitter but, through consultations and the determination of all delegations to work in a spirit of constructive compromise, a consensus had been achieved. There was thus every reason to be satisfied with the positive results of the Conference. He welcomed in particular the provisions adopted concerning the implementation of articles V and X of the Convention, which in his view represented the the Conference's most outstanding achievements.

23. He thanked the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Secretariat and, above all, the President of the Conference, all of whom had contributed by their efforts to the success of the Conference.

24. Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America) said that his delegation welcomed the successful conclusion of the Second Review Conference. Throughout the discussions, it had endeavoured to adopt an approach that was both critical and constructive, and it was in that context that he had made clear his conviction that the Convention had been violated. He noted in that connection that the Final Declaration reflected the grave doubts of several Parties about compliance with the most basic provisions of the Convention and that the Conference as a whole had stressed the need to deal seriously with compliance issues.

25. Recognizing the importance of the norm established by the Convention, the United States had joined in recommending several measures intended to strengthen that norm, particularly within the context of article V. He trusted that those measures would be fully implemented by all parties to the Convention and would thus lead to greater international transparency and openness with regard to the Convention.

26. He thanked the President of the Conference, the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Secretariat and Conference Services, which had contributed to the success of the Conference. He also paid a tribute to the efforts made by the leaders of the co-ordinating groups and, in particular, by Mr. Lundbo of Norway.

27. Mr. SHAFFI (Islamic Republic of Iran) welcomed the Conference's adoption of a Final Declaration by consensus. He regretted, however, that the Declaration failed to condemn in clearer and stronger terms the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, particularly since cases of such use were well-documented and had been confirmed by United Nations missions. He also noted with regret that, in the course of the Conference, one of the States Parties to the Convention had endeavoured to obstruct such a condemnation.

28. Mr. EDIS (United Kingdom) joined other delegations in thanking the President of the Conference for the skill and patience with which he had brought the Second Review Conference to a successful conclusion; in that task, he had been ably assisted by the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies and had received admirable support from the Secretariat.

29. He welcomed the successful outcome of the Conference and the following positive aspects in particular: the firm reaffirmation of the value of the Convention; agreement on strengthening measures, which would be followed up at an expert meeting in the spring of 1987; recognition of the importance of the outcome of the negotiations for a ban on chemical weapons; and lastly, the decision to convene a Third Review Conference at an early date, with a view to considering further strengthening measures and the possibility of legally-binding improvements to the Convention.

30. Mr. AL-KADHI (Iraq) said that he was gratified at the spirit of co-operation which had prevailed throughout the Second Review Conference; it was at least the sign of a genuine wish, on the part of all States Parties, to comply fully with the provisions of the Convention. Bearing in mind that the scourge of war had long afflicted mankind, he called upon all participants to put an end to all armed conflicts which ravaged the world, in the hope that it would be possible to establish peace in 1986, proclaimed by the General Assembly as the International Year of Peace.

31. Mr. MASARWEH (Jordan), noting with satisfaction that the Conference had been successful, thanked the President for the part he had played in that respect. As for the reference made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran during his statement, to one of the States Parties, the Jordanian delegation had never obstructed the adoption by consensus of any part of the Final Declaration. The Iranian delegation, had had ample opportunity during the Conference to express its views on the implementation of article VIII of the Convention - views which the majority of States Parties did not share.

32. Mr. LUNDBO (Norway), speaking as co-ordinator of the group of Western countries, paid a tribute to the President, who had conducted the work of the Review Conference in a most able way and who, by his discreet and efficient management, had enabled a meaningful Final Document to be adopted by consensus. He also expressed appreciation to the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies for their skilful conduct of the work of their respective Committees, and to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Conference Services, without whom the Review Conference would not have reached a successful conclusion.

33. Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary) noted with satisfaction that, after sometimes difficult negotiations, the Conference had none the less managed to adopt a Final Declaration by consensus. He was convinced that the success of the Second Review Conference would, in addition to strengthening the Convention, have a beneficial effect on the entire disarmament process. Speaking on behalf of the delegations of the socialist countries, he paid a tribute to the President of the Conference, who had secured the collaboration and mutual understanding of delegations throughout its work. He expressed the appreciation of the Socialist countries to the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, who had laid the foundations for the positive results achieved, and thanked the Secretary-General, the Secretariat and Conference Services.

34. Mr. TEJA (India), speaking on behalf of the group of neutral and non-aligned countries and other countries, said that, after three weeks of intensive and sometimes difficult debate marked by alternating hopes and doubts, the Conference had displayed the necessary will to preserve the main objectives of the Convention and to strengthen the régime established by it. He welcomed the adoption of a Final Declaration, which contained many positive elements, particularly regarding the implementation of article X. He paid a tribute to the President, who had contributed in large measure to the success of the Conference, and also to the chairmen of the three Committees, who, with skill and patience, had performed the tasks entrusted to them within the time allotted. He thanked the three group co-ordinators for their valuable support, and the Secretariat and Conference Services for their work.

35. The PRESIDENT said that a brief look backward seemed justified. To start with, participants had endeavoured to express their views on the Convention, on its past and future. That general discussion had been followed by a brain-storming phase which had been marked by a wealth of proposals and suggestions. Sorting them out and reflecting them in the report of the Committee of the Whole had been no easy task. The final phase had proved even more difficult, however; choices had had to be made and priorities assigned. At times, many delegations had felt close to failure, but the numerous bilateral consultations and efforts made by middle-of-the-road delegations had put the Conference back on the right track. The sense of innovation and spirit of accommodation essential for success had been present in many delegations.

36. In assessing the results of the Conference, one must be fully aware of the particular features of the Convention and its review process. It was a treaty that was not only a disarmament measure, but also an important element in international humanitarian law, since it gave practical substance to the general prohibition of weapons that caused unnecessary suffering. At the same time, since the Convention was highly dependent on the evolution of science, it should be a living organism as it were, capable of adapting itself to the

changing circumstances of scientific progress. Furthermore, the general international climate had not been very conducive in recent years to the maintenance among States Parties of the trust which was nevertheless essential for the functioning of any verification mechanism. However, most of the difficulties encountered during the previous three weeks had stemmed from the specific nature of review Conferences, which reflected the conviction that a treaty and the performance of the parties thereto should be subject to some kind of permanent challenge. At the end of the three weeks of review, the prevailing feeling seemed to be that the Convention was indeed alive and that its lifetime could be extended if its organs and mechanisms were strengthened and if confidence in its reliability could be reinforced. It was to be hoped that the measures agreed in the context of the Final Declaration would imbue the Convention with new strength.

37. He thanked all those delegations which throughout active negotiations, had displayed a sense of compromise, and in particular the chairmen of the Committees of the Conference who had spared no effort to bring it to a successful conclusion. He expressed gratitude to Miss Levin, Secretary-General of the Conference, to the other members of the Secretariat and to Conference Services, as well as to Mr. Martenson and Mr. Berasategui, representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. He hoped that, in serving as President, he had met the expectations of delegations.

The meeting rose at 11.10 p.m.

ANNEX I

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Title</u>
BWC/CONF.II/1	Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
BWC/CONF.II/2 and Add.1-6	1980-1983 Reports of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons of the Committee on Disarmament and 1984-1986 Reports of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament
BWC/CONF.II/3 and Add.1-5	Background document on compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
BWC/CONF.II/4 and Add.1-2	Background document on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
BWC/CONF.II/5	Revised estimated cost of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
BWC/CONF.II/6	Canadian paper on general nature and magnitude of biotechnology activities in Canada and the extent of governmental involvement therein
BWC/CONF.II/7	Letter dated 15 September 1986, from the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the President of the Review Conference, on behalf of a group of Socialist States, submitting the chapter entitled "Accelerated Development of Biotechnology", of the Comprehensive Programme for Scientific and Technological Progress of CMEA Member States up to the Year 2000

BWC/CONF.II/8	Document submitted by Democratic Kampuchea entitled "Use of toxins in Kampuchea: facts and syndromes"
BWC/CONF.II/9 and Corr.1-2 and Add.1	Report of the Committee of the Whole
BWC/CONF.II/10 and Corr.1 and Add.1	Credentials of Representatives to the Conference, Report of the Credentials Committee
BWC/CONF.II/11	Report of the Drafting Committee
BWC/CONF.II/12	Letter dated 26 September 1986, from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Second Review Conference, concerning the Report of the Credentials Committee
BWC/CONF.II/13	Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

SUMMARY RECORDS OF PLENARY MEETINGS

BWC/CONF.II/SR.1-10 and Corrigendum	Summary Records of the First to Tenth Plenary Meetings
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INFORMATION DOCUMENTS

BWC/CONF.II/INF.1	Offices and telephone numbers of the Secretariat
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ANNEX II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

I. STATES PARTIES

AFGHANISTAN

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S.E. Sr. Mario A. Cámpora	Embajador Representante Especial para Asuntos de Desarme Misión Especial para Desarme en Ginebra
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Head of Delegation

H.E. Mr. Richard Butler	Ambassador Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations for Disarmament Matters
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Australia to the Conference on
Disarmament

Alternate

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Dr. Friedrich Griessler

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